Foreign relations of Taiwan
Foreign relations of the Republic of China (ROC), more commonly known as Taiwan, are accomplished by efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, a cabinet-level ministry of the Government of the Republic of China.[1][2] It currently has formal diplomatic relations with 11 of the 193 United Nations member states and with the Holy See, which governs the Vatican City State, as of 27 April 2024.[3] In addition to these relations, the ROC also maintains unofficial relations[4] with 59 UN member states, one self-declared state (Somaliland), three territories (Guam, Hong Kong, and Macau), and the European Union via its representative offices and consulates. In 2021, the Government of the Republic of China had the 33rd largest diplomatic network in the world with 110 offices.[5]
Historically, the ROC has fiercely required its diplomatic allies to recognize it as the sole legitimate government of "China", competing for exclusive use of the name "China" with the PRC. During the early 1970s, the ROC was replaced by the PRC as the recognised government of "China" in the UN following Resolution 2758, which also led to the ROC's loss of its key position as a permanent member on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to the PRC in 1971.[6]
As international recognition of the ROC continues to dwindle concurrently with the PRC rise as a great power, its policy has changed into a more realistic position of actively seeking dual recognition with the PRC.[7] Today, many international organizations that the ROC participates in use alternative names, including "Chinese Taipei" at FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC), among others.[8]
Historical context edit
The ROC government participated in the 1943 Moscow Conference, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and the United Nations Conference on International Organization and was a charter member of the United Nations after participating in the alliance that won World War II. In 1949, the Nationalists lost the Chinese Civil War in mainland China and retreated to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, forming a rump state. Despite the major loss of territory, the ROC continued to be recognized as the legitimate government of China by the UN and by many non-Communist states.[9]
American foreign policy 1950–1971 called for full recognition and support of the government of China in Taiwan. As the Korean War (1950–1953) broke out, Taiwan was not allowed to send military support to South Korea. However, the Truman Administration resumed economic and military aid to the ROC on Taiwan and neutralized the Taiwan Strait by United States Seventh Fleet to stop a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) invasion and a potential ROC counter-invasion of the mainland.[10] In December 1954 a US-Taiwan military alliance was signed as part of the American Cold War strategy in the Far East, in the determination not to allow Chiang Kai-shek's forces on Taiwan to attack China[citation needed], thereby setting off another even larger war between the United States and China.[11][12]
The American military presence in Taiwan consisted of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and the United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC). Other notable units included the 327th Air Division. Until the US formally recognized the People's Republic of China in 1979, Washington provided the ROC with financial grants based on the Foreign Assistance Act,[13] Mutual Security Act, and Act for International Development enacted by the US Congress. A separate Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty was signed between the two governments of US and ROC in 1954 and lasted until 1979.[14]
The US State Department's official position in 1959 was:
- That the provisional capital of the Republic of China has been at Taipei, Taiwan (Formosa) since December 1949; that the Government of the Republic of China exercises authority over the island; that the sovereignty of Formosa has not been transferred to China; and that Formosa is not a part of China as a country, at least not as yet, and not until and unless appropriate treaties are hereafter entered into. Formosa may be said to be a territory or an area occupied and administered by the Government of the Republic of China, but is not officially recognized as being a part of the Republic of China.[15]
In the past decades, the US had maintained a position to not support Taiwanese independence, and instead to have a One China policy that's guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, and to expect cross-Strait differences to be handled peacefully, and oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side.[16]
1971 expulsion from the UN edit
In 1971, the UN expelled the ROC and transferred China's seat to the People's Republic of China (PRC).[6] In addition to the ad tempus recognition of the ROC by a majority of countries before UN Resolution 2758, the ROC lost its membership in all intergovernmental organisations related to the UN. As the UN and related organizations like the International Court of Justice are the most common venues for effective execution of international law and serve as the international community for sovereign states, a majority of the countries aligned with the West in the Cold War terminated diplomatic relations with the ROC and opened diplomatic relations with the PRC.
The United Nations Charter's Articles 23 and 110, in its Chapter II, explicitly refer to the ROC, but the seat of "China" is currently occupied by the PRC. The ROC continues to maintain substantial relations,[17][18] including with most of the non-governmental organisations[19][20][21][22][23][24][25] at the United Nations, in addition with the concern from UNESCO.[26] The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was signed and ratified by the ROC on 18 April 1961 and 19 December 1969,[27] including Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.[28] It is entitled by the founding of the United Nations as the cornerstone of modern-day diplomacy since the Vienna Congress, Article 35 of 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also applies to the ROC since 1971.[29] Due to the ROC's insecurity and intolerance in the 1970s and 1980s after it was expelled by the UN as well as American influence,[30] the ROC gradually democratized and adopted universal suffrage, ending under the one-party leadership of President Chiang Ching-kuo by lifting 38 years of martial law on the Communist rebellion on Mainland China and establishing the new self-identity of Republic of China (system) on Taiwan in the international community, enacting Two Chinas states in the world. UN Resolution 2758 is non-binding on the international law regarding the international status of the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the ROC continues to seek opportunities to join UN Specialized agencies to become a Permanent Observer[31] under the auspices of UN Resolution 396,[32] which duly recommended the questions of debate on Chinese representation in the United Nations.
Elections edit
The first direct presidential election was held in 1996, and the incumbent President Lee Teng-hui was elected.[33] As of 4 May 2015, ROC nationals are eligible for preferential visa treatment from 142 countries and areas.[34] In the context of superpower and influential diplomacy, the ROC's traditional and stable allies include United States of America, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.[35] The ROC's cultural diplomacy includes the establishment of the Taiwan Resource Center for Chinese Studies in 2012 in major universities around the world.
Development assistance edit
Since 1950 Taiwan has given high priority to international aid, making its representatives welcome even in states without formal diplomatic relations. The policies provide generous aid without strict accountability conditions, especially in developing nations in Africa, Latin America, and the South Pacific. Building a reputation as a responsible and generous donor has earned it prestige, especially in contrast to the role of foreign aid in China's policies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative.[36][37][38]
The ROC is one of the main supporters of official development assistance,[39] with the International Cooperation and Development Fund managing ROC's Foreign Assistance and International Cooperation projects.[40][41] As of 2010, along with other US security allies including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea in the Asia-Pacific region with Taiwan Relations Act, officials of the ROC have gained quasi-official level visits to the United States both in the governmental and political level, including the Taiwanese–US cooperative military guidance[42][43][44] in the annual Han Kuang joint-force exercises.[45]
Think tanks edit
Taiwan's political system has evolved in terms of increasing political liberalization. By the 1990s, Taiwan had a democratic system with multiparty competition, factionalism, a vigorous civil society, and many interest groups. Think tanks emerged because of the high prestige of expertise and the heavy demand for unofficial diplomacy necessitated by the loss of formal diplomatic recognition. Think tanks have played a major role in planning and operationalizing relations with countries around the world.[46]
European universities, research centers, and think tanks have developed a new academic field of Taiwan studies, especially in Europe, because of the unique status of Taiwan in the world's diplomatic system. The scholars involved have a deep commitment to Taiwan studies and have developed a Europe-wide network of scholars.[47]
Policies edit
Economics edit
The ROC's GDP was ahead of several G20 economies before 2012.[48]
UN specialised agencies edit
As a non-member state of the United Nations, by participating as members in one or more United Nations Specialised Agencies[49] and operating in a parallel political system with the CCP[50] as in the case of Germany and Korea, the ROC may be granted a Permanent Observer status in organisations such as the IMF and World Bank.[51][52]
Involvement and participation in the Asia Pacific Innovation Conference allows interaction with the Director of Economics and Statistics Division of WIPO, who directly reports to the Director-General.[53][54]
International isolation edit
Due to "the absence of a cross-strait understanding" (1992 consensus),[55] the ROC has encountered international isolation due to political and economic pressure from the PRC since the 1970s, and it has continued under the pro-Taiwan independence administration of the Democratic Progressive Party.[56] Taiwan is not allowed to attend World Health Assembly, Interpol, International Civil Aviation Organization, or the United Nations' Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Other forms of international isolation include measures against the activities of Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, Golden Horse Film Festival and Awards (boycotted), and a ban on Taiwan journalists to acquire passes to United Nations and as well as UNFCCC meetings.[57][58][59][60][61]
Analysts argue that PRC's coercive strategy might have proven counterproductive as it has further united US allies (including Australia and the UK) in their response which in turn makes it more challenging for Beijing to achieve its intended geostrategic objectives.[62][56]
The ROC's (multi-sector) civil society[63] currently participates in 11 projects of United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.[64] ROC ranks 31st of 176 countries and territories in the 2016 Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index[65] and is placed in Band B of the Government Defense Corruption Index.[66]
International disputes edit
In the 1970s many countries switched diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC, including the United States, Japan and Canada. In October 1971, Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly, expelling "the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek" and transferring China's seat on the Security Council to the PRC. The resolution declared that "the representatives of the Government of the PRC are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations." However, the eo ipso nature of Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction remained a contentious issue.[clarification needed]
Many attempts by the ROC to rejoin the UN have not made it past the committee, under fierce PRC opposition and threatened vetoes. President Chen Shui-bian argued that Resolution 2758, replacing the ROC with the PRC in 1971, addressed only the question of who should have China's seat in the UN rather than whether an additional seat for the Taiwan Area could be created to represent the 23 million people residing in the Taiwanese mainland and other islands.
Since the 1970s, the PRC and ROC have competed for diplomatic recognition from nations across the world, often by offering financial aid to poorer countries as an inducement.[68][69] As a precondition for diplomatic relations, the PRC requires that the other country renounce any recognition of the ROC. Since the introduction of the "pragmatic diplomacy" (務實外交; Wùshí wàijiāo) policy in 1991, the ROC has not insisted on consideration as the sole representative of China, and does not require nations that recognise it to end their relations with the PRC.[70] For example, when Saint Lucia recognised the ROC in 2007, its leader expressed his hope that Saint Lucia's relations with the PRC would continue.[71] However, the PRC responds to foreign recognitions of the ROC by suspending relations with the other country.[70]
On less official terms, the ROC is involved in a complex dispute over control of the Spratly Islands with China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brunei; and over the Paracel Islands, occupied by China, but claimed by Vietnam and by the ROC.[72] The ROC government also claims the Senkaku Islands.[73][74]
Types of relations edit
Full diplomatic relations edit
Taiwan maintains full diplomatic relations with 11 member states of the United Nations and the Holy See (Vatican City), which is a United Nations General Assembly observer state.
State | Region | Subregion | Relations established |
---|---|---|---|
Belize | Americas | Central America | 1989 |
Eswatini | Africa | Southern Africa | 1968 |
Guatemala[75] | Americas | Central America | 1933 |
Haiti | Americas | Caribbean | 1956 |
Holy See (Vatican City) | Europe | Southern Europe | 1942 |
Marshall Islands | Oceania | Micronesia | 1998 |
Palau | Oceania | Micronesia | 1999 |
Paraguay | Americas | South America | 1957 |
Saint Kitts and Nevis | Americas | Caribbean | 1983 |
Saint Lucia | Americas | Caribbean | 1984–1997, 2007 |
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | Americas | Caribbean | 1981 |
Tuvalu | Oceania | Polynesia | 1979 |
Non-diplomatic representation edit
A certain number of countries have official diplomatic relations with the PRC but also maintain some form of unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This number includes 59 sovereign states, 3 dependent or quasi-dependent territories, and the European Union.
Unofficial diplomatic relations typically involve an "Economic, Trade and Cultural Office" in Taiwan for the partner country, as well as a corresponding "Taipei/Taiwan/ROC Representative Office" representing Taiwan within the partner country. These unofficial offices generally function as embassies despite not being officially named as such. For example, the American Institute in Taiwan functions as the United States' de facto embassy, with the chairman and staff acting as unofficial government consulate officers who nevertheless perform duties that official embassies would undertake.
Various countries host Taiwanese representative offices within themselves but don't have representative offices in Taiwan. One country, Luxembourg, has a representative office in Taiwan but does not host a Taiwanese representative office within itself; Taiwan's interests in Luxembourg are served by the Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium. Taiwan also regards the European Union, with which it also has unofficial relations via the Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium, as a state entity in the context of international relations; the EU is a supranational union with a high level of integration between its member states, though each member state retains its national sovereignty.
Taiwan has unofficial diplomatic relations with Hong Kong and Macao, both of which are Special Administrative Regions of the PRC, though Taiwan does not have similar such relations with Mainland China (the PRC). Technically, Hong Kong and Macau are integral territories of the PRC, governed under the "One Country, Two Systems" framework. This means that Taiwan effectively has unofficial relations with parts of the PRC but not with the national government of the PRC itself. Taiwan maintains hostile relations with the PRC through the Mainland Affairs Council, whose counterpart is the Taiwan Affairs Office; neither office is considered to be an embassy by either Taiwan or the PRC, and both offices are operated within the home country rather than within the host country.
Taiwan has strong unofficial relations with Somaliland, which is a self-declared state in the Horn of Africa that is claimed as the territory of neighbouring Somalia, in a state of affairs that displays strong parallels to Taiwan's own sovereignty dispute with China.
Taiwan maintains a "Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office" in Guam, which is an external territory of the United States located in Oceania.
In 2021, Lithuania announced that it would open an unofficial representative office in Taiwan, and Taiwan likewise announced that it would open an unofficial representative office in Lithuania. The Lithuania office was due to open by fall (autumn) of 2021 in the Northern Hemisphere, which is essentially September to November inclusive.[76] Relations between Lithuania and the PRC have simultaneously soured.[77]
A certain number of countries have indirect unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan via third-party proxy countries. For example, the Taipei Liaison Office in the Republic of South Africa serves the interests of Taiwan throughout a great number of countries in Africa that otherwise don't have any channels of communication with Taiwan.
Africa (4 states)
Asia (20 states and 2 territories)
- Bahrain
- Brunei
- People's Republic of China (no direct relations with Mainland China)
- India
- Indonesia
- Israel
- Japan
- Jordan
- Kuwait
- Malaysia
- Mongolia
- Myanmar
- Oman
- Philippines
- Saudi Arabia
- Singapore
- South Korea
- Thailand
- Turkey
- United Arab Emirates
- Vietnam
Europe (23 states and 1 supranational union)
- European Union (supranational union)
- Austria
- Belgium
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Finland
- France[82]
- Germany
- Greece[83]
- Hungary
- Ireland
- Italy
- Latvia
- Lithuania (Taiwanese office opened in November 2021, first one in the world to adopt the name "Taiwanese").[84]
- Luxembourg (has an office in Taipei, Taipei does not have an office in Luxembourg; representation through Belgium and the EU)[85]
- Netherlands
- Poland
- Portugal
- Slovakia (has an Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei, Taiwan has Representative Office in Bratislava)
- Spain
- Sweden
- Russia
- Switzerland
- United Kingdom
North America (3 states)
Oceania (4 states and 1 territory)
South America (6 states)
No representation edit
The following states recognise Beijing and have no representation in Taiwan (including any non-political, non-diplomatic, non-intergovernmental representation):
Africa (50 states)
- Algeria
- Angola
- Benin
- Botswana
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cameroon
- Cape Verde
- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Comoros
- Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Djibouti
- Egypt
- Equatorial Guinea
- Eritrea
- Ethiopia
- Gabon
- The Gambia
- Ghana
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Kenya
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Libya
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Morocco
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Niger
- Republic of the Congo
- Rwanda
- Sao Tome and Principe
- Senegal
- Seychelles
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- South Sudan
- Sudan
- Tanzania
- Togo
- Tunisia
- Uganda
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe
Asia (24 states)
- Afghanistan
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Bangladesh
- Cambodia
- East Timor
- Georgia
- Iran
- Iraq
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Laos
- Lebanon
- Maldives
- Nepal
- North Korea
- Pakistan
- Palestine
- Qatar
- Sri Lanka
- Syria
- Tajikistan
- Turkmenistan
- Uzbekistan
- Yemen
Europe (22 states)
- Albania
- Andorra
- Belarus
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Bulgaria
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Estonia
- Iceland
- Liechtenstein
- Malta
- Moldova
- Monaco
- Montenegro
- North Macedonia
- Norway
- Romania
- San Marino
- Serbia
- Slovenia
- Ukraine
North America (13 states)
- Antigua and Barbuda
- Bahamas
- Barbados
- Costa Rica
- Cuba
- Dominica
- Dominican Republic
- El Salvador
- Grenada
- Honduras
- Jamaica
- Nicaragua
- Panama
- Trinidad and Tobago
Oceania (9 states)
- Cook Islands (state in free association with New Zealand)
- Kiribati
- Micronesia
- Nauru
- Niue (state in free association with New Zealand)
- Samoa
- Solomon Islands
- Tonga
- Vanuatu
South America (5 states)
Relations with neither the ROC nor the PRC edit
A certain number of countries or sovereign entities do not possess full diplomatic relations with either the ROC or the PRC. This includes eight states with limited recognition, one member state of the United Nations, and one non-territorial sovereign entity (Sovereign Military Order of Malta).
Out of the eight states with limited recognition that do not possess full diplomatic relations with Taiwan, one of them, Somaliland, has strong unofficial relations with Taiwan, while another, Kosovo, has been unilaterally recognised by Taiwan but does not recognise Taiwan in return. The other six states with limited recognition are ignored by Taiwan diplomatically.
The Sovereign Military Order of Malta is a non-territorial sovereign entity; it claims and controls no territory, it does not consider itself to be a state, and yet it considers itself to be sovereign.[86] The Order of Malta maintains full diplomatic relations with 110 sovereign states (including the Holy See), official relations with 5 other sovereign states, and ambassador-level relations with the European Union and the State of Palestine.[87][88] The Order of Malta does not maintain full diplomatic relations with either Taiwan or the PRC.[88] Even though the Order of Malta doesn't maintain full diplomatic relations with Taiwan, it has been involved in supporting Taiwan's participation in the UN-affiliated World Health Assembly during the COVID-19 pandemic.[89]
Bhutan is the only member state of the United Nations that does not have full diplomatic relations with either the ROC or the PRC. The ROC has unilaterally recognised Bhutan's sovereignty.
State or sovereign entity | Recognised by the ROC | Unofficial relations | Notes |
---|---|---|---|
Abkhazia | No | No | Currently recognised by 5 UN member states and two non-UN-member states. Claimed by Georgia. |
Artsakh | No | No | State dissolved in the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh. |
Bhutan | Yes[90] | No | A United Nations member state. The ROC recognises Bhutan as a sovereign state. |
Kosovo | Yes[91] | No | Currently recognised by 104 UN member states and three non--UN-member states. Claimed by Serbia. |
Northern Cyprus | No[92] | No | Recognised only by Turkey. Claimed by Cyprus. |
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic | No | No | Currently recognised by 46 UN member states and one non-UN-member state. Also known as Western Sahara. |
Somaliland | Yes[93] | Yes[94] | Taiwan and Somaliland mutually established representative offices on 1 July 2020.[94] |
South Ossetia | No | No | Currently recognised by 5 UN member states and four non-UN-member states. Claimed by Georgia. |
Sovereign Military Order of Malta | Yes[89] | No | Non-territorial sovereign entity.[86] No position on Taiwanese sovereignty.[88] Engages neutrally with Taiwan.[89] |
Transnistria | No | No | Claimed by Moldova. |
Relations switched from the ROC to the PRC edit
Taiwanese academics stated that if any one state switches its diplomatic relations to the PRC, it would create a domino effect, encouraging other states to do so as well.[95] The Holy See (Vatican), the only European state that has diplomatic relations with Taiwan, made efforts in 2007 to create formal ties with the PRC.[96] High-ranking bishops in the Catholic Church have implied that such a diplomatic move was possible,[97] predicated on the PRC's granting more freedom of religion[98] and interfering less in the hierarchy of the Catholic Church in China.[99]
Period of diplomatic relation | ||
---|---|---|
State | From | To: |
Afghanistan | 1944 | 1950 |
Argentina | 1945 | 1972 |
Australia | 1941 | 1972 |
Austria | 1928 | 1971 |
Barbados | 1967 | 1977 |
Bahamas | 1989 | 1997 |
Belgium | 1928 | 1971 |
Bolivia | 1919 | 1985 |
Botswana | 1966 | 1974 |
Brazil | 1928 | 1974 |
Bulgaria | 1947 | 1949 |
Burkina Faso | 1961 | 1973 |
1994 | 2018[100] | |
Burma | 1948 | 1950 |
Cambodia | 1953 | 1958 |
1970 | 1975 | |
Cameroon | 1960 | 1971 |
Canada | 1941 | 1970 |
Central African Republic | 1962 | 1964 |
1968 | 1976 | |
1991 | 1998 | |
Ceylon | 1948 | 1950 |
Ivory Coast | 1963 | 1983 |
Chad | 1962 | 1972 |
1997 | 2006 | |
Chile | 1915 | 1971 |
Colombia | 1941 | 1980[101] |
Congo-Brazzaville | 1960 | 1964 |
Costa Rica | 1941 | 2007[102] |
Cuba | 1913 | 1960 |
Cyprus | 1960 | 1972 |
Czechoslovakia | 1930 | 1949 |
Dahomey | 1960 | 1965 |
1966 | 1973 | |
Denmark | 1928 | 1950 |
Dominica | 1983 | 2004 |
Dominican Republic | 1941 | 2018[103] |
Ecuador | 1946 | 1971 |
Egypt | 1942 | 1956 |
El Salvador | 1941 | 2018[104] |
Estonia | 1937[clarification needed] | 1940 |
Finland | 1919 | 1944[105] |
France | 1928 | 1964 |
Gabon | 1960 | 1974 |
Gambia | 1968 | 1974 |
1995 | 2013[106] | |
Germany (Federal Rep.) | 1955 | 1972 |
Greece | 1929 | 1972 |
Grenada | 1989 | 2005 |
Guinea-Bissau | 1990 | 1998 |
Honduras | 1941 | 2023[107] |
India | 1947 | 1949 |
Iran | 1920 | 1971 |
Iraq | 1942 | 1958 |
Italy | 1928 | 1970 |
Jamaica | 1962 | 1972 |
Japan | 1930 | 1937 |
1952 | 1972 | |
Jordan | 1957 | 1977 |
Kiribati | 2003 | 2019[108] |
Kuwait | 1963 | 1971 |
Laos | 1958 | 1962 |
Latvia | 1936[clarification needed] | 1940 |
1992 | 1994[109] | |
Lebanon | 1954 | 1971 |
Lesotho | 1966 | 1983 |
1990 | 1994 | |
Liberia | 1957 | 1977 |
1989 | 1993 | |
1997 | 2003 | |
Libya | 1959 | 1978 |
Lithuania | 1921 | 1940 |
Luxembourg | 1949 | 1972 |
Macedonia | 1999 | 2001 |
Madagascar | 1960 | 1972 |
Malawi | 1966 | 2008[110] |
Malaysia | 1964 | 1974 |
Maldives | 1966 | 1972 |
Malta | 1967 | 1972 |
Mauritania | 1960 | 1965 |
Mexico | 1928 | 1971 |
Nauru | 1980 | 2002 |
2005 | 2024 | |
Netherlands | 1928 | 1950 |
New Zealand | 1912 | 1972 |
Nicaragua | 1930 | 1985 |
1990 | 2021[111] | |
Niger | 1963 | 1974 |
1992 | 1996 | |
Norway | 1928 | 1950 |
Pakistan | 1947 | 1950 |
Panama | 1912 | 2017[112] |
Peru | 1913 | 1971 |
Philippines | 1947 | 1975 |
Poland | 1929 | 1949 |
Portugal | 1928 | 1975 |
Papua New Guinea | 5 August 1999 | 21 August 1999[note 1] |
Romania | 1939 | 1949 |
Rwanda | 1962 | 1972 |
São Tomé and Príncipe | 1997 | 2016[113] |
Saudi Arabia | 1946 | 1990 |
Senegal | 1960 | 1964 |
1969 | 1972 | |
1996 | 2005 | |
Sierra Leone | 1963 | 1971 |
Solomon Islands | 1983 | 2019[114] |
South Africa | 1912 | 1998[115] |
South Korea | 1949 | 1992 |
South Vietnam | 1955 | 1975[note 2] |
Soviet Union | 1929 | 1949 |
Spain | 1928 | 1973 |
Sweden | 1928 | 1950 |
Switzerland | 1913 | 1950 |
Thailand | 1946 | 1975 |
Togo | 1960 | 1972 |
Tonga | 1972 | 1998 |
Turkey | 1934 | 1971[116] |
United Kingdom | 1928 | 1950 |
United States | 1928 | 1979 |
Uruguay | 1957 | 1988 |
Vanuatu | 3 November 2004 | 10 November 2004[note 3] |
Venezuela | 1941 | 1974 |
Western Samoa | 1972 | 1975 |
Yugoslavia | 1945 | 1955 |
Zaire | 1960 | 1973[117] |
States that have never had diplomatic relations with the ROC but have relations with the PRC edit
Bribery allegations edit
Taiwan has been accused on multiple occasions of bribing foreign politicians to commence or maintain diplomatic relations.[120] The ex-president of Guatemala admitted in a U.S. court taking $2.5m from Taiwan in exchange for continuing to recognize it diplomatically.[121] Regarding Taiwanese "dollar diplomacy" in Vanuatu an observer said: "the methods Taiwan uses, bribing countries and politicians, are unjust, violate international law and disturb the global community. Bribery diplomacy won't last."[122] Prior to Nauru choosing to recognize the government of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan had provided Nauruan government ministers with a monthly stipend of $5,000 in exchange for continuation of the Pacific island country's diplomatic relations with Taipei. Nauruan politicians, including President Marcus Stephen received secret funds. Other MPs received $2,500 a month in what was described as project funding that requires minimal accounting.[123]
History edit
Taiwan was annexed by Japan in 1895 after the First Sino-Japanese War. In the Northern Expedition, the Nationalists defeated the warlords of the Beiyang clique and established a unified government for China in Nanjing. The United States recognised Republic of China (ROC) on 25 July 1928, the first government to do so.[124] The Japanese occupied parts of China during World War II. After Japan's defeat in 1945, Taiwan was placed under the temporary administration of the ROC to handle the surrender of Japanese administration. The Chinese Civil War broke out again between the Nationalists and the CCP. The CCP gained control of the mainland in 1949 and proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC), while the Nationalists fled to Taiwan, taking the ROC government with them. In 1952, Japan renounced Taiwan in the Treaty of San Francisco without specifying to whom Taiwan is ceded.
In 2016, A. P. Winston, the author of Chinese Finance under the Republic, said, "chief sources of information on those matters of discussion which have been subjects of diplomacy" were official publications from the United Kingdom.[125] Winston explained that only a few official reports from the Chinese government aside from the maritime customs sector had appeared at that point, and that the government of the ROC was "too poor, perhaps still too secretive, to make regular and full publication of statistics."[125]
During the Cold War the ROC generally maintained an anti-communist stance, however during the late 1960s and early 1970s the government of Chiang Kai-shek undertook secret negotiations with Moscow. Even going so far as having the foreign minister suggest that the ROC would have their own "Warsaw talk" with the Soviets.[126] Throughout the Cold War Wang Sheng was a driving force in diplomacy between the ROC and the anti-communist world.[127]
After retreating there in 1949 Chiang Kai-shek never again left Taiwan, this required leaders who wanted to meet with Chiang to travel to Taiwan. The first head of state during the KMT era to make a state visit abroad was Yen Chia-kan in 1977 when he visited Saudi Arabia.[128]
In September 2016, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs planned to disband fewer than ten of its embassies to allocate for a "New Southbound Policy".[129]
This section needs expansion with: Second World War operations in Burma, Yalta Conference, Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Nationalists fleeing into exile in Taiwan in 1949, the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty and Treaty of Taipei, UN, Taiwan Strait Incidents, Korean War, Tachen retreat. You can help by adding to it. (August 2008) |
Since 1990, the ROC has witnessed a net of 16 countries switch recognition to the PRC.
In January 2021, the European Parliament passed two Taiwan related resolutions. The first resolution contained statements of support for Taiwan's democracy. The second encouraged member states to work to "revisit their engagement policies with Taiwan" as well as to work together with international partners to "protect democratic Taiwan from foreign threats."[130][131]
Bilateral relations edit
Cross-Strait relations edit
The Double Tenth Agreement signed on 10 October 1945 is the only legal document between the two parties. The following Political Consultative Conference ,[133] was engulfed by Cold War history and the American foreign policy of containment in East Asia after the Korean War.[134] Before the Korean War broke out, the US was preparing for a coup d'état in mid-1950 to replace Chiang Kai-shek with Hu Shih and Sun Li-jen and neutralize the ROC's legal status under UN Trusteeship to block any legal claim of the PRC on Taiwan, as proposed by United States Department of State official Dean Rusk.[135][136][137] The Formosa Resolution of 1955[138] was passed unanimously by the United States Congress. Resolving the cross-Strait relationship required both sides to rethink definitions of basic concepts such as sovereignty, "one China" and unification.[139]
The two polities of accession[140] resulted in the PRC's Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, the lifting of its martial law[141] on PRC territory, and more recently the enactment of the PRC's Anti-Secession Law towards the ROC. The two sides have no cross-strait military confidence-building measures (CBM) "to improve military-to-military relations in ways that reduce fears of attack and the potential for military miscalculation".[142][143] Nuclear tensions have risen since the PRC promulgated the Anti-Secession Law.[144][145][146][147]
Neither Taipei nor Beijing sees their relations as foreign relations.[citation needed] However, the government position that both Taiwan and mainland China are parts of the same state is not universally accepted among the people of Taiwan. In particular, the pro-independence Pan-Green Coalition considers Taiwan and China to be different countries. By contrast, the pro-unification Pan-Blue Coalition take the view that both Taiwan and mainland China are parts of the ROC. Former president Lee Tung-hui described these relations as "Special state-to-state relations".[148] The Chen administrations described Taiwan and China by saying "...with Taiwan and China on each side of the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country.". Former President Ma Ying-jeou returned to the government position of the early 1990s, calling relations with Beijing special relations between two areas within one state. That state, according to Taiwan is the ROC, and due to constitutional reasons, neither Taipei nor Beijing recognises each other as a legitimate government.[149][150][151]
The term preferred by Taiwanese and Chinese governments is "cross-strait relations", referring to the geographical separator, the Taiwan Strait. The constitutional position of Taipei is that the territory of the ROC is divided into the "Mainland Area" and the "Free Area" (also known as "Taiwan Area"). Administratively, cross-strait relations are not conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan, but by the Mainland Affairs Council, an instrument of the Executive Yuan. The relations with Hong Kong and Macau are also conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council, although not all regulations applicable to mainland China automatically apply to those territories.
Taiwanese and Chinese governments do not directly interact. Talks are conducted by China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), privately constituted bodies that are controlled and directly answerable to the executive branches of their respective governments.
Until the late 1990s, Hong Kong and Macau were British and Portuguese colonies respectively. They provided neutral detour points for people and goods crossing the strait. They and Singapore served as venues for talks between the two sides at that time. One modus vivendi outcome of such talks was the 1992 Consensus, arising from a 1992 meeting in Hong Kong. Under this consensus, the two sides agree that both Taiwan and mainland China are under the same single sovereignty of China, but the two sides agree to disagree on which side is the legitimate representative of that sovereignty. Setting aside that disagreement, the two sides agreed to co-operate on practical matters, such as recognising certifications authenticated by the other side.[152]
Relations between Taipei and Beijing warmed during the Ma government with the promotion of cross-strait links and increased economic and social interchanges between the two sides, but the 2014 local elections cooled them again.[153] A high-level meeting was held on 11 February 2014 in Nanjing that marked the first time China recognised Taiwan's top government officials on matters across the Taiwan Strait.[154] The thawed tensions were not welcomed by the Pan-Green Coalition for the Taiwan independence movement after the 2000 presidential election and to the ex injuria jus non-oritur basis[155] of the Anti-Secession Law. A meeting was held on 7 November 2015 between presidents Xi and Ma to affirm the 1992 Consensus before the ROC 2016 general election and in the midst of US Navy tests of area sea claims.[156] Following the election, Beijing cut off contact with the main Taiwan liaison body because of President Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to endorse the concept of a single Chinese nation.[157]
Arab world edit
Egypt maintained relations until 1956, when Gamal Abdel Nasser cut off relations and recognised the PRC. Ma Bufang, who was then living in Egypt, was ordered to move to Saudi Arabia, and became the ROC ambassador to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia ended its diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1990. Ambassador Wang Shi-ming was a Chinese Muslim, and the ROC ambassador to Kuwait.[158] The ROC also maintained relations with Libya and Saudi Arabia.
Africa edit
South Africa switched in 1998. Liberia recognised the ROC in 1989, and switched back to the PRC in October 2003.
In December 2016, the government of São Tomé and Príncipe switched.[159]
Burkina Faso has recognised the ROC since 1994, but cut diplomatic ties in May 2018, establishing relations with the PRC. Earlier, Burkina Faso had rejected US$50 billion from China to break ties with Taiwan.[160][161]
Eswatini edit
After Burkina Faso cut relations with Taiwan in 2018, Eswatini became Taiwan's sole ally in Africa.[162] Taiwan has an embassy in Mbabane, Eswatini. On 7 June 2016, the National Police Agency and Royal Eswatini Police Service signed a joint, cross-border, crime fighting pact, which included exchanges, probes, personnel visits, professional skills enhancement, law enforcement and technical assistance.[163] King Mswati III has visited Taiwan seventeen times as of June 2018, and has promised to continue recognising Taiwan instead of the PRC.[164] As of June 2018, the Taiwanese Ambassador is Thomas Chen (陳經銓).[165]
The Gambia edit
The Gambia recognised the ROC from 1968 until 1974, and then again from 1995 until 14 November 2013, when President Yahya Jammeh's office announced it had cut diplomatic ties with immediate effect.[166] During this era Taiwan gave hundreds of millions of dollars in aid and loans to The Gambia, much of which was diverted by President Yahya Jammeh and those close to him.[167] The PRC recognised The Gambia on 17 March 2016.[168] Upon Gambian recognition the PRC immediately began to furnish them with aid. The repeated switch off between PRC and ROC recognition is seen as an example of checkbook diplomacy.[167]
Americas edit
Dominican Republic edit
On 1 May 2018, the Dominican Republic switched. The government initially gave no reason, although it later said in the switchover ceremony that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China and that the switchover was to comply to the one-China policy. It was motivated by loans and investments worth US$3.1 billion. "History and socioeconomic reality" were cited as reasons for the switchover. Flavio Darío Espinal, a government executive, said that "In the following months and years, enormous opportunities for cooperation will gradually open up, not only in the commercial area, but also in the financial, technological, tourist, educational or energy fields. To take just one example, more than 135 million Chinese tourists visit international destinations annually. The establishment of these diplomatic relations will allow part of that tourism to flow into our country in the near future. And that is just one of the things that will improve."[169][170]
El Salvador edit
On 20 August 2018, El Salvador broke ties with Taiwan and established them with the PRC. El Salvador now only recognises the PRC. Just like Panama and the Dominican Republic, the event was broadcast nationwide on radio and television. Hours before the announcement, Taiwan (ROC) announced that it had broken ties with El Salvador, citing the imminent establishment of diplomatic and commercial ties with the PRC (China). El Salvador's president said that his government had decided to make the switchover due to UN Resolution 2758.[171] The Taiwanese government said that the switchover was not influenced by the Chinese government, but rather, the switchover was done in response to Taiwan refusing to fund the construction of Puerto La Unión and the El Salvador's 2019 Salvadoran presidential election.[172] In response, US Senator Marco Rubio said that El Salvador's decision was a terrible one and threatened to cut off funding for El Salvador. Rubio also said that the switchover could have been influenced by a promise (by the CCP) to help fund the current ruling political party in El Salvador to win again the elections there.
Guatemala edit
On 18 March 2014, Guatemala's former president Alfonso Portillo pled guilty in the Federal District Court in Manhattan to a charge that he accepted bribes in exchange for recognising the ROC. President Pérez Molina said that Guatemala's relations with the ROC were and are strong and that the Portillo confession would not affect diplomatic relations between the two nations.[173] Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs declined comment.[174]
Haiti edit
Haiti currently recognises the Republic of China over the People's Republic of China. In 2018, Taiwan offered a US$150 Million loan for Haiti's power grid in a bid to maintain diplomatic ties with the country once its neighbour, Dominican Republic severed ties with Taiwan along with Burkina Faso. In 2018, Haiti's president visited Taiwan to discuss economic issues and diplomatic relations.
Honduras edit
In 2021, it was reported the new Honduras Government elected in the 2021 Honduran general election led by the Liberty and Refoundation party was considering recognizing China.[175] This announcement came on the heels of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama having recently broken relations with the ROC;[176] Taiwan lost a total of nine diplomatic partners during Tsai Ing-wen's presidency with the switch from Honduras.[177] On 15 March 2023, the president Xiomara Castro said she has instructed her foreign minister to establish official relations with the PRC.[178]
Taiwanese leadership criticized Honduras' transition by urging them not to "fall into China's debt trap". Honduras' foreign minister Eduardo Enrique Reina stated that the country had asked Taiwan to double its annual aid and renegotiate its debt to the island, which went unanswered. Taiwan's foreign ministry disputed this, stating that they were still actively engaged in bilateral talks with Honduras' government.[179] President Tsai Ing-wen responded to the announcement by scheduling time to visit heads of government and state in nearby Belize and Guatemala.[176] The ROC recalled its Honduran ambassador on 23 March, as Honduras began negotiations with the PRC.[177] A 25 March statement confirmed that Honduras had completed the switch[180] and their embassy opened in Beijing on 11 June.[181]
Panama edit
On 13 June 2017, the government of Panama switched, breaking all ties with the ROC. Panamanians studying in Taiwan were given the choice of returning to Panama within 30 days or continuing their studies in China. Panama was motivated by promises of multibillion-dollar investments. The shift of recognition began with a letter sent in 2015 to the Chinese government that, according to Isabel Saint Malo, Panama's vice president, was titled "Panama wants to make ties with China". The contents of the letter have been kept confidential, as well as the reasons why it was sent. It has also been kept confidential who delivered the letter and assisted in the switchover process, a person described only as "a distinguished member of the Chinese community living in Panama".
The US ambassador to Panama, John D. Feeley, said that he had asked Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela about the switchover in 2016 but Varela lied to him, saying that there were no plans to make the switchover. Feeley also said that Varela didn't tell him the truth until one hour before the nationwide announcement.
Others questioned why the Panamanian government continues to use equipment donated by Taiwan. The Panamanian government initially gave no reason, later saying that one reason was because "China is the second largest user of the Panama Canal" and President Varela said it was because he "couldn't accept it anymore" and "that's what every responsible leader would do". The Panamanian government officially said that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China and that the switchover was to comply with the one-China policy. The ROC government said that Panama was its "number one ally" and that it would not participate in Beijing's checkbook diplomacy. The Taiwanese government complained that Panama maliciously hid the switchover process until the last moment.
A Panamanian government agency later said that the switchover was because of Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen's violations and lack of regard to the 1992 consensus regarding China, Taiwan and the One-china policy. Panamanian newspaper La Estrella questioned the reasons Varela initially gave for the switchover, like "China has the world's largest population and the 2nd largest economy and user of the Panama Canal"; La Estrella called Varela's actions contradictory and said that the reasons Varela gave were the reality Panama has lived under for decades, so those couldn't be regarded as valid reasons for the switchover. The same newspaper also says that China's plans in Latin America convince Latin American nations easily, with apparent benefits in the short term but with dependency on China in the long term and that China is silently invading other countries and Latin America in general.[182][183][184] There are also concerns that, in the long term, Chinese investments may control the Panamanian economy.[185]
In the first year of diplomatic relations, 19 treaties were signed, including a Free Trade Treaty. Varela said that its main purpose was to allow Chinese nationals to easily invest in Panama. Controversies over the sudden switchover included lack of due process, unusually high levels of confidentiality, and the fact that a few weeks before the switchover, Taiwan had donated medical equipment to Panama. In 2018, the first flight from Beijing to Panama by Air China landed at Tocumen International Airport, with a technical stop in Houston. Varela called it a milestone in Panamanian aviation. Due to this new route, the Panamanian ministry of tourism expected at least 40,000 Chinese tourist visits per year. "History and socioeconomic reality" were later cited as reasons for the switchover. Varela said that the move was backed by diplomatic relationships dating from 1912 and that the move strengthened the existing relationships, despite the fact that those relationships were with the ROC, not the PRC. As a result, Panama City was almost immediately added to China's list of officially approved tourist destinations.[186][187][188][189] The CCP government has offered the Panameñista Party-led government a free feasibility study for the planned 4th set of locks in the Panama Canal to gain a competitive advantage in bids for choosing the company to build the 4th set of locks, not to mention plans for a 1,200 hectare industrial park on the Pacific coast and a 4-hectare campus in Amador near the Biomuseo to house the PRC embassy in Panama. There are also fears that Panama could turn into a conflict zone between the US and the PRC, due to Panama's strategic location.
Paraguay edit
Paraguay recognizes Taiwan.[190] Paraguayan leader General Alfredo Stroessner was a partner of Generalissimo Chiang. Many Paraguayan officers trained in Fu Hsing Kang College in the ROC.[191]
Stroessner's 1989 ousting and his successor Andrés Rodríguez's reinventing himself as a democratically elected president, were immediately followed by invitations from Beijing to switch diplomatic recognition.[192] However, the Taiwanese ambassador, Wang Sheng, and his diplomats were able to convince the Paraguayans that continuing the relationship with the ROC, and thus keeping the ROC's development assistance and access to the ROC's markets, would be more advantageous for Paraguay.[193] Recognition of Taiwan was a matter of debate in the 2023 Paraguayan general election, with bilateral relations maintained after the results.[194]
United States edit
The ROC and the US signed a formal treaty of commerce and navigation in 1948. ROC passport holders can thus be granted an E1 and E2 Visa, with indefinite renewal status, based on continued operation of their enterprise[195] in the US.[196] In 1979 the US recognised the PRC instead of ROC.[197] Commercial[198] (such as Trade and Investment Framework Agreement signed in 1994,[199] TIFA[200][201][202][199]), cultural and other substantial relations are currently governed, inter alia, by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The Act does not recognise the terminology of "Republic of China". United States policy does not support or oppose Taiwan's independence; instead US policy takes a neutral position of "non-support" for Taiwan's independence.[203]
US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alex Wong officially[204] visited the ROC in March 2018 to protest the amendment of the PRC Constitution that removed Presidential tenure restrictions.[205] In July 2002, Minister of Justice Chen Ding-nan became the first Taiwanese government official to be invited to visit the White House after the switch.
While the US acknowledged PRC's One China Policy in 1979,[206] it did not accept the PRC's claim on Taiwan.[207][208][209] The unofficial name "Taiwan" was mentioned in the Three Communiqués between the United States and China. Consistent with the United States' One China policy, raising the ROC flag on an official government facility's property within US territory is not approved by the US.[210][211]
Taiwanese passport holders are included in the US Visa Waiver Program for a stay of 90 days.[212][213]
After 1979, the US-Taiwan Business Council continued to facilitate commercial activity (mostly semiconductor technology related) and arms sales service.[214][215][216] The United States House of Representatives added an amendment to the fiscal year 2016 US defense budget that includes a clause urging the ROC's participation in the biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise.[217] The United States State Department has close bilateral cooperation with the ROC through Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs' Fulbright Program.[218][219][220]
Recent disputes between the US and the ROC include the ROC's ban on the import of US beef and US pork, which was resolved after the ROC adopted the new standard of a maximum residue limit for ractopamine in both beef and pork.[221]