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Wikipedia

Huawei

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (/ˈhwɑːw/ HWAH-way; Chinese: 华为; pinyin: Huáwéi) is a Chinese multinational technology corporation headquartered in Shenzhen, Guangdong. It designs, develops, manufactures and sells telecommunications equipment, consumer electronics, smart devices and various rooftop solar products. The corporation was founded in 1987 by Ren Zhengfei, a former officer in the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Headquarters in Shenzhen, Guangdong, China
Native name
华为技术有限公司
Huáwèi jìshù yǒuxiàn gōngsī
TypePrivate
ISINHK0000HWEI11
Industry
Founded15 September 1987; 36 years ago (1987-09-15)
FounderRen Zhengfei
Headquarters,
Area served
Worldwide
Key people
Ren Zhengfei (CEO)
Liang Hua (chairman)
Meng Wanzhou (deputy chairwoman & CFO)
He Tingbo (Director)
Products
BrandsHuawei
Revenue CN¥642.3 billion (US$87.8 billion) (2022)[1]
47,515,000,000 renminbi (2016) 
CN¥35.6 billion (US$5.2 billion) (2022)
Total assets CN¥876.854 billion (US$140 billion) (2022)
Number of employees
208,000 (2022)[2]
ParentHuawei Investment & Holding[3]
SubsidiariesHonor (2013–2020)
Caliopa
Chinasoft International
FutureWei Technologies
HexaTier
HiSilicon
iSoftStone
Websitewww.huawei.com
Huawei
"Huawei" in Simplified (top) and Traditional (bottom) Chinese characters
Simplified Chinese华为
Traditional Chinese華為
Literal meaning"Splendid Achievement" or "Chinese Achievement"
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Simplified Chinese华为技术有限公司
Traditional Chinese華為技術有限公司
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinHuáwéi Jìshù Yǒuxiàn Gōngsī
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutpingwaa4 wai4 gei6 seot6 jau5 haan6 gung1 si1

Initially focused on manufacturing phone switches, Huawei has expanded to more than 170 countries to include building telecommunications networks, providing operational and consulting services and equipment, and manufacturing communications devices for the consumer market.[4] It overtook Ericsson in 2012 as the largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer in the world.[5] Huawei surpassed Apple and Samsung, in 2018 and 2020, respectively, to become the largest smartphone manufacturer worldwide.[6][7] Amidst its rise, Huawei has been accused of intellectual property infringement, for which it has settled with companies like Cisco.

Questions regarding the extent of state influence on Huawei have revolved around its national champions role in China, subsidies and financing support from state entities,[8] and reactions of the Chinese government in light of oppositions in certain countries to Huawei's participation in 5G.[9] Its software and equipment have been linked to the mass surveillance of Uyghurs and Xinjiang internment camps, drawing sanctions from the US.[10][11][12]

The company has faced difficulties in some countries arising from concerns that its equipment may enable surveillance by the Chinese government due to perceived connections with the country's military and intelligence agencies.[8][13] Huawei has argued that critics such as the US government have not shown evidence of espionage.[14] Experts say that China's 2014 Counter-Espionage Law and 2017 National Intelligence Law can compel Huawei and other companies to cooperate with state intelligence.[15] In 2012, Australian and US intelligence agencies concluded that a hack on Australia's telecom networks was conducted by or through Huawei, although the two network operators have disputed that information.[16][17]

In the midst of a trade war between China and the United States, the US government alleged that Huawei had violated sanctions against Iran and restricted it from doing business with American companies. In June 2019, Huawei cut jobs at its Santa Clara research center, and in December Ren Zhengfei said it was moving to Canada.[18][19] In 2020, Huawei agreed to sell the Honor brand to a state-owned enterprise of the Shenzhen government to "ensure its survival" under US sanctions.[20] In November 2022, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) banned sales or import of equipment made by Huawei out of national security concerns.[21] Other countries, such as India, Japan, Vietnam, and ten European Union states, have also banned or restricted some or all Huawei products.[22][23][24][25]

Name Edit

According to the company founder Ren Zhengfei, the name Huawei comes from a slogan he saw on a wall, Zhonghua youwei meaning "China has promise" (Chinese: 中华有为; pinyin: Zhōng huá yǒu wéi), when he was starting up the company and needed a name.[26] Zhonghua or Hua means China,[27] while youwei means "promising/to show promise".[28][29] Huawei has also been translated as "splendid achievement" or "China is able", which are possible readings of the name.[30]

In Chinese pinyin, the name is Huáwéi,[31] and pronounced [xwǎwéɪ] in Mandarin Chinese; in Cantonese, the name is transliterated with Jyutping as Waa4-wai4 and pronounced [waː˩wɐi˩]. However, the pronunciation of Huawei by non-Chinese varies in other countries, for example "Hoe-ah-wei" in Belgium and the Netherlands.[32]

The company had considered changing the name in English out of concern that non-Chinese people may find it hard to pronounce,[33] but decided to keep the name, and launched a name recognition campaign instead to encourage a pronunciation closer to "Wah-Way" using the words "Wow Way".[34][35] Ren states, "We will not change the name of our brand and will teach foreigners how to pronounce it. We have to make sure they do not pronounce it like 'Hawaii.'"[36]: 85 

History Edit

Early years Edit

During the 1980s, the Chinese government tried to modernize the country's underdeveloped telecommunications infrastructure. A core component of the telecommunications network was telephone exchange switches, and in the late 1980s, several Chinese research groups endeavored to acquire and develop the technology, usually through joint ventures with foreign companies.

Ren Zhengfei, a former deputy director of the People's Liberation Army engineering corps, founded Huawei in 1987 in Shenzhen. The company reports that it had RMB 21,000 (about $5,000 at the time) in registered capital from Ren Zhengfei and five other investors at the time of its founding where each contributed RMB 3,500.[37] These five initial investors gradually withdrew their investments in Huawei. The Wall Street Journal has suggested, however, that Huawei received approximately "$46 billion in loans and other support, coupled with $25 billion in tax cuts" since the Chinese government had a vested interest in fostering a company to compete against Apple and Samsung.[8][38]

Ren sought to reverse engineer foreign technologies with local researchers. China borrowed liberally from Qualcomm and other industry leaders (PBX as an example) in order to enter the market. At a time when all of China's telecommunications technology was imported from abroad, Ren hoped to build a domestic Chinese telecommunications company that could compete with, and ultimately replace, foreign competitors.[39]

During its first several years the company's business model consisted mainly of reselling private branch exchange (PBX) switches imported from Hong Kong.[40][41] Meanwhile, it was reverse-engineering imported switches and investing heavily in research and development to manufacture its own technologies.[40] By 1990 the company had approximately 600 R&D staff and began its own independent commercialization of PBX switches targeting hotels and small enterprises.[42]

In order to grow despite difficult competition from Alcatel, Lucent, and Nortel Networks, in 1992 Huawei focused on low-income and difficult to access market niches.[36]: 12  Huawei's sales force traveled from village to village in underdeveloped regions, gradually moving into more developed areas.[36]: 12 

The company's first major breakthrough came in 1993 when it launched its C&C08 program controlled telephone switch. It was by far the most powerful switch available in China at the time. By initially deploying in small cities and rural areas and placing emphasis on service and customizability, the company gained market share and made its way into the mainstream market.[43]

Huawei also won a key contract to build the first national telecommunications network for the People's Liberation Army, a deal one employee described as "small in terms of our overall business, but large in terms of our relationships".[44] In 1994, founder Ren Zhengfei had a meeting with General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Jiang Zemin, telling him that "switching equipment technology was related to national security, and that a nation that did not have its own switching equipment was like one that lacked its own military." Jiang reportedly agreed with this assessment.[40]

In the 1990s, Canadian telecom giant Nortel outsourced production of their entire product line to Huawei.[45] They subsequently outsourced much of their product engineering to Huawei as well.[46]

Another major turning point for the company came in 1996 when the government in Beijing adopted an explicit policy of supporting domestic telecommunications manufacturers and restricting access to foreign competitors. Huawei was promoted by both the government and the military as a national champion, and established new research and development offices.[40]

Foreign expansion Edit

Huawei Offices
 
In Voorburg, Netherlands
 
In Markham, Ontario, Canada

Beginning in the late 1990s, Huawei built communications networks throughout sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.[47] It has become the most important Chinese telecommunications company operating in these regions.[47]

In 1997, Huawei won a contract to provide fixed-line network products to Hong Kong company Hutchison Whampoa.[43] Later that year, Huawei launched wireless GSM-based products and eventually expanded to offer CDMA and UMTS. In 1999, the company opened a research and development (R&D) centre in Bengaluru, India to develop a wide range of telecom software.[42]

In May 2003, Huawei partnered with 3Com on a joint venture known as H3C, which was focused on enterprise networking equipment. It marked 3Com's re-entrance into the high-end core routers and switch market, after having abandoned it in 2000 to focus on other businesses. 3Com bought out Huawei's share of the venture in 2006 for US$882 million.[48][49]

In 2004, Huawei signed a $10 billion credit line with China Development Bank to provide low-cost financing to customers buying its telecommunications equipment to support its sales outside of China. This line of credit was tripled to $30 billion in 2009.[50]

In 2005, Huawei's foreign contract orders exceeded its domestic sales for the first time. Huawei signed a global framework agreement with Vodafone. This agreement marked the first time a telecommunications equipment supplier from China had received Approved Supplier status from Vodafone Global Supply Chain.[51][non-primary source needed]

In 2007, Huawei began a joint venture with US security software vendor Symantec Corporation, known as Huawei Symantec, which aimed to provide end-to-end solutions for network data storage and security. Huawei bought out Symantec's share in the venture in 2012, with The New York Times noting that Symantec had fears that the partnership "would prevent it from obtaining United States government classified information about cyber threats".[52]

In May 2008, Australian carrier Optus announced that it would establish a technology research facility with Huawei in Sydney.[53] In October 2008, Huawei reached an agreement to contribute to a new GSM-based HSPA+ network being deployed jointly by Canadian carriers Bell Mobility and Telus Mobility, joined by Nokia Siemens Networks.[54] Huawei delivered one of the world's first LTE/EPC commercial networks for TeliaSonera in Oslo, Norway in 2009.[42] Norway-based telecommunications Telenor instead selected Ericsson due to security concerns with Huawei.[55]

Huawei Marine Networks delivered the HANNIBAL submarine communications cable system for Tunisie Telecom across the Mediterranean Sea to Italy in 2009.[56]: 310 

In July 2010, Huawei was included in the Global Fortune 500 2010 list published by the US magazine Fortune for the first time, on the strength of annual sales of US$21.8 billion and net profit of US$2.67 billion.[57][58]

In October 2012, it was announced that Huawei would move its UK headquarters to Green Park, Reading, Berkshire.[59]

Huawei also has expanding operations in Ireland since 2016. As well as a headquarters in Dublin, it has facilities in Cork and Westmeath.[60]

In September 2017, Huawei created a Narrowband IoT city-aware network using a "one network, one platform, N applications" construction model utilizing 'Internet of things' (IoT), cloud computing, big data, and other next-generation information and communications technology, it also aims to be one of the world's five largest cloud players in the near future.[61][62]

In April 2019, Huawei established the Huawei Malaysia Global Training Centre (MGTC) at Cyberjaya, Malaysia.[63]

In November 2020, Telus dropped Huawei in favor of Samsung, Ericsson, and Nokia for their 5G/Radio Access Network[64]

Recent performance Edit

 
Huawei expo at IFA 2018 in Berlin

By 2018, Huawei had sold 200 million smartphones.[65] They reported that strong consumer demand for premium range smart phones helped the company reach consumer sales in excess of $52 billion in 2018.[66]

Huawei announced worldwide revenues of $105.1 billion for 2018, with a net profit of $8.7 billion.[67] Huawei's Q1 2019 revenues were up 39% year-over-year, at US$26.76 billion.[68]

In 2019, Huawei reported revenue of US$122 billion.[69] By the second quarter of 2020, Huawei had become the world's top smartphone seller, overtaking Samsung for the first time.[7] In 2021, Huawei was ranked the second-largest R&D investor in the world by the EU Joint Research Centre (JRC) in its EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard[70] and ranked fifth in the world in US patents according to a report by Fairview Research's IFI Claims Patent Services.[71][36]: 10 

However, heavy international sanctions saw Huawei's revenues drop by 32% in the 2021 third quarter.[72] Linghao Bao, an analyst at policy research firm Trivium China said the "communications giant went from being the second-largest smartphone maker in the world, after Samsung, to essentially dead."[73] By the end of third quarter in 2022, Huawei revenue had dropped a further 19.7% since the beginning of the year.[74]

Corporate affairs Edit

Huawei classifies itself as a "collective" entity and prior to 2019 did not refer to itself as a private company. Richard McGregor, author of The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers, said that this is "a definitional distinction that has been essential to the company's receipt of state support at crucial points in its development".[75] McGregor argued that "Huawei's status as a genuine collective is doubtful."[75] Huawei's position has shifted in 2019 when, Dr. Song Liuping, Huawei's chief legal officer, commented on the US government ban, said: "Politicians in the US are using the strength of an entire nation to come after a private company." (emphasis added).[76]

Leadership Edit

Ren Zhengfei is the founder and CEO of Huawei and has the power to veto any decisions made by the board of directors.[77][78] Huawei also has rotating co-CEOs.[36]: 11 

Huawei disclosed its list of board of directors for the first time in 2010.[79] Liang Hua is the current chair of the board. As of 2019, the members of the board are Liang Hua, Guo Ping, Xu Zhijun, Hu Houkun, Meng Wanzhou (CFO and deputy chairwoman), Ding Yun, Yu Chengdong, Wang Tao, Xu Wenwei, Shen-Han Chiu, Chen Lifang, Peng Zhongyang, He Tingbo, Li Yingtao, Ren Zhengfei, Yao Fuhai, Tao Jingwen, and Yan Lida.[80]

Guo Ping is the Chairman of Huawei Device, Huawei's mobile phone division.[81] Huawei's Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer is Zhou Daiqi[82] who is also Huawei's Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary.[83] Their chief legal officer is Song Liuping.[76]

Ownership Edit

At its founding in 1987, Huawei was established as a collectively-owned enterprise.[36]: 213  Collectively-owned enterprises were an intermediary corporate ownership status between state-owned enterprises and private businesses.[84][36]: 213  The Chinese government began issuing licenses for private businesses starting in 1992.[36]: 213 

Huawei states it is an employee-owned company, but this remains a point of dispute.[77][85] Ren Zhengfei retains approximately 1 percent of the shares of Huawei's holding company, Huawei Investment & Holding,[85] with the remainder of the shares held by a trade union committee (not a trade union per se, and the internal governance procedures of this committee, its members, its leaders or how they are selected all remain undisclosed to the public) that is claimed to be representative of Huawei's employee shareholders.[77][86] The company's trade union committee is registered with and pay dues to the Shenzhen federation of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.[87] About half of Huawei staff participate in this structure (foreign employees are not eligible), and hold what the company calls "virtual restricted shares". These shares are non-tradable and are allocated to reward performance.[88] When employees leave Huawei, their shares revert to the company, which compensates them for their holding.[89] Although employee shareholders receive dividends,[86] their shares do not entitle them to any direct influence in management decisions, but enables them to vote for members of the 115-person Representatives' Commission from a pre-selected list of candidates.[86] The Representatives' Commission selects Huawei Holding's board of directors and Board of Supervisors.[90]

Academics Christopher Balding of Fulbright University and Donald C. Clarke of George Washington University have described Huawei's virtual stock program as "purely a profit-sharing incentive scheme" that "has nothing to do with financing or control".[91] They found that, after a few stages of historical morphing, employees do not own a part of Huawei through their shares. Instead, the "virtual stock is a contract right, not a property right; it gives the holder no voting power in either Huawei Tech or Huawei Holding, cannot be transferred, and is cancelled when the employee leaves the firm, subject to a redemption payment from Huawei Holding TUC at a low fixed price".[92][77] Balding and Clarke add, "given the public nature of trade unions in China, if the ownership stake of the trade union committee is genuine, and if the trade union and its committee function as trade unions generally function in China, then Huawei may be deemed effectively state-owned."[77] Tim Rühlig, a Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, asked Huawei for a response to the Balding and Clarke paper; the "information provided by Huawei gives an indication of how difficult it is to run an independent company in such a crucial sector in China".[93] After the publication of Balding and Clarke's paper, Huawei has "engaged in a PR blitz to manufacture an image of a transparent company". [94]

Academic Toshio Goto of the Japan University of Economics has disagreed with Balding and Clarke's assessment of Huawei employee shareholders’ ownership.[95]: 13  Goto writes that the Huawei's ownership structure is a function of its formation amid the Chinese reforms, with the only mechanism for concentrating employee ownership under Shenzen's 1997 Provisions on State-owned Company Employee Stock Option Plans being to do so via Huawei's trade union.[95]: 25  In contrast to Balding and Clarke, Goto writes that the Huawei's virtual shares are substantially equivalent to voting stock, and that nominal ownership through the trade union does not change the legal and financial independence of employee ownership from the union itself.[95]: 25  Goto concludes that the firm is effectively owned by employees and therefore it is not effectively state-owned.[95]: 25  In analyzing Huawei's corporate governance and ownership structure, Academic Wang Jun of the Chinese University of Politics and Law also rejects the argument that Huawei is a state-owned enterprise controlled by a labor union, writing that normative practices and legal requirements distinguish between the shareholding vehicle of union-held employee assets and assets belonging to the union itself.[96] Academics Kunyuan Qiao of Cornell University and Christopher Marquis of the University of Cambridge likewise conclude that Huawei is a private company owned collectively by its employees and is neither owned nor controlled directly by the Chinese government.[36]: 11 

In 2021, Huawei did not report its ultimate beneficial ownership in Europe as required by European anti-money laundering laws.[97]

Lobbying and public relations Edit

In July 2021, Huawei hired Tony Podesta as a consultant and lobbyist, with a goal of nurturing the company's relationship with the Biden administration.[98][99]

Huawei has also hired public relations firms Ruder Finn, Wavemaker, Racepoint Global, and Burson Cohn & Wolfe for various campaigns.[100]

Corporate culture Edit

According to its CEO and founder Ren, Huawei's corporate culture is the same as the culture of the CCP, "and to serve the people wholeheartedly means to be customer-centric and responsible to society."[36]: 9  Ren frequently states that Huawei's management philosophy and strategy are commercial applications of Maoism.[36]: 11 

Ren states that in the event of a conflict between Huawei's business interests and the CCP's interests, he would "choose the CCP whose interest is to serve the people and all human beings".[36]: 11  Qiao and Marquis observe that company founder Ren is a dedicated communist who seeks to ingrain communist values at Huawei.[36]: 9 

Partners Edit

 
Huawei P9 was the first smartphone to be co-engineered with a Leica camera

As of the beginning of 2010, approximately 80% of the world's top 50 telecoms companies had worked with Huawei.[101]

In 2016, German camera company Leica has established a partnership with Huawei, and Leica cameras will be co-engineered into Huawei smartphones, including the P and Mate Series. The first smartphone to be co-engineered with a Leica camera was the Huawei P9.[102]

In August 2019, Huawei collaborated with eyewear company Gentle Monster and released smartglasses.[103] In November 2019, Huawei partners with Devialet and unveiled a new specifically designed speaker, the Sound X.[104] In October 2020, Huawei released its own mapping service, Petal Maps, which was developed in partnership with Dutch navigation device manufacturer TomTom.[105]

Products and services Edit

Telecommunication networks Edit

Huawei offers mobile and fixed softswitches, plus next-generation home location register and Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystems (IMS). Huawei sells xDSL, passive optical network (PON) and next-generation PON (NG PON) on a single platform. The company also offers mobile infrastructure, broadband access and service provider routers and switches (SPRS). Huawei's software products include service delivery platforms (SDPs), base station subsystems, and more.[106]

Global services Edit

Huawei Global Services provides telecommunications operators with equipment to build and operate networks as well as consulting and engineering services to improve operational efficiencies.[107] These include network integration services such as those for mobile and fixed networks; assurance services such as network safety; and learning services, such as competency consulting.[106]

Devices Edit

 
A Huawei Band 7 fitness tracker in Wilderness Green colour.

Huawei's Devices division provides white-label products to content-service providers, including USB modems, wireless modems and wireless routers for mobile Wi-Fi,[108] embedded modules, fixed wireless terminals, wireless gateways, set-top boxes, mobile handsets and video products.[109] Huawei also produces and sells a variety of devices under its own name, such as the IDEOS smartphones, tablet PCs and Huawei Smartwatch.[110][111]

Phones Edit

Huawei is the second-biggest smartphone maker in the world, after Samsung, as of the first quarter of 2019. Their portfolio of phones includes both high-end smartphones, its Huawei Mate series and Huawei P series, and cheaper handsets that fall under its Honor brand.[112]

Cheaper handsets fall under its Honor brand.[113] Honor was created in order to elevate Huawei-branded phones as premium offerings. In 2020, Huawei agreed to sell the Honor brand to a state-owned enterprise of the Shenzhen municipal government. Consequently, Honor was initially reported to be cut off from access to Huawei's IPs, which consists of more than 100,000 active patents by the end of 2020, and additionally cannot tap into Huawei's large R&D resources where $20 billion had been committed for 2021. However, Wired magazine noted in 2021 that Honor devices still had not differentiated their software much from Huawei phones and that core apps and certain engineering features, like the Honor-engineered camera features looked "virtually identical' across both phones.[20][113]

History of Huawei phones Edit

 
The Huawei P30 with rear triple-lens Leica optics camera

In July 2003, Huawei established their handset department and by 2004, Huawei shipped their first phone, the C300. The U626 was Huawei's first 3G phone in June 2005 and in 2006, Huawei launched the first Vodafone-branded 3G handset, the V710. The U8220 was Huawei's first Android smartphone and was unveiled in MWC 2009. At CES 2012, Huawei introduced the Ascend range starting with the Ascend P1 S. At MWC 2012, Huawei launched the Ascend D1. In September 2012, Huawei launched their first 4G ready phone, the Ascend P1 LTE. At CES 2013, Huawei launched the Ascend D2 and the Ascend Mate. At MWC 2013, the Ascend P2 was launched as the world's first LTE Cat4 smartphone. In June 2013, Huawei launched the Ascend P6 and in December 2013, Huawei introduced Honor as a subsidiary independent brand in China. At CES 2014, Huawei launched the Ascend Mate2 4G in 2014 and at MWC 2014, Huawei launched the MediaPad X1 tablet and Ascend G6 4G smartphone. Other launched in 2014 included the Ascend P7 in May 2014, the Ascend Mate7, the Ascend G7 and the Ascend P7 Sapphire Edition as China's first 4G smartphone with a sapphire screen.[114]

In January 2015, Huawei discontinued the "Ascend" brand for its flagship phones, and launched the new P series with the Huawei P8.[115][116] Huawei also partnered with Google to build the Nexus 6P which was released in September 2015.[117]

In May 2018, Huawei stated that they will no longer allow unlocking the bootloader of their phones to allow installing third party system software or security updates after Huawei stops them. [118]

Huawei is currently the most well-known international corporation in China and a pioneer of the 5G mobile phone standard, which has come to be used globally in the last few years.[119]

Laptops Edit

 
Huawei Matebook 2-in-1 tablet

In 2016, Huawei entered the laptop markets with the release of its Huawei MateBook series of laptops.[120] They have continued to release laptop models in this series into 2020 with their most recent models being the MateBook X Pro and Matebook 13 2020.[121]

Tablets Edit

The Huawei MatePad Pro, launched in November 2019.[122] Huawei is number one in the Chinese tablet market and number two globally as of 4Q 2019.[123]

Wearables Edit

The Huawei Watch is an Android Wear-based smartwatch developed by Huawei. It was released at Internationale Funkausstellung Berlin on 2 September 2015.[124] It is the first smartwatch produced by Huawei.[124] Their latest watch, the Huawei Watch GT 2e, was launched in India in May 2020.[125]

Software Edit

EMUI (Emotion User Interface) Edit

Emotion UI (EMUI) is a ROM/OS developed by Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. and based on Google's Android Open Source Project (AOSP). EMUI is pre-installed on most Huawei Smartphone devices and its subsidiaries the Honor series.[126]

Harmony OS Edit

On 9 August 2019, Huawei officially unveiled Harmony OS at its inaugural developers' conference HDC in Dongguan. Huawei described Harmony as a free, microkernel-based distributed operating system for various types of hardware, with faster inter-process communication than QNX or Google's "Fuchsia" microkernel, and real-time resource allocation. The ARK compiler can be used to port Android APK packages to the OS. Huawei stated that developers would be able to "flexibly" deploy Harmony OS software across various device categories; the company focused primarily on IoT devices, including "smart displays", wearable devices, and in-car entertainment systems, and did not explicitly position Harmony OS as a mobile OS.[127][128]

Huawei Mobile Services (HMS) Edit

Huawei Mobile Services (HMS) is Huawei's solution to GMS (Google Mobile services), it was created to work over Android System, so Android applications can work over Huawei HMS Mobile phones, if those don't use Google Mobile Services. HMS is part of Huawei ecosystem which Huawei developed complete solutions for several scenarios. One of their major application is called Huawei AppGallery, which is Huawei app store created as a competitor to Google's Android Play Store. As of December 2019 it was in version 4.0 and as of 16 January 2020 the company reports it has signed up 55,000 apps using its HMS Core software.[129]

Automobile Edit

Huawei has secured collaboration with a few automakers including Seres, Chery, BAIC Motor, Changan Automobile and GAC Group.[130]

AITO Edit

The Aito brand (问界, Wenjie) is Huawei's premium EV brand in cooperation with Seres. In December 2021, the AITO M5 was unveiled as the first vehicle to be developed in cooperation with Huawei. The model was developed mainly by Seres and is essentially a restyled Seres SF5 crossover.[131] The model was sold under a new brand called AITO, which stands for "Adding Intelligence to Auto" and uses Huawei DriveONE and HarmonyOS, while the Seres SF5 used Huawei DriveONE and HiCar.[132]

AVATR Edit

The Avatr brand is Huawei's premium EV brand in cooperation with Changan Automobile and CATL.

Luxeed Edit

The Luxeed brand (智界, Zhijie) is Huawei's premium EV brand in cooperation with Chery, with the first vehicle being the Luxeed S7, previously called the Chery EH3,[133] an upcoming premium electric executive sedan due to be unveiled in Q3 2023, and would be the first car to have the Harmony OS 4 system on board.[134]

Huawei Solar Edit

Huawei entered the photovoltaic (PV) market in 2011, and opened an Energy Center of Competence in Nuremberg, Germany the same year.[135] In September 2016, Huawei integrated new manufacturing capabilities into its Eindhoven hub in the Netherlands, where it can produce 7,000 inverter units per month.[135] In October that same year, Huawei entered the North American market and formed a strategic partnership with Strata Solar.[135] In April 2017, Huawei enters the residential solar market with the launch of its string solar inverters and DC power optimizers.[135]

As of 2022, Huawei is the largest producer of solar inverters in the world with a 29% market share, which saw a significant shipment increase of 83% compared to 2021.[136]

Competitive position Edit

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. was the world's largest telecom equipment maker in 2012[5] and China's largest telephone-network equipment maker.[137] With 3,442 patents, Huawei became the world's No. 1 applicant for international patents in 2014.[138] In 2019, Huawei had the second most patents granted by the European Patent Office.[139] In 2021, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)'s annual World Intellectual Property Indicators report ranked Huawei's number of patent applications published under the PCT System as 1st in the world, with 5464 patent applications being published during 2020.[140]

As of 2023, Huawei is the leading 5G equipment manufacturer and has the greatest market share of 5G equipment and has built approximately 70% of worldwide 5G base stations.[141]: 182 

Research and Development Edit

As of 2021, more than half of Huawei's employees are involved in research.[142]: 119  In the same year, Huawei spent $22.1 billion on R&D, around 22.4% of its net sales, being one of the six companies in the world to spend more than $20 billion on R&D spending.[143]

The company has twenty one R&D institutes in countries including China, the United States,[144] Canada,[145] the United Kingdom,[146] Pakistan, Finland, France, Belgium, Germany, Colombia, Sweden, Ireland, India,[147] Russia, Israel, and Turkey.[148][149]

Huawei is considering opening a new research and development (R&D) center in Russia (2019/2020), which would be the third in the country after the Moscow and St. Petersburg R&D centers. Huawei also announced plans (November 2018) to open an R&D center in the French city of Grenoble, which would be mainly focused on smartphone sensors and parallel computing software development. The new R&D team in Grenoble was expected to grow to 30 researchers by 2020, said the company. The company said that this new addition brought to five the number of its R&D teams in the country: two were located in Sophia Antipolis and Paris, researching image processing and design, while the other two existing teams were based at Huawei's facilities in Boulogne-Billancourt, working on algorithms and mobile and 5G standards. The technology giant also intended to open two new research centers in Zürich and Lausanne, Switzerland. Huawei at the time employed around 350 people in Switzerland.[150][151]

Huawei also funds research partnerships with universities such as the University of British Columbia, the University of Waterloo, the University of Western Ontario, the University of Guelph, and Université Laval.[152][153]

Controversies Edit

Huawei has faced allegations that its products contain backdoors for Chinese government espionage and domestic laws require Chinese citizens and companies to cooperate with state intelligence when warranted. Huawei executives denied these claims, saying that the company has not received requests by the Chinese government to introduce backdoors in its equipment, would refuse to do so, and that Chinese law does not compel them to do so. As of 2019, the United States had not produced evidence of coordinated hacking by Huawei.[154][155][156][157]

Early business practices Edit

Huawei employed a complex system of agreements with local state-owned telephone companies that seemed to include illicit payments to the local telecommunications bureau employees. During the late 1990s, the company created several joint ventures with their state-owned telecommunications company customers. By 1998, Huawei had signed agreements with municipal and provincial telephone bureaus to create Shanghai Huawei, Chengdu Huawei, Shenyang Huawei, Anhui Huawei, Sichuan Huawei, and other companies. The joint ventures were actually shell companies, and were a way to funnel money to local telecommunications employees so that Huawei could get deals to sell them equipment. In the case of Sichuan Huawei, for example, local partners could get 60–70 percent of their investment returned in the form of annual 'dividends'.[158]

Allegations of state support Edit

Martin Thorley of the University of Nottingham noted that a "company of Huawei’s size, working in what is considered a sensitive sector, simply cannot succeed in China without extensive links to the Party".[15] Klon Kitchen has suggested that 5G dominance is essential to China in order to achieve its vision where "the prosperity of state-run capitalism is combined with the stability and security of technologically enabled authoritarianism".[159] Nigel Inkster of the International Institute for Strategic Studies suggested that "Huawei involvement in the core backbone 5G infrastructure of developed western liberal democracies is a strategic game-changer because 5G is a game-changer”, with “national telecoms champions” playing a key role, which in turn is part of China's "ambitious strategy to reshape the planet in line with its interests” through the Belt and Road Initiative.[15] On 7 October 2020, the U.K. Parliament's Defence Committee released a report concluding that there was evidence of collusion between Huawei and Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party, based upon ownership model and government subsidies it has received.[160]

It has been observed that the Chinese government has granted Huawei much more comprehensive support than other domestic companies facing troubles abroad, such as ByteDance, since Huawei is considered a "national champion" along with Alibaba Group and Tencent.[9][161] For instance after Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou was detained in Canada pending extradition to the United States for fraud charges, China immediately arrested Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in what was widely viewed as "hostage diplomacy".[9][162] China has also imposed tariffs on Australian imports in 2020, in apparent retaliation for Huawei and ZTE being excluded from Australia's 5G network in 2018.[9] In June 2020, when the UK mulled reversing an earlier decision to permit Huawei's participation in 5G, China threatened retaliation in other sectors by withholding investments in power generation and high-speed rail. A House of Commons defence committee found that "Beijing had exerted pressure through "covert and overt threats" to keep Huawei in the UK's 5G network".[160] US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reassured the UK saying "the US stands with our allies and partners against the Chinese Communist Party's coercive bullying tactics," and "the US stands ready to assist our friends in the UK with any needs they have, from building secure and reliable nuclear power plants to developing trusted 5G solutions that protect their citizens' privacy".[163]

The "optics of Beijing's diplomats coming to [Huawei]'s defense" in the European Union has also contradicted Huawei's claims that it is "fully independent from the Chinese government".[164] In November 2019, the Chinese ambassador to Denmark, in meetings with high-ranking Faroese politicians, directly linked Huawei's 5G expansion with Chinese trade, according to a sound recording obtained by Kringvarp Føroya. According to Berlingske, the ambassador threatened with dropping a planned trade deal with the Faroe Islands, if the Faroese telecom company Føroya Tele did not let Huawei build the national 5G network. Huawei said they did not knоw about the meetings.[165] China's ambassador to Germany, Wu Ken, warned that ‘there will be consequences’ if Huawei was excluded, and floated the "possibility of German cars being banned on safety grounds".[166][167]

The Wall Street Journal has suggested that Huawei received approximately "$46 billion in loans and other support, coupled with $25 billion in tax cuts" since the Chinese government had a vested interest in fostering a company to compete against Apple and Samsung.[8] In particular, China's state-owned banks such as the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China make loans to Huawei customers which substantially undercut competitors' financing with lower interest and cash in advance, with China Development Bank providing a credit line totaling US$30 billion between 2004 and 2009. In 2010, the European Commission launched an investigation into China's subsidies that distorted global markets and harmed European vendors, and Huawei offered the initial complainant US$56 million to withdraw the complaint in an attempt to shut down the investigation. Then-European Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht found that Huawei leveraged state support to underbid competitors by up to 70 percent.[168]

Allegations of military and intelligence ties Edit

According to documents leaked by Edward Snowden, the National Security Agency infiltrated Huawei's computer network in 2009. The White House intelligence coordinator and the FBI were also involved. The operation obtained a list of 1,400 Huawei customers as well as the company's internal training documents. In addition, the company's central email archive was accessed, including messages from founder Ren Zhengfei and chairwoman Sun Yafang. So much data was gathered that "we don't know what to do with it", according to a leaked NSA document. The agency was concerned that Huawei's infrastructure could provide China with signals intelligence capabilities.[169]

In 2011, a report by the Open Source Enterprise detailed its "suspicions over potential close links between Huawei and the Chinese Government," such as former chairwoman Sun Yafang's prior employment by the Ministry of State Security (MSS)'s Communications Department.[170][171][172]

In 2019, Ren Zhengfei stated "we never participate in espionage and we do not allow any of our employees to do any act like that. And we absolutely never install backdoors. Even if we were required by Chinese law, we would firmly reject that".[173][174] Chinese Premier Li Keqiang was quoted saying "the Chinese government did not and will not ask Chinese companies to spy on other countries, such kind of action is not consistent with the Chinese law and is not how China behaves." Huawei has cited the opinion of Zhong Lun Law Firm, co-signed by a CCP member,[175] whose lawyers testified to the FCC that the National Intelligence Law doesn't apply to Huawei. The opinion of Zhong Lun lawyers, reviewed by British law firm Clifford Chance, has been distributed widely by Huawei as an "independent legal opinion", although Clifford Chance added a disclaimer stated that "the material should not be construed as constituting a legal opinion on the application of PRC law".[175][176] Follow up reporting from Wired cast doubt on the findings of Zhong Lun, particularly because the Chinese "government doesn't limit itself to what the law explicitly allows" when it comes to national security.[177] "All Chinese citizens and organisations are obliged to cooperate upon request with PRC intelligence operations—and also maintain the secrecy of such operations", as explicitly stipulated in Article 7 of the 2017 PRC national intelligence-gathering activities law.[175] Tim Rühlig, a Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, observed that "Not least in the light of the lack of the rule of law in China, but also given the clarity of the Intelligence Law, this legal opinion [by Clifford Chance] does not provide any substantial reassurance that Huawei could decline to cooperate with Chinese intelligence, even if the company wanted to do so".[178]

Experts have pointed out that "under [President] Xi's intensifying authoritarianism [since] Beijing promulgated a new national intelligence law" in 2017, as well as the 2014 Counter-Espionage Law, both of which are vaguely defined and far-reaching. The two laws "[compel] Chinese businesses to work with Chinese intelligence and security agencies whenever they are requested to do so", suggesting that Huawei or other domestic major technology companies could not refuse to cooperate with Chinese intelligence. Jerome Cohen, a New York University law professor and Council on Foreign Relations adjunct senior fellow stated "Not only is this mandated by existing legislation but, more important, also by political reality and the organizational structure and operation of the Party-State’s economy. The Party is embedded in Huawei and controls it".[15] One former Huawei employee said "The state wants to use Huawei, and it can use it if it wants. Everyone has to listen to the state. Every person. Every company and every individual, and you can't talk about it. You can't say you don't like it. That's just China." The new cybersecurity law also requires domestic companies, and eventually foreign subsidiaries, to use state-certified network equipment and software so that their data and communications are fully visible to China's Cybersecurity Bureau.[9][179][175][176] University of Nottingham's Martin Thorley has suggested that Huawei would have no recourse to oppose the CCP's request in court, since the party controls the police, the media, the judiciary and the government.[15] Klon Kitchen has suggested that 5G dominance is essential to China in order to achieve its vision where "the prosperity of state-run capitalism is combined with the stability and security of technologically enabled authoritarianism".[159]

In 2019, Henry Jackson Society researchers conducted an analysis of 25,000 Huawei employee CVs and found that some had worked or trained with China's Ministry of State Security, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), its academies, and a military unit accused of hacking US corporations, including 11 alumni from a PLA information engineering school.[180] One of the study researchers says this shows "a strong relationship between Huawei and all levels of the Chinese state, Chinese military and Chinese intelligence. This to me appears to be a systemized, structural relationship."[181] In a report by academics Christopher Balding of Fulbright University and Donald C. Clarke of George Washington University, a person "simultaneously held a position at Huawei and a teaching and research role at a military university through which they were employed by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army...a section in the PLA that is responsible for the Chinese military’s space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities".[182] Charles Parton, a British diplomat, said this "give the lie to Huawei's claim that there is no evidence that they help the Chinese intelligence services. This gun is smoking."[180] Huawei said that while it does not work on Chinese military or intelligence projects, it is no secret that some employees have a previous government background. It criticized the report's speculative language such as ‘believes’, ‘infers’, and ‘cannot rule out’.[182] In 2014, the National Security Agency penetrated Huawei's corporate networks in China to search for links between the company and the People's Liberation Army. It was able to monitor accounts belonging to Huawei employees and its founder Ren Zhengfei.[16]

Michael Wessel, a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, was quoted as saying “If there’s a locksmith who’s installing more and more locks on the doors in a community and suddenly there’s a rash of silent robberies, at some point the locksmith becomes a person of interest. Huawei around that time became a significant entity of interest".[16] A report from Bloomberg News stated that Australian intelligence in 2012 detected a backdoor in the country's telecom network and shared its findings with the United States, who reported similar hacks. It was reportedly caused by a software update from Huawei carrying malicious code that transmitted data to China before deleting itself. Investigators managed to reconstruct the exploit and determined that Huawei technicians must have pushed the update through the network on behalf of China's spy agencies. Huawei said updates would have required authorization from the customer and that no tangible evidence was presented. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the accusation a "slander". Australian telecom operators Optus and Vodafone disputed that they were compromised.[16][17] In addition, senior security officials in Uganda and Zambia admitted that Huawei played key roles enabling their governments to spy on political opponents.[9] Inside the African Union headquarters, whose computer systems were supplied by Huawei and paid for by the Chinese government, IT staff discovered that data transfers on its servers peaked after hours from January 2012 to January 2017, with the African Union's internal data sent to unknown servers hosted in Shanghai.[9] In May 2019, a Huawei Mediapad M5 belonging to a Canadian IT engineer living in Taiwan was found to be sending data to servers in China despite never being authorized to do so, as the apps could not be disabled and continued to send sensitive data even after appearing to be deleted.[183] At the end of 2019, United States officials disclosed to the United Kingdom and Germany that Huawei has had the ability to covertly exploit backdoors intended for law enforcement officials since 2009, as these backdoors are found on carrier equipment like antennas and routers, and Huawei's equipment is widely used around the world due to its low cost.[184][185] The United Kingdom established a lab that it ran, but which was paid for by Huawei, to evaluate Huawei equipment.[56]: 322  After eight years of study, the lab did not identify any Huawei backdoor, but concluded that Huawei's equipment had bugs that could be exploited by hackers.[56]: 322 

Timeline Edit

Yale University economist Stephen Roach states that there is no hard evidence to support the key allegations regarding a backdoor for industrial espionage.[142]: 118  Roach writes that there is a single documented instance of Huawei-installed software having an arguable backdoor: European telecom Vodafone disclosed in 2011 that its Italian fixed line network contained a security vulnerability in its Huawei-installed software.[142]: 118–119  Huawei fixed the vulnerability at Vodafone's request.[142]: 118  There was no report of any suspicious data capture or systems control activity.[142]: 118  Vodafone was satisfied with the outcome and thereafter increased its reliance on Huawei as an equipment-supplier.[142]: 118 

A 2012 White House-ordered security review found no evidence that Huawei spied for China and said instead that security vulnerabilities on its products posed a greater threat to its users. The details of the leaked review came a week after a US House Intelligence Committee report which warned against letting Huawei supply critical telecommunications infrastructure in the United States.[186]

Huawei has been at the center of concerns over Chinese involvement in 5G wireless networks. In 2018, the United States passed a defense funding bill that contained a passage barring the federal government from doing business with Huawei, ZTE, and several Chinese vendors of surveillance products, due to security concerns.[187][188][189] The Chinese government has threatened economic retaliation against countries that block Huawei's market access.[163]

Similarly in November 2018, New Zealand blocked Huawei from supplying mobile equipment to national telecommunications company Spark New Zealand's 5G network, citing a "significant network security risk" and concerns about China's National Intelligence Law.[190][191]

Between December 2018 and January 2019, German and British intelligence agencies initially pushed back against the US' allegations, stating that after examining Huawei's 5G hardware and accompanying source code, they have found no evidence of malevolence and that a ban would therefore be unwarranted.[192][193] Additionally, the head of Britain's National Cyber Security Centre (the information security arm of GCHQ) stated that the US has not managed to provide the UK with any proof of its allegations against Huawei and also their agency had concluded that any risks involving Huawei in UK's telecom networks are "manageable".[194][193] The Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), set up in 2010 to assuage security fears as it examined Huawei hardware and software for the UK market, was staffed largely by employees from Huawei but with regular oversight from GCHQ, which led to questions of operating independence from Huawei.[195] On 1 October 2020, an official report released by National Cyber Security Centre noted that "Huawei has failed to adequately tackle security flaws in equipment used in the UK's telecoms networks despite previous complaints", and flagged one vulnerability of "national significance" related to broadband in 2019. The report concluded that Huawei was not confident of implementing the five-year plan of improving its software engineering processes, so there was "limited assurance that all risks to UK national security" could be mitigated in the long-term.[196] On 14 July 2020, the United Kingdom Government announced a ban on the use of company's 5G network equipment, citing security concerns.[197] In October 2020, the British Defence Select Committee announced that it had found evidence of Huawei's collusion with the Chinese state and that it supported accelerated purging of Huawei equipment from Britain's telecom infrastructure by 2025, since they concluded that Huawei had "engaged in a variety of intelligence, security, and intellectual property activities" despite its repeated denials.[160][198] In November 2020, Huawei challenged the UK government's decision, citing an Oxford Economics report that it had contributed £3.3 billion to the UK's GDP.[199]

In March 2019, Huawei filed three defamation claims over comments suggesting ties to the Chinese government made on television by a French researcher, a broadcast journalist and a telecommunications sector expert.[200] In June 2020 ANSSI informed French telecommunications companies that they would not be allowed to renew licenses for 5G equipment made from Huawei after 2028.[201] On 28 August 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron assured the Chinese government that it did not ban Huawei products from participating in its fifth-generation mobile roll-out, but favored European providers for security reasons. The head of the France's cybersecurity agency also stated that it has granted time-limited waivers on 5G for wireless operators that use Huawei products, a decision that likely started a "phasing out" of the company's products.[202]

In February 2020, US government officials claimed that Huawei has had the ability to covertly exploit backdoors intended for law enforcement officials in carrier equipment like antennas and routers since 2009.[184][185]

In mid July 2020, Andrew Little, the Minister in charge of New Zealand's signals intelligence agency the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), announced that New Zealand would not join the United Kingdom and United States in banning Huawei from the country's 5G network.[203][204]

In May 2022, Canada's industry minister Francois-Philippe Champagne announced that Canada will ban Huawei from the country's 5G network, in an effort to protect the safety and security of Canadians, as well as to protect Canada's infrastructure.[205] The Canadian federal government cited national security concerns for the move, saying that the suppliers could be forced to company with "extrajudicial directions from foreign governments" in ways that could "conflict with Canadian laws or would be detrimental to Canadian interests". Telcos will be prevented from procuring new 4G or 5G equipment from Huawei and ZTE and must remove all ZTE- and Huawei-branded 5G equipment from their networks by 28 June 2024.[206]

Meng Wanzhou case Edit

 
Meng during her time under house arrest in Vancouver in 2021

On December 1, 2018, Huawei's board deputy chair Meng Wanzhou was detained upon arrival at Vancouver International Airport by Canada Border Services Agency officers for questioning, which lasted three hours.[207][208] The Royal Canadian Mounted Police subsequently arrested her on a provisional U.S. extradition request for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in order to circumvent U.S. sanctions against Iran.[207][209] On January 28, 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice formally announced financial fraud charges against Meng.[210][211] The first stage of the extradition hearing for Meng began Monday, January 20, 2020, and concluded on May 27, 2020, when the Supreme Court of British Columbia ordered the extradition to proceed.[212][213]

During the extradition courtroom proceedings, Meng's lawyers made several allegations against the prosecution, including allegations of unlawful detention of Meng,[214] unlawful search and seizure,[215] extradition law violations,[216] misrepresentation,[217][218][219] international law violation,[220] and fabricated testimonies by the CBSA,[221] each of which were responded to by the prosecution.[222][223][224][225] In August 2021, the extradition judge questioned the regularity of the case and expressed great difficulty in understanding how the Record of Case (ROC) presented by the US supported their allegation of criminality.[226][227][228]

On 24 September 2021, the Department of Justice announced it had reached a deal with Meng to resolve the case through a deferred prosecution agreement. As part of the deal, Meng agreed to a statement of facts that said she had made untrue statements to HSBC to enable transactions in the U.S., at least some of which supported Huawei's work in Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions, but did not have to pay a fine nor plead guilty to her key charges.[229][230][231] The Department of Justice said it would move to dismiss all charges against Meng when the deferral period ends on 21 December 2022, on the condition that Meng is not charged with a crime before then.[232] Meng left Canada for China on 24 September 2021; hours after news of the deal, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, two Canadians whose detention were widely seen as retaliation for Meng's arrest, were released from detention in China and flown back to Canada.[233] On December 2, 2022, the presiding judge dismissed the charges against Meng following the United States government's request.[234]

Intellectual property infringement Edit

Huawei has settled with Cisco Systems, Motorola, and PanOptis in patent infringement lawsuits.[235][236][237] In 2018, a German court ruled against Huawei and ZTE in favor of MPEG LA, which holds patents related to Advanced Video Coding.[238]

Huawei has been accused of intellectual property theft.[239][240] In February 2003, Cisco Systems sued Huawei Technologies for allegedly infringing on its patents and illegally copying source code used in its routers and switches.[241][non-primary source needed] By July 2004, Huawei removed the contested code, manuals and command-line interfaces and the case was subsequently settled out of court.[242] As part of the settlement Huawei admitted that it had copied some of Cisco's router software.[243]

At the 2004 Supercomm tech conference in Chicago, a Huawei employee allegedly opened up the networking equipment of other companies to photograph the circuit boards.[243][244]

Brian Shields, former chief security officer at Nortel, said that his company was compromised in 2004 by Chinese hackers; executive credentials were accessed remotely, and entire computers were taken over. Shields does not believe Huawei was directly involved but thinks that Huawei was a beneficiary of the hack. Documents taken included product roadmaps, sales proposals, and technical papers.[244] Nortel sought for but failed to receive help from the RCMP. The CSIS said it approached the company but was rebuffed.[245][45]

Cybersecurity experts have some doubts about a hack of such magnitude as described by Shields, calling it "unlikely".[245] An extensive analysis by University of Ottowa professor Jonathan Calof and recollections of former Nortel executive Tim Dempsey place the blame mostly on strategic mistakes and poor management at Nortel. On the other hand, some employees recall when Huawei or a front company returned a fibre card to Nortel disassembled, around a time when knock-offs products emerged in Asia. There remains a suspicion that industrial espionage brought down or at least accelerated Nortel's demise.[244]

In 2017, a jury found that Huawei had misappropriated trade secrets of T-Mobile US but awarded damages only for a breach of supplier contract; it did not compensate T-Mobile for claims of espionage.[246]

In February 2020, the United States Department of Justice charged Huawei with racketeering and conspiring to steal trade secrets from six US firms.[247] Huawei said those allegations, some going back almost 20 years, had never been found as a basis for any significant monetary judgment.[248][247]

North Korea Edit

Leaked documents obtained by The Washington Post in 2019 raised questions about whether Huawei conducted business secretly with North Korea, which was under numerous US sanctions.[249]

Xinjiang internment camps Edit

Huawei has assisted in the mass surveillance and detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang internment camps, resulting in sanctions by the United States Department of State.[10][250][11][251] Huawei also developed facial recognition software that recognizes ethnicity-specific features for surveillance.[12][252] In January 2021, it was reported that Huawei previously filed a patent with the China National Intellectual Property Administration for a technology to identify Uyghur pedestrians.[253]

In 2019, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a think tank often described as hawkish in Australian media,[254] accused Huawei of assisting in the mass detention of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang internment camps.[250][11][255] Huawei technology used by the Xinjiang internal security forces for data analysis,[256] and companies supplying Huawei operating in the Xinjiang region are accused of using forced labor.[257] However, Huawei denied these reports.[258]

US sanctions Edit

Before the 2020 semiconductor ban Edit

In August 2018, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA 2019) was signed into law, containing a provision that banned Huawei and ZTE equipment from being used by the US federal government, citing security concerns.[259] Huawei filed a lawsuit over the act in March 2019,[260] alleging it to be unconstitutional because it specifically targeted Huawei without granting it a chance to provide a rebuttal or due process.[261]

Additionally, on 15 May 2019, the Department of Commerce added Huawei and 70 foreign subsidiaries and "affiliates" to its Entity List under the Export Administration Regulations, citing the company having been indicted for "knowingly and willfully causing the export, re-export, sale and supply, directly and indirectly, of goods, technology and services (banking and other financial services) from the United States to Iran and the government of Iran without obtaining a license from the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)".[262] This restricts US companies from doing business with Huawei without a government license.[263][264][265] Various US-based companies immediately froze their business with Huawei to comply with the regulation.[266]

The May 2019 ban on Huawei was partial: it did not affect most non-American produced chips, and the Trump administration granted a series of extensions on the ban in any case,[267] with another 90-day reprieve issued in May 2020.[268] In May 2020, the US extended the ban to cover semiconductors customized for Huawei and made with US technology.[269] In August 2020, the US again extended the ban to a blanket ban on all semiconductor sales to Huawei.[269] The blanket ban took effect in September 2020.[270]

After 2020 Edit

The sanctions regime established in September 2020 negatively affected Huawei production, sales and financial projections.[271][272][273] However, on 29 June 2019 at the G20 summit, the US President made statements implicating plans to ease the restrictions on US companies doing business with Huawei.[274][275][276] Despite this statement, on 15 May 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce extended its export restrictions to bar Huawei from producing semiconductors derived from technology or software of US origin, even if the manufacturing is performed overseas.[277][278][279] In June 2020, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) designated Huawei a national security threat, thereby barring it from any US subsidies.[280] In July 2020, the Federal Acquisition Regulation Council published a Federal Register notice prohibiting all federal government contractors from selling Huawei hardware to the federal government and preventing federal contractors from using Huawei hardware.[281]

In November 2020, Donald Trump issued an executive order prohibiting any American company or individual from owning shares in companies that the United States Department of Defense has listed as having links to the People's Liberation Army, which included Huawei.[282][283][284] In January 2021, the Trump administration revoked licenses from US companies such as Intel from supplying products and technologies to Huawei.[285] In June 2021, the FCC voted unanimously to prohibit approvals of Huawei gear in US telecommunication networks on national security grounds.[286]

In June 2021, the administration of Joe Biden began to persuade the United Arab Emirates to remove the Huawei Technologies Co. equipment from its telecommunications network, while ensuring to further distance itself from China. It came as an added threat to the $23 billion arms deal of F-35 fighter jets and Reaper drones between the US and the UAE. The Emirates got a deadline of four years from Washington to replace the Chinese network.[287] A report in September 2021 analyzed how the UAE was struggling between maintaining its relations with both the United States and China. While Washington had a hawkish stance towards Beijing, the increasing Emirati relations with China have strained those with America. In that light, the Western nation has raised concerns for the UAE to beware of the security threat that the Chinese technologies like Huawei 5G telecommunications network possessed. However, the Gulf nations like the Emirates and Saudi Arabia defended their decision of picking Chinese technology over the American, saying that it is much cheaper and had no political conditions.[288]

On 18 November 2020, an opposition motion calling on the government for a decision on the participation of Huawei in Canada's 5G network and a plan on combating what it called "Chinese aggression" passed 179 to 146. The non-binding motion was supported by the NDP and Bloc Québécois.[289] In May 2022, Canada's government banned Huawei and ZTE equipment from the country's 5G network, with companies having until 28 June 2024 to remove 5G equipment from these Chinese vendors.[290] Christopher Parsons of the University of Toronto's Citizen Lab stated that continued use of Huawei and ZTE equipment "would have given the Chinese government leverage over Canada".[291]

On 25 November 2022, the FCC issued a ban on Huawei for national security reasons, citing the national security risk posed by the technology owned by China.[292]

Stockpiling of processors Edit

Before the 15 September 2020 deadline, Huawei was in "survival mode" and stockpiled "5G mobile processors, Wifi, radio frequency and display driver chips and other components" from key chip suppliers and manufacturers, including Samsung, SK Hynix, TSMC, MediaTek, Realtek, Novatek, and RichWave.[270] Even in 2019, Huawei spent $23.45 billion on the stockpiling of chips and other supplies in 2019, up 73% from 2018.[270]

On its most crucial business, namely, its telecoms business (including 5G) and server business, Huawei has stockpiled 1.5 to 2 years' worth of chips and components.[293] It began massively stockpiling from 2018, when Meng Wanzhou, the daughter of Huawei's founder, was arrested in Canada upon US request.[293] Key Huawei suppliers included Xilinx, Intel, AMD, Samsung, SK Hynix, Micron and Kioxia.[293] On the other hand, analysts predicted that Huawei could ship 195 million units of smartphones from its existing stockpile in 2021, but shipments may drop to 50 million in 2021 if rules are not relaxed.[270]

Development of processors Edit

In late 2020, it was reported that Huawei had planned to build a semiconductor manufacturing facility in Shanghai that did not involve US technology.[294] The plan may have helped Huawei obtain necessary chips after its existing stockpile became depleted, which would have helped the company chart a sustainable path for its telecoms business.[294] Huawei had also planned to collaborate with the government-run Shanghai IC R&D Center, which is partially owned by the state-owned enterprise Huahong Group.[294] Huawei may have been purchasing equipment from Chinese firms such as AMEC and Naura, as well as using foreign tools which it could still find on the market.[294]

In August 2023, the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), a US trade association, alleged that Huawei was building a collection of secret semiconductor-fabrication facilities across China, a shadow manufacturing network that would let the company skirt US sanctions.[295][296][297] Huawei was receiving an estimated $30 billion in state funding from the government at the time and had acquired at least two existing plants, with plans to construct at least three others.[295][297] The United States Department of Commerce had put Huawei on its entity list in 2019,[297] eventually "prohibiting it from working with American companies in almost all circumstances." However, if Huawei were to function under the names of other companies without disclosing its own involvement, it might have been able to circumvent those restrictions to "indirectly purchase American chipmaking equipment and other supplies that would otherwise be prohibited."[295]

On 6 September 2023, Huawei launched its new Mate 60 smartphone. The phone is powered by a new Kirin 9000s chip, made in China by Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp (SMIC).[298] This processor was the first to use the new 7 nanometre SMIC technology. TechInsights had stated in 2022 that it believed SMIC had managed to produce 7 nm chips, even though faced by a harsh sanctions regime, by adapting simpler machines that it could still purchase from ASML.[298] Holger Mueller of Constellation Research Inc. said that this showed that the US sanctions might have had the effect of sending China's chip-making industry into overdrive: "If SMIC really has perfected its 7nm process, this would be a major advance that can help Huawei remain at the forefront of the smartphone industry."[299] TechInsights found evidence that the processor had been manufactured using SMIC's N+2 7 nm node.[300] One of its analysts, Dan Hutcheson, who had led the breakdown of the new device, stated that it demonstrates "impressive technical progress China's semiconductor industry has made" despite not having EUVL tools, and that "the difficulty of this achievement also shows the resilience of the country's chip technological ability". However other analysts have said that such an achievement may lead to harsher sanctions against it.[301]

Replacement operating systems Edit

After the US sanctions regime started in summer 2018, Huawei started working on its own in-house operating system codenamed "HongMeng OS": in an interview with Die Welt, executive Richard Yu stated in 2019 that an in-house OS could be used as a "plan B" if it were prevented from using Android or Windows as the result of US action.[302][303][304] Huawei filed trademarks for the names "Ark", "Ark OS", and "Harmony" in Europe, which were speculated to be connected to this OS.[305][306] On 9 August 2019, Huawei officially unveiled Harmony OS at its inaugural HDC developers' conference in Dongguan with the ARK compiler which can be used to port Android APK packages to the OS.[127][128]

In September 2019, Huawei began offering the Linux distribution Deepin as a pre-loaded operating system on selected Matebook models in China.[307]

Whereas at first the official Huawei line was that Harmony OS was not intended for smartphones, in June 2021 Huawei began shipping its smartphones[308] with Harmony OS by default in China (in Europe it kept Android, in its own version EMUI, as the default). The operating system proved a success in China, rising from no market share at all to 10 per cent of the Chinese market for smartphones within two years (from mid-2021 to mid-2023), at the expense of Android.[309]

Bans and restrictions Edit

Some or all Huawei products have been banned in Australia, Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and ten EU states.[24][310][22][23]

In 2013, Taiwan blocked wireless carriers and government from using Huawei equipment.[311] In 2023, the country launched investigations into local firms reported to have supplied Huawei in violation of regulations.[312]

In 2018, Japan banned Huawei from receiving government contracts.[22][313]

In 2019, Vietnam left Huawei out of bids to build the country's 5G network due to security concerns.[25][314]

Following the initial 2020–2021 China–India skirmishes, India announced that Huawei gear would be removed from the country's telecommunication network and that Huawei would be blocked from participating in the country's 5G network for national security reasons.[315][24]

In October 2022, the UK extended the deadline by a year to the end of 2023 for removing core Huawei equipment from network functions. The ban, originally announced in 2020 following US pressure, calls for the phasing out of all Huawei gear from UK's 5G network by the end of 2027, which remains unchanged.[316]

Per an August 2023 decree on 5G network development, Costa Rica barred firms from all countries that have not signed the Budapest Convention on cybercrime.[317][318] The decree affects Chinese firms like Huawei, as well as firms from South Korea, Russia and Brazil, among others.[317]

In September 2023, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior proposed removing all Chinese equipment, including Huawei, from its 5G network by 2026.[319]

See also Edit

Notes Edit

References Edit

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huawei, technologies, ɑː, hwah, chinese, 华为, pinyin, huáwéi, chinese, multinational, technology, corporation, headquartered, shenzhen, guangdong, designs, develops, manufactures, sells, telecommunications, equipment, consumer, electronics, smart, devices, vari. Huawei Technologies Co Ltd ˈ hw ɑː w eɪ HWAH way Chinese 华为 pinyin Huawei is a Chinese multinational technology corporation headquartered in Shenzhen Guangdong It designs develops manufactures and sells telecommunications equipment consumer electronics smart devices and various rooftop solar products The corporation was founded in 1987 by Ren Zhengfei a former officer in the People s Liberation Army PLA Huawei Technologies Co Ltd Headquarters in Shenzhen Guangdong ChinaNative name华为技术有限公司Romanized nameHuawei jishu yǒuxian gōngsiTypePrivateISINHK0000HWEI11IndustryConsumer electronicsTelecom equipmentNetworking equipmentSemiconductorsArtificial intelligenceAutomationCloud computingInternet of thingsFounded15 September 1987 36 years ago 1987 09 15 FounderRen ZhengfeiHeadquartersShenzhen ChinaArea servedWorldwideKey peopleRen Zhengfei CEO Liang Hua chairman Meng Wanzhou deputy chairwoman amp CFO He Tingbo Director ProductsMobile and fixed broadband networksConsultancy and managed servicesMultimedia technologySmartphonesTablet computersDonglesSmart TVAITO Automobiles marqueHarmonyOSEMUIEulerOSBrandsHuaweiRevenueCN 642 3 billion US 87 8 billion 2022 1 Operating income47 515 000 000 renminbi 2016 Net incomeCN 35 6 billion US 5 2 billion 2022 Total assetsCN 876 854 billion US 140 billion 2022 Number of employees208 000 2022 2 ParentHuawei Investment amp Holding 3 SubsidiariesHonor 2013 2020 CaliopaChinasoft InternationalFutureWei TechnologiesHexaTierHiSiliconiSoftStoneWebsitewww wbr huawei wbr comHuawei Huawei in Simplified top and Traditional bottom Chinese charactersSimplified Chinese华为Traditional Chinese華為Literal meaning Splendid Achievement or Chinese Achievement TranscriptionsStandard MandarinHanyu PinyinHuaweiIPA xwa we ɪ Yue CantoneseYale RomanizationWaah waihJyutpingWaa4 wai4IPA waː wɐi Southern MinHokkien POJHoa uiHuawei Technologies Co Ltd Simplified Chinese华为技术有限公司Traditional Chinese華為技術有限公司TranscriptionsStandard MandarinHanyu PinyinHuawei Jishu Yǒuxian GōngsiYue CantoneseJyutpingwaa4 wai4 gei6 seot6 jau5 haan6 gung1 si1Initially focused on manufacturing phone switches Huawei has expanded to more than 170 countries to include building telecommunications networks providing operational and consulting services and equipment and manufacturing communications devices for the consumer market 4 It overtook Ericsson in 2012 as the largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer in the world 5 Huawei surpassed Apple and Samsung in 2018 and 2020 respectively to become the largest smartphone manufacturer worldwide 6 7 Amidst its rise Huawei has been accused of intellectual property infringement for which it has settled with companies like Cisco Questions regarding the extent of state influence on Huawei have revolved around its national champions role in China subsidies and financing support from state entities 8 and reactions of the Chinese government in light of oppositions in certain countries to Huawei s participation in 5G 9 Its software and equipment have been linked to the mass surveillance of Uyghurs and Xinjiang internment camps drawing sanctions from the US 10 11 12 The company has faced difficulties in some countries arising from concerns that its equipment may enable surveillance by the Chinese government due to perceived connections with the country s military and intelligence agencies 8 13 Huawei has argued that critics such as the US government have not shown evidence of espionage 14 Experts say that China s 2014 Counter Espionage Law and 2017 National Intelligence Law can compel Huawei and other companies to cooperate with state intelligence 15 In 2012 Australian and US intelligence agencies concluded that a hack on Australia s telecom networks was conducted by or through Huawei although the two network operators have disputed that information 16 17 In the midst of a trade war between China and the United States the US government alleged that Huawei had violated sanctions against Iran and restricted it from doing business with American companies In June 2019 Huawei cut jobs at its Santa Clara research center and in December Ren Zhengfei said it was moving to Canada 18 19 In 2020 Huawei agreed to sell the Honor brand to a state owned enterprise of the Shenzhen government to ensure its survival under US sanctions 20 In November 2022 the Federal Communications Commission FCC banned sales or import of equipment made by Huawei out of national security concerns 21 Other countries such as India Japan Vietnam and ten European Union states have also banned or restricted some or all Huawei products 22 23 24 25 Contents 1 Name 2 History 2 1 Early years 2 2 Foreign expansion 2 3 Recent performance 3 Corporate affairs 3 1 Leadership 3 2 Ownership 3 3 Lobbying and public relations 3 4 Corporate culture 4 Partners 5 Products and services 5 1 Telecommunication networks 5 2 Global services 5 3 Devices 5 4 Phones 5 4 1 History of Huawei phones 5 5 Laptops 5 6 Tablets 5 7 Wearables 5 8 Software 5 8 1 EMUI Emotion User Interface 5 8 2 Harmony OS 5 8 3 Huawei Mobile Services HMS 5 9 Automobile 5 9 1 AITO 5 9 2 AVATR 5 9 3 Luxeed 5 10 Huawei Solar 6 Competitive position 6 1 Research and Development 7 Controversies 7 1 Early business practices 7 2 Allegations of state support 7 3 Allegations of military and intelligence ties 7 3 1 Timeline 7 4 Meng Wanzhou case 7 5 Intellectual property infringement 7 6 North Korea 7 7 Xinjiang internment camps 8 US sanctions 8 1 Before the 2020 semiconductor ban 8 2 After 2020 8 3 Stockpiling of processors 8 4 Development of processors 8 5 Replacement operating systems 9 Bans and restrictions 10 See also 11 Notes 12 References 13 External linksName EditAccording to the company founder Ren Zhengfei the name Huawei comes from a slogan he saw on a wall Zhonghua youwei meaning China has promise Chinese 中华有为 pinyin Zhōng hua yǒu wei when he was starting up the company and needed a name 26 Zhonghua or Hua means China 27 while youwei means promising to show promise 28 29 Huawei has also been translated as splendid achievement or China is able which are possible readings of the name 30 In Chinese pinyin the name is Huawei 31 and pronounced xwa we ɪ in Mandarin Chinese in Cantonese the name is transliterated with Jyutping as Waa4 wai4 and pronounced waː wɐi However the pronunciation of Huawei by non Chinese varies in other countries for example Hoe ah wei in Belgium and the Netherlands 32 The company had considered changing the name in English out of concern that non Chinese people may find it hard to pronounce 33 but decided to keep the name and launched a name recognition campaign instead to encourage a pronunciation closer to Wah Way using the words Wow Way 34 35 Ren states We will not change the name of our brand and will teach foreigners how to pronounce it We have to make sure they do not pronounce it like Hawaii 36 85 History EditEarly years Edit During the 1980s the Chinese government tried to modernize the country s underdeveloped telecommunications infrastructure A core component of the telecommunications network was telephone exchange switches and in the late 1980s several Chinese research groups endeavored to acquire and develop the technology usually through joint ventures with foreign companies Ren Zhengfei a former deputy director of the People s Liberation Army engineering corps founded Huawei in 1987 in Shenzhen The company reports that it had RMB 21 000 about 5 000 at the time in registered capital from Ren Zhengfei and five other investors at the time of its founding where each contributed RMB 3 500 37 These five initial investors gradually withdrew their investments in Huawei The Wall Street Journal has suggested however that Huawei received approximately 46 billion in loans and other support coupled with 25 billion in tax cuts since the Chinese government had a vested interest in fostering a company to compete against Apple and Samsung 8 38 Ren sought to reverse engineer foreign technologies with local researchers China borrowed liberally from Qualcomm and other industry leaders PBX as an example in order to enter the market At a time when all of China s telecommunications technology was imported from abroad Ren hoped to build a domestic Chinese telecommunications company that could compete with and ultimately replace foreign competitors 39 During its first several years the company s business model consisted mainly of reselling private branch exchange PBX switches imported from Hong Kong 40 41 Meanwhile it was reverse engineering imported switches and investing heavily in research and development to manufacture its own technologies 40 By 1990 the company had approximately 600 R amp D staff and began its own independent commercialization of PBX switches targeting hotels and small enterprises 42 In order to grow despite difficult competition from Alcatel Lucent and Nortel Networks in 1992 Huawei focused on low income and difficult to access market niches 36 12 Huawei s sales force traveled from village to village in underdeveloped regions gradually moving into more developed areas 36 12 The company s first major breakthrough came in 1993 when it launched its C amp C08 program controlled telephone switch It was by far the most powerful switch available in China at the time By initially deploying in small cities and rural areas and placing emphasis on service and customizability the company gained market share and made its way into the mainstream market 43 Huawei also won a key contract to build the first national telecommunications network for the People s Liberation Army a deal one employee described as small in terms of our overall business but large in terms of our relationships 44 In 1994 founder Ren Zhengfei had a meeting with General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Jiang Zemin telling him that switching equipment technology was related to national security and that a nation that did not have its own switching equipment was like one that lacked its own military Jiang reportedly agreed with this assessment 40 In the 1990s Canadian telecom giant Nortel outsourced production of their entire product line to Huawei 45 They subsequently outsourced much of their product engineering to Huawei as well 46 Another major turning point for the company came in 1996 when the government in Beijing adopted an explicit policy of supporting domestic telecommunications manufacturers and restricting access to foreign competitors Huawei was promoted by both the government and the military as a national champion and established new research and development offices 40 Foreign expansion Edit Huawei Offices nbsp In Voorburg Netherlands nbsp In Markham Ontario Canada Beginning in the late 1990s Huawei built communications networks throughout sub Saharan Africa and the Middle East 47 It has become the most important Chinese telecommunications company operating in these regions 47 In 1997 Huawei won a contract to provide fixed line network products to Hong Kong company Hutchison Whampoa 43 Later that year Huawei launched wireless GSM based products and eventually expanded to offer CDMA and UMTS In 1999 the company opened a research and development R amp D centre in Bengaluru India to develop a wide range of telecom software 42 In May 2003 Huawei partnered with 3Com on a joint venture known as H3C which was focused on enterprise networking equipment It marked 3Com s re entrance into the high end core routers and switch market after having abandoned it in 2000 to focus on other businesses 3Com bought out Huawei s share of the venture in 2006 for US 882 million 48 49 In 2004 Huawei signed a 10 billion credit line with China Development Bank to provide low cost financing to customers buying its telecommunications equipment to support its sales outside of China This line of credit was tripled to 30 billion in 2009 50 In 2005 Huawei s foreign contract orders exceeded its domestic sales for the first time Huawei signed a global framework agreement with Vodafone This agreement marked the first time a telecommunications equipment supplier from China had received Approved Supplier status from Vodafone Global Supply Chain 51 non primary source needed In 2007 Huawei began a joint venture with US security software vendor Symantec Corporation known as Huawei Symantec which aimed to provide end to end solutions for network data storage and security Huawei bought out Symantec s share in the venture in 2012 with The New York Times noting that Symantec had fears that the partnership would prevent it from obtaining United States government classified information about cyber threats 52 In May 2008 Australian carrier Optus announced that it would establish a technology research facility with Huawei in Sydney 53 In October 2008 Huawei reached an agreement to contribute to a new GSM based HSPA network being deployed jointly by Canadian carriers Bell Mobility and Telus Mobility joined by Nokia Siemens Networks 54 Huawei delivered one of the world s first LTE EPC commercial networks for TeliaSonera in Oslo Norway in 2009 42 Norway based telecommunications Telenor instead selected Ericsson due to security concerns with Huawei 55 Huawei Marine Networks delivered the HANNIBAL submarine communications cable system for Tunisie Telecom across the Mediterranean Sea to Italy in 2009 56 310 In July 2010 Huawei was included in the Global Fortune 500 2010 list published by the US magazine Fortune for the first time on the strength of annual sales of US 21 8 billion and net profit of US 2 67 billion 57 58 In October 2012 it was announced that Huawei would move its UK headquarters to Green Park Reading Berkshire 59 Huawei also has expanding operations in Ireland since 2016 As well as a headquarters in Dublin it has facilities in Cork and Westmeath 60 In September 2017 Huawei created a Narrowband IoT city aware network using a one network one platform N applications construction model utilizing Internet of things IoT cloud computing big data and other next generation information and communications technology it also aims to be one of the world s five largest cloud players in the near future 61 62 In April 2019 Huawei established the Huawei Malaysia Global Training Centre MGTC at Cyberjaya Malaysia 63 In November 2020 Telus dropped Huawei in favor of Samsung Ericsson and Nokia for their 5G Radio Access Network 64 Recent performance Edit nbsp Huawei expo at IFA 2018 in BerlinBy 2018 Huawei had sold 200 million smartphones 65 They reported that strong consumer demand for premium range smart phones helped the company reach consumer sales in excess of 52 billion in 2018 66 Huawei announced worldwide revenues of 105 1 billion for 2018 with a net profit of 8 7 billion 67 Huawei s Q1 2019 revenues were up 39 year over year at US 26 76 billion 68 In 2019 Huawei reported revenue of US 122 billion 69 By the second quarter of 2020 Huawei had become the world s top smartphone seller overtaking Samsung for the first time 7 In 2021 Huawei was ranked the second largest R amp D investor in the world by the EU Joint Research Centre JRC in its EU Industrial R amp D Investment Scoreboard 70 and ranked fifth in the world in US patents according to a report by Fairview Research s IFI Claims Patent Services 71 36 10 However heavy international sanctions saw Huawei s revenues drop by 32 in the 2021 third quarter 72 Linghao Bao an analyst at policy research firm Trivium China said the communications giant went from being the second largest smartphone maker in the world after Samsung to essentially dead 73 By the end of third quarter in 2022 Huawei revenue had dropped a further 19 7 since the beginning of the year 74 Corporate affairs EditHuawei classifies itself as a collective entity and prior to 2019 did not refer to itself as a private company Richard McGregor author of The Party The Secret World of China s Communist Rulers said that this is a definitional distinction that has been essential to the company s receipt of state support at crucial points in its development 75 McGregor argued that Huawei s status as a genuine collective is doubtful 75 Huawei s position has shifted in 2019 when Dr Song Liuping Huawei s chief legal officer commented on the US government ban said Politicians in the US are using the strength of an entire nation to come after a private company emphasis added 76 Leadership Edit Ren Zhengfei is the founder and CEO of Huawei and has the power to veto any decisions made by the board of directors 77 78 Huawei also has rotating co CEOs 36 11 Huawei disclosed its list of board of directors for the first time in 2010 79 Liang Hua is the current chair of the board As of 2019 update the members of the board are Liang Hua Guo Ping Xu Zhijun Hu Houkun Meng Wanzhou CFO and deputy chairwoman Ding Yun Yu Chengdong Wang Tao Xu Wenwei Shen Han Chiu Chen Lifang Peng Zhongyang He Tingbo Li Yingtao Ren Zhengfei Yao Fuhai Tao Jingwen and Yan Lida 80 Guo Ping is the Chairman of Huawei Device Huawei s mobile phone division 81 Huawei s Chief Ethics amp Compliance Officer is Zhou Daiqi 82 who is also Huawei s Chinese Communist Party Committee Secretary 83 Their chief legal officer is Song Liuping 76 Ownership Edit At its founding in 1987 Huawei was established as a collectively owned enterprise 36 213 Collectively owned enterprises were an intermediary corporate ownership status between state owned enterprises and private businesses 84 36 213 The Chinese government began issuing licenses for private businesses starting in 1992 36 213 Huawei states it is an employee owned company but this remains a point of dispute 77 85 Ren Zhengfei retains approximately 1 percent of the shares of Huawei s holding company Huawei Investment amp Holding 85 with the remainder of the shares held by a trade union committee not a trade union per se and the internal governance procedures of this committee its members its leaders or how they are selected all remain undisclosed to the public that is claimed to be representative of Huawei s employee shareholders 77 86 The company s trade union committee is registered with and pay dues to the Shenzhen federation of the All China Federation of Trade Unions which is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party 87 About half of Huawei staff participate in this structure foreign employees are not eligible and hold what the company calls virtual restricted shares These shares are non tradable and are allocated to reward performance 88 When employees leave Huawei their shares revert to the company which compensates them for their holding 89 Although employee shareholders receive dividends 86 their shares do not entitle them to any direct influence in management decisions but enables them to vote for members of the 115 person Representatives Commission from a pre selected list of candidates 86 The Representatives Commission selects Huawei Holding s board of directors and Board of Supervisors 90 Academics Christopher Balding of Fulbright University and Donald C Clarke of George Washington University have described Huawei s virtual stock program as purely a profit sharing incentive scheme that has nothing to do with financing or control 91 They found that after a few stages of historical morphing employees do not own a part of Huawei through their shares Instead the virtual stock is a contract right not a property right it gives the holder no voting power in either Huawei Tech or Huawei Holding cannot be transferred and is cancelled when the employee leaves the firm subject to a redemption payment from Huawei Holding TUC at a low fixed price 92 77 Balding and Clarke add given the public nature of trade unions in China if the ownership stake of the trade union committee is genuine and if the trade union and its committee function as trade unions generally function in China then Huawei may be deemed effectively state owned 77 Tim Ruhlig a Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs asked Huawei for a response to the Balding and Clarke paper the information provided by Huawei gives an indication of how difficult it is to run an independent company in such a crucial sector in China 93 After the publication of Balding and Clarke s paper Huawei has engaged in a PR blitz to manufacture an image of a transparent company 94 Academic Toshio Goto of the Japan University of Economics has disagreed with Balding and Clarke s assessment of Huawei employee shareholders ownership 95 13 Goto writes that the Huawei s ownership structure is a function of its formation amid the Chinese reforms with the only mechanism for concentrating employee ownership under Shenzen s 1997 Provisions on State owned Company Employee Stock Option Plans being to do so via Huawei s trade union 95 25 In contrast to Balding and Clarke Goto writes that the Huawei s virtual shares are substantially equivalent to voting stock and that nominal ownership through the trade union does not change the legal and financial independence of employee ownership from the union itself 95 25 Goto concludes that the firm is effectively owned by employees and therefore it is not effectively state owned 95 25 In analyzing Huawei s corporate governance and ownership structure Academic Wang Jun of the Chinese University of Politics and Law also rejects the argument that Huawei is a state owned enterprise controlled by a labor union writing that normative practices and legal requirements distinguish between the shareholding vehicle of union held employee assets and assets belonging to the union itself 96 Academics Kunyuan Qiao of Cornell University and Christopher Marquis of the University of Cambridge likewise conclude that Huawei is a private company owned collectively by its employees and is neither owned nor controlled directly by the Chinese government 36 11 In 2021 Huawei did not report its ultimate beneficial ownership in Europe as required by European anti money laundering laws 97 Lobbying and public relations Edit In July 2021 Huawei hired Tony Podesta as a consultant and lobbyist with a goal of nurturing the company s relationship with the Biden administration 98 99 Huawei has also hired public relations firms Ruder Finn Wavemaker Racepoint Global and Burson Cohn amp Wolfe for various campaigns 100 Corporate culture Edit According to its CEO and founder Ren Huawei s corporate culture is the same as the culture of the CCP and to serve the people wholeheartedly means to be customer centric and responsible to society 36 9 Ren frequently states that Huawei s management philosophy and strategy are commercial applications of Maoism 36 11 Ren states that in the event of a conflict between Huawei s business interests and the CCP s interests he would choose the CCP whose interest is to serve the people and all human beings 36 11 Qiao and Marquis observe that company founder Ren is a dedicated communist who seeks to ingrain communist values at Huawei 36 9 Partners Edit nbsp Huawei P9 was the first smartphone to be co engineered with a Leica cameraAs of the beginning of 2010 update approximately 80 of the world s top 50 telecoms companies had worked with Huawei 101 In 2016 German camera company Leica has established a partnership with Huawei and Leica cameras will be co engineered into Huawei smartphones including the P and Mate Series The first smartphone to be co engineered with a Leica camera was the Huawei P9 102 In August 2019 Huawei collaborated with eyewear company Gentle Monster and released smartglasses 103 In November 2019 Huawei partners with Devialet and unveiled a new specifically designed speaker the Sound X 104 In October 2020 Huawei released its own mapping service Petal Maps which was developed in partnership with Dutch navigation device manufacturer TomTom 105 Products and services EditTelecommunication networks Edit Huawei offers mobile and fixed softswitches plus next generation home location register and Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystems IMS Huawei sells xDSL passive optical network PON and next generation PON NG PON on a single platform The company also offers mobile infrastructure broadband access and service provider routers and switches SPRS Huawei s software products include service delivery platforms SDPs base station subsystems and more 106 Global services Edit Huawei Global Services provides telecommunications operators with equipment to build and operate networks as well as consulting and engineering services to improve operational efficiencies 107 These include network integration services such as those for mobile and fixed networks assurance services such as network safety and learning services such as competency consulting 106 Devices Edit nbsp A Huawei Band 7 fitness tracker in Wilderness Green colour Huawei s Devices division provides white label products to content service providers including USB modems wireless modems and wireless routers for mobile Wi Fi 108 embedded modules fixed wireless terminals wireless gateways set top boxes mobile handsets and video products 109 Huawei also produces and sells a variety of devices under its own name such as the IDEOS smartphones tablet PCs and Huawei Smartwatch 110 111 Phones Edit Main article List of Huawei phones Huawei is the second biggest smartphone maker in the world after Samsung as of the first quarter of 2019 Their portfolio of phones includes both high end smartphones its Huawei Mate series and Huawei P series and cheaper handsets that fall under its Honor brand 112 Cheaper handsets fall under its Honor brand 113 Honor was created in order to elevate Huawei branded phones as premium offerings In 2020 Huawei agreed to sell the Honor brand to a state owned enterprise of the Shenzhen municipal government Consequently Honor was initially reported to be cut off from access to Huawei s IPs which consists of more than 100 000 active patents by the end of 2020 and additionally cannot tap into Huawei s large R amp D resources where 20 billion had been committed for 2021 However Wired magazine noted in 2021 that Honor devices still had not differentiated their software much from Huawei phones and that core apps and certain engineering features like the Honor engineered camera features looked virtually identical across both phones 20 113 History of Huawei phones Edit nbsp The Huawei P30 with rear triple lens Leica optics cameraIn July 2003 Huawei established their handset department and by 2004 Huawei shipped their first phone the C300 The U626 was Huawei s first 3G phone in June 2005 and in 2006 Huawei launched the first Vodafone branded 3G handset the V710 The U8220 was Huawei s first Android smartphone and was unveiled in MWC 2009 At CES 2012 Huawei introduced the Ascend range starting with the Ascend P1 S At MWC 2012 Huawei launched the Ascend D1 In September 2012 Huawei launched their first 4G ready phone the Ascend P1 LTE At CES 2013 Huawei launched the Ascend D2 and the Ascend Mate At MWC 2013 the Ascend P2 was launched as the world s first LTE Cat4 smartphone In June 2013 Huawei launched the Ascend P6 and in December 2013 Huawei introduced Honor as a subsidiary independent brand in China At CES 2014 Huawei launched the Ascend Mate2 4G in 2014 and at MWC 2014 Huawei launched the MediaPad X1 tablet and Ascend G6 4G smartphone Other launched in 2014 included the Ascend P7 in May 2014 the Ascend Mate7 the Ascend G7 and the Ascend P7 Sapphire Edition as China s first 4G smartphone with a sapphire screen 114 In January 2015 Huawei discontinued the Ascend brand for its flagship phones and launched the new P series with the Huawei P8 115 116 Huawei also partnered with Google to build the Nexus 6P which was released in September 2015 117 In May 2018 Huawei stated that they will no longer allow unlocking the bootloader of their phones to allow installing third party system software or security updates after Huawei stops them 118 Huawei is currently the most well known international corporation in China and a pioneer of the 5G mobile phone standard which has come to be used globally in the last few years 119 Laptops Edit Main article Huawei MateBook series nbsp Huawei Matebook 2 in 1 tabletIn 2016 Huawei entered the laptop markets with the release of its Huawei MateBook series of laptops 120 They have continued to release laptop models in this series into 2020 with their most recent models being the MateBook X Pro and Matebook 13 2020 121 Tablets Edit Main article Huawei MatePad Pro The Huawei MatePad Pro launched in November 2019 122 Huawei is number one in the Chinese tablet market and number two globally as of 4Q 2019 123 Wearables Edit Main article Huawei Watch The Huawei Watch is an Android Wear based smartwatch developed by Huawei It was released at Internationale Funkausstellung Berlin on 2 September 2015 124 It is the first smartwatch produced by Huawei 124 Their latest watch the Huawei Watch GT 2e was launched in India in May 2020 125 Software Edit EMUI Emotion User Interface Edit Main article EMUI Emotion UI EMUI is a ROM OS developed by Huawei Technologies Co Ltd and based on Google s Android Open Source Project AOSP EMUI is pre installed on most Huawei Smartphone devices and its subsidiaries the Honor series 126 Harmony OS Edit Main article Harmony OS On 9 August 2019 Huawei officially unveiled Harmony OS at its inaugural developers conference HDC in Dongguan Huawei described Harmony as a free microkernel based distributed operating system for various types of hardware with faster inter process communication than QNX or Google s Fuchsia microkernel and real time resource allocation The ARK compiler can be used to port Android APK packages to the OS Huawei stated that developers would be able to flexibly deploy Harmony OS software across various device categories the company focused primarily on IoT devices including smart displays wearable devices and in car entertainment systems and did not explicitly position Harmony OS as a mobile OS 127 128 Huawei Mobile Services HMS Edit Huawei Mobile Services HMS is Huawei s solution to GMS Google Mobile services it was created to work over Android System so Android applications can work over Huawei HMS Mobile phones if those don t use Google Mobile Services HMS is part of Huawei ecosystem which Huawei developed complete solutions for several scenarios One of their major application is called Huawei AppGallery which is Huawei app store created as a competitor to Google s Android Play Store As of December 2019 it was in version 4 0 and as of 16 January 2020 the company reports it has signed up 55 000 apps using its HMS Core software 129 Automobile Edit Huawei has secured collaboration with a few automakers including Seres Chery BAIC Motor Changan Automobile and GAC Group 130 AITO Edit Main article AITO marque The Aito brand 问界 Wenjie is Huawei s premium EV brand in cooperation with Seres In December 2021 the AITO M5 was unveiled as the first vehicle to be developed in cooperation with Huawei The model was developed mainly by Seres and is essentially a restyled Seres SF5 crossover 131 The model was sold under a new brand called AITO which stands for Adding Intelligence to Auto and uses Huawei DriveONE and HarmonyOS while the Seres SF5 used Huawei DriveONE and HiCar 132 nbsp AITO M5 front quarter view nbsp AITO M5 rear quarter view nbsp AITO M5 interiorAVATR Edit The Avatr brand is Huawei s premium EV brand in cooperation with Changan Automobile and CATL Luxeed Edit The Luxeed brand 智界 Zhijie is Huawei s premium EV brand in cooperation with Chery with the first vehicle being the Luxeed S7 previously called the Chery EH3 133 an upcoming premium electric executive sedan due to be unveiled in Q3 2023 and would be the first car to have the Harmony OS 4 system on board 134 Huawei Solar Edit Huawei entered the photovoltaic PV market in 2011 and opened an Energy Center of Competence in Nuremberg Germany the same year 135 In September 2016 Huawei integrated new manufacturing capabilities into its Eindhoven hub in the Netherlands where it can produce 7 000 inverter units per month 135 In October that same year Huawei entered the North American market and formed a strategic partnership with Strata Solar 135 In April 2017 Huawei enters the residential solar market with the launch of its string solar inverters and DC power optimizers 135 As of 2022 Huawei is the largest producer of solar inverters in the world with a 29 market share which saw a significant shipment increase of 83 compared to 2021 136 Competitive position EditHuawei Technologies Co Ltd was the world s largest telecom equipment maker in 2012 5 and China s largest telephone network equipment maker 137 With 3 442 patents Huawei became the world s No 1 applicant for international patents in 2014 138 In 2019 Huawei had the second most patents granted by the European Patent Office 139 In 2021 the World Intellectual Property Organization WIPO s annual World Intellectual Property Indicators report ranked Huawei s number of patent applications published under the PCT System as 1st in the world with 5464 patent applications being published during 2020 140 As of 2023 Huawei is the leading 5G equipment manufacturer and has the greatest market share of 5G equipment and has built approximately 70 of worldwide 5G base stations 141 182 Research and Development Edit As of 2021 update more than half of Huawei s employees are involved in research 142 119 In the same year Huawei spent 22 1 billion on R amp D around 22 4 of its net sales being one of the six companies in the world to spend more than 20 billion on R amp D spending 143 The company has twenty one R amp D institutes in countries including China the United States 144 Canada 145 the United Kingdom 146 Pakistan Finland France Belgium Germany Colombia Sweden Ireland India 147 Russia Israel and Turkey 148 149 Huawei is considering opening a new research and development R amp D center in Russia 2019 2020 which would be the third in the country after the Moscow and St Petersburg R amp D centers Huawei also announced plans November 2018 to open an R amp D center in the French city of Grenoble which would be mainly focused on smartphone sensors and parallel computing software development The new R amp D team in Grenoble was expected to grow to 30 researchers by 2020 said the company The company said that this new addition brought to five the number of its R amp D teams in the country two were located in Sophia Antipolis and Paris researching image processing and design while the other two existing teams were based at Huawei s facilities in Boulogne Billancourt working on algorithms and mobile and 5G standards The technology giant also intended to open two new research centers in Zurich and Lausanne Switzerland Huawei at the time employed around 350 people in Switzerland 150 151 Huawei also funds research partnerships with universities such as the University of British Columbia the University of Waterloo the University of Western Ontario the University of Guelph and Universite Laval 152 153 Controversies EditMain article Criticism of Huawei Huawei has faced allegations that its products contain backdoors for Chinese government espionage and domestic laws require Chinese citizens and companies to cooperate with state intelligence when warranted Huawei executives denied these claims saying that the company has not received requests by the Chinese government to introduce backdoors in its equipment would refuse to do so and that Chinese law does not compel them to do so As of 2019 the United States had not produced evidence of coordinated hacking by Huawei 154 155 156 157 Early business practices Edit Huawei employed a complex system of agreements with local state owned telephone companies that seemed to include illicit payments to the local telecommunications bureau employees During the late 1990s the company created several joint ventures with their state owned telecommunications company customers By 1998 Huawei had signed agreements with municipal and provincial telephone bureaus to create Shanghai Huawei Chengdu Huawei Shenyang Huawei Anhui Huawei Sichuan Huawei and other companies The joint ventures were actually shell companies and were a way to funnel money to local telecommunications employees so that Huawei could get deals to sell them equipment In the case of Sichuan Huawei for example local partners could get 60 70 percent of their investment returned in the form of annual dividends 158 Allegations of state support Edit Martin Thorley of the University of Nottingham noted that a company of Huawei s size working in what is considered a sensitive sector simply cannot succeed in China without extensive links to the Party 15 Klon Kitchen has suggested that 5G dominance is essential to China in order to achieve its vision where the prosperity of state run capitalism is combined with the stability and security of technologically enabled authoritarianism 159 Nigel Inkster of the International Institute for Strategic Studies suggested that Huawei involvement in the core backbone 5G infrastructure of developed western liberal democracies is a strategic game changer because 5G is a game changer with national telecoms champions playing a key role which in turn is part of China s ambitious strategy to reshape the planet in line with its interests through the Belt and Road Initiative 15 On 7 October 2020 the U K Parliament s Defence Committee released a report concluding that there was evidence of collusion between Huawei and Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party based upon ownership model and government subsidies it has received 160 It has been observed that the Chinese government has granted Huawei much more comprehensive support than other domestic companies facing troubles abroad such as ByteDance since Huawei is considered a national champion along with Alibaba Group and Tencent 9 161 For instance after Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou was detained in Canada pending extradition to the United States for fraud charges China immediately arrested Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in what was widely viewed as hostage diplomacy 9 162 China has also imposed tariffs on Australian imports in 2020 in apparent retaliation for Huawei and ZTE being excluded from Australia s 5G network in 2018 9 In June 2020 when the UK mulled reversing an earlier decision to permit Huawei s participation in 5G China threatened retaliation in other sectors by withholding investments in power generation and high speed rail A House of Commons defence committee found that Beijing had exerted pressure through covert and overt threats to keep Huawei in the UK s 5G network 160 US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reassured the UK saying the US stands with our allies and partners against the Chinese Communist Party s coercive bullying tactics and the US stands ready to assist our friends in the UK with any needs they have from building secure and reliable nuclear power plants to developing trusted 5G solutions that protect their citizens privacy 163 The optics of Beijing s diplomats coming to Huawei s defense in the European Union has also contradicted Huawei s claims that it is fully independent from the Chinese government 164 In November 2019 the Chinese ambassador to Denmark in meetings with high ranking Faroese politicians directly linked Huawei s 5G expansion with Chinese trade according to a sound recording obtained by Kringvarp Foroya According to Berlingske the ambassador threatened with dropping a planned trade deal with the Faroe Islands if the Faroese telecom company Foroya Tele did not let Huawei build the national 5G network Huawei said they did not know about the meetings 165 China s ambassador to Germany Wu Ken warned that there will be consequences if Huawei was excluded and floated the possibility of German cars being banned on safety grounds 166 167 The Wall Street Journal has suggested that Huawei received approximately 46 billion in loans and other support coupled with 25 billion in tax cuts since the Chinese government had a vested interest in fostering a company to compete against Apple and Samsung 8 In particular China s state owned banks such as the China Development Bank and the Export Import Bank of China make loans to Huawei customers which substantially undercut competitors financing with lower interest and cash in advance with China Development Bank providing a credit line totaling US 30 billion between 2004 and 2009 In 2010 the European Commission launched an investigation into China s subsidies that distorted global markets and harmed European vendors and Huawei offered the initial complainant US 56 million to withdraw the complaint in an attempt to shut down the investigation Then European Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht found that Huawei leveraged state support to underbid competitors by up to 70 percent 168 Allegations of military and intelligence ties Edit See also Concerns over Chinese involvement in 5G wireless networks and Chinese intelligence activity abroad According to documents leaked by Edward Snowden the National Security Agency infiltrated Huawei s computer network in 2009 The White House intelligence coordinator and the FBI were also involved The operation obtained a list of 1 400 Huawei customers as well as the company s internal training documents In addition the company s central email archive was accessed including messages from founder Ren Zhengfei and chairwoman Sun Yafang So much data was gathered that we don t know what to do with it according to a leaked NSA document The agency was concerned that Huawei s infrastructure could provide China with signals intelligence capabilities 169 In 2011 a report by the Open Source Enterprise detailed its suspicions over potential close links between Huawei and the Chinese Government such as former chairwoman Sun Yafang s prior employment by the Ministry of State Security MSS s Communications Department 170 171 172 In 2019 Ren Zhengfei stated we never participate in espionage and we do not allow any of our employees to do any act like that And we absolutely never install backdoors Even if we were required by Chinese law we would firmly reject that 173 174 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang was quoted saying the Chinese government did not and will not ask Chinese companies to spy on other countries such kind of action is not consistent with the Chinese law and is not how China behaves Huawei has cited the opinion of Zhong Lun Law Firm co signed by a CCP member 175 whose lawyers testified to the FCC that the National Intelligence Law doesn t apply to Huawei The opinion of Zhong Lun lawyers reviewed by British law firm Clifford Chance has been distributed widely by Huawei as an independent legal opinion although Clifford Chance added a disclaimer stated that the material should not be construed as constituting a legal opinion on the application of PRC law 175 176 Follow up reporting from Wired cast doubt on the findings of Zhong Lun particularly because the Chinese government doesn t limit itself to what the law explicitly allows when it comes to national security 177 All Chinese citizens and organisations are obliged to cooperate upon request with PRC intelligence operations and also maintain the secrecy of such operations as explicitly stipulated in Article 7 of the 2017 PRC national intelligence gathering activities law 175 Tim Ruhlig a Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs observed that Not least in the light of the lack of the rule of law in China but also given the clarity of the Intelligence Law this legal opinion by Clifford Chance does not provide any substantial reassurance that Huawei could decline to cooperate with Chinese intelligence even if the company wanted to do so 178 Experts have pointed out that under President Xi s intensifying authoritarianism since Beijing promulgated a new national intelligence law in 2017 as well as the 2014 Counter Espionage Law both of which are vaguely defined and far reaching The two laws compel Chinese businesses to work with Chinese intelligence and security agencies whenever they are requested to do so suggesting that Huawei or other domestic major technology companies could not refuse to cooperate with Chinese intelligence Jerome Cohen a New York University law professor and Council on Foreign Relations adjunct senior fellow stated Not only is this mandated by existing legislation but more important also by political reality and the organizational structure and operation of the Party State s economy The Party is embedded in Huawei and controls it 15 One former Huawei employee said The state wants to use Huawei and it can use it if it wants Everyone has to listen to the state Every person Every company and every individual and you can t talk about it You can t say you don t like it That s just China The new cybersecurity law also requires domestic companies and eventually foreign subsidiaries to use state certified network equipment and software so that their data and communications are fully visible to China s Cybersecurity Bureau 9 179 175 176 University of Nottingham s Martin Thorley has suggested that Huawei would have no recourse to oppose the CCP s request in court since the party controls the police the media the judiciary and the government 15 Klon Kitchen has suggested that 5G dominance is essential to China in order to achieve its vision where the prosperity of state run capitalism is combined with the stability and security of technologically enabled authoritarianism 159 In 2019 Henry Jackson Society researchers conducted an analysis of 25 000 Huawei employee CVs and found that some had worked or trained with China s Ministry of State Security the People s Liberation Army PLA its academies and a military unit accused of hacking US corporations including 11 alumni from a PLA information engineering school 180 One of the study researchers says this shows a strong relationship between Huawei and all levels of the Chinese state Chinese military and Chinese intelligence This to me appears to be a systemized structural relationship 181 In a report by academics Christopher Balding of Fulbright University and Donald C Clarke of George Washington University a person simultaneously held a position at Huawei and a teaching and research role at a military university through which they were employed by the Chinese People s Liberation Army a section in the PLA that is responsible for the Chinese military s space cyber and electronic warfare capabilities 182 Charles Parton a British diplomat said this give the lie to Huawei s claim that there is no evidence that they help the Chinese intelligence services This gun is smoking 180 Huawei said that while it does not work on Chinese military or intelligence projects it is no secret that some employees have a previous government background It criticized the report s speculative language such as believes infers and cannot rule out 182 In 2014 the National Security Agency penetrated Huawei s corporate networks in China to search for links between the company and the People s Liberation Army It was able to monitor accounts belonging to Huawei employees and its founder Ren Zhengfei 16 Michael Wessel a member of the U S China Economic and Security Review Commission was quoted as saying If there s a locksmith who s installing more and more locks on the doors in a community and suddenly there s a rash of silent robberies at some point the locksmith becomes a person of interest Huawei around that time became a significant entity of interest 16 A report from Bloomberg News stated that Australian intelligence in 2012 detected a backdoor in the country s telecom network and shared its findings with the United States who reported similar hacks It was reportedly caused by a software update from Huawei carrying malicious code that transmitted data to China before deleting itself Investigators managed to reconstruct the exploit and determined that Huawei technicians must have pushed the update through the network on behalf of China s spy agencies Huawei said updates would have required authorization from the customer and that no tangible evidence was presented China s Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the accusation a slander Australian telecom operators Optus and Vodafone disputed that they were compromised 16 17 In addition senior security officials in Uganda and Zambia admitted that Huawei played key roles enabling their governments to spy on political opponents 9 Inside the African Union headquarters whose computer systems were supplied by Huawei and paid for by the Chinese government IT staff discovered that data transfers on its servers peaked after hours from January 2012 to January 2017 with the African Union s internal data sent to unknown servers hosted in Shanghai 9 In May 2019 a Huawei Mediapad M5 belonging to a Canadian IT engineer living in Taiwan was found to be sending data to servers in China despite never being authorized to do so as the apps could not be disabled and continued to send sensitive data even after appearing to be deleted 183 At the end of 2019 United States officials disclosed to the United Kingdom and Germany that Huawei has had the ability to covertly exploit backdoors intended for law enforcement officials since 2009 as these backdoors are found on carrier equipment like antennas and routers and Huawei s equipment is widely used around the world due to its low cost 184 185 The United Kingdom established a lab that it ran but which was paid for by Huawei to evaluate Huawei equipment 56 322 After eight years of study the lab did not identify any Huawei backdoor but concluded that Huawei s equipment had bugs that could be exploited by hackers 56 322 Timeline Edit Yale University economist Stephen Roach states that there is no hard evidence to support the key allegations regarding a backdoor for industrial espionage 142 118 Roach writes that there is a single documented instance of Huawei installed software having an arguable backdoor European telecom Vodafone disclosed in 2011 that its Italian fixed line network contained a security vulnerability in its Huawei installed software 142 118 119 Huawei fixed the vulnerability at Vodafone s request 142 118 There was no report of any suspicious data capture or systems control activity 142 118 Vodafone was satisfied with the outcome and thereafter increased its reliance on Huawei as an equipment supplier 142 118 A 2012 White House ordered security review found no evidence that Huawei spied for China and said instead that security vulnerabilities on its products posed a greater threat to its users The details of the leaked review came a week after a US House Intelligence Committee report which warned against letting Huawei supply critical telecommunications infrastructure in the United States 186 Huawei has been at the center of concerns over Chinese involvement in 5G wireless networks In 2018 the United States passed a defense funding bill that contained a passage barring the federal government from doing business with Huawei ZTE and several Chinese vendors of surveillance products due to security concerns 187 188 189 The Chinese government has threatened economic retaliation against countries that block Huawei s market access 163 Similarly in November 2018 New Zealand blocked Huawei from supplying mobile equipment to national telecommunications company Spark New Zealand s 5G network citing a significant network security risk and concerns about China s National Intelligence Law 190 191 Between December 2018 and January 2019 German and British intelligence agencies initially pushed back against the US allegations stating that after examining Huawei s 5G hardware and accompanying source code they have found no evidence of malevolence and that a ban would therefore be unwarranted 192 193 Additionally the head of Britain s National Cyber Security Centre the information security arm of GCHQ stated that the US has not managed to provide the UK with any proof of its allegations against Huawei and also their agency had concluded that any risks involving Huawei in UK s telecom networks are manageable 194 193 The Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre HCSEC set up in 2010 to assuage security fears as it examined Huawei hardware and software for the UK market was staffed largely by employees from Huawei but with regular oversight from GCHQ which led to questions of operating independence from Huawei 195 On 1 October 2020 an official report released by National Cyber Security Centre noted that Huawei has failed to adequately tackle security flaws in equipment used in the UK s telecoms networks despite previous complaints and flagged one vulnerability of national significance related to broadband in 2019 The report concluded that Huawei was not confident of implementing the five year plan of improving its software engineering processes so there was limited assurance that all risks to UK national security could be mitigated in the long term 196 On 14 July 2020 the United Kingdom Government announced a ban on the use of company s 5G network equipment citing security concerns 197 In October 2020 the British Defence Select Committee announced that it had found evidence of Huawei s collusion with the Chinese state and that it supported accelerated purging of Huawei equipment from Britain s telecom infrastructure by 2025 since they concluded that Huawei had engaged in a variety of intelligence security and intellectual property activities despite its repeated denials 160 198 In November 2020 Huawei challenged the UK government s decision citing an Oxford Economics report that it had contributed 3 3 billion to the UK s GDP 199 In March 2019 Huawei filed three defamation claims over comments suggesting ties to the Chinese government made on television by a French researcher a broadcast journalist and a telecommunications sector expert 200 In June 2020 ANSSI informed French telecommunications companies that they would not be allowed to renew licenses for 5G equipment made from Huawei after 2028 201 On 28 August 2020 French President Emmanuel Macron assured the Chinese government that it did not ban Huawei products from participating in its fifth generation mobile roll out but favored European providers for security reasons The head of the France s cybersecurity agency also stated that it has granted time limited waivers on 5G for wireless operators that use Huawei products a decision that likely started a phasing out of the company s products 202 In February 2020 US government officials claimed that Huawei has had the ability to covertly exploit backdoors intended for law enforcement officials in carrier equipment like antennas and routers since 2009 184 185 In mid July 2020 Andrew Little the Minister in charge of New Zealand s signals intelligence agency the Government Communications Security Bureau GCSB announced that New Zealand would not join the United Kingdom and United States in banning Huawei from the country s 5G network 203 204 In May 2022 Canada s industry minister Francois Philippe Champagne announced that Canada will ban Huawei from the country s 5G network in an effort to protect the safety and security of Canadians as well as to protect Canada s infrastructure 205 The Canadian federal government cited national security concerns for the move saying that the suppliers could be forced to company with extrajudicial directions from foreign governments in ways that could conflict with Canadian laws or would be detrimental to Canadian interests Telcos will be prevented from procuring new 4G or 5G equipment from Huawei and ZTE and must remove all ZTE and Huawei branded 5G equipment from their networks by 28 June 2024 206 Meng Wanzhou case Edit This section is an excerpt from Extradition case of Meng Wanzhou edit nbsp Meng during her time under house arrest in Vancouver in 2021On December 1 2018 Huawei s board deputy chair Meng Wanzhou was detained upon arrival at Vancouver International Airport by Canada Border Services Agency officers for questioning which lasted three hours 207 208 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police subsequently arrested her on a provisional U S extradition request for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in order to circumvent U S sanctions against Iran 207 209 On January 28 2019 the U S Department of Justice formally announced financial fraud charges against Meng 210 211 The first stage of the extradition hearing for Meng began Monday January 20 2020 and concluded on May 27 2020 when the Supreme Court of British Columbia ordered the extradition to proceed 212 213 During the extradition courtroom proceedings Meng s lawyers made several allegations against the prosecution including allegations of unlawful detention of Meng 214 unlawful search and seizure 215 extradition law violations 216 misrepresentation 217 218 219 international law violation 220 and fabricated testimonies by the CBSA 221 each of which were responded to by the prosecution 222 223 224 225 In August 2021 the extradition judge questioned the regularity of the case and expressed great difficulty in understanding how the Record of Case ROC presented by the US supported their allegation of criminality 226 227 228 On 24 September 2021 the Department of Justice announced it had reached a deal with Meng to resolve the case through a deferred prosecution agreement As part of the deal Meng agreed to a statement of facts that said she had made untrue statements to HSBC to enable transactions in the U S at least some of which supported Huawei s work in Iran in violation of U S sanctions but did not have to pay a fine nor plead guilty to her key charges 229 230 231 The Department of Justice said it would move to dismiss all charges against Meng when the deferral period ends on 21 December 2022 on the condition that Meng is not charged with a crime before then 232 Meng left Canada for China on 24 September 2021 hours after news of the deal Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig two Canadians whose detention were widely seen as retaliation for Meng s arrest were released from detention in China and flown back to Canada 233 On December 2 2022 the presiding judge dismissed the charges against Meng following the United States government s request 234 Intellectual property infringement Edit Further information Allegations of intellectual property theft by China Huawei has settled with Cisco Systems Motorola and PanOptis in patent infringement lawsuits 235 236 237 In 2018 a German court ruled against Huawei and ZTE in favor of MPEG LA which holds patents related to Advanced Video Coding 238 Huawei has been accused of intellectual property theft 239 240 In February 2003 Cisco Systems sued Huawei Technologies for allegedly infringing on its patents and illegally copying source code used in its routers and switches 241 non primary source needed By July 2004 Huawei removed the contested code manuals and command line interfaces and the case was subsequently settled out of court 242 As part of the settlement Huawei admitted that it had copied some of Cisco s router software 243 At the 2004 Supercomm tech conference in Chicago a Huawei employee allegedly opened up the networking equipment of other companies to photograph the circuit boards 243 244 Brian Shields former chief security officer at Nortel said that his company was compromised in 2004 by Chinese hackers executive credentials were accessed remotely and entire computers were taken over Shields does not believe Huawei was directly involved but thinks that Huawei was a beneficiary of the hack Documents taken included product roadmaps sales proposals and technical papers 244 Nortel sought for but failed to receive help from the RCMP The CSIS said it approached the company but was rebuffed 245 45 Cybersecurity experts have some doubts about a hack of such magnitude as described by Shields calling it unlikely 245 An extensive analysis by University of Ottowa professor Jonathan Calof and recollections of former Nortel executive Tim Dempsey place the blame mostly on strategic mistakes and poor management at Nortel On the other hand some employees recall when Huawei or a front company returned a fibre card to Nortel disassembled around a time when knock offs products emerged in Asia There remains a suspicion that industrial espionage brought down or at least accelerated Nortel s demise 244 In 2017 a jury found that Huawei had misappropriated trade secrets of T Mobile US but awarded damages only for a breach of supplier contract it did not compensate T Mobile for claims of espionage 246 In February 2020 the United States Department of Justice charged Huawei with racketeering and conspiring to steal trade secrets from six US firms 247 Huawei said those allegations some going back almost 20 years had never been found as a basis for any significant monetary judgment 248 247 North Korea Edit Leaked documents obtained by The Washington Post in 2019 raised questions about whether Huawei conducted business secretly with North Korea which was under numerous US sanctions 249 Xinjiang internment camps Edit Further information Uyghur genocide and Xinjiang internment camps Huawei has assisted in the mass surveillance and detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang internment camps resulting in sanctions by the United States Department of State 10 250 11 251 Huawei also developed facial recognition software that recognizes ethnicity specific features for surveillance 12 252 In January 2021 it was reported that Huawei previously filed a patent with the China National Intellectual Property Administration for a technology to identify Uyghur pedestrians 253 In 2019 the Australian Strategic Policy Institute a think tank often described as hawkish in Australian media 254 accused Huawei of assisting in the mass detention of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang internment camps 250 11 255 Huawei technology used by the Xinjiang internal security forces for data analysis 256 and companies supplying Huawei operating in the Xinjiang region are accused of using forced labor 257 However Huawei denied these reports 258 US sanctions EditFurther information United States sanctions against China Before the 2020 semiconductor ban Edit In August 2018 the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA 2019 was signed into law containing a provision that banned Huawei and ZTE equipment from being used by the US federal government citing security concerns 259 Huawei filed a lawsuit over the act in March 2019 260 alleging it to be unconstitutional because it specifically targeted Huawei without granting it a chance to provide a rebuttal or due process 261 Additionally on 15 May 2019 the Department of Commerce added Huawei and 70 foreign subsidiaries and affiliates to its Entity List under the Export Administration Regulations citing the company having been indicted for knowingly and willfully causing the export re export sale and supply directly and indirectly of goods technology and services banking and other financial services from the United States to Iran and the government of Iran without obtaining a license from the Department of Treasury s Office of Foreign Assets Control OFAC 262 This restricts US companies from doing business with Huawei without a government license 263 264 265 Various US based companies immediately froze their business with Huawei to comply with the regulation 266 The May 2019 ban on Huawei was partial it did not affect most non American produced chips and the Trump administration granted a series of extensions on the ban in any case 267 with another 90 day reprieve issued in May 2020 268 In May 2020 the US extended the ban to cover semiconductors customized for Huawei and made with US technology 269 In August 2020 the US again extended the ban to a blanket ban on all semiconductor sales to Huawei 269 The blanket ban took effect in September 2020 270 After 2020 Edit The sanctions regime established in September 2020 negatively affected Huawei production sales and financial projections 271 272 273 However on 29 June 2019 at the G20 summit the US President made statements implicating plans to ease the restrictions on US companies doing business with Huawei 274 275 276 Despite this statement on 15 May 2020 the U S Department of Commerce extended its export restrictions to bar Huawei from producing semiconductors derived from technology or software of US origin even if the manufacturing is performed overseas 277 278 279 In June 2020 the Federal Communications Commission FCC designated Huawei a national security threat thereby barring it from any US subsidies 280 In July 2020 the Federal Acquisition Regulation Council published a Federal Register notice prohibiting all federal government contractors from selling Huawei hardware to the federal government and preventing federal contractors from using Huawei hardware 281 In November 2020 Donald Trump issued an executive order prohibiting any American company or individual from owning shares in companies that the United States Department of Defense has listed as having links to the People s Liberation Army which included Huawei 282 283 284 In January 2021 the Trump administration revoked licenses from US companies such as Intel from supplying products and technologies to Huawei 285 In June 2021 the FCC voted unanimously to prohibit approvals of Huawei gear in US telecommunication networks on national security grounds 286 In June 2021 the administration of Joe Biden began to persuade the United Arab Emirates to remove the Huawei Technologies Co equipment from its telecommunications network while ensuring to further distance itself from China It came as an added threat to the 23 billion arms deal of F 35 fighter jets and Reaper drones between the US and the UAE The Emirates got a deadline of four years from Washington to replace the Chinese network 287 A report in September 2021 analyzed how the UAE was struggling between maintaining its relations with both the United States and China While Washington had a hawkish stance towards Beijing the increasing Emirati relations with China have strained those with America In that light the Western nation has raised concerns for the UAE to beware of the security threat that the Chinese technologies like Huawei 5G telecommunications network possessed However the Gulf nations like the Emirates and Saudi Arabia defended their decision of picking Chinese technology over the American saying that it is much cheaper and had no political conditions 288 On 18 November 2020 an opposition motion calling on the government for a decision on the participation of Huawei in Canada s 5G network and a plan on combating what it called Chinese aggression passed 179 to 146 The non binding motion was supported by the NDP and Bloc Quebecois 289 In May 2022 Canada s government banned Huawei and ZTE equipment from the country s 5G network with companies having until 28 June 2024 to remove 5G equipment from these Chinese vendors 290 Christopher Parsons of the University of Toronto s Citizen Lab stated that continued use of Huawei and ZTE equipment would have given the Chinese government leverage over Canada 291 On 25 November 2022 the FCC issued a ban on Huawei for national security reasons citing the national security risk posed by the technology owned by China 292 Stockpiling of processors Edit Before the 15 September 2020 deadline Huawei was in survival mode and stockpiled 5G mobile processors Wifi radio frequency and display driver chips and other components from key chip suppliers and manufacturers including Samsung SK Hynix TSMC MediaTek Realtek Novatek and RichWave 270 Even in 2019 Huawei spent 23 45 billion on the stockpiling of chips and other supplies in 2019 up 73 from 2018 270 On its most crucial business namely its telecoms business including 5G and server business Huawei has stockpiled 1 5 to 2 years worth of chips and components 293 It began massively stockpiling from 2018 when Meng Wanzhou the daughter of Huawei s founder was arrested in Canada upon US request 293 Key Huawei suppliers included Xilinx Intel AMD Samsung SK Hynix Micron and Kioxia 293 On the other hand analysts predicted that Huawei could ship 195 million units of smartphones from its existing stockpile in 2021 but shipments may drop to 50 million in 2021 if rules are not relaxed 270 Development of processors Edit In late 2020 it was reported that Huawei had planned to build a semiconductor manufacturing facility in Shanghai that did not involve US technology 294 The plan may have helped Huawei obtain necessary chips after its existing stockpile became depleted which would have helped the company chart a sustainable path for its telecoms business 294 Huawei had also planned to collaborate with the government run Shanghai IC R amp D Center which is partially owned by the state owned enterprise Huahong Group 294 Huawei may have been purchasing equipment from Chinese firms such as AMEC and Naura as well as using foreign tools which it could still find on the market 294 In August 2023 the Semiconductor Industry Association SIA a US trade association alleged that Huawei was building a collection of secret semiconductor fabrication facilities across China a shadow manufacturing network that would let the company skirt US sanctions 295 296 297 Huawei was receiving an estimated 30 billion in state funding from the government at the time and had acquired at least two existing plants with plans to construct at least three others 295 297 The United States Department of Commerce had put Huawei on its entity list in 2019 297 eventually prohibiting it from working with American companies in almost all circumstances However if Huawei were to function under the names of other companies without disclosing its own involvement it might have been able to circumvent those restrictions to indirectly purchase American chipmaking equipment and other supplies that would otherwise be prohibited 295 On 6 September 2023 Huawei launched its new Mate 60 smartphone The phone is powered by a new Kirin 9000s chip made in China by Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp SMIC 298 This processor was the first to use the new 7 nanometre SMIC technology TechInsights had stated in 2022 that it believed SMIC had managed to produce 7 nm chips even though faced by a harsh sanctions regime by adapting simpler machines that it could still purchase from ASML 298 Holger Mueller of Constellation Research Inc said that this showed that the US sanctions might have had the effect of sending China s chip making industry into overdrive If SMIC really has perfected its 7nm process this would be a major advance that can help Huawei remain at the forefront of the smartphone industry 299 TechInsights found evidence that the processor had been manufactured using SMIC s N 2 7 nm node 300 One of its analysts Dan Hutcheson who had led the breakdown of the new device stated that it demonstrates impressive technical progress China s semiconductor industry has made despite not having EUVL tools and that the difficulty of this achievement also shows the resilience of the country s chip technological ability However other analysts have said that such an achievement may lead to harsher sanctions against it 301 Replacement operating systems Edit Main articles Deepin and Harmony OS After the US sanctions regime started in summer 2018 Huawei started working on its own in house operating system codenamed HongMeng OS in an interview with Die Welt executive Richard Yu stated in 2019 that an in house OS could be used as a plan B if it were prevented from using Android or Windows as the result of US action 302 303 304 Huawei filed trademarks for the names Ark Ark OS and Harmony in Europe which were speculated to be connected to this OS 305 306 On 9 August 2019 Huawei officially unveiled Harmony OS at its inaugural HDC developers conference in Dongguan with the ARK compiler which can be used to port Android APK packages to the OS 127 128 In September 2019 Huawei began offering the Linux distribution Deepin as a pre loaded operating system on selected Matebook models in China 307 Whereas at first the official Huawei line was that Harmony OS was not intended for smartphones in June 2021 Huawei began shipping its smartphones 308 with Harmony OS by default in China in Europe it kept Android in its own version EMUI as the default The operating system proved a success in China rising from no market share at all to 10 per cent of the Chinese market for smartphones within two years from mid 2021 to mid 2023 at the expense of Android 309 Bans and restrictions EditSome or all Huawei products have been banned in Australia Canada Sweden the United Kingdom and ten EU states 24 310 22 23 In 2013 Taiwan blocked wireless carriers and government from using Huawei equipment 311 In 2023 the country launched investigations into local firms reported to have supplied Huawei in violation of regulations 312 In 2018 Japan banned Huawei from receiving government contracts 22 313 In 2019 Vietnam left Huawei out of bids to build the country s 5G network due to security concerns 25 314 Following the initial 2020 2021 China India skirmishes India announced that Huawei gear would be removed from the country s telecommunication network and that Huawei would be blocked from participating in the country s 5G network for national security reasons 315 24 In October 2022 the UK extended the deadline by a year to the end of 2023 for removing core Huawei equipment from network functions The ban originally announced in 2020 following US pressure calls for the phasing out of all Huawei gear from UK s 5G network by the end of 2027 which remains unchanged 316 Per an August 2023 decree on 5G network development Costa Rica barred firms from 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