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Wikipedia

Al-Shabaab (militant group)

March 28, 2023

Not to be confused with Al-Shabaab (Mozambique).

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, more commonly known as al-Shabaab,[note 3] (also referring to itself as the Islamic Emirate of Somalia since 2011,[29]) is a Salafi-jihadist military and political organisation based in Somalia and active elsewhere in East Africa. It is actively involved in the ongoing Somali Civil War and incorporates elements of Somali nationalism into its Islamist cause. Allegiant to the militant pan-Islamist organization al-Qaeda since 2012, it has also been suspected of forging ties with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Al-Shabaab
حركة الشباب المجاهدين
Leaders
Dates of operationAugust 2006–present
Country Somalia
Headquarters
Active regions Somalia
 Kenya
 Ethiopia[note 1]
Ideology
Size7,000–12,000 (2023 estimate)[7]
Part of Al-Qaeda
Allies
 
Opponents
Battles and warsSomali Civil War

Formed in the mid-2000s as part of the Islamic Courts Union, al-Shabaab came to prominence during the 2006–2009 Somalia War, during which it presented itself as a vehicle for the waging of armed resistance against the Ethiopian occupation and Western imperialism. In subsequent years, it gained popular support from Somalis and became a dominant force in south and central Somalia, defending large swathes of territory by fighting against the African Union Mission to Somalia and the Federal Government of Somalia, as well as the latter's transitional predecessor. The group has also frequently clashed with the Somali Sufi militia Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a as well as with the Islamic State in Somalia. Al-Shabaab gained international prominence due to its recruitment of foreign fighters, including fighters who are from Western countries. Countries which include the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates, have all designated it as a terrorist organization, and the United States has militarily intervened in order to fight against the group.

Between 2011 and 2013, a coalition which mostly consisted of East African forces, led by the Somali government, wrested a significant amount of territory from al-Shabaab, including the capital city, Mogadishu. During the same period, the group was plagued by internal conflicts over its leadership and ideological direction, which intensified when, in February 2012, al-Shabaab's leadership pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. It suffered further military losses in 2014, as a result of Operation Indian Ocean, and the killing of its emir, Ahmed Abdi Godane, in an American drone strike, as well as the killing of other leaders. For several years thereafter, al-Shabaab retreated from the major cities, but it remained influential in many rural areas, and it prioritized guerrilla and terror attacks over territorial acquisitions. It is responsible for many high-fatality attacks, including the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya, the October 2017 Mogadishu bombings, the December 2019 Mogadishu bombing, and the October 2022 Mogadishu bombings. In addition to being active in Somalia, it is also active in other East African countries, especially in Kenya, and occasionally also in Ethiopia. Attendant to its recent resurgence, it was estimated to have increased its combat strength to between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters in February 2022.[30]

Name

Al-Shabaab is also known as Ash-Shabaab, Hizb al-Shabaab ("Party of the Youth")[31] and as the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM) (Arabic: حركة المقاومة الشعبية في بلاد الهجرتين).[32] The term al-Shabaab means "the youth" in Arabic.

Organisation and structure

Origins

Although it is unclear when al-Shabaab was formed, it is understood to have originated as a wing of the Islamic Courts Union, an umbrella group which provided de facto governance in much of Somalia until the country was invaded by Ethiopia in December 2006.[33][34] In 2007–8, al-Shabaab established itself as an independent actor, gaining prominence as a vehicle of armed resistance to Ethiopian occupation in the War in Somalia.[33][34] Many of its early leaders and members previously belonged not only to the Islamic Courts Union but also to the older al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, a group founded on the tenets of Salafism and opposition to clannism.[35] Many early al-Shabaab leaders had also been trained as mujahideen in Afghanistan and Syria.

Ideology

According to the International Crisis Group, Salafism has been the core unifying principle of al-Shabaab, although this principle is not interpreted uniformly by the group's members and leaders.[33] In particular, al-Shabaab officially and generally advocates a form of Salafi jihadism with transnational aims, linking Somali nationalist and local grievances to the plight of Muslims worldwide.[33] Through this lens, incursions into Somalia by Ethiopia – and later by Kenya, the United States, and others – are viewed as continuous with non-Muslim acts of aggression in other Muslim-majority countries.[35][36] However, this globalist framework is not universal within the group,[37][38] an ideological fault-line which has sometimes fostered factionalism and internal conflict. Much of al-Shabaab's Somali support base is fiercely nationalist, and sees as its primary goal the establishment of a stable Islamic state inside Somalia,[36][39] or, more ambitiously, inside so-called Greater Somalia, uniting the ethnic Somali populations of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.[40] Other domestic supporters are concerned primarily with clan-related and local objectives, and are therefore prone to infighting and shifting alliances.[41]

However, these ideological differences can accommodate broad opposition within the group to common adversaries – notably opposition to external intervention in Somalia, often publicly expressed in quasi-Qutbist terms;[42] and opposition to the internationally recognised Somali government, which, lacking a basis in religious (Sharia) law, is seen to lack legitimacy.[33] Al-Shabaab hardliners broadly adhere to a Takfiri interpretation of the principle of al-wala' wal-bara' (lit. 'loyalty and disavowal'),[33][43] insofar as it prescribes dissociation from non-Muslims and those perceived as apostates.[44]

A major component of Al-Shabaab's ideology is Somali religious nationalism which is incorporated into its Pan-Islamist cause. Patriotic themes warning Somalis of the plots from international NGOs, "Christian Crusaders" (United States, Ethiopia, AMISOM) and their collaborators are a regular feature of the movement's propaganda. During the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, Al-Shabab positioned itself as a staunch nationalist militia under the Islamic Muqawwama (resistance coalition) of the Islamic Courts Union, taking the most hardline stance against the invading "Christian crusaders". After the collapse of the ICU in 2007, Al-Shabaab launched its own independent insurgency, gaining popular support from Somalis for defending the country from American imperialism and foreign occupation. Al-Qaeda began enhancing its co-operation and support to Al-Shabab during this period, which enabled the movement to establish itself as the strongest military power in Southern Somalia. Al-Shabab regards Somalia's Federal Government as an illegitmitate "apostate" entity backed by foreign invaders.[45][46]

The group has persecuted those individuals belonging to Somalia's small Christian minority; whom it accused of aiding the agenda of foreign "Crusaders" to "convert Somalis to Christianity".[47] It has desecrated a Sufi mosque and graves on the basis that over-embellishing them into shrines is incompatible with Sharia,[48][49] and has clashed with the pro-AMISOM Sufi militias of Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a.[50][51] In addition, its statements have expressed anti-Zionist sentiments,[52][53] and the group claimed that its 2019 DusitD2 complex attack was retaliation against the declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.[54]

Size and structure

In 2017, observers estimated that al-Shabaab comprised between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters.[55] In 2018, the Council of Foreign Relations and United States military revised this figure downwards, estimating 3,000 to 6,000 and 4,000 to 6,000 respectively.[56] Reflecting an apparent al-Shabaab resurgence, the United States Africa Command estimated 5,000 to 10,000 fighters two years later, in 2020.[57] Most recently, an expert report submitted to the United Nations (UN) Security Council in early February 2022 estimated that al-Shabaab's fighting force had grown to between 7,000 and 12,000 fighters.[30] The group is led by a shura council of senior leaders, appointed and assigned portfolios by the emir, and operates several internal security organs, including an intelligence agency, Amniyat, and a police force, Jeysh Al-Hisbah.[57]

Membership

Especially in its early years, al-Shabaab was sometimes characterised by Somali opponents as dominated by the Hawiye clan, which is one of the largest clans in Somalia.[37] Hawiye remain influential in the group,[58] and, according to a 2018 analysis by the Somali Hiraal Institute, five of the ten members of the executive shura council were Hawiye, as were about 94 of the top 220 officials.[59] However, al-Shabaab is attached to an ethos of anti-clannism, and has therefore tried to appeal to minority groups and to ensure ethnic and clan diversity among its leadership.[60] It incorporates a relatively large contingent of foreign fighters (see below). Rank-and-file members, though sometimes recruited by force,[41] are also attracted by the regular pay that al-Shabaab offers and by its political propaganda.[60] In the past, many young al-Shabaab recruits were drawn from marginalised southern clans, such as the Jareer.[60][61] Many are children.[62]

In February 2012, Fu'ad Qalaf Shongole, an al-Shabaab officer with responsibility for "awareness raising", encouraged a Somali gathering to send their unmarried daughters to fight jihad with al-Shabaab, which until then had used only male fighters.[63] However, according to International Crisis Group, women rarely participate directly in military decision-making or operations, though they do play important roles in recruitment, intelligence, and explosives smuggling.[64]

History

Main article: Timeline of al-Shabaab-related events
See also: Somali Civil War (2009–present)

2006–09: Ethiopian incursion

Main article: Somalian War

Al-Shabaab rose to prominence as a relatively well-organised militia, garnering popular support from Somalis sympathetic to their opposition to the Ethiopian invasion: though the invasion had fractured the Islamic Courts Union, it galvanised nationalism on which al-Shabaab capitalised, especially for recruitment purposes.[35] In the military arena, al-Shabaab suffered key losses during offensives by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), which was established in 2007, but during this phase "put down the roots of an enduring insurgency", establishing networks and territorial bases concentrated in rural south-central Somalia.[33]

2009–10: Dominance in the south

Having made important territorial gains from mid-2008, al-Shabaab increasingly focused its attention on opposition to the Somali Transitional Federal Government, as the Ethiopian-led war segued into the next phase of the protracted Somali Civil War.[65] By 2009–10, al-Shabaab controlled most of central and southern Somalia (south of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland), and it had formed administrative structures to govern territories under its control.[34][66][67] It had particular success building relationships with local leaders in order to build cross-clan coalitions, combining its principled anti-clannism with a "pragmatic clannism": a willingness to manipulate clan networks and exploit inter-clan politics.[68][33][37][60]

 
Over 200 al-Shabaab fighters surrender to AMISOM, September 2012.
 
Somali and Kenyan troops celebrate al-Shabaab's retreat from Kismayo Airport, 2012.

2011–13: Internal and external challenges

In subsequent years, however, al-Shabaab's strong position was significantly weakened, as – in the context of a famine in the region and, simultaneously, a military offensive against the group – the group experienced territorial and strategic setbacks in the military arena; an internal struggle over the group's direction and leadership; and, in response to both, a wave of high-profile defections.

Territorial losses

The group's military fortunes turned with the failure of the August 2010 Ramadan offensive – the inauguration of the Battle of Mogadishu – which resulted in heavy al-Shabaab losses.[34] By August 2011, al-Shabaab had announced a "strategic withdrawal" from Mogadishu, although, from outlying districts, it continued to exert influence in the city and to launch deadly guerrilla attacks against AMISOM and the TFG.[66] In October and November 2011, Kenya and Ethiopia – partnering with local militias – launched offensives against al-Shabaab strongholds: Kenya's Operation Linda Nchi on the southern front, while Ethiopia approached from the west. The group lost territory to both armies, notably losing Baidoa to Ethiopia in February 2012 and losing the port city (and revenue hub) of Kismayo to Kenya in October 2012.[66][69] Military pressures on the group were sustained into 2013.

Drought, al-Qaeda, and internal struggle

Some al-Shabaab members viewed the 2010 Ramadan offensive as disastrously ill-conceived, and subsequent territorial losses galvanised internal opposition to the leadership of Ahmed Abdi Godane, who was publicly named the group's emir in December 2007.[70] As a severe drought afflicted the region, critics, generally associated with the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys and Mukhtar Robow,[67][71] opposed al-Shabaab's response to the resulting famine, particularly its obstruction of foreign humanitarian aid to populations in its territories (see below).[72][73][74] More broadly, they argued that the group's authoritarian style of governance, and use of violence, were causing the group to lose public support. Some suggested that these leadership missteps were the result of Godane's lack of clan roots, which they said led him to undervalue the lives both of civilians and of al-Shabaab fighters.[34]

These criticisms became intertwined with a broader and pre-existing dispute over the increasingly globalist flavour of al-Shabaab's ideology – Godane was among the faction which viewed Somalia as only one battleground of global jihad.[36][39] Godane's announcement in February 2012 of a merger with al-Qaeda (see below) thus also met opposition.[75][76] Other senior al-Shabaab members met at a conference in Baidabo,[77] and outlined a policy programme which diverged from Godane's: they rejected Godane's proposal to change the group's name to al-Qaeda in East Africa, and resolved to focus on domestic issues rather than global jihad. They also resolved to establish a national shura of Islamic clerics, independent of al-Qaeda control.[75][78] Godane's rival Aweys declared publicly that, "Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda are merely a small part of the larger Islamic group and al-Qaeda's ideology should not be viewed as the sole, righteous path for Islam."[79]

 
Suspected al-Shabaab militants in Mogadishu during a joint operation between Somali forces and AMISOM, May 2014.

In 2013, these internal rifts led to internecine violence as Godane effected what was virtually a purge of his critics.[67] Among those killed were Ibrahim al-Afghani and three other senior commanders, executed in June;[80] and Omar Shafik Hammami, killed in September.[81] Journalist Simon Tisdall viewed the September 2013 Westgate shopping mall shooting in Nairobi, Kenya as a reflection of the internal power struggle, with Godane's hardline globalist faction seeking to exert its authority.[82]

Defections

From mid-to-late 2011, and into 2012, al-Shabaab faced an increasing number of defections.[66] It was not the first such wave of defections: in particular, in late 2009, after the Ethiopian departure from Somalia, several leaders had defected to the Somali government, citing complaints about al-Shabaab's use of suicide attacks and executions;[83] its "false interpretations of Islam";[84] and its use of extortion and attitude towards foreign humanitarian aid.[85] Such defections were viewed as strategically important to al-Shabaab's adversaries, not only for their propaganda use but because former militants could provide intelligence about al-Shabaab's combat strategy.[86] However, according to AMISOM and the Somali government, the volume of defections in the period around 2012 was unprecedented, and indicated that al-Shabaab's cohesion and authority were deteriorating: in June 2012, the government said that around 500 al-Shabaab militants had already defected to it, and that more were doing so every day.[87] Al-Shabaab brutalities, which alienated local populations, were again cited as central in motivating defections.[88] On September 5 and September 22, 2012, two large contingents of al-Shabaab fighters – around 200 each time – surrendered to the government coalition in Afmadow and Garsale respectively.[86][89] Another wave of defections and desertions followed Godane's 2013 purges – Aweys, for example, fled the group in mid-2013.[80]

2013–17: Regrouping

Following its territorial losses, al-Shabaab reverted to the tactics of asymmetric warfare, launching guerrilla attacks on AMISOM and government positions and territories.[34][66] Southern commander Aweys had announced this new strategy in a media interview shortly after the withdrawal from Mogadishu in August 2011.[90] Al-Shabaab increasingly avoided direct military combat and large battles, in favour of "dictat[ing] the conflict's pace by undertaking smaller ambushes at locations of its own choosing".[33] It also developed a strategy of maintaining a "semi-territorial presence" in key regions and parts of key cities: while it no longer had exclusive and military authority over substantial territory, it retained a sporadic presence, and therefore significant influence, in many places.[91][92]

 
Territorial control of Somalia as of April 2017.

Nonetheless, by 2016, al-Shabaab was viewed as significantly weakened by the military campaign against it, with earlier losses compounded in 2014–15 by Operation Indian Ocean, a joint endeavour by AMISOM, the Somali government, and the United States.[91][93] The Somali government claimed in October 2014 that over 700 al-Shabaab militants had surrendered since September, when it had extended an amnesty offer to them.[94] Reports of further senior defections continued into 2015.[95][96][97][98] Moreover, an American drone strike killed Godane on September 1, 2014;[99] he was succeeded as al-Shabaab leader by Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah, who took office the same week.[100] Other senior members were killed in armed clashes or by American drone strikes in 2014 and 2015.[101][102][103][104] According to some reports, since Godane's death, the group has placed less weight on global jihad than on local grievances.[34][67][40]

2018–2022: Resurgence

In October 2017, more than 500 people were killed by a suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab did not claim responsibility for the attack but was suspected of involvement.[105] In December 2019, another suicide truck bomb marked the beginning of a series of al-Shabaab attacks on the capital city, which continued into 2022.[106][107][108] Al-Shabaab also targeted American military personnel in an attack on a Kenyan base in January 2020,[109] and in July 2022 launched an unusually bold, though short-lived, incursion into Ethiopian territory.[110] By 2020, the group's strategy of semi-territorialism allowed it operate freely in much of rural Somalia, with its primary base in the Jubba River Valley,[35] although air strikes against its leaders continued;[111] and it has recently won military successes against the government.[112] It had also expanded its operations in Puntland,[113][114] prompting a military offensive by Puntland forces in 2021.[115][116] As of July 2022, al-Shabaab is generally considered to be "resurgent",[117] a situation partly enabled by a reduction in the number of American air strikes,[118] and possibly motivated by competition with Islamic State in Somalia, which has been conducting its own expansionary campaign.[119]

2022–present: Retaliation

In August 2022, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared "total war" against Al Shabaab during a televised address after the group carried out a deadly hotel attack in Mogadishu and also announced that the Somalia military had regained territory from al Shabaab in the central Galmudug state and Southwest state.[120] Al By September 2022 Somali and ATMIS offensive operations against al-Shabaab, with U.S. support, would escalate to the highest point in five years.[121] The operation, which is considered a combined Somali-ATMIS offensive,[121] began in August 2022 and, with assistance from U.S. airstrikes, has been focused on disrupting al-Shabaab activity in Somalia's central Hiraan region.[122][121] Other Al Shabaab-controlled areas in southern Somalia have been targeted by the Somalia military as well.[123] On 20 September 2022, as the military operation progressed, a statement was released by the Somali Ministry of Information which revealed that President Sheikh would not offer any other option than surrender for al-Shabaab members.[124]

Propaganda strategy

 
Drawings left by fighters on the walls of a building in El Baraf.

Although al-Shabaab has disseminated its propaganda by various media, the bulk of its engagement with Somalis in rural areas is either face-to-face or by radio broadcast.[125] Face-to-face, the group holds seminars on Islamic jurisprudence and community meetings on such matters such as grain and livestock distribution.[125] It operates its own radio station, Radio Andalus, mainly operated using relay stations and other equipment seized from private radio stations, including the BBC.[126] Presenters broadcast in Somali, Arabic, Swahili and English.[126] In April 2010, al-Shabaab banned BBC and Voice of America broadcasts on Somali radio, objecting to what they alleged was Christian propaganda.[127] Also in 2010, and prior to its expulsion from Mogadishu the following year, al-Shabaab launched a television news channel, Al-Kataib News.[128] The group has also been known to conduct military parades in its territories, as a show of force.[129]

Propaganda films

Al-Shabaab began creating propaganda films early in its campaign against Ethiopian forces,[125] produced by its dedicated media wing, al-Kataib Media Foundation.[130] Since 2009, al-Shabaab's films have become noticeably more "professional", both in their production quality and in their messaging, reportedly with direct support from al-Qaeda's al-Sabab Media Foundation.[130] The early films were distributed primarily, and widely, online, and were primarily used as tools for recruitment, particularly among foreign jihadists.[125] More recent films show al-Shabaab distributing humanitarian aid and participating in other community or religious activities – though others are much more gruesome, displaying the corpses of beheaded members alleged to have been spies.[126][131] Propaganda films are also occasionally used to attempt to mobilise jihadi activity abroad: in October 2013, one film encouraged British jihadists to follow the example set by Lee Rigby's killers,[132] while a February 2015 film called (without effect) for attacks on shopping malls in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, including the West Edmonton Mall in Alberta, Canada, and the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota.[133][134]

Send me a cruise like Maa'lam Adam al Ansari
And send me a couple of tons like Zarqawi
And send me a drone like Abu Layth al Libi
And Special Forces like Saleh Ali Nabhan.

Send me all four and send me much much more
I pray for that on my way to heavens door
Send me four and send me more, that what I implore
An amazing martyrdom I strive for and adore.

– Chorus to "Send Me a Cruise"
by Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki[135]

Internet and social media

Al-Shabaab was an early adopter among African insurgents of the Internet, which it uses to distribute its propaganda videos and for various other propaganda functions.[125] Especially in its early years, it used online chatrooms and discussion forums, encouraging foreign fighters and even military commanders to post updates and field public questions about the state of the jihad.[130] Particularly prominent was American-born Omar Shafik Hammami, also known as Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki, who for many years kept a video blog about his life in al-Shabaab and who, from 2009, also created and posted raps about jihad.[136][137] Al-Shabaab also had an official website, which carried official statements and news – including sundry edicts and threats – and religious guidance. Since the site was closed in 2009, it has distributed its press releases and videos using other sympathetic websites, or, more commonly, using social media networks.[125][130]

Indeed, although al-Shabaab spokesmen occasionally grant interviews to "carefully selected" local and foreign journalists,[130] social media networks have provided an important channel for interaction with the press, as well as for disseminating information and building support. Al-Shabaab has used Facebook, particularly to communicate with the Somali diaspora;[130] and it has made prolific and innovative use of Twitter since late 2011,[138] although its first accounts were active as early as 2009.[139] Online engagement with al-Shabaab surged during Operation Linda Nchi, the Kenyan offensive of 2011–12, when al-Shabaab used Twitter, under the handle @HSMPress, to urge Somalis to take up arms against the Kenyan forces[140] and to portray its own military losses as tactical retreats.[141] In an extreme example of the latter in late 2011, al-Shabaab photos purportedly showed several dozen AMISOM casualties – but, according to an African Union spokesperson, in fact showed al-Shabaab's own casualties dressed in their adversaries' uniforms.[142][143] What received most attention, however, were tweets al-Shabaab posted mocking the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and sparring with Major Emmanuel Chirchir, then the KDF's official spokesman.[139][144] Responding to Chirchir's claim that Kismayo had been captured by the KDF, al-Shabaab tweeted that the KDF "boys are a grotesque parody of an army! [Al-Shabaab] can outpace ur world-class runners by far. Indeed, they 'Run like a Kenyan'".[145] Showing uncharacteristic levity, al-Shabaab also suggested by Tweet that it meet a UN official for "a caramel macchiato".[146]

Most of al-Shabaab's Tweets are in English, suggesting that they are intended for a foreign audience.[147] In 2011, officials in the United States, where Twitter is based, said they were considering having the account closed, but had legal and free speech concerns.[148] Chirchir himself tweeted that such a move would be counterproductive, as "al-Shabaab needs to be engaged positively, and Twitter is the only avenue."[149] Nonetheless, in January 2013, Twitter suspended al-Shabaab's English-language account. Observers guessed that the suspension was a response to the account having issued death threats against Kenyan hostages and against French spy Denis Allex, followed in the latter case by confirmation that the execution had taken place.[150][151] A new English-language account, opened in February 2013,[152] was closed in September, for unspecified reasons. This suspension also followed an apparent violation of Twitter's rules: al-Shabaab had recently used the account to claim responsibility for an unsuccessful ambush of a convoy carrying Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and to warn that, "next time, you won't be as lucky".[153]

Al-Shabaab relaunched its English-language Twitter account once again on September 11, 2013.[154] Two weeks later, the group gained notoriety for live-tweeting the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack, "justifying the attack, creating fictional threats, providing news on hostages and mocking the police and military response".[137] The account, which then had 15,000 or more followers, was retweeted several million times before it was shut down by Twitter.[125][130] And after @HSMPress was deleted, the live updates continued from other, new accounts: over the course of the attack, which lasted several days, at least eight different al-Shabaab-affiliated Twitter accounts were active.[125] Al-Shabaab had opened a new Twitter account by December that year, with an official telling Al Jazeera that, "The aim is to vigorously challenge defamatory reports in the media by presenting an accurate portrayal of the current state of Jihad in Somalia and countering Western, state-sponsored propaganda machines".[138] It has since tweeted, from various accounts, during other attacks;[155] Facebook, too, has had difficulty expeditiously removing graphic al-Shabaab content when it appears on newly created accounts.[156]

Local governance strategy

 
Residents of Tortoro celebrate with Lower Shabelle governor Abdulkadir Mohamed Sidi after the town's liberation from al-Shabaab, June 2015.

In territories it holds, al-Shabaab typically maintains "limited but effective" administrative control over resident populations,[33] providing services – such as dispute resolution through Sharia-based courts – which are sometimes compared favourably to those offered in government-held territories.[35][157] Al-Shabaab claimed some credit for Somalia's excellent crop yield in early 2010, saying that Somali grain production had flourished due to al-Shabaab's reduction of food imports, and that the policy had redistributed income to poor, rural Somali farmers.[158] However, the group has also allegedly committed widespread human rights abuses against populations in its territories, including through a brutal interpretation and application of Islamic jurisprudence on hudud.[159][160]

Humanitarian access

Despite routinely expelling, attacking, and harassing aid workers, al-Shabaab permits some agencies to work in areas under its control. At the height of its territorial control it implemented a system of aid agency regulation, taxation and surveillance. Where agencies are allowed to operate, this is often due to the desire of al-Shabaab to coopt and materially and politically benefit from the provision of aid and services.[161] Senior aid agency representatives often strongly rejected claims that they talked with al-Shabaab, while aid workers working in al-Shabaab-controlled areas often reported they directly negotiated with the group out of necessity.[162] Complaints made against the group include its attacks on aid workers. According to journalist Jon Lee Anderson:

The number of people in Somalia who are dependent on international food aid has tripled since 2007, to an estimated 3.6 million. But there is no permanent foreign expatriate presence in southern Somalia, because the Shabaab has declared war on the UN and on Western non-governmental organizations. International relief supplies are flown or shipped into the country and distributed, wherever possible, through local relief workers. Insurgents routinely attack and murder them, too; forty-two have been killed in the past two years alone.[163]

In 2009, Godane imposed an al-Shabaab ban on the UN World Food Programme and Western agencies in Somalia. The ban was opposed by other senior members, including Robow and Aweys, but Godane overruled them.[72][164]

In response to the 2011 Eastern Africa drought, which lasted until early 2012,[165] al-Shabaab announced in July 2011 that it had withdrawn its restrictions on international humanitarian workers.[166] The group also adapted its propaganda strategy to accommodate the changing circumstances. In some cases, group members employed humanitarian aid as a recruitment tool, using relief supplies as bribes and as an incentive to join the militants, whose numbers had decreased due to casualties and defections.[167] Group members dismissed the UN declaration of famine in various regions as grossly exaggerated and banned various organizations from providing aid to those regions.[168] In response, in August 2011, Somali Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali announced the establishment of a new 300-man security force, which, assisted by AMISOM, was tasked with protecting aid convoys from al-Shabaab and with securing IDP camps while relief was being distributed.[169] Although fighting disrupted aid delivery in some areas, humanitarian access to al-Shabaab-controlled areas improved, and a scaling up of relief operations in mid-November prompted the UN to downgrade the humanitarian situation in several regions from famine to emergency levels.[170]

Ban on single-use plastic bags

In July 2018, al-Shabaab announced a complete ban on single-use plastic bags within its territory in a broadcast in which it stated that they "pose a serious threat to the well-being of humans and animals alike", and in the same announcement, it also imposed a complete ban on the logging of several species of rare trees.[171] Some have argued that, whilst these environmentally-conscious advances are welcome, they are overshadowed by the group's terrorist activities, whilst others have mocked the United States and other countries for taking less action on climate change than a terrorist group.[172]

Response to COVID-19

Al-Shabaab acknowledged the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic and announced the formation of a coronavirus prevention and treatment committee.[173] In mid-June 2020, the group announced that it had set up a coronavirus treatment centre in Jilib, about 380 km (236 mi) south of the capital, Mogadishu.[174]

Foreign recruitment

Al-Shabaab is noteworthy in the region for its extensive recruitment of foreign fighters (see list below).[175][176] These foreign recruits include members of the Somali diaspora or ethnic Somalis overseas; citizens of other East African countries; and citizens of countries further afield, including in the Middle East and the West.[177][36] Non-Somali fighters have occasionally orchestrated high-profile al-Shabaab attacks, notably the 2010 Kampala bombings and 2019 DusitD2 complex attack in Nairobi.[178] However, of greater importance to al-Shabaab are the combat experience and specialised skills of some, usually Arab, foreign fighters,[179] which have been linked to al-Shabaab's increased sophistication in producing explosives,[81] improved sniper capability,[177] and increased propensity to use suicide attacks.[34] Foreign fighters may also have access to networks which improve al-Shabaab's capacity to recruit and operate in the region, and have made useful contributions to al-Shabaab's propaganda campaign: early Western recruits helped produce al-Shabaab's first English-language propaganda, and, thanks to its East African membership, Swahili remains the second most common language in al-Shabaab publications.[81][180] Foreign fighters also have symbolic importance for al-Shabaab propaganda: al-Shabaab has intentionally played up the diversity of its recruits as a paean to its pan-Islamism – that is, to demonstrate that it transcends clannism and nationalism, embodying a united transnational ummah.[81]

Early surge

 
American-born Jehad Mostafa is a senior al-Shabaab commander.

Foreign recruitment peaked in the period between 2011 and 2013,[81] which was also the period in which the phenomenon received the most attention. The 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia attracted foreign volunteers to al-Shabaab's cause,[36] and, as of 2010, al-Shabaab included an estimated 200–300 foreign fighters, not including a further 1,000 ethnic Somalis from the diaspora.[179] In subsequent years, al-Shabaab recruitment became a concern for the governments of both the United Kingdom and the United States. At a security conference in London in 2010, the former head of MI5, Jonathan Evans, said that "a significant number of U.K. residents" were training with al-Shabaab;[181] the precise number of British recruits was estimated at between 50[182] and 100[183] persons. There was also evidence that the group had received funding from Somali residents in Britain.[184] Between 2012 and 2013, several British citizens faced control orders or even criminal charges related to association with al-Shabaab.[185][186]

Sweden, Denmark, Canada, and the U.S. similarly encountered evidence of citizens' affiliation with al-Shabaab.[36] In the U.S., the U.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee heard as early as 2009 – from Michael Leiter, director of the National Counterterrorism Center – that American and other foreign fighters were being recruited and trained by al-Shabaab.[38] In 2011, the House Committee on Homeland Security reported that more than 40 Muslim Americans and 20 Canadians had fought with al-Shabaab, and that at least 15 of those volunteers had been killed in Somalia.[187] Later that year, a U.S. military official told the New York Times that about 30 U.S. citizens were al-Shabaab fighters.[188] This was a resumption of an earlier trend of al-Shabaab recruitment among Americans, which previously had peaked in 2007–8.[189] Also in 2011, two Somali Americans in Minnesota were convicted of illegally financing al-Shabaab.[188] By mid-2013, observers believed that recruitment of U.S. citizens had subsided.[190]

In general, foreign activity in al-Shabaab has decreased, first, and perhaps most importantly, because the Syrian civil war became the focal point for foreign jihadist recruitment networks.[81] Other factors, however, are more specific to al-Shabaab. One factor was the group's internal struggle of 2011–13: as tensions between Somali and non-Somali members increased, Godane scapegoated the foreigners as the cause of the group's disunity and, during his 2013 purge, executed various foreign recruits (see above).[81][34] In addition to serving as a disincentive to foreign fighters, this shift reduced the influence of the group's remaining foreign leaders.[67] Moreover, whereas the ascendancy of Godane and his faction had partly internationalized al-Shabaab, in subsequent years, al-Shabaab became (re-)"domesticated": as it made territorial gains, its attention was increasingly consumed by local governance and the management of clan dynamics, activities in which foreign fighters – frequently mistrusted by local populations – lacked utility and influence.[34] As the conflict, and al-Shabaab's priorities, became more localized and clan-based, they also held less appeal for foreign fighters themselves.[81] Foreign fighters also attracted the counterterrorism efforts of foreign countries, and were sometimes suspected of disloyalty and spying by their Somali peers.[34]

Current status

As of 2020, estimates of the number of foreign recruits still active in al-Shabaab ranged from 450 to 2,000.[177] Most of those recruits are from East Africa – primarily Kenya,[191] but also Tanzania and Uganda, all countries in which al-Shabaab recruitment networks are well entrenched.[33][81] The flow of recruits from Arab countries and the West has diminished substantially since 2014, except for in the case of Yemen.[178][81] Moreover, few foreign fighters hold strategically important roles in the group. Many are among the rank-and-file of the military wing.[81][192] Those in leadership positions tend to have prominent, but strategically marginal or mid-level, roles – for example, in managing the group's public relations or external relations, or in supervising and training other foreign recruits.[34] (Godane's nationalist critics, however, argue that earlier, under his leadership, foreign fighters did in fact gain significant influence over the group.[39]) Since 2013, al-Shabaab has also established two external military units, on Godane's initiative: one, in Ethiopia, has struggled, but the other, in the Great Lakes region, has carried out several attacks in Kenya.[178]

Relationship with other militant groups

Hizbul Islam

Between 2010 and 2012, Hizbul Islam, a smaller group of Somali militants,[193] was merged with al-Shabaab: after suffering military defeats against al-Shabaab in southern towns, Hizbul Islam was officially absorbed by its former rival in December 2010.[194][195] However, on September 24, 2012, Hizbul Islam announced that it would split from al-Shabaab, claiming the union had only ever been nominal and that the factions' political philosophies had differed irreconcilably. Hizbul Islam said that it welcomed "negotiations with all groups for the interest of Somalia", and added that al-Shabaab had been considerably "weakened" in recent years.[196][197]

 
Ahmed Abdi Godane faced internal opposition to his decision to affiliate with al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda

Before 2012, al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab had what academic Daniel Byman calls an "on-again, off-again" relationship, though both groups praised each other online in 2008.[198][199] During this early period, al-Shabaab occasionally harboured al-Qaeda leaders in Somalia, in exchange for their technical assistance.[198][200] In September 2009, in a video entitled "At Your Service Osama", al-Shabaab publicly declared allegiance to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden – but this reflected an "unrequited courtship", largely ignored by al-Qaeda.[201] However, after bin Laden's death and replacement by Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Shabaab became an official al-Qaeda affiliate in February 2012. In a fifteen-minute video message released on February 9, al-Shabaab leader Godane pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and al-Zawahiri on behalf of al-Shabaab.[202][203] Al-Zawahiri confirmed the alliance,[201] which he said would "please the believers and disturb the disbelievers" and "support the jihadi unity against the Zio-Crusader campaign and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers."[204] The announcement was met with internal opposition among some factions of al-Shabaab (see above).

By late 2012, the groups cooperated closely in various arenas, especially indoctrination and training, both in basic infantry skills and in advanced explosives and assassination – after the merger, a corps of al-Qaeda-trained militants moved to Somalia to train members of al-Shabaab.[198] However, al-Shabaab remained "largely independent".[198] Similarly, although al-Shabaab has publicly exploited the al-Qaeda "brand", echoing al-Qaeda ideology in its recruitment videos,[198] it is unclear whether the alliance has affected al-Shabaab's behaviour and aims on the ground.[57] A 2021 statistical analysis suggests that it has not significantly affected al-Shabaab's military strategy.[205] While an al-Shabaab commander has claimed that the group will bring jihad first to East Africa "and afterward, with God's will, to America",[206] an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that the group is far more interested in establishing a fundamentalist government inside Somalia than in carrying out attacks in the West.[207]

AQAP, AQIM and Boko Haram

In June 2012, General Carter Ham of the U.S. Army said that al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Nigeria-based Boko Haram were attempting to coordinate their activities, including in funding, training, and explosives.[207] In 2011, Boko Haram's first suicide bomb attack had been preceded by a public statement warning that "our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable", which analysts understood as an allusion to cooperation with al-Shabaab.[200][208] However, in the view of some observers, most consequential are al-Shabaab's links to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).[209][210] AQAP is based in Yemen, which has longstanding ties to Somalia, and analyst Katherine Zimmerman told the U.S. Congress that AQAP "almost certainly provided the equipment or the expertise" for al-Shabaab's 2016 laptop bomb.[209]

A so-called Islamic State has emerged in our land and stated to attempt to divide our Mujahidin, weaken our strength and carry out assassinations against our own. We have been ignoring their wicked behaviors for some time to give them a chance to change, but they have continued their wrongheadedness. Our senior command has ordered our fighters to attack and eliminate the 'disease' of IS and uproot the tree that would be used to undermine the fruits of the Jihad.

– Al-Shabaab announces Operation Disease Eradication, December 2018[211]

Islamic State

In early 2015, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) published online the first of a series of videos aimed at al-Shabaab, calling on the group to switch allegiances from al-Qaeda to ISIL and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.[212] These public appeals had reportedly been preceded by informal ISIL attempts to establish a relationship with al-Shabaab.[213] Yet al-Shabaab publicly ignored the overtures.[213] By September 2015, it had issued an internal memo, directed at pro-ISIL elements in its ranks, reaffirming the group's allegiance to al-Qaeda and banning any discussion about ISIL. The group also detained several fighters who had voiced support for ISIL.[214]

In October 2015, senior al-Shabaab commander Abdul Qadir Mumin and approximately 20 of his followers in Puntland pledged allegiance to ISIL,[215] establishing what became Islamic State in Somalia (ISIS).[211] Further defections in al-Shabaab ranks occurred in the border region between Somalia and northern Kenya,[216] leading the head of al-Shabaab in the Lower Shabelle region, Abu Abdalla, to announce that all pro-ISIL members should leave the group or be killed.[217] The groups clashed violently on several occasions, most fiercely during 2015, and al-Shabaab's internal security service continued to arrest, and sometimes execute, suspected ISIS supporters within al-Shabaab's ranks.[211]

Violent conflict between the groups was reinvigorated in 2018 by ISIS provocation, and, in December, al-Shabaab's spokesman announced an offensive – code-named Operation Disease Eradication – against ISIS.[218] The same week, al-Shabaab's governor-general, Sheikh Mohamed Abubakar, released an 8-page treatise rebuking ISIS's ideology and listing crimes it had committed under the Quran.[211]

Sources of income and arms

In 2020, the Hiraal Institute estimated that al-Shabaab collected at least $15 million in revenue every month, implying revenue on a similar scale to the government's;[219] and the UN estimates that the group's military budget was approximately $21 million in 2019.[57] In the period after 2014, al-Shabaab established its own Ministry of Finance,[220] and it has cultivated various revenue streams, among which it switches as its military position or political circumstances change.[221]

 
Map showing the Horn of Africa (though excluding Somaliland).

External support

During its early years, al-Shabaab received substantial external support in donations from the Somali diaspora or interested international jihadists,[221] enabled by the weakness of the Somalian government's financial regulation framework and the ubiquitous use of the hawala system for receipt of remittances.[222] Although al-Shabaab initially appeared a promising alternative to the Islamic Courts Union, its popularity with diaspora donors declined after the Ethiopian withdrawal and as the group gained a reputation for brutality.[221] Concurrently, however, al-Shabaab increased its ties to other jihadist groups, especially al-Qaeda, which have extensive capacity to generate income in the Arabian Peninsula and Horn of Africa.[221] For example, years before al-Shabaab became an official al-Qaeda affiliate, bin Laden publicly called on Muslims to send money to al-Shabaab.[198] However, over the past decade, the counterterrorism efforts of foreign governments have obstructed international funding sources.[221]

According to authorities, the Somali state of Puntland is a key transit point for weapons shipments into Somalia from foreign countries – particularly frequent shipments of small arms and ammunition from Yemen, typically transported across the Gulf of Aden in skiffs, and occasionally larger shipments from the Makran coast of Iran.[223][224][225] Puntland authorities have also seized Yemeni explosives shipments, which they suspect are the result of cooperation between al-Shabaab and Yemen-based AQAP.[226]

Alleged Eritrean support

In December 2009, adopting Resolution 1907, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea, accusing the country of arming and financing militia groups, including al-Shabaab, in southern Somalia's conflict zones.[227] Reports in 2010 and 2011 by a UN International Monitoring Group alleged continuing Eritrean support to Somali rebels – including, in the latter year, about $80,000 in monthly financial support and two air deliveries of weapons – but the Eritrean government emphatically denied the accusations, describing them as "concocted, baseless and unfounded".[227][228] The International Crisis Group added some credence to Eritrea's denials, suggesting that historical Eritrean support to Somali miilitants had been aimed at undermining Ethiopia during its 2006–9 invasion, and that Hizbul Islam was more likely a recipient than al-Shabaab.[229]

On July 5, 2012, the U.S. government imposed sanctions on Eritrea's intelligence chief and a high-ranking military officer, who allegedly facilitated support to al-Shabaab.[230] However, later that year, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported that it had found no evidence of direct Eritrean support to al-Shabaab in the preceding year.[231] Between then and 2017, successive annual reports of the Monitoring Group found no evidence for Eritrean involvement, while noting that Eritrea had not provided full access to investigators;[232][233] nonetheless, the UN Security Council did not enact the group's recommendation to lift its sanctions on Eritrea until November 2018.[234]

Internal revenue

Trade and smuggling

 
The port city of Kismayo, held by al-Shabaab between 2009 and 2012, is a charcoal smuggling hub.

As al-Shabaab expanded its territorial control, it was able to augment its internal funding through illicit markets and local populations. The smuggling of charcoal has been an important source of income for the group since it first gained control of Somali port cities, especially Kismayo.[40] Calculating that al-Shabaab was earning between $15 million and $50 million annually from illegal trade, the UN banned Somali charcoal imports.[221] The group also profits from involvement in – or taxation of – the smuggling and sale of ivory, sugar, and, reportedly, heroin;[220][40] and it has been implicated in illegal mining and minerals exports in East Africa.[221] There is some evidence that al-Shabaab has profited from piracy. In 2011, the head of the UN's counter-piracy division, Colonel John Steed, warned that there was circumstantial evidence that al-Shabaab increasingly sought to cooperate with pirate gangs and other criminal organizations.[235] Further reports suggested that Al-Shabaab members had extorted pirates, demanding protection money equivalent to 20% of the pirates' ransom proceeds, but did not provide evidence that al-Shabaab was itself involved in piracy.[236]

Extortion and taxation

Also in the 2008–11 period, al-Shabaab established a sophisticated taxation system, framed as a form of zakat, in line with sharia, but often resembling extortion. Al-Shabaab taxes may apply to clans, traders, corporations, farmers, or livestock herders – in fact, livestock are sometimes stolen outright by al-Shabaab militants, with the theft framed as a kind of pre-emptive in-kind taxation.[221] Humanitarian aid agencies are also taxed or extorted, in exchange for permission to operate inside certain territories (see above);[221] and al-Shabaab has been known to execute kidnappings for ransom.[237] In recent years, facing territorial losses in urban areas, al-Shabaab has had less recourse to previous revenue streams – notably the charcoal trade, through Kismayo, and the remittance economy – and therefore has relied more heavily on extracting zakat.[60] The development of its security and intelligence services has allowed it to expand its tax base by imposing taxes even in areas outside its territorial control:[221] according to the Hiraal Institute, more than half of al-Shabaab's revenue in 2019–20 came from Mogadishu, whose major companies are taxed at 2.5% of their annual profits.[219] Indeed, a commander in the Somali army confessed to paying tax to al-Shabaab despite being at war with it.[219] The group has been known to punish non-payment severely, including by blockading villages under threat of starvation.[221]

Somali government

Either directly or indirectly through black markets, al-Shabaab has access to arms intended for the Somali government. In 2018 and 2019, expert reports to the UN Security Council found that government military equipment enters the black market, where some of it is sold to al-Shabaab militants. In some cases, senior government officials orchestrate large-scale diversions of government arms and ammunition; in others, low-ranking members of the security forces sell their weapons for subsistence.[225][238] An earlier report in 2014 had alleged that government officials were actively involved in the direct supply of governments arms to al-Shabaab.[239] The group has also been known to infiltrate government institutions, as became clear when regional government employees carried out al-Shabaab's 24 July 2019 Mogadishu bombing, which killed Mogadishu Mayor Abdirahmean Omar Osman.[225]

International response

Terrorist designation

The following countries have officially listed al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization:

Bounties

In 2012, with the support of the Somali government,[249] the United States began issuing bounties for al-Shabaab members under its Rewards for Justice Program. On June 7, the U.S. Department of State offered a total of $33 million in bounties for information leading to the capture of any of seven senior commanders, including $7 million for Godane, then the group's emir, and $5 million for Robow, then his deputy.[249] In response, al-Shabaab's Fu'ad Qalaf issued a mock bounty of his own, promising ten camels to anyone possessing information on U.S. President Barack Obama, and a further, less valuable, reward of ten cocks and ten hens for information on Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State.[249] On an official state visit to Mogadishu, top U.S. envoy Johnnie Carson dismissed the counter-offer as "absurd". He also announced that the U.S. would impose sanctions, including visa and travel bans and asset freezes, on anyone attempting to thwart the ongoing political transition in Somalia.[250]

On March 21, 2013, the U.S. Department of State offered $5 million apiece for information on two American senior al-Shabaab commanders, Omar Shafik Hammami and Jehad Serwan Mostafa.[251] On March 15, 2014, it issued three further bounties, including one on Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir, who it said coordinated al-Shabaab's recruitment activities in Kenya.[252] On September 27, 2014, after Godane's death, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency announced its own bounty, offering $2 million for information leading to the arrest of the new emir, Umar, and a separate $1 million reward for information leading to his killing.[253] Several further Somali bounties were issued on April 10, 2015, with rewards ranging between $100,000 and $250,000.[254] In a separate programme, on April 3, 2015, the Kenyan government offered KSh. 20 million ($215,000) for information leading to the arrest of Mohamed Mohamud, a commander of al-Shabaab's operations in Kenya.[255]

List of leaders

 
Former leader Mukhtar Robow, also known as Abu Mansur, denounced al-Shabaab in 2017.

Emirs

Former members

Former leading members of al-Shabaab include:

Foreign leaders and members

Prominent foreign al-Shabaab members have included:[264]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ 2022 al-Shabaab invasion of Ethiopia
  2. ^ Unrecognized state, internationally as part of Somalia.
  3. ^ US: /ælʃəˈbɑːb/; Arabic: الشباب, lit. 'The Youth'

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Notes

  1. ^ Sources:[8][9][10][11][12][13]
  2. ^ Sources:[14][15][16][17]
  3. ^ Sources
  4. ^ Sources:[20][21][22][23]

Bibliography

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  • Woldemariam, Michael (2018). "The Long War in Somalia: The Somali National Movement, Islamic Courts Union, and Al-Shabaab, 1981–2013". Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa: Rebellion and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 211–281. ISBN 978-1-108-42325-0.

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  • Menkhaus, Ken (2014). "Al-Shabaab and Social Media: A Double-Edged Sword". The Brown Journal of World Affairs. 20 (2): 309–327. ISSN 1080-0786. JSTOR 24590990.
  • Molony, Thomas (2019). "Social Media Warfare and Kenya's Conflict with Al Shabaab in Somalia: A Right to Know?". African Affairs. 118 (471): 328–351. doi:10.1093/afraf/ady035. ISSN 0001-9909.
  • Mueller, Jason C. (2018). "The Evolution of Political Violence: The Case of Somalia's Al-Shabaab". Terrorism and Political Violence. 30 (1): 116–141. doi:10.1080/09546553.2016.1165213. ISSN 0954-6553. S2CID 148494845.
  • Muibu, Daisy (2017). "Foreign Technology or Local Expertise? Al-Shabaab's IED Capability". CTC Sentinel. 10 (10).
  • Onat, Ismail; Guler, Ahmet; Hsu, Henda Y.; Reyes, Jessica (2021). "A VAR Analysis of the Effects of Al-Shabaab's Pledge to Al-Qaeda on Bombings and Fatalities". Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. 16 (3): 283–301. doi:10.1080/18335330.2021.1953115. ISSN 1833-5330. S2CID 237772442.
  • Petrich, Katharine (2022). "Cows, Charcoal, and Cocaine: Al-Shabaab's Criminal Activities in the Horn of Africa". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 45 (5–6): 479–500. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678873. ISSN 1057-610X. S2CID 208835514.
  • Skjelderup, Michael (2014). "Hudūd Punishments in the Forefront: Application of Islamic Criminal Law by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen". Journal of Law and Religion. 29 (2): 317–329. doi:10.1017/jlr.2014.11. ISSN 0748-0814. JSTOR 24739145.
  • Skjelderup, Michael (2020). "Jihadi Governance and Traditional Authority Structures: al-Shabaab and Clan Elders in Southern Somalia, 2008-2012". Small Wars & Insurgencies. 31 (6): 1174–1195. doi:10.1080/09592318.2020.1780686. ISSN 0959-2318. S2CID 221158513.
  • Solomon, Hussein (2014). "Somalia's al-Shabaab: Clans vs Islamist nationalism". South African Journal of International Affairs. 21 (3): 351–366. doi:10.1080/10220461.2014.967286. ISSN 1022-0461. S2CID 153592166.
  • Thomas, Matthew J. (2013). "Exposing and Exploiting Weaknesses in the Merger of al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab". Small Wars & Insurgencies. 24 (3): 413–435. doi:10.1080/09592318.2013.802611. ISSN 0959-2318. S2CID 143419941.
  • Vidino, Lorenzo; Pantucci, Raffaello; Kohlmann, Evan (2010). "Bringing Global Jihad to the Horn of Africa: al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict". African Security. 3 (4): 216–238. doi:10.1080/19392206.2010.533071. ISSN 1939-2206. S2CID 144501155.
  • Warner, Jason; Weiss, Caleb (2017). "A Legitimate Challenger? Assessing the Rivalry between al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia". CTC Sentinel. 10 (10).
  • Weiss, Caleb (2019). "Reigniting the Rivalry: The Islamic State in Somalia vs. al-Shabaab". CTC Sentinel. 12 (4).
  • Williams, Paul D. (2014). "After Westgate: Opportunities and Challenges in the War Against Al-Shabaab". International Affairs. 90 (4): 907–923. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.12147. ISSN 0020-5850. JSTOR 24538204.

Reports

  • Bacon, Tricia (2022). "Inside the Minds of Somalia's Ascendant Insurgents" (PDF). Report of the George Washington University Program on Extremism.
  • Bahadur, Jay (September 17, 2020). "Following the Money: The Use of the Hawala Remittance System in the Yemen–Somalia Arms Trade". Report of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Retrieved December 5, 2021.
  • Barnett, James (May 28, 2020). "The Evolution of East African Salafi-jihadism". Report of the Hudson Institute. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
  • Bryden, Matt (December 8, 2006). . Center for Strategic and International Studies Africa Policy Forum Briefing. Archived from the original on January 8, 2007.
  • Bryden, Matt (2014). "The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity?" (PDF). Report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
  • Byman, Daniel (2012). "Breaking the Bonds between Al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliate Organizations" (PDF). Report of the Brookings Institute.
  • Center for International Security and Cooperation (2022). "Mapping Militants: Al Shabaab". Report of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
  • Chonka, Peter (2016b). "What You Need to Know to Understand al-Shabaab". Report of the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.
  • Dathan, Jennifer (May 25, 2017). "Sources of Funding: al-Shabaab". Action on Armed Violence Report. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
  • Felbab-Brown, Vanda (June 19, 2017). "Puntland's problems". Brookings Institute Briefing. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
  • Felter, Claire; Masters, Jonathan; Sergie, Mohammed Aly (January 10, 2020). "Backgrounder: Al-Shabab". Council on Foreign Relations Briefing.
  • Global Interagency Security Forum (March 23, 2016). "The Resurgence of al-Shabaab in Somalia and Implications for the Humanitarian Sector". Global Interagency Security Forum Briefing. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
  • Harrington, Jake (September 23, 2021). "Examining Extremism: Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen (al Shabaab)". Center for Strategic and International Studies Briefing. Retrieved December 29, 2021.
  • Horton, Michael (March 10, 2017). "Al-Shabaab: Why Somalia's al-Qaeda Affiliate Wants Puntland". Jamestown Foundation Briefing. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
  • Human Rights Watch (April 19, 2010). "Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government, and AMISOM in Somalia". Human Rights Watch Report. Retrieved September 11, 2022.
  • International Crisis Group (June 27, 2019). "Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency". Africa Briefing. 145. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
  • International Crisis Group (June 21, 2022). "Considering Political Engagement with Al-Shabaab in Somalia". Africa Report. 309. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
  • Jackson, Ashley; Aynte, Abdi (2013). "Al-Shabaab Engagement with Aid Agencies" (PDF). Overseas Development Institute Policy Brief. 53.
  • Jackson, Ashley (March 18, 2014). "Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Non-State Actors: Key Lessons from Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia". Overseas Development Institute Policy Brief. 55.
  • Jones, Seth G.; Liepman, Andrew; Chandler, Nathan (September 13, 2016). "Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Assessing the Campaign Against al-Shabaab". Report of the Rand Corporation.
  • Lulie, Hallelujah (March 18, 2013). "The Threat of the 'Unholy Trinity'". Institute for Security Studies Briefing. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
  • Mubarak, Mohamed (2018). "Taming the Clans: Al-Shabab's Clan Politics". Report of the Hiraal Institute. Retrieved September 10, 2022.
  • Roble, Muhyadin Ahmed (December 22, 2011). "The Twitter War: A New Battleground for Kenya and al-Shabaab". Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor. 9 (47). Retrieved September 10, 2022.
  • Schaefer, Alan (2011). "Clan and Conflict in Somalia: Al-Shabaab and the Myth of 'Transcending Clan Politics'". Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor. 9 (40).
  • Shinn, David (2010). . Foreign Policy Research Institute Briefing. Archived from the original on January 6, 2011.
  • The Soufan Center (March 18, 2022). "Somalia Continues to Deteriorate as Al-Shabaab Gains Ground". Soufan Center IntelBrief. Retrieved September 9, 2022.
  • United Nations (November 2, 2017). "Report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea". Report S/2017/924.
  • United Nations (November 9, 2018). "Report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea". Report S/2018/1002.
March 28, 2023
shabaab, militant, group, confused, with, shabaab, mozambique, harakat, shabaab, mujahideen, more, commonly, known, shabaab, note, also, referring, itself, islamic, emirate, somalia, since, 2011, salafi, jihadist, military, political, organisation, based, soma. Not to be confused with Al Shabaab Mozambique Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen more commonly known as al Shabaab note 3 also referring to itself as the Islamic Emirate of Somalia since 2011 29 is a Salafi jihadist military and political organisation based in Somalia and active elsewhere in East Africa It is actively involved in the ongoing Somali Civil War and incorporates elements of Somali nationalism into its Islamist cause Allegiant to the militant pan Islamist organization al Qaeda since 2012 it has also been suspected of forging ties with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Al Shabaabحركة الشباب المجاهدينSeal Logo Jihadist flag used by al ShabaabLeadersAhmed Godane 2007 2014 Ahmad Diriye 2014 present Dates of operationAugust 2006 presentCountry SomaliaHeadquartersKismayo 2008 12 Barawe 1 2012 14 Jilib 2 2014 present Active regions Somalia Kenya Ethiopia note 1 IdeologySalafi jihadism Qutbism Islamism Somali Islamic nationalism 3 4 Anti imperialism 3 5 Anti Zionism 6 Size7 000 12 000 2023 estimate 7 Part ofAl QaedaAllies State allies Eritrea a Qatar b denied Iran c denied Non state allies Al Islah Muslim Brotherhood 18 19 Quds Force d OpponentsState opponents Australia Canada 24 Djibouti Ethiopia France Italy Kenya New Zealand Norway 25 Somalia Somaliland note 2 26 Sudan Tanzania Uganda Turkey 27 United Kingdom United States Non state opponents African Union European Union 28 NATO ASWJ Islamic StateBattles and warsSomali Civil War Somalia War 2006 2009 Somali Civil War 2009 present Formed in the mid 2000s as part of the Islamic Courts Union al Shabaab came to prominence during the 2006 2009 Somalia War during which it presented itself as a vehicle for the waging of armed resistance against the Ethiopian occupation and Western imperialism In subsequent years it gained popular support from Somalis and became a dominant force in south and central Somalia defending large swathes of territory by fighting against the African Union Mission to Somalia and the Federal Government of Somalia as well as the latter s transitional predecessor The group has also frequently clashed with the Somali Sufi militia Ahlu Sunna Waljama a as well as with the Islamic State in Somalia Al Shabaab gained international prominence due to its recruitment of foreign fighters including fighters who are from Western countries Countries which include the United States the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates have all designated it as a terrorist organization and the United States has militarily intervened in order to fight against the group Between 2011 and 2013 a coalition which mostly consisted of East African forces led by the Somali government wrested a significant amount of territory from al Shabaab including the capital city Mogadishu During the same period the group was plagued by internal conflicts over its leadership and ideological direction which intensified when in February 2012 al Shabaab s leadership pledged allegiance to al Qaeda It suffered further military losses in 2014 as a result of Operation Indian Ocean and the killing of its emir Ahmed Abdi Godane in an American drone strike as well as the killing of other leaders For several years thereafter al Shabaab retreated from the major cities but it remained influential in many rural areas and it prioritized guerrilla and terror attacks over territorial acquisitions It is responsible for many high fatality attacks including the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi Kenya the October 2017 Mogadishu bombings the December 2019 Mogadishu bombing and the October 2022 Mogadishu bombings In addition to being active in Somalia it is also active in other East African countries especially in Kenya and occasionally also in Ethiopia Attendant to its recent resurgence it was estimated to have increased its combat strength to between 7 000 and 12 000 fighters in February 2022 30 Contents 1 Name 2 Organisation and structure 2 1 Origins 2 2 Ideology 2 3 Size and structure 2 4 Membership 3 History 3 1 2006 09 Ethiopian incursion 3 2 2009 10 Dominance in the south 3 3 2011 13 Internal and external challenges 3 3 1 Territorial losses 3 3 2 Drought al Qaeda and internal struggle 3 3 3 Defections 3 4 2013 17 Regrouping 3 5 2018 2022 Resurgence 3 6 2022 present Retaliation 4 Propaganda strategy 4 1 Propaganda films 4 2 Internet and social media 5 Local governance strategy 5 1 Humanitarian access 5 2 Ban on single use plastic bags 5 3 Response to COVID 19 6 Foreign recruitment 6 1 Early surge 6 2 Current status 7 Relationship with other militant groups 7 1 Hizbul Islam 7 2 Al Qaeda 7 3 AQAP AQIM and Boko Haram 7 4 Islamic State 8 Sources of income and arms 8 1 External support 8 2 Alleged Eritrean support 8 3 Internal revenue 8 3 1 Trade and smuggling 8 3 2 Extortion and taxation 8 3 3 Somali government 9 International response 9 1 Terrorist designation 9 2 Bounties 10 List of leaders 10 1 Emirs 10 2 Former members 10 3 Foreign leaders and members 11 See also 12 Notes 13 References 14 Notes 15 Bibliography 15 1 Books 15 2 Articles 15 3 Reports 16 External linksName EditAl Shabaab is also known as Ash Shabaab Hizb al Shabaab Party of the Youth 31 and as the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations PRM Arabic حركة المقاومة الشعبية في بلاد الهجرتين 32 The term al Shabaab means the youth in Arabic Organisation and structure EditOrigins Edit Although it is unclear when al Shabaab was formed it is understood to have originated as a wing of the Islamic Courts Union an umbrella group which provided de facto governance in much of Somalia until the country was invaded by Ethiopia in December 2006 33 34 In 2007 8 al Shabaab established itself as an independent actor gaining prominence as a vehicle of armed resistance to Ethiopian occupation in the War in Somalia 33 34 Many of its early leaders and members previously belonged not only to the Islamic Courts Union but also to the older al Ittihad al Islamiya a group founded on the tenets of Salafism and opposition to clannism 35 Many early al Shabaab leaders had also been trained as mujahideen in Afghanistan and Syria Ideology Edit According to the International Crisis Group Salafism has been the core unifying principle of al Shabaab although this principle is not interpreted uniformly by the group s members and leaders 33 In particular al Shabaab officially and generally advocates a form of Salafi jihadism with transnational aims linking Somali nationalist and local grievances to the plight of Muslims worldwide 33 Through this lens incursions into Somalia by Ethiopia and later by Kenya the United States and others are viewed as continuous with non Muslim acts of aggression in other Muslim majority countries 35 36 However this globalist framework is not universal within the group 37 38 an ideological fault line which has sometimes fostered factionalism and internal conflict Much of al Shabaab s Somali support base is fiercely nationalist and sees as its primary goal the establishment of a stable Islamic state inside Somalia 36 39 or more ambitiously inside so called Greater Somalia uniting the ethnic Somali populations of Ethiopia Kenya and Djibouti 40 Other domestic supporters are concerned primarily with clan related and local objectives and are therefore prone to infighting and shifting alliances 41 However these ideological differences can accommodate broad opposition within the group to common adversaries notably opposition to external intervention in Somalia often publicly expressed in quasi Qutbist terms 42 and opposition to the internationally recognised Somali government which lacking a basis in religious Sharia law is seen to lack legitimacy 33 Al Shabaab hardliners broadly adhere to a Takfiri interpretation of the principle of al wala wal bara lit loyalty and disavowal 33 43 insofar as it prescribes dissociation from non Muslims and those perceived as apostates 44 A major component of Al Shabaab s ideology is Somali religious nationalism which is incorporated into its Pan Islamist cause Patriotic themes warning Somalis of the plots from international NGOs Christian Crusaders United States Ethiopia AMISOM and their collaborators are a regular feature of the movement s propaganda During the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia Al Shabab positioned itself as a staunch nationalist militia under the Islamic Muqawwama resistance coalition of the Islamic Courts Union taking the most hardline stance against the invading Christian crusaders After the collapse of the ICU in 2007 Al Shabaab launched its own independent insurgency gaining popular support from Somalis for defending the country from American imperialism and foreign occupation Al Qaeda began enhancing its co operation and support to Al Shabab during this period which enabled the movement to establish itself as the strongest military power in Southern Somalia Al Shabab regards Somalia s Federal Government as an illegitmitate apostate entity backed by foreign invaders 45 46 The group has persecuted those individuals belonging to Somalia s small Christian minority whom it accused of aiding the agenda of foreign Crusaders to convert Somalis to Christianity 47 It has desecrated a Sufi mosque and graves on the basis that over embellishing them into shrines is incompatible with Sharia 48 49 and has clashed with the pro AMISOM Sufi militias of Ahlu Sunna Waljama a 50 51 In addition its statements have expressed anti Zionist sentiments 52 53 and the group claimed that its 2019 DusitD2 complex attack was retaliation against the declaration of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel 54 Size and structure Edit In 2017 observers estimated that al Shabaab comprised between 7 000 and 9 000 fighters 55 In 2018 the Council of Foreign Relations and United States military revised this figure downwards estimating 3 000 to 6 000 and 4 000 to 6 000 respectively 56 Reflecting an apparent al Shabaab resurgence the United States Africa Command estimated 5 000 to 10 000 fighters two years later in 2020 57 Most recently an expert report submitted to the United Nations UN Security Council in early February 2022 estimated that al Shabaab s fighting force had grown to between 7 000 and 12 000 fighters 30 The group is led by a shura council of senior leaders appointed and assigned portfolios by the emir and operates several internal security organs including an intelligence agency Amniyat and a police force Jeysh Al Hisbah 57 Membership Edit Especially in its early years al Shabaab was sometimes characterised by Somali opponents as dominated by the Hawiye clan which is one of the largest clans in Somalia 37 Hawiye remain influential in the group 58 and according to a 2018 analysis by the Somali Hiraal Institute five of the ten members of the executive shura council were Hawiye as were about 94 of the top 220 officials 59 However al Shabaab is attached to an ethos of anti clannism and has therefore tried to appeal to minority groups and to ensure ethnic and clan diversity among its leadership 60 It incorporates a relatively large contingent of foreign fighters see below Rank and file members though sometimes recruited by force 41 are also attracted by the regular pay that al Shabaab offers and by its political propaganda 60 In the past many young al Shabaab recruits were drawn from marginalised southern clans such as the Jareer 60 61 Many are children 62 In February 2012 Fu ad Qalaf Shongole an al Shabaab officer with responsibility for awareness raising encouraged a Somali gathering to send their unmarried daughters to fight jihad with al Shabaab which until then had used only male fighters 63 However according to International Crisis Group women rarely participate directly in military decision making or operations though they do play important roles in recruitment intelligence and explosives smuggling 64 History EditMain article Timeline of al Shabaab related events See also Somali Civil War 2009 present 2006 09 Ethiopian incursion Edit Main article Somalian War Al Shabaab rose to prominence as a relatively well organised militia garnering popular support from Somalis sympathetic to their opposition to the Ethiopian invasion though the invasion had fractured the Islamic Courts Union it galvanised nationalism on which al Shabaab capitalised especially for recruitment purposes 35 In the military arena al Shabaab suffered key losses during offensives by the African Union Mission to Somalia AMISOM which was established in 2007 but during this phase put down the roots of an enduring insurgency establishing networks and territorial bases concentrated in rural south central Somalia 33 2009 10 Dominance in the south EditHaving made important territorial gains from mid 2008 al Shabaab increasingly focused its attention on opposition to the Somali Transitional Federal Government as the Ethiopian led war segued into the next phase of the protracted Somali Civil War 65 By 2009 10 al Shabaab controlled most of central and southern Somalia south of the semi autonomous region of Puntland and it had formed administrative structures to govern territories under its control 34 66 67 It had particular success building relationships with local leaders in order to build cross clan coalitions combining its principled anti clannism with a pragmatic clannism a willingness to manipulate clan networks and exploit inter clan politics 68 33 37 60 Over 200 al Shabaab fighters surrender to AMISOM September 2012 Somali and Kenyan troops celebrate al Shabaab s retreat from Kismayo Airport 2012 2011 13 Internal and external challenges Edit In subsequent years however al Shabaab s strong position was significantly weakened as in the context of a famine in the region and simultaneously a military offensive against the group the group experienced territorial and strategic setbacks in the military arena an internal struggle over the group s direction and leadership and in response to both a wave of high profile defections Territorial losses Edit The group s military fortunes turned with the failure of the August 2010 Ramadan offensive the inauguration of the Battle of Mogadishu which resulted in heavy al Shabaab losses 34 By August 2011 al Shabaab had announced a strategic withdrawal from Mogadishu although from outlying districts it continued to exert influence in the city and to launch deadly guerrilla attacks against AMISOM and the TFG 66 In October and November 2011 Kenya and Ethiopia partnering with local militias launched offensives against al Shabaab strongholds Kenya s Operation Linda Nchi on the southern front while Ethiopia approached from the west The group lost territory to both armies notably losing Baidoa to Ethiopia in February 2012 and losing the port city and revenue hub of Kismayo to Kenya in October 2012 66 69 Military pressures on the group were sustained into 2013 Drought al Qaeda and internal struggle Edit Some al Shabaab members viewed the 2010 Ramadan offensive as disastrously ill conceived and subsequent territorial losses galvanised internal opposition to the leadership of Ahmed Abdi Godane who was publicly named the group s emir in December 2007 70 As a severe drought afflicted the region critics generally associated with the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys and Mukhtar Robow 67 71 opposed al Shabaab s response to the resulting famine particularly its obstruction of foreign humanitarian aid to populations in its territories see below 72 73 74 More broadly they argued that the group s authoritarian style of governance and use of violence were causing the group to lose public support Some suggested that these leadership missteps were the result of Godane s lack of clan roots which they said led him to undervalue the lives both of civilians and of al Shabaab fighters 34 These criticisms became intertwined with a broader and pre existing dispute over the increasingly globalist flavour of al Shabaab s ideology Godane was among the faction which viewed Somalia as only one battleground of global jihad 36 39 Godane s announcement in February 2012 of a merger with al Qaeda see below thus also met opposition 75 76 Other senior al Shabaab members met at a conference in Baidabo 77 and outlined a policy programme which diverged from Godane s they rejected Godane s proposal to change the group s name to al Qaeda in East Africa and resolved to focus on domestic issues rather than global jihad They also resolved to establish a national shura of Islamic clerics independent of al Qaeda control 75 78 Godane s rival Aweys declared publicly that Al Shabaab and al Qaeda are merely a small part of the larger Islamic group and al Qaeda s ideology should not be viewed as the sole righteous path for Islam 79 Suspected al Shabaab militants in Mogadishu during a joint operation between Somali forces and AMISOM May 2014 In 2013 these internal rifts led to internecine violence as Godane effected what was virtually a purge of his critics 67 Among those killed were Ibrahim al Afghani and three other senior commanders executed in June 80 and Omar Shafik Hammami killed in September 81 Journalist Simon Tisdall viewed the September 2013 Westgate shopping mall shooting in Nairobi Kenya as a reflection of the internal power struggle with Godane s hardline globalist faction seeking to exert its authority 82 Defections Edit From mid to late 2011 and into 2012 al Shabaab faced an increasing number of defections 66 It was not the first such wave of defections in particular in late 2009 after the Ethiopian departure from Somalia several leaders had defected to the Somali government citing complaints about al Shabaab s use of suicide attacks and executions 83 its false interpretations of Islam 84 and its use of extortion and attitude towards foreign humanitarian aid 85 Such defections were viewed as strategically important to al Shabaab s adversaries not only for their propaganda use but because former militants could provide intelligence about al Shabaab s combat strategy 86 However according to AMISOM and the Somali government the volume of defections in the period around 2012 was unprecedented and indicated that al Shabaab s cohesion and authority were deteriorating in June 2012 the government said that around 500 al Shabaab militants had already defected to it and that more were doing so every day 87 Al Shabaab brutalities which alienated local populations were again cited as central in motivating defections 88 On September 5 and September 22 2012 two large contingents of al Shabaab fighters around 200 each time surrendered to the government coalition in Afmadow and Garsale respectively 86 89 Another wave of defections and desertions followed Godane s 2013 purges Aweys for example fled the group in mid 2013 80 2013 17 Regrouping EditFollowing its territorial losses al Shabaab reverted to the tactics of asymmetric warfare launching guerrilla attacks on AMISOM and government positions and territories 34 66 Southern commander Aweys had announced this new strategy in a media interview shortly after the withdrawal from Mogadishu in August 2011 90 Al Shabaab increasingly avoided direct military combat and large battles in favour of dictat ing the conflict s pace by undertaking smaller ambushes at locations of its own choosing 33 It also developed a strategy of maintaining a semi territorial presence in key regions and parts of key cities while it no longer had exclusive and military authority over substantial territory it retained a sporadic presence and therefore significant influence in many places 91 92 Territorial control of Somalia as of April 2017 Nonetheless by 2016 al Shabaab was viewed as significantly weakened by the military campaign against it with earlier losses compounded in 2014 15 by Operation Indian Ocean a joint endeavour by AMISOM the Somali government and the United States 91 93 The Somali government claimed in October 2014 that over 700 al Shabaab militants had surrendered since September when it had extended an amnesty offer to them 94 Reports of further senior defections continued into 2015 95 96 97 98 Moreover an American drone strike killed Godane on September 1 2014 99 he was succeeded as al Shabaab leader by Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah who took office the same week 100 Other senior members were killed in armed clashes or by American drone strikes in 2014 and 2015 101 102 103 104 According to some reports since Godane s death the group has placed less weight on global jihad than on local grievances 34 67 40 2018 2022 Resurgence Edit In October 2017 more than 500 people were killed by a suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu Al Shabaab did not claim responsibility for the attack but was suspected of involvement 105 In December 2019 another suicide truck bomb marked the beginning of a series of al Shabaab attacks on the capital city which continued into 2022 106 107 108 Al Shabaab also targeted American military personnel in an attack on a Kenyan base in January 2020 109 and in July 2022 launched an unusually bold though short lived incursion into Ethiopian territory 110 By 2020 the group s strategy of semi territorialism allowed it operate freely in much of rural Somalia with its primary base in the Jubba River Valley 35 although air strikes against its leaders continued 111 and it has recently won military successes against the government 112 It had also expanded its operations in Puntland 113 114 prompting a military offensive by Puntland forces in 2021 115 116 As of July 2022 al Shabaab is generally considered to be resurgent 117 a situation partly enabled by a reduction in the number of American air strikes 118 and possibly motivated by competition with Islamic State in Somalia which has been conducting its own expansionary campaign 119 2022 present Retaliation Edit In August 2022 Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declared total war against Al Shabaab during a televised address after the group carried out a deadly hotel attack in Mogadishu and also announced that the Somalia military had regained territory from al Shabaab in the central Galmudug state and Southwest state 120 Al By September 2022 Somali and ATMIS offensive operations against al Shabaab with U S support would escalate to the highest point in five years 121 The operation which is considered a combined Somali ATMIS offensive 121 began in August 2022 and with assistance from U S airstrikes has been focused on disrupting al Shabaab activity in Somalia s central Hiraan region 122 121 Other Al Shabaab controlled areas in southern Somalia have been targeted by the Somalia military as well 123 On 20 September 2022 as the military operation progressed a statement was released by the Somali Ministry of Information which revealed that President Sheikh would not offer any other option than surrender for al Shabaab members 124 Propaganda strategy Edit Drawings left by fighters on the walls of a building in El Baraf Although al Shabaab has disseminated its propaganda by various media the bulk of its engagement with Somalis in rural areas is either face to face or by radio broadcast 125 Face to face the group holds seminars on Islamic jurisprudence and community meetings on such matters such as grain and livestock distribution 125 It operates its own radio station Radio Andalus mainly operated using relay stations and other equipment seized from private radio stations including the BBC 126 Presenters broadcast in Somali Arabic Swahili and English 126 In April 2010 al Shabaab banned BBC and Voice of America broadcasts on Somali radio objecting to what they alleged was Christian propaganda 127 Also in 2010 and prior to its expulsion from Mogadishu the following year al Shabaab launched a television news channel Al Kataib News 128 The group has also been known to conduct military parades in its territories as a show of force 129 Propaganda films Edit Al Shabaab began creating propaganda films early in its campaign against Ethiopian forces 125 produced by its dedicated media wing al Kataib Media Foundation 130 Since 2009 al Shabaab s films have become noticeably more professional both in their production quality and in their messaging reportedly with direct support from al Qaeda s al Sabab Media Foundation 130 The early films were distributed primarily and widely online and were primarily used as tools for recruitment particularly among foreign jihadists 125 More recent films show al Shabaab distributing humanitarian aid and participating in other community or religious activities though others are much more gruesome displaying the corpses of beheaded members alleged to have been spies 126 131 Propaganda films are also occasionally used to attempt to mobilise jihadi activity abroad in October 2013 one film encouraged British jihadists to follow the example set by Lee Rigby s killers 132 while a February 2015 film called without effect for attacks on shopping malls in Canada the United Kingdom and the United States including the West Edmonton Mall in Alberta Canada and the Mall of America in Bloomington Minnesota 133 134 Send me a cruise like Maa lam Adam al Ansari And send me a couple of tons like Zarqawi And send me a drone like Abu Layth al Libi And Special Forces like Saleh Ali Nabhan Send me all four and send me much much more I pray for that on my way to heavens door Send me four and send me more that what I implore An amazing martyrdom I strive for and adore Chorus to Send Me a Cruise by Abu Mansoor Al Amriki 135 Internet and social media Edit Al Shabaab was an early adopter among African insurgents of the Internet which it uses to distribute its propaganda videos and for various other propaganda functions 125 Especially in its early years it used online chatrooms and discussion forums encouraging foreign fighters and even military commanders to post updates and field public questions about the state of the jihad 130 Particularly prominent was American born Omar Shafik Hammami also known as Abu Mansoor Al Amriki who for many years kept a video blog about his life in al Shabaab and who from 2009 also created and posted raps about jihad 136 137 Al Shabaab also had an official website which carried official statements and news including sundry edicts and threats and religious guidance Since the site was closed in 2009 it has distributed its press releases and videos using other sympathetic websites or more commonly using social media networks 125 130 Indeed although al Shabaab spokesmen occasionally grant interviews to carefully selected local and foreign journalists 130 social media networks have provided an important channel for interaction with the press as well as for disseminating information and building support Al Shabaab has used Facebook particularly to communicate with the Somali diaspora 130 and it has made prolific and innovative use of Twitter since late 2011 138 although its first accounts were active as early as 2009 139 Online engagement with al Shabaab surged during Operation Linda Nchi the Kenyan offensive of 2011 12 when al Shabaab used Twitter under the handle HSMPress to urge Somalis to take up arms against the Kenyan forces 140 and to portray its own military losses as tactical retreats 141 In an extreme example of the latter in late 2011 al Shabaab photos purportedly showed several dozen AMISOM casualties but according to an African Union spokesperson in fact showed al Shabaab s own casualties dressed in their adversaries uniforms 142 143 What received most attention however were tweets al Shabaab posted mocking the Kenya Defence Forces KDF and sparring with Major Emmanuel Chirchir then the KDF s official spokesman 139 144 Responding to Chirchir s claim that Kismayo had been captured by the KDF al Shabaab tweeted that the KDF boys are a grotesque parody of an army Al Shabaab can outpace ur world class runners by far Indeed they Run like a Kenyan 145 Showing uncharacteristic levity al Shabaab also suggested by Tweet that it meet a UN official for a caramel macchiato 146 Most of al Shabaab s Tweets are in English suggesting that they are intended for a foreign audience 147 In 2011 officials in the United States where Twitter is based said they were considering having the account closed but had legal and free speech concerns 148 Chirchir himself tweeted that such a move would be counterproductive as al Shabaab needs to be engaged positively and Twitter is the only avenue 149 Nonetheless in January 2013 Twitter suspended al Shabaab s English language account Observers guessed that the suspension was a response to the account having issued death threats against Kenyan hostages and against French spy Denis Allex followed in the latter case by confirmation that the execution had taken place 150 151 A new English language account opened in February 2013 152 was closed in September for unspecified reasons This suspension also followed an apparent violation of Twitter s rules al Shabaab had recently used the account to claim responsibility for an unsuccessful ambush of a convoy carrying Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and to warn that next time you won t be as lucky 153 Al Shabaab relaunched its English language Twitter account once again on September 11 2013 154 Two weeks later the group gained notoriety for live tweeting the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack justifying the attack creating fictional threats providing news on hostages and mocking the police and military response 137 The account which then had 15 000 or more followers was retweeted several million times before it was shut down by Twitter 125 130 And after HSMPress was deleted the live updates continued from other new accounts over the course of the attack which lasted several days at least eight different al Shabaab affiliated Twitter accounts were active 125 Al Shabaab had opened a new Twitter account by December that year with an official telling Al Jazeera that The aim is to vigorously challenge defamatory reports in the media by presenting an accurate portrayal of the current state of Jihad in Somalia and countering Western state sponsored propaganda machines 138 It has since tweeted from various accounts during other attacks 155 Facebook too has had difficulty expeditiously removing graphic al Shabaab content when it appears on newly created accounts 156 Local governance strategy Edit Residents of Tortoro celebrate with Lower Shabelle governor Abdulkadir Mohamed Sidi after the town s liberation from al Shabaab June 2015 In territories it holds al Shabaab typically maintains limited but effective administrative control over resident populations 33 providing services such as dispute resolution through Sharia based courts which are sometimes compared favourably to those offered in government held territories 35 157 Al Shabaab claimed some credit for Somalia s excellent crop yield in early 2010 saying that Somali grain production had flourished due to al Shabaab s reduction of food imports and that the policy had redistributed income to poor rural Somali farmers 158 However the group has also allegedly committed widespread human rights abuses against populations in its territories including through a brutal interpretation and application of Islamic jurisprudence on hudud 159 160 Humanitarian access EditDespite routinely expelling attacking and harassing aid workers al Shabaab permits some agencies to work in areas under its control At the height of its territorial control it implemented a system of aid agency regulation taxation and surveillance Where agencies are allowed to operate this is often due to the desire of al Shabaab to coopt and materially and politically benefit from the provision of aid and services 161 Senior aid agency representatives often strongly rejected claims that they talked with al Shabaab while aid workers working in al Shabaab controlled areas often reported they directly negotiated with the group out of necessity 162 Complaints made against the group include its attacks on aid workers According to journalist Jon Lee Anderson The number of people in Somalia who are dependent on international food aid has tripled since 2007 to an estimated 3 6 million But there is no permanent foreign expatriate presence in southern Somalia because the Shabaab has declared war on the UN and on Western non governmental organizations International relief supplies are flown or shipped into the country and distributed wherever possible through local relief workers Insurgents routinely attack and murder them too forty two have been killed in the past two years alone 163 In 2009 Godane imposed an al Shabaab ban on the UN World Food Programme and Western agencies in Somalia The ban was opposed by other senior members including Robow and Aweys but Godane overruled them 72 164 In response to the 2011 Eastern Africa drought which lasted until early 2012 165 al Shabaab announced in July 2011 that it had withdrawn its restrictions on international humanitarian workers 166 The group also adapted its propaganda strategy to accommodate the changing circumstances In some cases group members employed humanitarian aid as a recruitment tool using relief supplies as bribes and as an incentive to join the militants whose numbers had decreased due to casualties and defections 167 Group members dismissed the UN declaration of famine in various regions as grossly exaggerated and banned various organizations from providing aid to those regions 168 In response in August 2011 Somali Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali announced the establishment of a new 300 man security force which assisted by AMISOM was tasked with protecting aid convoys from al Shabaab and with securing IDP camps while relief was being distributed 169 Although fighting disrupted aid delivery in some areas humanitarian access to al Shabaab controlled areas improved and a scaling up of relief operations in mid November prompted the UN to downgrade the humanitarian situation in several regions from famine to emergency levels 170 Ban on single use plastic bags Edit In July 2018 al Shabaab announced a complete ban on single use plastic bags within its territory in a broadcast in which it stated that they pose a serious threat to the well being of humans and animals alike and in the same announcement it also imposed a complete ban on the logging of several species of rare trees 171 Some have argued that whilst these environmentally conscious advances are welcome they are overshadowed by the group s terrorist activities whilst others have mocked the United States and other countries for taking less action on climate change than a terrorist group 172 Response to COVID 19 Edit Al Shabaab acknowledged the existence of the COVID 19 pandemic and announced the formation of a coronavirus prevention and treatment committee 173 In mid June 2020 the group announced that it had set up a coronavirus treatment centre in Jilib about 380 km 236 mi south of the capital Mogadishu 174 Foreign recruitment EditAl Shabaab is noteworthy in the region for its extensive recruitment of foreign fighters see list below 175 176 These foreign recruits include members of the Somali diaspora or ethnic Somalis overseas citizens of other East African countries and citizens of countries further afield including in the Middle East and the West 177 36 Non Somali fighters have occasionally orchestrated high profile al Shabaab attacks notably the 2010 Kampala bombings and 2019 DusitD2 complex attack in Nairobi 178 However of greater importance to al Shabaab are the combat experience and specialised skills of some usually Arab foreign fighters 179 which have been linked to al Shabaab s increased sophistication in producing explosives 81 improved sniper capability 177 and increased propensity to use suicide attacks 34 Foreign fighters may also have access to networks which improve al Shabaab s capacity to recruit and operate in the region and have made useful contributions to al Shabaab s propaganda campaign early Western recruits helped produce al Shabaab s first English language propaganda and thanks to its East African membership Swahili remains the second most common language in al Shabaab publications 81 180 Foreign fighters also have symbolic importance for al Shabaab propaganda al Shabaab has intentionally played up the diversity of its recruits as a paean to its pan Islamism that is to demonstrate that it transcends clannism and nationalism embodying a united transnational ummah 81 Early surge Edit American born Jehad Mostafa is a senior al Shabaab commander Foreign recruitment peaked in the period between 2011 and 2013 81 which was also the period in which the phenomenon received the most attention The 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia attracted foreign volunteers to al Shabaab s cause 36 and as of 2010 al Shabaab included an estimated 200 300 foreign fighters not including a further 1 000 ethnic Somalis from the diaspora 179 In subsequent years al Shabaab recruitment became a concern for the governments of both the United Kingdom and the United States At a security conference in London in 2010 the former head of MI5 Jonathan Evans said that a significant number of U K residents were training with al Shabaab 181 the precise number of British recruits was estimated at between 50 182 and 100 183 persons There was also evidence that the group had received funding from Somali residents in Britain 184 Between 2012 and 2013 several British citizens faced control orders or even criminal charges related to association with al Shabaab 185 186 Sweden Denmark Canada and the U S similarly encountered evidence of citizens affiliation with al Shabaab 36 In the U S the U S Senate Homeland Security Committee heard as early as 2009 from Michael Leiter director of the National Counterterrorism Center that American and other foreign fighters were being recruited and trained by al Shabaab 38 In 2011 the House Committee on Homeland Security reported that more than 40 Muslim Americans and 20 Canadians had fought with al Shabaab and that at least 15 of those volunteers had been killed in Somalia 187 Later that year a U S military official told the New York Times that about 30 U S citizens were al Shabaab fighters 188 This was a resumption of an earlier trend of al Shabaab recruitment among Americans which previously had peaked in 2007 8 189 Also in 2011 two Somali Americans in Minnesota were convicted of illegally financing al Shabaab 188 By mid 2013 observers believed that recruitment of U S citizens had subsided 190 In general foreign activity in al Shabaab has decreased first and perhaps most importantly because the Syrian civil war became the focal point for foreign jihadist recruitment networks 81 Other factors however are more specific to al Shabaab One factor was the group s internal struggle of 2011 13 as tensions between Somali and non Somali members increased Godane scapegoated the foreigners as the cause of the group s disunity and during his 2013 purge executed various foreign recruits see above 81 34 In addition to serving as a disincentive to foreign fighters this shift reduced the influence of the group s remaining foreign leaders 67 Moreover whereas the ascendancy of Godane and his faction had partly internationalized al Shabaab in subsequent years al Shabaab became re domesticated as it made territorial gains its attention was increasingly consumed by local governance and the management of clan dynamics activities in which foreign fighters frequently mistrusted by local populations lacked utility and influence 34 As the conflict and al Shabaab s priorities became more localized and clan based they also held less appeal for foreign fighters themselves 81 Foreign fighters also attracted the counterterrorism efforts of foreign countries and were sometimes suspected of disloyalty and spying by their Somali peers 34 Current status Edit As of 2020 estimates of the number of foreign recruits still active in al Shabaab ranged from 450 to 2 000 177 Most of those recruits are from East Africa primarily Kenya 191 but also Tanzania and Uganda all countries in which al Shabaab recruitment networks are well entrenched 33 81 The flow of recruits from Arab countries and the West has diminished substantially since 2014 except for in the case of Yemen 178 81 Moreover few foreign fighters hold strategically important roles in the group Many are among the rank and file of the military wing 81 192 Those in leadership positions tend to have prominent but strategically marginal or mid level roles for example in managing the group s public relations or external relations or in supervising and training other foreign recruits 34 Godane s nationalist critics however argue that earlier under his leadership foreign fighters did in fact gain significant influence over the group 39 Since 2013 al Shabaab has also established two external military units on Godane s initiative one in Ethiopia has struggled but the other in the Great Lakes region has carried out several attacks in Kenya 178 Relationship with other militant groups EditHizbul Islam EditBetween 2010 and 2012 Hizbul Islam a smaller group of Somali militants 193 was merged with al Shabaab after suffering military defeats against al Shabaab in southern towns Hizbul Islam was officially absorbed by its former rival in December 2010 194 195 However on September 24 2012 Hizbul Islam announced that it would split from al Shabaab claiming the union had only ever been nominal and that the factions political philosophies had differed irreconcilably Hizbul Islam said that it welcomed negotiations with all groups for the interest of Somalia and added that al Shabaab had been considerably weakened in recent years 196 197 Ahmed Abdi Godane faced internal opposition to his decision to affiliate with al Qaeda Al Qaeda Edit Before 2012 al Qaeda and al Shabaab had what academic Daniel Byman calls an on again off again relationship though both groups praised each other online in 2008 198 199 During this early period al Shabaab occasionally harboured al Qaeda leaders in Somalia in exchange for their technical assistance 198 200 In September 2009 in a video entitled At Your Service Osama al Shabaab publicly declared allegiance to al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden but this reflected an unrequited courtship largely ignored by al Qaeda 201 However after bin Laden s death and replacement by Ayman al Zawahiri al Shabaab became an official al Qaeda affiliate in February 2012 In a fifteen minute video message released on February 9 al Shabaab leader Godane pledged allegiance to al Qaeda and al Zawahiri on behalf of al Shabaab 202 203 Al Zawahiri confirmed the alliance 201 which he said would please the believers and disturb the disbelievers and support the jihadi unity against the Zio Crusader campaign and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers 204 The announcement was met with internal opposition among some factions of al Shabaab see above By late 2012 the groups cooperated closely in various arenas especially indoctrination and training both in basic infantry skills and in advanced explosives and assassination after the merger a corps of al Qaeda trained militants moved to Somalia to train members of al Shabaab 198 However al Shabaab remained largely independent 198 Similarly although al Shabaab has publicly exploited the al Qaeda brand echoing al Qaeda ideology in its recruitment videos 198 it is unclear whether the alliance has affected al Shabaab s behaviour and aims on the ground 57 A 2021 statistical analysis suggests that it has not significantly affected al Shabaab s military strategy 205 While an al Shabaab commander has claimed that the group will bring jihad first to East Africa and afterward with God s will to America 206 an analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that the group is far more interested in establishing a fundamentalist government inside Somalia than in carrying out attacks in the West 207 AQAP AQIM and Boko Haram Edit In June 2012 General Carter Ham of the U S Army said that al Shabaab al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb AQIM and the Nigeria based Boko Haram were attempting to coordinate their activities including in funding training and explosives 207 In 2011 Boko Haram s first suicide bomb attack had been preceded by a public statement warning that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable which analysts understood as an allusion to cooperation with al Shabaab 200 208 However in the view of some observers most consequential are al Shabaab s links to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQAP 209 210 AQAP is based in Yemen which has longstanding ties to Somalia and analyst Katherine Zimmerman told the U S Congress that AQAP almost certainly provided the equipment or the expertise for al Shabaab s 2016 laptop bomb 209 A so called Islamic State has emerged in our land and stated to attempt to divide our Mujahidin weaken our strength and carry out assassinations against our own We have been ignoring their wicked behaviors for some time to give them a chance to change but they have continued their wrongheadedness Our senior command has ordered our fighters to attack and eliminate the disease of IS and uproot the tree that would be used to undermine the fruits of the Jihad Al Shabaab announces Operation Disease Eradication December 2018 211 Islamic State Edit In early 2015 the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIL published online the first of a series of videos aimed at al Shabaab calling on the group to switch allegiances from al Qaeda to ISIL and its leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi 212 These public appeals had reportedly been preceded by informal ISIL attempts to establish a relationship with al Shabaab 213 Yet al Shabaab publicly ignored the overtures 213 By September 2015 it had issued an internal memo directed at pro ISIL elements in its ranks reaffirming the group s allegiance to al Qaeda and banning any discussion about ISIL The group also detained several fighters who had voiced support for ISIL 214 In October 2015 senior al Shabaab commander Abdul Qadir Mumin and approximately 20 of his followers in Puntland pledged allegiance to ISIL 215 establishing what became Islamic State in Somalia ISIS 211 Further defections in al Shabaab ranks occurred in the border region between Somalia and northern Kenya 216 leading the head of al Shabaab in the Lower Shabelle region Abu Abdalla to announce that all pro ISIL members should leave the group or be killed 217 The groups clashed violently on several occasions most fiercely during 2015 and al Shabaab s internal security service continued to arrest and sometimes execute suspected ISIS supporters within al Shabaab s ranks 211 Violent conflict between the groups was reinvigorated in 2018 by ISIS provocation and in December al Shabaab s spokesman announced an offensive code named Operation Disease Eradication against ISIS 218 The same week al Shabaab s governor general Sheikh Mohamed Abubakar released an 8 page treatise rebuking ISIS s ideology and listing crimes it had committed under the Quran 211 Sources of income and arms EditIn 2020 the Hiraal Institute estimated that al Shabaab collected at least 15 million in revenue every month implying revenue on a similar scale to the government s 219 and the UN estimates that the group s military budget was approximately 21 million in 2019 57 In the period after 2014 al Shabaab established its own Ministry of Finance 220 and it has cultivated various revenue streams among which it switches as its military position or political circumstances change 221 Map showing the Horn of Africa though excluding Somaliland External support Edit During its early years al Shabaab received substantial external support in donations from the Somali diaspora or interested international jihadists 221 enabled by the weakness of the Somalian government s financial regulation framework and the ubiquitous use of the hawala system for receipt of remittances 222 Although al Shabaab initially appeared a promising alternative to the Islamic Courts Union its popularity with diaspora donors declined after the Ethiopian withdrawal and as the group gained a reputation for brutality 221 Concurrently however al Shabaab increased its ties to other jihadist groups especially al Qaeda which have extensive capacity to generate income in the Arabian Peninsula and Horn of Africa 221 For example years before al Shabaab became an official al Qaeda affiliate bin Laden publicly called on Muslims to send money to al Shabaab 198 However over the past decade the counterterrorism efforts of foreign governments have obstructed international funding sources 221 According to authorities the Somali state of Puntland is a key transit point for weapons shipments into Somalia from foreign countries particularly frequent shipments of small arms and ammunition from Yemen typically transported across the Gulf of Aden in skiffs and occasionally larger shipments from the Makran coast of Iran 223 224 225 Puntland authorities have also seized Yemeni explosives shipments which they suspect are the result of cooperation between al Shabaab and Yemen based AQAP 226 Alleged Eritrean support Edit In December 2009 adopting Resolution 1907 the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Eritrea accusing the country of arming and financing militia groups including al Shabaab in southern Somalia s conflict zones 227 Reports in 2010 and 2011 by a UN International Monitoring Group alleged continuing Eritrean support to Somali rebels including in the latter year about 80 000 in monthly financial support and two air deliveries of weapons but the Eritrean government emphatically denied the accusations describing them as concocted baseless and unfounded 227 228 The International Crisis Group added some credence to Eritrea s denials suggesting that historical Eritrean support to Somali miilitants had been aimed at undermining Ethiopia during its 2006 9 invasion and that Hizbul Islam was more likely a recipient than al Shabaab 229 On July 5 2012 the U S government imposed sanctions on Eritrea s intelligence chief and a high ranking military officer who allegedly facilitated support to al Shabaab 230 However later that year the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea reported that it had found no evidence of direct Eritrean support to al Shabaab in the preceding year 231 Between then and 2017 successive annual reports of the Monitoring Group found no evidence for Eritrean involvement while noting that Eritrea had not provided full access to investigators 232 233 nonetheless the UN Security Council did not enact the group s recommendation to lift its sanctions on Eritrea until November 2018 234 Internal revenue Edit Trade and smuggling Edit The port city of Kismayo held by al Shabaab between 2009 and 2012 is a charcoal smuggling hub As al Shabaab expanded its territorial control it was able to augment its internal funding through illicit markets and local populations The smuggling of charcoal has been an important source of income for the group since it first gained control of Somali port cities especially Kismayo 40 Calculating that al Shabaab was earning between 15 million and 50 million annually from illegal trade the UN banned Somali charcoal imports 221 The group also profits from involvement in or taxation of the smuggling and sale of ivory sugar and reportedly heroin 220 40 and it has been implicated in illegal mining and minerals exports in East Africa 221 There is some evidence that al Shabaab has profited from piracy In 2011 the head of the UN s counter piracy division Colonel John Steed warned that there was circumstantial evidence that al Shabaab increasingly sought to cooperate with pirate gangs and other criminal organizations 235 Further reports suggested that Al Shabaab members had extorted pirates demanding protection money equivalent to 20 of the pirates ransom proceeds but did not provide evidence that al Shabaab was itself involved in piracy 236 Extortion and taxation Edit Also in the 2008 11 period al Shabaab established a sophisticated taxation system framed as a form of zakat in line with sharia but often resembling extortion Al Shabaab taxes may apply to clans traders corporations farmers or livestock herders in fact livestock are sometimes stolen outright by al Shabaab militants with the theft framed as a kind of pre emptive in kind taxation 221 Humanitarian aid agencies are also taxed or extorted in exchange for permission to operate inside certain territories see above 221 and al Shabaab has been known to execute kidnappings for ransom 237 In recent years facing territorial losses in urban areas al Shabaab has had less recourse to previous revenue streams notably the charcoal trade through Kismayo and the remittance economy and therefore has relied more heavily on extracting zakat 60 The development of its security and intelligence services has allowed it to expand its tax base by imposing taxes even in areas outside its territorial control 221 according to the Hiraal Institute more than half of al Shabaab s revenue in 2019 20 came from Mogadishu whose major companies are taxed at 2 5 of their annual profits 219 Indeed a commander in the Somali army confessed to paying tax to al Shabaab despite being at war with it 219 The group has been known to punish non payment severely including by blockading villages under threat of starvation 221 Somali government Edit Either directly or indirectly through black markets al Shabaab has access to arms intended for the Somali government In 2018 and 2019 expert reports to the UN Security Council found that government military equipment enters the black market where some of it is sold to al Shabaab militants In some cases senior government officials orchestrate large scale diversions of government arms and ammunition in others low ranking members of the security forces sell their weapons for subsistence 225 238 An earlier report in 2014 had alleged that government officials were actively involved in the direct supply of governments arms to al Shabaab 239 The group has also been known to infiltrate government institutions as became clear when regional government employees carried out al Shabaab s 24 July 2019 Mogadishu bombing which killed Mogadishu Mayor Abdirahmean Omar Osman 225 International response EditTerrorist designation Edit The following countries have officially listed al Shabaab as a terrorist organization Australia since 22 August 2009 240 241 Canada since 5 March 2010 242 Malaysia 243 New Zealand since 10 February 2010 244 Singapore since 18 March 2016 245 United Arab Emirates since 15 November 2014 246 United Kingdom since March 2010 247 United States since 29 February 2008 248 Bounties Edit In 2012 with the support of the Somali government 249 the United States began issuing bounties for al Shabaab members under its Rewards for Justice Program On June 7 the U S Department of State offered a total of 33 million in bounties for information leading to the capture of any of seven senior commanders including 7 million for Godane then the group s emir and 5 million for Robow then his deputy 249 In response al Shabaab s Fu ad Qalaf issued a mock bounty of his own promising ten camels to anyone possessing information on U S President Barack Obama and a further less valuable reward of ten cocks and ten hens for information on Hillary Clinton the U S Secretary of State 249 On an official state visit to Mogadishu top U S envoy Johnnie Carson dismissed the counter offer as absurd He also announced that the U S would impose sanctions including visa and travel bans and asset freezes on anyone attempting to thwart the ongoing political transition in Somalia 250 On March 21 2013 the U S Department of State offered 5 million apiece for information on two American senior al Shabaab commanders Omar Shafik Hammami and Jehad Serwan Mostafa 251 On March 15 2014 it issued three further bounties including one on Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir who it said coordinated al Shabaab s recruitment activities in Kenya 252 On September 27 2014 after Godane s death the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency announced its own bounty offering 2 million for information leading to the arrest of the new emir Umar and a separate 1 million reward for information leading to his killing 253 Several further Somali bounties were issued on April 10 2015 with rewards ranging between 100 000 and 250 000 254 In a separate programme on April 3 2015 the Kenyan government offered KSh 20 million 215 000 for information leading to the arrest of Mohamed Mohamud a commander of al Shabaab s operations in Kenya 255 List of leaders Edit Former leader Mukhtar Robow also known as Abu Mansur denounced al Shabaab in 2017 Emirs Edit Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaidah 2014 present 256 Ahmed Godane 2007 14 257 Former members Edit Former leading members of al Shabaab include Hassan Dahir Aweys 258 Mohamed Said Atom 259 Mukhtar Robow 260 Mujahid Miski 261 Abdul Qadir Mumin Aden Hashi Farah Ayro Ibrahim al Afghani 262 Hassan Abdullah Hersi al Turki 263 Foreign leaders and members Edit Prominent foreign al Shabaab members have included 264 Jehad Serwan Mostafa United States 265 Abu Musa Mombasa Pakistan Fu ad Qalaf Shongole Sweden 63 Samantha Lewthwaite Britain unconfirmed 266 Fazul Abdullah Mohammed Kenya 267 Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir Kenya 268 Omar Shafik Hammami United States 269 See also Edit Somalia portalChild soldiers in Somalia Drone strikes in Somalia Human rights in Somalia Islam in Somalia Religion in Somalia Freedom of religion in SomaliaNotes Edit 2022 al Shabaab invasion of Ethiopia Unrecognized state internationally as part of Somalia US ae l ʃ e ˈ b ɑː b Arabic الشباب lit The Youth 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mall attack The Christian Science Monitor Archived from the original on 25 September 2013 Retrieved 23 September 2013 Peter Tom A June 8 2011 Somalia kills Fazul Abdullah Mohammed widening Al Qaeda power vacuum The Christian Science Monitor Retrieved October 9 2012 U S raid in Somalia targeted al Shabaab commander Ikrima Reuters October 6 2013 Retrieved October 8 2013 Rapping American jihadi killed reports Sydney Morning Herald September 12 2013 Archived from the original on December 31 2013 Retrieved September 12 2013 Notes Edit Sources 8 9 10 11 12 13 Sources 14 15 16 17 Sources Sources 20 21 22 23 Bibliography EditBooks Edit Bacon Tricia Muibu Daisy 2019a Foreign Fighter Influence in Al Shabaab Limitations and Future Prospects War and Peace in Somalia National Grievances Local Conflict and Al Shabaab Oxford University Press doi 10 1093 oso 9780190947910 003 0037 Hansen Stig Jarle 2013 Al Shabaab in Somalia The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group Oxford University Press ISBN 978 0199327874 Hansen Stig Jarle 2017 Al Shabaab and the Accidental Jihadists Africa s Insurgents Navigating An Evolving Landscape Lynne Riener Publishers pp 181 196 ISBN 978 1 62637 652 6 OCLC 965781617 Harper Mary 2019 Everything You Have Told Me Is True The Many Faces of Al Shabaab Oxford University Press ISBN 978 1 78738 290 9 Keating Michael Waldman Matt eds 2019 War and Peace in Somalia National Grievances Local Conflict and Al Shabaab Oxford University Press doi 10 1093 oso 9780190947910 003 0037 Maruf Harun Joseph Dan 2018 Inside Al Shabaab The Secret History of Al Qaeda s Most Powerful Ally Indiana University Press ISBN 978 0253037497 Woldemariam Michael 2018 The Long War in Somalia The Somali National Movement Islamic Courts Union and Al Shabaab 1981 2013 Insurgent Fragmentation in the Horn of Africa Rebellion and its Discontents Cambridge University Press pp 211 281 ISBN 978 1 108 42325 0 Articles Edit Alkaff Syed Huzaifah 2013 Al Shabaab A New Phase Counter Terrorist 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Politics Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 9 40 Shinn David 2010 Al Shabaab Tries to Take Control in Somalia Foreign Policy Research Institute Briefing Archived from the original on January 6 2011 The Soufan Center March 18 2022 Somalia Continues to Deteriorate as Al Shabaab Gains Ground Soufan Center IntelBrief Retrieved September 9 2022 United Nations November 2 2017 Report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Report S 2017 924 United Nations November 9 2018 Report on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Report S 2018 1002 span, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

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