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Hamas

Hamas,[e] an acronym of its official name, the Islamic Resistance Movement,[f] is a Palestinian Sunni Islamist[53] political and military organization governing the Gaza Strip of the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories.[54] Headquartered in Gaza City, it has a presence in the West Bank, the larger of the two Palestinian territories, where its secular rival Fatah exercises control.

Islamic Resistance Movement
حركة المقاومة الإسلامية
Chairman of the Political BureauIsmail Haniyeh
Deputy ChairmanSaleh al-Arouri X
Leader in the Gaza StripYahya Sinwar
Military commanderMohammed Deif
Deputy military commanderMarwan Issa
Founder
... and others
FoundedDecember 10, 1987 (1987-12-10)
Split fromMuslim Brotherhood
HeadquartersGaza City, Gaza Strip
Military wingIzz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades
Membership20,000–25,000[7]
Ideology
ReligionSunni Islam
Political allianceAlliance of Palestinian Forces
Colours  Green
Palestinian Legislative Council
74 / 132
Party flag
Hamas
HeadquartersGaza City, Gaza Strip
AlliesState allies:

Non-state allies:

OpponentsState opponents:

Non-state opponents:

Battles and wars
Designated as a terrorist group by

Hamas was founded by Palestinian imam and activist Ahmed Yassin in 1987, after the outbreak of the First Intifada against the Israeli occupation. It emerged from his 1973 Mujama al-Islamiya Islamic charity affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.[55] In 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian legislative election by campaigning on Palestinian armed resistance against the Israeli occupation,[56] thus securing a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council.[57] In 2007, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip from rival Palestinian faction Fatah,[58][59] which it has governed since separately from the Palestinian National Authority. This was followed by an Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip with Egyptian support, and multiple wars with Israel, including in 2008–09, 2012, 2014, and 2021. The ongoing 2023 war began after Hamas launched an attack, killing both civilians and soldiers, and taking hostages back to Gaza.[60][61][62] The attack has been described as the biggest military setback for Israel since the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, which Israel has responded to in an ongoing ground invasion of Gaza.[63]

While initially seeking a state in all of Mandatory Palestine, Hamas began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007.[64][65][66] In 2017, Hamas released a new charter that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel.[67][68][69][70][71] Hamas's repeated offers of a truce (for a period of 10–100 years[72]) based on the 1967 borders are seen by many as consistent with a two-state solution,[73][74][75][76] while others say that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.[77][78] The 1988 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic,[79][80][81] but Hamas's 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language and said Hamas's struggle was with Zionists, not Jews.[82][83][84][85] Hamas promotes Palestinian nationalism in an Islamic context.[86] Hamas is widely popular in Palestinian society due to its anti-Israeli stance.[87][88][89][90]

Hamas has carried out attacks against Israeli civilians, including suicide bombings and indiscriminate rocket attacks.[91] These actions have led human rights groups to accuse it of war crimes, and Argentina, Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Paraguay, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union[46] to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. In 2018, a motion at the United Nations to condemn Hamas was rejected.[g][93][94]

Etymology

Hamas is an acronym of the Arabic phrase حركة المقاومة الإسلامية or Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, meaning "Islamic Resistance Movement". This acronym, HMS, was later glossed in the 1988 Hamas Covenant[95] by the Arabic word ḥamās (حماس) which itself means "zeal", "strength", or "bravery".[96]

History

Origins

When Israel occupied the Palestinian territories in 1967, the Muslim Brotherhood members there did not take active part in the resistance, preferring to focus on social-religious reform and on restoring Islamic values.[97] This outlook changed in the early 1980s, and Islamic organizations became more involved in Palestinian politics.[98] The driving force behind this transformation was Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a Palestinian refugee from Al-Jura.[98] Of humble origins and quadriplegic,[98] he became one of the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders in Gaza. His charisma and conviction brought him a loyal group of followers, upon whom he depended for everything from feeding him and transporting him to and from events to communicating his strategy to the public.[99] In 1973, Yassin founded the social-religious charity Mujama al-Islamiya ("Islamic center") in Gaza as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.[100][101]

Israeli authorities in the 1970s and 1980s showed indifference to al-Mujama al-Islamiya. They viewed it as a religious cause that was significantly less militant against Israel than Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization; many also believed that the infighting between Islamist organizations and the PLO would lead to the latter's weakening.[55][102][103][104][105] Thus, the Israeli government did not intervene in fights between PLO and Islamist forces.[55] Israeli officials disagree on how much governmental indifference (or even support) of these disputes led to the rise of Islamism in Palestine. Some, such as Arieh Spitzen, have argued that "even if Israel had tried to stop the Islamists sooner, he doubts it could have done much to curb political Islam, a movement that was spreading across the Muslim world." Others, including Israel's religious affairs official in Gaza, Avner Cohen, believed that the indifference to the situation fueled Islamism's rise, stating it was "Israel's creation" and failure.[55] Others attribute the rise of the group to state sponsors, including Iran.[55] In 2018, The Intercept published an article claiming that "Israeli officials admit they helped start the group".[106]

In 1984, Yassin was arrested after the Israelis found out that his group collected arms,[55] but released in May 1985 as part of a prisoner exchange.[107][108] He continued to expand the reach of his charity in Gaza.[55] Following his release, he set up al-Majd (an acronym for Munazamat al-Jihad wa al-Da'wa), headed by former student leader Yahya Sinwar and Rawhi Mushtaha, tasked with handling internal security and hunting local informants for the Israeli intelligence services.[109][110] At about the same time, he ordered former student leader Salah Shehade to set up al-Mujahidun al-Filastiniun (Palestinian fighters), but its militants were quickly rounded up by Israeli authorities and had their arms confiscated.[111][h]

The idea of Hamas began to take form on December 10, 1987, when several members of the Brotherhood[i] convened the day after an incident in which an Israeli army truck crashed into a car at a Gaza checkpoint, killing four Palestinian day-workers, the impetus of the First Intifada. The group met at Yassin's house to strategize on how to maximize the incident's impact in spreading nationalist sentiments and sparking public demonstrations.[3] A leaflet issued on December 14 calling for resistance is considered its first public intervention, though the name Hamas itself was not used until January 1988.[3]

Hamas was formally recognized by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood after a key meeting in Amman in February 1988.[112] Yassin was not directly connected to the organization but he gave it his blessing.[113]

Creating Hamas as an entity distinct from the Muslim Brotherhood was a matter of practicality; the Muslim Brotherhood refused to engage in violence against Israel,[114] but without participating in the intifada, the Islamists tied to it feared they would lose support to their rivals the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the PLO. They also hoped that by keeping the militant activities of Hamas separate, Israel would not interfere with the Muslim Brotherhood's social work.[j]

To many Palestinians, Hamas represented a more authentic engagement with their national aspirations. This perception arose because Hamas offered an Islamic interpretation of the original goals of the secular PLO, focusing on armed struggle to liberate all of Palestine. This approach contrasted with the PLO's eventual acceptance of territorial compromise, which involved settling for a smaller portion of Mandatory Palestine.[117] Hamas's formal establishment came a month after the PLO and other intifada leaders issued a 14-point declaration in January 1988 advocating for the coexistence of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.[118]

In August 1988, Hamas published the Hamas Charter, wherein it defined itself as a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood and stated its desire to establish "an Islamic state throughout Palestine".[119]

First Intifada

Hamas's first combat operation against Israel came in spring 1989 as it abducted and killed Avi Sasportas and Ilan Saadon, two Israeli soldiers.[120] At the time, Shehade and Sinwar were incarcerated in Israeli prisons and Hamas had set up a new group, Unit 101, headed by Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, whose modus operandi was to abduct soldiers.[121] The discovery of Sasportas's body triggered, in the words of Jean-Pierre Filiu, "an extremely violent Israeli response"; hundreds of Hamas leaders and activists, including Yassin, were arrested.[122] Hamas was outlawed on September 28, 1989.[123] This mass detention of activists, together with a further wave of arrests in 1990, effectively dismantled Hamas and, devastated, it was forced to adapt;[124][125] its command system became regionalized to make its operative structure more diffuse,[90] and to minimize the chances of being detected.[126]

Anger following the Temple Mount killings in October 1990, in which Muslim worshippers had tried to prevent Jewish extremists from placing a foundation stone for the Third Temple on the Temple Mount and Israeli police used live fire against Palestinians in the Al-Aqsa compound, killing 17, caused Hamas to intensify its campaign of abductions. Hamas declared every Israeli soldier a target[127] and called for a "jihad against the Zionist enemy everywhere, in all fronts and every means."[128]

Hamas reorganized its units from al-Majd and al-Mujahidun al-Filastiniun into a military wing called the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades led by Yahya Ayyash in 1991 or 1992.[129][k] The name comes from the militant Palestinian nationalist leader Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam who fought against the British and whose death in 1935 sparked the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine.[135] Its members sometimes called themselves "Students of Ayyash", "Students of the Engineer", "Yahya Ayyash Units",[127] or "Yahyia Ayyash's Disciples".[136]

Ayyash, an engineering graduate from Birzeit University, was a skillful bomb maker and greatly improved Hamas's striking capability,[137] earning him the nickname al-Muhandis ("the Engineer"). He is thought to have been one of the driving forces in Hamas's use of suicide bombings, reportedly arguing: "We paid a high price when we used only slingshots and stones. We need to exert more pressure, make the cost of the occupation that much more expensive in human lives, that much more unbearable."[138][139] Until his assassination by Shin Bet in 1996, almost all bombs used on suicide missions were constructed by him.[140]

In December 1992, Israel responded to the abduction and killing of Nissim Toledano, a border policeman, by exiling 415 members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Southern Lebanon, at the time occupied by Israel.[141][142] There, Hamas established contacts with Hezbollah, Palestinians living in refugee camps, and learned how to construct suicide and car bombs.[143][142] In addition to the deportations, Israel imposed a two-week curfew on the Gaza Strip, which cost the economy approximately $1,810,000 per day.[144] The deportees were allowed to return nine months later.[143] The deportation provoked international condemnation and a unanimous UN Security Council resolution condemning the action.[145][146] Hamas ordered two car bombs in retaliation for the deportation.[128]

In April 1993, Hamas launched its first suicide attack, the Mehola Junction bombing, near the Mehola settlement in the West Bank.[147] The attacker drove his car between two buses–one military and one civilian.[148] Only the driver and an Arab worker were killed in the attack.[147] The bomb design was flawed, but Hamas soon learned how to manufacture more lethal bombs.[149]

In the first years of the Intifada, Hamas violence was restricted to Palestinians; collaborators with Israel, and people it defined as "moral deviants," that is, drug dealers and prostitutes known to enjoy ties with Israeli criminal networks,[150] or for engaging in loose behavior, such as seducing women in hairdressing salons with alcohol, behavior Hamas considered was encouraged by Israeli agents.[l] Hamas leaders likened their rooting out of collaborators to what the French resistance did with Nazi collaborators in World War II. In 1992 alone they executed more than 150.[152] In Western media this was reported as typical "intercommunal strife" among Arabs.[150]

Hamas's actions in the First Intifada expanded its popularity. In 1989, fewer than 3% of the Palestinians in Gaza, where Hamas was most popular, supported Hamas.[124] In the days leading up to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, 16.6% of Gazans and 10% of West Bank Palestinians identified politically with Hamas[124]—a number that still paled in comparison to Fatah, which enjoyed the support of 45% of the Palestinians in the occupied territories.[153]

Oslo years

The Oslo process began in September 1993, when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat signed the Declaration of Principles, known as the Oslo I Accord.[154] This led to the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PA), which was backed by Arafat but strongly opposed by Hamas.[155] The PA was staffed mainly by members of Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.[155] The peaceful posture adopted by Hamas's rivals created an opportunity to set itself apart as the representative of the resistance movement.[156]

Hamas first began suicide attacks specifically targeting civilians in response to the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre carried out by the American-Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein, who on 25 February 1994, during Ramadan, killed 29 unarmed civilians by throwing hand grenades and firing at a group of worshippers during prayer at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron.[157][158] There was a strong sense that the Israeli military was complicit in the massacre because Goldstein wore military fatigues during his attack and carried an assault rifle issued by the IDF, the nearby IDF forces failed to intervene to stop the attack, and indeed an additional 19 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces in the riots that ensued in protest of the massacre.[158] Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin condemned the massacre, but refused to withdraw Jewish settlers from Hebron, fearing a violent confrontation with the settler community.[128] Hamas announced that if Israel did not discriminate between "fighters and civilians", then it would be "forced ... to treat the Zionists in the same manner. Treating like with like is a universal principle."[159]

Prior to the Hebron massacre, Hamas did not deliberately attack civilian targets.[157] But following the massacre, it felt that it no longer had to distinguish between military and civilian targets. The leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank, Sheikh Ahmed Haj Ali, later argued that "had there not been the 1994 Ibrahimi Mosque massacre, there would have been no suicide bombings." Al-Rantisi in an interview in 1998 stated that the suicide attacks "began after the massacre committed by the terrorist Baruch Goldstein and intensified after the assassination of Yahya Ayyash."[160] Musa Abu Marzouk put the blame for the escalation on the Israelis: "We were against targeting civilians ... After the Hebron massacre we determined that it was time to kill Israel's civilians ... we offered to stop if Israel would, but they rejected that offer."[161]

According to Matti Steinberg, former advisor to Shin Bet and one of Israel's leading experts on Hamas, the massacre laid to rest an internal debate within Hamas on the usefulness of indiscriminate violence: "In the Hamas writings there is an explicit prohibition against indiscriminate harm to helpless people. The massacre at the mosque released them from this taboo and introduced a dimension of measure for measure, based on citations from the Koran."[128]

 
The aftermath of the 1994 Dizengoff Street bus bombing in Tel Aviv

On April 6, a suicide bomber blew up his car at a crowded bus stop in Afula, killing eight Israelis and injuring 34.[162][158] An additional five Israelis were killed and 30 injured as a Palestinian detonated himself on a bus in Hadera a week later.[163] Hamas claimed responsibility for both attacks.[163] The attacks may have been timed to disrupt negotiations between Israel and PLO on the implementation of the Oslo I Accord.[162] A bomb on a bus in downtown Tel Aviv in October 1994, killed 22 and injured 45.[164]

In late December 1995, Hamas promised the Palestinian Authority (PA) to cease military operations. But it was not to be as Shin Bet assassinated Ayyash, the 29-year-old leader of the al-Qassam Brigades on January 5, 1996, using a booby-trapped cellphone given to Ayyash by his uncle who worked as an informer.[165] Nearly 100,000 Gazans, about 11% of the total population, marched in his funeral.[165] Hamas resumed its campaign of suicide bombings which had been dormant for a good part of 1995 to retaliate the assassination.[166]

In September 1997, Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the assassination of Hamas leader Khaled Mashal who lived in Jordan.[167] Two Mossad agents entered Jordan on false Canadian passports and sprayed Mashal with a nerve agent on a street in Amman.[167] They were caught however and King Hussein threatened to put the agents on trial unless Israel provided Mashal with an antidote and released Yassin.[167] Israel obliged and the antidote saved Mashal's life.[167] Yassin was returned to Gaza where he was given a hero's welcome with banners calling him the "sheikh of the Intifada". Yassin's release temporarily boosted Hamas' popularity and at a press conference Yassin declared: "There will be no halt to armed operations until the end of the occupation ... we are peace-seekers. We love peace. And we call on them [the Israelis] to maintain peace with us and to help us in order to restore our rights by peace."[168]

Although the suicide attacks by the al-Qassam Brigades and other groups violated the 1993 Oslo accords (which Hamas opposed[169]), Arafat was reluctant to pursue the attackers and may have had inadequate means to do so.[166]

While the Palestinians were used to the idea that their young were willing to die for the struggle, the idea that they would strap explosives to their bodies and blow themselves up was a new and not well-supported development.[161] A poll taken in 1996 after the wave of suicide bombings Hamas carried out to retaliate Israel's assassination of Ayyash showed that most 70% opposed the tactic and 59% called for Arafat to take action to prevent further attacks.[170] In the political arena Hamas continued to trail far behind its rival Fatah; 41% trusted Arafat in 1996 but only 3% trusted Yassin.[171]

In 1999, Hamas was banned in Jordan, reportedly in part at the request of the United States, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority.[172] Jordan's King Abdullah feared the activities of Hamas and its Jordanian allies would jeopardize peace negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, and accused Hamas of engaging in illegitimate activities within Jordan.[173] In mid-September 1999, authorities arrested Hamas leaders Khaled Mashal and Ibrahim Ghosheh on their return from a visit to Iran, and charged them with being members of an illegal organization, storing weapons, conducting military exercises, and using Jordan as a training base.[173][174] The Hamas leaders denied the charges.[175] Mashal was exiled and eventually settled in Damascus in Syria in 2001.[176] As a result of the Syrian civil war he distanced himself from Bashar al-Assad's regime in 2012 and moved to Qatar.[176]

Second Intifada

 
Yagur Junction bombing was a suicide attack on the Egged 960 bus in 2002. Hamas was responsible for about 40% of the 135 suicide attacks during the Second Intifiada.[177]

In contrast to the preceding uprising, the Al-Aqsa or Second Intifada began violently, with mass demonstrations and lethal Israeli counter-insurgency tactics. Prior to the incidents surrounding Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount (September 2000), Palestinian support for violence against Israelis and for Hamas had been gauged to be 52% and 10%, respectively. By July of the following year, after almost a year of savage conflict, polling indicated that 86% of Palestinians endorsed violence against Israelis and support for Hamas had risen to 17%.[178]

The al-Qassam Brigades were among the many militant groups that launched both military-style attacks and suicide bombings against Israeli civilian and military targets in this period. In the ensuing years almost 5000 Palestinians and over 1100 Israelis were killed.[179] While there was a large number of Palestinian attacks against Israelis, the Palestinians' most effective form of violence were suicide attacks; in the first five years of the intifada a little more than half of all Israeli deaths were victims of suicide attacks. Hamas performed about 40% of the 135 suicide attacks during the period.[177]

Whatever the immediate circumstances triggering the uprising, a more general cause, writes US political science professor Jeremy Pressman, was "popular Palestinian discontent [that] grew during the Oslo peace process because the reality on the ground did not match the expectations created by the peace agreements".[180] Hamas would be the beneficiary of this growing discontent in the 2006 Palestinian Authority legislative elections.[citation needed]

According to Tristan Dunning, Israel has never responded to repeated offers by Hamas over subsequent years for a quid pro quo moratorium on attacks against civilians.[181] It has engaged in several tadi'a (periods of calm), and proposed a number of ceasefires.[181] In January 2004, Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin, prior to his assassination, said that the group would end armed resistance against Israel for a 10-year hudna[m] in exchange for a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, and that restoring Palestinians' "historical rights" (relating to the 1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight) "would be left for future generations". His views were quickly echoed by senior Hamas official Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi, who added that Hamas envisaged a "phased liberation".[183] Israel's response was to assassinate Yassin in March in a targeted Israeli air strike, and then al-Rantisi in a similar air strike in April.[184]

In 2005, Hamas signed the Palestinian Cairo Declaration, which confirms "the right of the Palestinian people to resistance in order to end the occupation, establish a Palestinian state with full sovereignty with Jerusalem as its capital, and the guaranteeing of the right of return of refugees to their homes and property."[185]

2006 legislative elections

 
Ismail Haniyeh became the prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority in 2006.

Hamas had boycotted the 1996 Palestinian general election and the January 2005 Palestinian presidential election (won by Mahmoud Abbas), but decided to participate in the 25 January 2006 Palestinian legislative election, the first to take place after the death of Yasser Arafat (11 November 2004). The EU figured prominently in the proposal that democratic elections be held in the Palestinian territories.[186] In the run-up to the polling day, the US administration's Condoleezza Rice, Israel's Tzipi Livni and British Prime Minister Tony Blair all expressed reservations about allowing Hamas to compete in a democratic process.[187] Hamas ran on a platform of clean government, a thorough overhaul of the corrupt administrative system, and the issue of rampant lawlessness.[188][189] The Palestinian Authority (PA), notoriously accused of corruption, chose to run Marwan Barghouti as its leading candidate, who was serving five life sentences in Israel. The US donated two million dollars to the PA to improve its media image. Israel also assisted the PA by allowing Barghouti to be interviewed in prison by Arab television and by permitting 100,000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem to vote.[189]

Crucially, the elections took place shortly after Israel had evacuated its settlements in Gaza.[190] The evacuation, executed without consulting Fatah, gave currency to Hamas' view that resistance had compelled Israel to leave Gaza.[191] In a statement Hamas portrayed it as a vindication of their strategy of armed resistance ("Four years of resistance surpassed 10 years of bargaining") and Mohammed Deif attributed "the Liberation of Gaza" to his comrades' "love of martyrdom".[192]

Hamas, intent on reaching power by political means rather than by violence, announced that it would refrain from attacks on Israel if Israel were to cease its offensives against Palestinian towns and villages.[193] Its election manifesto dropped the Islamic agenda, spoke of sovereignty for the Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem (an implicit endorsement of the two-state solution), while making no mention about its claims to all of Palestine. It mentioned "armed resistance" twice and affirmed in article 3.6 that there existed a right to resist the "terrorism of occupation".[188] A Palestinian Christian figured on its candidate list.[194]

In the 25 January 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Hamas won 74 or 76 seats of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, an absolute majority. Fatah only won 43, four seats went to independents supporting Hamas.[190] The elections were judged by international observers to have been "competitive and genuinely democratic". The EU said that they had been run better than elections in some member countries of the EU, and promised to maintain its financial support.[186] Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates urged the US to give Hamas a chance, and that it was inadvisable to punish Palestinians for their choice, a position also endorsed by the Arab League a month later.[195]

After these elections, the Hamas leader sent a letter to U.S. President George W. Bush, declaring, among other things, that Hamas would accept a state on the 1967 borders including "a truce for many years." However, the Bush administration did not reply.[196] Early February 2006, Hamas also offered Israel a ten-year truce "in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories: the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem,"[197] and recognition of Palestinian rights including the "right of return".[198] But Hamas leader Mashal added that Hamas was not calling for a final end to armed operations against Israel, and it would not impede other Palestinian groups from carrying out such operations.[199]

Also after these elections, the Quartet on the Middle East (the United States, Russia, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations) stated that assistance to the Palestinian Authority would only continue if Hamas renounced violence, recognized Israel, and accepted previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements, which Hamas refused to do.[200] The Quartet then imposed a freeze on all international aid to the Palestinian territories;[201] by the time Haniyeh presented his Hamas government in late March, the U.S.-led boycott against the PA was in full force.[202] As for the part of the EU, which in January 2006 had declared (see above) the Palestinian elections to have been free, their abrupt freezing of financial assistance to the Hamas-led government (following the example set by the US and Canada) in late April 2006[clarification needed] was a violation of its own core principles regarding free elections. The EU instead undertook to channel funds directly to people and projects, and pay salaries only to Fatah members, employed or otherwise.[203]

After unsuccessful attempts to form a coalition government with Fatah, Hamas on 27 March 2006 then assumed the administration of Gaza on its own,[202] and introduced radical changes.[clarification needed]

Hamas had inherited a chaotic situation of lawlessness. The (new) economic sanctions imposed by Israel, the US and the Quartet (since Hamas' victory in the elections) had further crippled the PA's administrative resources, leading to the emergence of numerous mafia-style gangs and terror cells modeled after Al Qaeda.[204] Writing in Foreign Affairs, Daniel Byman later stated:

After it took over the Gaza Strip Hamas revamped the police and security forces, cutting them 50,000 members (on paper, at least) under Fatah to smaller, efficient forces of just over 10,000, which then cracked down on crime and gangs. No longer did groups openly carry weapons or steal with impunity. People paid their taxes and electric bills, and in return authorities picked up garbage and put criminals in jail. Gaza – neglected under Egyptian and then Israeli control, and misgoverned by Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat and his successors – finally has a real government.'[205][n]

Hamas–Fatah conflict

 
Hamas rally in Bethlehem

After the formation of the Hamas-led cabinet on March 20, 2006, tensions between Fatah and Hamas militants progressively rose in the Gaza strip as Fatah commanders refused to take orders from the government while the Palestinian Authority initiated a campaign of demonstrations, assassinations and abductions against Hamas, which led to Hamas responding.[207] Israeli intelligence warned Mahmoud Abbas that Hamas had planned to kill him at his office in Gaza. According to a Palestinian source close to Abbas, Hamas considers President Abbas to be a barrier to its complete control over the Palestinian Authority and decided to kill him. In a statement to Al Jazeera, Hamas leader Mohammed Nazzal accused Abbas of being party to the besieging and isolation of the Hamas-led government.[208]

On June 9, 2006, during an Israeli artillery operation, an explosion occurred on a busy Gaza beach, killing eight Palestinian civilians.[209][210] It was assumed that Israeli shellings were responsible for the killings, but Israeli government officials denied this.[211][212] Hamas formally withdrew from its 16-month ceasefire on June 10, taking responsibility for the subsequent Qassam rocket attacks launched from Gaza into Israel.[213]

On June 25, two Israeli soldiers were killed and another, Gilad Shalit, captured following an incursion by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Popular Resistance Committees and Army of Islam. In response, the Israeli military launched Operation Summer Rains three days later to secure the release of the kidnapped soldier,[214][215] arresting 64 Hamas officials. Among them were 8 Palestinian Authority cabinet ministers and up to 20 members of the Palestinian Legislative Council.[215] The arrests, along with other events, effectively prevented the Hamas-dominated legislature from functioning during most of its term.[216][217] Shalit was held captive until 2011, when he was released in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners.[218] Since then, Hamas has continued building a network of internal and cross-border tunnels,[219] which are used to store and deploy weapons, shield militants, and facilitate cross-border attacks. Destroying the tunnels was a primary objective of Israeli forces in the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict.[220][221]

In February 2007 Saudi-sponsored negotiations led to the Hamas & Fatah Mecca Agreement to form a unity government, signed by Mahmoud Abbas on behalf of Fatah and Khaled Mashal on behalf of Hamas. The new government was called on to achieve Palestinian national goals as approved by the Palestine National Council, the clauses of the Basic Law and the National Reconciliation Document (the "Prisoners' Document") as well as the decisions of the Arab summit.[222]

In March 2007, the Palestinian Legislative Council established a national unity government, with 83 representatives voting in favor and three against. Government ministers were sworn in by Mahmoud Abbas, the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, at a ceremony held simultaneously in Gaza and Ramallah. In June that year, renewed fighting broke out between Hamas and Fatah.[223] In a leaked comment by Major General Yadlin to the American Ambassador Richard H Jones at this point (June 12, 2007), Yadlin emphasized Hamas's electoral victory and an eventual Fatah withdrawal from Gaza would be advantageous to Israeli interests, in that the PLO's relocation to the West Bank would allow Israel to treat the Gaza Strip and Hamas as a hostile country.[o] In the course of the June 2007 Battle of Gaza, Hamas exploited the near total collapse of Palestinian Authority forces in Gaza to seize[225] control of Gaza, ousting Fatah officials. President Mahmoud Abbas then dismissed the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government[226] and outlawed the Hamas militia.[227] At least 600 Palestinians died in fighting between Hamas and Fatah.[228] Human Rights Watch, a US-based group, accused both sides in the conflict of torture and war crimes.[229]

Human Rights Watch estimates several hundred Gazans were "maimed" and tortured in the aftermath of the Gaza War. 73 Gazan men accused of "collaborating" had their arms and legs broken by "unidentified perpetrators" and 18 Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel, who had escaped from Gaza's main prison compound after Israel bombed the facility, were executed by Hamas security officials in the first days of the conflict.[230][231] Hamas security forces attacked hundreds of Fatah officials who supported Israel. Human Rights Watch interviewed one such person:

There were eight of us sitting there. We were all from Fatah. Then three masked militants broke in. They were dressed in brown camouflage military uniforms; they all had guns. They pointed their guns at us and cursed us, then they began beating us with iron rods, including a 10-year-old boy whom they hit in the face. They said we were "collaborators" and "unfaithful". They beat me with iron sticks and gun butts for 15 minutes. They were yelling: "You are happy that Israel is bombing us!" until people came out of their houses, and they withdrew.[230]

In March 2012, Mahmoud Abbas stated that there were no political differences between Hamas and Fatah as they had reached agreement on a joint political platform and on a truce with Israel. Commenting on relations with Hamas, Abbas revealed in an interview with Al Jazeera that "We agreed that the period of calm would be not only in the Gaza Strip, but also in the West Bank," adding that "We also agreed on a peaceful popular resistance [against Israel], the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders and that the peace talks would continue if Israel halted settlement construction and accepted our conditions."[232][233] Progress was stalled, until an April 2014 agreement to form a compromise unity government, with elections to be held in late 2014.[234] These elections did not take place and following a new agreement, the next Palestinian general election was scheduled to take place by the end of March 2021, but did not happen.[235]

2008–2009 Gaza War

On 24 April 2008, Hamas through Egyptian mediators proposed to Israel a six-month truce inside the Gaza Strip, thus excluding the West Bank from his proposal. Israel on 25 April 2008 rejected the proposal, reluctant that such an agreement would strengthen Hamas against their rivals in the Palestinian Territories, Fatah, based on the West Bank, at that time running the Palestinian National Authority and as such currently negotiating peace with Israel. Also Israel rejected the proposal because Israel presumed that Hamas would use the truce to prepare for more fighting rather than peace.[236]

On June 17, 2008, Egyptian mediators announced that an informal truce had been agreed to between Hamas and Israel.[237][238] Hamas agreed to cease rocket attacks on Israel, while Israel agreed to allow limited commercial shipping across its border with Gaza, barring any breakdown of the tentative peace deal; Hamas also hinted that it would discuss the release of Gilad Shalit.[239] Israeli sources state that Hamas also committed itself to enforce the ceasefire on the other Palestinian organizations.[240] Even before the truce was agreed to, some on the Israeli side were not optimistic about it, Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin stating in May 2008 that a ground incursion into Gaza was unavoidable and would more effectively quell arms smuggling and pressure Hamas into relinquishing power.[241]

 
Destroyed building in Rafah, January 12, 2009

While Hamas was careful to maintain the ceasefire, the lull was sporadically violated by other groups, sometimes in defiance of Hamas.[240][242][243] For example, on June 24 Islamic Jihad launched rockets at the Israeli town of Sderot; Israel called the attack a grave violation of the informal truce, and closed its border crossings with Gaza.[244] On November 4, 2008, Israeli forces, in an attempt to stop construction of a tunnel, killed six Hamas gunmen in a raid inside the Gaza Strip.[245][246] Hamas responded by resuming rocket attacks with a total of 190 rockets in November according to Israel's military.[247][248]

When the six-month truce officially expired on December 19, Hamas launched 50 to more than 70 rockets and mortars into Israel over the next three days, though no Israelis were injured.[249][250] On December 21, Hamas said it was ready to stop the attacks and renew the truce if Israel stopped its "aggression" in Gaza and opened up its border crossings.[250][251]

On December 27 and 28, Israel implemented Operation Cast Lead against Hamas. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said "We warned Hamas repeatedly that rejecting the truce would push Israel to aggression against Gaza." According to Palestinian officials, over 280 people were killed and 600 were injured in the first two days of airstrikes.[252] Most were Hamas police and security officers, though many civilians also died.[252] According to Israel, militant training camps, rocket-manufacturing facilities and weapons warehouses that had been pre-identified were hit, and later they attacked rocket and mortar squads who fired around 180 rockets and mortars at Israeli communities.[253] Chief of Gaza police force Tawfiq Jabber, head of the General Security Service Salah Abu Shrakh,[254] senior religious authority and security officer Nizar Rayyan,[255] and Interior Minister Said Seyam[256] were among those killed during the fighting. Although Israel sent out thousands of cell-phone messages urging residents of Gaza to leave houses where weapons may be stored in an attempt to minimise civilian casualties,[253] some residents complained there was nowhere to go because many neighborhoods had received the same message.[253][257][258] Israeli bombs landed close to civilian structures such as schools,[259][260] and some alleged that Israel was deliberately targeting Palestinian civilians.[261]

Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire on January 17, 2009.[262] Hamas responded the following day by announcing a one-week ceasefire to give Israel time to withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip.[263] Israeli, Palestinian and third-party sources disagreed on the total casualty figures from the Gaza war, and the number of Palestinian casualties who were civilians.[264] In November 2010, a senior Hamas official acknowledged that up to 300 fighters were killed and "In addition to them, between 200 and 300 fighters from the Al-Qassam Brigades and another 150 security forces were martyred." These new numbers reconcile the total with those of the Israeli military, which originally had said there were 709 "terror operatives" killed.[265][266]

After the Gaza War

 
25th anniversary of Hamas celebrated in Gaza, December 8, 2012

On August 16, 2009, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal stated that the organization was ready to open dialogue with the Obama administration because its policies were much better than those of former US president George W. Bush:

As long as there's a new language, we welcome it, but we want to see not only a change of language, but also a change of policies on the ground. We have said that we are prepared to cooperate with the US or any other international party that would enable the Palestinians to get rid of occupation."[267]

Despite this, an August 30, 2009, speech during a visit to Jordan[268] in which Mashal expressed support for the Palestinian right of return was interpreted by David Pollock of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy as a sign that "Hamas has now clearly opted out of diplomacy."[269] In an interview in May 2010, Mashal said that if a Palestinian state with real sovereignty was established under the conditions he set out, on the borders of 1967 with its capital Jerusalem and with the right of return, that will be the end of the Palestinian resistance, and then the nature of any subsequent ties with Israel would be decided democratically by the Palestinians.[270][271] In July 2009, Khaled Mashal, Hamas's political bureau chief, stated Hamas's willingness to cooperate with a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which included a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders, provided that Palestinian refugees be given the right to return to Israel and that East Jerusalem be recognized as the new state's capital.[272]

In 2011, after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, Hamas distanced itself from the Syrian regime and its members began leaving Syria. Where once there were "hundreds of exiled Palestinian officials and their relatives", that number shrunk to "a few dozen".[273] In 2012, Hamas publicly announced its support for the Syrian opposition.[274] This prompted Syrian state TV to issue a "withering attack" on the Hamas leadership.[275] Khaled Mashal said that Hamas had been "forced out" of Damascus because of its disagreements with the Syrian regime.[276] In late October, Syrian Army soldiers shot dead two Hamas leaders in Daraa refugee camp.[277] On November 5, 2012, the Syrian state security forces shut down all Hamas offices in the country.[278] In January 2013, another two Hamas members were found dead in Syria's Husseinieh camp. Activists said the two had been arrested and executed by state security forces.[279] In 2013, it was reported that the military wing of Hamas had begun training units of the Free Syrian Army.[280] In 2013, after "several intense weeks of indirect three-way diplomacy between representatives of Hamas, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority", no agreement was reached.[281] Also, intra-Palestinian reconciliation talks stalled and, as a result, during Obama's visit to Israel, Hamas launched five rocket strikes on Israel.[281] In November, Isra Almodallal was appointed the first spokeswoman of the group.[282]

In 2014, in the presence and mediation of the Emir of Qatar in Doha, the Fatah leadership headed by Abbas met with the Hamas leadership headed by Khaled Mash’al. The full minutes of the talks were published in an official Emirati document. In essence, the message of the Hamas leadership was clear: "If you in Fatah are convinced that you can get a state from Israel along the 1967 lines through negotiations, go for it. We will not interfere."[283]

2014 Gaza War to 2022

Anyone who wants to thwart the establishment of a Palestinian state has to support bolstering Hamas and transferring money to Hamas. This is part of our strategy — to isolate the Palestinians in Gaza from the Palestinians in the West Bank.

Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister, 2019[284][285]

During the 2014 Gaza War, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge to counter increased Hamas rocket fire from Gaza. The conflict ended with a permanent cease-fire after 7 weeks, and more than 2,200 dead. 64 of the dead were Israeli soldiers, 7 were civilians in Israel (from rocket attacks), and 2,101 were killed in Gaza, of which, according to UN OCHA, at least 1,460 were civilians. Israel says 1,000 of the dead were militants. Following the conflict, Mahmoud Abbas president of the Palestinian Authority, accused Hamas of needlessly extending the fighting in the Gaza Strip, contributing to the high death toll, of running a "shadow government" in Gaza, and of illegally executing scores of Palestinians.[286][287][288] Hamas has complained about the slow delivery of reconstruction materials after the conflict and announced that they were diverting these materials from civilian uses to build more infiltration tunnels.[289]

In 2016, Hamas began security co-ordination with Egypt to crack down on Islamic terrorist organizations in Sinai, in return for economic aid.[290]

In early 2017, Hamas established the Supreme Administrative Committee to oversee Gaza's ministries. Abbas decried the move as Hamas creating a shadow government and trying to entrench its control in Gaza.[291] On 17 September 2017, Hamas announced it was dissolving the committee in response to Egypt's efforts as part of the Fatah–Hamas reconciliation process.[292]

In October 2017, Fatah and Hamas signed yet another reconciliation agreement. The partial agreement addresses civil and administrative matters involving Gaza and the West Bank. Other contentious issues such as national elections, reform of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and possible demilitarization of Hamas were to be discussed in the next meeting in November 2017, due to a new step-by-step approach.[293]

Between 2018 and 2019, Hamas participated in "the Great March of Return" along the Gaza border with Israel. At least 183 Palestinians were killed.[294]

In February–March 2021, Fatah and Hamas reached agreement to jointly conduct elections for a new Palestinian legislative assembly, in accordance with the Oslo Accords. Hamas committed to upholding international law, transferring control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority and to allowing it to negotiate with Israel to establish a Palestinian state along the 1967 ceasefire lines, with East Jerusalem as its capital. According to Menachem Klein, Israeli Arabist and political scientist at Bar-Ilan University, Mahmood Abbas subsequently cancelled the elections after capitulating to severe pressure from Israel and the United States.[283]

In May 2021, after tensions escalated in Sheikh Jarrah and the al-Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem, Israel and Hamas clashed in Gaza once again. After eleven days of fighting, at least 243 people were killed in Gaza and 12 in Israel.[295] During this conflict Hamas's military wing, the Al-Aqsa Brigades, started planning the operation which would break out on 7 October 2023.[283]

2023 Israel–Hamas war

 
A blood-stained home floor in the aftermath of the Nahal Oz massacre
 
Civilian casualty in Gaza during the Israel–Hamas war

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched an invasion, breaching the Gaza–Israel barrier. For months prior to the attack, Hamas had been leading Israeli intelligence to believe that they were not seeking conflict.[296][297] Hamas fighters proceeded to massacre hundreds of civilians at a music festival in kibbutz Be'eri, Kfar Aza and other Israeli villages, and take hostages from Southern Israel back to the Gaza Strip. In total, 1,139 people were killed in Israel, making this the deadliest attack by Palestinian militants since the foundation of Israel in 1948, and about 250 more Israelis were taken hostage.[298][299][300][301] International human rights groups, medical personnel, and journalists have chronicled the militants' onslaught, detailing the killing, including the decapitation and burning, of women, children, and the elderly, alongside young men and soldiers.[302][301][303][304] Senior Hamas official Khaled Mashal said that the group was fully aware of the consequences of attack on Israel, stating that Palestinian liberation comes with "sacrifices".[305][306]

The Israeli military responded by imposing a total blockade of the Gaza Strip,[307][308][309] followed by an extensive aerial bombardment campaign on Gazan targets. Israel then launched an ongoing large-scale ground invasion of Gaza with the stated goal of destroying Hamas and controlling Gaza afterwards.[310][311][312]

Political and religious positions

Hamas is widely considered to be the "dominant political force" within the Palestinian territories.[62][313][314]

Hamas' policy towards a two-state solution and towards Israel has evolved. Historically, Hamas envisioned a Palestinian state on all of the territory that belonged to the British Mandate for Palestine (that is, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea).[133] However, Hamas signed agreements with Fatah in 2005, 2007, 2011 and 2012 that indicated a tacit acceptance of the 1967 borders and previous accords[clarification needed] between PLO and Israel.[315] In 2006, Hamas signed the Prisoners Document which supported a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders.[65][316][317] This document also recognized authority of the President of the Palestinian National Authority to negotiate with Israel.[317] On 2 May 2017, in a press conference in Doha (Qatar) presenting a new charter, Khaled Mashal, chief of the Hamas Political Bureau declared that, though Hamas considered the establishment of a Palestinian state "on the basis of June 4, 1967" (West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem) acceptable, Hamas would in that case still not recognise the statehood of Israel and not relinquish their goal of liberating all of Palestine from "the Zionist project".[70][318] Professor Mohammed Ayoob interpreted the 2017 charter as "a de facto acceptance of the preconditions for a two-state solution".[319] Hamas leaders still occasionally called for the annihilation of Israel in the early 2020s.[320]

Whether Hamas would recognize Israel is debated. Hamas leaders have emphasized they do not recognize Israel,[70] but indicate they "have a de facto acceptance of its presence".[321] Hamas's acceptance of the 1967 borders acknowledges the existence of another entity on the other side.[322] Many scholars believe Hamas's acceptance of the 1967 borders implicitly recognizes Israel.[323][324]

In a 2006 interview, Ismail Haniyeh, senior political leader of Hamas and at that time Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, said ""We have no problem with a sovereign Palestinian state over all our lands within the 1967 borders, living in calm."[325] In May 2010, Khaled Mashal, then chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau said that the state of Israel living next to "a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967" would be acceptable for Hamas. In November 2010, Ismail Haniyeh[p] also proposed a Palestinian state on 1967 borders, though added three further conditions: "resolution of the issue of refugees", "the release of Palestinian prisoners", and "Jerusalem as its capital"; both Mashal and Haniyeh that year also made reservations as to a "referendum" in which "the Palestinian people" should decide whether, in such a two-state situation, those two states should still be merged into one.[327][328]

In the 1988 charter, Hamas' declared objectives were to wage an armed struggle against Israel,[133] liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation and transform the country into an Islamic state.[329]

In March 2006, two months after winning an absolute majority in the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Hamas released its legislative program, which signaled that Hamas could refer the issue of recognizing Israel to a national referendum: "The question of recognizing Israel is not the jurisdiction of one faction, nor the government, but a decision for the Palestinian people." In June 2006, Hamas MP Riad Mustafa explained: "Hamas will never recognize Israel", but if a popular Palestinian referendum would endorse a peace agreement including recognition of Israel, "we would of course accept their verdict".[330] A few months later, via University of Maryland's Jerome Segal, Hamas sent a letter to US President George W. Bush, stating that they "don't mind having a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders", and asked for direct negotiations.[331]

In 2007, Hamas signed the Fatah–Hamas Mecca Agreement.[332] At the time of signing this agreement, Moussa Abu Marzouk, Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, said regarding the recognition of Israel:

I can recognize the presence of Israel as a fait accompli (amr wâqi‘) or, as the French say, a de facto recognition, but this does not mean that I recognize Israel as a state.[333]

Marzouk further added that the charter could not be altered because it would look like a compromise not acceptable to the 'street' and risk fracturing the party's unity. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal has stated that the Charter is "a piece of history and no longer relevant, but cannot be changed for internal reasons". Ahmed Yousef, senior adviser to Ismail Haniyeh, added in 2011 that it reflected the views of the Elders in the face of a 'relentless occupation.' The details of its religious and political language had not been examined within the framework of international law, and an internal committee review to amend it was shelved out of concern not to offer concessions to Israel, as had Fatah, on a silver platter.[334] While Hamas representatives recognize the problem, one official notes that Arafat got very little in return for changing the PLO Charter under the Oslo Accords, and that there is agreement that little is gained from a non-violent approach.[335] Richard Davis says the dismissal by contemporary leaders of its relevance and yet the suspension of a desire to rewrite it reflects the differing constituencies Hamas must address, the domestic audience and international relations.[334] The charter itself is considered an 'historical relic.'[336]

In an April 2008 meeting between Hamas leader Khaled Mashal and former US President Jimmy Carter, an understanding was reached in which Hamas agreed it would respect the creation of a Palestinian state in the territory seized by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, provided this were ratified by the Palestinian people in a referendum.[337] In 2009, in a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Haniyeh repeated his group's support for a two-state settlement based on 1967 borders: "We would never thwart efforts to create an independent Palestinian state with borders [from] June 4, 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital."[338] On December 1, 2010, Ismail Haniyeh again repeated, "We accept a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and the resolution of the issue of refugees," and "Hamas will respect the results [of a referendum] regardless of whether it differs with its ideology and principles."[339]

In November 2011, Hamas leader Khaled Mishal made an agreement with Mahmoud Abbas in Cairo, in which he committed to respecting the 1967 borders.[340]

In February 2012, according to the Palestinian authority, Hamas forswore the use of violence. Evidence for this was provided by an eruption of violence from Islamic Jihad in March 2012 after an Israeli assassination of a Jihad leader, during which Hamas refrained from attacking Israel.[341] "Israel—despite its mantra that because Hamas is sovereign in Gaza it is responsible for what goes on there—almost seems to understand," wrote Israeli journalists Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel, "and has not bombed Hamas offices or installations".[342]

As to the question whether Hamas is capable to enter into a long-term non-aggression treaty with Israel without being disloyal to their understanding of Islamic law and God's word, the Atlantic magazine columnist Jeffrey Goldberg in 2009 stated: "I tend to think not, though I’ve noticed over the years a certain plasticity of belief among some Hamas ideologues. Also, this is the Middle East, so anything is possible".[343]

Co-founder Ahmed Yassin of Hamas (who died in 2004) was convinced that Israel was endeavouring to destroy Islam, and concluded that loyal Muslims had a religious obligation to destroy Israel.[clarification needed][344] The short-term goal of Hamas was to liberate Palestine, including modern-day Israel, from Israeli occupation. Some academics argue that the long-term aim seeks to establish an Islamic state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, remarkably similar to, and perhaps derived from, the Zionist notion of the same area under a Jewish majority.[q][346][347][348][349][350]

On 2 November 2023, Ismail Haniyeh stated that if Israel agreed to a ceasefire in the 2023 Israel–Hamas war and the opening of humanitarian corridors to bring more aid into Gaza, Hamas is "ready for political negotiations for a two-state solution with Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine."[351]

Hudna proposals

When Hamas won a majority in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Ismail Haniyeh, the then newly elected Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, sent messages both to US President George W. Bush and to Israel's leaders, asking to be recognized and offering a long-term truce and the establishment of a border on the lines of 1967. No response came.[352] Haniyeh's proposal reportedly was a fifty-year armistice with Israel, if a Palestinian state is created along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.[353] A Hamas official added that the armistice would renew automatically each time.[354] In mid-2006, University of Maryland's Jerome Segal suggested that a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and a truce for many years could be considered Hamas's de facto recognition of Israel.[331] Hamas's spokesperson, Ahmed Yousef, said that a "hudna" is more than a ceasefire and it "obliges parties to use the period to seek a permanent, non-violent resolution to their differences."[182]

In November 2008, in a meeting, on Gaza Strip soil, with 11 European members of parliaments, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh re-stated that Hamas was willing to accept a Palestinian state "in the territories of 1967" (Gaza Strip and West Bank), and offered Israel a long-term truce if Israel recognized the Palestinians' national rights; and stated that Israel rejected this proposal.[355] A Hamas finance minister around 2018 contended that such a "long-term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two-state settlement are the same”.[74]

Mkhaimer Abusada, a political scientist at Al Azhar University, in September 2009 wrote that Hamas talks "of hudna [temporary ceasefire], not of peace or reconciliation with Israel. They believe over time they will be strong enough to liberate all historic Palestine."[356] Several more authors have warned around 2020, that, if Israel would accept such a proposal (a Palestinian state "in the territories of 1967" combined with a long-term truce), Hamas would retain its objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.[77][78] Hamas originally proposed a 10-year truce, or hudna, to Israel, contingent on the creation of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Sheikh Ahmed Yasin indicated that such truce could be extended for 30, 40, or even 100 years, but it would never signal a recognition of Israel. A Hamas official explained that having an indefinite truce with Israel doesn't contradict Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel, comparing it to the Irish Republican Army's willingness to accept a permanent armistice with the United Kingdom without recognizing the UK's sovereignty over Northern Ireland.[72] Many scholars maintain that Hamas's goal of establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is an interim solution, while its long-term goal is a single state in all of mandatory Palestine in which Jews live as citizens.[78]

Religious policy

In the Gaza Strip

The gender ideology outlined in the Hamas charter, the importance of women in the religious-nationalist project of liberation is asserted as no lesser than that of males. Their role was defined primarily as one of manufacturing males and caring for their upbringing and rearing, though the charter recognized they could fight for liberation without obtaining their husband's permission and in 2002 their participation in jihad was permitted.[357] The doctrinal emphasis on childbearing and rearing as woman's primary duty is not so different from Fatah's view of women in the First Intifada and it also resembles the outlook of Jewish settlers, and over time it has been subjected to change.[358][359]

In 1989, during the First Intifada, a small number of Hamas followers[360] campaigned for the wearing of the hijab, which is not a part of traditional women's attire in Palestine,[citation needed] for polygamy, and also insisted women stay at home and be segregated from men. In the course of this campaign, women who chose not to wear the hijab were verbally and physically harassed, with the result that the hijab was being worn 'just to avoid problems on the streets'.[361] The harassment dropped drastically when, after 18 months UNLU condemned it,[362] though similar campaigns reoccurred.

Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, some of its members have attempted to impose Islamic dress or the hijab head covering on women.[356][363] The government's "Islamic Endowment Ministry" has deployed Virtue Committee members to warn citizens of the dangers of immodest dress, card playing, and dating.[364] There are no government laws imposing dress and other moral standards, and the Hamas education ministry reversed one effort to impose Islamic dress on students.[356] There has also been successful resistance to attempts by local Hamas officials to impose Islamic dress on women.[365] Hamas officials deny having any plans to impose Islamic law, one legislator stating that "What you are seeing are incidents, not policy," and that Islamic law is the desired standard "but we believe in persuasion".[364]

In 2013, UNRWA canceled its annual marathon in Gaza after Hamas prohibited women from participating in the race.[366]

In the West Bank

In 2005, the human rights organization Freemuse released a report titled "Palestine: Taliban-like attempts to censor music", which said that Palestinian musicians feared that harsh religious laws against music and concerts will be imposed since Hamas group scored political gains in the Palestinian Authority local elections of 2005.[367]

The attempt by Hamas to dictate a cultural code of conduct in the 1980s and early 1990s led to a violent fighting between different Palestinian sectors. Hamas members reportedly burned down stores that stocked videos they deemed indecent and destroyed books they described as "heretical".[368]

In 2005, an outdoor music-and-dance performance in Qalqiliya was suddenly banned by the Hamas-led municipality, for the reason that such an event would be "haram", i.e. forbidden by Islam.[369] The municipality also ordered that music no longer be played in the Qalqiliya zoo, and mufti Akrameh Sabri issued a religious edict affirming the municipality decision.[368] In response, the Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish warned that "There are Taliban-type elements in our society, and this is a very dangerous sign."[367][368][370][371]

The Palestinian columnist Mohammed Abd Al-Hamid, a resident of Ramallah, wrote that this religious coercion could cause the migration of artists, and said "The religious fanatics in Algeria destroyed every cultural symbol, shattered statues and rare works of art and liquidated intellectuals and artists, reporters and authors, ballet dancers and singers—are we going to imitate the Algerian and Afghani examples?"[368]

Erdoğan's Turkey as a role model

Some Hamas members have stated that the model of Islamic government that Hamas seeks to emulate is that of Turkey under the rule of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The foremost members to distance Hamas from the practices of the Taliban and to publicly support the Erdoğan model were Ahmed Yousef and Ghazi Hamad, advisers to Prime Minister Hanieh.[372][373] Yusuf, the Hamas deputy foreign minister, reflected this goal in an interview with a Turkish newspaper, stating that while foreign public opinion equates Hamas with the Taliban or al-Qaeda, the analogy is inaccurate. Yusuf described the Taliban as "opposed to everything", including education and women's rights, while Hamas wants to establish good relations between the religious and secular elements of society and strives for human rights, democracy and an open society.[374] According to professor Yezid Sayigh of King's College in London, how influential this view is within Hamas is uncertain, since both Ahmad Yousef and Ghazi Hamad were dismissed from their posts as advisers to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh in October 2007.[372] Both have since been appointed to other prominent positions within the Hamas government. Khaled al-Hroub of the West Bank-based and anti-Hamas[375] Palestinian daily Al Ayyam added that despite claims by Hamas leaders that it wants to repeat the Turkish model of Islam, "what is happening on the ground in reality is a replica of the Taliban model of Islam."[376][377]

1988 Hamas Charter

Hamas published its charter in August 1988, wherein it defined itself as a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood and its desire to establish "an Islamic state throughout Palestine".[119] The foundational document was, according to Khaled Hroub, written by a single individual and made public without going through the usual prior consultation process.[r] It was then signed on August 18, 1988. It contains both antisemitic passages and characterizations of Israeli society as Nazi-like in its cruelty,[379] and irredentist claims.[380][381][382] It declares all of Palestine a waqf, an unalienable religious property consisting of land endowed to Muslims in perpetuity by God,[383][s][385] with religious coexistence under Islam's rule.[386] The charter rejects a two-state solution, stating that the conflict cannot be resolved "except through jihad".[387][388]

Article 6 states that the movement's aim is to "raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned".[389][390] It adds that, "when our enemies usurp some Islamic lands, jihad becomes a duty binding on all Muslims",[391] for which the whole of the land is non-negotiable, a position likened, without the racist sentiments present in the Hamas charter, to that in the Likud party platform and in movements such as Gush Emunim. For Hamas, to concede territory is seen as equivalent to renouncing Islam itself.[392][393][346][347][348][349][394][350]

The violent language against all Jews in the original Hamas charter is antisemitic and has been characterized by some as genocidal.[395][396][397] The charter attributes collective responsibility to Jews, not just Israelis, for various global issues, including both World Wars.[398]

2017 Document of General Principles and Policies

In May 2017, Hamas unveiled a rewritten charter, titled "A Document of General Principles and Policies", in an attempt to moderate its image. It maintains the longstanding goal of an Islamist Palestinian state covering all of the area of today's Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip, and that the State of Israel is illegal and illegitimate. It now states that Hamas is anti-Zionist rather than anti-Jewish, but describes Zionism as part of a conspiratorial global plot, as the enemy of all Muslims, and a danger to international security, and blames the Zionists for the conflation of anti-Zionism and antisemitism. It rejects the Oslo Accords and affirms Hamas' commitment to the use of force. It also claims to support democracy, although Hamas has not held an election since 2006.[19][318] Hamas has described these changes as adaptation within a specific context, as opposed to abandonment of its principles.[399]

Organization

Leadership and structure

 
Map of key Hamas leadership nodes. 2010

Hamas inherited from its predecessor a tripartite structure that consisted in the provision of social services, of religious training and military operations under a Shura Council. Traditionally it had four distinct functions: (a) a charitable social welfare division (dawah); (b) a military division for procuring weapons and undertaking operations (al-Mujahideen al Filastinun); (c) a security service (Jehaz Aman); and (d) a media branch (A'alam).[400] Hamas has both an internal leadership within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and an external leadership, split between a Gaza group directed by Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook from his exile first in Damascus and then in Egypt, and a Kuwaiti group (Kuwaidia) under Khaled Mashal.[147] The Kuwaiti group of Palestinian exiles began to receive extensive funding from the Gulf States after its leader Mashal broke with Yasser Arafat's decision to side with Saddam Hussein in the Invasion of Kuwait, with Mashal insisting that Iraq withdraw.[401] On May 6, 2017, Hamas' Shura Council chose Ismail Haniya to become the new leader, to replace Mashal.[402]

The exact structure of the organization is unclear as it is shrouded in a veil of secrecy in order to conceal operational activities. Formally, Hamas maintains the wings are separate and independent, but this has been questioned. It has been argued that its wings are both separate and combined for reasons of internal and external political necessity. Communication between the political and military wings of Hamas is made difficult by the thoroughness of Israeli intelligence surveillance and the existence of an extensive base of informants. After the assassination of Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi the political direction of the militant wing was diminished and field commanders were given wider discretional autonomy over operations.[403]

Political Bureau

Hamas's overarching governing body is the Majlis al-Shura (Shura Council), based on the Qur'anic concept of consultation and popular assembly (shura), which Hamas leaders argue provides for democracy within an Islamic framework.[404] As the organization grew more complex and Israeli pressure increased, the Shura Council was renamed the General Consultative Council, with members elected from local council groups. The council elects the 15-member Political Bureau (al-Maktab al-Siyasi)[405] that makes decisions for Hamas. Representatives come from Gaza, the West Bank, leaders in exile and Israeli prisons.[406] The Political Bureau was based in Damascus until the Syrian Civil War until Hamas's support for the civil opposition to Bashar al-Assad led to the office's relocation to Qatar in January 2012, .[406][407]

Finances and funding

Hamas, like its predecessor the Muslim Brotherhood, assumed the administration of Gaza's waqf properties, endowments which extend over 10% of all real estate in the Gaza Strip, with 2,000 acres of agricultural land held in religious trusts, together with numerous shops, rentable apartments and public buildings.[408]

In the first five years of the 1st Intifada, the Gaza economy, 50% of which depended on external sources of income, plummeted by 30–50% as Israel closed its labour market and remittances from the Palestinian expatriates in the Gulf countries dried up following the 1991–1992 Gulf War.[409] At the 1993 Philadelphia conference, Hamas leaders' statements indicated that they read George H. W. Bush's outline of a New World Order as embodying a tacit aim to destroy Islam, and that therefore funding should focus on enhancing the Islamic roots of Palestinian society and promoting jihad, which also means zeal for social justice, in the occupied territories.[410] Hamas became particularly fastidious about maintaining separate resourcing for its respective branches of activity—military, political and social services.[411] It has had a holding company in East Jerusalem (Beit al-Mal), a 20% stake in Al Aqsa International Bank which served as its financial arm, the Sunuqrut Global Group and al-Ajouli money-changing firm.[412]

By 2011, Hamas's budget, calculated to be roughly US$70 million, derived even more substantially (85%) from foreign, rather than internal Palestinian, sources.[412] Only two Israeli-Palestinian sources figure in a list seized in 2004, while the other contributors were donor bodies located in Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Britain, Germany, the United States, United Arab Emirates, Italy and France. Much of the money raised comes from sources that direct their assistance to what Hamas describes as its charitable work for Palestinians, but investments in support of its ideological position are also relevant, with Persian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia prominent in the latter. Matthew Levitt claims that Hamas also taps money from corporations, criminal organizations and financial networks that support terror.[413] It is also alleged that it engages in cigarette and drug smuggling, multimedia copyright infringement and credit card fraud.[412] The United States, Israel and the EU have shut down many charities and organs that channel money to Hamas, such as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief.[414] Between 1992 and 2001, this group is said to have provided $6.8 million to Palestinian charities of the $57 million collected. By 2001, it was alleged to have given Hamas $13 million, and was shut down shortly afterwards.[415]

About half of Hamas's funding came from states in the Persian Gulf down to the mid-2000s. Saudi Arabia supplied half of the Hamas budget of $50 million in the early 2000s,[416] but, under US pressure, began to cut its funding by cracking down on Islamic charities and private donor transfers to Hamas in 2004,[417] which by 2006 drastically reduced the flow of money from that area. Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Hamas's 2006 electoral victory, stepped in to fill the shortfall.[418][419] Saudi funding, negotiated with third parties including Egypt, remained supportive of Hamas as a Sunni group but chose to provide more assistance to the PNA, the electoral loser, when the EU responded to the outcome by suspending its monetary aid.[420] During the 1980s, Iran began to provide 10% of Hamas's funding, which it increased annually until by the 1990s it supplied $30 million.[416] It accounted for $22 million, over a quarter of Hamas's budget, by the late 2000s.[417] According to Matthew Levitt, Iran preferred direct financing to operative groups rather than charities, requiring video proof of attacks.[417][421] Much of the Iran funding is said to be channeled through Hezbollah.[417] After 2006, Iran's willingness to take over the burden of the shortfall created by the drying up of Saudi funding also reflected the geopolitical tensions between the two, since, though Shiite, Iran was supporting a Sunni group traditionally closely linked with the Saudi kingdom.[422] The US imposed sanctions on Iran's Bank Saderat, alleging it had funneled hundreds of millions to Hamas.[423] The US has expressed concerns that Hamas obtains funds through Palestinian and Lebanese sympathizers of Arab descent in the Foz do Iguaçu area of the tri-border region of Latin America, an area long associated with arms trading, drug trafficking, contraband, the manufacture of counterfeit goods, money-laundering and currency fraud. The State Department adds that confirmatory information of a Hamas operational presence there is lacking.[424]

After 2009, sanctions on Iran made funding difficult, forcing Hamas to rely on religious donations by individuals in the West Bank, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Funds amounting to tens of millions of dollars raised in the Gulf states were transferred through the Rafah Border Crossing. These were not sufficient to cover the costs of governing the Strip and running the al Qassam Brigades, and when tensions arose with Iran over support of President Assad in Syria, Iran dropped its financial assistance to the government, restricting its funding to the military wing, which meant a drop from $150 million in 2012 to $60 million the following year. A further drop occurred in 2015 when Hamas expressed its criticisms of Iran's role in the Yemeni Civil War.[425]

In 2017, the PA government imposed its own sanctions against Gaza, including, among other things, cutting off salaries to thousands of PA employees, as well as financial assistance to hundreds of families in the Gaza Strip. The PA initially said it would stop paying for the electricity and fuel that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip, but after a year partially backtracked.[426] The Israeli government has allowed millions of dollars from Qatar to be funneled on a regular basis through Israel to Hamas, to replace the millions of dollars the PA had stopped transferring to Hamas. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained that letting the money go through Israel meant that it could not be used for terrorism, saying: "Now that we are supervising, we know it's going to humanitarian causes."[427]

According to U.S. officials, as of 2023 Hamas has an investment portfolio that is worth anywhere from 500 million to US$1 billion, including assets in Sudan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and the United Arab Emirates.[428] Hamas has denied such allegations.[429]

Social services wing

Hamas developed its social welfare programme by replicating the model established by Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. For Hamas, charity and the development of one's community are both prescribed by religion and to be understood as forms of resistance.[430] In Islamic tradition, dawah (lit. transl. "the call to God") obliges the faithful to reach out to others by both proselytising and by charitable works, and typically the latter centre on the mosques which make use of both waqf endowment resources and charitable donations (zakat, one of the five pillars of Islam) to fund grassroots services such as nurseries, schools, orphanages, soup kitchens, women's activities, library services and even sporting clubs within a larger context of preaching and political discussions.[431] In the 1990s, some 85% of its budget was allocated to the provision of social services.[432] Hamas has been called perhaps the most significant social services actor in Palestine. By 2000, Hamas or its affiliated charities ran roughly 40% of the social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza and, with other Islamic charities, by 2005, was supporting 120,000 individuals with monthly financial support in Gaza.[433] Part of the appeal of these institutions is that they fill a vacuum in the administration by the PLO of the Palestinian territories, which had failed to cater to the demand for jobs and broad social services, and is widely viewed as corrupt.[90] As late as 2005, the budget of Hamas, drawing on global charity contributions, was mostly tied up in covering running expenses for its social programmes, which extended from the supply of housing, food and water for the needy to more general functions such as financial aid, medical assistance, educational development and religious instruction. A certain accounting flexibility allowed these funds to cover both charitable causes and military operations, permitting transfer from one to the other.[434]

The dawah infrastructure itself was understood, within the Palestinian context, as providing the soil from which a militant opposition to the occupation would flower.[t] In this regard it differs from the rival Palestinian Islamic Jihad which lacks any social welfare network, and relies on spectacular terrorist attacks to recruit adherents.[436] In 2007, through funding from Iran, Hamas managed to allocate at a cost of $60 million, monthly stipends of $100 for 100,000 workers, and a similar sum for 3,000 fishermen laid idle by Israel's imposition of restrictions on fishing offshore, plus grants totalling $45 million to detainees and their families.[437] Matthew Levitt argues that Hamas grants to people are subject to a rigorous cost-benefit analysis of how beneficiaries will support Hamas, with those linked to terrorist activities receiving more than others.[438] Israel holds the families of suicide bombers accountable and bulldozes their homes, whereas the families of Hamas activists who have been killed or wounded during militant operations are given an initial, one-time grant varying between $500–$5,000, together with a $100 monthly allowance. Rent assistance is also given to families whose homes have been destroyed by Israeli bombing though families unaffiliated with Hamas are said to receive less.[359][439]

Until 2007, these activities extended to the West Bank, but, after a PLO crackdown, now continue exclusively in the Gaza Strip.[440] After the 2013 Egyptian coup d'état deposed the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohamed Morsi in 2013, Hamas found itself in a financial straitjacket and has since endeavoured to throw the burden of responsibility for public works infrastructure in the Gaza Strip back onto the Palestinian National Authority, but without success.[441]

Military wing

 
Weapons found in a mosque during Operation Cast Lead, according to the IDF

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades is Hamas's military wing.[442] While the number of members is known only to the Brigades leadership, Israel estimates the Brigades have a core of several hundred members who receive military style training, including training in Iran and in Syria (before the Syrian Civil War).[135] Additionally, the brigades have an estimated 10,000–17,000 operatives,[433][443] forming a backup force whenever circumstances call for reinforcements for the Brigade. Recruitment training lasts for two years.[135] The group's ideology outlines its aim as the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of Palestinian rights under the dispensations set forth in the Qur'an, and this translates into three policy priorities:

To evoke the spirit of Jihad (Resistance) among Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims; to defend Palestinians and their land against the Zionist occupation and its manifestations; to liberate Palestinians and their land that was usurped by the Zionist occupation forces and settlers.[444]

According to its official stipulations, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades' military operations are to be restricted to operating only inside Palestine, engaging with Israeli soldiers,[u] and in exercising the right of self-defense against armed settlers. They are to avoid civilian targets, to respect the enemy's humanity by refraining from mutilation, defacement or excessive killing, and to avoid targeting Westerners either in the occupied zones or beyond.[445]

 
Exercise of al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza City, January 27, 2013

Down to 2007, the Brigades are estimated to have lost some 800 operatives in conflicts with Israeli forces. The leadership has been consistently undermined by targeted assassinations. Aside from Yahya Ayyash (January 5, 1996), it has lost Emad Akel (November 24, 1993), Salah Shehade (July 23, 2002), Ibrahim al-Makadmeh (March 8, 2003), Ismail Abu Shanab (August 21, 2003), Ahmed Yassin (March 22, 2004), and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi (April 17, 2004).[446][113]

The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades groups its fighters in 4–5 man cells, which in turn are integrated into companies and battalions. Unlike the political section, which is split between an internal and external structure, the Brigades are under a local Palestinian leadership, and disobedience with the decisions taken by the political leadership have been relatively rare.[447]

Although the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades are an integral part of Hamas, the exact nature of the relationship is hotly debated. They appear to operate at times independently of Hamas, exercising a certain autonomy.[448][449][450][451][452] Some cells have independent links with the external leadership, enabling them to bypass the hierarchical command chain and political leadership in Gaza.[453] Ilana Kass and Bard O'Neill, likening Hamas's relationship with the Brigades to the political party Sinn Féin's relationship to the military arm of the Irish Republican Army, quote a senior Hamas official as stating: "The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade is a separate armed military wing, which has its own leaders who do not take their orders from Hamas and do not tell us of their plans in advance."[454][v]

Gaza forces, October 2023

During the 2023 Gaza war, the IDF published its intelligence about the Hamas military in the Strip.[456] They put the strength of the Qassam Brigades there at the start of the war at 30,000 fighters, organised by area in five brigades, consisting in total of 24 battalions and c. 140 companies.[456] Each regional brigade had a number of strongholds and outposts, and included specialised arrays for rocket firing, anti-tank missiles, air defenses, snipers, and engineering.[456]

Media

Al-Aqsa TV

Al-Aqsa TV is a television channel founded by Hamas.[457] The station began broadcasting in the Gaza Strip on January 9, 2006,[458][459] less than three weeks before the Palestinian legislative elections. It has shown television programs, including some children's television, which deliver antisemitic messages.[460] Hamas has stated that the television station is "an independent media institution that often does not express the views of the Palestinian government headed by Ismail Haniyeh or of the Hamas movement", and that Hamas does not hold antisemitic views.[461] The programming includes ideologically tinged children's shows, news talk, and religiously inspired entertainment.[462] According to the Anti-Defamation League, the station promotes terrorist activity and incites hatred of Jews and Israelis.[459] Al-Aqsa TV is headed by Fathi Ahmad Hammad, chairman of al-Ribat Communications and Artistic Productions—a Hamas-run company that also produces Hamas's radio station, Voice of al-Aqsa, and its biweekly newspaper, The Message.[463]

Al-Fateh magazine

Al-Fateh ("the conqueror") is the Hamas children's magazine, published biweekly in London, and also posted in an online website. It began publication in September 2002, and its 108th issue was released in mid-September 2007. The magazine features stories, poems, riddles, and puzzles, and states it is for "the young builders of the future".[464]

According to the Anti-Defamation League, al-Fateh promotes violence and antisemitism, with praise for and encouragement to become suicide bombers, and that it "regularly includes photos of children it claims have been detained, injured or killed by Israeli police, images of children firing slingshots or throwing rocks at Israelis and children holding automatic weapons and firebombs."[465]

Social media

Hamas has traditionally presented itself as a voice of suffering of the Palestinian people. According to Time magazine, a new social media strategy was employed in the wake of the October 7 attack: Hamas asserted itself as the dominant resistance force in the Middle East by recording and broadcasting the brutality of their attacks.[466]

According to Dr. Harel Horev, historian and researcher of Palestinian affairs at Tel Aviv University, Hamas has used social medi to dehumanize Israelis/Jews. According to his research, Hamas took over the most popular accounts on Palestinian networks in a covert manner that did not reveal its involvement. This control gave it the ability to significantly influence the Palestinian discourse online through content that denies the humanity and right to life of Israelis. These included posters, songs and videos glorifying threats; computer games that encourage the murder of Jews; training videos for carrying out effective and indiscriminate stabbing and shooting attacks; and anti-Semitic cartoons as a central means of dehumanizing the Israeli/Jew in the Palestinian online discourse.[467][468]

Violence

Hamas has used both political activities and violence in pursuit of its goals. For example, while politically engaged in the 2006 Palestinian Territories parliamentary election campaign, Hamas stated in its election manifesto that it was prepared to use "armed resistance to end the occupation".[469]

From 2000 to 2004, Hamas was responsible for killing nearly 400 Israelis and wounding more than 2,000 in 425 attacks, according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 2001 through May 2008, Hamas launched more than 3,000 Qassam rockets and 2,500 mortar attacks into Israel.[470]

Attacks on civilians

 
Aftermath of 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings in which 26 people were killed

Hamas has attacked Israeli civilians. Hamas's most deadly suicide bombing was an attack on a Netanya hotel on March 27, 2002, in which 30 people were killed and 140 were wounded. The attack has also been referred to as the Passover massacre since it took place on the first night of the Jewish festival of Passover at a Seder.

Hamas has defended suicide attacks as a legitimate aspect of its asymmetric warfare against Israel. In 2003, according to Stephen Atkins, Hamas resumed suicide bombings in Israel as a retaliatory measure after the failure of peace talks and an Israeli campaign targeting members of the upper echelon of the Hamas leadership.[w] but they are considered as crimes against humanity under international law.[472][473] In a 2002 report, Human Rights Watch stated that Hamas leaders "should be held accountable" for "war crimes and crimes against humanity" committed by the al-Qassam Brigades.[474][475][476]

In May 2006, Israel arrested a top Hamas official, Ibrahim Hamed, who Israeli security officials alleged was responsible for dozens of suicide bombings and other attacks on Israelis.[477] Hamed's trial on those charges has not yet concluded.[478] In 2008, Hamas explosives engineer Shihab al-Natsheh organized a deadly suicide bombing in Dimona.[479][480]

Since 2002, militants of al-Qassam Brigades and other groups have used homemade Qassam rockets to hit Israeli towns in the Negev, such as Sderot. Al-Qassam Brigades was estimated in 2007 to have launched 22% of the rocket and mortar attacks,[481] which killed fifteen people between the years 2000 and 2009.[482] The introduction of the Qassam-2 rocket in 2008 enabled Palestinian paramilitary groups to reach, from Gaza, such Israeli cities such as Ashkelon.[483]

In 2008, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal, offered that Hamas would attack only military targets if the IDF would stop causing the deaths of Palestinian civilians.[484] Following a June 19, 2008, ceasefire, the al-Qassam Brigades ended its rocket attacks and arrested Fatah militants in Gaza who had continued sporadic rocket and mortar attacks against Israel. The al-Qassam Brigades resumed the attacks after the November 4 Israeli incursion into Gaza.[240][485]

On June 15, 2014, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Hamas of involvement in the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers (including one who held American citizenship), saying "This has severe repercussions."[486] On July 20, 2014, nearly two weeks into Operation Protective Edge, Netanyahu in an interview with CNN described Hamas as "genocidal terrorists."[487]

On August 5, 2014, Israel announced that Israeli security forces arrested Hussam Kawasme, in Shuafat, in connection with the murders of the teens.[488] During interrogation, Kawasme admitted to being the mastermind behind the attack, in addition to securing the funding from Hamas.[489] Officials have stated that additional people arrested in connection with the murders are still being held, but no names have been released.[490]

On August 20, Saleh al-Arouri, a Hamas leader then in exile in Turkey, claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of the three Israeli teens. He delivered an address on behalf of Khaled Mashal at the conference of the International Union of Muslim Scholars in Istanbul, a move that might reflect a desire by Hamas to gain leverage.[491] In it he said:

Our goal was to ignite an intifada in the West Bank and Jerusalem, as well as within the 1948 borders. ... Your brothers in the Al-Qassam Brigades carried out this operation to support their imprisoned brothers, who were on a hunger strike. ... The mujahideen captured these settlers in order to have a swap deal.[492][better source needed]

Hamas political leader Khaled Mashal accepted that members of Hamas were responsible, stating that he knew nothing of it in advance and that what the leadership knew of the details came from reading Israeli reports.[493] Mashal, who had headed Hamas's exiled political wing since 2004, has denied being involved in the "details" of Hamas's "military issues," but "justified the killings as a legitimate action against Israelis on 'occupied' lands."[494]

 
The 2023 Re'im music festival massacre has left 364 people dead with many others wounded or taken hostage

During the 2023 Hamas attack on Israel, Hamas infiltrated homes, shot civilians en masse, and took scores of Israeli civilians and soldiers as hostages into Gaza.[60][61] According to Human Rights Watch, the deliberate targeting of civilians, indiscriminate attacks, and taking of civilians as hostages amount to war crimes under international humanitarian law.[495] During its October 2023 offensive against Israel, Hamas massacred 364 people at the Re'im music festival, while abucting others.[496][497] During the same offensive, it also was reported that Hamas had massacred the population of the Kfar Aza kibbutz.[498] About 10 percent of the residents of the Be'eri kibbutz were killed.[499] Hamas militants attacked the Psyduck festival, that took place near kibutz Nir Oz, killing 17 Israeli partygoers.[500] Video footage shows children being deliberately killed during the kibbutz attacks,[501] as well as what appears to be an attempt to decapitate a living person using a garden hoe.[502] Forensic teams who have examined bodies of victims said many bodies showed signs of torture as well as rape.[503][504][505] Testimonies from witnesses to acts of gang rapes committed by Hamas militants were collected by the police.[506]

Rocket attacks on Israel

Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have launched thousands of rockets into Israel since 2001, killing 15 civilians, wounding many more, and posing an ongoing threat to the nearly 800,000 Israeli civilians who live and work in the weapons' range. Hamas officials have said that the rockets were aimed only at military targets, saying that civilian casualties were the "accidental result" of the weapons' poor quality. According to Human Rights Watch, statements by Hamas leaders suggest that the purpose of the rocket attacks was indeed to strike civilians and civilian objects. From January 2009, following Operation Cast Lead, Hamas largely stopped launching rocket attacks on Israel and has on at least two occasions arrested members of other groups who have launched rockets, "showing that it has the ability to impose the law when it wants".[507] In February 2010, Hamas issued a statement regretting any harm that may have befallen Israeli civilians as a result of Palestinian rocket attacks during the Gaza war. It maintained that its rocket attacks had been aimed at Israeli military targets but lacked accuracy and hence sometimes hit civilian areas. Israel responded that Hamas had boasted repeatedly of targeting and murdering civilians in the media.[508]

According to one report, commenting on the 2014 conflict, "nearly all the 2,500–3,000 rockets and mortars Hamas has fired at Israel since the start of the war seem to have been aimed at towns", including an attack on "a kibbutz collective farm close to the Gaza border", in which an Israeli child was killed.[509] Former Israeli Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi stated that "Hamas has expressed pride in aiming long-range rockets at strategic targets in Israel including the nuclear reactor in Dimona, the chemical plants in Haifa, and Ben-Gurion Airport", which "could have caused thousands" of Israeli casualties "if successful".[510]

In July 2008, Barack Obama, then the Democratic presidential candidate, said: "If somebody was sending rockets into my house, where my two daughters sleep at night, I'm going to do everything in my power to stop that, and I would expect Israelis to do the same thing."[511] On December 28, 2008, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a statement: "the United States strongly condemns the repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israel."[512] On March 2, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the attacks.[513]

On October 7, 2023, Hamas claimed responsibility for a barrage of missile attacks originating from the Gaza strip.[514]

Attempts to derail 2010 peace talks

In 2010, Hamas, who have been actively sidelined from the peace talks by Israel, spearheaded a coordinated effort by 13 Palestinian militant groups, in attempt to derail the stalled peace talks between Israel and Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority. According to the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Major Gen. Eitan Dangot, Israel seeks to work with Salam Fayyad, to help revive the Palestinian economy, and hopes to ease restrictions on the Gaza Strip further, "while somehow preventing the Islamic militants who rule it from getting credit for any progress". According to Dangot, Hamas must not be seen as ruling successfully or be allowed to "get credit for a policy that would improve the lives of people".[515] The campaign consists of attacks against Israelis in which, according to a Hamas declaration in early September, "all options are open".[516][517][518][519] The participating groups also include Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Resistance Committees and an unnamed splinter group of Fatah.[520]

As part of the campaign, on August 31, 2010, 4 Israeli settlers, including a pregnant woman, were killed by Hamas militants while driving on Route 60 near the settlement Kiryat Arba, in the West bank. According to witnesses, militants opened fire on the moving vehicle, but then "approached the car" and shot the occupants in their seats at "close range". The attack was described by Israeli sources as one of the "worst" terrorist acts in years.[521][522][523] A senior Hamas official said that Israeli settlers in the West Bank are legitimate targets since "they are an army in every sense of the word".[524][525]

Guerrilla warfare

 
Hamas anti-tank rockets, captured by Israel Defense Forces during Operation Protective Edge

Hamas has made great use of guerrilla tactics in the Gaza Strip and to a lesser degree the West Bank.[526] It has successfully adapted these techniques over the years since its inception. According to a 2006 report by rival Fatah party, Hamas had smuggled between several hundred and 1,300 tons of advanced rockets, along with other weaponry, into Gaza.[526]

Hamas has used IEDs and anti-tank rockets against the IDF in Gaza. The latter include standard RPG-7 warheads and home-made rockets such as the Al-Bana, Al-Batar and Al-Yasin. The IDF has a difficult, if not impossible, time trying to find hidden weapons caches in Palestinian areas—this is due to the high local support base Hamas enjoys.[527]

Extrajudicial killings of rivals

In addition to killing Israeli civilians and armed forces, Hamas has also murdered suspected Palestinian Israel collaborators and Fatah rivals.[528][529] According to the Associated Press, collaborating with Israel is a crime punishable by death in Gaza.[530] Hundreds of Palestinians were executed by both Hamas and Fatah during the First Intifada.[531] In the wake of the 2006 Israeli conflict with Gaza, Hamas was accused of systematically rounding up, torturing and summarily executing Fatah supporters suspected of supplying information to Israel. Human Rights Watch estimates several hundred Gazans were "maimed" and tortured in the aftermath of the conflict. Seventy-three Gazan men accused of "collaborating" had their arms and legs broken by "unidentified perpetrators", and 18 Palestinians accused of helping Israel were executed by Hamas security officials in the first days of the conflict.[230][231][532] In November 2012, Hamas's Izzedine al-Qassam brigade publicly executed six Gaza residents accused of collaborating with Israel. According to the witnesses, six alleged informers were shot dead one by one in Gaza City, while the corpse of the sixth victim was tied by a cable to the back of a motorcycle and dragged through the streets.[533] In 2013, Human Rights Watch issued a statement condemning Hamas for not investigating and giving a proper trial to the six men. Their statement was released the day before Hamas issued a deadline for "collaborators" to turn themselves in, or they will be pursued "without mercy".[534] During the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, Hamas executed at least 23 accused collaborators after three of its commanders were assassinated by Israeli forces, with Amnesty International also reporting instances of torture used by Hamas forces.[535][536] An Israeli source denied that any of the commanders had been targeted on the basis of human intelligence.[537]

Frequent killings of unarmed people have also occurred during Hamas-Fatah clashes.[538][539] NGOs have cited a number of summary executions as particular examples of violations of the rules of warfare, including the case of Muhammad Swairki, 28, a cook for Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas's presidential guard, who was thrown to his death, with his hands and legs tied, from a 15-story apartment building in Gaza City.[540] Hamas security forces reportedly shoot and torture Palestinians who opposed Hamas rule in Gaza.[541] In one case, a Palestinian had criticized Hamas in a conversation on the street with some friends. Later that day, more than a dozen armed men with black masks and red kaffiyeh took the man from his home, and brought him to a solitary area where they shot him three times in the lower legs and ankles. The man told Human Rights Watch that he was not politically active.[230]

On August 14, 2009, Hamas fighters stormed the Mosque of cleric Abdel-Latif Moussa.[542] The cleric was protected by at least 100 fighters from Jund Ansar Allah ("Army of the Helpers of God"), an Islamist group with links to Al-Qaeda. The resulting battle left at least 13 people dead, including Moussa and six Hamas fighters, and 120 people injured.[543] According to Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, during 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, Hamas killed more than 120 Palestinian youths for defying house arrest imposed on them by Hamas, in addition to 30–40 Palestinians killed by Hamas in extrajudicial executions after accusing them of being collaborators with Israel.[544] Referring to the killing of suspected collaborators, a Shin Bet official stated that "not even one" of those executed by Hamas provided any intelligence to Israel, while the Shin Bet officially "confirmed that those executed during Operation Protective Edge had all been held in prison in Gaza in the course of the hostilities".[537]

2011–2013 Sinai insurgency

Hamas has been accused of providing weapons, training and fighters for Sinai-based insurgent attacks,[545][546] although Hamas strongly denies the allegations, calling them a smear campaign aiming to harm relations with Egypt.[545] According to the Egyptian Army, since the ouster of Egypt's Muslim-Brotherhood president Mohamed Morsi, over 600 Hamas members have entered the Sinai Peninsula through smuggling tunnels.[547] In addition, several weapons used in Sinai's insurgent attacks are being traced back to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, according to the army.[547] The four leading insurgent groups in the Sinai have all reportedly maintained close ties with the Gaza Strip.[548] Hamas called the accusation a "dangerous development".[549] Egyptian authorities stated that the 2011 Alexandria bombing was carried out by the Gaza-based Army of Islam, which has received sanctuary from Hamas and earlier collaborated in the capture of Gilad Shalit.[548][550][551][552] Army of Islam members linked to the August 2012 Sinai attack have reportedly sought refuge in the Gaza Strip.[548] Egypt stated that Hamas directly provided logistical support to the Muslim Brotherhood militants who carried out the December 2013 Mansoura bombing.[553]

Terrorist designation

 
  Designated Hamas as a terrorist organization
  Designated the military wing of Hamas as a terrorist organization

The United States designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation in 1995, as did Canada in November 2002,[554] and the United Kingdom in November 2021.[49] The European Union so designated Hamas's military wing in 2001 and, under US pressure,[555] designated Hamas in 2003.[556] Hamas challenged this decision,[557] which was upheld by the European Court of Justice in July 2017.[558] Japan[559] and New Zealand[560] have designated the military wing of Hamas as a terrorist organization.[561] The organization is banned in Jordan.[562]

Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organization by Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran,[563] Russia,[564] Norway,[x] Turkey, China,[566] Egypt, Syria, and Brazil.[567][568][569][excessive citations] "Many other states, including Russia, China, Syria, Turkey and Iran consider the (armed) struggle waged by Hamas to be legitimate."[570]

According to Tobias Buck, Hamas is "listed as a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US and the EU, but few dare to treat it that way now" and in the Arab and Muslim world it has lost its pariah status and its emissaries are welcomed in capitals of Islamic countries.[571] While Hamas is considered a terrorist group by several governments and some academics, others regard Hamas as a complex organization, with terrorism as only one component.[572][573]

Country Designated as terrorist org. Comments
  Australia Yes Australia announced they would designate Hamas as a terrorist organization in its entirety in 2022. Prior to that, Hamas's military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, were recognized as one but the political branch were not.[574][575][576][577]
  Brazil No Brazil does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization.[567][578] The Brazilian government only classifies organizations as terrorists when the United Nations does so.[579]
  Canada Yes Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Government of Canada has listed Hamas as a terrorist entity, thus establishing it as a terrorist group, since 2002.[580][581]
  China No As of 2006, China does not designate Hamas to be a terrorist organization and acknowledges Hamas to be the legitimately elected political entity in the Gaza Strip that represents the Palestinian people. In June 2006, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated: "We believe that the Palestinian government is legally elected by the people there and it should be respected."[582][583]
  Egypt No In March 2014, as part of a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood organization following the July 2013 overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, Cairo's Urgent Matters Court outlawed Hamas's activities in Egypt, ordered the closure of its offices and to arrest any Hamas member found in the country.[584][585] In February 2015, the aforementioned court designated Hamas as a terrorist organization, accusing Hamas of carrying terrorist attacks in Egypt through tunnels linking the Sinai Peninsula to the Gaza Strip.[586]
However, in June 2015, Egypt's appeals court overturned the prior ruling that listed Hamas as a terrorist organization,[587] and Egypt (as of 2023) no longer officially regards Hamas to be a terrorist organization.
  European Union Yes The EU designated Hamas as a terrorist group from 2003. In December 2014, the General Court of the European Union ordered that Hamas be removed from the register. The court stated that the move was technical and was not a reassessment of Hamas's classification as a terrorist group. In March 2015, EU decided to keep Hamas on its terrorism blacklist "despite a controversial court decision", appealing the court's judgment.[588][589][590][591][592][593][594][595] In July 2017, this appeal was upheld by the European Court of Justice.[596][597]
  India No Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organization by India,[598] though individual Indian leaders have condemned certain Hamas' attacks as terrorist.
  Iran No Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organization by Iran.[563][570]
  Israel Yes The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, "Hamas maintains a terrorist infrastructure in Gaza and the West Bank, and acts to carry out terrorist attacks in the territories and Israel."[599]
  Japan Yes As of 2005, Japan had frozen the assets of 472 terrorists and terrorist organizations including those of Hamas.[600] However, in 2006 it publicly acknowledged that Hamas had won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections democratically.[601]
  Jordan No Hamas was banned in 1999, reportedly in part at the request of the United States, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority.[172] In 2019, Jordanian sources are said to have revealed "that the Kingdom refused a request from the General Secretariat of the Arab League in late March to ban Hamas and list it as a terrorist organization."[602][better source needed]
  New Zealand Partial The military wing of Hamas, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has been listed as a terrorist entity since 2010.[603] New Zealand PM Chris Hipkins reiterated in October 2023 that "Hamas is recognised by New Zealand as a terrorist organisation".[604]
  Norway No Norway does not list Hamas as a terrorist organization.[605] Norway distanced itself from the European Union in 2006, claiming that its listing was causing problems for its role as a 'neutral facilitator.'[565] After Progress Party leader Sylvi Listhaug criticized PM Jonas Gahr Støre at the start of the 2023 Israel-Hamas war for not calling Hamas a terrorist organization, Støre said that it was an organization that carried out terrorist acts but he would not change Norway's listing.[606]
  Paraguay Partial The military wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, is listed as a terrorist organization.[citation needed]
  Philippines No Hamas is not considered as a terrorist organization by the Philippines. The National Security Council has proposed considering Hamas as a terrorist group as a response to the 2023 Israel–Hamas war.[607][608]
  Qatar No The Qatari government has a designated terrorist list. As of 2014, the list contained no names, according to The Daily Telegraph.[609] In September 2020, Qatar brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas that is reported to include "plans to build a power station operated by Qatar, the provision of $34 million for humanitarian aid, provision of 20,000 COVID-19 testing kits by Qatar to the Health Ministry, and a number of initiatives to reduce unemployment in the Gaza Strip."[610]
  Russia No Russia does not designate Hamas a terrorist organisation, and held direct talks with Hamas in 2006, after Hamas won the Palestine elections, stating that it did so to press Hamas to reject violence and recognise Israel.[611]
  Saudi Arabia No Saudi Arabia banned the Muslim Brotherhood in 2014 and branded it a terrorist organization. While Hamas is not specifically listed, a non-official Saudi source stated that the decision also encompasses its branches in other countries, including Hamas.[612][613] As of January 2020, ties between Saudi Arabia and Hamas remain strained despite attempts at a rapprochement. Wesam Afifa, director general of Al-Aqsa TV is quoted as saying that "Saudi Arabia did not sever ties with Hamas, and even when Riyadh made public its list of terrorists in 2017, Hamas was not added to the list."[614] In 2020, Saudi Arabia arrested 68 Palestinian and Jordanian citizens associated with Hamas in a special terrorism court. However, in 2022, Saudi Arabia released a number of those detainees in recent months, including senior member Mohammad Al-Khodary, who was set free in October, following statements by Hamas leaders expressing their desire for improved relations with the country.[615] In 2023, during Ramadan, senior members of Hamas, including Ismail Haniyeh, Mousa Marzook, Khalil al-Hayya and Khaled Meshaal arrived in Saudi Arabia to mend Hamas's relationship with Saudi Arabia. They were spotted performing Umrah in Mecca, Saudi Arabia.[616]
   Switzerland Yes Before the Hamas-led attack on Israel, Switzerland had not designated Hamas as a terrorist organization and had direct contacts with all major stakeholders in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, including Hamas.[617] After the Hamas-led attack, the Swiss government decided to list Hamas as a terrorist organization[618] and stated that it would pass a new law by the end of February 2024 to ban “Hamas activities" or "support" for the group.[619]
  Syria No Syria does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization. Syria is among other countries that consider Hamas' armed struggle to be legitimate.[570]
  Turkey No The Turkish government met with Hamas leaders in February 2006, after the organization's victory in the Palestinian elections. In 2010, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan described Hamas as "resistance fighters who are struggling to defend their land".[620][621]
  United Kingdom Yes Hamas in its entirety is proscribed as a terrorist group and banned under the Terrorism Act 2000. "The government now assess that the approach of distinguishing between the various parts of Hamas is artificial. Hamas is a complex but single terrorist organisation."[49]
  United Nations No The list of United Nations designated terrorist groups does not include Hamas.[622] On December 5, 2018, the UN rejected a US resolution aimed at unilaterally condemning Hamas for Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel and other violence.[623][624][92][625]
  United States Yes Lists Hamas as a "Foreign Terrorist Organization".[626] The State Department decided to add Hamas to its US State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in April 1993.[627] As of 2023, it is still listed.[628]

Criticism

Aside from its use of political violence in pursuit of its goals, Hamas has been widely criticised for a variety of reasons, including the use of antisemitic hate speech by its representatives, frequent calls for the military destruction of Israel, its specific use of human shields and child combatants as part of its military operations, its restriction of political freedoms within the Gaza Strip, and human rights abuses.

After starting the 2023 war, the European Parliament passed a motion stating the need for Hamas to be eliminated, with US President Biden having expressed the same sentiment.[629][630] Hamas was accused of having committed genocide against Israelis on 7 October 2023 by 240 legal experts, including jurists and academics, Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, chaired by former Canadian Justice Minister Irwin Cotler, and Genocide Watch.[631][632][633][634][635]

Support

Israeli policy towards Hamas

Benjamin Netanyahu had been Israel's prime minister for most of the two decades preceding the 2023 Israel–Hamas war, and was criticized for having championed a policy of empowering Hamas in Gaza.[636][637][638][639] This policy was part of a strategy to sabotage a two-state solution by confining the Palestinian Authority to the West Bank and weakening it, and to demonstrate to the Israeli public and western governments that Israel has no partner for peace.[640][641] This criticism was leveled by several Israeli officials, including former prime minister Ehud Barak, and former head of Shin Bet security services Yuval Diskin.[640] Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Authority were also critical of Israel under Netanyahu allowing suitcases of Qatari money to be given to Hamas,[640] in exchange for maintaining the ceasefire.[636] The Times of Israel reported after the Hamas attack that Netanyahu's policy to treat the Palestinian Authority as a burden and Hamas as an asset had "blown up in our faces".[636]

Public support

A poll conducted in 2021 found that 53% of Palestinians believed Hamas was "most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people", while only 14% preferred Abbas's Fatah party.[642] At the same time, a majority of Gazans saw Hamas as corrupt as well, but were frightened to criticize the group.[643] Polls conducted in September 2023 found that support for Hamas among Palestinians was around 27–31%.[644]

Public opinions of Hamas deteriorated after it took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. Prior to the takeover, 62% of Palestinians had held a favorable view of the group, while a third had negative views. According to a 2014 Pew Research just prior to the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, only about a third had positive opinions and more than half viewed Hamas negatively. Furthermore, 68% of Israeli Arabs viewed Hamas negatively.[645] In July 2014, 65% of Lebanese viewed Hamas negatively. In Jordan and Egypt, roughly 60% viewed Hamas negatively, and in Turkey, 80% had a negative view of Hamas. In Tunisia, 42% had a negative view of Hamas, while 56% of Bangladeshis and 44% of Indonesians had a negative opinion of Hamas.[645]

Hamas popularity surged after the war in July–August 2014 with polls reporting that 81 percent of Palestinians felt that Hamas had "won" that war.[646][647] A June 2021 opinion poll found that 46% of respondents in Saudi Arabia supported rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas during the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis.[648] A March/April 2023 poll found that 60% of Jordanians viewed Hamas firing rockets at Israel at least somewhat positively.[649]

In November 2023, during Israel's bombing and blockade of the Gaza Strip, Hamas's popularity among Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank increased significantly.[650][651] Support for Hamas also increased among the people of Jordan.[652] According to the poll conducted by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy from November 14 to December 6, 2023, 40% of Saudi participants expressed a positive view of Hamas, 95% of Saudis did not believe that Hamas killed civilians in its attack on Israel, and only 16% of Saudis said Hamas should accept a two-state solution.[653]

 
Pro-Hamas rally in Damascus

International relations

 
Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2012

After winning the Palestinian elections, Hamas leaders made multi-national diplomatic tours abroad. In April 2006, Mahmoud al-Zahar (then foreign minister) visited Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Sudan and Egypt.[654] He met the Saudi foreign minister Prince Faysal. In Syria he held talks on the issue of Palestinians stuck on the Syrian-Iraqi border. He also stated that he unofficially met officials from Western Europe in Qatar who did not wish to be named.[654] In May 2006, Hamas foreign minister visited Indonesia, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Brunei, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and Iran.[654] The minister also participated in China–Arab States Cooperation Forum.[655] Ismail Haniyeh in 2006 visited Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, Iran, Lebanon, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.[656]

Hamas has always maintained leadership abroad. The movement is deliberately fragmented to ensure that Israel cannot kill its top political and military leaders.[657] Hamas used to be strongly allied with both Iran and Syria. Iran gave Hamas an estimated $13–15 million in 2011 as well as access to long-range missiles. Hamas's political bureau was once located in the Syrian capital of Damascus before the start of the Syrian civil war. Relations between Hamas, Iran, and Syria began to turn cold when Hamas refused to back the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Instead, Hamas backed the Sunni rebels fighting against Assad. As a result, Iran cut funding to Hamas, and Iranian ally Hezbollah ordered Hamas members out of Lebanon.[28] Hamas was then forced out of Syria, and subsequently has tried to mend fences with Iran and Hezbollah.[28] Hamas contacted Jordan and Sudan to see if either would open up its borders to its political bureau, but both countries refused, although they welcomed many Hamas members leaving Syria.[658]

From 2012 to 2013, under the short-lived leadership of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi, Hamas had the support of Egypt. However, after Morsi was removed from office, his successor Abdul Fattah al-Sisi outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and destroyed the tunnels Hamas built into Egypt. In 2015, Egypt declared Hamas a terrorist organization. But this decision was overturned by Egypt in June of the same year.[659] There was a rapprochement between Hamas and Egypt, when a Hamas delegation visited Cairo on 12 March 2016.[660] Hamas has assisted Egypt in controlling the insurgency in Sinai.[660] However, Hamas denied Egypt's request to deploy its own militants in the Sinai leading to tensions between the two.[660]

Egypt has mediated between Hamas and Fatah and sought to unify the two factions. In 2017, Yahya Sinwar visited Cairo for 5 weeks and manage to convince Egypt the Rafah crossing,[clarification needed] in return Hamas committed to better relations with Fatah.[661]

The United Arab Emirates has been hostile to Hamas designating the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and Hamas was at the time viewed as the Brotherhood's Palestinian equivalent.[28]

Hamas enjoyed close relations with Saudi Arabia in its early years.[662] Saudi Arabia funded most of its operations from 2000 to 2004, but reduced its support due to US pressure.[663] In 2020, many Hamas members in Saudi Arabia were arrested. In 2022, Saudi Arabia began releasing Hamas members from prison. In April 2023, Ismail Haniyeh visited Riyadh, a sign of improving relations.[662] Haniyeh had long sough to visit Saudi Arabia but the Saudis had ignored his request[664] (until 2023).

Hamas has adopted ideological flexibility in its approach to international relations. Even though Hamas is Sunni, it has strong relations with Iran, the leading Shia power.[665] It has established relations with secular states.[665] Hamas also has relations with Russia, despite Russia's past wars against Muslims.[665]

North Korea supplies Hamas with weaponry.[666] Ali Barakeh, a Hamas official living in Lebanon, claimed the two are allies.[667][668]

Hamas leaders reportedly re-established relations with Kuwait, Libya and Oman, all of which reportedly have not had warm relations with Fatah.[669] The cool relationship between Fatah and Kuwait owed to Arafat's support for Saddam during the First Gulf War, which lead to the Palestinian exodus from Kuwait (1990–91).[669] This rapproachment is in part due to Hamas's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries.[669] Mahmoud Al-Zahar stated that Hamas does not "play the game" of siding with one Arab nation against another (e.g. in the Gulf War).[670] When Al-Qaradawi, and other Sunni ulema, called for an uprising against Assad's regime in Syria, Mahmoud Al-Zahar maintained that taking sides would harm the Palestinian cause.[671][clarification needed]

Qatar and Turkey

According to Middle East experts, now Hamas has two firm allies: Qatar and Turkey. Both give Hamas public and financial assistance estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars.[28] Qatar has transferred more than $1.8 billion to Hamas.[672] Shashank Joshi, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, says that "Qatar also hosts Hamas's political bureau which includes Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal." Meshaal also visits Turkey frequently to meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.[28] Erdogan has dedicated himself to breaking Hamas out of its political and economic seclusion. On US television, Erdogan said in 2012 that "I don't see Hamas as a terror organization. Hamas is a political party."[657]

Qatar has been called Hamas' most important financial backer and foreign ally.[673][674] In 2007, Qatar was, with Turkey, the only country to back Hamas after the group ousted the Palestinian Authority from the Gaza Strip.[28] The relationship between Hamas and Qatar strengthened in 2008 and 2009 when Khaled Meshaal was invited to attend the Doha Summit where he was seated next to the then Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, who pledged $250 million to repair the damage caused by Israel in the Israeli war on Gaza.[658] These events caused Qatar to become the main player in the "Palestinian issue". Qatar called Gaza's blockade unjust and immoral, which prompted the Hamas government in Gaza, including former Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, to thank Qatar for their "unconditional" support. Qatar then began regularly handing out political, material, humanitarian and charitable support for Hamas.[658]

 
Haniyeh with Turkish Minister of Culture Numan Kurtulmuş, 20 November 2012

In 2012, Qatar's former Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, became the first head of state to visit Gaza under Hamas rule. He pledged to raise $400 million for reconstruction.[675] Sources say that advocating for Hamas is politically beneficial to Turkey and Qatar because the Palestinian cause draws popular support amongst their citizens at home.[676]

Speaking in reference to Qatar's support for Hamas, during a 2015 visit to Palestine, Qatari official Mohammad al-Emadi, said Qatar is using the money not to help Hamas but rather the Palestinian people as a whole. He acknowledges however that giving to the Palestinian people means using Hamas as the local contact. Emadi said, "You have to support them. You don't like them, don't like them. But they control the country, you know."[677] Some argue that Hamas's relations with Qatar are putting Hamas in an awkward position because Qatar has become part of the regional Arab problem. However, Hamas claims that having contacts with various Arab countries establishes positive relations which will encourage Arab countries to do their duty toward the Palestinians and support their cause by influencing public opinion in the Arab world.[658] In March 2015, Hamas has announced its support of the Saudi Arabian-led military intervention in Yemen against the Shia Houthis and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.[678]

In May 2018, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan tweeted to the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but a resistance movement that defends the Palestinian homeland against an occupying power. During that period there were conflicts between Israeli troops and Palestinian protestors in the Gaza Strip, due to the decision of the United States to move their embassy to Jerusalem.[679] Also in 2018 the Israel Security Agency accused SADAT International Defense Consultancy (a Turkish private military company with connections to the Turkish government) of transferring funds to Hamas.[680]

In February 2020, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh met with Turkish President Erdoğan.[681] On 26 July 2023, Haniyeh met with Erdoğan and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Behind the meeting was Turkey's effort to reconcile Fatah with Hamas.[682] On 7 October 2023, the day of the Hamas attack on Israel, Haniyeh was in Istanbul, Turkey.[683] On 21 October 2023, Haniyeh spoke with Erdoğan about the latest developments in the Israel–Hamas war and the current situation in Gaza.[684] On 25 October 2023, Erdoğan said that Hamas was not a terrorist organisation but a liberation group fighting to protect Palestinian lands and people.[685]

Lawsuits

In the United States

The charitable trust Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development was accused in December 2001 of funding Hamas.[686][687][688] The US Justice Department filed 200 charges against the foundation. The case first ended in a mistrial, in which jurors acquitted on some counts and were deadlocked on charges ranging from tax violations to providing material support for terrorists. In a retrial, on November 24, 2008, the five leaders of the Foundation were convicted on 108 counts.[689]

Several US organizations were either shut down or held liable for financing Hamas in early 2001, groups that have origins from the mid-1990s, among them the Holy Land Foundation (HLF), Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), and Kind Hearts. The US Treasury Department specially designated the HLF in 2001 for terror ties because from 1995 to 2001 the HLF transferred "approximately $12.4 million outside of the United States with the intent to contribute funds, goods, and services to Hamas." According to the Treasury Department, Khaled Meshal identified one of HLF's officers, Mohammed El-Mezain as "the Hamas leader for the US". In 2003, IAP was found liable for financially supporting Hamas, and in 2006, Kind Hearts had their assets frozen for supporting Hamas.[690]

In 2004, a federal court in the United States found Hamas liable in a civil lawsuit for the 1996 murders of Yaron and Efrat Ungar near Bet Shemesh, Israel. Hamas was ordered to pay the families of the Ungars $116 million.[691] The Palestinian Authority settled the lawsuit in 2011. The settlement terms were not disclosed.[692] On August 20, 2004, three Palestinians, one a naturalized American citizen, were charged with a "lengthy racketeering conspiracy to provide money for terrorist acts in Israel".[693] The indicted included Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook, who had left the US in 1997.[694] On February 1, 2007, two men were acquitted of contravening United States law by supporting Hamas. Both men argued that they helped move money for Palestinian causes aimed at helping the Palestinian people and not to promote terrorism.[695]

In January 2009, a Federal prosecutor accused the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) of having links to a charity designated as a support network for Hamas.[696] The Justice Department identified CAIR as an "un-indicted co-conspirator" in the Holy Land Foundation case.[697] Later, a federal appeals court removed that label for all parties and instead, named them "joint venturers".[698] CAIR was never charged with any crime, and it complained that the designation had tarnished its reputation.[699][better source needed]

In Germany

A German federal court ruled in 2004 that Hamas was a unified organization whose humanitarian aid work could not be separated from its "terrorist and political activities".[700] In July 2010, Germany outlawed Frankfurt-based International Humanitarian Aid Organization (IHH e.V.), saying it had used donations to support Hamas-affiliated relief projects in Gaza.[701][702] German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere said that while presenting their activities to donors as humanitarian assistance, IHH e.V. had "exploited trusting donors' willingness to help by using money that was given for a good purpose for supporting what is, in the final analysis, a terrorist organization".[701][702][703]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ "As with Islamic political organizations elsewhere, Hamas offers its followers an ideology that appropriates the universal message of Islam for what is, in effect, a nationalist struggle."[9]
  2. ^ "Hamas considers Palestine the main front of jihad and viewed the uprising as an Islamic way of fighting the Occupation. The organisation's leaders argued that Islam gave the Palestinian people the power to confront Israel and described the Intifada as the return of the masses to Islam. Since its inception, Hamas has tried to reconcile nationalism and Islam. [...] Hamas claims to speak as a nationalist movement but with an Islamic-nationalist rather than a secular nationalist agenda."[12]
  3. ^ "Hamas is primarily a religious movement whose nationalist worldview is shaped by its religious ideology."[13]
  4. ^ officially denied[20]
  5. ^ UK: /həˈmæs/ hə-MASS, US: /həˈmɑːs/ hə-MAHSS;[51] Arabic: حَمَاس, romanizedḤamās, IPA: [ħaˈmaːs][52]
  6. ^ حركة المقاومة الإسلامية Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah
  7. ^ A two-thirds majority was required for the motion to pass. 87 voted in favour, 58 against, 32 abstained and 16 did not vote.[92]
  8. ^ It is unclear whether these groups were set up in 1985 or 1986.
  9. ^ Abu Amr states the following people attended: Dr. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi (40), a physician residing in Khan Yunis; Dr. Ibrahim al-Yazuri (45), a pharmacist residing in Gaza city; Shaykh Salih Shehada (40), a University instructor from Beit Hanoun; 'Isa al-Nashshar (35), an engineer in Rafah; Muhammad Sham'a (50), a teacher in al-Shati refugee camp and 'Abd al-Fattah Dukhan (50), a school principal at al-Nusayrat refugee camp.[3]
  10. ^ 'In truth, the creation of Hamas as a separate entity from the Muslim Brotherhood was done precisely to prevent Israeli authorities from targeting the organizations' greater activities, in the hopes that it would leave them relatively immune. Moreover, Hamas was created essentially because the Islamicists connected to the Muslim Brotherhood feared that without their direct participation in the first Intifada, they would lose supporters to both the PIJ and the PLO, the latter of which was anxious to reassert itself in the Palestinian territories after being marginalized following its expulsion from Lebanon. As authors Mishal and Sela, explain, "The Mujamma's decision to adopt a 'jihad now' policy against 'enemies of Allah' (through the creation of Hamas) was thus largely a matter of survival.'[115][116]
  11. ^ Davis, de Búrca, and Dalacoura write that the Brigades were formed in 1991;[130][131][132] Najib & Friedrich write that they were formed in the summer of 1991;[111] O'Malley[133] and Hussein[134] write that they were formed in 1992.
  12. ^ Islah Jad writes: "The Arabic word isqat has various literal meanings, most pertinently to 'tumble' or 'fall,' as into a trap. In the Palestinian context, it refers specifically to the methods used by the Israelis to manipulate or seduce victims and force them to work against their people's national interests."[151]
  13. ^ Hamas' former spokesman and Deputy Foreign Minister in Gaza, Ahmed Yousef, explained in a New York Times op-ed what this meant juridically. (A hudna) 'typically cover(s) 10 years and (is) recognized in Islamic jurisprudence as a legitimate and binding contract. A hudna extends beyond the Western concept of a ceasefire and obliges parties to use the period to seek a permanent, non-violent resolution to their differences'.[182]
  14. ^ "Aside from Hamas' stated goal to 'serve the people', this desire for security reform, again, perhaps is unsurprising given that Hamas was frequently the target of these apparatuses as an opposition movement. Hamas' security apparatus in the Gaza Strip is presently politicized as well, but it has managed to institute the rule of law and order which had eluded the previous Fatah-led forces, despite the Hamas government employing only a fraction of the resources and personnel. Indeed, Hamas streamlined the security forces, reducing the number of personnel from 56,887 prior to its armed seizure of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 to around 15,000 today. In contrast to its West Bank counterparts, moreover, the Hamas security sector is unambiguously under civilian control in line with Western modes of governance, and is thus, according to Sayigh, more accountable."[206]
  15. ^ :'(Yadlin) commented that if Fatah decided it had lost Gaza, there would be calls for Abbas to set up a separate regime in the West Bank. While not necessarily reflecting a consensus GOI (Government of Israel) view, Yadlin commented that such a development would please Israel since it would enable the IDF (Israel's occupying force) to treat Gaza as a hostile country rather than having to deal with Hamas as a non-state actor.'[224]
  16. ^ Haniyeh at the time was the Prime Minister of the State of Palestine but dismissed[326] by his President Abbas in 2007
  17. ^ In nutshell, the notion of "Palestine from the river to the sea" is nothing but the boundaries of Eretz Israel as imagined by the first Zionists. The notion was enshrined in the founding charter of the ruling Likud party, which states that "between the Sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty." One can thus entertain the chilling irony that Hamas owes its cherished slogan to the Zionists. After all, what is "free Palestine from the river to the sea" but a utopian parody of "Greater Israel"?[345]
  18. ^ 'The Charter was written in early 1988 by one individual and was made public without appropriate general Hamas consultation, revision or consensus, to the regret of Hamas's leaders in later years. The author of the Charter was one of the 'old guard' of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip, completely cut off from the outside world. All kinds of confusions and conflations between Judaism and Zionism found their way into the Charter, to the disservice of Hamas ever since, as this document has managed to brand it with charges of 'anti-Semitism' and a naïve world-view' Hamas leaders and spokespeople have rarely referred to the Charter or quoted from it, evidence that it has come to be seen as a burden rather than an intellectual platform that embraces the movement's principles.'[378]
  19. ^ 'The second major component in Palestine's sanctity, according to Hamas, is its designation as a waqf by the Caliph 'Umar b. al-Khattab. When the Muslim armies conquered Palestine in the year 638, the Hamas Charter says, the Caliph 'Umar b. al-Khattab decided not to divide the conquered land among the victorious soldiers, but to establish it as a waqf, belonging to the entire Muslim nation until the day of resurrection.'[384]
  20. ^ 'In a 1995 lecture, Sheikh Jamil Hamami, a party to the foundation of Hamas and a senior member of its West Bank leadership, expounded the importance of Hamas' dawa infrastructure as the soil from which militancy would flower.'[435]
  21. ^ 'Consistent attacks on army units by Hamas activists are as new as the use of anti-tank missiles against civilian homes by the Israeli military.'[409]
  22. ^ Matthew Levitt on the other hand claims that Hamas's welfare institutions act as a mere façade or front for the financing of terrorism, and dismisses the idea of two wings as a 'myth'.[455] He cites Ahmad Yassin stating in 1998: "We can not separate the wing from the body. If we do so, the body will not be able to fly. Hamas is one body."[102]
  23. ^ 'This ceasefire ended when Israel started targeting Hamas leaders for assassination in July 2003. Hamas retaliated with a suicide bombing in Israel on August 19, 2003, that killed 20 people, including 6 children. Since then Israelis have mounted an assassination campaign against the senior leadership of Hamas that has killed 13 Hamas members, including Ismail Abu Shanab, one of the most moderate leaders of Hamas. ... After each of these assassinations, Hamas has sent a suicide bomber into Israel in retaliation.'[471]
  24. ^ "In 2006, Norway explicitly distanced itself from the EU proscription regime, claiming that it was causing problems for its role as a 'neutral facilitator.'"[565]

References

  1. ^ Abdelal 2016, p. 122.
  2. ^ Dalloul 2017.
  3. ^ a b c d Abu-Amr 1993, p. 10.
  4. ^ Litvak 1998, p. 151.
  5. ^ Barzak 2011.
  6. ^ AFP 2019.
  7. ^ "National Counterterrorism Center | FTOs". www.dni.gov.
  8. ^ a b c Dalacoura 2012, pp. 66–67.
  9. ^ Gelvin 2014, p. 226.
  10. ^ Dunning 2016, p. 270.
  11. ^ Stepanova 2008, p. 113.
  12. ^ Cheema 2008, p. 465.
  13. ^ Litvak 2004, pp. 156–57.
  14. ^ Mišʿal, Šāʾûl; Sela, Avraham; Selaʿ, Avrāhām (2006). The Palestinian Hamas: vision, violence, and coexistence ; [with a new introduction]. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. ISBN 9780231116756. Retrieved October 20, 2023.
  15. ^ Tibi, B. (2015). From Sayyid Qutb to Hamas: The Middle East conflict and the islamization of antisemitism. U: Small, Charles A.(ur) The Yale Papers: Antisemitism in Comparative Perspective, p. 459 "antisemitism is inherent to a form of Islamist ideology of which the Hamas Charter is not only an expression but also a powerful source."
  16. ^ Bartal, S. (2023). Hamas, Antisemitism and Social Media Incitement. Portugese Journal of Asian Studies, (30), p. 183. "As we saw, antisemitism is a major pillar in the ideology of Hamas which perceives and articulates its conflict with Israel in absolutist religious terms."
  17. ^ Fastenbauer, R. (2020). Islamic antisemitism: Jews in the Qur’an, Reflections of European antisemitism, Political anti-Zionism: Common codes and differences. Confronting Antisemitism from the Perspectives of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, diedit oleh Armin Lange, Kerstin Mayerhofer, Dina Porat, and Lawrence H. Schiffman, p. 284. "Direct calls for use of violence in the text of the Hamas charter also reveal its antisemitic character"
  18. ^ Litvak 1998, pp. 151–52: "This strong anti-Jewish stance distinguishes Hamas from the PLO organization".
  19. ^ a b Hoffman, Bruce (October 10, 2023). "Understanding Hamas's Genocidal Ideology". The Atlantic. Retrieved October 11, 2023.
  20. ^ "Hamas in 2017: The document in full". Middle East Eye. Retrieved November 22, 2023.
  21. ^ Honig-Parnass, Tikva; Haddad, Toufic (2007). "10: Expanding Regionally, Resisting Locally". Between the Lines. Haymarket Books. p. 297. ISBN 978-1931859-44-8.
  22. ^ Kingsley, Patrick (July 26, 2013). "Egyptian army questions Mohamed Morsi over alleged Hamas terror links". The Guardian. Retrieved October 18, 2023.
  23. ^ "Adviser to Iran's Khamenei expresses support for Palestinian attacks: Report". Al Arabiya. AFP. October 7, 2023 – via al-Arabiya.
  24. ^ a b Ehl, David (May 15, 2021). "What is Hamas and who supports it?". Deutsche Welle.
  25. ^ Abdelaziz, Khalid; Eltahir, Nafisa; Irish, John (September 23, 2021). "Sudan closes door on support for Hamas". Reuters. Retrieved October 18, 2023.
  26. ^ a b "Qatar, Iran, Turkey and beyond: Hamas's network of allies". France 24. October 14, 2023.
  27. ^ "Experts Weigh in on Regional Impact of Syria-Hamas Rapprochement". VOA News. October 20, 2022. Retrieved October 8, 2023.
  28. ^ a b c d e f g h Gidda, Mirren (July 25, 2014). "Hamas Still Has Some Friends Left". Time. Retrieved October 18, 2023.
  29. ^ "Houthis, Hamas merge diplomacy around prisoner releases – Al-Monitor: Independent, trusted coverage of the Middle East". Al-Monitor. January 5, 2021.
  30. ^ "Hamas awards 'Shield of Honor' to Houthi representative in Yemen, sparking outrage in Saudi Arabia". JNS.org. June 16, 2021.
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hamas, other, uses, disambiguation, islamic, resistance, movement, redirects, here, confused, with, islamic, resistance, movement, azerbaijan, islamic, resistance, movement, iraq, this, article, long, read, navigate, comfortably, when, this, added, readable, p. For other uses see Hamas disambiguation Islamic Resistance Movement redirects here Not to be confused with Islamic Resistance Movement of Azerbaijan or Islamic Resistance Movement Iraq This article may be too long to read and navigate comfortably When this tag was added its readable prose size was 18 000 words Please consider splitting content into sub articles condensing it or adding subheadings Please discuss this issue on the article s talk page December 2023 Hamas e an acronym of its official name the Islamic Resistance Movement f is a Palestinian Sunni Islamist 53 political and military organization governing the Gaza Strip of the Israeli occupied Palestinian territories 54 Headquartered in Gaza City it has a presence in the West Bank the larger of the two Palestinian territories where its secular rival Fatah exercises control Islamic Resistance Movement حركة المقاومة الإسلاميةEmblem of HamasChairman of the Political BureauIsmail HaniyehDeputy ChairmanSaleh al Arouri XLeader in the Gaza StripYahya SinwarMilitary commanderMohammed DeifDeputy military commanderMarwan IssaFounderAhmed YassinAbdel Aziz al Rantisi and others Mahmoud al ZaharMohammad TahaAbdul Fatah Dukhan 1 Ibrahim Fares Al Yazouri 2 Isa al Nashshar 3 Ibrahim Quqa 4 Mohammed Hassan Shama a 5 Hassan Yousef 6 FoundedDecember 10 1987 1987 12 10 Split fromMuslim BrotherhoodHeadquartersGaza City Gaza StripMilitary wingIzz ad Din al Qassam BrigadesMembership20 000 25 000 7 IdeologyPalestinian nationalism 8 a Islamism 8 10 Islamic nationalism 8 11 b c Anti Zionism 14 Antisemitism 15 16 17 18 19 d Anti imperialism 21 ReligionSunni IslamPolitical allianceAlliance of Palestinian ForcesColours GreenPalestinian Legislative Council74 132Party flagPolitics of PalestinePolitical partiesElectionsHamasHeadquartersGaza City Gaza StripAlliesState allies Egypt 2011 2013 22 Iran 23 Qatar 24 Sudan until 2019 occasionally since 2023 25 24 26 Syria until 2011 again since 2022 27 28 Turkey partially 26 Non state allies Hezbollah Houthis 29 30 Islamic Jihad 31 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine PFLP 32 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine DFLP citation needed Lions Den 33 Popular Mobilization Forces 34 al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades 35 Hay at Tahrir al Sham 36 Popular Resistance Committees PRC 37 OpponentsState opponents Bahrain 38 39 Israel United Arab Emirates 28 United States 40 Non state opponents Fatah reconciliation ongoing Islamic State 41 42 Battles and warsIsraeli Palestinian conflict Gaza Israel conflict Fatah Hamas conflict Israeli Lebanese conflictDesignated as a terrorist group by Argentina 43 Australia 44 Canada 45 European Union 46 Israel 47 Paraguay 48 United Kingdom 49 United States 50 Hamas was founded by Palestinian imam and activist Ahmed Yassin in 1987 after the outbreak of the First Intifada against the Israeli occupation It emerged from his 1973 Mujama al Islamiya Islamic charity affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood 55 In 2006 Hamas won the Palestinian legislative election by campaigning on Palestinian armed resistance against the Israeli occupation 56 thus securing a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council 57 In 2007 Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip from rival Palestinian faction Fatah 58 59 which it has governed since separately from the Palestinian National Authority This was followed by an Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip with Egyptian support and multiple wars with Israel including in 2008 09 2012 2014 and 2021 The ongoing 2023 war began after Hamas launched an attack killing both civilians and soldiers and taking hostages back to Gaza 60 61 62 The attack has been described as the biggest military setback for Israel since the 1973 Arab Israeli War which Israel has responded to in an ongoing ground invasion of Gaza 63 While initially seeking a state in all of Mandatory Palestine Hamas began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005 2006 and 2007 64 65 66 In 2017 Hamas released a new charter that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel 67 68 69 70 71 Hamas s repeated offers of a truce for a period of 10 100 years 72 based on the 1967 borders are seen by many as consistent with a two state solution 73 74 75 76 while others say that Hamas retains the long term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine 77 78 The 1988 Hamas charter was widely described as antisemitic 79 80 81 but Hamas s 2017 charter removed the antisemitic language and said Hamas s struggle was with Zionists not Jews 82 83 84 85 Hamas promotes Palestinian nationalism in an Islamic context 86 Hamas is widely popular in Palestinian society due to its anti Israeli stance 87 88 89 90 Hamas has carried out attacks against Israeli civilians including suicide bombings and indiscriminate rocket attacks 91 These actions have led human rights groups to accuse it of war crimes and Argentina Australia Canada Israel Japan Paraguay New Zealand the United Kingdom the United States and the European Union 46 to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization In 2018 a motion at the United Nations to condemn Hamas was rejected g 93 94 Contents 1 Etymology 2 History 2 1 Origins 2 2 First Intifada 2 3 Oslo years 2 4 Second Intifada 2 5 2006 legislative elections 2 6 Hamas Fatah conflict 2 7 2008 2009 Gaza War 2 7 1 After the Gaza War 2 8 2014 Gaza War to 2022 2 9 2023 Israel Hamas war 3 Political and religious positions 3 1 Hudna proposals 3 2 Religious policy 3 2 1 In the Gaza Strip 3 2 2 In the West Bank 3 3 Erdogan s Turkey as a role model 3 4 1988 Hamas Charter 3 5 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies 4 Organization 4 1 Leadership and structure 4 1 1 Political Bureau 4 2 Finances and funding 4 3 Social services wing 4 4 Military wing 4 4 1 Gaza forces October 2023 4 5 Media 4 5 1 Al Aqsa TV 4 5 2 Al Fateh magazine 4 5 3 Social media 5 Violence 5 1 Attacks on civilians 5 2 Rocket attacks on Israel 5 3 Attempts to derail 2010 peace talks 5 4 Guerrilla warfare 5 5 Extrajudicial killings of rivals 5 6 2011 2013 Sinai insurgency 5 7 Terrorist designation 6 Criticism 7 Support 7 1 Israeli policy towards Hamas 7 2 Public support 8 International relations 8 1 Qatar and Turkey 9 Lawsuits 9 1 In the United States 9 2 In Germany 10 See also 11 Notes 12 References 12 1 Sources 12 1 1 Books 12 1 2 Journal articles 12 1 3 Other 13 External linksEtymologyHamas is an acronym of the Arabic phrase حركة المقاومة الإسلامية or Ḥarakah al Muqawamah al ʾIslamiyyah meaning Islamic Resistance Movement This acronym HMS was later glossed in the 1988 Hamas Covenant 95 by the Arabic word ḥamas حماس which itself means zeal strength or bravery 96 HistoryMain article History of Hamas Origins When Israel occupied the Palestinian territories in 1967 the Muslim Brotherhood members there did not take active part in the resistance preferring to focus on social religious reform and on restoring Islamic values 97 This outlook changed in the early 1980s and Islamic organizations became more involved in Palestinian politics 98 The driving force behind this transformation was Sheikh Ahmed Yassin a Palestinian refugee from Al Jura 98 Of humble origins and quadriplegic 98 he became one of the Muslim Brotherhood s leaders in Gaza His charisma and conviction brought him a loyal group of followers upon whom he depended for everything from feeding him and transporting him to and from events to communicating his strategy to the public 99 In 1973 Yassin founded the social religious charity Mujama al Islamiya Islamic center in Gaza as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood 100 101 Israeli authorities in the 1970s and 1980s showed indifference to al Mujama al Islamiya They viewed it as a religious cause that was significantly less militant against Israel than Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization many also believed that the infighting between Islamist organizations and the PLO would lead to the latter s weakening 55 102 103 104 105 Thus the Israeli government did not intervene in fights between PLO and Islamist forces 55 Israeli officials disagree on how much governmental indifference or even support of these disputes led to the rise of Islamism in Palestine Some such as Arieh Spitzen have argued that even if Israel had tried to stop the Islamists sooner he doubts it could have done much to curb political Islam a movement that was spreading across the Muslim world Others including Israel s religious affairs official in Gaza Avner Cohen believed that the indifference to the situation fueled Islamism s rise stating it was Israel s creation and failure 55 Others attribute the rise of the group to state sponsors including Iran 55 In 2018 The Intercept published an article claiming that Israeli officials admit they helped start the group 106 In 1984 Yassin was arrested after the Israelis found out that his group collected arms 55 but released in May 1985 as part of a prisoner exchange 107 108 He continued to expand the reach of his charity in Gaza 55 Following his release he set up al Majd an acronym for Munazamat al Jihad wa al Da wa headed by former student leader Yahya Sinwar and Rawhi Mushtaha tasked with handling internal security and hunting local informants for the Israeli intelligence services 109 110 At about the same time he ordered former student leader Salah Shehade to set up al Mujahidun al Filastiniun Palestinian fighters but its militants were quickly rounded up by Israeli authorities and had their arms confiscated 111 h The idea of Hamas began to take form on December 10 1987 when several members of the Brotherhood i convened the day after an incident in which an Israeli army truck crashed into a car at a Gaza checkpoint killing four Palestinian day workers the impetus of the First Intifada The group met at Yassin s house to strategize on how to maximize the incident s impact in spreading nationalist sentiments and sparking public demonstrations 3 A leaflet issued on December 14 calling for resistance is considered its first public intervention though the name Hamas itself was not used until January 1988 3 Hamas was formally recognized by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood after a key meeting in Amman in February 1988 112 Yassin was not directly connected to the organization but he gave it his blessing 113 Creating Hamas as an entity distinct from the Muslim Brotherhood was a matter of practicality the Muslim Brotherhood refused to engage in violence against Israel 114 but without participating in the intifada the Islamists tied to it feared they would lose support to their rivals the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the PLO They also hoped that by keeping the militant activities of Hamas separate Israel would not interfere with the Muslim Brotherhood s social work j To many Palestinians Hamas represented a more authentic engagement with their national aspirations This perception arose because Hamas offered an Islamic interpretation of the original goals of the secular PLO focusing on armed struggle to liberate all of Palestine This approach contrasted with the PLO s eventual acceptance of territorial compromise which involved settling for a smaller portion of Mandatory Palestine 117 Hamas s formal establishment came a month after the PLO and other intifada leaders issued a 14 point declaration in January 1988 advocating for the coexistence of a Palestinian state alongside Israel 118 In August 1988 Hamas published the Hamas Charter wherein it defined itself as a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood and stated its desire to establish an Islamic state throughout Palestine 119 First Intifada See also First Intifada Hamas s first combat operation against Israel came in spring 1989 as it abducted and killed Avi Sasportas and Ilan Saadon two Israeli soldiers 120 At the time Shehade and Sinwar were incarcerated in Israeli prisons and Hamas had set up a new group Unit 101 headed by Mahmoud al Mabhouh whose modus operandi was to abduct soldiers 121 The discovery of Sasportas s body triggered in the words of Jean Pierre Filiu an extremely violent Israeli response hundreds of Hamas leaders and activists including Yassin were arrested 122 Hamas was outlawed on September 28 1989 123 This mass detention of activists together with a further wave of arrests in 1990 effectively dismantled Hamas and devastated it was forced to adapt 124 125 its command system became regionalized to make its operative structure more diffuse 90 and to minimize the chances of being detected 126 Anger following the Temple Mount killings in October 1990 in which Muslim worshippers had tried to prevent Jewish extremists from placing a foundation stone for the Third Temple on the Temple Mount and Israeli police used live fire against Palestinians in the Al Aqsa compound killing 17 caused Hamas to intensify its campaign of abductions Hamas declared every Israeli soldier a target 127 and called for a jihad against the Zionist enemy everywhere in all fronts and every means 128 Hamas reorganized its units from al Majd and al Mujahidun al Filastiniun into a military wing called the Izz ad Din al Qassam Brigades led by Yahya Ayyash in 1991 or 1992 129 k The name comes from the militant Palestinian nationalist leader Sheikh Izz ad Din al Qassam who fought against the British and whose death in 1935 sparked the 1936 1939 Arab revolt in Palestine 135 Its members sometimes called themselves Students of Ayyash Students of the Engineer Yahya Ayyash Units 127 or Yahyia Ayyash s Disciples 136 Ayyash an engineering graduate from Birzeit University was a skillful bomb maker and greatly improved Hamas s striking capability 137 earning him the nickname al Muhandis the Engineer He is thought to have been one of the driving forces in Hamas s use of suicide bombings reportedly arguing We paid a high price when we used only slingshots and stones We need to exert more pressure make the cost of the occupation that much more expensive in human lives that much more unbearable 138 139 Until his assassination by Shin Bet in 1996 almost all bombs used on suicide missions were constructed by him 140 In December 1992 Israel responded to the abduction and killing of Nissim Toledano a border policeman by exiling 415 members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Southern Lebanon at the time occupied by Israel 141 142 There Hamas established contacts with Hezbollah Palestinians living in refugee camps and learned how to construct suicide and car bombs 143 142 In addition to the deportations Israel imposed a two week curfew on the Gaza Strip which cost the economy approximately 1 810 000 per day 144 The deportees were allowed to return nine months later 143 The deportation provoked international condemnation and a unanimous UN Security Council resolution condemning the action 145 146 Hamas ordered two car bombs in retaliation for the deportation 128 In April 1993 Hamas launched its first suicide attack the Mehola Junction bombing near the Mehola settlement in the West Bank 147 The attacker drove his car between two buses one military and one civilian 148 Only the driver and an Arab worker were killed in the attack 147 The bomb design was flawed but Hamas soon learned how to manufacture more lethal bombs 149 In the first years of the Intifada Hamas violence was restricted to Palestinians collaborators with Israel and people it defined as moral deviants that is drug dealers and prostitutes known to enjoy ties with Israeli criminal networks 150 or for engaging in loose behavior such as seducing women in hairdressing salons with alcohol behavior Hamas considered was encouraged by Israeli agents l Hamas leaders likened their rooting out of collaborators to what the French resistance did with Nazi collaborators in World War II In 1992 alone they executed more than 150 152 In Western media this was reported as typical intercommunal strife among Arabs 150 Hamas s actions in the First Intifada expanded its popularity In 1989 fewer than 3 of the Palestinians in Gaza where Hamas was most popular supported Hamas 124 In the days leading up to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 16 6 of Gazans and 10 of West Bank Palestinians identified politically with Hamas 124 a number that still paled in comparison to Fatah which enjoyed the support of 45 of the Palestinians in the occupied territories 153 Oslo years The Oslo process began in September 1993 when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat signed the Declaration of Principles known as the Oslo I Accord 154 This led to the creation of the Palestinian National Authority PA which was backed by Arafat but strongly opposed by Hamas 155 The PA was staffed mainly by members of Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Organization 155 The peaceful posture adopted by Hamas s rivals created an opportunity to set itself apart as the representative of the resistance movement 156 Hamas first began suicide attacks specifically targeting civilians in response to the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre carried out by the American Israeli settler Baruch Goldstein who on 25 February 1994 during Ramadan killed 29 unarmed civilians by throwing hand grenades and firing at a group of worshippers during prayer at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron 157 158 There was a strong sense that the Israeli military was complicit in the massacre because Goldstein wore military fatigues during his attack and carried an assault rifle issued by the IDF the nearby IDF forces failed to intervene to stop the attack and indeed an additional 19 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces in the riots that ensued in protest of the massacre 158 Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin condemned the massacre but refused to withdraw Jewish settlers from Hebron fearing a violent confrontation with the settler community 128 Hamas announced that if Israel did not discriminate between fighters and civilians then it would be forced to treat the Zionists in the same manner Treating like with like is a universal principle 159 Prior to the Hebron massacre Hamas did not deliberately attack civilian targets 157 But following the massacre it felt that it no longer had to distinguish between military and civilian targets The leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank Sheikh Ahmed Haj Ali later argued that had there not been the 1994 Ibrahimi Mosque massacre there would have been no suicide bombings Al Rantisi in an interview in 1998 stated that the suicide attacks began after the massacre committed by the terrorist Baruch Goldstein and intensified after the assassination of Yahya Ayyash 160 Musa Abu Marzouk put the blame for the escalation on the Israelis We were against targeting civilians After the Hebron massacre we determined that it was time to kill Israel s civilians we offered to stop if Israel would but they rejected that offer 161 According to Matti Steinberg former advisor to Shin Bet and one of Israel s leading experts on Hamas the massacre laid to rest an internal debate within Hamas on the usefulness of indiscriminate violence In the Hamas writings there is an explicit prohibition against indiscriminate harm to helpless people The massacre at the mosque released them from this taboo and introduced a dimension of measure for measure based on citations from the Koran 128 nbsp The aftermath of the 1994 Dizengoff Street bus bombing in Tel AvivOn April 6 a suicide bomber blew up his car at a crowded bus stop in Afula killing eight Israelis and injuring 34 162 158 An additional five Israelis were killed and 30 injured as a Palestinian detonated himself on a bus in Hadera a week later 163 Hamas claimed responsibility for both attacks 163 The attacks may have been timed to disrupt negotiations between Israel and PLO on the implementation of the Oslo I Accord 162 A bomb on a bus in downtown Tel Aviv in October 1994 killed 22 and injured 45 164 In late December 1995 Hamas promised the Palestinian Authority PA to cease military operations But it was not to be as Shin Bet assassinated Ayyash the 29 year old leader of the al Qassam Brigades on January 5 1996 using a booby trapped cellphone given to Ayyash by his uncle who worked as an informer 165 Nearly 100 000 Gazans about 11 of the total population marched in his funeral 165 Hamas resumed its campaign of suicide bombings which had been dormant for a good part of 1995 to retaliate the assassination 166 In September 1997 Israel s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the assassination of Hamas leader Khaled Mashal who lived in Jordan 167 Two Mossad agents entered Jordan on false Canadian passports and sprayed Mashal with a nerve agent on a street in Amman 167 They were caught however and King Hussein threatened to put the agents on trial unless Israel provided Mashal with an antidote and released Yassin 167 Israel obliged and the antidote saved Mashal s life 167 Yassin was returned to Gaza where he was given a hero s welcome with banners calling him the sheikh of the Intifada Yassin s release temporarily boosted Hamas popularity and at a press conference Yassin declared There will be no halt to armed operations until the end of the occupation we are peace seekers We love peace And we call on them the Israelis to maintain peace with us and to help us in order to restore our rights by peace 168 Although the suicide attacks by the al Qassam Brigades and other groups violated the 1993 Oslo accords which Hamas opposed 169 Arafat was reluctant to pursue the attackers and may have had inadequate means to do so 166 While the Palestinians were used to the idea that their young were willing to die for the struggle the idea that they would strap explosives to their bodies and blow themselves up was a new and not well supported development 161 A poll taken in 1996 after the wave of suicide bombings Hamas carried out to retaliate Israel s assassination of Ayyash showed that most 70 opposed the tactic and 59 called for Arafat to take action to prevent further attacks 170 In the political arena Hamas continued to trail far behind its rival Fatah 41 trusted Arafat in 1996 but only 3 trusted Yassin 171 In 1999 Hamas was banned in Jordan reportedly in part at the request of the United States Israel and the Palestinian Authority 172 Jordan s King Abdullah feared the activities of Hamas and its Jordanian allies would jeopardize peace negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel and accused Hamas of engaging in illegitimate activities within Jordan 173 In mid September 1999 authorities arrested Hamas leaders Khaled Mashal and Ibrahim Ghosheh on their return from a visit to Iran and charged them with being members of an illegal organization storing weapons conducting military exercises and using Jordan as a training base 173 174 The Hamas leaders denied the charges 175 Mashal was exiled and eventually settled in Damascus in Syria in 2001 176 As a result of the Syrian civil war he distanced himself from Bashar al Assad s regime in 2012 and moved to Qatar 176 Second Intifada nbsp Yagur Junction bombing was a suicide attack on the Egged 960 bus in 2002 Hamas was responsible for about 40 of the 135 suicide attacks during the Second Intifiada 177 Main article Second Intifada In contrast to the preceding uprising the Al Aqsa or Second Intifada began violently with mass demonstrations and lethal Israeli counter insurgency tactics Prior to the incidents surrounding Ariel Sharon s visit to the Temple Mount September 2000 Palestinian support for violence against Israelis and for Hamas had been gauged to be 52 and 10 respectively By July of the following year after almost a year of savage conflict polling indicated that 86 of Palestinians endorsed violence against Israelis and support for Hamas had risen to 17 178 The al Qassam Brigades were among the many militant groups that launched both military style attacks and suicide bombings against Israeli civilian and military targets in this period In the ensuing years almost 5000 Palestinians and over 1100 Israelis were killed 179 While there was a large number of Palestinian attacks against Israelis the Palestinians most effective form of violence were suicide attacks in the first five years of the intifada a little more than half of all Israeli deaths were victims of suicide attacks Hamas performed about 40 of the 135 suicide attacks during the period 177 Whatever the immediate circumstances triggering the uprising a more general cause writes US political science professor Jeremy Pressman was popular Palestinian discontent that grew during the Oslo peace process because the reality on the ground did not match the expectations created by the peace agreements 180 Hamas would be the beneficiary of this growing discontent in the 2006 Palestinian Authority legislative elections citation needed According to Tristan Dunning Israel has never responded to repeated offers by Hamas over subsequent years for a quid pro quo moratorium on attacks against civilians 181 It has engaged in several tadi a periods of calm and proposed a number of ceasefires 181 In January 2004 Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin prior to his assassination said that the group would end armed resistance against Israel for a 10 year hudna m in exchange for a Palestinian state in the West Bank Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem and that restoring Palestinians historical rights relating to the 1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight would be left for future generations His views were quickly echoed by senior Hamas official Abdel Aziz al Rantissi who added that Hamas envisaged a phased liberation 183 Israel s response was to assassinate Yassin in March in a targeted Israeli air strike and then al Rantisi in a similar air strike in April 184 In 2005 Hamas signed the Palestinian Cairo Declaration which confirms the right of the Palestinian people to resistance in order to end the occupation establish a Palestinian state with full sovereignty with Jerusalem as its capital and the guaranteeing of the right of return of refugees to their homes and property 185 2006 legislative elections nbsp Ismail Haniyeh became the prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority in 2006 Hamas had boycotted the 1996 Palestinian general election and the January 2005 Palestinian presidential election won by Mahmoud Abbas but decided to participate in the 25 January 2006 Palestinian legislative election the first to take place after the death of Yasser Arafat 11 November 2004 The EU figured prominently in the proposal that democratic elections be held in the Palestinian territories 186 In the run up to the polling day the US administration s Condoleezza Rice Israel s Tzipi Livni and British Prime Minister Tony Blair all expressed reservations about allowing Hamas to compete in a democratic process 187 Hamas ran on a platform of clean government a thorough overhaul of the corrupt administrative system and the issue of rampant lawlessness 188 189 The Palestinian Authority PA notoriously accused of corruption chose to run Marwan Barghouti as its leading candidate who was serving five life sentences in Israel The US donated two million dollars to the PA to improve its media image Israel also assisted the PA by allowing Barghouti to be interviewed in prison by Arab television and by permitting 100 000 Palestinians in East Jerusalem to vote 189 Crucially the elections took place shortly after Israel had evacuated its settlements in Gaza 190 The evacuation executed without consulting Fatah gave currency to Hamas view that resistance had compelled Israel to leave Gaza 191 In a statement Hamas portrayed it as a vindication of their strategy of armed resistance Four years of resistance surpassed 10 years of bargaining and Mohammed Deif attributed the Liberation of Gaza to his comrades love of martyrdom 192 Hamas intent on reaching power by political means rather than by violence announced that it would refrain from attacks on Israel if Israel were to cease its offensives against Palestinian towns and villages 193 Its election manifesto dropped the Islamic agenda spoke of sovereignty for the Palestinian territories including Jerusalem an implicit endorsement of the two state solution while making no mention about its claims to all of Palestine It mentioned armed resistance twice and affirmed in article 3 6 that there existed a right to resist the terrorism of occupation 188 A Palestinian Christian figured on its candidate list 194 In the 25 January 2006 Palestinian legislative election Hamas won 74 or 76 seats of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council an absolute majority Fatah only won 43 four seats went to independents supporting Hamas 190 The elections were judged by international observers to have been competitive and genuinely democratic The EU said that they had been run better than elections in some member countries of the EU and promised to maintain its financial support 186 Egypt Saudi Arabia Qatar and the United Arab Emirates urged the US to give Hamas a chance and that it was inadvisable to punish Palestinians for their choice a position also endorsed by the Arab League a month later 195 After these elections the Hamas leader sent a letter to U S President George W Bush declaring among other things that Hamas would accept a state on the 1967 borders including a truce for many years However the Bush administration did not reply 196 Early February 2006 Hamas also offered Israel a ten year truce in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories the West Bank Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem 197 and recognition of Palestinian rights including the right of return 198 But Hamas leader Mashal added that Hamas was not calling for a final end to armed operations against Israel and it would not impede other Palestinian groups from carrying out such operations 199 Also after these elections the Quartet on the Middle East the United States Russia the European Union EU and the United Nations stated that assistance to the Palestinian Authority would only continue if Hamas renounced violence recognized Israel and accepted previous Israeli Palestinian agreements which Hamas refused to do 200 The Quartet then imposed a freeze on all international aid to the Palestinian territories 201 by the time Haniyeh presented his Hamas government in late March the U S led boycott against the PA was in full force 202 As for the part of the EU which in January 2006 had declared see above the Palestinian elections to have been free their abrupt freezing of financial assistance to the Hamas led government following the example set by the US and Canada in late April 2006 clarification needed was a violation of its own core principles regarding free elections The EU instead undertook to channel funds directly to people and projects and pay salaries only to Fatah members employed or otherwise 203 After unsuccessful attempts to form a coalition government with Fatah Hamas on 27 March 2006 then assumed the administration of Gaza on its own 202 and introduced radical changes clarification needed Hamas had inherited a chaotic situation of lawlessness The new economic sanctions imposed by Israel the US and the Quartet since Hamas victory in the elections had further crippled the PA s administrative resources leading to the emergence of numerous mafia style gangs and terror cells modeled after Al Qaeda 204 Writing in Foreign Affairs Daniel Byman later stated After it took over the Gaza Strip Hamas revamped the police and security forces cutting them 50 000 members on paper at least under Fatah to smaller efficient forces of just over 10 000 which then cracked down on crime and gangs No longer did groups openly carry weapons or steal with impunity People paid their taxes and electric bills and in return authorities picked up garbage and put criminals in jail Gaza neglected under Egyptian and then Israeli control and misgoverned by Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat and his successors finally has a real government 205 n Hamas Fatah conflict Main articles Fatah Hamas conflict and Battle of Gaza 2007 nbsp Hamas rally in BethlehemAfter the formation of the Hamas led cabinet on March 20 2006 tensions between Fatah and Hamas militants progressively rose in the Gaza strip as Fatah commanders refused to take orders from the government while the Palestinian Authority initiated a campaign of demonstrations assassinations and abductions against Hamas which led to Hamas responding 207 Israeli intelligence warned Mahmoud Abbas that Hamas had planned to kill him at his office in Gaza According to a Palestinian source close to Abbas Hamas considers President Abbas to be a barrier to its complete control over the Palestinian Authority and decided to kill him In a statement to Al Jazeera Hamas leader Mohammed Nazzal accused Abbas of being party to the besieging and isolation of the Hamas led government 208 On June 9 2006 during an Israeli artillery operation an explosion occurred on a busy Gaza beach killing eight Palestinian civilians 209 210 It was assumed that Israeli shellings were responsible for the killings but Israeli government officials denied this 211 212 Hamas formally withdrew from its 16 month ceasefire on June 10 taking responsibility for the subsequent Qassam rocket attacks launched from Gaza into Israel 213 On June 25 two Israeli soldiers were killed and another Gilad Shalit captured following an incursion by the Izz ad Din al Qassam Brigades Popular Resistance Committees and Army of Islam In response the Israeli military launched Operation Summer Rains three days later to secure the release of the kidnapped soldier 214 215 arresting 64 Hamas officials Among them were 8 Palestinian Authority cabinet ministers and up to 20 members of the Palestinian Legislative Council 215 The arrests along with other events effectively prevented the Hamas dominated legislature from functioning during most of its term 216 217 Shalit was held captive until 2011 when he was released in exchange for 1 027 Palestinian prisoners 218 Since then Hamas has continued building a network of internal and cross border tunnels 219 which are used to store and deploy weapons shield militants and facilitate cross border attacks Destroying the tunnels was a primary objective of Israeli forces in the 2014 Israel Gaza conflict 220 221 In February 2007 Saudi sponsored negotiations led to the Hamas amp Fatah Mecca Agreement to form a unity government signed by Mahmoud Abbas on behalf of Fatah and Khaled Mashal on behalf of Hamas The new government was called on to achieve Palestinian national goals as approved by the Palestine National Council the clauses of the Basic Law and the National Reconciliation Document the Prisoners Document as well as the decisions of the Arab summit 222 In March 2007 the Palestinian Legislative Council established a national unity government with 83 representatives voting in favor and three against Government ministers were sworn in by Mahmoud Abbas the chairman of the Palestinian Authority at a ceremony held simultaneously in Gaza and Ramallah In June that year renewed fighting broke out between Hamas and Fatah 223 In a leaked comment by Major General Yadlin to the American Ambassador Richard H Jones at this point June 12 2007 Yadlin emphasized Hamas s electoral victory and an eventual Fatah withdrawal from Gaza would be advantageous to Israeli interests in that the PLO s relocation to the West Bank would allow Israel to treat the Gaza Strip and Hamas as a hostile country o In the course of the June 2007 Battle of Gaza Hamas exploited the near total collapse of Palestinian Authority forces in Gaza to seize 225 control of Gaza ousting Fatah officials President Mahmoud Abbas then dismissed the Hamas led Palestinian Authority government 226 and outlawed the Hamas militia 227 At least 600 Palestinians died in fighting between Hamas and Fatah 228 Human Rights Watch a US based group accused both sides in the conflict of torture and war crimes 229 Human Rights Watch estimates several hundred Gazans were maimed and tortured in the aftermath of the Gaza War 73 Gazan men accused of collaborating had their arms and legs broken by unidentified perpetrators and 18 Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel who had escaped from Gaza s main prison compound after Israel bombed the facility were executed by Hamas security officials in the first days of the conflict 230 231 Hamas security forces attacked hundreds of Fatah officials who supported Israel Human Rights Watch interviewed one such person There were eight of us sitting there We were all from Fatah Then three masked militants broke in They were dressed in brown camouflage military uniforms they all had guns They pointed their guns at us and cursed us then they began beating us with iron rods including a 10 year old boy whom they hit in the face They said we were collaborators and unfaithful They beat me with iron sticks and gun butts for 15 minutes They were yelling You are happy that Israel is bombing us until people came out of their houses and they withdrew 230 In March 2012 Mahmoud Abbas stated that there were no political differences between Hamas and Fatah as they had reached agreement on a joint political platform and on a truce with Israel Commenting on relations with Hamas Abbas revealed in an interview with Al Jazeera that We agreed that the period of calm would be not only in the Gaza Strip but also in the West Bank adding that We also agreed on a peaceful popular resistance against Israel the establishment of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders and that the peace talks would continue if Israel halted settlement construction and accepted our conditions 232 233 Progress was stalled until an April 2014 agreement to form a compromise unity government with elections to be held in late 2014 234 These elections did not take place and following a new agreement the next Palestinian general election was scheduled to take place by the end of March 2021 but did not happen 235 2008 2009 Gaza War Main article Gaza War 2008 2009 Further information United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict On 24 April 2008 Hamas through Egyptian mediators proposed to Israel a six month truce inside the Gaza Strip thus excluding the West Bank from his proposal Israel on 25 April 2008 rejected the proposal reluctant that such an agreement would strengthen Hamas against their rivals in the Palestinian Territories Fatah based on the West Bank at that time running the Palestinian National Authority and as such currently negotiating peace with Israel Also Israel rejected the proposal because Israel presumed that Hamas would use the truce to prepare for more fighting rather than peace 236 On June 17 2008 Egyptian mediators announced that an informal truce had been agreed to between Hamas and Israel 237 238 Hamas agreed to cease rocket attacks on Israel while Israel agreed to allow limited commercial shipping across its border with Gaza barring any breakdown of the tentative peace deal Hamas also hinted that it would discuss the release of Gilad Shalit 239 Israeli sources state that Hamas also committed itself to enforce the ceasefire on the other Palestinian organizations 240 Even before the truce was agreed to some on the Israeli side were not optimistic about it Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin stating in May 2008 that a ground incursion into Gaza was unavoidable and would more effectively quell arms smuggling and pressure Hamas into relinquishing power 241 nbsp Destroyed building in Rafah January 12 2009While Hamas was careful to maintain the ceasefire the lull was sporadically violated by other groups sometimes in defiance of Hamas 240 242 243 For example on June 24 Islamic Jihad launched rockets at the Israeli town of Sderot Israel called the attack a grave violation of the informal truce and closed its border crossings with Gaza 244 On November 4 2008 Israeli forces in an attempt to stop construction of a tunnel killed six Hamas gunmen in a raid inside the Gaza Strip 245 246 Hamas responded by resuming rocket attacks with a total of 190 rockets in November according to Israel s military 247 248 When the six month truce officially expired on December 19 Hamas launched 50 to more than 70 rockets and mortars into Israel over the next three days though no Israelis were injured 249 250 On December 21 Hamas said it was ready to stop the attacks and renew the truce if Israel stopped its aggression in Gaza and opened up its border crossings 250 251 On December 27 and 28 Israel implemented Operation Cast Lead against Hamas Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said We warned Hamas repeatedly that rejecting the truce would push Israel to aggression against Gaza According to Palestinian officials over 280 people were killed and 600 were injured in the first two days of airstrikes 252 Most were Hamas police and security officers though many civilians also died 252 According to Israel militant training camps rocket manufacturing facilities and weapons warehouses that had been pre identified were hit and later they attacked rocket and mortar squads who fired around 180 rockets and mortars at Israeli communities 253 Chief of Gaza police force Tawfiq Jabber head of the General Security Service Salah Abu Shrakh 254 senior religious authority and security officer Nizar Rayyan 255 and Interior Minister Said Seyam 256 were among those killed during the fighting Although Israel sent out thousands of cell phone messages urging residents of Gaza to leave houses where weapons may be stored in an attempt to minimise civilian casualties 253 some residents complained there was nowhere to go because many neighborhoods had received the same message 253 257 258 Israeli bombs landed close to civilian structures such as schools 259 260 and some alleged that Israel was deliberately targeting Palestinian civilians 261 Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire on January 17 2009 262 Hamas responded the following day by announcing a one week ceasefire to give Israel time to withdraw its forces from the Gaza Strip 263 Israeli Palestinian and third party sources disagreed on the total casualty figures from the Gaza war and the number of Palestinian casualties who were civilians 264 In November 2010 a senior Hamas official acknowledged that up to 300 fighters were killed and In addition to them between 200 and 300 fighters from the Al Qassam Brigades and another 150 security forces were martyred These new numbers reconcile the total with those of the Israeli military which originally had said there were 709 terror operatives killed 265 266 After the Gaza War nbsp 25th anniversary of Hamas celebrated in Gaza December 8 2012On August 16 2009 Hamas leader Khaled Mashal stated that the organization was ready to open dialogue with the Obama administration because its policies were much better than those of former US president George W Bush As long as there s a new language we welcome it but we want to see not only a change of language but also a change of policies on the ground We have said that we are prepared to cooperate with the US or any other international party that would enable the Palestinians to get rid of occupation 267 Despite this an August 30 2009 speech during a visit to Jordan 268 in which Mashal expressed support for the Palestinian right of return was interpreted by David Pollock of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy as a sign that Hamas has now clearly opted out of diplomacy 269 In an interview in May 2010 Mashal said that if a Palestinian state with real sovereignty was established under the conditions he set out on the borders of 1967 with its capital Jerusalem and with the right of return that will be the end of the Palestinian resistance and then the nature of any subsequent ties with Israel would be decided democratically by the Palestinians 270 271 In July 2009 Khaled Mashal Hamas s political bureau chief stated Hamas s willingness to cooperate with a resolution to the Arab Israeli conflict which included a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders provided that Palestinian refugees be given the right to return to Israel and that East Jerusalem be recognized as the new state s capital 272 In 2011 after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War Hamas distanced itself from the Syrian regime and its members began leaving Syria Where once there were hundreds of exiled Palestinian officials and their relatives that number shrunk to a few dozen 273 In 2012 Hamas publicly announced its support for the Syrian opposition 274 This prompted Syrian state TV to issue a withering attack on the Hamas leadership 275 Khaled Mashal said that Hamas had been forced out of Damascus because of its disagreements with the Syrian regime 276 In late October Syrian Army soldiers shot dead two Hamas leaders in Daraa refugee camp 277 On November 5 2012 the Syrian state security forces shut down all Hamas offices in the country 278 In January 2013 another two Hamas members were found dead in Syria s Husseinieh camp Activists said the two had been arrested and executed by state security forces 279 In 2013 it was reported that the military wing of Hamas had begun training units of the Free Syrian Army 280 In 2013 after several intense weeks of indirect three way diplomacy between representatives of Hamas Israel and the Palestinian Authority no agreement was reached 281 Also intra Palestinian reconciliation talks stalled and as a result during Obama s visit to Israel Hamas launched five rocket strikes on Israel 281 In November Isra Almodallal was appointed the first spokeswoman of the group 282 In 2014 in the presence and mediation of the Emir of Qatar in Doha the Fatah leadership headed by Abbas met with the Hamas leadership headed by Khaled Mash al The full minutes of the talks were published in an official Emirati document In essence the message of the Hamas leadership was clear If you in Fatah are convinced that you can get a state from Israel along the 1967 lines through negotiations go for it We will not interfere 283 2014 Gaza War to 2022 Anyone who wants to thwart the establishment of a Palestinian state has to support bolstering Hamas and transferring money to Hamas This is part of our strategy to isolate the Palestinians in Gaza from the Palestinians in the West Bank Benjamin Netanyahu Israeli Prime Minister 2019 284 285 During the 2014 Gaza War Israel launched Operation Protective Edge to counter increased Hamas rocket fire from Gaza The conflict ended with a permanent cease fire after 7 weeks and more than 2 200 dead 64 of the dead were Israeli soldiers 7 were civilians in Israel from rocket attacks and 2 101 were killed in Gaza of which according to UN OCHA at least 1 460 were civilians Israel says 1 000 of the dead were militants Following the conflict Mahmoud Abbas president of the Palestinian Authority accused Hamas of needlessly extending the fighting in the Gaza Strip contributing to the high death toll of running a shadow government in Gaza and of illegally executing scores of Palestinians 286 287 288 Hamas has complained about the slow delivery of reconstruction materials after the conflict and announced that they were diverting these materials from civilian uses to build more infiltration tunnels 289 In 2016 Hamas began security co ordination with Egypt to crack down on Islamic terrorist organizations in Sinai in return for economic aid 290 In early 2017 Hamas established the Supreme Administrative Committee to oversee Gaza s ministries Abbas decried the move as Hamas creating a shadow government and trying to entrench its control in Gaza 291 On 17 September 2017 Hamas announced it was dissolving the committee in response to Egypt s efforts as part of the Fatah Hamas reconciliation process 292 In October 2017 Fatah and Hamas signed yet another reconciliation agreement The partial agreement addresses civil and administrative matters involving Gaza and the West Bank Other contentious issues such as national elections reform of the Palestine Liberation Organization PLO and possible demilitarization of Hamas were to be discussed in the next meeting in November 2017 due to a new step by step approach 293 Between 2018 and 2019 Hamas participated in the Great March of Return along the Gaza border with Israel At least 183 Palestinians were killed 294 In February March 2021 Fatah and Hamas reached agreement to jointly conduct elections for a new Palestinian legislative assembly in accordance with the Oslo Accords Hamas committed to upholding international law transferring control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority and to allowing it to negotiate with Israel to establish a Palestinian state along the 1967 ceasefire lines with East Jerusalem as its capital According to Menachem Klein Israeli Arabist and political scientist at Bar Ilan University Mahmood Abbas subsequently cancelled the elections after capitulating to severe pressure from Israel and the United States 283 In May 2021 after tensions escalated in Sheikh Jarrah and the al Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem Israel and Hamas clashed in Gaza once again After eleven days of fighting at least 243 people were killed in Gaza and 12 in Israel 295 During this conflict Hamas s military wing the Al Aqsa Brigades started planning the operation which would break out on 7 October 2023 283 2023 Israel Hamas war Main article 2023 Israel Hamas war nbsp A blood stained home floor in the aftermath of the Nahal Oz massacre nbsp Civilian casualty in Gaza during the Israel Hamas warOn October 7 2023 Hamas launched an invasion breaching the Gaza Israel barrier For months prior to the attack Hamas had been leading Israeli intelligence to believe that they were not seeking conflict 296 297 Hamas fighters proceeded to massacre hundreds of civilians at a music festival in kibbutz Be eri Kfar Aza and other Israeli villages and take hostages from Southern Israel back to the Gaza Strip In total 1 139 people were killed in Israel making this the deadliest attack by Palestinian militants since the foundation of Israel in 1948 and about 250 more Israelis were taken hostage 298 299 300 301 International human rights groups medical personnel and journalists have chronicled the militants onslaught detailing the killing including the decapitation and burning of women children and the elderly alongside young men and soldiers 302 301 303 304 Senior Hamas official Khaled Mashal said that the group was fully aware of the consequences of attack on Israel stating that Palestinian liberation comes with sacrifices 305 306 The Israeli military responded by imposing a total blockade of the Gaza Strip 307 308 309 followed by an extensive aerial bombardment campaign on Gazan targets Israel then launched an ongoing large scale ground invasion of Gaza with the stated goal of destroying Hamas and controlling Gaza afterwards 310 311 312 Political and religious positionsHamas is widely considered to be the dominant political force within the Palestinian territories 62 313 314 Hamas policy towards a two state solution and towards Israel has evolved Historically Hamas envisioned a Palestinian state on all of the territory that belonged to the British Mandate for Palestine that is from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea 133 However Hamas signed agreements with Fatah in 2005 2007 2011 and 2012 that indicated a tacit acceptance of the 1967 borders and previous accords clarification needed between PLO and Israel 315 In 2006 Hamas signed the Prisoners Document which supported a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders 65 316 317 This document also recognized authority of the President of the Palestinian National Authority to negotiate with Israel 317 On 2 May 2017 in a press conference in Doha Qatar presenting a new charter Khaled Mashal chief of the Hamas Political Bureau declared that though Hamas considered the establishment of a Palestinian state on the basis of June 4 1967 West Bank Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem acceptable Hamas would in that case still not recognise the statehood of Israel and not relinquish their goal of liberating all of Palestine from the Zionist project 70 318 Professor Mohammed Ayoob interpreted the 2017 charter as a de facto acceptance of the preconditions for a two state solution 319 Hamas leaders still occasionally called for the annihilation of Israel in the early 2020s 320 Whether Hamas would recognize Israel is debated Hamas leaders have emphasized they do not recognize Israel 70 but indicate they have a de facto acceptance of its presence 321 Hamas s acceptance of the 1967 borders acknowledges the existence of another entity on the other side 322 Many scholars believe Hamas s acceptance of the 1967 borders implicitly recognizes Israel 323 324 In a 2006 interview Ismail Haniyeh senior political leader of Hamas and at that time Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority said We have no problem with a sovereign Palestinian state over all our lands within the 1967 borders living in calm 325 In May 2010 Khaled Mashal then chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau said that the state of Israel living next to a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967 would be acceptable for Hamas In November 2010 Ismail Haniyeh p also proposed a Palestinian state on 1967 borders though added three further conditions resolution of the issue of refugees the release of Palestinian prisoners and Jerusalem as its capital both Mashal and Haniyeh that year also made reservations as to a referendum in which the Palestinian people should decide whether in such a two state situation those two states should still be merged into one 327 328 In the 1988 charter Hamas declared objectives were to wage an armed struggle against Israel 133 liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation and transform the country into an Islamic state 329 In March 2006 two months after winning an absolute majority in the 2006 Palestinian legislative election Hamas released its legislative program which signaled that Hamas could refer the issue of recognizing Israel to a national referendum The question of recognizing Israel is not the jurisdiction of one faction nor the government but a decision for the Palestinian people In June 2006 Hamas MP Riad Mustafa explained Hamas will never recognize Israel but if a popular Palestinian referendum would endorse a peace agreement including recognition of Israel we would of course accept their verdict 330 A few months later via University of Maryland s Jerome Segal Hamas sent a letter to US President George W Bush stating that they don t mind having a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders and asked for direct negotiations 331 In 2007 Hamas signed the Fatah Hamas Mecca Agreement 332 At the time of signing this agreement Moussa Abu Marzouk Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau said regarding the recognition of Israel I can recognize the presence of Israel as a fait accompli amr waqi or as the French say a de facto recognition but this does not mean that I recognize Israel as a state 333 Marzouk further added that the charter could not be altered because it would look like a compromise not acceptable to the street and risk fracturing the party s unity Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal has stated that the Charter is a piece of history and no longer relevant but cannot be changed for internal reasons Ahmed Yousef senior adviser to Ismail Haniyeh added in 2011 that it reflected the views of the Elders in the face of a relentless occupation The details of its religious and political language had not been examined within the framework of international law and an internal committee review to amend it was shelved out of concern not to offer concessions to Israel as had Fatah on a silver platter 334 While Hamas representatives recognize the problem one official notes that Arafat got very little in return for changing the PLO Charter under the Oslo Accords and that there is agreement that little is gained from a non violent approach 335 Richard Davis says the dismissal by contemporary leaders of its relevance and yet the suspension of a desire to rewrite it reflects the differing constituencies Hamas must address the domestic audience and international relations 334 The charter itself is considered an historical relic 336 In an April 2008 meeting between Hamas leader Khaled Mashal and former US President Jimmy Carter an understanding was reached in which Hamas agreed it would respect the creation of a Palestinian state in the territory seized by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War provided this were ratified by the Palestinian people in a referendum 337 In 2009 in a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki moon Haniyeh repeated his group s support for a two state settlement based on 1967 borders We would never thwart efforts to create an independent Palestinian state with borders from June 4 1967 with Jerusalem as its capital 338 On December 1 2010 Ismail Haniyeh again repeated We accept a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967 with Jerusalem as its capital the release of Palestinian prisoners and the resolution of the issue of refugees and Hamas will respect the results of a referendum regardless of whether it differs with its ideology and principles 339 In November 2011 Hamas leader Khaled Mishal made an agreement with Mahmoud Abbas in Cairo in which he committed to respecting the 1967 borders 340 In February 2012 according to the Palestinian authority Hamas forswore the use of violence Evidence for this was provided by an eruption of violence from Islamic Jihad in March 2012 after an Israeli assassination of a Jihad leader during which Hamas refrained from attacking Israel 341 Israel despite its mantra that because Hamas is sovereign in Gaza it is responsible for what goes on there almost seems to understand wrote Israeli journalists Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel and has not bombed Hamas offices or installations 342 As to the question whether Hamas is capable to enter into a long term non aggression treaty with Israel without being disloyal to their understanding of Islamic law and God s word the Atlantic magazine columnist Jeffrey Goldberg in 2009 stated I tend to think not though I ve noticed over the years a certain plasticity of belief among some Hamas ideologues Also this is the Middle East so anything is possible 343 Co founder Ahmed Yassin of Hamas who died in 2004 was convinced that Israel was endeavouring to destroy Islam and concluded that loyal Muslims had a religious obligation to destroy Israel clarification needed 344 The short term goal of Hamas was to liberate Palestine including modern day Israel from Israeli occupation Some academics argue that the long term aim seeks to establish an Islamic state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea remarkably similar to and perhaps derived from the Zionist notion of the same area under a Jewish majority q 346 347 348 349 350 On 2 November 2023 Ismail Haniyeh stated that if Israel agreed to a ceasefire in the 2023 Israel Hamas war and the opening of humanitarian corridors to bring more aid into Gaza Hamas is ready for political negotiations for a two state solution with Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine 351 Hudna proposals When Hamas won a majority in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative election Ismail Haniyeh the then newly elected Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority sent messages both to US President George W Bush and to Israel s leaders asking to be recognized and offering a long term truce and the establishment of a border on the lines of 1967 No response came 352 Haniyeh s proposal reportedly was a fifty year armistice with Israel if a Palestinian state is created along the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital 353 A Hamas official added that the armistice would renew automatically each time 354 In mid 2006 University of Maryland s Jerome Segal suggested that a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and a truce for many years could be considered Hamas s de facto recognition of Israel 331 Hamas s spokesperson Ahmed Yousef said that a hudna is more than a ceasefire and it obliges parties to use the period to seek a permanent non violent resolution to their differences 182 In November 2008 in a meeting on Gaza Strip soil with 11 European members of parliaments Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh re stated that Hamas was willing to accept a Palestinian state in the territories of 1967 Gaza Strip and West Bank and offered Israel a long term truce if Israel recognized the Palestinians national rights and stated that Israel rejected this proposal 355 A Hamas finance minister around 2018 contended that such a long term ceasefire as understood by Hamas and a two state settlement are the same 74 Mkhaimer Abusada a political scientist at Al Azhar University in September 2009 wrote that Hamas talks of hudna temporary ceasefire not of peace or reconciliation with Israel They believe over time they will be strong enough to liberate all historic Palestine 356 Several more authors have warned around 2020 that if Israel would accept such a proposal a Palestinian state in the territories of 1967 combined with a long term truce Hamas would retain its objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine 77 78 Hamas originally proposed a 10 year truce or hudna to Israel contingent on the creation of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders Sheikh Ahmed Yasin indicated that such truce could be extended for 30 40 or even 100 years but it would never signal a recognition of Israel A Hamas official explained that having an indefinite truce with Israel doesn t contradict Hamas s lack of recognition of Israel comparing it to the Irish Republican Army s willingness to accept a permanent armistice with the United Kingdom without recognizing the UK s sovereignty over Northern Ireland 72 Many scholars maintain that Hamas s goal of establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is an interim solution while its long term goal is a single state in all of mandatory Palestine in which Jews live as citizens 78 Religious policy In the Gaza Strip Main article Islamization of the Gaza Strip The gender ideology outlined in the Hamas charter the importance of women in the religious nationalist project of liberation is asserted as no lesser than that of males Their role was defined primarily as one of manufacturing males and caring for their upbringing and rearing though the charter recognized they could fight for liberation without obtaining their husband s permission and in 2002 their participation in jihad was permitted 357 The doctrinal emphasis on childbearing and rearing as woman s primary duty is not so different from Fatah s view of women in the First Intifada and it also resembles the outlook of Jewish settlers and over time it has been subjected to change 358 359 In 1989 during the First Intifada a small number of Hamas followers 360 campaigned for the wearing of the hijab which is not a part of traditional women s attire in Palestine citation needed for polygamy and also insisted women stay at home and be segregated from men In the course of this campaign women who chose not to wear the hijab were verbally and physically harassed with the result that the hijab was being worn just to avoid problems on the streets 361 The harassment dropped drastically when after 18 months UNLU condemned it 362 though similar campaigns reoccurred Since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 some of its members have attempted to impose Islamic dress or the hijab head covering on women 356 363 The government s Islamic Endowment Ministry has deployed Virtue Committee members to warn citizens of the dangers of immodest dress card playing and dating 364 There are no government laws imposing dress and other moral standards and the Hamas education ministry reversed one effort to impose Islamic dress on students 356 There has also been successful resistance to attempts by local Hamas officials to impose Islamic dress on women 365 Hamas officials deny having any plans to impose Islamic law one legislator stating that What you are seeing are incidents not policy and that Islamic law is the desired standard but we believe in persuasion 364 In 2013 UNRWA canceled its annual marathon in Gaza after Hamas prohibited women from participating in the race 366 In the West Bank In 2005 the human rights organization Freemuse released a report titled Palestine Taliban like attempts to censor music which said that Palestinian musicians feared that harsh religious laws against music and concerts will be imposed since Hamas group scored political gains in the Palestinian Authority local elections of 2005 367 The attempt by Hamas to dictate a cultural code of conduct in the 1980s and early 1990s led to a violent fighting between different Palestinian sectors Hamas members reportedly burned down stores that stocked videos they deemed indecent and destroyed books they described as heretical 368 In 2005 an outdoor music and dance performance in Qalqiliya was suddenly banned by the Hamas led municipality for the reason that such an event would be haram i e forbidden by Islam 369 The municipality also ordered that music no longer be played in the Qalqiliya zoo and mufti Akrameh Sabri issued a religious edict affirming the municipality decision 368 In response the Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish warned that There are Taliban type elements in our society and this is a very dangerous sign 367 368 370 371 The Palestinian columnist Mohammed Abd Al Hamid a resident of Ramallah wrote that this religious coercion could cause the migration of artists and said The religious fanatics in Algeria destroyed every cultural symbol shattered statues and rare works of art and liquidated intellectuals and artists reporters and authors ballet dancers and singers are we going to imitate the Algerian and Afghani examples 368 Erdogan s Turkey as a role model Some Hamas members have stated that the model of Islamic government that Hamas seeks to emulate is that of Turkey under the rule of Recep Tayyip Erdogan The foremost members to distance Hamas from the practices of the Taliban and to publicly support the Erdogan model were Ahmed Yousef and Ghazi Hamad advisers to Prime Minister Hanieh 372 373 Yusuf the Hamas deputy foreign minister reflected this goal in an interview with a Turkish newspaper stating that while foreign public opinion equates Hamas with the Taliban or al Qaeda the analogy is inaccurate Yusuf described the Taliban as opposed to everything including education and women s rights while Hamas wants to establish good relations between the religious and secular elements of society and strives for human rights democracy and an open society 374 According to professor Yezid Sayigh of King s College in London how influential this view is within Hamas is uncertain since both Ahmad Yousef and Ghazi Hamad were dismissed from their posts as advisers to Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Hanieh in October 2007 372 Both have since been appointed to other prominent positions within the Hamas government Khaled al Hroub of the West Bank based and anti Hamas 375 Palestinian daily Al Ayyam added that despite claims by Hamas leaders that it wants to repeat the Turkish model of Islam what is happening on the ground in reality is a replica of the Taliban model of Islam 376 377 1988 Hamas Charter Main article 1988 Hamas charterSee also Calls for the destruction of Israel Hamas published its charter in August 1988 wherein it defined itself as a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood and its desire to establish an Islamic state throughout Palestine 119 The foundational document was according to Khaled Hroub written by a single individual and made public without going through the usual prior consultation process r It was then signed on August 18 1988 It contains both antisemitic passages and characterizations of Israeli society as Nazi like in its cruelty 379 and irredentist claims 380 381 382 It declares all of Palestine a waqf an unalienable religious property consisting of land endowed to Muslims in perpetuity by God 383 s 385 with religious coexistence under Islam s rule 386 The charter rejects a two state solution stating that the conflict cannot be resolved except through jihad 387 388 Article 6 states that the movement s aim is to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety where their lives possessions and rights are concerned 389 390 It adds that when our enemies usurp some Islamic lands jihad becomes a duty binding on all Muslims 391 for which the whole of the land is non negotiable a position likened without the racist sentiments present in the Hamas charter to that in the Likud party platform and in movements such as Gush Emunim For Hamas to concede territory is seen as equivalent to renouncing Islam itself 392 393 346 347 348 349 394 350 The violent language against all Jews in the original Hamas charter is antisemitic and has been characterized by some as genocidal 395 396 397 The charter attributes collective responsibility to Jews not just Israelis for various global issues including both World Wars 398 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies Main article A Document of General Principles and Policies In May 2017 Hamas unveiled a rewritten charter titled A Document of General Principles and Policies in an attempt to moderate its image It maintains the longstanding goal of an Islamist Palestinian state covering all of the area of today s Israel West Bank and Gaza Strip and that the State of Israel is illegal and illegitimate It now states that Hamas is anti Zionist rather than anti Jewish but describes Zionism as part of a conspiratorial global plot as the enemy of all Muslims and a danger to international security and blames the Zionists for the conflation of anti Zionism and antisemitism It rejects the Oslo Accords and affirms Hamas commitment to the use of force It also claims to support democracy although Hamas has not held an election since 2006 19 318 Hamas has described these changes as adaptation within a specific context as opposed to abandonment of its principles 399 OrganizationLeadership and structure nbsp Map of key Hamas leadership nodes 2010Hamas inherited from its predecessor a tripartite structure that consisted in the provision of social services of religious training and military operations under a Shura Council Traditionally it had four distinct functions a a charitable social welfare division dawah b a military division for procuring weapons and undertaking operations al Mujahideen al Filastinun c a security service Jehaz Aman and d a media branch A alam 400 Hamas has both an internal leadership within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and an external leadership split between a Gaza group directed by Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook from his exile first in Damascus and then in Egypt and a Kuwaiti group Kuwaidia under Khaled Mashal 147 The Kuwaiti group of Palestinian exiles began to receive extensive funding from the Gulf States after its leader Mashal broke with Yasser Arafat s decision to side with Saddam Hussein in the Invasion of Kuwait with Mashal insisting that Iraq withdraw 401 On May 6 2017 Hamas Shura Council chose Ismail Haniya to become the new leader to replace Mashal 402 The exact structure of the organization is unclear as it is shrouded in a veil of secrecy in order to conceal operational activities Formally Hamas maintains the wings are separate and independent but this has been questioned It has been argued that its wings are both separate and combined for reasons of internal and external political necessity Communication between the political and military wings of Hamas is made difficult by the thoroughness of Israeli intelligence surveillance and the existence of an extensive base of informants After the assassination of Abdel Aziz al Rantisi the political direction of the militant wing was diminished and field commanders were given wider discretional autonomy over operations 403 Political Bureau Hamas s overarching governing body is the Majlis al Shura Shura Council based on the Qur anic concept of consultation and popular assembly shura which Hamas leaders argue provides for democracy within an Islamic framework 404 As the organization grew more complex and Israeli pressure increased the Shura Council was renamed the General Consultative Council with members elected from local council groups The council elects the 15 member Political Bureau al Maktab al Siyasi 405 that makes decisions for Hamas Representatives come from Gaza the West Bank leaders in exile and Israeli prisons 406 The Political Bureau was based in Damascus until the Syrian Civil War until Hamas s support for the civil opposition to Bashar al Assad led to the office s relocation to Qatar in January 2012 406 407 Finances and funding Hamas like its predecessor the Muslim Brotherhood assumed the administration of Gaza s waqf properties endowments which extend over 10 of all real estate in the Gaza Strip with 2 000 acres of agricultural land held in religious trusts together with numerous shops rentable apartments and public buildings 408 In the first five years of the 1st Intifada the Gaza economy 50 of which depended on external sources of income plummeted by 30 50 as Israel closed its labour market and remittances from the Palestinian expatriates in the Gulf countries dried up following the 1991 1992 Gulf War 409 At the 1993 Philadelphia conference Hamas leaders statements indicated that they read George H W Bush s outline of a New World Order as embodying a tacit aim to destroy Islam and that therefore funding should focus on enhancing the Islamic roots of Palestinian society and promoting jihad which also means zeal for social justice in the occupied territories 410 Hamas became particularly fastidious about maintaining separate resourcing for its respective branches of activity military political and social services 411 It has had a holding company in East Jerusalem Beit al Mal a 20 stake in Al Aqsa International Bank which served as its financial arm the Sunuqrut Global Group and al Ajouli money changing firm 412 By 2011 Hamas s budget calculated to be roughly US 70 million derived even more substantially 85 from foreign rather than internal Palestinian sources 412 Only two Israeli Palestinian sources figure in a list seized in 2004 while the other contributors were donor bodies located in Jordan Qatar Kuwait Saudi Arabia Britain Germany the United States United Arab Emirates Italy and France Much of the money raised comes from sources that direct their assistance to what Hamas describes as its charitable work for Palestinians but investments in support of its ideological position are also relevant with Persian Gulf States and Saudi Arabia prominent in the latter Matthew Levitt claims that Hamas also taps money from corporations criminal organizations and financial networks that support terror 413 It is also alleged that it engages in cigarette and drug smuggling multimedia copyright infringement and credit card fraud 412 The United States Israel and the EU have shut down many charities and organs that channel money to Hamas such as the Holy Land Foundation for Relief 414 Between 1992 and 2001 this group is said to have provided 6 8 million to Palestinian charities of the 57 million collected By 2001 it was alleged to have given Hamas 13 million and was shut down shortly afterwards 415 About half of Hamas s funding came from states in the Persian Gulf down to the mid 2000s Saudi Arabia supplied half of the Hamas budget of 50 million in the early 2000s 416 but under US pressure began to cut its funding by cracking down on Islamic charities and private donor transfers to Hamas in 2004 417 which by 2006 drastically reduced the flow of money from that area Iran and Syria in the aftermath of Hamas s 2006 electoral victory stepped in to fill the shortfall 418 419 Saudi funding negotiated with third parties including Egypt remained supportive of Hamas as a Sunni group but chose to provide more assistance to the PNA the electoral loser when the EU responded to the outcome by suspending its monetary aid 420 During the 1980s Iran began to provide 10 of Hamas s funding which it increased annually until by the 1990s it supplied 30 million 416 It accounted for 22 million over a quarter of Hamas s budget by the late 2000s 417 According to Matthew Levitt Iran preferred direct financing to operative groups rather than charities requiring video proof of attacks 417 421 Much of the Iran funding is said to be channeled through Hezbollah 417 After 2006 Iran s willingness to take over the burden of the shortfall created by the drying up of Saudi funding also reflected the geopolitical tensions between the two since though Shiite Iran was supporting a Sunni group traditionally closely linked with the Saudi kingdom 422 The US imposed sanctions on Iran s Bank Saderat alleging it had funneled hundreds of millions to Hamas 423 The US has expressed concerns that Hamas obtains funds through Palestinian and Lebanese sympathizers of Arab descent in the Foz do Iguacu area of the tri border region of Latin America an area long associated with arms trading drug trafficking contraband the manufacture of counterfeit goods money laundering and currency fraud The State Department adds that confirmatory information of a Hamas operational presence there is lacking 424 After 2009 sanctions on Iran made funding difficult forcing Hamas to rely on religious donations by individuals in the West Bank Qatar and Saudi Arabia Funds amounting to tens of millions of dollars raised in the Gulf states were transferred through the Rafah Border Crossing These were not sufficient to cover the costs of governing the Strip and running the al Qassam Brigades and when tensions arose with Iran over support of President Assad in Syria Iran dropped its financial assistance to the government restricting its funding to the military wing which meant a drop from 150 million in 2012 to 60 million the following year A further drop occurred in 2015 when Hamas expressed its criticisms of Iran s role in the Yemeni Civil War 425 In 2017 the PA government imposed its own sanctions against Gaza including among other things cutting off salaries to thousands of PA employees as well as financial assistance to hundreds of families in the Gaza Strip The PA initially said it would stop paying for the electricity and fuel that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip but after a year partially backtracked 426 The Israeli government has allowed millions of dollars from Qatar to be funneled on a regular basis through Israel to Hamas to replace the millions of dollars the PA had stopped transferring to Hamas Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained that letting the money go through Israel meant that it could not be used for terrorism saying Now that we are supervising we know it s going to humanitarian causes 427 According to U S officials as of 2023 Hamas has an investment portfolio that is worth anywhere from 500 million to US 1 billion including assets in Sudan Turkey Saudi Arabia Algeria and the United Arab Emirates 428 Hamas has denied such allegations 429 Social services wing Hamas developed its social welfare programme by replicating the model established by Egypt s Muslim Brotherhood For Hamas charity and the development of one s community are both prescribed by religion and to be understood as forms of resistance 430 In Islamic tradition dawah lit transl the call to God obliges the faithful to reach out to others by both proselytising and by charitable works and typically the latter centre on the mosques which make use of both waqf endowment resources and charitable donations zakat one of the five pillars of Islam to fund grassroots services such as nurseries schools orphanages soup kitchens women s activities library services and even sporting clubs within a larger context of preaching and political discussions 431 In the 1990s some 85 of its budget was allocated to the provision of social services 432 Hamas has been called perhaps the most significant social services actor in Palestine By 2000 Hamas or its affiliated charities ran roughly 40 of the social institutions in the West Bank and Gaza and with other Islamic charities by 2005 was supporting 120 000 individuals with monthly financial support in Gaza 433 Part of the appeal of these institutions is that they fill a vacuum in the administration by the PLO of the Palestinian territories which had failed to cater to the demand for jobs and broad social services and is widely viewed as corrupt 90 As late as 2005 the budget of Hamas drawing on global charity contributions was mostly tied up in covering running expenses for its social programmes which extended from the supply of housing food and water for the needy to more general functions such as financial aid medical assistance educational development and religious instruction A certain accounting flexibility allowed these funds to cover both charitable causes and military operations permitting transfer from one to the other 434 The dawah infrastructure itself was understood within the Palestinian context as providing the soil from which a militant opposition to the occupation would flower t In this regard it differs from the rival Palestinian Islamic Jihad which lacks any social welfare network and relies on spectacular terrorist attacks to recruit adherents 436 In 2007 through funding from Iran Hamas managed to allocate at a cost of 60 million monthly stipends of 100 for 100 000 workers and a similar sum for 3 000 fishermen laid idle by Israel s imposition of restrictions on fishing offshore plus grants totalling 45 million to detainees and their families 437 Matthew Levitt argues that Hamas grants to people are subject to a rigorous cost benefit analysis of how beneficiaries will support Hamas with those linked to terrorist activities receiving more than others 438 Israel holds the families of suicide bombers accountable and bulldozes their homes whereas the families of Hamas activists who have been killed or wounded during militant operations are given an initial one time grant varying between 500 5 000 together with a 100 monthly allowance Rent assistance is also given to families whose homes have been destroyed by Israeli bombing though families unaffiliated with Hamas are said to receive less 359 439 Until 2007 these activities extended to the West Bank but after a PLO crackdown now continue exclusively in the Gaza Strip 440 After the 2013 Egyptian coup d etat deposed the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohamed Morsi in 2013 Hamas found itself in a financial straitjacket and has since endeavoured to throw the burden of responsibility for public works infrastructure in the Gaza Strip back onto the Palestinian National Authority but without success 441 Military wing Main article Izz ad Din al Qassam Brigades nbsp Weapons found in a mosque during Operation Cast Lead according to the IDFThe Izz ad Din al Qassam Brigades is Hamas s military wing 442 While the number of members is known only to the Brigades leadership Israel estimates the Brigades have a core of several hundred members who receive military style training including training in Iran and in Syria before the Syrian Civil War 135 Additionally the brigades have an estimated 10 000 17 000 operatives 433 443 forming a backup force whenever circumstances call for reinforcements for the Brigade Recruitment training lasts for two years 135 The group s ideology outlines its aim as the liberation of Palestine and the restoration of Palestinian rights under the dispensations set forth in the Qur an and this translates into three policy priorities To evoke the spirit of Jihad Resistance among Palestinians Arabs and Muslims to defend Palestinians and their land against the Zionist occupation and its manifestations to liberate Palestinians and their land that was usurped by the Zionist occupation forces and settlers 444 According to its official stipulations the Izz ad Din al Qassam Brigades military operations are to be restricted to operating only inside Palestine engaging with Israeli soldiers u and in exercising the right of self defense against armed settlers They are to avoid civilian targets to respect the enemy s humanity by refraining from mutilation defacement or excessive killing and to avoid targeting Westerners either in the occupied zones or beyond 445 nbsp Exercise of al Qassam Brigades in Gaza City January 27 2013Down to 2007 the Brigades are estimated to have lost some 800 operatives in conflicts with Israeli forces The leadership has been consistently undermined by targeted assassinations Aside from Yahya Ayyash January 5 1996 it has lost Emad Akel November 24 1993 Salah Shehade July 23 2002 Ibrahim al Makadmeh March 8 2003 Ismail Abu Shanab August 21 2003 Ahmed Yassin March 22 2004 and Abdel Aziz al Rantisi April 17 2004 446 113 The Izz ad Din al Qassam Brigades groups its fighters in 4 5 man cells which in turn are integrated into companies and battalions Unlike the political section which is split between an internal and external structure the Brigades are under a local Palestinian leadership and disobedience with the decisions taken by the political leadership have been relatively rare 447 Although the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades are an integral part of Hamas the exact nature of the relationship is hotly debated They appear to operate at times independently of Hamas exercising a certain autonomy 448 449 450 451 452 Some cells have independent links with the external leadership enabling them to bypass the hierarchical command chain and political leadership in Gaza 453 Ilana Kass and Bard O Neill likening Hamas s relationship with the Brigades to the political party Sinn Fein s relationship to the military arm of the Irish Republican Army quote a senior Hamas official as stating The Izz al Din al Qassam Brigade is a separate armed military wing which has its own leaders who do not take their orders from Hamas and do not tell us of their plans in advance 454 v Gaza forces October 2023 During the 2023 Gaza war the IDF published its intelligence about the Hamas military in the Strip 456 They put the strength of the Qassam Brigades there at the start of the war at 30 000 fighters organised by area in five brigades consisting in total of 24 battalions and c 140 companies 456 Each regional brigade had a number of strongholds and outposts and included specialised arrays for rocket firing anti tank missiles air defenses snipers and engineering 456 Media Al Aqsa TV Main article Al Aqsa TVSee also Shehab News Agency Al Aqsa TV is a television channel founded by Hamas 457 The station began broadcasting in the Gaza Strip on January 9 2006 458 459 less than three weeks before the Palestinian legislative elections It has shown television programs including some children s television which deliver antisemitic messages 460 Hamas has stated that the television station is an independent media institution that often does not express the views of the Palestinian government headed by Ismail Haniyeh or of the Hamas movement and that Hamas does not hold antisemitic views 461 The programming includes ideologically tinged children s shows news talk and religiously inspired entertainment 462 According to the Anti Defamation League the station promotes terrorist activity and incites hatred of Jews and Israelis 459 Al Aqsa TV is headed by Fathi Ahmad Hammad chairman of al Ribat Communications and Artistic Productions a Hamas run company that also produces Hamas s radio station Voice of al Aqsa and its biweekly newspaper The Message 463 Al Fateh magazine This section s factual accuracy is disputed Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page Please help to ensure that disputed statements are reliably sourced October 2023 Learn how and when to remove this template message Main article Al Fateh Al Fateh the conqueror is the Hamas children s magazine published biweekly in London and also posted in an online website It began publication in September 2002 and its 108th issue was released in mid September 2007 The magazine features stories poems riddles and puzzles and states it is for the young builders of the future 464 According to the Anti Defamation League al Fateh promotes violence and antisemitism with praise for and encouragement to become suicide bombers and that it regularly includes photos of children it claims have been detained injured or killed by Israeli police images of children firing slingshots or throwing rocks at Israelis and children holding automatic weapons and firebombs 465 Social media Hamas has traditionally presented itself as a voice of suffering of the Palestinian people According to Time magazine a new social media strategy was employed in the wake of the October 7 attack Hamas asserted itself as the dominant resistance force in the Middle East by recording and broadcasting the brutality of their attacks 466 According to Dr Harel Horev historian and researcher of Palestinian affairs at Tel Aviv University Hamas has used social medi to dehumanize Israelis Jews According to his research Hamas took over the most popular accounts on Palestinian networks in a covert manner that did not reveal its involvement This control gave it the ability to significantly influence the Palestinian discourse online through content that denies the humanity and right to life of Israelis These included posters songs and videos glorifying threats computer games that encourage the murder of Jews training videos for carrying out effective and indiscriminate stabbing and shooting attacks and anti Semitic cartoons as a central means of dehumanizing the Israeli Jew in the Palestinian online discourse 467 468 ViolenceHamas has used both political activities and violence in pursuit of its goals For example while politically engaged in the 2006 Palestinian Territories parliamentary election campaign Hamas stated in its election manifesto that it was prepared to use armed resistance to end the occupation 469 From 2000 to 2004 Hamas was responsible for killing nearly 400 Israelis and wounding more than 2 000 in 425 attacks according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs From 2001 through May 2008 Hamas launched more than 3 000 Qassam rockets and 2 500 mortar attacks into Israel 470 Attacks on civilians nbsp Aftermath of 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings in which 26 people were killedHamas has attacked Israeli civilians Hamas s most deadly suicide bombing was an attack on a Netanya hotel on March 27 2002 in which 30 people were killed and 140 were wounded The attack has also been referred to as the Passover massacre since it took place on the first night of the Jewish festival of Passover at a Seder Hamas has defended suicide attacks as a legitimate aspect of its asymmetric warfare against Israel In 2003 according to Stephen Atkins Hamas resumed suicide bombings in Israel as a retaliatory measure after the failure of peace talks and an Israeli campaign targeting members of the upper echelon of the Hamas leadership w but they are considered as crimes against humanity under international law 472 473 In a 2002 report Human Rights Watch stated that Hamas leaders should be held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the al Qassam Brigades 474 475 476 In May 2006 Israel arrested a top Hamas official Ibrahim Hamed who Israeli security officials alleged was responsible for dozens of suicide bombings and other attacks on Israelis 477 Hamed s trial on those charges has not yet concluded 478 In 2008 Hamas explosives engineer Shihab al Natsheh organized a deadly suicide bombing in Dimona 479 480 Since 2002 militants of al Qassam Brigades and other groups have used homemade Qassam rockets to hit Israeli towns in the Negev such as Sderot Al Qassam Brigades was estimated in 2007 to have launched 22 of the rocket and mortar attacks 481 which killed fifteen people between the years 2000 and 2009 482 The introduction of the Qassam 2 rocket in 2008 enabled Palestinian paramilitary groups to reach from Gaza such Israeli cities such as Ashkelon 483 In 2008 Hamas leader Khaled Mashal offered that Hamas would attack only military targets if the IDF would stop causing the deaths of Palestinian civilians 484 Following a June 19 2008 ceasefire the al Qassam Brigades ended its rocket attacks and arrested Fatah militants in Gaza who had continued sporadic rocket and mortar attacks against Israel The al Qassam Brigades resumed the attacks after the November 4 Israeli incursion into Gaza 240 485 On June 15 2014 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Hamas of involvement in the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers including one who held American citizenship saying This has severe repercussions 486 On July 20 2014 nearly two weeks into Operation Protective Edge Netanyahu in an interview with CNN described Hamas as genocidal terrorists 487 On August 5 2014 Israel announced that Israeli security forces arrested Hussam Kawasme in Shuafat in connection with the murders of the teens 488 During interrogation Kawasme admitted to being the mastermind behind the attack in addition to securing the funding from Hamas 489 Officials have stated that additional people arrested in connection with the murders are still being held but no names have been released 490 On August 20 Saleh al Arouri a Hamas leader then in exile in Turkey claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of the three Israeli teens He delivered an address on behalf of Khaled Mashal at the conference of the International Union of Muslim Scholars in Istanbul a move that might reflect a desire by Hamas to gain leverage 491 In it he said Our goal was to ignite an intifada in the West Bank and Jerusalem as well as within the 1948 borders Your brothers in the Al Qassam Brigades carried out this operation to support their imprisoned brothers who were on a hunger strike The mujahideen captured these settlers in order to have a swap deal 492 better source needed Hamas political leader Khaled Mashal accepted that members of Hamas were responsible stating that he knew nothing of it in advance and that what the leadership knew of the details came from reading Israeli reports 493 Mashal who had headed Hamas s exiled political wing since 2004 has denied being involved in the details of Hamas s military issues but justified the killings as a legitimate action against Israelis on occupied lands 494 nbsp The 2023 Re im music festival massacre has left 364 people dead with many others wounded or taken hostageDuring the 2023 Hamas attack on Israel Hamas infiltrated homes shot civilians en masse and took scores of Israeli civilians and soldiers as hostages into Gaza 60 61 According to Human Rights Watch the deliberate targeting of civilians indiscriminate attacks and taking of civilians as hostages amount to war crimes under international humanitarian law 495 During its October 2023 offensive against Israel Hamas massacred 364 people at the Re im music festival while abucting others 496 497 During the same offensive it also was reported that Hamas had massacred the population of the Kfar Aza kibbutz 498 About 10 percent of the residents of the Be eri kibbutz were killed 499 Hamas militants attacked the Psyduck festival that took place near kibutz Nir Oz killing 17 Israeli partygoers 500 Video footage shows children being deliberately killed during the kibbutz attacks 501 as well as what appears to be an attempt to decapitate a living person using a garden hoe 502 Forensic teams who have examined bodies of victims said many bodies showed signs of torture as well as rape 503 504 505 Testimonies from witnesses to acts of gang rapes committed by Hamas militants were collected by the police 506 Rocket attacks on Israel See also Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups have launched thousands of rockets into Israel since 2001 killing 15 civilians wounding many more and posing an ongoing threat to the nearly 800 000 Israeli civilians who live and work in the weapons range Hamas officials have said that the rockets were aimed only at military targets saying that civilian casualties were the accidental result of the weapons poor quality According to Human Rights Watch statements by Hamas leaders suggest that the purpose of the rocket attacks was indeed to strike civilians and civilian objects From January 2009 following Operation Cast Lead Hamas largely stopped launching rocket attacks on Israel and has on at least two occasions arrested members of other groups who have launched rockets showing that it has the ability to impose the law when it wants 507 In February 2010 Hamas issued a statement regretting any harm that may have befallen Israeli civilians as a result of Palestinian rocket attacks during the Gaza war It maintained that its rocket attacks had been aimed at Israeli military targets but lacked accuracy and hence sometimes hit civilian areas Israel responded that Hamas had boasted repeatedly of targeting and murdering civilians in the media 508 According to one report commenting on the 2014 conflict nearly all the 2 500 3 000 rockets and mortars Hamas has fired at Israel since the start of the war seem to have been aimed at towns including an attack on a kibbutz collective farm close to the Gaza border in which an Israeli child was killed 509 Former Israeli Lt Col Jonathan D Halevi stated that Hamas has expressed pride in aiming long range rockets at strategic targets in Israel including the nuclear reactor in Dimona the chemical plants in Haifa and Ben Gurion Airport which could have caused thousands of Israeli casualties if successful 510 In July 2008 Barack Obama then the Democratic presidential candidate said If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night I m going to do everything in my power to stop that and I would expect Israelis to do the same thing 511 On December 28 2008 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in a statement the United States strongly condemns the repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israel 512 On March 2 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned the attacks 513 On October 7 2023 Hamas claimed responsibility for a barrage of missile attacks originating from the Gaza strip 514 Attempts to derail 2010 peace talks See also 2010 Palestinian militancy campaign In 2010 Hamas who have been actively sidelined from the peace talks by Israel spearheaded a coordinated effort by 13 Palestinian militant groups in attempt to derail the stalled peace talks between Israel and Mahmoud Abbas President of the Palestinian Authority According to the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories Major Gen Eitan Dangot Israel seeks to work with Salam Fayyad to help revive the Palestinian economy and hopes to ease restrictions on the Gaza Strip further while somehow preventing the Islamic militants who rule it from getting credit for any progress According to Dangot Hamas must not be seen as ruling successfully or be allowed to get credit for a policy that would improve the lives of people 515 The campaign consists of attacks against Israelis in which according to a Hamas declaration in early September all options are open 516 517 518 519 The participating groups also include Palestinian Islamic Jihad the Popular Resistance Committees and an unnamed splinter group of Fatah 520 As part of the campaign on August 31 2010 4 Israeli settlers including a pregnant woman were killed by Hamas militants while driving on Route 60 near the settlement Kiryat Arba in the West bank According to witnesses militants opened fire on the moving vehicle but then approached the car and shot the occupants in their seats at close range The attack was described by Israeli sources as one of the worst terrorist acts in years 521 522 523 A senior Hamas official said that Israeli settlers in the West Bank are legitimate targets since they are an army in every sense of the word 524 525 Guerrilla warfare nbsp Hamas anti tank rockets captured by Israel Defense Forces during Operation Protective EdgeHamas has made great use of guerrilla tactics in the Gaza Strip and to a lesser degree the West Bank 526 It has successfully adapted these techniques over the years since its inception According to a 2006 report by rival Fatah party Hamas had smuggled between several hundred and 1 300 tons of advanced rockets along with other weaponry into Gaza 526 Hamas has used IEDs and anti tank rockets against the IDF in Gaza The latter include standard RPG 7 warheads and home made rockets such as the Al Bana Al Batar and Al Yasin The IDF has a difficult if not impossible time trying to find hidden weapons caches in Palestinian areas this is due to the high local support base Hamas enjoys 527 Extrajudicial killings of rivals In addition to killing Israeli civilians and armed forces Hamas has also murdered suspected Palestinian Israel collaborators and Fatah rivals 528 529 According to the Associated Press collaborating with Israel is a crime punishable by death in Gaza 530 Hundreds of Palestinians were executed by both Hamas and Fatah during the First Intifada 531 In the wake of the 2006 Israeli conflict with Gaza Hamas was accused of systematically rounding up torturing and summarily executing Fatah supporters suspected of supplying information to Israel Human Rights Watch estimates several hundred Gazans were maimed and tortured in the aftermath of the conflict Seventy three Gazan men accused of collaborating had their arms and legs broken by unidentified perpetrators and 18 Palestinians accused of helping Israel were executed by Hamas security officials in the first days of the conflict 230 231 532 In November 2012 Hamas s Izzedine al Qassam brigade publicly executed six Gaza residents accused of collaborating with Israel According to the witnesses six alleged informers were shot dead one by one in Gaza City while the corpse of the sixth victim was tied by a cable to the back of a motorcycle and dragged through the streets 533 In 2013 Human Rights Watch issued a statement condemning Hamas for not investigating and giving a proper trial to the six men Their statement was released the day before Hamas issued a deadline for collaborators to turn themselves in or they will be pursued without mercy 534 During the 2014 Israel Gaza conflict Hamas executed at least 23 accused collaborators after three of its commanders were assassinated by Israeli forces with Amnesty International also reporting instances of torture used by Hamas forces 535 536 An Israeli source denied that any of the commanders had been targeted on the basis of human intelligence 537 Frequent killings of unarmed people have also occurred during Hamas Fatah clashes 538 539 NGOs have cited a number of summary executions as particular examples of violations of the rules of warfare including the case of Muhammad Swairki 28 a cook for Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas s presidential guard who was thrown to his death with his hands and legs tied from a 15 story apartment building in Gaza City 540 Hamas security forces reportedly shoot and torture Palestinians who opposed Hamas rule in Gaza 541 In one case a Palestinian had criticized Hamas in a conversation on the street with some friends Later that day more than a dozen armed men with black masks and red kaffiyeh took the man from his home and brought him to a solitary area where they shot him three times in the lower legs and ankles The man told Human Rights Watch that he was not politically active 230 On August 14 2009 Hamas fighters stormed the Mosque of cleric Abdel Latif Moussa 542 The cleric was protected by at least 100 fighters from Jund Ansar Allah Army of the Helpers of God an Islamist group with links to Al Qaeda The resulting battle left at least 13 people dead including Moussa and six Hamas fighters and 120 people injured 543 According to Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas during 2014 Israel Gaza conflict Hamas killed more than 120 Palestinian youths for defying house arrest imposed on them by Hamas in addition to 30 40 Palestinians killed by Hamas in extrajudicial executions after accusing them of being collaborators with Israel 544 Referring to the killing of suspected collaborators a Shin Bet official stated that not even one of those executed by Hamas provided any intelligence to Israel while the Shin Bet officially confirmed that those executed during Operation Protective Edge had all been held in prison in Gaza in the course of the hostilities 537 2011 2013 Sinai insurgency See also Sinai insurgency Hamas has been accused of providing weapons training and fighters for Sinai based insurgent attacks 545 546 although Hamas strongly denies the allegations calling them a smear campaign aiming to harm relations with Egypt 545 According to the Egyptian Army since the ouster of Egypt s Muslim Brotherhood president Mohamed Morsi over 600 Hamas members have entered the Sinai Peninsula through smuggling tunnels 547 In addition several weapons used in Sinai s insurgent attacks are being traced back to Hamas in the Gaza Strip according to the army 547 The four leading insurgent groups in the Sinai have all reportedly maintained close ties with the Gaza Strip 548 Hamas called the accusation a dangerous development 549 Egyptian authorities stated that the 2011 Alexandria bombing was carried out by the Gaza based Army of Islam which has received sanctuary from Hamas and earlier collaborated in the capture of Gilad Shalit 548 550 551 552 Army of Islam members linked to the August 2012 Sinai attack have reportedly sought refuge in the Gaza Strip 548 Egypt stated that Hamas directly provided logistical support to the Muslim Brotherhood militants who carried out the December 2013 Mansoura bombing 553 Terrorist designation nbsp Designated Hamas as a terrorist organization Designated the military wing of Hamas as a terrorist organizationThe United States designated Hamas as a terrorist organisation in 1995 as did Canada in November 2002 554 and the United Kingdom in November 2021 49 The European Union so designated Hamas s military wing in 2001 and under US pressure 555 designated Hamas in 2003 556 Hamas challenged this decision 557 which was upheld by the European Court of Justice in July 2017 558 Japan 559 and New Zealand 560 have designated the military wing of Hamas as a terrorist organization 561 The organization is banned in Jordan 562 Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organization by Afghanistan Algeria Iran 563 Russia 564 Norway x Turkey China 566 Egypt Syria and Brazil 567 568 569 excessive citations Many other states including Russia China Syria Turkey and Iran consider the armed struggle waged by Hamas to be legitimate 570 According to Tobias Buck Hamas is listed as a terrorist organisation by Israel the US and the EU but few dare to treat it that way now and in the Arab and Muslim world it has lost its pariah status and its emissaries are welcomed in capitals of Islamic countries 571 While Hamas is considered a terrorist group by several governments and some academics others regard Hamas as a complex organization with terrorism as only one component 572 573 Country Designated as terrorist org Comments nbsp Australia Yes Australia announced they would designate Hamas as a terrorist organization in its entirety in 2022 Prior to that Hamas s military wing the Izz ad Din al Qassam Brigades were recognized as one but the political branch were not 574 575 576 577 nbsp Brazil No Brazil does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization 567 578 The Brazilian government only classifies organizations as terrorists when the United Nations does so 579 nbsp Canada Yes Under the Anti Terrorism Act the Government of Canada has listed Hamas as a terrorist entity thus establishing it as a terrorist group since 2002 580 581 nbsp China No As of 2006 China does not designate Hamas to be a terrorist organization and acknowledges Hamas to be the legitimately elected political entity in the Gaza Strip that represents the Palestinian people In June 2006 a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated We believe that the Palestinian government is legally elected by the people there and it should be respected 582 583 nbsp Egypt No In March 2014 as part of a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood organization following the July 2013 overthrow of Mohamed Morsi Cairo s Urgent Matters Court outlawed Hamas s activities in Egypt ordered the closure of its offices and to arrest any Hamas member found in the country 584 585 In February 2015 the aforementioned court designated Hamas as a terrorist organization accusing Hamas of carrying terrorist attacks in Egypt through tunnels linking the Sinai Peninsula to the Gaza Strip 586 However in June 2015 Egypt s appeals court overturned the prior ruling that listed Hamas as a terrorist organization 587 and Egypt as of 2023 no longer officially regards Hamas to be a terrorist organization nbsp European Union Yes The EU designated Hamas as a terrorist group from 2003 In December 2014 the General Court of the European Union ordered that Hamas be removed from the register The court stated that the move was technical and was not a reassessment of Hamas s classification as a terrorist group In March 2015 EU decided to keep Hamas on its terrorism blacklist despite a controversial court decision appealing the court s judgment 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 In July 2017 this appeal was upheld by the European Court of Justice 596 597 nbsp India No Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organization by India 598 though individual Indian leaders have condemned certain Hamas attacks as terrorist nbsp Iran No Hamas is not regarded as a terrorist organization by Iran 563 570 nbsp Israel Yes The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs states Hamas maintains a terrorist infrastructure in Gaza and the West Bank and acts to carry out terrorist attacks in the territories and Israel 599 nbsp Japan Yes As of 2005 Japan had frozen the assets of 472 terrorists and terrorist organizations including those of Hamas 600 However in 2006 it publicly acknowledged that Hamas had won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections democratically 601 nbsp Jordan No Hamas was banned in 1999 reportedly in part at the request of the United States Israel and the Palestinian Authority 172 In 2019 Jordanian sources are said to have revealed that the Kingdom refused a request from the General Secretariat of the Arab League in late March to ban Hamas and list it as a terrorist organization 602 better source needed nbsp New Zealand Partial The military wing of Hamas the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades has been listed as a terrorist entity since 2010 603 New Zealand PM Chris Hipkins reiterated in October 2023 that Hamas is recognised by New Zealand as a terrorist organisation 604 nbsp Norway No Norway does not list Hamas as a terrorist organization 605 Norway distanced itself from the European Union in 2006 claiming that its listing was causing problems for its role as a neutral facilitator 565 After Progress Party leader Sylvi Listhaug criticized PM Jonas Gahr Store at the start of the 2023 Israel Hamas war for not calling Hamas a terrorist organization Store said that it was an organization that carried out terrorist acts but he would not change Norway s listing 606 nbsp Paraguay Partial The military wing of Hamas the Izz ad Din al Qassam Brigades is listed as a terrorist organization citation needed nbsp Philippines No Hamas is not considered as a terrorist organization by the Philippines The National Security Council has proposed considering Hamas as a terrorist group as a response to the 2023 Israel Hamas war 607 608 nbsp Qatar No The Qatari government has a designated terrorist list As of 2014 the list contained no names according to The Daily Telegraph 609 In September 2020 Qatar brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas that is reported to include plans to build a power station operated by Qatar the provision of 34 million for humanitarian aid provision of 20 000 COVID 19 testing kits by Qatar to the Health Ministry and a number of initiatives to reduce unemployment in the Gaza Strip 610 nbsp Russia No Russia does not designate Hamas a terrorist organisation and held direct talks with Hamas in 2006 after Hamas won the Palestine elections stating that it did so to press Hamas to reject violence and recognise Israel 611 nbsp Saudi Arabia No Saudi Arabia banned the Muslim Brotherhood in 2014 and branded it a terrorist organization While Hamas is not specifically listed a non official Saudi source stated that the decision also encompasses its branches in other countries including Hamas 612 613 As of January 2020 ties between Saudi Arabia and Hamas remain strained despite attempts at a rapprochement Wesam Afifa director general of Al Aqsa TV is quoted as saying that Saudi Arabia did not sever ties with Hamas and even when Riyadh made public its list of terrorists in 2017 Hamas was not added to the list 614 In 2020 Saudi Arabia arrested 68 Palestinian and Jordanian citizens associated with Hamas in a special terrorism court However in 2022 Saudi Arabia released a number of those detainees in recent months including senior member Mohammad Al Khodary who was set free in October following statements by Hamas leaders expressing their desire for improved relations with the country 615 In 2023 during Ramadan senior members of Hamas including Ismail Haniyeh Mousa Marzook Khalil al Hayya and Khaled Meshaal arrived in Saudi Arabia to mend Hamas s relationship with Saudi Arabia They were spotted performing Umrah in Mecca Saudi Arabia 616 nbsp Switzerland Yes Before the Hamas led attack on Israel Switzerland had not designated Hamas as a terrorist organization and had direct contacts with all major stakeholders in the Israeli Palestinian conflict including Hamas 617 After the Hamas led attack the Swiss government decided to list Hamas as a terrorist organization 618 and stated that it would pass a new law by the end of February 2024 to ban Hamas activities or support for the group 619 nbsp Syria No Syria does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization Syria is among other countries that consider Hamas armed struggle to be legitimate 570 nbsp Turkey No The Turkish government met with Hamas leaders in February 2006 after the organization s victory in the Palestinian elections In 2010 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan described Hamas as resistance fighters who are struggling to defend their land 620 621 nbsp United Kingdom Yes Hamas in its entirety is proscribed as a terrorist group and banned under the Terrorism Act 2000 The government now assess that the approach of distinguishing between the various parts of Hamas is artificial Hamas is a complex but single terrorist organisation 49 nbsp United Nations No The list of United Nations designated terrorist groups does not include Hamas 622 On December 5 2018 the UN rejected a US resolution aimed at unilaterally condemning Hamas for Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel and other violence 623 624 92 625 nbsp United States Yes Lists Hamas as a Foreign Terrorist Organization 626 The State Department decided to add Hamas to its US State Department list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in April 1993 627 As of 2023 update it is still listed 628 CriticismMain articles Criticism of Hamas Use of human shields by Hamas and Allegations of genocide in the 2023 Hamas attack on Israel Aside from its use of political violence in pursuit of its goals Hamas has been widely criticised for a variety of reasons including the use of antisemitic hate speech by its representatives frequent calls for the military destruction of Israel its specific use of human shields and child combatants as part of its military operations its restriction of political freedoms within the Gaza Strip and human rights abuses After starting the 2023 war the European Parliament passed a motion stating the need for Hamas to be eliminated with US President Biden having expressed the same sentiment 629 630 Hamas was accused of having committed genocide against Israelis on 7 October 2023 by 240 legal experts including jurists and academics Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights chaired by former Canadian Justice Minister Irwin Cotler and Genocide Watch 631 632 633 634 635 SupportIsraeli policy towards Hamas Benjamin Netanyahu had been Israel s prime minister for most of the two decades preceding the 2023 Israel Hamas war and was criticized for having championed a policy of empowering Hamas in Gaza 636 637 638 639 This policy was part of a strategy to sabotage a two state solution by confining the Palestinian Authority to the West Bank and weakening it and to demonstrate to the Israeli public and western governments that Israel has no partner for peace 640 641 This criticism was leveled by several Israeli officials including former prime minister Ehud Barak and former head of Shin Bet security services Yuval Diskin 640 Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Authority were also critical of Israel under Netanyahu allowing suitcases of Qatari money to be given to Hamas 640 in exchange for maintaining the ceasefire 636 The Times of Israel reported after the Hamas attack that Netanyahu s policy to treat the Palestinian Authority as a burden and Hamas as an asset had blown up in our faces 636 Public support A poll conducted in 2021 found that 53 of Palestinians believed Hamas was most deserving of representing and leading the Palestinian people while only 14 preferred Abbas s Fatah party 642 At the same time a majority of Gazans saw Hamas as corrupt as well but were frightened to criticize the group 643 Polls conducted in September 2023 found that support for Hamas among Palestinians was around 27 31 644 Public opinions of Hamas deteriorated after it took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 Prior to the takeover 62 of Palestinians had held a favorable view of the group while a third had negative views According to a 2014 Pew Research just prior to the 2014 Israel Gaza conflict only about a third had positive opinions and more than half viewed Hamas negatively Furthermore 68 of Israeli Arabs viewed Hamas negatively 645 In July 2014 65 of Lebanese viewed Hamas negatively In Jordan and Egypt roughly 60 viewed Hamas negatively and in Turkey 80 had a negative view of Hamas In Tunisia 42 had a negative view of Hamas while 56 of Bangladeshis and 44 of Indonesians had a negative opinion of Hamas 645 Hamas popularity surged after the war in July August 2014 with polls reporting that 81 percent of Palestinians felt that Hamas had won that war 646 647 A June 2021 opinion poll found that 46 of respondents in Saudi Arabia supported rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas during the 2021 Israel Palestine crisis 648 A March April 2023 poll found that 60 of Jordanians viewed Hamas firing rockets at Israel at least somewhat positively 649 In November 2023 during Israel s bombing and blockade of the Gaza Strip Hamas s popularity among Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank increased significantly 650 651 Support for Hamas also increased among the people of Jordan 652 According to the poll conducted by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy from November 14 to December 6 2023 40 of Saudi participants expressed a positive view of Hamas 95 of Saudis did not believe that Hamas killed civilians in its attack on Israel and only 16 of Saudis said Hamas should accept a two state solution 653 nbsp Pro Hamas rally in DamascusInternational relationsSee also Foreign relations of Hamas nbsp Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2012After winning the Palestinian elections Hamas leaders made multi national diplomatic tours abroad In April 2006 Mahmoud al Zahar then foreign minister visited Saudi Arabia Syria Kuwait Bahrein Qatar the United Arab Emirates Yemen Libya Algeria Sudan and Egypt 654 He met the Saudi foreign minister Prince Faysal In Syria he held talks on the issue of Palestinians stuck on the Syrian Iraqi border He also stated that he unofficially met officials from Western Europe in Qatar who did not wish to be named 654 In May 2006 Hamas foreign minister visited Indonesia Malaysia the Sultanate of Brunei Pakistan China Sri Lanka and Iran 654 The minister also participated in China Arab States Cooperation Forum 655 Ismail Haniyeh in 2006 visited Egypt Syria Kuwait Iran Lebanon Qatar and Saudi Arabia 656 Hamas has always maintained leadership abroad The movement is deliberately fragmented to ensure that Israel cannot kill its top political and military leaders 657 Hamas used to be strongly allied with both Iran and Syria Iran gave Hamas an estimated 13 15 million in 2011 as well as access to long range missiles Hamas s political bureau was once located in the Syrian capital of Damascus before the start of the Syrian civil war Relations between Hamas Iran and Syria began to turn cold when Hamas refused to back the government of Syrian President Bashar al Assad Instead Hamas backed the Sunni rebels fighting against Assad As a result Iran cut funding to Hamas and Iranian ally Hezbollah ordered Hamas members out of Lebanon 28 Hamas was then forced out of Syria and subsequently has tried to mend fences with Iran and Hezbollah 28 Hamas contacted Jordan and Sudan to see if either would open up its borders to its political bureau but both countries refused although they welcomed many Hamas members leaving Syria 658 From 2012 to 2013 under the short lived leadership of Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi Hamas had the support of Egypt However after Morsi was removed from office his successor Abdul Fattah al Sisi outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and destroyed the tunnels Hamas built into Egypt In 2015 Egypt declared Hamas a terrorist organization But this decision was overturned by Egypt in June of the same year 659 There was a rapprochement between Hamas and Egypt when a Hamas delegation visited Cairo on 12 March 2016 660 Hamas has assisted Egypt in controlling the insurgency in Sinai 660 However Hamas denied Egypt s request to deploy its own militants in the Sinai leading to tensions between the two 660 Egypt has mediated between Hamas and Fatah and sought to unify the two factions In 2017 Yahya Sinwar visited Cairo for 5 weeks and manage to convince Egypt the Rafah crossing clarification needed in return Hamas committed to better relations with Fatah 661 The United Arab Emirates has been hostile to Hamas designating the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and Hamas was at the time viewed as the Brotherhood s Palestinian equivalent 28 Hamas enjoyed close relations with Saudi Arabia in its early years 662 Saudi Arabia funded most of its operations from 2000 to 2004 but reduced its support due to US pressure 663 In 2020 many Hamas members in Saudi Arabia were arrested In 2022 Saudi Arabia began releasing Hamas members from prison In April 2023 Ismail Haniyeh visited Riyadh a sign of improving relations 662 Haniyeh had long sough to visit Saudi Arabia but the Saudis had ignored his request 664 until 2023 Hamas has adopted ideological flexibility in its approach to international relations Even though Hamas is Sunni it has strong relations with Iran the leading Shia power 665 It has established relations with secular states 665 Hamas also has relations with Russia despite Russia s past wars against Muslims 665 North Korea supplies Hamas with weaponry 666 Ali Barakeh a Hamas official living in Lebanon claimed the two are allies 667 668 Hamas leaders reportedly re established relations with Kuwait Libya and Oman all of which reportedly have not had warm relations with Fatah 669 The cool relationship between Fatah and Kuwait owed to Arafat s support for Saddam during the First Gulf War which lead to the Palestinian exodus from Kuwait 1990 91 669 This rapproachment is in part due to Hamas s policy of non interference in the internal affairs of Arab countries 669 Mahmoud Al Zahar stated that Hamas does not play the game of siding with one Arab nation against another e g in the Gulf War 670 When Al Qaradawi and other Sunni ulema called for an uprising against Assad s regime in Syria Mahmoud Al Zahar maintained that taking sides would harm the Palestinian cause 671 clarification needed Qatar and Turkey See also Qatar and state sponsored terrorism Qatari support for Hamas and Turkish support for Hamas According to Middle East experts now Hamas has two firm allies Qatar and Turkey Both give Hamas public and financial assistance estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars 28 Qatar has transferred more than 1 8 billion to Hamas 672 Shashank Joshi senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute says that Qatar also hosts Hamas s political bureau which includes Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal Meshaal also visits Turkey frequently to meet with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan 28 Erdogan has dedicated himself to breaking Hamas out of its political and economic seclusion On US television Erdogan said in 2012 that I don t see Hamas as a terror organization Hamas is a political party 657 Qatar has been called Hamas most important financial backer and foreign ally 673 674 In 2007 Qatar was with Turkey the only country to back Hamas after the group ousted the Palestinian Authority from the Gaza Strip 28 The relationship between Hamas and Qatar strengthened in 2008 and 2009 when Khaled Meshaal was invited to attend the Doha Summit where he was seated next to the then Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani who pledged 250 million to repair the damage caused by Israel in the Israeli war on Gaza 658 These events caused Qatar to become the main player in the Palestinian issue Qatar called Gaza s blockade unjust and immoral which prompted the Hamas government in Gaza including former Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh to thank Qatar for their unconditional support Qatar then began regularly handing out political material humanitarian and charitable support for Hamas 658 nbsp Haniyeh with Turkish Minister of Culture Numan Kurtulmus 20 November 2012In 2012 Qatar s former Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani became the first head of state to visit Gaza under Hamas rule He pledged to raise 400 million for reconstruction 675 Sources say that advocating for Hamas is politically beneficial to Turkey and Qatar because the Palestinian cause draws popular support amongst their citizens at home 676 Speaking in reference to Qatar s support for Hamas during a 2015 visit to Palestine Qatari official Mohammad al Emadi said Qatar is using the money not to help Hamas but rather the Palestinian people as a whole He acknowledges however that giving to the Palestinian people means using Hamas as the local contact Emadi said You have to support them You don t like them don t like them But they control the country you know 677 Some argue that Hamas s relations with Qatar are putting Hamas in an awkward position because Qatar has become part of the regional Arab problem However Hamas claims that having contacts with various Arab countries establishes positive relations which will encourage Arab countries to do their duty toward the Palestinians and support their cause by influencing public opinion in the Arab world 658 In March 2015 Hamas has announced its support of the Saudi Arabian led military intervention in Yemen against the Shia Houthis and forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh 678 In May 2018 Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan tweeted to the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but a resistance movement that defends the Palestinian homeland against an occupying power During that period there were conflicts between Israeli troops and Palestinian protestors in the Gaza Strip due to the decision of the United States to move their embassy to Jerusalem 679 Also in 2018 the Israel Security Agency accused SADAT International Defense Consultancy a Turkish private military company with connections to the Turkish government of transferring funds to Hamas 680 In February 2020 Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh met with Turkish President Erdogan 681 On 26 July 2023 Haniyeh met with Erdogan and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas Behind the meeting was Turkey s effort to reconcile Fatah with Hamas 682 On 7 October 2023 the day of the Hamas attack on Israel Haniyeh was in Istanbul Turkey 683 On 21 October 2023 Haniyeh spoke with Erdogan about the latest developments in the Israel Hamas war and the current situation in Gaza 684 On 25 October 2023 Erdogan said that Hamas was not a terrorist organisation but a liberation group fighting to protect Palestinian lands and people 685 LawsuitsSee also Anti terrorism legislation In the United States The charitable trust Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development was accused in December 2001 of funding Hamas 686 687 688 The US Justice Department filed 200 charges against the foundation The case first ended in a mistrial in which jurors acquitted on some counts and were deadlocked on charges ranging from tax violations to providing material support for terrorists In a retrial on November 24 2008 the five leaders of the Foundation were convicted on 108 counts 689 Several US organizations were either shut down or held liable for financing Hamas in early 2001 groups that have origins from the mid 1990s among them the Holy Land Foundation HLF Islamic Association for Palestine IAP and Kind Hearts The US Treasury Department specially designated the HLF in 2001 for terror ties because from 1995 to 2001 the HLF transferred approximately 12 4 million outside of the United States with the intent to contribute funds goods and services to Hamas According to the Treasury Department Khaled Meshal identified one of HLF s officers Mohammed El Mezain as the Hamas leader for the US In 2003 IAP was found liable for financially supporting Hamas and in 2006 Kind Hearts had their assets frozen for supporting Hamas 690 In 2004 a federal court in the United States found Hamas liable in a civil lawsuit for the 1996 murders of Yaron and Efrat Ungar near Bet Shemesh Israel Hamas was ordered to pay the families of the Ungars 116 million 691 The Palestinian Authority settled the lawsuit in 2011 The settlement terms were not disclosed 692 On August 20 2004 three Palestinians one a naturalized American citizen were charged with a lengthy racketeering conspiracy to provide money for terrorist acts in Israel 693 The indicted included Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook who had left the US in 1997 694 On February 1 2007 two men were acquitted of contravening United States law by supporting Hamas Both men argued that they helped move money for Palestinian causes aimed at helping the Palestinian people and not to promote terrorism 695 In January 2009 a Federal prosecutor accused the Council on American Islamic Relations CAIR of having links to a charity designated as a support network for Hamas 696 The Justice Department identified CAIR as an un indicted co conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation case 697 Later a federal appeals court removed that label for all parties and instead named them joint venturers 698 CAIR was never charged with any crime and it complained that the designation had tarnished its reputation 699 better source needed In Germany A German federal court ruled in 2004 that Hamas was a unified organization whose humanitarian aid work could not be separated from its terrorist and political activities 700 In July 2010 Germany outlawed Frankfurt based International Humanitarian Aid Organization IHH e V saying it had used donations to support Hamas affiliated relief projects in Gaza 701 702 German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere said that while presenting their activities to donors as humanitarian assistance IHH e V had exploited trusting donors willingness to help by using money that was given for a good purpose for supporting what is in the final analysis a terrorist organization 701 702 703 See also nbsp Palestine portal nbsp Islam portal nbsp Politics portalHamastan Politics of Palestine List of political parties in the State of PalestineNotes As with Islamic political organizations elsewhere Hamas offers its followers an ideology that appropriates the universal message of Islam for what is in effect a nationalist struggle 9 Hamas considers Palestine the main front of jihad and viewed the uprising as an Islamic way of fighting the Occupation The organisation s leaders argued that Islam gave the Palestinian people the power to confront Israel and described the Intifada as the return of the masses to Islam Since its inception Hamas has tried to reconcile nationalism and Islam Hamas claims to speak as a nationalist movement but with an Islamic nationalist rather than a secular nationalist agenda 12 Hamas is primarily a religious movement whose nationalist worldview is shaped by its religious ideology 13 officially denied 20 UK h e ˈ m ae s he MASS US h e ˈ m ɑː s he MAHSS 51 Arabic ح م اس romanized Ḥamas IPA ħaˈmaːs 52 حركة المقاومة الإسلامية Ḥarakat al Muqawamah al ʾIslamiyyah A two thirds majority was required for the motion to pass 87 voted in favour 58 against 32 abstained and 16 did not vote 92 It is unclear whether these groups were set up in 1985 or 1986 Abu Amr states the following people attended Dr Abd al Aziz al Rantisi 40 a physician residing in Khan Yunis Dr Ibrahim al Yazuri 45 a pharmacist residing in Gaza city Shaykh Salih Shehada 40 a University instructor from Beit Hanoun Isa al Nashshar 35 an engineer in Rafah Muhammad Sham a 50 a teacher in al Shati refugee camp and Abd al Fattah Dukhan 50 a school principal at al Nusayrat refugee camp 3 In truth the creation of Hamas as a separate entity from the Muslim Brotherhood was done precisely to prevent Israeli authorities from targeting the organizations greater activities in the hopes that it would leave them relatively immune Moreover Hamas was created essentially because the Islamicists connected to the Muslim Brotherhood feared that without their direct participation in the first Intifada they would lose supporters to both the PIJ and the PLO the latter of which was anxious to reassert itself in the Palestinian territories after being marginalized following its expulsion from Lebanon As authors Mishal and Sela explain The Mujamma s decision to adopt a jihad now policy against enemies of Allah through the creation of Hamas was thus largely a matter of survival 115 116 Davis de Burca and Dalacoura write that the Brigades were formed in 1991 130 131 132 Najib amp Friedrich write that they were formed in the summer of 1991 111 O Malley 133 and Hussein 134 write that they were formed in 1992 Islah Jad writes The Arabic word isqat has various literal meanings most pertinently to tumble or fall as into a trap In the Palestinian context it refers specifically to the methods used by the Israelis to manipulate or seduce victims and force them to work against their people s national interests 151 Hamas former spokesman and Deputy Foreign Minister in Gaza Ahmed Yousef explained in a New York Times op ed what this meant juridically A hudna typically cover s 10 years and is recognized in Islamic jurisprudence as a legitimate and binding contract A hudna extends beyond the Western concept of a ceasefire and obliges parties to use the period to seek a permanent non violent resolution to their differences 182 Aside from Hamas stated goal to serve the people this desire for security reform again perhaps is unsurprising given that Hamas was frequently the target of these apparatuses as an opposition movement Hamas security apparatus in the Gaza Strip is presently politicized as well but it has managed to institute the rule of law and order which had eluded the previous Fatah led forces despite the Hamas government employing only a fraction of the resources and personnel Indeed Hamas streamlined the security forces reducing the number of personnel from 56 887 prior to its armed seizure of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 to around 15 000 today In contrast to its West Bank counterparts moreover the Hamas security sector is unambiguously under civilian control in line with Western modes of governance and is thus according to Sayigh more accountable 206 Yadlin commented that if Fatah decided it had lost Gaza there would be calls for Abbas to set up a separate regime in the West Bank While not necessarily reflecting a consensus GOI Government of Israel view Yadlin commented that such a development would please Israel since it would enable the IDF Israel s occupying force to treat Gaza as a hostile country rather than having to deal with Hamas as a non state actor 224 Haniyeh at the time was the Prime Minister of the State of Palestine but dismissed 326 by his President Abbas in 2007 In nutshell the notion of Palestine from the river to the sea is nothing but the boundaries of Eretz Israel as imagined by the first Zionists The notion was enshrined in the founding charter of the ruling Likud party which states that between the Sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty One can thus entertain the chilling irony that Hamas owes its cherished slogan to the Zionists After all what is free Palestine from the river to the sea but a utopian parody of Greater Israel 345 The Charter was written in early 1988 by one individual and was made public without appropriate general Hamas consultation revision or consensus to the regret of Hamas s leaders in later years The author of the Charter was one of the old guard of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip completely cut off from the outside world All kinds of confusions and conflations between Judaism and Zionism found their way into the Charter to the disservice of Hamas ever since as this document has managed to brand it with charges of anti Semitism and a naive world view Hamas leaders and spokespeople have rarely referred to the Charter or quoted from it evidence that it has come to be seen as a burden rather than an intellectual platform that embraces the movement s principles 378 The second major component in Palestine s sanctity according to Hamas is its designation as a waqf by the Caliph Umar b al Khattab When the Muslim armies conquered Palestine in the year 638 the Hamas Charter says the Caliph Umar b al Khattab decided not to divide the conquered land among the victorious soldiers but to establish it as a waqf belonging to the entire Muslim nation until the day of resurrection 384 In a 1995 lecture Sheikh Jamil Hamami a party to the foundation of Hamas and a senior member of its West Bank leadership expounded the importance of Hamas dawa infrastructure as the soil from which militancy would flower 435 Consistent attacks on army units by Hamas activists are as new as the use of anti tank missiles against civilian homes by the Israeli military 409 Matthew Levitt on the other hand claims that Hamas s welfare institutions act as a mere facade or front for the financing of terrorism and dismisses the idea of two wings as a myth 455 He cites Ahmad Yassin stating in 1998 We can not separate the wing from the body If we do so the body will not be able to fly Hamas is one body 102 This ceasefire ended when Israel started targeting Hamas leaders for assassination in July 2003 Hamas retaliated with a suicide bombing in Israel on August 19 2003 that killed 20 people including 6 children Since then Israelis have mounted an assassination campaign against the senior leadership of Hamas that has killed 13 Hamas members including Ismail Abu Shanab one of the most moderate leaders of Hamas After each of these assassinations Hamas has sent a suicide bomber into Israel in retaliation 471 In 2006 Norway explicitly distanced itself from the EU proscription regime claiming that it was causing problems for its role as a neutral facilitator 565 References Abdelal 2016 p 122 Dalloul 2017 a b c d Abu Amr 1993 p 10 Litvak 1998 p 151 Barzak 2011 AFP 2019 National Counterterrorism Center FTOs www dni gov a b c Dalacoura 2012 pp 66 67 Gelvin 2014 p 226 Dunning 2016 p 270 Stepanova 2008 p 113 Cheema 2008 p 465 Litvak 2004 pp 156 57 Misʿal Saʾul Sela Avraham Selaʿ Avraham 2006 The Palestinian Hamas vision violence and coexistence with a new introduction New York Columbia Univ Press ISBN 9780231116756 Retrieved October 20 2023 Tibi B 2015 From Sayyid Qutb to Hamas The Middle East conflict and the islamization of antisemitism U Small Charles A ur The Yale Papers Antisemitism in Comparative Perspective p 459 antisemitism is inherent to a form of Islamist ideology of which the Hamas Charter is not only an expression but also a powerful source Bartal S 2023 Hamas Antisemitism and Social Media Incitement Portugese Journal of Asian Studies 30 p 183 As we saw antisemitism is a major pillar in the ideology of Hamas which perceives and articulates its conflict with Israel in absolutist religious terms Fastenbauer R 2020 Islamic antisemitism Jews in the Qur an Reflections of European antisemitism Political anti Zionism Common codes and differences Confronting Antisemitism from the Perspectives of Christianity Islam and Judaism diedit oleh Armin Lange Kerstin Mayerhofer Dina Porat and Lawrence H Schiffman p 284 Direct calls for use of violence in the text of the Hamas charter also reveal its antisemitic character Litvak 1998 pp 151 52 This strong anti Jewish stance distinguishes Hamas from the PLO organization a b Hoffman Bruce October 10 2023 Understanding Hamas s Genocidal Ideology The Atlantic Retrieved October 11 2023 Hamas in 2017 The document in full Middle East Eye Retrieved November 22 2023 Honig Parnass Tikva Haddad Toufic 2007 10 Expanding Regionally Resisting Locally Between the Lines Haymarket Books p 297 ISBN 978 1931859 44 8 Kingsley Patrick July 26 2013 Egyptian army questions Mohamed Morsi over alleged Hamas terror links The Guardian Retrieved October 18 2023 Adviser to Iran s Khamenei expresses support for Palestinian attacks Report Al Arabiya AFP October 7 2023 via al Arabiya a b Ehl David May 15 2021 What is Hamas and who supports it Deutsche Welle Abdelaziz Khalid Eltahir Nafisa Irish John September 23 2021 Sudan closes door on support for Hamas Reuters Retrieved October 18 2023 a b Qatar Iran Turkey and beyond Hamas s network of allies France 24 October 14 2023 Experts Weigh in on Regional Impact of Syria Hamas Rapprochement VOA News October 20 2022 Retrieved October 8 2023 a b c d e f g h Gidda Mirren July 25 2014 Hamas Still Has Some Friends Left Time Retrieved October 18 2023 Houthis Hamas merge diplomacy around prisoner releases Al Monitor Independent trusted coverage of the Middle East Al Monitor January 5 2021 Hamas awards Shield of Honor to Houthi representative in Yemen sparking outrage in Saudi Arabia JNS org June 16 2021 Fabian Emanuel Officer 2 soldiers killed in clash with terrorists on Lebanon border mortars fired The Times of Israel Archived from the original on October 9 2023 Retrieved October 9 2023 الجبهة الشعبية قرار الإدارة الأمريكية بتوفير الدعم للكيان هدفه تطويق النتائج الاستراتيجية لمعركة طوفان الأقصى alahednews com lb in Arabic Archived from the original on October 9 2023 Retrieved October 8 2023 Qassam Brigades announces control of Erez Crossing Roya News October 7 2023 Archived from the original on October 7 2023 Retrieved October 7 2023 IRAN UPDATE OCTOBER 14 2023 ISW Retrieved October 16 2023 Iran Update October 17 2023 Institute for the Study of War October 17 2023 Y Zelin Aaron 2022 6 External Operations Guidance and Inspiration The Age of Political Jihadism A Study of Hayat Tahrir al Sham Washington DC USA The Washington Institute for Near East Policy pp 61 62 ISBN 978 1 5381 8292 5 Fabian Emanuel October 19 2023 IDF says it killed head of military wing of Gaza s Popular Resistance Committees The Times of Israel Retrieved October 19 2023 Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses importance of providing full protection to citizens ending battle between Hamas Israeli Forces Bahrain Ministry of Foreign Affairs October 9 2023 Archived from the original on October 10 2023 Retrieved October 9 2023 Bahrain denounces Hamas kidnappings www timesofisrael com October 9 2023 Archived from the original on October 10 2023 Retrieved October 9 2023 How the US became Israel s closest ally October 13 2023 What Effect ISIS Declaration Of War Against Hamas Could Have In The Middle East NPR AFP Hamas arrests Salafi sheikh over alleged Islamic State ties Radical cleric Adnan Khader Mayat detained on Sunday by Gaza security forces Times of Israel Retrieved November 9 2023 El gobierno argentino incluira al grupo Hamas en la lista de organizaciones terroristas frente a Cano Entirety of Hamas to be listed as a terrorist organisation ABC News February 17 2022 Currently listed entities December 21 2018 a b Boffey Daniel July 26 2017 EU court upholds Hamas terror listing The Guardian Retrieved October 18 2023 Fighting terrorism Paraguay adds Hamas Hezbollah to terrorism list August 20 2019 a b c Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations GOV UK Foreign Terrorist Organizations Hamas n meanings etymology and more Oxford English Dictionary Taraki Lisa January February 1989 The Islamic Resistance Movement in the Palestinian Uprising Middle East Report No 156 Tacoma WA MERIP pp 30 32 doi 10 2307 3012813 ISSN 0899 2851 JSTOR 3012813 OCLC 615545050 Archived from the original on February 1 2022 Retrieved February 1 2022 Lopez Anthony Ireland Carol Ireland Jane Lewis Michael 2020 The Handbook of Collective Violence Current Developments and Understanding Taylor amp Francis p 239 ISBN 9780429588952 The most successful radical Sunni Islamist group has been Hamas which began as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine in the early 1980s It used terrorist attacks against civilians particularly suicide bombings to help build a larger movement going so far as to emerge as the recognized government of the Gaza Strip in the Palestine Authority Kear 2018 p 22 a b c d e f g Higgins Andrew January 24 2009 How Israel Helped to Spawn Hamas The Wall Street Journal Archived from the original on September 26 2009 Retrieved January 25 2023 When Israel first encountered Islamists in Gaza in the 1970s and 80s they seemed focused on studying the Quran not on confrontation with Israel The Israeli government officially recognized a precursor to Hamas called Mujama Al Islamiya registering the group as a charity It allowed Mujama members to set up an Islamic university and build mosques clubs and schools Crucially Israel often stood aside when the Islamists and their secular left wing Palestinian rivals battled sometimes violently for influence in both Gaza and the West Bank When I look back at the chain of events I think we made a mistake says David Hacham who worked in Gaza in the late 1980s and early 90s as an Arab affairs expert in the Israeli military But at the time nobody thought about the possible results Israeli officials who served in Gaza disagree on how much their own actions may have contributed to the rise of Hamas They blame the group s recent ascent on outsiders primarily Iran This view is shared by the Israeli government Hamas in Gaza was built by Iran as a foundation for power and is backed through funding through training and through the provision of advanced weapons Mr Olmert said last Saturday Hamas has denied receiving military assistance from Iran Charrett 2020 pp 129 37 Madelene Axelsson January 27 2006 Islamistisk politik vinner mark in Swedish Stockholms Fria Tidning Archived from the original on September 27 2007 Retrieved April 10 2006 Davis 2017 pp 67 69 Mukhimer 2012 pp vii 58 a b Debre Isabel October 8 2023 Israeli hostage crisis in Hamas ruled Gaza becomes a political trap for Netanyahu AP News Archived from the original on October 14 2023 Retrieved October 15 2023 a b Gold Hadas Murphy Paul P Salma Abeer Dahman Ibrahim Khadder Kareem Mezzofiore Gianluca Goodwin Allegra October 8 2023 Hamas captures hostages as Israelis share photos of those missing CNN Archived from the original on October 14 2023 Retrieved October 15 2023 a b Byman Daniel Palmer Alexander October 7 2023 What You Need to Know About the Israel Hamas Violence Foreign Policy Archived from the original on October 7 2023 Retrieved October 8 2023 Nakhoul Samia Saul Jonathan October 8 2023 How Israel was duped as Hamas planned devastating assault Reuters Archived from the original on October 9 2023 Retrieved October 9 2023 Seurat 2019 pp 17 19 Indeed since 2006 Hamas has unceasingly highlighted its acceptance of the 1967 borders as well as accords signed by the PLO and Israel This position has been an integral part of reconciliation agreements between Hamas and Fatah since 2005 the Cairo Agreement in 2005 the Prisoners Document in 2006 the Mecca Agreement in 2007 and finally the Cairo and Doha Agreements in 2011 and 2012 a b Baconi 2018 pp 114 116 Prisoners Document enshrined many issues that had already been settled including statehood on the 1967 borders UN Resolution 194 for the right of return and the right to resist within the occupied territories This agreement was in essence a key text that offered a platform for unity between Hamas and Fatah within internationally defined principles animating the Palestinian struggle Roy 2013 p 210 Khaled Meshal as chief of Hamas s Political Bureau in Damascus as well as Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh similarly confirmed the organization s willingness to accept the June 4 1967 borders and a two state solution should Israel withdraw from the occupied territories a reality reaffirmed in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners Document in which most major Palestinian factions had reached a consensus on a two state solution that is a Palestinian state within 1967 borders including East Jerusalem and the refugee right of return Baconi 2018 pp 82 The Cairo Declaration formalized what Hamas s military disposition throughout the Second Intifada had alluded to that the movement s immediate political goals were informed by the desire to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders Sources that believe that Hamas 2017 charter accepted the 1967 borders Bjorn Brenner Gaza Under Hamas I B Tauris p 206 Mohammed Ayoob The Many Faces of Political Islam Second Edition University of Michigan Press p 133 Maria Koinova Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States Oxford University Press p 150 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