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Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

October 21, 2023

Indo–Pakistani War of 1965
Part of the Cold War and Indo–Pakistani wars and conflicts

Geopolitical map of Kashmir provided by the United States CIA, c. 2004
Date5 August – 23 September 1965
(1 month, 2 weeks and 4 days)
Location
Result

Stalemate
(Both nations declared victory)

Territorial
changes		 No territorial changes
Belligerents
 India  Pakistan
Commanders and leaders
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
(President of India)
Lal Bahadur Shastri
(Prime Minister of India)
Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri
(Chief of the Army Staff)
Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh
(GOC-in-C, Western Command)
Lt. Gen. Patrick Dunn
(GOC, I Corps)
Lt. Gen. Joginder Dhillon
(GOC, XI Corps)
Lt. Gen. Kashmir Katoch
(GOC, XV Corps)
AM Arjan Singh
(Chief of the Air Staff)
Vice Adm. Bhaskar Soman
(Chief of the Naval Staff)		 Muhammad Ayub Khan
(President of Pakistan)
Gen. Musa Khan
(Cdr-in-Chief, Army)
Lt. Gen. Bakhtiar Rana
(Commander, I Corps)
Lt. Gen. Attiqur Rahman
(Commander, IV Corps)
Maj. Gen. A. H. Malik
(GOC, 12th Infantry Division)
Maj. Gen. Yahya Khan
(GOC, 7th Infantry Division)
AM Nur Khan
(Cdr-in-Chief, Air Force)
VAdm A. R. Khan
(Cdr-in-Chief, Navy)
RAdm S. M. Ahsan
(Cdr. Eastern Naval Command)
Cdre S. M. Anwar
(OTC, 25th Destroyer Sqn)
Strength

700,000 infantry (whole army)[2]
700+ aircraft[3]
720 tanks[2]

628 Artillery[4]

Effective strength on the West Pakistan Border[5]

  • 9 Infantry divisions (4 under-strength)
  • 3 Armored brigades

260,000 infantry (whole army)[2]
280 aircraft[3]
756 tanks[4]

552 Artillery[4]

  • 72x 105mm How[4]
  • 234x 25pdr[4]
  • 126x 155mm How[4]
  • 48x 8" How[4]
  • 72x 3.7" How[4]
  • AK Lt Btys[4]

Effective strength on the West Pakistan Border[5]

  • 6 Infantry divisions
  • 2 Armored divisions
Casualties and losses

Neutral claims[6][7]

Indian claims

  • 35[11]–59 aircraft lost[12] In addition, Indian sources claim that there were 13 IAF aircraft lost in accidents, and 3 Indian civilian aircraft shot down.[13]
  • 520 km2 (200 mi2) territory lost[14]

Pakistani claims

  • 8,200 men killed or captured[14]
  • 110[15]–113[14] aircraft destroyed
  • 500 tanks captured or destroyed[14]
  • 2602,[16] 2575 km2[14] territory gained

Neutral claims[6]

Pakistani claims

  • 19 aircraft lost[15]

Indian claims

  • 5,259 men killed or captured[14]
  • 43[17] −73 aircraft destroyed[14]
  • 471 tanks destroyed[14]
  • 1,735 km2 (670 mi2) territory gained[14]

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 or the Second India–Pakistan War was an armed conflict between Pakistan and India that took place from August 1965 to September 1965. The conflict began following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar,[18] which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against Indian rule.[19] The seventeen-week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and witnessed the largest engagement of armored vehicles and the largest tank battle since World War II.[20][21] Hostilities between the two countries ended after a ceasefire was declared through UNSC Resolution 211 following a diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.[22] Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the border between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armored units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations.

India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared.[23][24][25][26][27][28][29] Although the two countries fought to a standoff, the conflict is seen as a strategic and political defeat for Pakistan,[30][24][31][32][33][34][35] as it had not succeeded in fomenting insurrection in Kashmir.[36] However, in terms of aerial warfare, the PAF managed an upper hand over the combat zones despite being numerically inferior.[37][38][39][40] India failed to achieve its objective of military deterrence.[41][42]

Internationally, the war was viewed in the context of the greater Cold War, and resulted in a significant geopolitical shift in the subcontinent.[43] Before the war, the United States and the United Kingdom had been major material allies of both India and Pakistan, as their primary suppliers of military hardware and foreign developmental aid. During and after the conflict, both India and Pakistan felt betrayed by the perceived lack of support by the western powers for their respective positions; those feelings of betrayal were increased with the imposition of an American and British embargo on military aid to the opposing sides.[43][44] As a consequence, India and Pakistan openly developed closer relationships with the Soviet Union and China, respectively.[44] The perceived negative stance of the western powers during the conflict, and during the 1971 war, has continued to affect relations between the West and the subcontinent. Despite improved relations with the U.S. and Britain since the end of the Cold War, the conflict generated a deep distrust of both countries within the subcontinent which to an extent lingers until now.[45][46][47]

Background

Since the partition of British India in August 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues. Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. The issue first arose in 1956, which ended with India regaining control over the disputed area.[48] In the 1960s Pakistan received 700 million dollars of military aid from the United States, by signing a defense agreement in 1954, which significantly modernized Pakistan's military equipment.[49][50][51] After the defeat in 1962 Sino-Indian War, the Indian military was undergoing massive changes both in personnel and equipment. During this period, despite being numerically smaller than the Indian Military, Pakistan's armed forces had a qualitative edge in air power and armor over India, which Pakistan sought to utilize before India completed its defense build-up.[51][52]

War

 
A declassified US State Department letter that confirms the existence of hundreds of “infiltrators” in the Indian-administered part of the disputed Kashmir region. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war.
 
Azad Kashmiri Irregular Militiamen, 1965 War
 
Colorized Image of a Pakistani Azad Kashmiri militiaman


Pakistani soldiers began patrolling in territory controlled by India in January 1965, which was followed by attacks by both countries on each other's posts on 8 April 1965.[48][53] Initially involving border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. Pakistan launched Operation Desert Hawk and captured a few Indian posts near the Kanjarkot fort border area.[54] In June 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities. Both countries signed an agreement to settle the disputed border through international arbitration by the International Court of Justice on 30 June 1965.[55][56] A tribunal was set to resolve the dispute, the verdict which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan awarded 780 square kilometres (301 square miles) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 9,100 km2 (3,500 sq mi).[57][58][59][60]

After its success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of Muhammad Ayub Khan, believed the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962[citation needed] in the Sino-Indian War. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule, and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement employing a covert infiltration, code-named Operation Gibraltar.[61] The Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered, however, their presence reported by local Kashmiris,[62] and the operation ended unsuccessfully.

On 5 August 1965, between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on 15 August.[citation needed]

Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Poonch and India had captured the Haji Pir pass, 8 km into Pakistan administered Kashmir.[63]

On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub Khan calculated that “Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place”[64][65][66] although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass.[64]

At 03:30 on 1 September 1965, the entire Chumb area came under massive artillery bombardment. Pakistan had launched operation Grand Slam and India's Army Headquarters was taken surprised.[67] Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theatre of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning points in the war, when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south. In the valley, another area of strategic importance was Kargil. Kargil town was in Indian hands, but Pakistan occupied high ground overlooking Kargil and Srinagar-Leh road. However, after the launch of a massive anti-infiltration operation by the Indian army, the Pakistani infiltrators were forced out of that area in the month of August.[68]

India crossed the International Border on the Western front on 6 September.[69] On 6 September, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Niranjan Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Icchogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was an in fact border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed, and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki (Battle of Burki), just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore.

The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, three Jats, had also crossed the Icchogil canal and captured[70] the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counteroffensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although three Jats suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and store vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of three Jats' capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment[71] to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of the three Jats. Dograi was eventually recaptured by the three Jats on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements, in the Battle of Dograi.[72]

On 8 September 1965, a company of 5 Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at Munabao – a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometers from Jodhpur. Their brief was simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions from overrunning the post at bay. But at Maratha Hill (in Munabao) – as the post has now been christened – the Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours. A company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway station. On 10 September, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed.[73]

On the days following 9 September, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's First Armored Division, labeled the “pride of the Indian Army”, launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani sixth Armored Division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks.[citation needed]

The Pakistanis followed up their success by launching Operation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the first Armored Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar.[citation needed]

The Pakistani First Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the end of 10 September lay disintegrated by the defenses of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar (lit. meaning – “Real Answer”, or more appropriate English equivalent – “Fitting Response”). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton tanks. Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged.

The hostilities in the Rajasthan Front commenced on 8 September. Initially, the Pakistan Desert Force and the Hur militia (followers of Pir Pagaro) were placed in a defensive role, a role for which they were well suited as it turned out. The Hurs were familiar with the terrain and the local area and possessed many essential desert survival skills which their opponents and their comrades in the Pakistan Army did not. Fighting as mainly light infantry, the Hur inflicted many casualties on the Indian forces as they entered Sindh. The Hurs were also employed as skirmishers, harassing the Indians in the Line of Control, a task they often undertook on camels. As the battle wore on, the Hurs and the Desert Force were increasingly used to attack and capture Indian villages inside Rajasthan.[74]

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 1,920 km2 (740 sq mi) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 550 km2 (210 sq mi) of Indian territory.[75] The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors,[76][77] while Pakistani ground gains were primarily in deserts opposite Sindh and in the Chumb sector near Kashmir.[77] Pakistan claims that it held 1,600 km2 (620 sq mi) of Indian territory, while losing 1,200 km2 (450 sq mi) of its territory.[78][79][80][81]

Aerial warfare

Main article: Indo-Pakistani Air War of 1965
Further information: Indian Air Force § Second Kashmir War 1965, and Pakistan Air Force § Indo-Pakistani War of 1965
 
Pakistani Army Position, MG1A3 AA, 1965 War
 
Pakistani Sabre being shot down in combat by an Indian Gnat in September 1965 as seen from the Indian aircraft.

The war saw the aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in combat for the first time since independence. Although the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940s, that engagement was very limited in scale compared to the 1965 conflict.[citation needed]

The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunters, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberra bombers. During the conflict, the PAF claimed it was out-numbered by around 5:1.[82]

The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and Soviet airplanes. However, the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF's.[83][84]

The F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed “Sabre Slayer”.[85] The Gnat is credited by many independent and Indian sources as having shot down seven Pakistani Canadair Sabres[a] in the 1965 war.[86][87] while two Gnats were downed by PAF fighters. The PAF's F-104 Starfighter was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as “the pride of the PAF”. However, according to Sajjad Haider, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being “a high-level interceptor designed to neutralize Soviet strategic bombers at altitudes above 40,000 feet (12.19 km),” rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was “unsuited to the tactical environment of the region”.[88] In combat the Starfighter was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter.[89][90] Yet it zoomed into an ongoing dogfight between Sabres and Gnats, at supersonic speed, successfully broke off the fight and caused the Gnats to egress. An IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur, as he lacked the fuel to return to his base, and was captured by the Pakistan Army. According to the pilot, he got separated from his formation due to a malfunctioning compass and radio.[91][92] This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, Karachi. Sqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated its flight performance, presumed that Gnat was no “Sabre Slayer” when it came to dog fighting.[92] Three Indian civilian aircraft were shot down by PAF, one of which shot down at Bhuj, Gujarat was carrying Balwantrai Mehta, chief minister of the Indian state of Gujarat, total 8 killed in the incident along with Balwantrai Mehta and his wife. The Pakistan Air Force had fought well in countering the much larger Indian Air Force and supported the ground forces.[93]

 
Captured Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF Museum, Karachi.

The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war, and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 59.[94] According to PAF, It flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Star fighters and 20 B-57 Canberra's in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force.[95] Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and China within 10 days of the beginning of the war.[96]

The two air forces were rather equal in the conflict because much of the Indian air force remained farther east to guard against the possibility of China entering the war.[97] According to the independent sources, the PAF lost some 20 aircraft while the Indians lost 60–75.[6][7] Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front-line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 percent. Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out, and it has been estimated that another three weeks' fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and India's losses totaling 15 percent. Air superiority was not achieved, and they were unable to prevent IAF fighter bombers and reconnaissance Canberra's from flying daylight missions over Pakistan. Thus, 1965 was a stalemate in terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority.[97][98] However, according to Kenneth Werrell, the Pakistan Air Force "did well in the conflict and probably had the edge”.[99] When hostilities broke out, the Pakistan Air Force with around 100 F-86s faced an enemy with five times as many combat aircraft; the Indians were also equipped with comparatively modern aircraft inventory. Despite this, Werrell credits the PAF as having the advantage of a “decade's experience with the Sabre” and pilots with long flight hours experience. One Pakistani fighter pilot, MM Alam, was credited with the record of downing five Indian aircraft in less than a minute, becoming the first known flying ace since the Korean War.[99] However, his claims were never confirmed by the PAF and is disputed by Indian sources[100][101][102] and some PAF officials.[103][104][105]

Tank battles

Main articles: Battle of Phillora, Battle of Asal Uttar, Battle of Burki, Lahore Front, and Battle of Chawinda

The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, and better equipment overall.[106] Pakistani armor was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.[107] The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a more significant number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.[108]

At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armored cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Patton, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armored divisions, the 1st and 6th Armored divisions – the latter being in the process of formation.

 
Destroyed Sherman Tank

The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and some M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armored division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armored Division, which consisted of the 17th Horse (The Poona Horse), also called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse (Hodson's Horse), the 16th Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armored Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.

Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armor,[109] Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar;[110][111] they were sometimes employed faultily, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armored Division at Asal Uttar.

After India breached the Madhupur canal on 11 September, the Khem Karan counter-offensive was halted, affecting Pakistan's strategy substantially.[64] Although India's tank formations experienced some results, India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armored Division and supporting units, was brought to halt by the newly raised 6th Armored Division (ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda.[112] compared to 44 of its own[113] But later, Indian official sources confirmed India lost only 29 tanks at Chawinda.[114][115] Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armored formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armored Division at Asal Uttar (Battle of Asal Uttar) or the Indian 1st Armored Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role, such as India's 2nd Armored Brigade at Asal Uttar and Pakistan's 25th Cavalry at Chawinda. The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armor, performed better than the overly complex[need quotation to verify] Patton.[111]

Naval hostilities

Naval operations did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965. On 7 September, a flotilla of the Pakistan Navy commanded by Commodore S.M. Anwar, carried out a bombardment of the Indian Navy's radar station coastal town of Dwarka, which was 320 kilometres (200 mi) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Operation Dwarka, as it is known, is a significant naval operation of the 1965 war[116][117][118] contested as a nuisance raid by some.[119][120] The attack on Dwarka led to questions being asked in India's parliament[121] and subsequent post-war modernization and expansion of the Indian Navy, with an increase in budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 115 crores.[122]

[123] Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.[124]

Covert operations

The Pakistan Army launched numerous covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases.[125] On 7 September 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army General Muhammad Musa, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt turned out to be an “unmitigated disaster”.[125] Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police, or civilians.[citation needed] The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation.[126]

Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles.[127]

India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers.[128] Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory,[126] but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded.[129]

Assessment of losses

India and Pakistan make widely divergent claims about the damage they inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims.

Indian claims[130] Pakistani claims[131] Independent Sources[132]
Casualties    – 3,000 Indian soldiers, 3,800 Pakistani soldiers
Combat flying effort 4,073+ combat sorties 2,279 combat sorties
Aircraft lost 59 IAF (official), 43 PAF.[12] In addition, Indian sources claim that there were 13 IAF aircraft lost in accidents, and 3 Indian civilian aircraft shot down.[13] 19 PAF, 104 IAF 20 PAF, 60–75 IAF[140][141]
Aerial victories 17 + 3 (post-war) 30  –
Tanks destroyed 128 Indian tanks, 152 Pakistani tanks captured, 150 Pakistani tanks destroyed. Officially, 471 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 38 captured[142] 165 Pakistan tanks[dubious – discuss][citation needed]
Land area won 3,900 km2 (1,500 sq mi) of Pakistani territory 650 km2 (250 sq mi) of Indian territory India held 1,840 km2 (710 sq mi) of Pakistani territory and Pakistan held 540 km2 (210 sq mi) of Indian territory

Neutral assessments

There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war. Most of these assessments agree that India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared. Some neutral assessments are mentioned below —

The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by “Hindu India” and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.

  • Former New York Times reporter Arif Jamal wrote in his book Shadow War[10] —

This time, India's victory was nearly total: India accepted a cease-fire only after it had occupied 740 square miles [1,900 km2], though Pakistan had made marginal gains of 210 square miles [540 km2] of territory. Despite the obvious strength of the Indian win, both countries claim to have been victorious.

  • Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book South Asia in world politics[143] –

The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time the United Nations intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.

  • In his book National identity and geopolitical visions,[144] Gertjan Dijkink writes –

The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.

In three weeks, the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced the cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.

  • In his book titled The greater game: India's race with destiny and China, David Van Praagh wrote[9] –

India won the war. It held on to the Vale of Kashmir, the prize Pakistan vainly sought. It gained 1,840 km2 [710 sq mi] of Pakistani territory: 640 km2 [250 sq mi] in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 km2 [180 sq mi] of the Sailkot sector; 380 km2 [150 sq mi] far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 km2 [140 sq mi] on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 km2 [210 sq mi] of Indian territory: 490 km2 [190 sq mi] in the Chhamb sector and 50 km2 [19 sq mi] around Khem Karan.

  • Dennis Kux's India and the United States estranged democracies also provides a summary of the war,[146]

Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the best of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.

  • A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947 by Robert Johnson mentions[147] –

India's strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny the Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in possession of 720 square miles [1,900 km2] of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 square miles [570 km2] of its own.

  • An excerpt from William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment[148] –

A brief, but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by the Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.

  • English historian John Keay's India: A History provides a summary of the 1965 war[149] –

The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert, but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed, and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory, but India had most to celebrate.

  • Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan[150] –

Again, India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position, but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory.

Conflict resumed again in early 1965, when Pakistani and Indian forces clashed over disputed territory along the border between the two nations. Hostilities intensified that August when the Pakistani army attempted to take Kashmir by force. The attempt to seize the state was unsuccessful, and the second India-Pakistan War reached a stalemate.

Ceasefire

On 20 September, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution, which noted that its previous two resolutions went “unheeded” and now demanded an unconditional ceasefire from both nations within 48 hours.[152][153] India immediately accepted,[154][b] while Pakistan accepted it on 23 September, with some notable dramatics.[156]

India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations; India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India.[157] In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire, India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On 10 October, an B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala.[158] A Pakistani Army Auster AOP was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pakistani army captain; on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hawker Hunters.

The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Tashkent Declaration

The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted peace negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Declaration on 10 January 1966,[159] agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than 25 February 1966. In India, the agreement was criticized because it did not contain a no-war pact or any renunciation of guerrilla warfare across Kashmir.

India's Prime Minister, Shastri, suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the Tashkent Agreement on 11 January 1966. As a consequence, the public outcry in India against the peace declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the ruling Indian National Congress.[160]

Public perceptions

The ceasefire was criticized by many Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. The protests led to student riots.[161] Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war – which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India – and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains.[162] Some recent books written by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed Durrani initially titled The Myth of 1965 Victory,[163] reportedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war, but all copies of the book were bought by the Pakistan Army to prevent circulation because the topic was “too sensitive”.[164][165] The book was published with the revised title History of Indo Pak War 1965, published by Services Book Club, a part of the Pakistan military and printed by Oxford University Press, Karachi. A few copies of the book have survived.[166] A version was published in India as Illusion of Victory: A Military History of the Indo-Pak War-1965 by Lexicon Publishers.[167] Recently a new Pakistani impression has been published in 2017.

Intelligence failures

Strategic miscalculations by both India and Pakistan ensured that the war ended in a stalemate.

Indian miscalculations

Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.

The “Official War History – 1965”, drafted by the Ministry of Defense of India in 1992, was a long-suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on 22 September when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up, and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired, and India held twice the number of tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition.

Air Chief Marshal (retd.) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans, drafted by the Ministry of Defense and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the “Supremo Syndrome”, a patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.[130]

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani Army's failures began with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive victory. The Kashmiri people, on the other hand, remained calm and collected. The Indian Army was given enough information to understand Operation Gibraltar and that they were battling not insurgents, as they had initially thought, but Pakistani Army regulars.

 
Telegram from the Embassy of the United States in Karachi: “Continuing propaganda regarding achievements of PAK forces seems to have convinced most that only PAK forbearance saved the Indians from disaster.”

The Pakistani Army didn't know that Indian leaders wanted to attack the southern part of the country to start a new war. Pakistan had to send troops to the southern part of the country to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead of using them to help get to Kashmir.

Pakistan's attempt to capture Ahnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was a failure. Many Pakistani commentators said that the Ayub Khan administration was indecisive during “Operation Grand Slam”. The critics contend that the mission was unsuccessful due to Ayub Khan's awareness of the significance of Akhnoor to India, referring to it as India's 'jugular vein', and his reluctance to invade it and initiate a conflict. Although progress was made in Akhnoor, General Ayub Khan relieved the commanding officer, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, and replaced him with General Yahya Khan. During the replacement, a 24-hour pause was observed, enabling the Indian army to regroup in Akhnoor and successfully repel a sluggish assault led by General Yahya Khan. The Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command said, “The enemy came to our rescue." Then, Akhtar Hussain Malik criticized Ayub Khan for inventing Operation Gibraltar, which ultimately failed, and for denying him command at a crucial point in the conflict. Malik said he would tell the truth about the war and how the army failed, but later decided not to because he was afraid of being banned.[168]

Some authors have said that a war game – that was held in March 1965 at the Institute for Defense Analyses in the United States might have encouraged Pakistan. The exercise concluded that Pakistan would prevail in the event of a conflict with India.[169][170] Other authors like Stephen P. Cohen, have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army had "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military … the 1965 war was a shock."[171]

During the war, the Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF, Nur Khan, later stated that it is the Pakistan Army that should be held accountable for initiating the conflict, rather than India.[172][173] However, propaganda about the war continued in Pakistan,[174][175] with most of the blame being placed on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures. This pattern persisted until the disastrous outcome of the Indo-Pakistani War in 1971.

Involvement of other nations

The United States and the United Kingdom have been the principal suppliers of military matériel to India and Pakistan since 1947. Both India and Pakistan were Commonwealth republics. While India had pursued a policy of nominal non-alignment, Pakistan was a member of both CENTO and SEATO and an ally of the West in its struggle against communism.[176] Well before the conflict began, however, Britain and the United States had suspected Pakistan of joining both alliances out of opportunism to acquire advanced weapons for a war against India. They had therefore limited their military aid to Pakistan to maintain the existing balance of power in the subcontinent.[177] In 1959, however, Pakistan and the United States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation under which the United States agreed to take “appropriate action, including the use of armed forces” to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.[178] By 1965, American and British analysts had recognised the two international groupings, CENTO and SEATO, and Pakistan's continued alliance with the West as being largely meaningless.[179]

Following the start of the 1965 war, both the United States and Britain took the view that the conflict was largely Pakistan's fault, and suspended all arms shipments to both India and Pakistan.[25] While the United States maintained a neutral stance, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, condemned India for aggression after its army advanced towards Lahore; his statement was met with a furious rebuttal from India.[180]

Internationally, the level of support which Pakistan received was limited at best.[181][182][183] Iran and Turkey issued a joint communiqué on 10 September which placed the blame on India, backed the United Nations' appeal for a cease-fire and offered to deploy troops for a UN peacekeeping mission in Kashmir.[184] Pakistan received support from Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in the form of six naval vessels, jet fuel, guns, and ammunition and financial support, respectively.[185] Pakistan didn't gain meaningful support at an international level.[31][181][186][187]

Since before the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and a military opponent of India, with whom it had fought a brief war in 1962. China had also become a foreign patron for Pakistan and had given Pakistan $60 million in development assistance in 1965.[188] During the war, China openly supported the Pakistani position. It took advantage of the conflict to issue a strongly worded ultimatum to India condemning its “aggression” in Tibet and hinting at nuclear retaliation by China (China had exploded its first nuclear device the previous year).[183] Despite strong fears of Chinese intervention on the side of Pakistan, the Chinese government ultimately exercised restraint.[189] This was partly due to the logistical difficulties of a direct Chinese military intervention against India and India's improved military strength after its defeat by China in 1962.[182] China had also received strong warnings by the American and Soviet governments against expanding the scope of the conflict by intervening.[183] In the face of this pressure, China backed down, extending the deadline for India to respond to its ultimatum and warning India against attacking East Pakistan.[187] Ultimately, Pakistan rejected Chinese offers of military aid, recognizing that accepting it would only result in further alienating Pakistan internationally.[183] International opinion considered China's actions to be dangerously reckless and aggressive, and it was soundly rebuked in the world press for its unnecessarily provocative stance during the conflict.[183]

India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members.[190] Support given by Indonesia to Pakistan was seen as a major Indian diplomatic failure, as Indonesia had been among the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement along with India.[191] Despite its close relations with India, the Soviet Union was more neutral than other nations during the war, inviting both nations to peace talks under its aegis in Tashkent.[192]

Aftermath

India

Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was perceived by many as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir.[32] In its October 1965 issue, the Time magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the war[193] —

Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right.

In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a “politico-strategic” victory for India. The Indian prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India.[194]

While the overall performance of the Indian military was praised, military leaders were criticized for their failure to effectively deploy India's superior armed forces to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan.[195] In his book War in the modern world since 1815, noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan “lost heavily” during the 1965 war, India's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates[196] —

India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out of ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable tanks.

In 2015, Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh, the last surviving armed force commander of the conflict, gave his assessment that the war ended in a stalemate, but only due to international pressure for a ceasefire, and that India would have achieved a decisive victory had hostilities continued for a few days more:[197]

For political reasons, Pakistan claims victory in the 1965 war. In my opinion, the war ended in a kind of stalemate. We were in a position of strength. Had the war continued for a few more days, we would have gained a decisive victory. I advised then prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri not to agree to a ceasefire. But I think he was pressured by the United Nations and some countries.

As a consequence, India focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the tri-services of the Indian Armed Forces. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks.

China's repeated threats to intervene in the conflict supporting Pakistan increased pressure on the government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons.[198] Despite repeated assurances, the United States did little to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict, thus irking India.[199] At the same time, the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further strained the relations between the West and India.[200] These developments led to a significant change in India's foreign policy – India, which had previously championed the cause of non-alignment, distanced itself further from Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India.[201] From 1967 to 1977, 81% of India's arms imports were from the Soviet Union.[202] After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far.[203] India's defense budget too would increase gradually after the war, in 1966–1967 it would rise to 17% and by 1970–1971 it would rise to 25% of its revenue.[204] However, according to the World Bank data, India's defense expenditure by GDP decreased from 3.871% in 1965 to 3.141% in 1969, thereafter slightly increased to 3.652% in 1971.[205]

Pakistan

After the war, a significant number of Pakistanis regarded their military performance to be positive. In Pakistan, 6 September is celebrated as Defence Day to remember how Lahore was able to defend itself against the Indian army. The performance of the Pakistani Air Force was particularly praised.

The Pakistani government was accused of spreading misinformation about the consequences of the war among its citizens.[206] In his book Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies, S.M. Burke writes[143] —

After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength.

Air Marshal (retired) Nur Khan, who headed the Pakistan Air Force in 1965, said in an interview with Dawn newspaper[207] —

The army “misled the nation with a big lie” – that India rather than Pakistan provoked the war – and that Pakistan won a “great victory”.

And since the “lie” was never rectified, the Pakistani “army came to believe its fiction, (and) has continued to fight unwanted wars,”

Pakistani commentator Haidar Imtiaz remarked:[208]

The myth of ‘victory’ was created after the war had ended, to counter Indian claims of victory on the one hand and to shield the Ayub regime and the army from criticism on the other.

A book titled Indo-Pakistan War of 1965: A Flashback,[209] produced by the Inter-Services Public Relations of Pakistan, is used as the official history of the war, which omits any mention of the operations Gibraltar and Grand Slam, and begins with the Indian counter-offensive on the Lahore front. The Pakistan Army is claimed to have put up a “valiant defense of the motherland” and forced the attack in its tracks.[208]

Most people agree that the idea of a mobile, hard-hitting Pakistan Army was badly hurt during the war because important breakthroughs were not made.[210] The military's ill-founded belief that their “martial race” of soldiers could defeat “Hindu India” in the conflict was criticized by several Pakistani writers.[211][212] Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wrote[213] –

The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in an intense violent military campaign fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long.

Historian Akbar S Zaidi notes that Pakistan “lost terribly in the 1965 war”.[214]

The Pakistani air force, on the other hand, racked up considerable acclaim and esteem among the military and international warfare critics for its triumphant defense of Lahore and other crucial parts of the country and its hefty retaliation against India the day afterward. The air force's vigilance was also influenced by the fact that some pilots were frantically re-enlisted six times in a single hour when they detected Indian air raids. In Pakistan, the air force and army are honored on Defence Day and Air Force Day. These days are on September 6 and 7, respectively.[215][216]

Furthermore, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the conflict, and, perhaps even more crucial, it had failed to secure Kashmir. Many people consider this outcome to be a setback for Pakistan.[33][34][35]

The faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar was criticized by senior Pakistani officials and military experts, which ultimately led to the conflict. The Tashkent declaration was also criticized in Pakistan, even though few people were aware of the seriousness of the situation at the end of the conflict. Political leaders were also subjected to criticism. Ayub Khan had espoused high expectations among the Pakistani populace regarding the superiority,  if not invincibility,  of its armed forces,[217] in accordance with the guidance of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the foreign minister of Pakistan. Nonetheless, the failure of Pakistan to attain its military objectives during the conflict resulted in a political liability for Ayub.[218] After the defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions, an increasingly vocal opposition challenged the army's invincibility.[219]

The economic contraction in Pakistan was one of the most significant outcomes of the conflict.[220][221] Pakistan had experienced impressive economic growth since the early 1960s, but the war ended that. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defense spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting a tremendous strain on its economy. In 1970-71, the expenditure on defense accounted for a staggering 32%[204] or 55.66% of the total government expenditure.[222] According to veterans of the war, the war greatly cost Pakistan economically, politically, and militarily.[223] Nuclear theorist Feroze Khan maintained that the 1965 war was a last conventional attempt to snatch Kashmir by military force, and Pakistan's own position in the international community, especially with the United States, began to deteriorate from the point the war started, while on the other hand, the alliance with China saw improvements.[223] Chairman joint chiefs General Tariq Majid claims in his memoirs that Zhou Enlai had longed advised the government in the classic style of Sun Tzu: "to go slow, not to push India hard, and avoid a fight over Kashmir, 'for at least, 20–30 years, until you have developed your economy and consolidated your national power'."[223] General Majid maintained in Eating Grass that the "sane, philosophical and political critical thinking" was missing in Pakistan, and that the country had lost extensive human resources by fighting the war.[223]

Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support from the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. The US turned neutral in the war when it cut off military supplies to Pakistan (and India);[citation needed] an action that the Pakistanis took as a sign of betrayal.[224] After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support.

Another negative consequence of the war was growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh),[171] particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir.[225] Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir.[226] In fact, despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector,[227] although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrengthed infantry division (14th Division), sixteen planes and no tanks.[228] Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, an action that ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation War and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

Pakistan celebrates Defence Day every year to commemorate 6 September 1965 to pay tribute to the soldiers killed in the war.[229] However, Pakistani journalists, including Taha Siddiqui[230] and Haseeb Asif[231] have criticized the celebration of Defence Day.

Awards

National awards

Gallantry awards

For bravery, the following soldiers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries, the Indian award Param Vir Chakra and the Pakistani award Nishan-e-Haider:

India
Pakistan

Battle honours

After the war, a total of 16 battle honours and 3 theatre honours were awarded to units of the Indian Army, the notable among which are:[242]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ License-built North American F-86 Sabres with Canadian engines.
  2. ^ India accepted unconditional ceasefire in principle as early as 14 September.[155]

References

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  28. ^ Kux, Dennis (1992). India and the United States : Estranged democracies, 1941–1991. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. p. 238. ISBN 978-0-7881-0279-0. from the original on 17 January 2023. Retrieved 15 November 2015. Quote: India had the best of the war.
  29. ^ "Asia: Silent Guns, Wary Combatants". Time. 1 October 1965. from the original on 7 January 2016. Retrieved 30 August 2013. Quote: India, by contrast, is still the big gainer in the war. Alternate link content.time.com 2 November 2018 at the Wayback Machine
  30. ^ Kux, Dennis (2006). India-Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue?. US Institute of Peace Press. p. 30. ISBN 978-1-929223-87-9. The conflict was short, but nasty. After seventeen days, both sides accepted a UN Security Council call for a cease-fire. Although the two militaries fought to a standoff, India won by not losing.
  31. ^ a b Small, Andrew (2015). The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics. Oxford University Press. p. 17. ISBN 978-0-19-021075-5. "… the war itself was a disaster for Pakistan, from the first failed attempts by Pakistani troops to precipitate an insurgency in Kashmir to the appearance of Indian artillery within range of Lahore International Airport."
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  38. ^ John Andreas Olsen (2018). Routledge Handbook of Air Power. Routledge. Careful analysis available in the public domain tends to list IAF losses as sixty-five aircraft to all causes and PAF losses at twenty-five aircraft….Finally, there was agreement that the losses suffered by the IAF were not commensurate with the value gained in terms of the effect on the adversary and its combat efficiency.
  39. ^ Kaushik Roy (2017). Conventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the present. Routledge. point that the PAF's superior strategy enabled it to win air superiority by 5 September bears serious consideration. The preemptive air strike over the Indian air fields and the subsequent provocation of the IAF to fight over the heavily defended Pakistani airfields did indeed result in heavy attrition of the IAF's aircraft.
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External links

 
Wikiquote has quotations related to Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.
  • Records of the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) (1965–1966) at the United Nations Archives
  • ,(Center for Indian Military History)
  • Mohammed Muhammad Musa (1983). My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965. Wajidalis.
  • United States Library of Congress Country Studies – India
  •  – very detailed roll of events and analysis
  • The India-Pakistan War, 1965: 40 Years On – From Rediff.com
  • Spirit of '65 & the parallels with today – Ayaz Amir

October 21, 2023
indo, pakistani, 1965, indo, pakistani, 1965part, cold, indo, pakistani, wars, conflictsgeopolitical, kashmir, provided, united, states, 2004date5, august, september, 1965, month, weeks, days, locationkashmir, punjab, rajasthan, bengal, resultstalemate, both, . Indo Pakistani War of 1965Part of the Cold War and Indo Pakistani wars and conflictsGeopolitical map of Kashmir provided by the United States CIA c 2004Date5 August 23 September 1965 1 month 2 weeks and 4 days LocationKashmir Punjab Rajasthan Bengal 1 ResultStalemate Both nations declared victory Ceasefire through UNSC Resolution 211 No permanent territorial changes see Tashkent Declaration Return to the status quo ante bellumTerritorialchangesNo territorial changesBelligerents India PakistanCommanders and leadersSarvepalli Radhakrishnan President of India Lal Bahadur Shastri Prime Minister of India Gen J N Chaudhuri Chief of the Army Staff Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh GOC in C Western Command Lt Gen Patrick Dunn GOC I Corps Lt Gen Joginder Dhillon GOC XI Corps Lt Gen Kashmir Katoch GOC XV Corps AM Arjan Singh Chief of the Air Staff Vice Adm Bhaskar Soman Chief of the Naval Staff Muhammad Ayub Khan President of Pakistan Gen Musa Khan Cdr in Chief Army Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana Commander I Corps Lt Gen Attiqur Rahman Commander IV Corps Maj Gen A H Malik GOC 12th Infantry Division Maj Gen Yahya Khan GOC 7th Infantry Division AM Nur Khan Cdr in Chief Air Force VAdm A R Khan Cdr in Chief Navy RAdm S M Ahsan Cdr Eastern Naval Command Cdre S M Anwar OTC 25th Destroyer Sqn Strength700 000 infantry whole army 2 700 aircraft 3 720 tanks 2 186 Centurions 4 346 Shermans 2 90 AMX 13 2 4 90 PT 76 2 628 Artillery 4 66x 3 7 How 4 450x 25pdr 4 96x 5 5 4 16x 7 2 4 Effective strength on the West Pakistan Border 5 9 Infantry divisions 4 under strength 3 Armored brigades260 000 infantry whole army 2 280 aircraft 3 756 tanks 4 352 Pattons 4 308 Shermans 4 96 Chaffees 4 552 Artillery 4 72x 105mm How 4 234x 25pdr 4 126x 155mm How 4 48x 8 How 4 72x 3 7 How 4 AK Lt Btys 4 Effective strength on the West Pakistan Border 5 6 Infantry divisions 2 Armored divisionsCasualties and lossesNeutral claims 6 7 3 000 men 6 150 8 190 tanks 6 60 75 aircraft 6 540 km2 210 mi2 of territory lost primarily in Kashmir 9 10 Indian claims 35 11 59 aircraft lost 12 In addition Indian sources claim that there were 13 IAF aircraft lost in accidents and 3 Indian civilian aircraft shot down 13 520 km2 200 mi2 territory lost 14 Pakistani claims 8 200 men killed or captured 14 110 15 113 14 aircraft destroyed 500 tanks captured or destroyed 14 2602 16 2575 km2 14 territory gainedNeutral claims 6 3 800 men 6 200 6 300 Tanks 8 20 aircraft 6 Over 1 840 km2 710 mi2 of territory lost in Sindh Lahore Sialkot and Kashmir sectors 9 10 Pakistani claims 19 aircraft lost 15 Indian claims 5 259 men killed or captured 14 43 17 73 aircraft destroyed 14 471 tanks destroyed 14 1 735 km2 670 mi2 territory gained 14 The Indo Pakistani War of 1965 or the Second India Pakistan War was an armed conflict between Pakistan and India that took place from August 1965 to September 1965 The conflict began following Pakistan s Operation Gibraltar 18 which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against Indian rule 19 The seventeen week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and witnessed the largest engagement of armored vehicles and the largest tank battle since World War II 20 21 Hostilities between the two countries ended after a ceasefire was declared through UNSC Resolution 211 following a diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration 22 Much of the war was fought by the countries land forces in Kashmir and along the border between India and Pakistan This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of India in 1947 a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001 2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armored units with substantial backing from air forces and naval operations India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Although the two countries fought to a standoff the conflict is seen as a strategic and political defeat for Pakistan 30 24 31 32 33 34 35 as it had not succeeded in fomenting insurrection in Kashmir 36 However in terms of aerial warfare the PAF managed an upper hand over the combat zones despite being numerically inferior 37 38 39 40 India failed to achieve its objective of military deterrence 41 42 Internationally the war was viewed in the context of the greater Cold War and resulted in a significant geopolitical shift in the subcontinent 43 Before the war the United States and the United Kingdom had been major material allies of both India and Pakistan as their primary suppliers of military hardware and foreign developmental aid During and after the conflict both India and Pakistan felt betrayed by the perceived lack of support by the western powers for their respective positions those feelings of betrayal were increased with the imposition of an American and British embargo on military aid to the opposing sides 43 44 As a consequence India and Pakistan openly developed closer relationships with the Soviet Union and China respectively 44 The perceived negative stance of the western powers during the conflict and during the 1971 war has continued to affect relations between the West and the subcontinent Despite improved relations with the U S and Britain since the end of the Cold War the conflict generated a deep distrust of both countries within the subcontinent which to an extent lingers until now 45 46 47 Contents 1 Background 2 War 2 1 Aerial warfare 2 2 Tank battles 2 3 Naval hostilities 2 4 Covert operations 3 Assessment of losses 3 1 Neutral assessments 4 Ceasefire 4 1 Tashkent Declaration 4 2 Public perceptions 5 Intelligence failures 5 1 Indian miscalculations 5 2 Pakistani miscalculations 6 Involvement of other nations 7 Aftermath 7 1 India 7 2 Pakistan 8 Awards 8 1 National awards 8 2 Gallantry awards 8 3 Battle honours 9 See also 10 Notes 11 References 12 Bibliography 13 External linksBackgroundSince the partition of British India in August 1947 Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations other border disputes existed most notably over the Rann of Kutch a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat The issue first arose in 1956 which ended with India regaining control over the disputed area 48 In the 1960s Pakistan received 700 million dollars of military aid from the United States by signing a defense agreement in 1954 which significantly modernized Pakistan s military equipment 49 50 51 After the defeat in 1962 Sino Indian War the Indian military was undergoing massive changes both in personnel and equipment During this period despite being numerically smaller than the Indian Military Pakistan s armed forces had a qualitative edge in air power and armor over India which Pakistan sought to utilize before India completed its defense build up 51 52 War nbsp A declassified US State Department letter that confirms the existence of hundreds of infiltrators in the Indian administered part of the disputed Kashmir region Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war nbsp Azad Kashmiri Irregular Militiamen 1965 War nbsp Colorized Image of a Pakistani Azad Kashmiri militiamanPakistani soldiers began patrolling in territory controlled by India in January 1965 which was followed by attacks by both countries on each other s posts on 8 April 1965 48 53 Initially involving border police from both nations the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries armed forces Pakistan launched Operation Desert Hawk and captured a few Indian posts near the Kanjarkot fort border area 54 In June 1965 British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities Both countries signed an agreement to settle the disputed border through international arbitration by the International Court of Justice on 30 June 1965 55 56 A tribunal was set to resolve the dispute the verdict which came later in 1968 saw Pakistan awarded 780 square kilometres 301 square miles of the Rann of Kutch as against its original claim of 9 100 km2 3 500 sq mi 57 58 59 60 After its success in the Rann of Kutch Pakistan under the leadership of Muhammad Ayub Khan believed the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962 citation needed in the Sino Indian War Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement employing a covert infiltration code named Operation Gibraltar 61 The Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered however their presence reported by local Kashmiris 62 and the operation ended unsuccessfully On 5 August 1965 between 26 000 and 33 000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir Indian forces tipped off by the local populace crossed the cease fire line on 15 August citation needed Initially the Indian Army met with considerable success capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage By the end of August however both sides had relative progress Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal Uri and Poonch and India had captured the Haji Pir pass 8 km into Pakistan administered Kashmir 63 On 1 September 1965 Pakistan launched a counterattack called Operation Grand Slam with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops Ayub Khan calculated that Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place 64 65 66 although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass 64 At 03 30 on 1 September 1965 the entire Chumb area came under massive artillery bombardment Pakistan had launched operation Grand Slam and India s Army Headquarters was taken surprised 67 Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks Pakistan made gains against Indian forces who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack The next day Pakistan retaliated its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab India s decision to open up the theatre of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab Operation Grand Slam therefore failed as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor it became one of the turning points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south In the valley another area of strategic importance was Kargil Kargil town was in Indian hands but Pakistan occupied high ground overlooking Kargil and Srinagar Leh road However after the launch of a massive anti infiltration operation by the Indian army the Pakistani infiltrators were forced out of that area in the month of August 68 India crossed the International Border on the Western front on 6 September 69 On 6 September the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army under World War II veteran Major General Niranjan Prasad battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Icchogil Canal BRB Canal which was an in fact border of India and Pakistan The General s entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle A second this time successful attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki Battle of Burki just east of Lahore These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport As a result the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade they quickly advanced across the border reaching the Ichhogil BRB Canal by 6 September The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment three Jats had also crossed the Icchogil canal and captured 70 the town of Batapore Jallo Mur to Pakistan on the west side of the canal The same day a counteroffensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point Although three Jats suffered minimal casualties the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and store vehicles the higher commanders had no information of three Jats capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal Dial This move brought extreme disappointment 71 to Lt Col Desmond Hayde CO of the three Jats Dograi was eventually recaptured by the three Jats on 21 September for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements in the Battle of Dograi 72 On 8 September 1965 a company of 5 Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary RAC post at Munabao a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometers from Jodhpur Their brief was simple To hold the post and to keep Pakistan s infantry battalions from overrunning the post at bay But at Maratha Hill in Munabao as the post has now been christened the Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours A company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach The Pakistani Air Force had strafed the entire area and also hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway station On 10 September Munabao fell into Pakistani hands and efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed 73 On the days following 9 September both nations premiere formations were routed in unequal battles India s First Armored Division labeled the pride of the Indian Army launched an offensive towards Sialkot The Division divided itself into two prongs was forced back by the Pakistani sixth Armored Division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks citation needed The Pakistanis followed up their success by launching Operation Windup which forced the Indians back farther Similarly Pakistan s pride the first Armored Division pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan with the intent to capture Amritsar a major city in Punjab India and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar citation needed The Pakistani First Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan however and by the end of 10 September lay disintegrated by the defenses of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar lit meaning Real Answer or more appropriate English equivalent Fitting Response The area became known as Patton Nagar Patton Town because of the large number of US made Pakistani Patton tanks Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged The hostilities in the Rajasthan Front commenced on 8 September Initially the Pakistan Desert Force and the Hur militia followers of Pir Pagaro were placed in a defensive role a role for which they were well suited as it turned out The Hurs were familiar with the terrain and the local area and possessed many essential desert survival skills which their opponents and their comrades in the Pakistan Army did not Fighting as mainly light infantry the Hur inflicted many casualties on the Indian forces as they entered Sindh The Hurs were also employed as skirmishers harassing the Indians in the Line of Control a task they often undertook on camels As the battle wore on the Hurs and the Desert Force were increasingly used to attack and capture Indian villages inside Rajasthan 74 The war was heading for a stalemate with both nations holding territory of the other The Indian army suffered 3 000 battlefield deaths while Pakistan suffered 3 800 The Indian army was in possession of 1 920 km2 740 sq mi of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 550 km2 210 sq mi of Indian territory 75 The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot Lahore and Kashmir sectors 76 77 while Pakistani ground gains were primarily in deserts opposite Sindh and in the Chumb sector near Kashmir 77 Pakistan claims that it held 1 600 km2 620 sq mi of Indian territory while losing 1 200 km2 450 sq mi of its territory 78 79 80 81 Aerial warfare Main article Indo Pakistani Air War of 1965 Further information Indian Air Force Second Kashmir War 1965 and Pakistan Air Force Indo Pakistani War of 1965 nbsp Pakistani Army Position MG1A3 AA 1965 War nbsp Pakistani Sabre being shot down in combat by an Indian Gnat in September 1965 as seen from the Indian aircraft The war saw the aircraft of the Indian Air Force IAF and the Pakistan Air Force PAF engaging in combat for the first time since independence Although the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940s that engagement was very limited in scale compared to the 1965 conflict citation needed The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunters Indian manufactured Folland Gnats de Havilland Vampires EE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG 21s The PAF s fighter force comprised 102 F 86F Sabres and 12 F 104 Starfighters along with 24 B 57 Canberra bombers During the conflict the PAF claimed it was out numbered by around 5 1 82 The PAF s aircraft were largely of American origin whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and Soviet airplanes However the PAF s American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF s 83 84 The F 86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat nicknamed Sabre Slayer 85 The Gnat is credited by many independent and Indian sources as having shot down seven Pakistani Canadair Sabres a in the 1965 war 86 87 while two Gnats were downed by PAF fighters The PAF s F 104 Starfighter was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as the pride of the PAF However according to Sajjad Haider the F 104 did not deserve this reputation Being a high level interceptor designed to neutralize Soviet strategic bombers at altitudes above 40 000 feet 12 19 km rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes it was unsuited to the tactical environment of the region 88 In combat the Starfighter was not as effective as the IAF s far more agile albeit much slower Folland Gnat fighter 89 90 Yet it zoomed into an ongoing dogfight between Sabres and Gnats at supersonic speed successfully broke off the fight and caused the Gnats to egress An IAF Gnat piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur as he lacked the fuel to return to his base and was captured by the Pakistan Army According to the pilot he got separated from his formation due to a malfunctioning compass and radio 91 92 This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum Karachi Sqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha and later tested and evaluated its flight performance presumed that Gnat was no Sabre Slayer when it came to dog fighting 92 Three Indian civilian aircraft were shot down by PAF one of which shot down at Bhuj Gujarat was carrying Balwantrai Mehta chief minister of the Indian state of Gujarat total 8 killed in the incident along with Balwantrai Mehta and his wife The Pakistan Air Force had fought well in countering the much larger Indian Air Force and supported the ground forces 93 nbsp Captured Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF Museum Karachi The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 59 94 According to PAF It flew 86 F 86 Sabres 10 F 104 Star fighters and 20 B 57 Canberra s in a parade soon after the war was over Thus disproving the IAF s claim of downing 73 PAF fighters which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front line fighter force 95 Indian sources have pointed out that despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia Iraq Iran Turkey and China within 10 days of the beginning of the war 96 The two air forces were rather equal in the conflict because much of the Indian air force remained farther east to guard against the possibility of China entering the war 97 According to the independent sources the PAF lost some 20 aircraft while the Indians lost 60 75 6 7 Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front line strength while India s losses amounted to less than 10 percent Moreover the loss rate had begun to even out and it has been estimated that another three weeks fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and India s losses totaling 15 percent Air superiority was not achieved and they were unable to prevent IAF fighter bombers and reconnaissance Canberra s from flying daylight missions over Pakistan Thus 1965 was a stalemate in terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority 97 98 However according to Kenneth Werrell the Pakistan Air Force did well in the conflict and probably had the edge 99 When hostilities broke out the Pakistan Air Force with around 100 F 86s faced an enemy with five times as many combat aircraft the Indians were also equipped with comparatively modern aircraft inventory Despite this Werrell credits the PAF as having the advantage of a decade s experience with the Sabre and pilots with long flight hours experience One Pakistani fighter pilot MM Alam was credited with the record of downing five Indian aircraft in less than a minute becoming the first known flying ace since the Korean War 99 However his claims were never confirmed by the PAF and is disputed by Indian sources 100 101 102 and some PAF officials 103 104 105 Tank battles Main articles Battle of Phillora Battle of Asal Uttar Battle of Burki Lahore Front and Battle of Chawinda The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II At the beginning of the war the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks and better equipment overall 106 Pakistani armor was largely American made it consisted mainly of Patton M 47 and M 48 tanks but also included many M4 Sherman tanks some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers equipped with 90 mm guns 107 The bulk of India s tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks some were up gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L 40 gun Besides the M4 tanks India fielded the British made Centurion Tank Mk 7 with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun and the AMX 13 PT 76 and M3 Stuart light tanks Pakistan fielded a more significant number and more modern artillery its guns out ranged those of the Indian artillery according to Pakistan s Major General T H Malik 108 At the outbreak of war in 1965 Pakistan had about 15 armored cavalry regiments each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons Besides the Patton there were about 200 M4 Shermans re armed with 76 mm guns 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers Most of these regiments served in Pakistan s two armored divisions the 1st and 6th Armored divisions the latter being in the process of formation nbsp Destroyed Sherman TankThe Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX 13 light tanks and 188 Centurions The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and some M3A3 Stuart light tanks India had only a single armored division the 1st Black Elephant Armored Division which consisted of the 17th Horse The Poona Horse also called Fakhr i Hind Pride of India the 4th Horse Hodson s Horse the 16th Cavalry the 7th Light Cavalry the 2nd Lancers the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry the two first named being equipped with Centurions There was also the 2nd Independent Armored Brigade one of whose three regiments the 3rd Cavalry was also equipped with Centurions Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armor 109 Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India which made progress into the Lahore Sialkot sector whilst halting Pakistan s counteroffensive on Amritsar 110 111 they were sometimes employed faultily such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan s 1st Armored Division at Asal Uttar After India breached the Madhupur canal on 11 September the Khem Karan counter offensive was halted affecting Pakistan s strategy substantially 64 Although India s tank formations experienced some results India s attack at the Battle of Chawinda led by its 1st Armored Division and supporting units was brought to halt by the newly raised 6th Armored Division ex 100th independent brigade group in the Chawinda sector Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda 112 compared to 44 of its own 113 But later Indian official sources confirmed India lost only 29 tanks at Chawinda 114 115 Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armored formations in offensive operations whether the Pakistani 1st Armored Division at Asal Uttar Battle of Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armored Division at Chawinda In contrast both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such as India s 2nd Armored Brigade at Asal Uttar and Pakistan s 25th Cavalry at Chawinda The Centurion battle tank with its 105 mm gun and heavy armor performed better than the overly complex need quotation to verify Patton 111 Naval hostilities Naval operations did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965 On 7 September a flotilla of the Pakistan Navy commanded by Commodore S M Anwar carried out a bombardment of the Indian Navy s radar station coastal town of Dwarka which was 320 kilometres 200 mi south of the Pakistani port of Karachi Operation Dwarka as it is known is a significant naval operation of the 1965 war 116 117 118 contested as a nuisance raid by some 119 120 The attack on Dwarka led to questions being asked in India s parliament 121 and subsequent post war modernization and expansion of the Indian Navy with an increase in budget from Rs 35 crores to Rs 115 crores 122 123 Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan and wished to restrict the war to a land based conflict 124 Covert operations The Pakistan Army launched numerous covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases 125 On 7 September 1965 the Special Services Group SSG commandos were parachuted into enemy territory According to Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army General Muhammad Musa about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields Halwara Pathankot and Adampur The daring attempt turned out to be an unmitigated disaster 125 Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned 93 were taken prisoner including one of the Commanders of the operations Major Khalid Butt and 20 were killed in encounters with the army police or civilians citation needed The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation 126 Despite failing to sabotage the airfields Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport and destroyed many vehicles 127 India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers 128 Meanwhile in Pakistan rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory 126 but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded 129 Assessment of lossesIndia and Pakistan make widely divergent claims about the damage they inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them The following summarizes each nation s claims Indian claims 130 Pakistani claims 131 Independent Sources 132 Casualties Army 169 commissioned officers 1 brigadier 9 lieutenant colonels 30 majors 39 captains 11 lieutenants 79 second lieutenants 80 junior commissioned officers JCO 1 820 other ranks 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 130 Air force 19 officers 21 other ranks 130 3 000 Indian soldiers 3 800 Pakistani soldiersCombat flying effort 4 073 combat sorties 2 279 combat sortiesAircraft lost 59 IAF official 43 PAF 12 In addition Indian sources claim that there were 13 IAF aircraft lost in accidents and 3 Indian civilian aircraft shot down 13 19 PAF 104 IAF 20 PAF 60 75 IAF 140 141 Aerial victories 17 3 post war 30 Tanks destroyed 128 Indian tanks 152 Pakistani tanks captured 150 Pakistani tanks destroyed Officially 471 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 38 captured 142 165 Pakistan tanks dubious discuss citation needed Land area won 3 900 km2 1 500 sq mi of Pakistani territory 650 km2 250 sq mi of Indian territory India held 1 840 km2 710 sq mi of Pakistani territory and Pakistan held 540 km2 210 sq mi of Indian territoryNeutral assessments This article contains too many or overly lengthy quotations for an encyclopedic entry Please help improve the article by presenting facts as a neutrally worded summary with appropriate citations Consider transferring direct quotations to Wikiquote or for entire works to Wikisource February 2022 There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war Most of these assessments agree that India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared Some neutral assessments are mentioned below According to the Library of Congress Country Studies conducted by the Federal Research Division of the United States 25 The war was militarily inconclusive each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other Losses were relatively heavy on the Pakistani side twenty aircraft 200 tanks and 3 800 troops Pakistan s army had been able to withstand Indian pressure but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan Most Pakistanis schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess refused to accept the possibility of their country s military defeat by Hindu India and were instead quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government Former New York Times reporter Arif Jamal wrote in his book Shadow War 10 This time India s victory was nearly total India accepted a cease fire only after it had occupied 740 square miles 1 900 km2 though Pakistan had made marginal gains of 210 square miles 540 km2 of territory Despite the obvious strength of the Indian win both countries claim to have been victorious Devin T Hagerty wrote in his book South Asia in world politics 143 The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore Pakistan s second largest city By the time the United Nations intervened on September 22 Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat In his book National identity and geopolitical visions 144 Gertjan Dijkink writes The superior Indian forces however won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts An excerpt from Stanley Wolpert s India 145 summarizing the Indo Pakistani War of 1965 In three weeks the second Indo Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U S ammunition and replacements for both armies forced the cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory India however was in a position to inflict grave damage to if not capture Pakistan s capital of the Punjab when the cease fire was called and controlled Kashmir s strategic Uri Poonch bulge much to Ayub s chagrin In his book titled The greater game India s race with destiny and China David Van Praagh wrote 9 India won the war It held on to the Vale of Kashmir the prize Pakistan vainly sought It gained 1 840 km2 710 sq mi of Pakistani territory 640 km2 250 sq mi in Azad Kashmir Pakistan s portion of the state 460 km2 180 sq mi of the Sailkot sector 380 km2 150 sq mi far to the south of Sindh and most critical 360 km2 140 sq mi on the Lahore front Pakistan took 540 km2 210 sq mi of Indian territory 490 km2 190 sq mi in the Chhamb sector and 50 km2 19 sq mi around Khem Karan Dennis Kux s India and the United States estranged democracies also provides a summary of the war 146 Although both sides lost heavily in men and material and neither gained a decisive military advantage India had the best of the war New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan s attempt to seize Kashmir by force Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated A region in turmoil South Asian conflicts since 1947 by Robert Johnson mentions 147 India s strategic aims were modest it aimed to deny the Pakistani Army victory although it ended up in possession of 720 square miles 1 900 km2 of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 square miles 570 km2 of its own An excerpt from William M Carpenter and David G Wiencek s Asian security handbook terrorism and the new security environment 148 A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by the Indian Army Another UN sponsored cease fire left borders unchanged but Pakistan s vulnerability had again been exposed English historian John Keay s India A History provides a summary of the 1965 war 149 The 1965 Indo Pak war lasted barely a month Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India s Jammu Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book Conflict in Asia Korea China Taiwan and India Pakistan 150 Again India appeared logistically at least to be in a superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory According to the Office of the Historian within the U S Department of State 151 Conflict resumed again in early 1965 when Pakistani and Indian forces clashed over disputed territory along the border between the two nations Hostilities intensified that August when the Pakistani army attempted to take Kashmir by force The attempt to seize the state was unsuccessful and the second India Pakistan War reached a stalemate CeasefireOn 20 September the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution which noted that its previous two resolutions went unheeded and now demanded an unconditional ceasefire from both nations within 48 hours 152 153 India immediately accepted 154 b while Pakistan accepted it on 23 September with some notable dramatics 156 India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India 157 In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December On 10 October an B 57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA 2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala 158 A Pakistani Army Auster AOP was shot down on 16 December killing one Pakistani army captain on 2 February 1967 an AOP was shot down by IAF Hawker Hunters The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo Pakistani War of 1971 Tashkent Declaration The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations The Soviet Union led by Premier Alexei Kosygin hosted peace negotiations in Tashkent now in Uzbekistan where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Declaration on 10 January 1966 159 agreeing to withdraw to pre August lines no later than 25 February 1966 In India the agreement was criticized because it did not contain a no war pact or any renunciation of guerrilla warfare across Kashmir India s Prime Minister Shastri suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the Tashkent Agreement on 11 January 1966 As a consequence the public outcry in India against the peace declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the ruling Indian National Congress 160 Public perceptions The ceasefire was criticized by many Pakistanis who relying on fabricated official reports and the controlled Pakistani press believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains The protests led to student riots 161 Pakistan State s reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains 162 Some recent books written by Pakistani authors including one by ex ISI chief Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed Durrani initially titled The Myth of 1965 Victory 163 reportedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war but all copies of the book were bought by the Pakistan Army to prevent circulation because the topic was too sensitive 164 165 The book was published with the revised title History of Indo Pak War 1965 published by Services Book Club a part of the Pakistan military and printed by Oxford University Press Karachi A few copies of the book have survived 166 A version was published in India as Illusion of Victory A Military History of the Indo Pak War 1965 by Lexicon Publishers 167 Recently a new Pakistani impression has been published in 2017 Intelligence failuresStrategic miscalculations by both India and Pakistan ensured that the war ended in a stalemate Indian miscalculations Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result The Official War History 1965 drafted by the Ministry of Defense of India in 1992 was a long suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations According to the document on 22 September when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war were he to delay accepting the ceasefire The general replied that most of India s frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses It was determined later that only 14 of India s frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of tanks as Pakistan By this time the Pakistani Army had used close to 80 of its ammunition Air Chief Marshal retd P C Lal who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defense and General Chaudhari did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle This attitude of Gen Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the Supremo Syndrome a patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military 130 Pakistani miscalculations The Pakistani Army s failures began with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people would revolt against their Indian rulers bringing about a swift and decisive victory The Kashmiri people on the other hand remained calm and collected The Indian Army was given enough information to understand Operation Gibraltar and that they were battling not insurgents as they had initially thought but Pakistani Army regulars nbsp Telegram from the Embassy of the United States in Karachi Continuing propaganda regarding achievements of PAK forces seems to have convinced most that only PAK forbearance saved the Indians from disaster The Pakistani Army didn t know that Indian leaders wanted to attack the southern part of the country to start a new war Pakistan had to send troops to the southern part of the country to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead of using them to help get to Kashmir Pakistan s attempt to capture Ahnoor a town north east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India was a failure Many Pakistani commentators said that the Ayub Khan administration was indecisive during Operation Grand Slam The critics contend that the mission was unsuccessful due to Ayub Khan s awareness of the significance of Akhnoor to India referring to it as India s jugular vein and his reluctance to invade it and initiate a conflict Although progress was made in Akhnoor General Ayub Khan relieved the commanding officer Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and replaced him with General Yahya Khan During the replacement a 24 hour pause was observed enabling the Indian army to regroup in Akhnoor and successfully repel a sluggish assault led by General Yahya Khan The Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command said The enemy came to our rescue Then Akhtar Hussain Malik criticized Ayub Khan for inventing Operation Gibraltar which ultimately failed and for denying him command at a crucial point in the conflict Malik said he would tell the truth about the war and how the army failed but later decided not to because he was afraid of being banned 168 Some authors have said that a war game that was held in March 1965 at the Institute for Defense Analyses in the United States might have encouraged Pakistan The exercise concluded that Pakistan would prevail in the event of a conflict with India 169 170 Other authors like Stephen P Cohen have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army had acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military the 1965 war was a shock 171 During the war the Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander in Chief of PAF Nur Khan later stated that it is the Pakistan Army that should be held accountable for initiating the conflict rather than India 172 173 However propaganda about the war continued in Pakistan 174 175 with most of the blame being placed on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures This pattern persisted until the disastrous outcome of the Indo Pakistani War in 1971 Involvement of other nationsThe United States and the United Kingdom have been the principal suppliers of military materiel to India and Pakistan since 1947 Both India and Pakistan were Commonwealth republics While India had pursued a policy of nominal non alignment Pakistan was a member of both CENTO and SEATO and an ally of the West in its struggle against communism 176 Well before the conflict began however Britain and the United States had suspected Pakistan of joining both alliances out of opportunism to acquire advanced weapons for a war against India They had therefore limited their military aid to Pakistan to maintain the existing balance of power in the subcontinent 177 In 1959 however Pakistan and the United States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation under which the United States agreed to take appropriate action including the use of armed forces to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request 178 By 1965 American and British analysts had recognised the two international groupings CENTO and SEATO and Pakistan s continued alliance with the West as being largely meaningless 179 Following the start of the 1965 war both the United States and Britain took the view that the conflict was largely Pakistan s fault and suspended all arms shipments to both India and Pakistan 25 While the United States maintained a neutral stance the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson condemned India for aggression after its army advanced towards Lahore his statement was met with a furious rebuttal from India 180 Internationally the level of support which Pakistan received was limited at best 181 182 183 Iran and Turkey issued a joint communique on 10 September which placed the blame on India backed the United Nations appeal for a cease fire and offered to deploy troops for a UN peacekeeping mission in Kashmir 184 Pakistan received support from Indonesia Iran Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the form of six naval vessels jet fuel guns and ammunition and financial support respectively 185 Pakistan didn t gain meaningful support at an international level 31 181 186 187 Since before the war the People s Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and a military opponent of India with whom it had fought a brief war in 1962 China had also become a foreign patron for Pakistan and had given Pakistan 60 million in development assistance in 1965 188 During the war China openly supported the Pakistani position It took advantage of the conflict to issue a strongly worded ultimatum to India condemning its aggression in Tibet and hinting at nuclear retaliation by China China had exploded its first nuclear device the previous year 183 Despite strong fears of Chinese intervention on the side of Pakistan the Chinese government ultimately exercised restraint 189 This was partly due to the logistical difficulties of a direct Chinese military intervention against India and India s improved military strength after its defeat by China in 1962 182 China had also received strong warnings by the American and Soviet governments against expanding the scope of the conflict by intervening 183 In the face of this pressure China backed down extending the deadline for India to respond to its ultimatum and warning India against attacking East Pakistan 187 Ultimately Pakistan rejected Chinese offers of military aid recognizing that accepting it would only result in further alienating Pakistan internationally 183 International opinion considered China s actions to be dangerously reckless and aggressive and it was soundly rebuked in the world press for its unnecessarily provocative stance during the conflict 183 India s participation in the Non Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members 190 Support given by Indonesia to Pakistan was seen as a major Indian diplomatic failure as Indonesia had been among the founding members of the Non Aligned Movement along with India 191 Despite its close relations with India the Soviet Union was more neutral than other nations during the war inviting both nations to peace talks under its aegis in Tashkent 192 AftermathIndia Despite the declaration of a ceasefire India was perceived by many as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan backed insurgency in Kashmir 32 In its October 1965 issue the Time magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the war 193 Now it s apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right In light of the failures of the Sino Indian War the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a politico strategic victory for India The Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri was hailed as a national hero in India 194 While the overall performance of the Indian military was praised military leaders were criticized for their failure to effectively deploy India s superior armed forces to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan 195 In his book War in the modern world since 1815 noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan lost heavily during the 1965 war India s hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces He elaborates 196 India s chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out of ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted In fact the army had used less than 15 of its ammunition compared to Pakistan which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable tanks In 2015 Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh the last surviving armed force commander of the conflict gave his assessment that the war ended in a stalemate but only due to international pressure for a ceasefire and that India would have achieved a decisive victory had hostilities continued for a few days more 197 For political reasons Pakistan claims victory in the 1965 war In my opinion the war ended in a kind of stalemate We were in a position of strength Had the war continued for a few more days we would have gained a decisive victory I advised then prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri not to agree to a ceasefire But I think he was pressured by the United Nations and some countries As a consequence India focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the tri services of the Indian Armed Forces Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during the Indo Pakistani War of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks China s repeated threats to intervene in the conflict supporting Pakistan increased pressure on the government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons 198 Despite repeated assurances the United States did little to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict thus irking India 199 At the same time the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further strained the relations between the West and India 200 These developments led to a significant change in India s foreign policy India which had previously championed the cause of non alignment distanced itself further from Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union By the end of the 1960s the Soviet Union emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India 201 From 1967 to 1977 81 of India s arms imports were from the Soviet Union 202 After the 1965 war the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far 203 India s defense budget too would increase gradually after the war in 1966 1967 it would rise to 17 and by 1970 1971 it would rise to 25 of its revenue 204 However according to the World Bank data India s defense expenditure by GDP decreased from 3 871 in 1965 to 3 141 in 1969 thereafter slightly increased to 3 652 in 1971 205 Pakistan After the war a significant number of Pakistanis regarded their military performance to be positive In Pakistan 6 September is celebrated as Defence Day to remember how Lahore was able to defend itself against the Indian army The performance of the Pakistani Air Force was particularly praised The Pakistani government was accused of spreading misinformation about the consequences of the war among its citizens 206 In his book Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies S M Burke writes 143 After the Indo Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary despite her economic and political problems had been determinedly building up her strength Air Marshal retired Nur Khan who headed the Pakistan Air Force in 1965 said in an interview with Dawn newspaper 207 The army misled the nation with a big lie that India rather than Pakistan provoked the war and that Pakistan won a great victory And since the lie was never rectified the Pakistani army came to believe its fiction and has continued to fight unwanted wars Pakistani commentator Haidar Imtiaz remarked 208 The myth of victory was created after the war had ended to counter Indian claims of victory on the one hand and to shield the Ayub regime and the army from criticism on the other A book titled Indo Pakistan War of 1965 A Flashback 209 produced by the Inter Services Public Relations of Pakistan is used as the official history of the war which omits any mention of the operations Gibraltar and Grand Slam and begins with the Indian counter offensive on the Lahore front The Pakistan Army is claimed to have put up a valiant defense of the motherland and forced the attack in its tracks 208 Most people agree that the idea of a mobile hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly hurt during the war because important breakthroughs were not made 210 The military s ill founded belief that their martial race of soldiers could defeat Hindu India in the conflict was criticized by several Pakistani writers 211 212 Rasul Bux Rais a Pakistani political analyst wrote 213 The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in an intense violent military campaign fashion nor could she sustain an all out conflict for long Historian Akbar S Zaidi notes that Pakistan lost terribly in the 1965 war 214 The Pakistani air force on the other hand racked up considerable acclaim and esteem among the military and international warfare critics for its triumphant defense of Lahore and other crucial parts of the country and its hefty retaliation against India the day afterward The air force s vigilance was also influenced by the fact that some pilots were frantically re enlisted six times in a single hour when they detected Indian air raids In Pakistan the air force and army are honored on Defence Day and Air Force Day These days are on September 6 and 7 respectively 215 216 Furthermore Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the conflict and perhaps even more crucial it had failed to secure Kashmir Many people consider this outcome to be a setback for Pakistan 33 34 35 The faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar was criticized by senior Pakistani officials and military experts which ultimately led to the conflict The Tashkent declaration was also criticized in Pakistan even though few people were aware of the seriousness of the situation at the end of the conflict Political leaders were also subjected to criticism Ayub Khan had espoused high expectations among the Pakistani populace regarding the superiority if not invincibility of its armed forces 217 in accordance with the guidance of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the foreign minister of Pakistan Nonetheless the failure of Pakistan to attain its military objectives during the conflict resulted in a political liability for Ayub 218 After the defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions an increasingly vocal opposition challenged the army s invincibility 219 The economic contraction in Pakistan was one of the most significant outcomes of the conflict 220 221 Pakistan had experienced impressive economic growth since the early 1960s but the war ended that Between 1964 and 1966 Pakistan s defense spending rose from 4 82 to 9 86 of GDP putting a tremendous strain on its economy In 1970 71 the expenditure on defense accounted for a staggering 32 204 or 55 66 of the total government expenditure 222 According to veterans of the war the war greatly cost Pakistan economically politically and militarily 223 Nuclear theorist Feroze Khan maintained that the 1965 war was a last conventional attempt to snatch Kashmir by military force and Pakistan s own position in the international community especially with the United States began to deteriorate from the point the war started while on the other hand the alliance with China saw improvements 223 Chairman joint chiefs General Tariq Majid claims in his memoirs that Zhou Enlai had longed advised the government in the classic style of Sun Tzu to go slow not to push India hard and avoid a fight over Kashmir for at least 20 30 years until you have developed your economy and consolidated your national power 223 General Majid maintained in Eating Grass that the sane philosophical and political critical thinking was missing in Pakistan and that the country had lost extensive human resources by fighting the war 223 Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support from the United States an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation The US turned neutral in the war when it cut off military supplies to Pakistan and India citation needed an action that the Pakistanis took as a sign of betrayal 224 After the war Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support Another negative consequence of the war was growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan present day Bangladesh 171 particularly for West Pakistan s obsession with Kashmir 225 Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir 226 In fact despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war India did not retaliate in that sector 227 although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrengthed infantry division 14th Division sixteen planes and no tanks 228 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan an action that ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation War and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971 Pakistan celebrates Defence Day every year to commemorate 6 September 1965 to pay tribute to the soldiers killed in the war 229 However Pakistani journalists including Taha Siddiqui 230 and Haseeb Asif 231 have criticized the celebration of Defence Day AwardsNational awards Santu Jouharmal Shahaney an IOFS officer served as the first Indian Director General Ordnance Factories DGOF He was awarded Padma Bhushan by the Government of India in the Civil Service category 232 K C Banerjee an IOFS officer Received Padma Shri in 1967 for his contributions during the Indo Pakistani War of 1965 as the General Manager of Rifle Factory Ishapore 233 that developed and manufactured the 7 62 Self Loading Automatic Rifle that played decisive role in India s victory in the Indo Pakistani War of 1965 234 235 236 237 Joginder Singh Dhillon Lt Gen awarded the Padma Bhushan in 1966 by the Government of India for his role in the 1965 war 238 becoming the first Indian Army officer to receive the award 239 Gallantry awards For bravery the following soldiers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries the Indian award Param Vir Chakra and the Pakistani award Nishan e Haider IndiaCompany Quarter Master Havildar Abdul Hamid 240 Posthumous Lieutenant Colonel Ardeshir Burzorji Tarapore 240 Posthumous PakistanMajor Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed 241 Posthumous Battle honours After the war a total of 16 battle honours and 3 theatre honours were awarded to units of the Indian Army the notable among which are 242 nbsp Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other politicians visit Shauryanjali a commemorative exhibition on the 1965 war 17 September 2015Jammu and Kashmir 1965 theatre honour Punjab 1965 theatre honour Rajasthan 1965 theatre honour Assal Uttar Burki Dograi Hajipir Hussainiwala Kalidhar OP Hill PhilloraSee alsoIndo Pakistani War of 1971 Post World War II air to air combat lossesNotes License built North American F 86 Sabres with Canadian engines India accepted unconditional ceasefire in principle as early as 14 September 155 References Nordeen Lon O 1985 Air Warfare in the Missile Age Smithsonian Institution Press pp 68 69 ISBN 978 0 87474 680 8 archived from the original on 7 February 2023 a b c d e f Rakshak Bharat Page 15 PDF Official History Times of India Archived from the 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Rakshak com Indian Air Force Losses 1965 War Archived from the original on 27 September 2013 Retrieved 11 February 2014 a b c d e f g h i Nordeen Lon O 1985 Air Warfare in the Missile Age Smithsonian Institution Press pp 149 151 ISBN 978 0 87474 680 8 archived from the original on 7 February 2023 retrieved 17 March 2019 a b 1965 War A Different Legacy ALL THINGS PAKISTAN Archived 27 August 2009 at the Wayback Machine Pakistaniat com 6 September 1965 Retrieved on 14 April 2011 1965 War Archived 7 January 2016 at the Wayback Machine Pakistan army 1 September 2009 Retrieved on 14 April 2011 The Sunday Tribune Spectrum Archived 19 July 2017 at the Wayback Machine Tribuneindia com Retrieved on 14 April 2011 Montgomery Evan Braden 24 May 2016 In the Hegemon s Shadow Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers Cornell University Press ISBN 978 1 5017 0400 0 Archived from the original on 7 February 2023 Retrieved 22 September 2021 Hali S M 2011 Operation Gibraltar an unmitigated disaster Defence Journal 15 1 2 10 34 via EBSCO David R Higgins 2016 Rachna Bisht 2015 Lyon Peter 2008 Conflict between India and Pakistan an encyclopedia ABC CLIO p 82 ISBN 978 1 57607 712 2 Archived from the original on 7 February 2023 Retrieved 30 October 2011 Dijink Gertjan 2002 National Identity and Geopolitical Visions Maps of Pride and Pain Routledge ISBN 978 1 134 77129 5 The superior Indian forces however won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts a b McGarr Paul The Cold War in South Asia Britain the United States and the Indian Subcontinent 1945 1965 Cambridge University Press 2013 p 331 ISBN 978 1 139 02207 1 Satisfied that it had secured a strategic and psychological victory over Pakistan by frustrating its attempt to seize Kashmir by force when the UN resolution was passed India accepted its terms with Pakistan s stocks of ammunition and other essential supplies all but exhausted and with the military balance tipping steadily in India s favour a b c Pakistan The Indo Pakistani War of 1965 Library of Congress Country Studies United States of America April 1994 Archived from the original on 7 January 2016 Retrieved 2 October 2010 Losses were relatively heavy on the Pakistani side twenty aircraft 200 tanks and 3 800 troops Pakistan s army had been able to withstand Indian pressure but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan Hagerty Devin 2005 South Asia in world politics Rowman amp Littlefield p 26 ISBN 978 0 7425 2587 0 Archived from the original on 7 February 2023 Retrieved 12 November 2020 Quote The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore Pakistan s second largest city By the time the United Nations intervened on 20 September Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat Wolpert Stanley 2005 India 3rd ed with a new preface ed Berkeley University of California Press p 235 ISBN 978 0 520 24696 6 Archived from the original on 17 January 2023 Retrieved 15 November 2015 Quote India however was in a position to inflict grave damage to if not capture Pakistan s capital of the Punjab when the cease fire was called and controlled Kashmir s strategic Uri Poonch bulge much to Ayub s chagrin Kux Dennis 1992 India and the United States Estranged democracies 1941 1991 Washington DC National Defense University Press p 238 ISBN 978 0 7881 0279 0 Archived from the original on 17 January 2023 Retrieved 15 November 2015 Quote India had the best of the war Asia Silent Guns Wary Combatants Time 1 October 1965 Archived from the original on 7 January 2016 Retrieved 30 August 2013 Quote India by contrast is still the big gainer in the war Alternate link content time com Archived 2 November 2018 at the Wayback Machine Kux Dennis 2006 India Pakistan Negotiations Is Past Still Prologue US Institute of Peace Press p 30 ISBN 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over the IAF s Hunters and Mysteres Tarapore Arzan 2 January 2023 Defence without deterrence India s strategy in the 1965 war Journal of Strategic Studies 46 1 150 179 doi 10 1080 01402390 2019 1668274 ISSN 0140 2390 S2CID 211312207 Awan Ayesha Azmat 7 September 2022 Looking back at India s failed strategy in 1965 War Global Village Space Retrieved 27 July 2023 a b Riedel Bruce 2013 Avoiding Armageddon America India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back Brookings Institution Press pp 67 70 ISBN 978 0 8157 2408 7 a b McGarr Paul The Cold War in South Asia Britain the United States and the Indian Subcontinent 1945 1965 Cambridge University Press 2013 pp 324 326 ISBN 978 1 139 02207 1 McGarr Paul The Cold War in South Asia Britain the United States and the Indian Subcontinent 1945 1965 Cambridge University Press 2013 pp 350 353 ISBN 978 1 139 02207 1 In retrospect it is clear that the Indo Pakistani War of 1965 represented a watershed in the West s association with the subcontinent McGarr 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United Nations India Pakistan Observation Mission UNIPOM 1965 1966 at the United Nations Archives IAF Combat Kills 1965 war Center for Indian Military History Mohammed Muhammad Musa 1983 My Version India Pakistan War 1965 Wajidalis United States Library of Congress Country Studies India Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the 1965 War with Pakistan Grand Slam A Battle of lost Opportunities Maj Retd Agha Humayun Amin very detailed roll of events and analysis The India Pakistan War 1965 40 Years On From Rediff com Lessons of the 1965 War from Daily Times Pakistan Spirit of 65 amp the parallels with today Ayaz Amir Portals nbsp India nbsp Pakistan Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Indo Pakistani War of 1965 amp oldid 1179712799, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

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