UNITA

Not to be confused with UNITAS.

For the Italian newspaper, see L'Unità.

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, abbr. UNITA) is the second-largest political party in Angola. Founded in 1966, UNITA fought alongside the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the Angolan War for Independence (1961–1975) and then against the MPLA in the ensuing civil war (1975–2002). The war was one of the most prominent Cold War proxy wars, with UNITA receiving military aid initially from People's Republic of China from 1966 until October 1975^[3][4] and later from the United States^[a] and apartheid South Africa while the MPLA received support from the Soviet Union and its allies, especially Cuba.^[5][6]

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
Leader	Adalberto Costa Júnior
Founder	Jonas Savimbi
Founded	13 March 1966
Headquarters	Luanda
Youth wing	Revolutionary United Youth of Angola
Women's wing	Angolan Women's League
Armed wing	FALA (until 1993)
Ideology	Big tent^[1] Angolan nationalism Formerly: Maoism^[2]
Political position	Centre^[1] to centre-right^[1] Formerly: Far-left^[1]
National affiliation	United Patriotic Front
Regional affiliation	Democrat Union of Africa
International affiliation	Centrist Democrat International
Seats in the National Assembly	90 / 220
Party flag
Website
www.unitaangola.org
Politics of Angola Political parties Elections

Until 1996, UNITA was funded through Angolan diamond mines in both Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul along the Cuango River valley, especially the Catoca mine, which was Angola's only Kimberlite mine at that time.^[7] Valdemar Chidondo served as Chief of Staff in the government of UNITA,^[8] pro-Western rebels, during the Angolan Civil War (1975–2002). Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, allegedly ordered Chidondo's assassination.^[9]

Savimbi's successor as president of UNITA was Isaías Samakuva. Following Savimbi's death, UNITA abandoned armed struggle and participated in electoral politics. The party won 51 out of 220 seats in the 2017 parliamentary election. Samakuva resigned as party leader in November 2019, being replaced by Adalberto Costa Júnior.

Founding

Jonas Savimbi and Antonio da Costa Fernandes founded UNITA on 13 March 1966 in Muangai in Moxico province in Portuguese Angola (during the Estado Novo regime). 200 other delegates were present in the event.^[6] UNITA launched its first attack on Portuguese colonial authorities on 25 December 1966.^[10]

Savimbi was originally affiliated with Holden Roberto's National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). UNITA later moved to Jamba in Angola's southeastern province of Cuando Cubango. UNITA's leadership was drawn heavily from Angola's majority Ovimbundu ethnic group and its policies were originally Maoist, perhaps influenced by Savimbi's early training in China. They aimed at rural rights and recognized ethnic divisions. During the 1980s, however, UNITA became more aligned with the United States under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush and apartheid South Africa, espousing support for capitalism in Angola.^[6][11] After the 1992 Angolan general election, UNITA lost its support from the United States and was only supported by apartheid South Africa.^[6]

Independence and civil war

Main article: Angolan Civil War

After the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola in 1974–75 and the end of their colonial rule, the MPLA and UNITA splintered, and civil war began as the movements clashed militarily and ideologically. MPLA leader Agostinho Neto became the first president of post-colonial Angola. Backed by Soviet and Cuban money, weapons and troops, the MPLA defeated the FNLA militarily and forced them largely into exile.^[12] UNITA also was nearly destroyed in November 1975, but it managed to survive and set up a second government, the Democratic People's Republic of Angola, in the provincial capital of Huambo. UNITA was hard-pressed but recovered with South African aid and then was strengthened considerably by U.S. support during the 1980s.^[13] The MPLA's military presence was strongest in Angolan cities, the coastal region and the strategic oil fields. But UNITA controlled much of the highland's interior, notably the Bié Plateau, and other strategic regions of the country. Up to 300,000 Angolans died in the civil war.^[13]

Guerrilla movement

In the 1980s and early 1990s, Savimbi sought out vastly expanded relations with the U.S. He received considerable guidance from The Heritage Foundation, an influential conservative research institute in Washington, D.C. that maintained strong relations with both the Reagan administration and the U.S. Congress. Michael Johns, the Heritage Foundation's leading expert on Africa and Third World Affairs issues, visited Savimbi in his clandestine southern Angolan base camps, offering the UNITA leader both tactical military and political advice.^[14] Through the lobbying efforts of Paul Manafort and his firm Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly which was paid $600,000 each year from Savimbi beginning in 1985, UNITA gained strong backing from the Reagan administration.^{[15][16][17][18][19][20]}

In 1986, U.S. conservatives convinced President Ronald Reagan to meet with Savimbi at the White House. While the meeting itself was confidential, Reagan emerged from it with support and enthusiasm for Savimbi's efforts, stating that he could envision a UNITA "victory that electrifies the world," suggesting that Reagan saw the outcome of the Angolan conflict as critical to his entire Reagan Doctrine foreign policy, consisting of support for anti-communist resistance movements in Central America, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere.^[21]

Under Savimbi's leadership, UNITA proved especially effective militarily before and after independence, becoming one of the world's most effective armed resistance movements of the late 20th century. According to the U.S. State Department, UNITA came to control "vast swaths of the interior (of Angola)".^[22] Savimbi's very survival in Angola in and of itself was viewed as an incredible accomplishment, and he came to be known as "Africa's most enduring bush fighter"^[23] given assassination attempts, aided by extensive Soviet, Cuban, and East German military troops, advisors and support, that he survived.^[24]

As Savimbi gained ground despite the forces aligned against him, American conservatives pointed to his success, and that of Afghan mujahideen and the Nicaraguan contras, all of which, with U.S. support, were successfully opposing Soviet-sponsored governments, as evidence that the U.S. was beginning to gain an upper hand in the Cold War conflict and that the Reagan Doctrine was working. Critics, on the other hand, responded that the support given to UNITA, the contras, and the Afghan mujahideen was inflaming regional conflicts at great expense to these nations. Furthermore, UNITA, like the Angolan government it fought, was criticized for human rights abuses.^[25]

1980s

UNITA gained some international notoriety in 1983 after abducting 66 Czechoslovak civilians and detaining a third of them for about 15 months.^[26] Belgium eventually negotiated the release of the civilians. Fighting in Angola continued until 1989, when, with UNITA advancing militarily, Cuba withdrew its support, removing several thousand troops that it had dispatched to Angola to fight Savimbi's UNITA.^[27] With many commentators and foreign policy specialists seeing that the Cold War might be drawing to an end, Savimbi's U.S. support, which had been strong, began to be questioned, with some in Congress urging the end of U.S. support for UNITA.^[28] Matters were further complicated by repeated reports that Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev had raised U.S. support for UNITA in several formal and informal summit meetings with President George H. W. Bush, placing further pressure on the U.S. to end its support for UNITA.^[29]

 

A UNITA sticker, issued for its 20th anniversary celebrations in 1986. The sticker carries the UNITA symbol and the slogan 'Socialism – Negritude – Democracy – Non-Alignment'

As the war began to include both military and diplomatic components, Johns and leading U.S. conservatives urged Savimbi to make a ceasefire contingent on the MPLA's agreement to "free and fair elections."^[30] When the UNITA demand was originally rebuffed by the MPLA, Savimbi vastly intensified his military pressure, while alleging that the MPLA was resisting free and fair elections because they feared a UNITA electoral victory. Meanwhile, an agreement was reached that provided for the removal of foreign troops from Angola in exchange for the independence of Namibia from South Africa. In Angola, however, Savimbi told Johns and conservative leader Howard Phillips that he had not felt adequately consulted on the negotiations or agreement and was in opposition to it. "There are a lot of loopholes in that agreement. The agreement is not good at all," Johns reported Savimbi telling both of them during a March 1989 visit with Savimbi in Angola."^[14]

A ceasefire ultimately was negotiated and MPLA leader José Eduardo dos Santos and the MPLA's Central Committee rejected its Marxist past and agreed to Savimbi's demand for free and fair elections, though UNITA and its supporters viewed the promises skeptically, especially because the MPLA's relations with the Soviet Union remained strong.^[31]

1990s

 

Unita leader Jonas Savimbi.

Following the 1991 Bicesse Accords, signed in Lisbon, United Nations-brokered elections were held, with both Savimbi and dos Santos running for president in 1992. Failing to win an overall majority in the first round of balloting, and then questioning the election's legitimacy, Savimbi and UNITA returned to armed conflict. Fighting resumed in October 1992 in Huambo, quickly spreading to Angola's capital, Luanda. It was here that Jeremias Chitunda, UNITA's long-time vice-president and other UNITA officials were killed while fleeing the city culminating in the Halloween Massacre. Following Chitunda's death, UNITA defensively moved their base from Jamba to Huambo. Savimbi's 1992 decision to return to combat ultimately proved a costly one, with many of Savimbi's U.S. conservative allies urging Savimbi to contest dos Santos electorally in the run-off election. Savimbi's decision to forego the run-off also greatly strained UNITA's relations with U.S. President George H. W. Bush.^[32]

As Savimbi resumed fighting, the U.N. responded by implementing an embargo against UNITA through United Nations Security Council Resolution 1173. The UN-commissioned Fowler Report detailed how UNITA continued to finance its war effort through the sales of diamonds (later to be known as blood diamonds)^[33] and resulted in further sanctions in the form of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1295 and action to end to the trade in blood diamonds through the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. In late 1992 following the general elections, the U.S. government, which had never recognized the legitimacy of the MPLA, finally recognized the Angolan government and stopped supporting UNITA, further alienating Savimbi.^[6] After failed talks in 1993 to end the conflict, another agreement, the Lusaka Protocol, was implemented in 1994 to form a government of national unity. In 1995, U.N. peacekeepers arrived. But UNITA broke away from the Lusaka agreement in 1998, citing violations of it by the MPLA. In late 1998, a militant group calling itself UNITA Renovada broke away from mainstream UNITA, when several UNITA commanders dissatisfied with the leadership of Jonas Savimbi ended their allegiance to his organization. Thousands more deserted UNITA in 1999 and 2000.^[34]

In 1999, a MPLA military offensive damaged UNITA considerably, essentially destroying UNITA as a conventional military force and forcing UNITA to return to more traditional guerilla tactics.^[35][36]

2000s

The Angolan civil war ended only after the death of Savimbi, who was killed in an ambush on 22 February 2002. His death was shocking to many Angolans, many of whom had grown up during the Angolan civil war and witnessed Savimbi's ability to successfully evade efforts by Soviet, Cuban and Angolan troops to kill him.^[37]

Six weeks following Savimbi's death, in April 2002, UNITA agreed to a ceasefire with the government. Under an amnesty agreement, UNITA soldiers and their families, comprising roughly 350,000 people, were gathered in 33 demobilisation camps under the "Program For Social and Productive Reintegration of Demobilized and War Displaced People". In August 2002, UNITA officially gave up its armed wing, and UNITA placed all of its efforts on the development of its political party. Despite the ceasefire, deep political conflict between UNITA and the MPLA remains.^[38]

Savimbi was immediately succeeded by António Dembo, who died shortly after Savimbi. Following Dembo, in elections contested by General Paulo Lukamba, Dinho Chingunji and Isaías Samakuva, Samakuva won the UNITA election and emerged as UNITA's new president.

In November 2019, Isaias Samakuva resigned as president and was replaced by Adalberto Costa Júnior^[39] with Arlete Leona Chimbinda as the new vice-president.^[40]

Foreign support

UNITA received support from several governments in Africa and around the world, including the People's Republic of Bulgaria,^[41] Egypt, France, Israel, Morocco, the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Zaire,^[42] and Zambia.^[43][44]

United States

See also: CIA activities in Angola

During the Reagan administration high ranking security officials met with UNITA leaders. Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Casey, National Security Advisor Richard Allen, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, on 6 March met with Unita leaders in Washington, D.C. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walker met with Savimbi in March in Rabat, Morocco. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, his assistant for International Security Matters Francis West, Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director of the CIA Bobby Inman, and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency James Williams met with Savimbi between November 1981 and January 1982. Although the Clark Amendment forbid U.S. involvement in the civil war, Secretary Haig told Savimbi in December 1981 that the U.S. would continue to provide assistance to UNITA.^[45]

The U.S. government "explicitly encouraged" the governments of Israel, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Zaire to aid UNITA. In 1983 the U.S. and South African governments agreed to ship weapons from the Honduras, Belgium and Switzerland to South Africa and then to UNITA in Angola. The U.S. also traded weapons with South Africa for intelligence on the civil war.^[45]

Savimbi benefited from the support of influential American conservatives, including The Heritage Foundation's Michael Johns and other U.S. conservative leaders, who helped elevate Savimbi's stature in Washington and promoted the transfer of American weapons to his war.^[46]

Johns and other American conservatives met regularly with Savimbi in remote Jamba, culminating in the "Democratic International" in 1985. Savimbi later drew the praise of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who hailed him as a freedom fighter and spoke of Savimbi winning a victory that "electrifies the world" while others hinted at a much darker regime, dismissing Savimbi as a power-hungry propagandist.^[6]

After the 1992 Angolan general election, UNITA lost its support from the United States and was only supported by South Africa.^[6]

Electoral history

Presidential elections

Election	Party candidate	Votes	%	Result
1992	Jonas Savimbi	1,579,298	40.07%	Lost  N
2012	Isaías Samakuva	1,074,565	18.67%	Lost  N
2017		1,818,903	26.68%	Lost  N
2022	Adalberto Costa Júnior	2,756,786	43.95%	Lost  N

National Assembly elections

Election	Leader	Votes	%	Seats	+/–	Position	Government
1992	Jonas Savimbi	1,347,636	34.10%	70 / 220	New	2nd	Opposition
2008	Isaías Samakuva	670,363	10.39%	16 / 220	54	2nd	Opposition
2012		1,074,565	18.66%	32 / 220	16	2nd	Opposition
2017		1,790,320	26.70%	51 / 220	19	2nd	Opposition
2022	Adalberto Costa Júnior	2,756,786	43.95%	90 / 220	39	2nd	Opposition

See also

• African independence movements
• Blood Diamonds
• David Chingunji
• Jorge Sangumba
• Kafundanga Chingunji

Notes

1. The United States supported the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) from 1961 to 1969 and from August 1974 to January 1976. The FNLA/UNITA coalition opposed the MPLA.^[4]

References

1. JUSTINO, Jofre. A actual UNITA traiu o espírito de Muangai. Maputo, 2006
2. "Angola-Emergence of Unita". Mongabay. February 1989. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
3. Weigert, Stephen L. (25 October 2011). Angola: A Modern Military History, 1961-2002. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 33–34. ISBN 978-0230337831. Retrieved 28 January 2020.
4. Hess, Morgan (2014). U.S.-Chinese Cooperation and Conflict in the Angolan Civil War (Thesis). City University of New York (CUNY) City College. Retrieved 28 January 2020.
5. Hare, Paul (9 May 2007). "China in Angola: An Emerging Energy Partnership". Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 28 January 2020 – via China Brief Volume: 6 Issue: 22.
6. Simpson, Chris (25 February 2002). "Obituary: Jonas Savimbi, Unita's local boy". BBC. Retrieved 27 January 2020.
7. Harden, Blaine (6 April 2000). . New York Times. Archived from the original on 28 January 2020. Retrieved 27 January 2020.
8. Brittain, Victoria (1998). Death of Dignity: Angola's Civil War. London: Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-7453-1247-7.
9. Kukkuk, Leon (2005). Letters to Gabriella. FLF Press. p. 102. ISBN 978-1891855672.
10. Kukkuk, Leon (2005). Letters to Gabriella. FLF Press. p. 156. ISBN 978-1891855672.
11. Savimbi, Jonas (January 1986). The War against Soviet Colonialism. Policy Review. pp. 18–25.
12. "Political background – Angola – area, power". Nations Encyclopedia. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
13. "Angola country profile – Overview". BBC News. 11 April 2011. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
14. Johns, Michael (26 October 1989). "Savimbi's Elusive Victory in Angola". Human Events. Retrieved 20 January 2015 – via U.S. Congressional Record.^{[permanent dead link]}
15. Swan, Betsy; Mak, Tim (April 13, 2016). "Top Trump Aide Led the 'Torturers' Lobby' BLOOD MONEY: Paul Manafort and the partners at his firm made a fortune repping some of the most despicable dictators of the 20th century". Daily Beast. Retrieved August 28, 2021. Updated on 6 November 2017.
16. Thomas, Evan (March 3, 1986). . Time. Archived from the original on April 18, 2016. Retrieved August 28, 2021.
17. Thomas, Evan (March 3, 1986). . Time. Archived from the original on February 26, 2018. Retrieved August 28, 2021.
18. Shear, Michael D.; Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. (May 22, 2008). . The Washington Post. Archived from the original on March 9, 2016. Retrieved August 28, 2021.
19. Shear, Michael D.; Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. (May 22, 2008). . The Washington Post. Archived from the original on April 16, 2016. Retrieved August 28, 2021.
20. Levine, Art (February 1992). "Inside Washington's Propaganda Shops: Publicists of the Damned". Spy (volume 6). pp. 52–60. Retrieved August 28, 2021. See page 60. The full title of the article is "Believe it or not, there are Americans out there who have nice things to say about Saddam Hussein, Nicolae Ceaucescu, and the murderous governments of Zaire, Myanmar, and El Salvador - and they have better access to your congressman than you do. They're lobbyists, and they earn hundreds of thousands of dollars flacking for fascists and schmoozing on behalf of tyrants blithely waltzing through life as PUBLICISTS OF THE DAMNED."
21. Aaronovitch, David (7 June 2004). "Terrible legacy of the Reagan years". The Guardian. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
22. "Angola". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
23. "Angola: Key Figures". The Daily Telegraph. 8 August 2002. Archived from the original on 2022-01-12. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
24. Taylor, Paul (19 December 1993). . The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 29 March 2015. Retrieved 27 January 2020.
25. Ali B. Ali-Dinar, ed. (26 September 1999). "Angola: Human Rights Watch Report, 9/26/99". Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
26. Falvey, Christian (8 February 2011). "The Angola abduction". Radio Praha. Retrieved 15 November 2018.
27. . History.com. 10 January 1989. Archived from the original on 8 March 2010. Retrieved 27 January 2020.
28. Root, Christine (5 May 1989). "Congress to Act Soon on Angola: Urgent Lobbying Needed" (PDF). Association of Concerned Africa Scholars. Retrieved 27 January 2020.
29. Riding, Alan (2 June 1991). "U.S. and Soviets Bridge Gap on Conventional Weapons and Plan for Summit Soon; Bush Hails Accord". The New York Times. Retrieved 27 January 2020.
30. Michael Johns, With Freedom Near In Angola, This is No Time to Curtail Unita Assistance 2014-08-10 at the Wayback Machine, Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum 276, 31 July 1990, as entered in U.S. Congressional Record.
31. Johns, Michael (5 February 1990). "Angola: Testing Gorbachev's 'New Thinking'". The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved 28 January 2020.
32. . New York Times. Reuters. 22 November 1992. Archived from the original on 28 January 2020. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
33. Fowler, Robert; Mollander, Anders (10 March 2000). "Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts ("The "Fowler Report")". Global Policy Forum. Retrieved 10 March 2010.
34. Hodges, Tony (2004). Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State (second ed.). Indiana University Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 978-0253344465.
35. . New York Times. Agence France-Presse. 29 December 1999. Archived from the original on 20 January 2015. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
36. McGreal, Chris (27 December 1999). "Rebels lose former HQ to Angolan army". The Guardian. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
37. "Angolan rebel leader 'killed'". BBC News. 23 February 2002. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
38. "Angola opposition will contest election result". The Telegraph. 7 September 2008. Archived from the original on 2022-01-12. Retrieved 20 January 2015.
39. "Angola: Adalberto Costa Junior, new leader of Unita - RFI". tellerreport.com. November 16, 2019. Retrieved 8 April 2020.
40. "Arlete Chimbinda indicada Vice-Presidente da UNITA". CLUB-K ANGOLA - Notícias Imparciais de Angola (in European Portuguese). Retrieved 2021-01-25.
41. Howe, Herbert M. (2004). Ambiguous Order: Military Forces In African States. Lynne Rienner. pp. 81. ISBN 978-1555879310.
42. Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin (1988). The Israeli Connection: Whom Israel Arms and Why. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. p. 65. ISBN 978-1850430698.
43. AlʻAmin Mazrui, Ali (1977). The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa. Brill Academic. p. 228. ISBN 978-9004056466.
44. Stockwell, John. "1975, Angola: Mercenaries, Murder and Corruption". Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade. Retrieved 28 January 2020.
45. Wright, George (1997). The Destruction of a Nation: United States Policy Towards Angola Since 1945. Pluto Press. pp. 110. ISBN 978-0745310305.
46. . thomas.loc.gov. Archived from the original on 10 August 2014. Retrieved 6 July 2017.

Further reading

• Didier Péclard, "Les incertitudes de la nation en Angola: Aux racines sociales de l'Unita", Paris: Karthala, (2015).
• Hoekstra, Quint. "The effect of foreign state support to UNITA during the Angolan War (1975–1991)." Small Wars & Insurgencies 29.5-6 (2018): 981–1005.
• Pearce, Justin. "From Rebellion to Opposition: UNITA’s Social Engagement in Post-War Angola." Government and Opposition 55.3 (2020): 474–489.
• Wright, George. The Destruction of a Nation: United States' Policy Towards Angola Since 1945 (1997)

External links

• Official website (in Portuguese)
• Unita campaign website 2009-05-12 at the Wayback Machine (in Portuguese)
• French interview of Jonas Savimbi in 1978
• List of attacks attributed to Unita on the START terrorism database, Profile on START 2013-01-11 at the Wayback Machine