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Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis, also known as the October Crisis (of 1962) (Spanish: Crisis de Octubre) in Cuba, the Caribbean Crisis (Russian: Карибский кризис, tr. Karibsky krizis, IPA: [kɐˈrʲipskʲɪj ˈkrʲizʲɪs]) in Russia, or the Missile Scare, was a 35-day (October 16 – November 20, 1962) confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which escalated into an international crisis when American deployments of missiles in Italy and Turkey were matched by Soviet deployments of similar ballistic missiles in Cuba. Despite the short time frame, the Cuban Missile Crisis remains a defining moment in national security and nuclear war preparation. The confrontation is often considered the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full-scale nuclear war.[4]

Cuban Missile Crisis
Part of the Cold War

CIA reference photograph of a Soviet medium-range ballistic missile in Red Square, Moscow
DateOctober 16–29, 1962
(Naval quarantine[2] of Cuba ended on November 20)
Location
Result
  • Publicized removal of the Soviet Union's nuclear missiles from Cuba
  • Non-publicized removal of American nuclear missiles from Turkey and Italy
  • Agreement with the Soviet Union that the United States would never invade Cuba without direct provocation
  • Creation of a nuclear hotline between the United States and the Soviet Union
Belligerents
 Soviet Union
 Cuba
Supported by:
Warsaw Pact (except Albania and Romania[1])
 United States
 Italy
 Turkey
Supported by:
 NATO (except France)
 OAS
Commanders and leaders
Strength
40,000 soldiers[3] Unknown
Casualties and losses
None 1 U-2 spy aircraft lost
1 killed

Universal Newsreel about the Cuban Missile Crisis

In 1961, the US government put Jupiter nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey. It had trained a force of Cuban exiles which the CIA led in an attempt to invade Cuba and overthrow the Cuban government. Starting in November of that year the US government engaged in a campaign of terrorism and sabotage in Cuba, referred to as the Cuban Project, which continued throughout the first half of the 1960s. The Soviet administration was concerned about a Cuban drift towards China, with which the Soviets had an increasingly fractious relationship. In response to these factors, Soviet First Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, agreed with the Cuban Prime Minister, Fidel Castro, to place nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba to deter a future invasion. An agreement was reached during a secret meeting between Khrushchev and Castro in July 1962, and construction of a number of missile launch facilities started later that summer.

Meanwhile, campaigning for the 1962 United States elections was underway, and the White House denied charges for months that it was ignoring dangerous Soviet missiles 90 mi (140 km) from Florida. The missile preparations were confirmed when a US Air Force U-2 spy plane produced clear photographic evidence of medium-range R-12 (NATO code name SS-4) and intermediate-range R-14 (NATO code name SS-5) ballistic missile facilities.

When this was reported to President John F. Kennedy, he then convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers, in a group that became known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM). During this meeting, President Kennedy was originally advised to carry out an air strike on Cuban soil in order to compromise Soviet missile supplies, followed by an invasion of the Cuban mainland. After careful consideration, President Kennedy chose a less aggressive course of action, in order to avoid a declaration of war. After consultation with EXCOMM, Kennedy ordered a naval "quarantine" on October 22 to prevent further missiles from reaching Cuba.[5] By using the term "quarantine", rather than "blockade" (an act of war by legal definition), the United States was able to avoid the implications of a state of war.[6] The US announced it would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba and demanded that the weapons already in Cuba be dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union.

After several days of tense negotiations, an agreement was reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev: publicly, the Soviets would dismantle their offensive weapons in Cuba and return them to the Soviet Union, subject to United Nations verification, in exchange for a US public declaration and agreement to not invade Cuba again. Secretly, the United States agreed with the Soviets that it would dismantle all of the Jupiter MRBMs which had been deployed to Turkey against the Soviet Union. There has been debate on whether or not Italy was included in the agreement as well. While the Soviets dismantled their missiles, some Soviet bombers remained in Cuba, and the United States kept the naval quarantine in place until November 20, 1962.[6]

When all offensive missiles and the Ilyushin Il-28 light bombers had been withdrawn from Cuba, the blockade was formally ended on November 20. The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union pointed out the necessity of a quick, clear, and direct communication line between the two superpowers. As a result, the Moscow–Washington hotline was established. A series of agreements later reduced US–Soviet tensions for several years, until both parties eventually resumed expanding their nuclear arsenals.

The compromise embarrassed Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the withdrawal of US missiles from Italy and Turkey was a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev, and the Soviets were seen as retreating from circumstances that they had started. Khrushchev's fall from power two years later was in part because of the Soviet Politburo's embarrassment at both Khrushchev's eventual concessions to the US and his ineptitude in precipitating the crisis in the first place. According to Dobrynin, the top Soviet leadership took the Cuban outcome as "a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation".[7][8]

Background

Cuba–Soviet relations

In late 1961, Fidel Castro asked for more SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles from the Soviet Union. The request was not acted upon by the Soviet leadership. In the interval Fidel Castro began criticizing the Soviets for lack of "revolutionary boldness", and began talking to China about agreements for economic assistance. In March 1962, Fidel Castro ordered the ousting of Anibal Escalante and his pro-Moscow comrades from Cuba's Integrated Revolutionary Organizations. This affair alarmed the Soviet leadership as well as fears of a possible US invasion. In this crisis of international relations the Soviet Union sent more SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles in April as well as a regiment of regular Soviet troops.[9]

Timothy Naftali has contended that Escalante's dismissal was a motivating factor behind the Soviet decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962. According to Naftali, Soviet foreign policy planners were concerned Castro's break with Escalante foreshadowed a Cuban drift toward China and sought to solidify the Soviet-Cuban relationship through the missile basing program.[10]

Cuba–US relations

 
Image of plans for the Bay of Pigs Invasion

The Cuban government regarded US imperialism as the primary explanation for the island's structural weaknesses.[11] The US government had provided arms, money and its authority to the Batista dictatorship. The majority of the Cuban population had tired of the severe socioeconomic problems associated with the US domination of the country. The Cuban government was aware of the necessity of ending the turmoil and incongruities of US-dominated prerevolution Cuban society. It determined that the US government's demands, made as part of the hostile US reaction to Cuban government policy, were unacceptable.[11][12]

With the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War, the United States government sought to promote private enterprise as an instrument for advancing US strategic interests in the developing world.[13] It had grown concerned about the expansion of communism.

In December 1959, under the Eisenhower administration and less than twelve months after the Cuban Revolution, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) developed a plan for paramilitary action against Cuba. The CIA recruited operatives on the island to carry out terrorism and sabotage, kill civilians, and cause economic damage.[18] The John F. Kennedy administration was publicly embarrassed by the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961. It had been launched at the initiative of Richard M. Bissell Jr. and approved by Kennedy, and used CIA-trained forces of Cuban exiles. Afterward, former President Eisenhower told Kennedy that "the failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that they would otherwise not do."[19]: 10  The half-hearted invasion left Soviet first secretary Nikita Khrushchev and his advisers with the impression that Kennedy was indecisive and, as one Soviet adviser wrote, "too young, intellectual, not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations... too intelligent and too weak".[19] The historian Renata Keller has said that for the first few years following the Cuban Revolution, the United States did not view Cuba as a security threat. According to Keller, it quickly became clear that the reforms that the new regime was determined to undertake would harm US business interests on the island.[20]

Following the failed invasion, the US massively escalated its sponsorship of terrorism against the island. In late 1961, using the military and the Central Intelligence Agency, the US government engaged in an extensive campaign of state-sponsored terrorism against civilian and military targets in Cuba. The terrorist attacks killed significant numbers of civilians. The US armed, trained, funded and directed the terrorists, most of whom were Cuban expatriates. Terrorist attacks were planned at the direction and with the participation of US government employees and launched from US territory.[26] In January 1962, US Air Force General Edward Lansdale described the plans to overthrow the Cuban government in a top-secret report, addressed to Kennedy and officials involved with Operation Mongoose.[27][17] CIA agents or "pathfinders" from the Special Activities Division were to be infiltrated into Cuba to carry out sabotage and organization, including radio broadcasts.[28] In February 1962, the US launched an embargo against Cuba,[29] and Lansdale presented a 26-page, top-secret timetable for implementation of the overthrow of the Cuban government, mandating guerrilla operations to begin in August and September. "Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime" was hoped by the planners to occur in the first two weeks of October.[17]

The terrorism campaign and the threat of invasion were crucial factors in the Cuban government's decision to accept the placement of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuban territory.[30][31][32][33] The US government was aware at the time, as reported to the president in a National Intelligence Estimate, that the invasion threat was a key reason for Cuban acceptance of the missiles.[34][35]

Soviet–US relations

When Kennedy ran for president in 1960, one of his key election issues was an alleged "missile gap" with the Soviets. In fact, the US at that time led the Soviets by a wide margin, which would only increase over time. In 1961, the Soviets had only four R-7 Semyorka intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). By October 1962, they may have had dozens, with some intelligence estimates as high as 75.[36]

The US, on the other hand, had 170 ICBMs and was quickly building more. It also had eight George Washington- and Ethan Allen-class ballistic missile submarines, with the capability to launch 16 Polaris missiles, each with a range of 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 km). Khrushchev increased the perception of a missile gap when he loudly boasted to the world that the Soviets were building missiles "like sausages" but Soviet missiles' numbers and capabilities were nowhere close to his assertions. The Soviet Union had medium-range ballistic missiles in quantity, about 700 of them, but they were unreliable and inaccurate. The US had a considerable advantage in its total number of nuclear warheads (27,000 against 3,600) and in the technology required for their accurate delivery. The US also led in missile defensive capabilities, naval and air power; however, the Soviets held a two-to-one advantage in conventional ground forces, more pronounced in field guns and tanks, particularly in the European theatre.[36]

Khrushchev also had an impression of Kennedy as weak, which to him was confirmed by the President's response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961, particularly to the building of the Berlin Wall by East Germany to prevent its citizens from emigrating to the West.[37] Speaking to Soviet officials in the aftermath of the crisis, Khrushchev asserted, "I know for certain that Kennedy doesn't have a strong background, nor, generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand up to a serious challenge." He also told his son Sergei that on Cuba, Kennedy "would make a fuss, make more of a fuss, and then agree".[38]

Prelude

Conception

In May 1962, Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev was persuaded by the idea of countering the US's growing lead in developing and deploying strategic missiles by placing Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Cuba, despite the misgivings of the Soviet Ambassador in Havana, Alexandr Ivanovich Alexeyev, who argued that Castro would not accept the deployment of the missiles.[39] Khrushchev faced a strategic situation in which the US was perceived to have a "splendid first strike" capability that put the Soviet Union at a huge disadvantage. In 1962, the Soviets had only 20 ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the US from inside the Soviet Union.[40] The poor accuracy and reliability of the missiles raised serious doubts about their effectiveness. A newer, more reliable generation of ICBMs would become operational only after 1965.[40]

Therefore, Soviet nuclear capability in 1962 placed less emphasis on ICBMs than on medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs). The missiles could hit American allies and most of Alaska from Soviet territory but not the contiguous United States. Graham Allison, the director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, points out, "The Soviet Union could not right the nuclear imbalance by deploying new ICBMs on its own soil. In order to meet the threat it faced in 1962, 1963, and 1964, it had very few options. Moving existing nuclear weapons to locations from which they could reach American targets was one."[41]

A second reason that Soviet missiles were deployed to Cuba was because Khrushchev wanted to bring West Berlin, controlled by the American, British and French within Communist East Germany, into the Soviet orbit. The East Germans and Soviets considered western control over a portion of Berlin a grave threat to East Germany. Khrushchev made West Berlin the central battlefield of the Cold War. Khrushchev believed that if the US did nothing over the missile deployments in Cuba, he could muscle the West out of Berlin using said missiles as a deterrent to western countermeasures in Berlin. If the US tried to bargain with the Soviets after it became aware of the missiles, Khrushchev could demand trading the missiles for West Berlin. Since Berlin was strategically more important than Cuba, the trade would be a win for Khrushchev, as Kennedy recognized: "The advantage is, from Khrushchev's point of view, he takes a great chance but there are quite some rewards to it."[42]

Thirdly, from the perspective of the Soviet Union and of Cuba, it seemed that the United States wanted to increase its presence in Cuba. With actions including the attempt to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States,[43] placing economic sanctions on the nation, directly invading it in addition to conducting secret operations on containing communism and Cuba, it was assumed that America was trying to overrun Cuba. As a result, to try and prevent this, the USSR would place missiles in Cuba and neutralise the threat. This would ultimately serve to secure Cuba against attack and keep the country in the Socialist Bloc.[44]

 
Fifteen US-built PGM-19 Jupiter missiles, with the capability to strike Moscow with nuclear warheads, were deployed in Turkey in 1961.[citation needed]

Another major reason why Khrushchev planned to place missiles on Cuba undetected was to "level the playing field" with the evident American nuclear threat. America had the upper hand as they could launch from Turkey and destroy the USSR before they would have a chance to react. After the emplacement of nuclear missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev had finally established mutual assured destruction, meaning that if the United States decided to launch a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union, the latter would react by launching a retaliatory nuclear strike against the US.[45]

Finally, placing nuclear missiles on Cuba was a way for the USSR to show their support for Cuba and support the Cuban people who viewed the United States as a threatening force,[43] as the latter had become their ally after the Cuban Revolution of 1959. According to Khrushchev, the Soviet Union's motives were "aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire".[46]

Schlesinger, a historian and adviser to Kennedy, told National Public Radio in an interview on October 16, 2002, that Castro did not want the missiles, but Khrushchev pressured Castro to accept them. Castro was not completely happy with the idea, but the Cuban National Directorate of the Revolution accepted them, both to protect Cuba against US attack and to aid the Soviet Union.[47]: 272 

Soviet military deployments

 
The relative ranges of the Il-28, SS-4, and SS-5 based on Cuba in nautical miles (NM)

In early 1962, a group of Soviet military and missile construction specialists accompanied an agricultural delegation to Havana. They obtained a meeting with Cuban prime minister Fidel Castro. The Cuban leadership had a strong expectation that the US would invade Cuba again and enthusiastically approved the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. According to another source, Castro objected to the missiles' deployment as making him look like a Soviet puppet, but he was persuaded that missiles in Cuba would be an irritant to the US and help the interests of the entire socialist camp.[48] Also, the deployment would include short-range tactical weapons (with a range of 40 km, usable only against naval vessels) that would provide a "nuclear umbrella" for attacks upon the island.

By May, Khrushchev and Castro agreed to place strategic nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent and that to lose Cuba would do great harm to the communists, especially in Latin America. He said he wanted to confront the Americans "with more than words.... the logical answer was missiles".[49]: 29  The Soviets maintained their tight secrecy, writing their plans longhand, which were approved by Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky on July 4 and Khrushchev on July 7.

From the very beginning, the Soviets' operation entailed elaborate denial and deception, known as "maskirovka". All the planning and preparation for transporting and deploying the missiles were carried out in the utmost secrecy, with only a very few told the exact nature of the mission. Even the troops detailed for the mission were given misdirection by being told that they were headed for a cold region and being outfitted with ski boots, fleece-lined parkas, and other winter equipment. The Soviet code-name was Operation Anadyr. The Anadyr River flows into the Bering Sea, and Anadyr is also the capital of Chukotsky District and a bomber base in the far eastern region. All the measures were meant to conceal the program from both internal and external audiences.[50]

Specialists in missile construction under the guise of "machine operators", "irrigation specialists", and "agricultural specialists" arrived in July.[50] A total of 43,000 foreign troops would ultimately be brought in.[51] Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergei Biryuzov, Head of the Soviet Rocket Forces, led a survey team that visited Cuba. He told Khrushchev that the missiles would be concealed and camouflaged by palm trees.[36]

As early as August 1962, the US suspected the Soviets of building missile facilities in Cuba. During that month, its intelligence services gathered information about sightings by ground observers of Soviet-built MiG-21 fighters and Il-28 light bombers. U-2 spy planes found S-75 Dvina (NATO designation SA-2) surface-to-air missile sites at eight different locations. CIA director John A. McCone was suspicious. Sending antiaircraft missiles into Cuba, he reasoned, "made sense only if Moscow intended to use them to shield a base for ballistic missiles aimed at the United States".[52] On August 10, he wrote a memo to Kennedy in which he guessed that the Soviets were preparing to introduce ballistic missiles into Cuba.[36] Che Guevara himself traveled to the Soviet Union on August 30, 1962 to sign off on the final agreement regarding the deployment of missiles in Cuba.[53] The visit was heavily monitored by the CIA as Guevara had gained more scruitiny by American intelligence. While in the Soviet Union Guevara argued with Khrushchev that the missile deal should be made public but Khrushchev insisted on total secrecy, and swore the Soviet Union's support if the Americans discovered the missiles. By the time Guevara arrived in Cuba the United States had already discovered the Soviet troops in Cuba via U-2 spy planes.[54]

With important Congressional elections scheduled for November, the crisis became enmeshed in American politics. On August 31, Senator Kenneth Keating (R-New York) warned on the Senate floor that the Soviet Union was "in all probability" constructing a missile base in Cuba. He charged the Kennedy administration with covering up a major threat to the US, thereby starting the crisis.[55] He may have received this initial "remarkably accurate" information from his friend, former congresswoman and ambassador Clare Boothe Luce, who in turn received it from Cuban exiles.[56] A later confirming source for Keating's information possibly was the West German ambassador to Cuba, who had received information from dissidents inside Cuba that Soviet troops had arrived in Cuba in early August and were seen working "in all probability on or near a missile base" and who passed this information to Keating on a trip to Washington in early October.[57] Air Force General Curtis LeMay presented a pre-invasion bombing plan to Kennedy in September, and spy flights and minor military harassment from US forces at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base were the subject of continual Cuban diplomatic complaints to the US government.[17]

 
Map created by American intelligence showing Surface-to-Air Missile activity in Cuba, September 5, 1962

The first consignment of Soviet R-12 missiles arrived on the night of September 8, followed by a second on September 16. The R-12 was a medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead.[58] It was a single-stage, road-transportable, surface-launched, storable liquid propellant fuelled missile that could deliver a megaton-class nuclear weapon.[citation needed] The Soviets were building nine sites—six for R-12 medium-range missiles (NATO designation SS-4 Sandal) with an effective range of 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) and three for R-14 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (NATO designation SS-5 Skean) with a maximum range of 4,500 kilometres (2,800 mi).[citation needed]

On October 7, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado spoke at the UN General Assembly: "If... we are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ."[59] On October 10 in another Senate speech Sen. Keating reaffirmed his earlier warning of August 31 and stated that, "Construction has begun on at least a half dozen launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles."[60]

The Cuban leadership was further upset when on September 20, the US Senate approved Joint Resolution 230, which expressed the US was determined "to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally-supported military capability endangering the security of the United States".[61][62] On the same day, the US announced a major military exercise in the Caribbean, PHIBRIGLEX-62, which Cuba denounced as a deliberate provocation and proof that the US planned to invade Cuba.[62][63][unreliable source?]

The Soviet leadership believed, based on its perception of Kennedy's lack of confidence during the Bay of Pigs Invasion, that he would avoid confrontation and accept the missiles as a fait accompli.[19]: 1  On September 11, the Soviet Union publicly warned that a US attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships that were carrying supplies to the island would mean war.[17] The Soviets continued the Maskirovka program to conceal their actions in Cuba. They repeatedly denied that the weapons being brought into Cuba were offensive in nature. On September 7, Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin assured United States Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson that the Soviet Union was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba. On September 11, the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS: Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza) announced that the Soviet Union had no need or intention to introduce offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba. On October 13, Dobrynin was questioned by former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles about whether the Soviets planned to put offensive weapons in Cuba. He denied any such plans.[62] On October 17, Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought President Kennedy a personal message from Khrushchev reassuring him that "under no circumstances would surface-to-surface missiles be sent to Cuba."[62]: 494 

Missiles reported

The missiles in Cuba allowed the Soviets to effectively target most of the Continental US. The planned arsenal was forty launchers. The Cuban populace readily noticed the arrival and deployment of the missiles and hundreds of reports reached Miami. US intelligence received countless reports, many of dubious quality or even laughable, most of which could be dismissed as describing defensive missiles.[64][65][66]

Only five reports bothered the analysts. They described large trucks passing through towns at night that were carrying very long canvas-covered cylindrical objects that could not make turns through towns without backing up and maneuvering. Defensive missile transporters, it was believed, could make such turns without undue difficulty. The reports could not be satisfactorily dismissed.[67]

 
A U-2 reconnaissance photograph of Cuba, showing Soviet nuclear missiles, their transports and tents for fueling and maintenance

Aerial confirmation

The United States had been sending U-2 surveillance over Cuba since the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion.[68] The first issue that led to a pause in reconnaissance flights took place on August 30, when a U-2 operated by the US Air Force's Strategic Air Command flew over Sakhalin Island in the Soviet Far East by mistake. The Soviets lodged a protest and the US apologized. Nine days later, a Taiwanese-operated U-2[69][70] was lost over western China to an SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM). US officials were worried that one of the Cuban or Soviet SAMs in Cuba might shoot down a CIA U-2, initiating another international incident. In a meeting with members of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) on September 10, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy heavily restricted further U-2 flights over Cuban airspace. The resulting lack of coverage over the island for the next five weeks became known to historians as the "Photo Gap".[71] No significant U-2 coverage was achieved over the interior of the island. US officials attempted to use a Corona photo-reconnaissance satellite to obtain coverage over reported Soviet military deployments, but imagery acquired over western Cuba by a Corona KH-4 mission on October 1 was heavily covered by clouds and haze and failed to provide any usable intelligence.[72] At the end of September, Navy reconnaissance aircraft photographed the Soviet ship Kasimov, with large crates on its deck the size and shape of Il-28 jet bomber fuselages.[36]

In September 1962, analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) noticed that Cuban surface-to-air missile sites were arranged in a pattern similar to those used by the Soviet Union to protect its ICBM bases, leading DIA to lobby for the resumption of U-2 flights over the island.[73] Although in the past the flights had been conducted by the CIA, pressure from the Defense Department led to that authority being transferred to the Air Force.[36] Following the loss of a CIA U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960, it was thought that if another U-2 were shot down, an Air Force aircraft arguably being used for a legitimate military purpose would be easier to explain than a CIA flight.

When the reconnaissance missions were reauthorized on October 9, poor weather kept the planes from flying. The US first obtained U-2 photographic evidence of the missiles on October 14, when a U-2 flight piloted by Major Richard Heyser took 928 pictures on a path selected by DIA analysts, capturing images of what turned out to be an SS-4 construction site at San Cristóbal, Pinar del Río Province (now in Artemisa Province), in western Cuba.[74]

 
One of the first U-2 reconnaissance images of missile bases under construction shown to President Kennedy on the morning of October 16, 1962

President notified

On October 15, the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) reviewed the U-2 photographs and identified objects that they interpreted as medium range ballistic missiles. This identification was made, in part, on the strength of reporting provided by Oleg Penkovsky, a double agent in the GRU working for the CIA and MI6. Although he provided no direct reports of the Soviet missile deployments to Cuba, technical and doctrinal details of Soviet missile regiments that had been provided by Penkovsky in the months and years prior to the Crisis helped NPIC analysts correctly identify the missiles on U-2 imagery.[75]

That evening, the CIA notified the Department of State and at 8:30 pm EDT, Bundy chose to wait until the next morning to tell the President. McNamara was briefed at midnight. The next morning, Bundy met with Kennedy and showed him the U-2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA's analysis of the images.[76] At 6:30 pm EDT, Kennedy convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers,[77] in a group he formally named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) after the fact on October 22 by National Security Action Memorandum 196.[78] Without informing the members of EXCOMM, President Kennedy tape-recorded all of their proceedings, and Sheldon M. Stern, head of the Kennedy library transcribed some of them.[79][80]

On October 16, President Kennedy notified Attorney General Robert Kennedy that he was convinced the Soviets were placing missiles in Cuba and it was a legitimate threat. This made the threat of nuclear destruction by two world superpowers a reality. Robert Kennedy responded by contacting the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin. Robert Kennedy expressed his "concern about what was happening" and Dobrynin "was instructed by Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev to assure President Kennedy that there would be no ground-to-ground missiles or offensive weapons placed in Cuba". Khrushchev further assured Kennedy that the Soviet Union had no intention of "disrupting the relationship of our two countries" despite the photo evidence presented before President Kennedy.[81]

Responses considered

 
President Kennedy meets in the Oval Office with General Curtis LeMay and the reconnaissance pilots who found the missile sites in Cuba.

The US had no plan in place because until recently its intelligence had been convinced that the Soviets would never install nuclear missiles in Cuba. EXCOMM discussed several possible courses of action:[82]

  1. Do nothing: American vulnerability to Soviet missiles was not new.
  2. Diplomacy: Use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles.
  3. Secret approach: Offer Castro the choice of splitting with the Soviets or being invaded.
  4. Invasion: Full-force invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro.
  5. Air strike: Use the US Air Force to attack all known missile sites.
  6. Blockade: Use the US Navy to block any missiles from arriving in Cuba.
 
As the article describes, both the US and the Soviet Union considered many possible outcomes of their actions and threats during the crisis (Allison, Graham T.; Zelikow, Philip D.). This game tree models how both actors would have considered their decisions. It is broken down into a simple form for basic understanding.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only solution. They believed that the Soviets would not attempt to stop the US from conquering Cuba. Kennedy was skeptical:

They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something. They can't, after all their statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don't take action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin.[83]

Kennedy concluded that attacking Cuba by air would signal the Soviets to presume "a clear line" to conquer Berlin. Kennedy also believed that US allies would think of the country as "trigger-happy cowboys" who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation.[84]

 
President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara in an EXCOMM meeting, October 29, 1962

The EXCOMM then discussed the effect on the strategic balance of power, both political and military. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the missiles would seriously alter the military balance, but McNamara disagreed. An extra 40, he reasoned, would make little difference to the overall strategic balance. The US already had approximately 5,000 strategic warheads,[85]: 261  but the Soviet Union had only 300. McNamara concluded that the Soviets having 340 would not therefore substantially alter the strategic balance. In 1990, he reiterated that "it made no difference.... The military balance wasn't changed. I didn't believe it then, and I don't believe it now."[86]

The EXCOMM agreed that the missiles would affect the political balance. Kennedy had explicitly promised the American people less than a month before the crisis that "if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States... the United States would act."[87]: 674–681  Further, US credibility among its allies and people would be damaged if the Soviet Union appeared to redress the strategic imbalance by placing missiles in Cuba. Kennedy explained after the crisis that "it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality."[88]

 
President Kennedy meets in the Oval Office with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, October 18, 1962.

On October 18, Kennedy met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, who claimed the weapons were for defensive purposes only. Not wanting to expose what he already knew and to avoid panicking the American public,[89] Kennedy did not reveal that he was already aware of the missile buildup.[90] By October 19, frequent U-2 spy flights showed four operational sites.[citation needed]

Operational plans

Two Operational Plans (OPLAN) were considered. OPLAN 316 envisioned a full invasion of Cuba by Army and Marine units, supported by the Navy, following Air Force and naval airstrikes. Army units in the US would have had trouble fielding mechanised and logistical assets, and the US Navy could not supply enough amphibious shipping to transport even a modest armoured contingent from the Army.

OPLAN 312, primarily an Air Force and Navy carrier operation, was designed with enough flexibility to do anything from engaging individual missile sites to providing air support for OPLAN 316's ground forces.[91]

Blockade

 
A US Navy P-2H Neptune of VP-18 flying over a Soviet cargo ship with crated Il-28s on deck during the Cuban Crisis[92]

Kennedy met with members of EXCOMM and other top advisers throughout October 21, considering two remaining options: an air strike primarily against the Cuban missile bases or a naval blockade of Cuba.[90] A full-scale invasion was not the administration's first option. McNamara supported the naval blockade as a strong but limited military action that left the US in control. The term "blockade" was problematic – according to international law, a blockade is an act of war, but the Kennedy administration did not think that the Soviets would be provoked to attack by a mere blockade.[93] Additionally, legal experts at the State Department and Justice Department concluded that a declaration of war could be avoided if another legal justification, based on the Rio Treaty for defence of the Western Hemisphere, was obtained from a resolution by a two-thirds vote from the members of the Organization of American States (OAS).[94]

Admiral George Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations wrote a position paper that helped Kennedy to differentiate between what they termed a "quarantine"[95] of offensive weapons and a blockade of all materials, claiming that a classic blockade was not the original intention. Since it would take place in international waters, Kennedy obtained the approval of the OAS for military action under the hemispheric defence provisions of the Rio Treaty:

Latin American participation in the quarantine now involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report to the US Commander South Atlantic [COMSOLANT] at Trinidad on November 9. An Argentine submarine and a Marine battalion with lift were available if required. In addition, two Venezuelan destroyers (Destroyers ARV D-11 Nueva Esparta" and "ARV D-21 Zulia") and one submarine (Caribe) had reported to COMSOLANT, ready for sea by November 2. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago offered the use of Chaguaramas Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the "quarantine". The Dominican Republic had made available one escort ship. Colombia was reported ready to furnish units and had sent military officers to the US to discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the "quarantine" operation.[96]

This initially was to involve a naval blockade against offensive weapons within the framework of the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty. Such a blockade might be expanded to cover all types of goods and air transport. The action was to be backed up by surveillance of Cuba. The CNO's scenario was followed closely in later implementing the "quarantine."

On October 19, the EXCOMM formed separate working groups to examine the air strike and blockade options, and by the afternoon most support in the EXCOMM had shifted to a blockade. Reservations about the plan continued to be voiced as late as October 21, the paramount concern being that once the blockade was put into effect, the Soviets would rush to complete some of the missiles. Consequently, the US could find itself bombing operational missiles if the blockade did not force Khrushchev to remove the missiles already on the island.[97]: 99–101 

Speech to the nation

 
President Kennedy signing the Proclamation for Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba at the Oval Office on October 23, 1962[98]

At 3:00 pm EDT on October 22, President Kennedy formally established the executive committee (EXCOMM) with National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 196. At 5:00 pm, he met with Congressional leaders, who contentiously opposed a blockade and demanded a stronger response. In Moscow, US Ambassador Foy D. Kohler briefed Khrushchev on the pending blockade and Kennedy's speech to the nation. Ambassadors around the world gave notice to non-Eastern Bloc leaders. Before the speech, US delegations met with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, French President Charles de Gaulle and Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, José Antonio Mora to brief them on this intelligence and the US's proposed response. All were supportive of the US position. Over the course of the crisis, Kennedy had daily telephone conversations with Macmillan, who was publicly supportive of US actions.[99]

Shortly before his speech, Kennedy telephoned former President Dwight Eisenhower.[100] Kennedy's conversation with the former president also revealed that the two had been consulting during the Cuban Missile Crisis.[101] The two also anticipated that Khrushchev would respond to the Western world in a manner similar to his response during the Suez Crisis, and would possibly wind up trading off[clarification needed] Berlin.[101]

At 7:00 pm EDT on October 22, Kennedy delivered a nationwide televised address on all of the major networks announcing the discovery of the missiles. He noted:

It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.[102]

Kennedy described the administration's plan:

To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba, from whatever nation or port, will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.[102]

During the speech, a directive went out to all US forces worldwide, placing them on DEFCON 3. The heavy cruiser USS Newport News was the designated flagship for the blockade,[95] with USS Leary as Newport News's destroyer escort.[96] Kennedy's speech writer Ted Sorensen stated in 2007 that the address to the nation was "Kennedy's most important speech historically, in terms of its impact on our planet."[103]

Crisis deepens

 
Soviet First Secretary Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy (dated October 24, 1962) stating that the blockade of Cuba "constitute[s] an act of aggression"[104][105]

On October 24, at 11:24 am EDT, a cable, drafted by George Wildman Ball to the US Ambassador in Turkey and NATO, notified them that they were considering making an offer to withdraw the missiles from Italy and Turkey, in exchange for the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. Turkish officials replied that they would "deeply resent" any trade involving the US missile presence in their country.[106] One day later, on the morning of October 25, American journalist Walter Lippmann proposed the same thing in his syndicated column. Castro reaffirmed Cuba's right to self-defense and said that all of its weapons were defensive and Cuba would not allow an inspection.[17]

International response

Three days after Kennedy's speech, the Chinese People's Daily announced that "650,000,000 Chinese men and women were standing by the Cuban people."[107] In West Germany, newspapers supported the US response by contrasting it with the weak American actions in the region during the preceding months. They also expressed some fear that the Soviets might retaliate in Berlin. In France on October 23, the crisis made the front page of all the daily newspapers. The next day, an editorial in Le Monde expressed doubt about the authenticity of the CIA's photographic evidence. Two days later, after a visit by a high-ranking CIA agent, the newspaper accepted the validity of the photographs. In the October 29 issue of Le Figaro, Raymond Aron wrote in support of the American response.[108] On October 24, Pope John XXIII sent a message to the Soviet embassy in Rome, to be transmitted to the Kremlin, in which he voiced his concern for peace. In this message he stated, "We beg all governments not to remain deaf to this cry of humanity. That they do all that is in their power to save peace."[109]

Soviet broadcast and communications

The crisis continued unabated, and on the evening of October 24, the Soviet TASS news agency broadcast a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy, in which Khrushchev warned that the United States' "outright piracy" would lead to war.[110] Khruschev then sent at 9:24 pm a telegram to Kennedy, which was received at 10:52 pm EDT. Khrushchev stated, "if you weigh the present situation with a cool head without giving way to passion, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot afford not to decline the despotic demands of the USA" and that the Soviet Union viewed the blockade as "an act of aggression", and their ships would be instructed to ignore it.[105] After October 23, Soviet communications with the USA increasingly showed indications of having been rushed. Undoubtedly a product of pressure, it was not uncommon for Khrushchev to repeat himself and to send messages lacking basic editing.[111] With President Kennedy making his aggressive intentions of a possible airstrike followed by an invasion on Cuba known, Khrushchev rapidly sought a diplomatic compromise. Communications between the two superpowers had entered into a unique and revolutionary period; with the newly-developed threat of mutual destruction through the deployment of nuclear weapons, diplomacy now demonstrated how power and coercion could dominate negotiations.[clarification needed][112]

US alert level raised

 
Adlai Stevenson shows aerial photos of Cuban missiles to the United Nations, October 25, 1962.

The US requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on October 25. US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin in an emergency meeting of the Security Council, challenging him to admit the existence of the missiles. Ambassador Zorin refused to answer. At 10:00 pm EDT the next day, the US raised the readiness level of Strategic Air Command (SAC) forces to DEFCON 2. For the only confirmed time in US history, B-52 bombers went on continuous airborne alert, and B-47 medium bombers were dispersed to various military and civilian airfields and made ready to take off, fully equipped, on 15 minutes' notice.[113] One-eighth of SAC's 1,436 bombers were on airborne alert, and some 145 intercontinental ballistic missiles stood on ready alert, some of which targeted Cuba.[114] Air Defense Command (ADC) redeployed 161 nuclear-armed interceptors to 16 dispersal fields within nine hours, with one third maintaining 15-minute alert status.[91] Twenty-three nuclear-armed B-52s were sent to orbit points within striking distance of the Soviet Union so it would believe that the US was serious.[115] Jack J. Catton later estimated that about 80 per cent of SAC's planes were ready for launch during the crisis; David A. Burchinal recalled that, by contrast:[116]

the Russians were so thoroughly stood down, and we knew it. They didn't make any move. They did not increase their alert; they did not increase any flights, or their air defense posture. They didn't do a thing, they froze in place. We were never further from nuclear war than at the time of Cuba, never further.

By October 22, Tactical Air Command (TAC) had 511 fighters, plus supporting tankers and reconnaissance aircraft, deployed to face Cuba on one-hour alert status. TAC and the Military Air Transport Service had problems. The concentration of aircraft in Florida strained command and support echelons, which faced critical undermanning in security, armaments, and communications; the absence of initial authorization for war-reserve stocks of conventional munitions forced TAC to scrounge; and the lack of airlift assets to support a major airborne drop necessitated the call-up of 24 reserve squadrons.[91]

On October 25 at 1:45 am EDT, Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's telegram by stating that the US was forced into action after receiving repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba, and when the assurances proved to be false, the deployment "required the responses I have announced.... I hope that your government will take necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation."

 
A declassified map used by the US Navy's Atlantic Fleet showing the position of American and Soviet ships at the height of the crisis

Blockade challenged

At 7:15 am EDT on October 25, USS Essex and USS Gearing attempted to intercept Bucharest but failed to do so. Fairly certain that the tanker did not contain any military material, the US allowed it through the blockade. Later that day, at 5:43 pm, the commander of the blockade effort ordered the destroyer USS Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. to intercept and board the Lebanese freighter Marucla. That took place the next day, and Marucla was cleared through the blockade after its cargo was checked.[117]

At 5:00 pm EDT on October 25, William Clements announced that the missiles in Cuba were still actively being worked on. That report was later verified by a CIA report that suggested there had been no slowdown at all. In response, Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199, authorizing the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft under the command of SACEUR, which had the duty of carrying out first air strikes on the Soviet Union. Kennedy claimed that the blockade had succeeded when the USSR turned back fourteen ships presumably carrying offensive weapons.[118] The first indication of this came from a report from the British GCHQ sent to the White House Situation Room containing intercepted communications from Soviet ships reporting their positions. On October 24, Kislovodsk, a Soviet cargo ship, reported a position north-east of where it had been 24 hours earlier indicating it had "discontinued" its voyage and turned back towards the Baltic. The next day, reports showed more ships originally bound for Cuba had altered their course.[119]

Raising the stakes

The next morning, October 26, Kennedy informed the EXCOMM that he believed only an invasion would remove the missiles from Cuba. He was persuaded to give the matter time and continue with both military and diplomatic pressure. He agreed and ordered the low-level flights over the island to be increased from two per day to once every two hours. He also ordered a crash program to institute a new civil government in Cuba if an invasion went ahead.

At this point, the crisis was ostensibly at a stalemate. The Soviets had shown no indication that they would back down and had made public media and private inter-governmental statements to that effect. The US had no reason to believe otherwise and was in the early stages of preparing for an invasion, along with a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union if it responded militarily, which the US assumed it would.[120] Kennedy had no intention of keeping these plans a secret; with an array of Cuban and Soviet spies forever present, Khrushchev was quickly made aware of this looming danger.

The implicit threat of air strikes on Cuba followed by invasion allowed the United States to exert pressure in future talks. It was the possibility of military action that played an influential role in accelerating Khrushchev's proposal for a compromise.[121] Throughout the closing stages of October, Soviet communications to the United States indicated increasing defensiveness. Khrushchev's increasing tendency to use poorly phrased and ambiguous communications throughout the compromise negotiations conversely increased United States confidence and clarity in messaging. Leading Soviet figures consistently failed to mention that only the Cuban government could agree to inspections of the territory and continually made arrangements relating to Cuba without the knowledge of Fidel Castro himself. According to Dean Rusk, Khrushchev "blinked"; he began to panic from the consequences of his own plan, and this was reflected in the tone of Soviet messages. This allowed the US to largely dominate negotiations in late October.[122]

Secret negotiations

At 1:00 pm EDT on October 26, John A. Scali of ABC News had lunch with Aleksandr Fomin, the cover name of Alexander Feklisov, the KGB station chief in Washington, at Fomin's request. Following the instructions of the Politburo of the CPSU,[123] Fomin noted, "War seems about to break out." He asked Scali to use his contacts to talk to his "high-level friends" at the State Department to see if the US would be interested in a diplomatic solution. He suggested that the language of the deal would contain an assurance from the Soviet Union to remove the weapons under UN supervision and that Castro would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons again in exchange for a public statement by the US that it would not invade Cuba.[124] The US responded by asking the Brazilian government to pass a message to Castro that the US would be "unlikely to invade" if the missiles were removed.[106]

Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot, and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

— Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962[125]

At 6:00 pm EDT on October 26, the State Department started receiving a message that appeared to be written personally by Khrushchev. It was Saturday 2:00 am in Moscow. The long letter took several minutes to arrive, and it took translators additional time to translate and transcribe it.[106]

Robert F. Kennedy described the letter as "very long and emotional". Khrushchev reiterated the basic outline that had been stated to Scali earlier in the day: "I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear." At 6:45 pm EDT, news of Fomin's offer to Scali was finally heard and was interpreted as a "set up" for the arrival of Khrushchev's letter. The letter was then considered official and accurate, although it was later learned that Fomin was almost certainly operating of his own accord without official backing. Additional study of the letter was ordered and continued into the night.[106]

Crisis continues

Direct aggression against Cuba would mean nuclear war. The Americans speak about such aggression as if they did not know or did not want to accept this fact. I have no doubt they would lose such a war.

— Che Guevara, October 1962[126]
 
S-75 Dvina with V-750V 1D missile (NATO designation SA-2 Guideline) on a launcher. A similar installation shot down Major Anderson's U-2 over Cuba.

Castro, on the other hand, was convinced that an invasion of Cuba was soon at hand, and on October 26, he sent a telegram to Khrushchev that appeared to call for a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the US in case of attack. In a 2010 interview, Castro expressed regret about his 1962 stance on first use: "After I've seen what I've seen, and knowing what I know now, it wasn't worth it at all."[127] Castro also ordered all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba to fire on any US aircraft;[128] previous orders had been to fire only on groups of two or more. At 6:00 am EDT on October 27, the CIA delivered a memo reporting that three of the four missile sites at San Cristobal and both sites at Sagua la Grande appeared to be fully operational. It also noted that the Cuban military continued to organise for action but was under order not to initiate action unless attacked.[citation needed]

At 9:00 am EDT on October 27, Radio Moscow began broadcasting a message from Khrushchev. Contrary to the letter of the night before, the message offered a new trade: the missiles on Cuba would be removed in exchange for the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey. At 10:00 am EDT, the executive committee met again to discuss the situation and came to the conclusion that the change in the message was because of internal debate between Khrushchev and other party officials in the Kremlin.[129]: 300  Kennedy realised that he would be in an "insupportable position if this becomes Khrushchev's proposal" because the missiles in Turkey were not militarily useful and were being removed anyway and "It's gonna – to any man at the United Nations or any other rational man, it will look like a very fair trade." Bundy explained why Khrushchev's public acquiescence could not be considered: "The current threat to peace is not in Turkey, it is in Cuba."[130]

McNamara noted that another tanker, the Grozny, was about 600 miles (970 km) out and should be intercepted. He also noted that they had not made the Soviets aware of the blockade line and suggested relaying that information to them via U Thant at the United Nations.[131]

 
A Lockheed U-2F, the high altitude reconnaissance type shot down over Cuba, being refueled by a Boeing KC-135Q. The aircraft in 1962 was painted overall gray and carried USAF military markings and national insignia.

While the meeting progressed, at 11:03 am EDT a new message began to arrive from Khrushchev. The message stated, in part:

"You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is ninety-nine miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But... you have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Italy and Turkey, literally next to us.... I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive.... Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States... will remove its analogous means from Turkey... and after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made."

The executive committee continued to meet through the day.

Throughout the crisis, Turkey had repeatedly stated that it would be upset if the Jupiter missiles were removed. Italy's Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, who was also Foreign Minister ad interim, offered to allow withdrawal of the missiles deployed in Apulia as a bargaining chip. He gave the message to one of his most trusted friends, Ettore Bernabei, general manager of RAI-TV, to convey to Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. Bernabei was in New York to attend an international conference on satellite TV broadcasting.

 
The engine of the Lockheed U-2 shot down over Cuba on display at Museum of the Revolution in Havana

On the morning of October 27, a U-2F (the third CIA U-2A, modified for air-to-air refuelling) piloted by USAF Major Rudolf Anderson,[132] departed its forward operating location at McCoy AFB, Florida. At approximately 12:00 pm EDT, the aircraft was struck by an SA-2 surface-to-air missile launched from Cuba. The aircraft crashed, and Anderson was killed. Stress in negotiations between the Soviets and the US intensified; only later was it assumed that the decision to fire the missile was made locally by an undetermined Soviet commander, acting on his own authority. Later that day, at about 3:41 pm EDT, several US Navy RF-8A Crusader aircraft, on low-level photo-reconnaissance missions, were fired upon.

On October 28, 1962, Khrushchev told his son Sergei that the shooting down of Anderson's U-2 was by the "Cuban military at the direction of Raul Castro".[133][134][135][136]

At 4:00 pm EDT, Kennedy recalled members of EXCOMM to the White House and ordered that a message should immediately be sent to U Thant asking the Soviets to suspend work on the missiles while negotiations were carried out. During the meeting, General Maxwell Taylor delivered the news that the U-2 had been shot down. Kennedy had earlier claimed he would order an attack on such sites if fired upon, but he decided to not act unless another attack was made. Forty years later, McNamara said:

We had to send a U-2 over to gain reconnaissance information on whether the Soviet missiles were becoming operational. We believed that if the U-2 was shot down that—the Cubans didn't have capabilities to shoot it down, the Soviets did—we believed if it was shot down, it would be shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air-missile unit, and that it would represent a decision by the Soviets to escalate the conflict. And therefore, before we sent the U-2 out, we agreed that if it was shot down we wouldn't meet, we'd simply attack. It was shot down on Friday.... Fortunately, we changed our mind, we thought "Well, it might have been an accident, we won't attack." Later we learned that Khrushchev had reasoned just as we did: we send over the U-2, if it was shot down, he reasoned we would believe it was an intentional escalation. And therefore, he issued orders to Pliyev, the Soviet commander in Cuba, to instruct all of his batteries not to shoot down the U-2.[note 1][137]

Ellsberg said that Robert Kennedy (RFK) told him in 1964 that after the U-2 was shot down and the pilot killed, he (RFK) told Soviet ambassador Dobrynin, "You have drawn first blood ... . [T]he president had decided against advice ... not to respond militarily to that attack, but he [Dobrynin] should know that if another plane was shot at, ... we would take out all the SAMs and antiaircraft ... . And that would almost surely be followed by an invasion."[138]

Drafting response

Emissaries sent by both Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to meet at the Yenching Palace Chinese restaurant in the Cleveland Park neighbourhood of Washington, DC, on Saturday evening, October 27.[139] Kennedy suggested to take Khrushchev's offer to trade away the missiles. Unknown to most members of the EXCOMM, but with the support of his brother the president, Robert Kennedy had been meeting with the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington to discover whether the intentions were genuine.[140] The EXCOMM was generally against the proposal because it would undermine NATO's authority, and the Turkish government had repeatedly stated it was against any such trade.

As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged, and Kennedy was slowly persuaded. The new plan called for him to ignore the latest message and instead to return to Khrushchev's earlier one. Kennedy was initially hesitant, feeling that Khrushchev would no longer accept the deal because a new one had been offered, but Llewellyn Thompson argued that it was still possible.[97]: 135–56  White House Special Counsel and Adviser Ted Sorensen and Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later, with a draft letter to that effect. The President made several changes, had it typed, and sent it.

After the EXCOMM meeting, a smaller meeting continued in the Oval Office. The group argued that the letter should be underscored with an oral message to Dobrynin that stated that if the missiles were not withdrawn, military action would be used to remove them. Rusk added one proviso that no part of the language of the deal would mention Turkey, but there would be an understanding that the missiles would be removed "voluntarily" in the immediate aftermath. The president agreed, and the message was sent.

 
EXCOMM meeting in the White House Cabinet Room, with President Kennedy, Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk in attendance, October 29, 1962

At Rusk's request, Fomin and Scali met again. Scali asked why the two letters from Khrushchev were so different, and Fomin claimed it was because of "poor communications". Scali replied that the claim was not credible and shouted that he thought it was a "stinking double cross". He went on to claim that an invasion was only hours away, and Fomin stated that a response to the US message was expected from Khrushchev shortly and urged Scali to tell the State Department that no treachery was intended. Scali said that he did not think anyone would believe him, but he agreed to deliver the message. The two went their separate ways, and Scali immediately typed out a memo for the EXCOMM.[141]

Within the US establishment, it was well understood that ignoring the second offer and returning to the first put Khrushchev in a terrible position. Military preparations continued, and all active duty Air Force personnel were recalled to their bases for possible action. Robert Kennedy later recalled the mood: "We had not abandoned all hope, but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev's revising his course within the next few hours. It was a hope, not an expectation. The expectation was military confrontation by Tuesday (October 30), and possibly tomorrow (October 29) ...."[141]

At 8:05 pm EDT, the letter drafted earlier in the day was delivered. The message read, "As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows: 1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safe-guards, to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems into Cuba. 2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations, to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against the invasion of Cuba." The letter was also released directly to the press to ensure it could not be "delayed".[142] With the letter delivered, a deal was on the table. As Robert Kennedy noted, there was little expectation it would be accepted. At 9:00 pm EDT, the EXCOMM met again to review the actions for the following day. Plans were drawn up for air strikes on the missile sites as well as other economic targets, notably petroleum storage. McNamara stated that they had to "have two things ready: a government for Cuba, because we're going to need one; and secondly, plans for how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe, because sure as hell they're going to do something there".[143]

At 12:12 am EDT, on October 27, the US informed its NATO allies that "the situation is growing shorter.... the United States may find it necessary within a very short time in its interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary." To add to the concern, at 6:00 am, the CIA reported that all missiles in Cuba were ready for action.

 
A US Navy HSS-1 Seabat helicopter hovers over Soviet submarine B-59, driven to the surface by US Naval forces in the Caribbean near Cuba (October 28 or 29, 1962).

On October 27, Khrushchev also received a letter from Castro, what is now known as the Armageddon Letter (dated the day before), which was interpreted as urging the use of nuclear force in the event of an attack on Cuba:[144] "I believe the imperialists' aggressiveness is extremely dangerous and if they actually carry out the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of international law and morality, that would be the moment to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be," Castro wrote.[145]

Averted nuclear launch

Later that same day, what the White House later called "Black Saturday", the US Navy dropped a series of "signalling" depth charges (practice depth charges the size of hand grenades)[146] on a Soviet submarine (B-59) at the blockade line, unaware that it was armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo with orders that allowed it to be used if the submarine was damaged by depth charges or surface fire.[147] As the submarine was too deep to monitor any radio traffic,[148][149] the captain of the B-59, Valentin Grigoryevich Savitsky, decided that a war might already have started and wanted to launch a nuclear torpedo.[150] The decision to launch these normally only required agreement from the two commanding officers on board, the Captain and the Political Officer. However, the commander of the submarine Flotilla, Vasily Arkhipov, was aboard B-59 and so he also had to agree. Arkhipov objected and so the nuclear launch was narrowly averted.

On the same day a U-2 spy plane made an accidental, unauthorised ninety-minute overflight of the Soviet Union's far eastern coast.[151] The Soviets responded by scrambling MiG fighters from Wrangel Island; in turn, the Americans launched F-102 fighters armed with nuclear air-to-air missiles over the Bering Sea.[152]

Resolution

On Saturday, October 27, after much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy secretly agreed to remove all missiles set in Turkey and possibly southern Italy, the former on the border of the Soviet Union, in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in Cuba.[153] There is some dispute as to whether removing the missiles from Italy was part of the secret agreement. Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that it was, and when the crisis had ended McNamara gave the order to dismantle the missiles in both Italy and Turkey.[154]

At this point, Khrushchev knew things the US did not. First, that the shooting down of the U-2 by a Soviet missile violated direct orders from Moscow, and Cuban anti-aircraft fire against other US reconnaissance aircraft also violated direct orders from Khrushchev to Castro.[155] Second, the Soviets already had 162 nuclear warheads on Cuba that the US did not then believe were there.[156] Third, the Soviets and Cubans on the island would almost certainly have responded to an invasion by using those nuclear weapons, even though Castro believed that every human in Cuba would likely die as a result.[157] Khrushchev also knew but may not have considered the fact that he had submarines armed with nuclear weapons that the US Navy may not have known about.

Khrushchev knew he was losing control. President Kennedy had been told in early 1961 that a nuclear war would likely kill a third of humanity, with most or all of those deaths concentrated in the US, the USSR, Europe and China;[158] Khrushchev may well have received similar reports from his military.

With this background, when Khrushchev heard Kennedy's threats relayed by Robert Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, he immediately drafted his acceptance of Kennedy's latest terms from his dacha without involving the Politburo, as he had previously, and had them immediately broadcast over Radio Moscow, which he believed the US would hear. In that broadcast at 9:00 am EST, on October 28, Khrushchev stated that "the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as 'offensive' and their crating and return to the Soviet Union."[159][160][161] At 10:00 am, October 28, Kennedy first learned of Khrushchev's solution to the crisis with the US removing the 15 Jupiters in Turkey and the Soviets would remove the rockets from Cuba. Khrushchev had made the offer in a public statement for the world to hear. Despite almost solid opposition from his senior advisers, Kennedy quickly embraced the Soviet offer. "This is a pretty good play of his," Kennedy said, according to a tape recording that he made secretly of the Cabinet Room meeting. Kennedy had deployed the Jupiters in March 1962, causing a stream of angry outbursts from Khrushchev. "Most people will think this is a rather even trade and we ought to take advantage of it," Kennedy said. Vice President Lyndon Johnson was the first to endorse the missile swap but others continued to oppose the offer. Finally, Kennedy ended the debate. "We can't very well invade Cuba with all its toil and blood," Kennedy said, "when we could have gotten them out by making a deal on the same missiles on Turkey. If that's part of the record, then you don't have a very good war."[162]

Kennedy immediately responded to Khrushchev's letter, issuing a statement calling it "an important and constructive contribution to peace".[161] He continued this with a formal letter:

I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out.... The US will make a statement in the framework of the Security Council in reference to Cuba as follows: it will declare that the United States of America will respect the inviolability of Cuban borders, its sovereignty, that it take the pledge not to interfere in internal affairs, not to intrude themselves and not to permit our territory to be used as a bridgehead for the invasion of Cuba, and will restrain those who would plan to carry an aggression against Cuba, either from US territory or from the territory of other countries neighboring to Cuba.[161][163]: 103 

Kennedy's planned statement would also contain suggestions he had received from his adviser Schlesinger Jr. in a "Memorandum for the President" describing the "Post Mortem on Cuba".[164]

On October 28, Kennedy participated in telephone conversations with Eisenhower[165] and fellow former US President Harry Truman.[166] In these calls, Kennedy revealed that he thought the crisis would result in the two superpowers being "toe to toe"[165] in Berlin by the end of the following month and expressed concern that the Soviet setback in Cuba would "make things tougher"[166] there. He also informed his predecessors that he had rejected the public Soviet offer to withdraw from Cuba in exchange for the withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey.[165][166]

 
Removal of Missiles in Cuba November 11, 1962 – NARA – 193868

The US continued the blockade; in the following days, aerial reconnaissance proved that the Soviets were making progress in removing the missile systems. The 42 missiles and their support equipment were loaded onto eight Soviet ships. On November 2, 1962, Kennedy addressed the US via radio and television broadcasts regarding the dismantlement process of the Soviet R-12 missile bases located in the Caribbean region.[167] The ships left Cuba on November 5 to 9. The US made a final visual check as each of the ships passed the blockade line. Further diplomatic efforts were required to remove the Soviet Il-28 bombers, and they were loaded on three Soviet ships on December 5 and 6. Concurrent with the Soviet commitment on the Il-28s, the US government announced the end of the blockade from 6:45 pm EST on November 20, 1962.[citation needed]

At the time when the Kennedy administration thought that the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved, nuclear tactical rockets stayed in Cuba since they were not part of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings and the Americans did not know about them. The Soviets changed their minds, fearing possible future Cuban militant steps, and on November 22, 1962, Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union Anastas Mikoyan told Castro that the rockets with the nuclear warheads were being removed as well.[48]

In his negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, Robert Kennedy informally proposed that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed[168] "within a short time after this crisis was over".[169]: 222  Under an operation code-named Operation Pot Pie,[170] the removal of the Jupiters from Italy and Turkey began on April 1, and was completed by April 24, 1963. The initial plans were to recycle the missiles for use in other programs, but NASA and the USAF were not interested in retaining the missile hardware. The missile bodies were destroyed on site, warheads, guidance packages, and launching equipment worth $14 million were returned to the United States.[171][172]

The practical effect of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact was that the US would remove their rockets from Italy and Turkey[173][174] and that the Soviets had no intention of resorting to nuclear war if they were out-gunned by the US.[clarification needed][failed verification] Because the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from NATO bases in Italy and Turkey was not made public at the time,[168] Khrushchev appeared to have lost the conflict and become weakened. The perception was that Kennedy had won the contest between the superpowers and that Khrushchev had been humiliated. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid full conflict despite pressures from their respective governments. Khrushchev held power for another two years.[163]: 102–105 

Nuclear forces

By the time of the crisis in October 1962, the total number of nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of each country numbered approximately 26,400 for the United States and 3,300 for the Soviet Union. For the US, around 3,500 (with a combined yield of approximately 6,300 megatons) would have been used in attacking the Soviet Union. The Soviets had considerably less strategic firepower at their disposal: some 300–320 bombs and warheads, without submarine-based weapons in a position to threaten the US mainland and most of their intercontinental delivery systems based on bombers that would have difficulty penetrating North American air defence systems. However, they had already moved 158 warheads to Cuba; between 95 and 100 would have been ready for use if the US had invaded Cuba, most of which were short-ranged. The US had approximately 4,375 nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, most of which were tactical weapons such as nuclear artillery, with around 450 of them for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft; the Soviets had more than 550 similar weapons in Europe.[175][176]

United States

  • SAC
  • Atlantic Command
    • 112 UGM-27 Polaris in seven SSBNs (16 each); five submarines with Polaris A1 and two with A2
  • Pacific Command
  • European Command
    • IRBM: 105; 60 Thor (UK), 45 Jupiter (30 Italy, 15 Turkey)
    • 48–90 Mace cruise missiles
    • Two US Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers with some 40 bombs each
    • Land-based aircraft with some 50 bombs

Soviet Union

  • Strategic (for use against North America):
  • Regional (mostly targeting Europe, and others targeting US bases in east Asia):
    • MRBM: 528 SS-4/R-12, 492 at soft launch sites and 36 at hard launch sites (approximately six to eight R-12s were operational in Cuba, capable of striking the US mainland at any moment until the crisis was resolved)
    • IRBM: 28 SS-5/R-14
    • Unknown number of Tu-16 Badger, Tu-22 Blinder, and MiG-21 aircraft tasked with nuclear strike missions

Aftermath

 
The nuclear-armed Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missile. The US secretly agreed to withdraw the missiles from Italy and Turkey.

Cuban leadership

Cuba perceived the outcome as a betrayal by the Soviets, as decisions on how to resolve the crisis had been made exclusively by Kennedy and Khrushchev. Castro was especially upset that certain issues of interest to Cuba, such as the status of the US Naval Base in Guantánamo, were not addressed. That caused Cuban–Soviet relations to deteriorate for years to come.[47]: 278 

Historian Arthur Schlesinger believed that when the missiles were withdrawn, Castro was more angry with Khrushchev than with Kennedy because Khrushchev had not consulted Castro before deciding to remove them.[note 2] Although Castro was infuriated by Khrushchev, he planned on striking the US with the remaining missiles if an invasion of the island occurred.[47]: 311 

A few weeks after the crisis, during an interview with the British communist newspaper the Daily Worker, Guevara was still fuming over the perceived Soviet betrayal and told correspondent Sam Russell that, if the missiles had been under Cuban control, they would have fired them off.[177] While expounding on the incident later, Guevara reiterated that the cause of socialist liberation against global "imperialist aggression" would ultimately have been worth the possibility of "millions of atomic war victims".[178] The missile crisis further convinced Guevara that the world's two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) used Cuba as a pawn in their own global strategies. Afterward, he denounced the Soviets almost as frequently as he denounced the Americans.[179]

Romanian leadership

During the crisis, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, general secretary of Romania's communist party, sent a letter to President Kennedy dissociating Romania from Soviet actions. This convinced the American administration of Bucharest's intentions of detaching itself from Moscow.[1]

Soviet leadership

The enormity of how close the world came to thermonuclear war impelled Khrushchev to propose a far-reaching easing of tensions with the US.[180] In a letter to President Kennedy dated October 30, 1962, Khrushchev outlined a range of bold initiatives to forestall the possibility of a further nuclear crisis, including proposing a non-aggression treaty between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact or even disbanding these military blocs, a treaty to cease all nuclear weapons testing and even the elimination of all nuclear weapons, resolution of the hot-button issue of Germany by both East and West formally accepting the existence of West Germany and East Germany, and US recognition of the government of mainland China. The letter invited counter-proposals and further exploration of these and other issues through peaceful negotiations. Khrushchev invited Norman Cousins, the editor of a major US periodical and an anti-nuclear weapons activist, to serve as liaison with President Kennedy, and Cousins met with Khrushchev for four hours in December 1962.[181]

Kennedy's response to Khrushchev's proposals was lukewarm but Kennedy expressed to Cousins that he felt constrained in exploring these issues due to pressure from hardliners in the US national security apparatus. The United States and the Soviet Union did shortly thereafter agree on a treaty banning atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, known as the "Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty".[182]

Further after the crisis, the US and the USSR created the Moscow–Washington hotline, a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington. The purpose was to have a way that the leaders of the two Cold War countries could communicate directly to solve such a crisis.

The compromise embarrassed Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the withdrawal of US missiles from Italy and Turkey was a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Khrushchev went to Kennedy as he thought that the crisis was getting out of hand, but the Soviets were seen as retreating from circumstances that they had started.

Khrushchev's fall from power two years later was in part because of the Soviet Politburo's embarrassment at both Khrushchev's eventual concessions to the US and this ineptitude in precipitating the crisis in the first place. According to Dobrynin, the top Soviet leadership took the Cuban outcome as "a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation".[183]

US leadership

The worldwide US Forces DEFCON 3 status was returned to DEFCON 4 on November 20, 1962. General Curtis LeMay told the President that the resolution of the crisis was the "greatest defeat in our history"; his was a minority position.[84] He had pressed for an immediate invasion of Cuba as soon as the crisis began and still favored invading Cuba even after the Soviets had withdrawn their missiles.[184] Twenty-five years later, LeMay still believed that "We could have gotten not only the missiles out of Cuba, we could have gotten the Communists out of Cuba at that time."[116]

By 1962 President Kennedy faced four crisis situations: the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion that he had approved of,[185] settlement negotiations between the pro-Western government of Laos and the Pathet Lao communist movement ("Kennedy sidestepped Laos, whose rugged terrain was no battleground for American soldiers."[186]: 265 ), the construction of the Berlin Wall, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy believed that yet another failure to gain control and stop communist expansion would irreparably damage US credibility. He was determined to "draw a line in the sand" and prevent a communist victory in Vietnam. He told James Reston of The New York Times immediately after his Vienna summit meeting with Khrushchev, "Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place."[187][188]

At least four contingency strikes were armed and launched from Florida against Cuban airfields and suspected missile sites in 1963 and 1964, although all were diverted to the Pinecastle Range Complex after the planes passed Andros island.[189] Critics, including Seymour Melman[190] and Seymour Hersh,[191] suggested that the Cuban Missile Crisis encouraged the United States' use of military means, such as the case in the later Vietnam War.

Human casualties

U-2 pilot Anderson's body was returned to the US and was buried with full military honours in South Carolina. He was the first recipient of the newly created Air Force Cross, which was awarded posthumously. Although Anderson was the only combatant fatality during the crisis, 11 crew members of three reconnaissance Boeing RB-47 Stratojets of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing were also killed in crashes during the period between September 27 and November 11, 1962.[192] Seven crew died when a Military Air Transport Service Boeing C-135B Stratolifter delivering ammunition to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base stalled and crashed on approach on October 23.[193]

Later revelations

Submarine close call

Arguably, the most dangerous moment in the crisis was not recognized until the Cuban Missile Crisis Havana conference, in October 2002. Attended by many of the veterans of the crisis, they all learned that on October 27, 1962, USS Beale had tracked and dropped signalling depth charges (the size of hand grenades) on B-59, a Soviet Project 641 (NATO designation Foxtrot) submarine. Unknown to the US, it was armed with a 15-kiloton nuclear torpedo.[194] Running out of air, the Soviet submarine was surrounded by American warships and desperately needed to surface. An argument broke out among three officers aboard B-59, including submarine captain Valentin Savitsky, political officer Ivan Semyonovich Maslennikov, and Deputy brigade commander Captain 2nd rank (US Navy Commander rank equivalent) Vasily Arkhipov. An exhausted Savitsky became furious and ordered that the nuclear torpedo on board be made combat ready. Accounts differ about whether Arkhipov convinced Savitsky not to make the attack or whether Savitsky himself finally concluded that the only reasonable choice left open to him was to come to the surface.[195]: 303, 317  During the conference, McNamara stated that nuclear war had come much closer than people had thought. Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive, said, "A guy called Vasily Arkhipov saved the world."

Possibility of nuclear launch

In early 1992, it was confirmed that Soviet forces in Cuba had already received tactical nuclear warheads for their artillery rockets and Il-28 bombers when the crisis broke.[196] Castro stated that he would have recommended their use if the US invaded despite Cuba being destroyed.[196]

Fifty years after the crisis, Graham Allison wrote:

Fifty years ago, the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster. During the standoff, US President John F. Kennedy thought the chance of escalation to war was "between 1 in 3 and even", and what we have learned in later decades has done nothing to lengthen those odds. We now know, for example, that in addition to nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, the Soviet Union had deployed 100 tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba, and the local Soviet commander there could have launched these weapons without additional codes or commands from Moscow. The US air strike and invasion that were scheduled for the third week of the confrontation would likely have triggered a nuclear response against American ships and troops, and perhaps even Miami. The resulting war might have led to the deaths of over 100 million Americans and over 100 million Russians.[197][198]

BBC journalist Joe Matthews published the story, on October 13, 2012, behind the 100 tactical nuclear warheads mentioned by Graham Allison in the excerpt above.[199] Khrushchev feared that Castro's hurt pride and widespread Cuban indignation over the concessions he had made to Kennedy might lead to a breakdown of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. To prevent that, Khrushchev decided to offer to give Cuba more than 100 tactical nuclear weapons that had been shipped to Cuba along with the long-range missiles but, crucially, had escaped the notice of US intelligence. Khrushchev determined that because the Americans had not listed the missiles on their list of demands, keeping them in Cuba would be in the Soviet Union's interests.[199]

Anastas Mikoyan was tasked with the negotiations with Castro over the missile transfer deal that was designed to prevent a breakdown in the relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union. While in Havana, Mikoyan witnessed the mood swings and paranoia of Castro, who was convinced that Moscow had made the agreement with the US at the expense of Cuba's defence. Mikoyan, on his own initiative, decided that Castro and his military should not be given control of weapons with an explosive force equal to 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs under any circumstances. He defused the seemingly intractable situation, which risked re-escalating the crisis, on November 22, 1962. During a tense, four-hour meeting, Mikoyan convinced Castro that despite Moscow's desire to help, it would be in breach of an unpublished Soviet law, which did not actually exist, to transfer the missiles permanently into Cuban hands and provide them with an independent nuclear deterrent. Castro was forced to give way and, much to the relief of Khrushchev and the rest of the Soviet government, the tactical nuclear weapons were crated and returned by sea to the Soviet Union during December 1962.[199]

In popular culture

 
A Soviet ship unloading a missile in the 1969 spy movie Topaz

The American popular media, especially television, made frequent use of the events of the missile crisis in both fictional and documentary forms.[200] Jim Willis includes the Crisis as one of the 100 "media moments that changed America".[201] Sheldon Stern finds that a half century later there are still many "misconceptions, half-truths, and outright lies" that have shaped media versions of what happened in the White House during those harrowing two weeks.[202]

Historian William Cohn argued in a 1976 article that television programs are typically the main source used by the American public to know about and interpret the past.[203] According to Cold War historian Andrei Kozovoi, the Soviet media proved somewhat disorganized as it was unable to generate a coherent popular history. Khrushchev lost power and was airbrushed out of the story. Cuba was no longer portrayed as a heroic David against the American Goliath. One contradiction that pervaded the Soviet media campaign was between the pacifistic rhetoric of the peace movement that emphasizes the horrors of nuclear war and the militancy of the need to prepare Soviets for war against American aggression.[204]

Media representations

Non fiction

Fiction

  • Topaz, 1969 film by Alfred Hitchcock based on the 1967 novel by Leon Uris, set during the run-up to the crisis.[208]
  • Matinee, 1993 film starring John Goodman set during the Cuban Missile Crisis in which an independent-filmmaker decides to seize the opportunity to debut an atomic themed film.[209]
  • Thirteen Days (film), based on The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, a 2000 docudrama directed by Roger Donaldson about the crisis.[210]
  • Command & Conquer: Red Alert 3, a 2008 video game, set in an alternate timeline where Einstein did not exist. During the Allied Nations campaign, an alternate version of the Cuban Missile Crisis occurs, dubbed in game as the mission "The Great Bear Trap", where the Soviet Union had secretly planned and constructed an invasion force in Havana, capped by specially designed Kirov Airships that were yielding 50 megaton bombs and intended to fly towards Allied controlled cities.
  • Mad Men, the 2008 episode "Meditations in an Emergency" is set in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
  • Ur, a 2009 short novel by Stephen King, is about three men who discover through a magic Kindle that in a parallel universe, the Cuban Missile Crisis escalated into a nuclear war and ended that universe.[211]
  • Call of Duty: Black Ops, 2010 video game, set during and after the Cuban Missile Crisis.[212]
  • The Kennedys (TV miniseries), 2011 production chronicling the lives of the Kennedy family, including a dramatisation of the crisis.[213]
  • X-Men: First Class, 2011 superhero film set during the Cuban Missile Crisis, which depicts the crisis as being escalated by a group of mutants with the goal of establishing a mutant ruling class after the subsequent war.[214]
  • The Courier (2020 film), tells the "true story of the British businessman Greville Wynne (played by Benedict Cumberbatch) who helped MI6 penetrate the Soviet nuclear programme during the Cold War. Wynne and his Russian source, Oleg Penkovsky (codenamed Ironbark), provided crucial intelligence that ended the Cuban Missile Crisis."[215]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ McNamara mistakenly dates the shooting down of USAF Major Rudolf Anderson's U-2 on October 26.
  2. ^ In his biography, Castro did not compare his feelings for either leader at that moment but makes it clear that he was angry with Khrushchev for failing to consult with him. (Ramonet 1978)

References

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  2. ^ "Milestones: 1961–1968 – The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962". history.state.gov. from the original on April 3, 2019.
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  4. ^ Scott, Len; Hughes, R. Gerald (2015). The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal. Taylor & Francis. p. 17. ISBN 9781317555414. from the original on July 29, 2016. Retrieved December 31, 2015.
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  12. ^ Bolender, Keith (2012). Cuba under siege : American policy, the revolution, and its people. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. x, 14, 18–20, 45–57, 63–64, et passim. doi:10.1057/9781137275554. ISBN 978-1-137-27554-7. The economic inequality and social unrest was brought to a head under the brutal Batista dictatorship, supported by American arms, money, and authority. An estimated 20,000 were killed opposing the government from 1955 to his overthrow, with even President John F. Kennedy using this figure in a rare expression of sympathy for revolutionary goals. Kennedy also came closest to recognizing America could not claim ignorance of the harm its neocolonial control was inflicting on the inhabitants...Transformation came swiftly, completely, and often framed in direct conflict with American immoderations. Popular support for radicalization was possible only by aiming it at the social inequalities associated with foreign domination, of which the greater part of the Cuban population, particularly in the rural areas, had tired of finally. The backing of the countryside permitted Castro to act ruthlessly to ensure his revolution would not suffer the same fate as Grau's. Concurrently, America's hostile reaction worked in harmony, if not intentionally, with Castro's political ambitions. He comprehended the turmoil and incongruities of American dominated prerevolution society had to end.
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  15. ^ Piccone, Ted; Miller, Ashley (December 19, 2016). Cuba, the U.S., and the concept of sovereignty: Toward a common vocabulary? (Report). Washington: Brookings Institution. from the original on July 7, 2017. Retrieved January 6, 2023. President Dwight D. Eisenhower approved a plan to train Cuban exiles to commit violent acts of terrorism within Cuba against civilians, and the CIA trained and commanded pilots to bomb civilian airfields...U.S. government officials justified some of the terrorist attacks on Cuban soil on the grounds of coercive regime change
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  18. ^ [14][15][16][17]
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  22. ^ Schoultz, Lars (2009). "State Sponsored Terrorism". That infernal little Cuban republic : the United States and the Cuban Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. pp. 170–211. ISBN 978-0807888605. Retrieved February 2, 2020. What more could be done? How about a program of sabotage focused on blowing up "such targets as refineries, power plants, micro wave stations, radio and TV installations, strategic highway bridges and railroad facilities, military and naval installations and equipment, certain industrial plants and sugar refineries." The CIA proposed just that approach a month after the Bay of Pigs, and the State Department endorsed the proposal... In early November, six months after the Bay of Pigs, JFK authorized the CIA's "Program of Covert Action", now dubbed Operation Mongoose, and named Lansdale its chief of operations. A few days later, President Kennedy told a Seattle audience, "We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adversaries in tactics of terror, assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs and crises." Perhaps – but the Mongoose decision indicated that he was willing to try.
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Further reading

  • Allison, Graham; Zelikow, Philip (1999). Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Addison Wesley Longman. ISBN 978-0-321-01349-1.
  • Barrett, David M. and Max Holland (2012). Blind Over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2012.
  • Campus, Leonardo (2014). I sei giorni che sconvolsero il mondo. La crisi dei missili di Cuba e le sue percezioni internazionali [=Six Days that Shook the World. The Cuban Missile Crisis and Its International Perceptions]. Florence: Le Monnier. ISBN 9788800745321
  • Chayes, Abram (1974). The Cuban Missile Crisis. International crises and the role of law. London: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-825320-4.
  • Cockburn, Andrew, "Defensive, Not Aggressive" (review of Theodore Voorhees, The Silent Guns of Two Octobers: Kennedy and Khrushchev Play the Double Game, Michigan, September 2021, ISBN 978 0 472 03871 8, 384 pp.; and Serhii Plokhy, Nuclear Folly: A New History of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allen Lane, April 2021, ISBN 978 0 241 45473 2, 464 pp.), London Review of Books, vol. 43, no. 17 (9 September 2021), pp. 9–10. "[F]or Kennedy, the [Cuban Missile] crisis was entirely about [internal US] politics." [...] Voorhees argues convincingly that there was never any real danger of war, since Kennedy and Khrushchev were equally determined to avoid one..." (p. 10.)
  • Diez Acosta, Tomás (2002). October 1962: The "Missile" Crisis As Seen from Cuba. New York: Pathfinder. ISBN 978-0-87348-956-0.
  • Divine, Robert A. (1988). The Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: M. Wiener Pub. ISBN 978-0-910129-15-2.
  • Dobbs, Michael (2008). One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War. New York: Knopf. ISBN 978-1-4000-7891-2.
  • Feklisov, Aleksandr; Kostin, Sergueï (2001). The Man Behind the Rosenbergs: By the KGB Spymaster Who Was the Case Officer of Julius Rosenberg, Klaus Fuchs, and Helped Resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Enigma Books. ISBN 978-1-929631-08-7.
  • Frankel, Max (2004). High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Ballantine Books. ISBN 978-0-345-46505-4.
  • Fursenko, Aleksandr; Naftali, Timothy J. (1998). One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964. New York: Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-31790-9.
  • Fursenko, Aleksandr (Summer 2006). . Naval War College Review. 59 (3). Archived from the original on October 6, 2011.
  • George, Alice L. (2003). Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-0-8078-2828-1.
  • Gibson, David R. (2012). Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-0-691-15131-1.
  • Gonzalez, Servando (2002). The Nuclear Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Oakland, CA: Spooks Books. ISBN 978-0-9711391-5-2.
  • Jones, Milo; Silberzahn, Philppe (2013). Constructing Cassandra, Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0804793360.
  • Khrushchev, Sergei (October 2002). "How My Father And President Kennedy Saved The World". American Heritage. 53 (5).
  • Kolbert, Elizabeth, "This Close: The day the Cuban missile crisis almost went nuclear" (a review of Martin J. Sherwin's Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York, Knopf, 2020), The New Yorker, 12 October 2020, pp. 70–73. Article includes information from recently declassified sources.
  • Plokhy, Serhii. Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (W. W. Norton & Company, 2021).
  • Polmar, Norman; Gresham, John D. (2006). DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis. Foreword by Tom Clancy. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. ISBN 978-0-471-67022-3.
  • Pope, Ronald R. (1982). Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Myth and Reality in Foreign Policy Analysis. Washington, DC: Univ. Press of America. ISBN 978-0-8191-2584-2.
  • Powers, Thomas, "The Nuclear Worrier" (review of Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, New York, Bloomsbury, 2017, ISBN 9781608196708, 420 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXV, no. 1 (January 18, 2018), pp. 13–15.
  • Pressman, Jeremy (2001). "September Statements, October Missiles, November Elections: Domestic Politics, Foreign-Policy Making, and the Cuban Missile Crisis". Security Studies. 10 (3): 80–114. doi:10.1080/09636410108429438. S2CID 154854331.
  • Radchenko, Sergey; Zubok, Vladislav (May–June 2023). "Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis". Foreign Affairs. 102 (3): 44–63.
  • Russell, Bertrand (1963). Unarmed Victory. London: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 978-0-04-327024-0.
  • Seydi, SÜleyman. “Turkish—American Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1957-63.” Middle Eastern Studies 46#3 (2010), pp. 433–455. online
  • Stern, Sheldon M. (2003). Averting 'the Final Failure': John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings. Stanford nuclear age series. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-4846-9. Retrieved November 4, 2011.
  • Stern, Sheldon M. (2005). . Stanford nuclear age series. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-5077-6. Archived from the original on October 14, 2011. Retrieved November 4, 2011.
  • Stern, Sheldon M. (2012). The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality. Stanford nuclear age series. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
  • Trahair, Richard C. S.; Miller, Robert L. (2009). Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations. New York: Enigma Books. ISBN 978-1-929631-75-9.
  • Matthews, Joe (October 2012). "Cuban missile crisis: The other, secret one". BBC.
  • Weaver, Michael E. The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force: An Example from the Cuban Missile Crisis, Diplomatic History, January 2014, Volume 38, Number 1, pp. 137–81. The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force: An Example from the Cuban Missile Crisis
  • White, Mark. "The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963." Diplomatic History (2002) 26#1 pp 147–153.

Historiography

  • Allison, Graham T. (September 1969). "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis". American Political Science Review. 63 (3): 689–718. doi:10.2307/1954423. JSTOR 1954423. S2CID 251094337.
  • Dorn, A. Walter; Pauk, Robert (April 2009). "Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis". Diplomatic History. 33 (2): 261–292. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.2008.00762.x.
  • Garthoff, Raymond L. (Spring 2004). "Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War". Journal of Cold War Studies. 6 (2): 21–56. doi:10.1162/152039704773254759. ISSN 1520-3972. S2CID 57563600.
  • Gibson, David R. (2011). "Avoiding Catastrophe: The Interactional Production of Possibility during the Cuban Missile Crisis". The American Journal of Sociology. 117 (2): 361–419. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.374.2005. doi:10.1086/661761. JSTOR 10.1086/661761. S2CID 143717875.
  • Jones, John A.; Jones, Virginia H. (Spring 2005). "Through the Eye of the Needle: Five Perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis". Rhetoric & Public Affairs. 8 (1): 133–144. doi:10.1353/rap.2005.0044. S2CID 154894890.
  • Jones, Milo; Silberzahn, Philppe (2013). Constructing Cassandra, Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA, 1947–2001. Stanford University Press. pp. 135–191. ISBN 978-0804793360.
  • Lebow, Richard Ned (October 1990). "Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations Reevaluated". Diplomatic History. 14 (4): 471–492. doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00103.x.

Primary sources

  • Getchell, Michelle. Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War: A Short History with Documents(Hackett Publishing, 2018) 200 pp. online review[permanent dead link]
  • Chang, Laurence; Kornbluh, Peter, eds. (1998). "Introduction". The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (2nd ed.). New York: New Press. ISBN 978-1-56584-474-2.
  • "Cuban Missile Crisis". JFK in History. John F. Kennedy Library.
  • . Presidential Recordings Program. Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia. Archived from the original on August 16, 2011.
  • . Wilson Center Digital Archive. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Archived from the original on June 29, 2015. Retrieved June 27, 2015.
  • Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A History (2nd ed.). New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14-026547-7.
  • Keefer, Edward C.; Sampson, Charles S.; Smith, Louis J., eds. (1996). . Foreign relations of the United States, 1961–1963. Vol. XI. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. ISBN 978-0-16-045210-9. Archived from the original on December 23, 2016. Retrieved December 8, 2018.
  • Kennedy, Robert F. (1969). Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W. W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-31834-0.
  • May, Ernest R.; Zelikow, Philip D., eds. (2002) [1997]. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd ed.). New York: Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-32259-0.
  • McAuliffe, Mary S., ed. (October 1992). (PDF). Historical Review Program. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original (PDF) on December 24, 2011. Retrieved May 11, 2011.
  • "The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The 40th Anniversary". National Security Archive: Special Exhibits. Gelman Library: The George Washington University.
  • . Interactive Exhibits. John F. Kennedy Library. Archived from the original on January 18, 2011. Retrieved April 9, 2011.
  • Gavrov, Sergei, ed. (November 2013). . Moscow: Vzglyad (Russia). Archived from the original on October 17, 2016. Retrieved September 10, 2016.
  • Dallek, Robert. "If We Listen to Them, None of Us Will Be Alive." In Camelot's Court, 279–334. New York: HarperCollins, 2013.

Lesson plans

  • . Slideshows for Educators. Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Archived from the original on January 5, 2011.
  • Moser, John; Hahn, Lori (July 15, 2010). . EDSITEment: Lesson Plans. National Endowment for the Humanities. Archived from the original on January 16, 2011. Retrieved January 26, 2011.

External links

  • Cuban Missile Crisis: Операция Анадырь (Operation Anadyr) on Flickr
  • from the
  • "Cuban Missile Crisis". Topics. History Channel. 2011.
  • . Nuclear Weapons History: Cold War. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Archived from the original on October 5, 2018. Retrieved December 8, 2018.
  • . Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues. Archived from the original on August 7, 2011. Retrieved May 11, 2011.
  • Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
  • October 1962: DEFCON 4, DEFCON 3
  • Spartacus Educational(UK): Cuban Missile Crisis
  • Document – Britain's Cuban Missile Crisis
  • Patrick J. Kiger (June 7, 2019): Key Moments in the Cuban Missile Crisis. A Timeline of the Cuban Missile C

cuban, missile, crisis, missile, crisis, redirects, here, missile, crisis, cyprus, cypriot, crisis, cuban, missile, redirects, here, baseball, player, aroldis, chapman, also, known, october, crisis, 1962, spanish, crisis, octubre, cuba, caribbean, crisis, russ. Missile Crisis redirects here For the missile crisis in Cyprus see Cypriot S 300 crisis Cuban Missile redirects here For the baseball player see Aroldis Chapman The Cuban Missile Crisis also known as the October Crisis of 1962 Spanish Crisis de Octubre in Cuba the Caribbean Crisis Russian Karibskij krizis tr Karibsky krizis IPA kɐˈrʲipskʲɪj ˈkrʲizʲɪs in Russia or the Missile Scare was a 35 day October 16 November 20 1962 confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union which escalated into an international crisis when American deployments of missiles in Italy and Turkey were matched by Soviet deployments of similar ballistic missiles in Cuba Despite the short time frame the Cuban Missile Crisis remains a defining moment in national security and nuclear war preparation The confrontation is often considered the closest the Cold War came to escalating into a full scale nuclear war 4 Cuban Missile CrisisPart of the Cold WarCIA reference photograph of a Soviet medium range ballistic missile in Red Square MoscowDateOctober 16 29 1962 Naval quarantine 2 of Cuba ended on November 20 LocationCubaResultPublicized removal of the Soviet Union s nuclear missiles from Cuba Non publicized removal of American nuclear missiles from Turkey and Italy Agreement with the Soviet Union that the United States would never invade Cuba without direct provocation Creation of a nuclear hotline between the United States and the Soviet UnionBelligerents Soviet Union CubaSupported by Warsaw Pact except Albania and Romania 1 United States Italy TurkeySupported by NATO except France OASCommanders and leadersNikita Khrushchev Anastas Mikoyan Rodion Malinovsky Matvei Zakharov Sergey Biryuzov Issa Pliyev Georgy Abashvili Fidel Castro Raul Castro Che GuevaraJohn F Kennedy Robert McNamara Maxwell D Taylor Curtis LeMay George W Anderson Robert F Kennedy Amintore Fanfani Giulio Andreotti Cemal Gursel Ilhami SancarStrength40 000 soldiers 3 UnknownCasualties and lossesNone1 U 2 spy aircraft lost1 killed source source source source source source track Universal Newsreel about the Cuban Missile Crisis In 1961 the US government put Jupiter nuclear missiles in Italy and Turkey It had trained a force of Cuban exiles which the CIA led in an attempt to invade Cuba and overthrow the Cuban government Starting in November of that year the US government engaged in a campaign of terrorism and sabotage in Cuba referred to as the Cuban Project which continued throughout the first half of the 1960s The Soviet administration was concerned about a Cuban drift towards China with which the Soviets had an increasingly fractious relationship In response to these factors Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev agreed with the Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro to place nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba to deter a future invasion An agreement was reached during a secret meeting between Khrushchev and Castro in July 1962 and construction of a number of missile launch facilities started later that summer Meanwhile campaigning for the 1962 United States elections was underway and the White House denied charges for months that it was ignoring dangerous Soviet missiles 90 mi 140 km from Florida The missile preparations were confirmed when a US Air Force U 2 spy plane produced clear photographic evidence of medium range R 12 NATO code name SS 4 and intermediate range R 14 NATO code name SS 5 ballistic missile facilities When this was reported to President John F Kennedy he then convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers in a group that became known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council EXCOMM During this meeting President Kennedy was originally advised to carry out an air strike on Cuban soil in order to compromise Soviet missile supplies followed by an invasion of the Cuban mainland After careful consideration President Kennedy chose a less aggressive course of action in order to avoid a declaration of war After consultation with EXCOMM Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine on October 22 to prevent further missiles from reaching Cuba 5 By using the term quarantine rather than blockade an act of war by legal definition the United States was able to avoid the implications of a state of war 6 The US announced it would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba and demanded that the weapons already in Cuba be dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union After several days of tense negotiations an agreement was reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev publicly the Soviets would dismantle their offensive weapons in Cuba and return them to the Soviet Union subject to United Nations verification in exchange for a US public declaration and agreement to not invade Cuba again Secretly the United States agreed with the Soviets that it would dismantle all of the Jupiter MRBMs which had been deployed to Turkey against the Soviet Union There has been debate on whether or not Italy was included in the agreement as well While the Soviets dismantled their missiles some Soviet bombers remained in Cuba and the United States kept the naval quarantine in place until November 20 1962 6 When all offensive missiles and the Ilyushin Il 28 light bombers had been withdrawn from Cuba the blockade was formally ended on November 20 The negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union pointed out the necessity of a quick clear and direct communication line between the two superpowers As a result the Moscow Washington hotline was established A series of agreements later reduced US Soviet tensions for several years until both parties eventually resumed expanding their nuclear arsenals The compromise embarrassed Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the withdrawal of US missiles from Italy and Turkey was a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev and the Soviets were seen as retreating from circumstances that they had started Khrushchev s fall from power two years later was in part because of the Soviet Politburo s embarrassment at both Khrushchev s eventual concessions to the US and his ineptitude in precipitating the crisis in the first place According to Dobrynin the top Soviet leadership took the Cuban outcome as a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation 7 8 Contents 1 Background 1 1 Cuba Soviet relations 1 2 Cuba US relations 1 3 Soviet US relations 2 Prelude 2 1 Conception 2 2 Soviet military deployments 3 Missiles reported 3 1 Aerial confirmation 3 2 President notified 3 3 Responses considered 4 Operational plans 5 Blockade 5 1 Speech to the nation 5 2 Crisis deepens 5 3 International response 5 4 Soviet broadcast and communications 5 5 US alert level raised 5 6 Blockade challenged 5 7 Raising the stakes 6 Secret negotiations 6 1 Crisis continues 6 2 Drafting response 6 3 Averted nuclear launch 7 Resolution 8 Nuclear forces 8 1 United States 8 2 Soviet Union 9 Aftermath 9 1 Cuban leadership 9 2 Romanian leadership 9 3 Soviet leadership 9 4 US leadership 9 5 Human casualties 10 Later revelations 10 1 Submarine close call 10 2 Possibility of nuclear launch 11 In popular culture 12 Media representations 12 1 Non fiction 12 2 Fiction 13 See also 14 Notes 15 References 16 Further reading 16 1 Historiography 16 2 Primary sources 16 3 Lesson plans 17 External linksBackground EditCuba Soviet relations Edit Main article Escalante affair In late 1961 Fidel Castro asked for more SA 2 anti aircraft missiles from the Soviet Union The request was not acted upon by the Soviet leadership In the interval Fidel Castro began criticizing the Soviets for lack of revolutionary boldness and began talking to China about agreements for economic assistance In March 1962 Fidel Castro ordered the ousting of Anibal Escalante and his pro Moscow comrades from Cuba s Integrated Revolutionary Organizations This affair alarmed the Soviet leadership as well as fears of a possible US invasion In this crisis of international relations the Soviet Union sent more SA 2 anti aircraft missiles in April as well as a regiment of regular Soviet troops 9 Timothy Naftali has contended that Escalante s dismissal was a motivating factor behind the Soviet decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962 According to Naftali Soviet foreign policy planners were concerned Castro s break with Escalante foreshadowed a Cuban drift toward China and sought to solidify the Soviet Cuban relationship through the missile basing program 10 Cuba US relations Edit Further information Operation 40 Bay of Pigs Invasion and Operation Mongoose Image of plans for the Bay of Pigs Invasion The Cuban government regarded US imperialism as the primary explanation for the island s structural weaknesses 11 The US government had provided arms money and its authority to the Batista dictatorship The majority of the Cuban population had tired of the severe socioeconomic problems associated with the US domination of the country The Cuban government was aware of the necessity of ending the turmoil and incongruities of US dominated prerevolution Cuban society It determined that the US government s demands made as part of the hostile US reaction to Cuban government policy were unacceptable 11 12 With the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War the United States government sought to promote private enterprise as an instrument for advancing US strategic interests in the developing world 13 It had grown concerned about the expansion of communism In December 1959 under the Eisenhower administration and less than twelve months after the Cuban Revolution the Central Intelligence Agency CIA developed a plan for paramilitary action against Cuba The CIA recruited operatives on the island to carry out terrorism and sabotage kill civilians and cause economic damage 18 The John F Kennedy administration was publicly embarrassed by the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961 It had been launched at the initiative of Richard M Bissell Jr and approved by Kennedy and used CIA trained forces of Cuban exiles Afterward former President Eisenhower told Kennedy that the failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that they would otherwise not do 19 10 The half hearted invasion left Soviet first secretary Nikita Khrushchev and his advisers with the impression that Kennedy was indecisive and as one Soviet adviser wrote too young intellectual not prepared well for decision making in crisis situations too intelligent and too weak 19 The historian Renata Keller has said that for the first few years following the Cuban Revolution the United States did not view Cuba as a security threat According to Keller it quickly became clear that the reforms that the new regime was determined to undertake would harm US business interests on the island 20 Following the failed invasion the US massively escalated its sponsorship of terrorism against the island In late 1961 using the military and the Central Intelligence Agency the US government engaged in an extensive campaign of state sponsored terrorism against civilian and military targets in Cuba The terrorist attacks killed significant numbers of civilians The US armed trained funded and directed the terrorists most of whom were Cuban expatriates Terrorist attacks were planned at the direction and with the participation of US government employees and launched from US territory 26 In January 1962 US Air Force General Edward Lansdale described the plans to overthrow the Cuban government in a top secret report addressed to Kennedy and officials involved with Operation Mongoose 27 17 CIA agents or pathfinders from the Special Activities Division were to be infiltrated into Cuba to carry out sabotage and organization including radio broadcasts 28 In February 1962 the US launched an embargo against Cuba 29 and Lansdale presented a 26 page top secret timetable for implementation of the overthrow of the Cuban government mandating guerrilla operations to begin in August and September Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime was hoped by the planners to occur in the first two weeks of October 17 The terrorism campaign and the threat of invasion were crucial factors in the Cuban government s decision to accept the placement of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuban territory 30 31 32 33 The US government was aware at the time as reported to the president in a National Intelligence Estimate that the invasion threat was a key reason for Cuban acceptance of the missiles 34 35 Soviet US relations Edit Main article Missile gap See also Berlin Crisis of 1961 When Kennedy ran for president in 1960 one of his key election issues was an alleged missile gap with the Soviets In fact the US at that time led the Soviets by a wide margin which would only increase over time In 1961 the Soviets had only four R 7 Semyorka intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs By October 1962 they may have had dozens with some intelligence estimates as high as 75 36 The US on the other hand had 170 ICBMs and was quickly building more It also had eight George Washington and Ethan Allen class ballistic missile submarines with the capability to launch 16 Polaris missiles each with a range of 2 500 nautical miles 4 600 km Khrushchev increased the perception of a missile gap when he loudly boasted to the world that the Soviets were building missiles like sausages but Soviet missiles numbers and capabilities were nowhere close to his assertions The Soviet Union had medium range ballistic missiles in quantity about 700 of them but they were unreliable and inaccurate The US had a considerable advantage in its total number of nuclear warheads 27 000 against 3 600 and in the technology required for their accurate delivery The US also led in missile defensive capabilities naval and air power however the Soviets held a two to one advantage in conventional ground forces more pronounced in field guns and tanks particularly in the European theatre 36 Khrushchev also had an impression of Kennedy as weak which to him was confirmed by the President s response during the Berlin Crisis of 1961 particularly to the building of the Berlin Wall by East Germany to prevent its citizens from emigrating to the West 37 Speaking to Soviet officials in the aftermath of the crisis Khrushchev asserted I know for certain that Kennedy doesn t have a strong background nor generally speaking does he have the courage to stand up to a serious challenge He also told his son Sergei that on Cuba Kennedy would make a fuss make more of a fuss and then agree 38 Prelude EditConception Edit In May 1962 Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev was persuaded by the idea of countering the US s growing lead in developing and deploying strategic missiles by placing Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles in Cuba despite the misgivings of the Soviet Ambassador in Havana Alexandr Ivanovich Alexeyev who argued that Castro would not accept the deployment of the missiles 39 Khrushchev faced a strategic situation in which the US was perceived to have a splendid first strike capability that put the Soviet Union at a huge disadvantage In 1962 the Soviets had only 20 ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear warheads to the US from inside the Soviet Union 40 The poor accuracy and reliability of the missiles raised serious doubts about their effectiveness A newer more reliable generation of ICBMs would become operational only after 1965 40 Therefore Soviet nuclear capability in 1962 placed less emphasis on ICBMs than on medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles MRBMs and IRBMs The missiles could hit American allies and most of Alaska from Soviet territory but not the contiguous United States Graham Allison the director of Harvard University s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs points out The Soviet Union could not right the nuclear imbalance by deploying new ICBMs on its own soil In order to meet the threat it faced in 1962 1963 and 1964 it had very few options Moving existing nuclear weapons to locations from which they could reach American targets was one 41 A second reason that Soviet missiles were deployed to Cuba was because Khrushchev wanted to bring West Berlin controlled by the American British and French within Communist East Germany into the Soviet orbit The East Germans and Soviets considered western control over a portion of Berlin a grave threat to East Germany Khrushchev made West Berlin the central battlefield of the Cold War Khrushchev believed that if the US did nothing over the missile deployments in Cuba he could muscle the West out of Berlin using said missiles as a deterrent to western countermeasures in Berlin If the US tried to bargain with the Soviets after it became aware of the missiles Khrushchev could demand trading the missiles for West Berlin Since Berlin was strategically more important than Cuba the trade would be a win for Khrushchev as Kennedy recognized The advantage is from Khrushchev s point of view he takes a great chance but there are quite some rewards to it 42 Thirdly from the perspective of the Soviet Union and of Cuba it seemed that the United States wanted to increase its presence in Cuba With actions including the attempt to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States 43 placing economic sanctions on the nation directly invading it in addition to conducting secret operations on containing communism and Cuba it was assumed that America was trying to overrun Cuba As a result to try and prevent this the USSR would place missiles in Cuba and neutralise the threat This would ultimately serve to secure Cuba against attack and keep the country in the Socialist Bloc 44 Fifteen US built PGM 19 Jupiter missiles with the capability to strike Moscow with nuclear warheads were deployed in Turkey in 1961 citation needed Another major reason why Khrushchev planned to place missiles on Cuba undetected was to level the playing field with the evident American nuclear threat America had the upper hand as they could launch from Turkey and destroy the USSR before they would have a chance to react After the emplacement of nuclear missiles in Cuba Khrushchev had finally established mutual assured destruction meaning that if the United States decided to launch a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union the latter would react by launching a retaliatory nuclear strike against the US 45 Finally placing nuclear missiles on Cuba was a way for the USSR to show their support for Cuba and support the Cuban people who viewed the United States as a threatening force 43 as the latter had become their ally after the Cuban Revolution of 1959 According to Khrushchev the Soviet Union s motives were aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire 46 Schlesinger a historian and adviser to Kennedy told National Public Radio in an interview on October 16 2002 that Castro did not want the missiles but Khrushchev pressured Castro to accept them Castro was not completely happy with the idea but the Cuban National Directorate of the Revolution accepted them both to protect Cuba against US attack and to aid the Soviet Union 47 272 Soviet military deployments Edit The relative ranges of the Il 28 SS 4 and SS 5 based on Cuba in nautical miles NM In early 1962 a group of Soviet military and missile construction specialists accompanied an agricultural delegation to Havana They obtained a meeting with Cuban prime minister Fidel Castro The Cuban leadership had a strong expectation that the US would invade Cuba again and enthusiastically approved the idea of installing nuclear missiles in Cuba According to another source Castro objected to the missiles deployment as making him look like a Soviet puppet but he was persuaded that missiles in Cuba would be an irritant to the US and help the interests of the entire socialist camp 48 Also the deployment would include short range tactical weapons with a range of 40 km usable only against naval vessels that would provide a nuclear umbrella for attacks upon the island By May Khrushchev and Castro agreed to place strategic nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba Like Castro Khrushchev felt that a US invasion of Cuba was imminent and that to lose Cuba would do great harm to the communists especially in Latin America He said he wanted to confront the Americans with more than words the logical answer was missiles 49 29 The Soviets maintained their tight secrecy writing their plans longhand which were approved by Marshal of the Soviet Union Rodion Malinovsky on July 4 and Khrushchev on July 7 From the very beginning the Soviets operation entailed elaborate denial and deception known as maskirovka All the planning and preparation for transporting and deploying the missiles were carried out in the utmost secrecy with only a very few told the exact nature of the mission Even the troops detailed for the mission were given misdirection by being told that they were headed for a cold region and being outfitted with ski boots fleece lined parkas and other winter equipment The Soviet code name was Operation Anadyr The Anadyr River flows into the Bering Sea and Anadyr is also the capital of Chukotsky District and a bomber base in the far eastern region All the measures were meant to conceal the program from both internal and external audiences 50 Specialists in missile construction under the guise of machine operators irrigation specialists and agricultural specialists arrived in July 50 A total of 43 000 foreign troops would ultimately be brought in 51 Chief Marshal of Artillery Sergei Biryuzov Head of the Soviet Rocket Forces led a survey team that visited Cuba He told Khrushchev that the missiles would be concealed and camouflaged by palm trees 36 As early as August 1962 the US suspected the Soviets of building missile facilities in Cuba During that month its intelligence services gathered information about sightings by ground observers of Soviet built MiG 21 fighters and Il 28 light bombers U 2 spy planes found S 75 Dvina NATO designation SA 2 surface to air missile sites at eight different locations CIA director John A McCone was suspicious Sending antiaircraft missiles into Cuba he reasoned made sense only if Moscow intended to use them to shield a base for ballistic missiles aimed at the United States 52 On August 10 he wrote a memo to Kennedy in which he guessed that the Soviets were preparing to introduce ballistic missiles into Cuba 36 Che Guevara himself traveled to the Soviet Union on August 30 1962 to sign off on the final agreement regarding the deployment of missiles in Cuba 53 The visit was heavily monitored by the CIA as Guevara had gained more scruitiny by American intelligence While in the Soviet Union Guevara argued with Khrushchev that the missile deal should be made public but Khrushchev insisted on total secrecy and swore the Soviet Union s support if the Americans discovered the missiles By the time Guevara arrived in Cuba the United States had already discovered the Soviet troops in Cuba via U 2 spy planes 54 With important Congressional elections scheduled for November the crisis became enmeshed in American politics On August 31 Senator Kenneth Keating R New York warned on the Senate floor that the Soviet Union was in all probability constructing a missile base in Cuba He charged the Kennedy administration with covering up a major threat to the US thereby starting the crisis 55 He may have received this initial remarkably accurate information from his friend former congresswoman and ambassador Clare Boothe Luce who in turn received it from Cuban exiles 56 A later confirming source for Keating s information possibly was the West German ambassador to Cuba who had received information from dissidents inside Cuba that Soviet troops had arrived in Cuba in early August and were seen working in all probability on or near a missile base and who passed this information to Keating on a trip to Washington in early October 57 Air Force General Curtis LeMay presented a pre invasion bombing plan to Kennedy in September and spy flights and minor military harassment from US forces at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base were the subject of continual Cuban diplomatic complaints to the US government 17 Map created by American intelligence showing Surface to Air Missile activity in Cuba September 5 1962 The first consignment of Soviet R 12 missiles arrived on the night of September 8 followed by a second on September 16 The R 12 was a medium range ballistic missile capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead 58 It was a single stage road transportable surface launched storable liquid propellant fuelled missile that could deliver a megaton class nuclear weapon citation needed The Soviets were building nine sites six for R 12 medium range missiles NATO designation SS 4 Sandal with an effective range of 2 000 kilometres 1 200 mi and three for R 14 intermediate range ballistic missiles NATO designation SS 5 Skean with a maximum range of 4 500 kilometres 2 800 mi citation needed On October 7 Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado spoke at the UN General Assembly If we are attacked we will defend ourselves I repeat we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves we have indeed our inevitable weapons the weapons which we would have preferred not to acquire and which we do not wish to employ 59 On October 10 in another Senate speech Sen Keating reaffirmed his earlier warning of August 31 and stated that Construction has begun on at least a half dozen launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles 60 The Cuban leadership was further upset when on September 20 the US Senate approved Joint Resolution 230 which expressed the US was determined to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States 61 62 On the same day the US announced a major military exercise in the Caribbean PHIBRIGLEX 62 which Cuba denounced as a deliberate provocation and proof that the US planned to invade Cuba 62 63 unreliable source The Soviet leadership believed based on its perception of Kennedy s lack of confidence during the Bay of Pigs Invasion that he would avoid confrontation and accept the missiles as a fait accompli 19 1 On September 11 the Soviet Union publicly warned that a US attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships that were carrying supplies to the island would mean war 17 The Soviets continued the Maskirovka program to conceal their actions in Cuba They repeatedly denied that the weapons being brought into Cuba were offensive in nature On September 7 Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin assured United States Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson that the Soviet Union was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba On September 11 the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union TASS Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza announced that the Soviet Union had no need or intention to introduce offensive nuclear missiles into Cuba On October 13 Dobrynin was questioned by former Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles about whether the Soviets planned to put offensive weapons in Cuba He denied any such plans 62 On October 17 Soviet embassy official Georgy Bolshakov brought President Kennedy a personal message from Khrushchev reassuring him that under no circumstances would surface to surface missiles be sent to Cuba 62 494 Missiles reported EditThe missiles in Cuba allowed the Soviets to effectively target most of the Continental US The planned arsenal was forty launchers The Cuban populace readily noticed the arrival and deployment of the missiles and hundreds of reports reached Miami US intelligence received countless reports many of dubious quality or even laughable most of which could be dismissed as describing defensive missiles 64 65 66 Only five reports bothered the analysts They described large trucks passing through towns at night that were carrying very long canvas covered cylindrical objects that could not make turns through towns without backing up and maneuvering Defensive missile transporters it was believed could make such turns without undue difficulty The reports could not be satisfactorily dismissed 67 A U 2 reconnaissance photograph of Cuba showing Soviet nuclear missiles their transports and tents for fueling and maintenance Aerial confirmation Edit The United States had been sending U 2 surveillance over Cuba since the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion 68 The first issue that led to a pause in reconnaissance flights took place on August 30 when a U 2 operated by the US Air Force s Strategic Air Command flew over Sakhalin Island in the Soviet Far East by mistake The Soviets lodged a protest and the US apologized Nine days later a Taiwanese operated U 2 69 70 was lost over western China to an SA 2 surface to air missile SAM US officials were worried that one of the Cuban or Soviet SAMs in Cuba might shoot down a CIA U 2 initiating another international incident In a meeting with members of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance COMOR on September 10 Secretary of State Dean Rusk and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy heavily restricted further U 2 flights over Cuban airspace The resulting lack of coverage over the island for the next five weeks became known to historians as the Photo Gap 71 No significant U 2 coverage was achieved over the interior of the island US officials attempted to use a Corona photo reconnaissance satellite to obtain coverage over reported Soviet military deployments but imagery acquired over western Cuba by a Corona KH 4 mission on October 1 was heavily covered by clouds and haze and failed to provide any usable intelligence 72 At the end of September Navy reconnaissance aircraft photographed the Soviet ship Kasimov with large crates on its deck the size and shape of Il 28 jet bomber fuselages 36 In September 1962 analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency DIA noticed that Cuban surface to air missile sites were arranged in a pattern similar to those used by the Soviet Union to protect its ICBM bases leading DIA to lobby for the resumption of U 2 flights over the island 73 Although in the past the flights had been conducted by the CIA pressure from the Defense Department led to that authority being transferred to the Air Force 36 Following the loss of a CIA U 2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960 it was thought that if another U 2 were shot down an Air Force aircraft arguably being used for a legitimate military purpose would be easier to explain than a CIA flight When the reconnaissance missions were reauthorized on October 9 poor weather kept the planes from flying The US first obtained U 2 photographic evidence of the missiles on October 14 when a U 2 flight piloted by Major Richard Heyser took 928 pictures on a path selected by DIA analysts capturing images of what turned out to be an SS 4 construction site at San Cristobal Pinar del Rio Province now in Artemisa Province in western Cuba 74 One of the first U 2 reconnaissance images of missile bases under construction shown to President Kennedy on the morning of October 16 1962 President notified Edit On October 15 the CIA s National Photographic Interpretation Center NPIC reviewed the U 2 photographs and identified objects that they interpreted as medium range ballistic missiles This identification was made in part on the strength of reporting provided by Oleg Penkovsky a double agent in the GRU working for the CIA and MI6 Although he provided no direct reports of the Soviet missile deployments to Cuba technical and doctrinal details of Soviet missile regiments that had been provided by Penkovsky in the months and years prior to the Crisis helped NPIC analysts correctly identify the missiles on U 2 imagery 75 That evening the CIA notified the Department of State and at 8 30 pm EDT Bundy chose to wait until the next morning to tell the President McNamara was briefed at midnight The next morning Bundy met with Kennedy and showed him the U 2 photographs and briefed him on the CIA s analysis of the images 76 At 6 30 pm EDT Kennedy convened a meeting of the nine members of the National Security Council and five other key advisers 77 in a group he formally named the Executive Committee of the National Security Council EXCOMM after the fact on October 22 by National Security Action Memorandum 196 78 Without informing the members of EXCOMM President Kennedy tape recorded all of their proceedings and Sheldon M Stern head of the Kennedy library transcribed some of them 79 80 On October 16 President Kennedy notified Attorney General Robert Kennedy that he was convinced the Soviets were placing missiles in Cuba and it was a legitimate threat This made the threat of nuclear destruction by two world superpowers a reality Robert Kennedy responded by contacting the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin Robert Kennedy expressed his concern about what was happening and Dobrynin was instructed by Soviet Chairman Nikita S Khrushchev to assure President Kennedy that there would be no ground to ground missiles or offensive weapons placed in Cuba Khrushchev further assured Kennedy that the Soviet Union had no intention of disrupting the relationship of our two countries despite the photo evidence presented before President Kennedy 81 Responses considered Edit President Kennedy meets in the Oval Office with General Curtis LeMay and the reconnaissance pilots who found the missile sites in Cuba The US had no plan in place because until recently its intelligence had been convinced that the Soviets would never install nuclear missiles in Cuba EXCOMM discussed several possible courses of action 82 Do nothing American vulnerability to Soviet missiles was not new Diplomacy Use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles Secret approach Offer Castro the choice of splitting with the Soviets or being invaded Invasion Full force invasion of Cuba and overthrow of Castro Air strike Use the US Air Force to attack all known missile sites Blockade Use the US Navy to block any missiles from arriving in Cuba As the article describes both the US and the Soviet Union considered many possible outcomes of their actions and threats during the crisis Allison Graham T Zelikow Philip D This game tree models how both actors would have considered their decisions It is broken down into a simple form for basic understanding The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously agreed that a full scale attack and invasion was the only solution They believed that the Soviets would not attempt to stop the US from conquering Cuba Kennedy was skeptical They no more than we can let these things go by without doing something They can t after all their statements permit us to take out their missiles kill a lot of Russians and then do nothing If they don t take action in Cuba they certainly will in Berlin 83 Kennedy concluded that attacking Cuba by air would signal the Soviets to presume a clear line to conquer Berlin Kennedy also believed that US allies would think of the country as trigger happy cowboys who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation 84 President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara in an EXCOMM meeting October 29 1962 The EXCOMM then discussed the effect on the strategic balance of power both political and military The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the missiles would seriously alter the military balance but McNamara disagreed An extra 40 he reasoned would make little difference to the overall strategic balance The US already had approximately 5 000 strategic warheads 85 261 but the Soviet Union had only 300 McNamara concluded that the Soviets having 340 would not therefore substantially alter the strategic balance In 1990 he reiterated that it made no difference The military balance wasn t changed I didn t believe it then and I don t believe it now 86 The EXCOMM agreed that the missiles would affect the political balance Kennedy had explicitly promised the American people less than a month before the crisis that if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States the United States would act 87 674 681 Further US credibility among its allies and people would be damaged if the Soviet Union appeared to redress the strategic imbalance by placing missiles in Cuba Kennedy explained after the crisis that it would have politically changed the balance of power It would have appeared to and appearances contribute to reality 88 President Kennedy meets in the Oval Office with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko October 18 1962 On October 18 Kennedy met with Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko who claimed the weapons were for defensive purposes only Not wanting to expose what he already knew and to avoid panicking the American public 89 Kennedy did not reveal that he was already aware of the missile buildup 90 By October 19 frequent U 2 spy flights showed four operational sites citation needed Operational plans EditTwo Operational Plans OPLAN were considered OPLAN 316 envisioned a full invasion of Cuba by Army and Marine units supported by the Navy following Air Force and naval airstrikes Army units in the US would have had trouble fielding mechanised and logistical assets and the US Navy could not supply enough amphibious shipping to transport even a modest armoured contingent from the Army OPLAN 312 primarily an Air Force and Navy carrier operation was designed with enough flexibility to do anything from engaging individual missile sites to providing air support for OPLAN 316 s ground forces 91 Blockade Edit A US Navy P 2H Neptune of VP 18 flying over a Soviet cargo ship with crated Il 28s on deck during the Cuban Crisis 92 Kennedy met with members of EXCOMM and other top advisers throughout October 21 considering two remaining options an air strike primarily against the Cuban missile bases or a naval blockade of Cuba 90 A full scale invasion was not the administration s first option McNamara supported the naval blockade as a strong but limited military action that left the US in control The term blockade was problematic according to international law a blockade is an act of war but the Kennedy administration did not think that the Soviets would be provoked to attack by a mere blockade 93 Additionally legal experts at the State Department and Justice Department concluded that a declaration of war could be avoided if another legal justification based on the Rio Treaty for defence of the Western Hemisphere was obtained from a resolution by a two thirds vote from the members of the Organization of American States OAS 94 Admiral George Anderson Chief of Naval Operations wrote a position paper that helped Kennedy to differentiate between what they termed a quarantine 95 of offensive weapons and a blockade of all materials claiming that a classic blockade was not the original intention Since it would take place in international waters Kennedy obtained the approval of the OAS for military action under the hemispheric defence provisions of the Rio Treaty Latin American participation in the quarantine now involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report to the US Commander South Atlantic COMSOLANT at Trinidad on November 9 An Argentine submarine and a Marine battalion with lift were available if required In addition two Venezuelan destroyers Destroyers ARV D 11 Nueva Esparta and ARV D 21 Zulia and one submarine Caribe had reported to COMSOLANT ready for sea by November 2 The Government of Trinidad and Tobago offered the use of Chaguaramas Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the quarantine The Dominican Republic had made available one escort ship Colombia was reported ready to furnish units and had sent military officers to the US to discuss this assistance The Argentine Air Force informally offered three SA 16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the quarantine operation 96 This initially was to involve a naval blockade against offensive weapons within the framework of the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty Such a blockade might be expanded to cover all types of goods and air transport The action was to be backed up by surveillance of Cuba The CNO s scenario was followed closely in later implementing the quarantine On October 19 the EXCOMM formed separate working groups to examine the air strike and blockade options and by the afternoon most support in the EXCOMM had shifted to a blockade Reservations about the plan continued to be voiced as late as October 21 the paramount concern being that once the blockade was put into effect the Soviets would rush to complete some of the missiles Consequently the US could find itself bombing operational missiles if the blockade did not force Khrushchev to remove the missiles already on the island 97 99 101 Speech to the nation Edit President Kennedy signing the Proclamation for Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba at the Oval Office on October 23 1962 98 At 3 00 pm EDT on October 22 President Kennedy formally established the executive committee EXCOMM with National Security Action Memorandum NSAM 196 At 5 00 pm he met with Congressional leaders who contentiously opposed a blockade and demanded a stronger response In Moscow US Ambassador Foy D Kohler briefed Khrushchev on the pending blockade and Kennedy s speech to the nation Ambassadors around the world gave notice to non Eastern Bloc leaders Before the speech US delegations met with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer French President Charles de Gaulle and Secretary General of the Organization of American States Jose Antonio Mora to brief them on this intelligence and the US s proposed response All were supportive of the US position Over the course of the crisis Kennedy had daily telephone conversations with Macmillan who was publicly supportive of US actions 99 Shortly before his speech Kennedy telephoned former President Dwight Eisenhower 100 Kennedy s conversation with the former president also revealed that the two had been consulting during the Cuban Missile Crisis 101 The two also anticipated that Khrushchev would respond to the Western world in a manner similar to his response during the Suez Crisis and would possibly wind up trading off clarification needed Berlin 101 Address on the Buildup of Arms in Cuba source source track Kennedy addressing the nation on October 22 1962 about the buildup of arms on Cuba Problems playing this file See media help Wikisource has original text related to this article Cuban Missile Crisis At 7 00 pm EDT on October 22 Kennedy delivered a nationwide televised address on all of the major networks announcing the discovery of the missiles He noted It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union 102 Kennedy described the administration s plan To halt this offensive buildup a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons be turned back This quarantine will be extended if needed to other types of cargo and carriers We are not at this time however denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948 102 During the speech a directive went out to all US forces worldwide placing them on DEFCON 3 The heavy cruiser USS Newport News was the designated flagship for the blockade 95 with USS Leary as Newport News s destroyer escort 96 Kennedy s speech writer Ted Sorensen stated in 2007 that the address to the nation was Kennedy s most important speech historically in terms of its impact on our planet 103 Crisis deepens Edit Soviet First Secretary Khrushchev s letter to Kennedy dated October 24 1962 stating that the blockade of Cuba constitute s an act of aggression 104 105 On October 24 at 11 24 am EDT a cable drafted by George Wildman Ball to the US Ambassador in Turkey and NATO notified them that they were considering making an offer to withdraw the missiles from Italy and Turkey in exchange for the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba Turkish officials replied that they would deeply resent any trade involving the US missile presence in their country 106 One day later on the morning of October 25 American journalist Walter Lippmann proposed the same thing in his syndicated column Castro reaffirmed Cuba s right to self defense and said that all of its weapons were defensive and Cuba would not allow an inspection 17 International response Edit Three days after Kennedy s speech the Chinese People s Daily announced that 650 000 000 Chinese men and women were standing by the Cuban people 107 In West Germany newspapers supported the US response by contrasting it with the weak American actions in the region during the preceding months They also expressed some fear that the Soviets might retaliate in Berlin In France on October 23 the crisis made the front page of all the daily newspapers The next day an editorial in Le Monde expressed doubt about the authenticity of the CIA s photographic evidence Two days later after a visit by a high ranking CIA agent the newspaper accepted the validity of the photographs In the October 29 issue of Le Figaro Raymond Aron wrote in support of the American response 108 On October 24 Pope John XXIII sent a message to the Soviet embassy in Rome to be transmitted to the Kremlin in which he voiced his concern for peace In this message he stated We beg all governments not to remain deaf to this cry of humanity That they do all that is in their power to save peace 109 Soviet broadcast and communications Edit The crisis continued unabated and on the evening of October 24 the Soviet TASS news agency broadcast a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy in which Khrushchev warned that the United States outright piracy would lead to war 110 Khruschev then sent at 9 24 pm a telegram to Kennedy which was received at 10 52 pm EDT Khrushchev stated if you weigh the present situation with a cool head without giving way to passion you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot afford not to decline the despotic demands of the USA and that the Soviet Union viewed the blockade as an act of aggression and their ships would be instructed to ignore it 105 After October 23 Soviet communications with the USA increasingly showed indications of having been rushed Undoubtedly a product of pressure it was not uncommon for Khrushchev to repeat himself and to send messages lacking basic editing 111 With President Kennedy making his aggressive intentions of a possible airstrike followed by an invasion on Cuba known Khrushchev rapidly sought a diplomatic compromise Communications between the two superpowers had entered into a unique and revolutionary period with the newly developed threat of mutual destruction through the deployment of nuclear weapons diplomacy now demonstrated how power and coercion could dominate negotiations clarification needed 112 US alert level raised Edit Adlai Stevenson shows aerial photos of Cuban missiles to the United Nations October 25 1962 The US requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council on October 25 US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin in an emergency meeting of the Security Council challenging him to admit the existence of the missiles Ambassador Zorin refused to answer At 10 00 pm EDT the next day the US raised the readiness level of Strategic Air Command SAC forces to DEFCON 2 For the only confirmed time in US history B 52 bombers went on continuous airborne alert and B 47 medium bombers were dispersed to various military and civilian airfields and made ready to take off fully equipped on 15 minutes notice 113 One eighth of SAC s 1 436 bombers were on airborne alert and some 145 intercontinental ballistic missiles stood on ready alert some of which targeted Cuba 114 Air Defense Command ADC redeployed 161 nuclear armed interceptors to 16 dispersal fields within nine hours with one third maintaining 15 minute alert status 91 Twenty three nuclear armed B 52s were sent to orbit points within striking distance of the Soviet Union so it would believe that the US was serious 115 Jack J Catton later estimated that about 80 per cent of SAC s planes were ready for launch during the crisis David A Burchinal recalled that by contrast 116 the Russians were so thoroughly stood down and we knew it They didn t make any move They did not increase their alert they did not increase any flights or their air defense posture They didn t do a thing they froze in place We were never further from nuclear war than at the time of Cuba never further By October 22 Tactical Air Command TAC had 511 fighters plus supporting tankers and reconnaissance aircraft deployed to face Cuba on one hour alert status TAC and the Military Air Transport Service had problems The concentration of aircraft in Florida strained command and support echelons which faced critical undermanning in security armaments and communications the absence of initial authorization for war reserve stocks of conventional munitions forced TAC to scrounge and the lack of airlift assets to support a major airborne drop necessitated the call up of 24 reserve squadrons 91 On October 25 at 1 45 am EDT Kennedy responded to Khrushchev s telegram by stating that the US was forced into action after receiving repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba and when the assurances proved to be false the deployment required the responses I have announced I hope that your government will take necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation A declassified map used by the US Navy s Atlantic Fleet showing the position of American and Soviet ships at the height of the crisis Blockade challenged Edit At 7 15 am EDT on October 25 USS Essex and USS Gearing attempted to intercept Bucharest but failed to do so Fairly certain that the tanker did not contain any military material the US allowed it through the blockade Later that day at 5 43 pm the commander of the blockade effort ordered the destroyer USS Joseph P Kennedy Jr to intercept and board the Lebanese freighter Marucla That took place the next day and Marucla was cleared through the blockade after its cargo was checked 117 At 5 00 pm EDT on October 25 William Clements announced that the missiles in Cuba were still actively being worked on That report was later verified by a CIA report that suggested there had been no slowdown at all In response Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199 authorizing the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft under the command of SACEUR which had the duty of carrying out first air strikes on the Soviet Union Kennedy claimed that the blockade had succeeded when the USSR turned back fourteen ships presumably carrying offensive weapons 118 The first indication of this came from a report from the British GCHQ sent to the White House Situation Room containing intercepted communications from Soviet ships reporting their positions On October 24 Kislovodsk a Soviet cargo ship reported a position north east of where it had been 24 hours earlier indicating it had discontinued its voyage and turned back towards the Baltic The next day reports showed more ships originally bound for Cuba had altered their course 119 Raising the stakes Edit The next morning October 26 Kennedy informed the EXCOMM that he believed only an invasion would remove the missiles from Cuba He was persuaded to give the matter time and continue with both military and diplomatic pressure He agreed and ordered the low level flights over the island to be increased from two per day to once every two hours He also ordered a crash program to institute a new civil government in Cuba if an invasion went ahead At this point the crisis was ostensibly at a stalemate The Soviets had shown no indication that they would back down and had made public media and private inter governmental statements to that effect The US had no reason to believe otherwise and was in the early stages of preparing for an invasion along with a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union if it responded militarily which the US assumed it would 120 Kennedy had no intention of keeping these plans a secret with an array of Cuban and Soviet spies forever present Khrushchev was quickly made aware of this looming danger The implicit threat of air strikes on Cuba followed by invasion allowed the United States to exert pressure in future talks It was the possibility of military action that played an influential role in accelerating Khrushchev s proposal for a compromise 121 Throughout the closing stages of October Soviet communications to the United States indicated increasing defensiveness Khrushchev s increasing tendency to use poorly phrased and ambiguous communications throughout the compromise negotiations conversely increased United States confidence and clarity in messaging Leading Soviet figures consistently failed to mention that only the Cuban government could agree to inspections of the territory and continually made arrangements relating to Cuba without the knowledge of Fidel Castro himself According to Dean Rusk Khrushchev blinked he began to panic from the consequences of his own plan and this was reflected in the tone of Soviet messages This allowed the US to largely dominate negotiations in late October 122 Secret negotiations EditAt 1 00 pm EDT on October 26 John A Scali of ABC News had lunch with Aleksandr Fomin the cover name of Alexander Feklisov the KGB station chief in Washington at Fomin s request Following the instructions of the Politburo of the CPSU 123 Fomin noted War seems about to break out He asked Scali to use his contacts to talk to his high level friends at the State Department to see if the US would be interested in a diplomatic solution He suggested that the language of the deal would contain an assurance from the Soviet Union to remove the weapons under UN supervision and that Castro would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons again in exchange for a public statement by the US that it would not invade Cuba 124 The US responded by asking the Brazilian government to pass a message to Castro that the US would be unlikely to invade if the missiles were removed 106 Mr President we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war because the more the two of us pull the tighter that knot will be tied And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it and then it will be necessary to cut that knot and what that would mean is not for me to explain to you because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose Consequently if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope let us take measures to untie that knot We are ready for this Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy October 26 1962 125 At 6 00 pm EDT on October 26 the State Department started receiving a message that appeared to be written personally by Khrushchev It was Saturday 2 00 am in Moscow The long letter took several minutes to arrive and it took translators additional time to translate and transcribe it 106 Robert F Kennedy described the letter as very long and emotional Khrushchev reiterated the basic outline that had been stated to Scali earlier in the day I propose we for our part will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba Then the necessity of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear At 6 45 pm EDT news of Fomin s offer to Scali was finally heard and was interpreted as a set up for the arrival of Khrushchev s letter The letter was then considered official and accurate although it was later learned that Fomin was almost certainly operating of his own accord without official backing Additional study of the letter was ordered and continued into the night 106 Crisis continues Edit Direct aggression against Cuba would mean nuclear war The Americans speak about such aggression as if they did not know or did not want to accept this fact I have no doubt they would lose such a war Che Guevara October 1962 126 S 75 Dvina with V 750V 1D missile NATO designation SA 2 Guideline on a launcher A similar installation shot down Major Anderson s U 2 over Cuba Castro on the other hand was convinced that an invasion of Cuba was soon at hand and on October 26 he sent a telegram to Khrushchev that appeared to call for a pre emptive nuclear strike on the US in case of attack In a 2010 interview Castro expressed regret about his 1962 stance on first use After I ve seen what I ve seen and knowing what I know now it wasn t worth it at all 127 Castro also ordered all anti aircraft weapons in Cuba to fire on any US aircraft 128 previous orders had been to fire only on groups of two or more At 6 00 am EDT on October 27 the CIA delivered a memo reporting that three of the four missile sites at San Cristobal and both sites at Sagua la Grande appeared to be fully operational It also noted that the Cuban military continued to organise for action but was under order not to initiate action unless attacked citation needed At 9 00 am EDT on October 27 Radio Moscow began broadcasting a message from Khrushchev Contrary to the letter of the night before the message offered a new trade the missiles on Cuba would be removed in exchange for the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey At 10 00 am EDT the executive committee met again to discuss the situation and came to the conclusion that the change in the message was because of internal debate between Khrushchev and other party officials in the Kremlin 129 300 Kennedy realised that he would be in an insupportable position if this becomes Khrushchev s proposal because the missiles in Turkey were not militarily useful and were being removed anyway and It s gonna to any man at the United Nations or any other rational man it will look like a very fair trade Bundy explained why Khrushchev s public acquiescence could not be considered The current threat to peace is not in Turkey it is in Cuba 130 McNamara noted that another tanker the Grozny was about 600 miles 970 km out and should be intercepted He also noted that they had not made the Soviets aware of the blockade line and suggested relaying that information to them via U Thant at the United Nations 131 A Lockheed U 2F the high altitude reconnaissance type shot down over Cuba being refueled by a Boeing KC 135Q The aircraft in 1962 was painted overall gray and carried USAF military markings and national insignia While the meeting progressed at 11 03 am EDT a new message began to arrive from Khrushchev The message stated in part You are disturbed over Cuba You say that this disturbs you because it is ninety nine miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America But you have placed destructive missile weapons which you call offensive in Italy and Turkey literally next to us I therefore make this proposal We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States will remove its analogous means from Turkey and after that persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made The executive committee continued to meet through the day Throughout the crisis Turkey had repeatedly stated that it would be upset if the Jupiter missiles were removed Italy s Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani who was also Foreign Minister ad interim offered to allow withdrawal of the missiles deployed in Apulia as a bargaining chip He gave the message to one of his most trusted friends Ettore Bernabei general manager of RAI TV to convey to Arthur M Schlesinger Jr Bernabei was in New York to attend an international conference on satellite TV broadcasting The engine of the Lockheed U 2 shot down over Cuba on display at Museum of the Revolution in Havana On the morning of October 27 a U 2F the third CIA U 2A modified for air to air refuelling piloted by USAF Major Rudolf Anderson 132 departed its forward operating location at McCoy AFB Florida At approximately 12 00 pm EDT the aircraft was struck by an SA 2 surface to air missile launched from Cuba The aircraft crashed and Anderson was killed Stress in negotiations between the Soviets and the US intensified only later was it assumed that the decision to fire the missile was made locally by an undetermined Soviet commander acting on his own authority Later that day at about 3 41 pm EDT several US Navy RF 8A Crusader aircraft on low level photo reconnaissance missions were fired upon On October 28 1962 Khrushchev told his son Sergei that the shooting down of Anderson s U 2 was by the Cuban military at the direction of Raul Castro 133 134 135 136 At 4 00 pm EDT Kennedy recalled members of EXCOMM to the White House and ordered that a message should immediately be sent to U Thant asking the Soviets to suspend work on the missiles while negotiations were carried out During the meeting General Maxwell Taylor delivered the news that the U 2 had been shot down Kennedy had earlier claimed he would order an attack on such sites if fired upon but he decided to not act unless another attack was made Forty years later McNamara said We had to send a U 2 over to gain reconnaissance information on whether the Soviet missiles were becoming operational We believed that if the U 2 was shot down that the Cubans didn t have capabilities to shoot it down the Soviets did we believed if it was shot down it would be shot down by a Soviet surface to air missile unit and that it would represent a decision by the Soviets to escalate the conflict And therefore before we sent the U 2 out we agreed that if it was shot down we wouldn t meet we d simply attack It was shot down on Friday Fortunately we changed our mind we thought Well it might have been an accident we won t attack Later we learned that Khrushchev had reasoned just as we did we send over the U 2 if it was shot down he reasoned we would believe it was an intentional escalation And therefore he issued orders to Pliyev the Soviet commander in Cuba to instruct all of his batteries not to shoot down the U 2 note 1 137 Ellsberg said that Robert Kennedy RFK told him in 1964 that after the U 2 was shot down and the pilot killed he RFK told Soviet ambassador Dobrynin You have drawn first blood T he president had decided against advice not to respond militarily to that attack but he Dobrynin should know that if another plane was shot at we would take out all the SAMs and antiaircraft And that would almost surely be followed by an invasion 138 Drafting response Edit This section needs additional citations for verification Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources in this section Unsourced material may be challenged and removed Find sources Cuban Missile Crisis news newspapers books scholar JSTOR October 2017 Learn how and when to remove this template message Emissaries sent by both Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed to meet at the Yenching Palace Chinese restaurant in the Cleveland Park neighbourhood of Washington DC on Saturday evening October 27 139 Kennedy suggested to take Khrushchev s offer to trade away the missiles Unknown to most members of the EXCOMM but with the support of his brother the president Robert Kennedy had been meeting with the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington to discover whether the intentions were genuine 140 The EXCOMM was generally against the proposal because it would undermine NATO s authority and the Turkish government had repeatedly stated it was against any such trade As the meeting progressed a new plan emerged and Kennedy was slowly persuaded The new plan called for him to ignore the latest message and instead to return to Khrushchev s earlier one Kennedy was initially hesitant feeling that Khrushchev would no longer accept the deal because a new one had been offered but Llewellyn Thompson argued that it was still possible 97 135 56 White House Special Counsel and Adviser Ted Sorensen and Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later with a draft letter to that effect The President made several changes had it typed and sent it After the EXCOMM meeting a smaller meeting continued in the Oval Office The group argued that the letter should be underscored with an oral message to Dobrynin that stated that if the missiles were not withdrawn military action would be used to remove them Rusk added one proviso that no part of the language of the deal would mention Turkey but there would be an understanding that the missiles would be removed voluntarily in the immediate aftermath The president agreed and the message was sent EXCOMM meeting in the White House Cabinet Room with President Kennedy Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk in attendance October 29 1962 At Rusk s request Fomin and Scali met again Scali asked why the two letters from Khrushchev were so different and Fomin claimed it was because of poor communications Scali replied that the claim was not credible and shouted that he thought it was a stinking double cross He went on to claim that an invasion was only hours away and Fomin stated that a response to the US message was expected from Khrushchev shortly and urged Scali to tell the State Department that no treachery was intended Scali said that he did not think anyone would believe him but he agreed to deliver the message The two went their separate ways and Scali immediately typed out a memo for the EXCOMM 141 Within the US establishment it was well understood that ignoring the second offer and returning to the first put Khrushchev in a terrible position Military preparations continued and all active duty Air Force personnel were recalled to their bases for possible action Robert Kennedy later recalled the mood We had not abandoned all hope but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev s revising his course within the next few hours It was a hope not an expectation The expectation was military confrontation by Tuesday October 30 and possibly tomorrow October 29 141 At 8 05 pm EDT the letter drafted earlier in the day was delivered The message read As I read your letter the key elements of your proposals which seem generally acceptable as I understand them are as follows 1 You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision and undertake with suitable safe guards to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems into Cuba 2 We on our part would agree upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments a to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and b to give assurances against the invasion of Cuba The letter was also released directly to the press to ensure it could not be delayed 142 With the letter delivered a deal was on the table As Robert Kennedy noted there was little expectation it would be accepted At 9 00 pm EDT the EXCOMM met again to review the actions for the following day Plans were drawn up for air strikes on the missile sites as well as other economic targets notably petroleum storage McNamara stated that they had to have two things ready a government for Cuba because we re going to need one and secondly plans for how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe because sure as hell they re going to do something there 143 At 12 12 am EDT on October 27 the US informed its NATO allies that the situation is growing shorter the United States may find it necessary within a very short time in its interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary To add to the concern at 6 00 am the CIA reported that all missiles in Cuba were ready for action A US Navy HSS 1 Seabat helicopter hovers over Soviet submarine B 59 driven to the surface by US Naval forces in the Caribbean near Cuba October 28 or 29 1962 On October 27 Khrushchev also received a letter from Castro what is now known as the Armageddon Letter dated the day before which was interpreted as urging the use of nuclear force in the event of an attack on Cuba 144 I believe the imperialists aggressiveness is extremely dangerous and if they actually carry out the brutal act of invading Cuba in violation of international law and morality that would be the moment to eliminate such danger forever through an act of clear legitimate defense however harsh and terrible the solution would be Castro wrote 145 Averted nuclear launch Edit Further information List of nuclear close calls 27 October 1962 Later that same day what the White House later called Black Saturday the US Navy dropped a series of signalling depth charges practice depth charges the size of hand grenades 146 on a Soviet submarine B 59 at the blockade line unaware that it was armed with a nuclear tipped torpedo with orders that allowed it to be used if the submarine was damaged by depth charges or surface fire 147 As the submarine was too deep to monitor any radio traffic 148 149 the captain of the B 59 Valentin Grigoryevich Savitsky decided that a war might already have started and wanted to launch a nuclear torpedo 150 The decision to launch these normally only required agreement from the two commanding officers on board the Captain and the Political Officer However the commander of the submarine Flotilla Vasily Arkhipov was aboard B 59 and so he also had to agree Arkhipov objected and so the nuclear launch was narrowly averted On the same day a U 2 spy plane made an accidental unauthorised ninety minute overflight of the Soviet Union s far eastern coast 151 The Soviets responded by scrambling MiG fighters from Wrangel Island in turn the Americans launched F 102 fighters armed with nuclear air to air missiles over the Bering Sea 152 Resolution EditOn Saturday October 27 after much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy s cabinet Kennedy secretly agreed to remove all missiles set in Turkey and possibly southern Italy the former on the border of the Soviet Union in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in Cuba 153 There is some dispute as to whether removing the missiles from Italy was part of the secret agreement Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that it was and when the crisis had ended McNamara gave the order to dismantle the missiles in both Italy and Turkey 154 At this point Khrushchev knew things the US did not First that the shooting down of the U 2 by a Soviet missile violated direct orders from Moscow and Cuban anti aircraft fire against other US reconnaissance aircraft also violated direct orders from Khrushchev to Castro 155 Second the Soviets already had 162 nuclear warheads on Cuba that the US did not then believe were there 156 Third the Soviets and Cubans on the island would almost certainly have responded to an invasion by using those nuclear weapons even though Castro believed that every human in Cuba would likely die as a result 157 Khrushchev also knew but may not have considered the fact that he had submarines armed with nuclear weapons that the US Navy may not have known about Khrushchev knew he was losing control President Kennedy had been told in early 1961 that a nuclear war would likely kill a third of humanity with most or all of those deaths concentrated in the US the USSR Europe and China 158 Khrushchev may well have received similar reports from his military With this background when Khrushchev heard Kennedy s threats relayed by Robert Kennedy to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin he immediately drafted his acceptance of Kennedy s latest terms from his dacha without involving the Politburo as he had previously and had them immediately broadcast over Radio Moscow which he believed the US would hear In that broadcast at 9 00 am EST on October 28 Khrushchev stated that the Soviet government in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as offensive and their crating and return to the Soviet Union 159 160 161 At 10 00 am October 28 Kennedy first learned of Khrushchev s solution to the crisis with the US removing the 15 Jupiters in Turkey and the Soviets would remove the rockets from Cuba Khrushchev had made the offer in a public statement for the world to hear Despite almost solid opposition from his senior advisers Kennedy quickly embraced the Soviet offer This is a pretty good play of his Kennedy said according to a tape recording that he made secretly of the Cabinet Room meeting Kennedy had deployed the Jupiters in March 1962 causing a stream of angry outbursts from Khrushchev Most people will think this is a rather even trade and we ought to take advantage of it Kennedy said Vice President Lyndon Johnson was the first to endorse the missile swap but others continued to oppose the offer Finally Kennedy ended the debate We can t very well invade Cuba with all its toil and blood Kennedy said when we could have gotten them out by making a deal on the same missiles on Turkey If that s part of the record then you don t have a very good war 162 Kennedy immediately responded to Khrushchev s letter issuing a statement calling it an important and constructive contribution to peace 161 He continued this with a formal letter I consider my letter to you of October twenty seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out The US will make a statement in the framework of the Security Council in reference to Cuba as follows it will declare that the United States of America will respect the inviolability of Cuban borders its sovereignty that it take the pledge not to interfere in internal affairs not to intrude themselves and not to permit our territory to be used as a bridgehead for the invasion of Cuba and will restrain those who would plan to carry an aggression against Cuba either from US territory or from the territory of other countries neighboring to Cuba 161 163 103 Kennedy s planned statement would also contain suggestions he had received from his adviser Schlesinger Jr in a Memorandum for the President describing the Post Mortem on Cuba 164 On October 28 Kennedy participated in telephone conversations with Eisenhower 165 and fellow former US President Harry Truman 166 In these calls Kennedy revealed that he thought the crisis would result in the two superpowers being toe to toe 165 in Berlin by the end of the following month and expressed concern that the Soviet setback in Cuba would make things tougher 166 there He also informed his predecessors that he had rejected the public Soviet offer to withdraw from Cuba in exchange for the withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey 165 166 Removal of Missiles in Cuba November 11 1962 NARA 193868 The US continued the blockade in the following days aerial reconnaissance proved that the Soviets were making progress in removing the missile systems The 42 missiles and their support equipment were loaded onto eight Soviet ships On November 2 1962 Kennedy addressed the US via radio and television broadcasts regarding the dismantlement process of the Soviet R 12 missile bases located in the Caribbean region 167 The ships left Cuba on November 5 to 9 The US made a final visual check as each of the ships passed the blockade line Further diplomatic efforts were required to remove the Soviet Il 28 bombers and they were loaded on three Soviet ships on December 5 and 6 Concurrent with the Soviet commitment on the Il 28s the US government announced the end of the blockade from 6 45 pm EST on November 20 1962 citation needed At the time when the Kennedy administration thought that the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved nuclear tactical rockets stayed in Cuba since they were not part of the Kennedy Khrushchev understandings and the Americans did not know about them The Soviets changed their minds fearing possible future Cuban militant steps and on November 22 1962 Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union Anastas Mikoyan told Castro that the rockets with the nuclear warheads were being removed as well 48 In his negotiations with the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin Robert Kennedy informally proposed that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed 168 within a short time after this crisis was over 169 222 Under an operation code named Operation Pot Pie 170 the removal of the Jupiters from Italy and Turkey began on April 1 and was completed by April 24 1963 The initial plans were to recycle the missiles for use in other programs but NASA and the USAF were not interested in retaining the missile hardware The missile bodies were destroyed on site warheads guidance packages and launching equipment worth 14 million were returned to the United States 171 172 The practical effect of the Kennedy Khrushchev Pact was that the US would remove their rockets from Italy and Turkey 173 174 and that the Soviets had no intention of resorting to nuclear war if they were out gunned by the US clarification needed failed verification Because the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from NATO bases in Italy and Turkey was not made public at the time 168 Khrushchev appeared to have lost the conflict and become weakened The perception was that Kennedy had won the contest between the superpowers and that Khrushchev had been humiliated Both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid full conflict despite pressures from their respective governments Khrushchev held power for another two years 163 102 105 Nuclear forces EditBy the time of the crisis in October 1962 the total number of nuclear weapons in the stockpiles of each country numbered approximately 26 400 for the United States and 3 300 for the Soviet Union For the US around 3 500 with a combined yield of approximately 6 300 megatons would have been used in attacking the Soviet Union The Soviets had considerably less strategic firepower at their disposal some 300 320 bombs and warheads without submarine based weapons in a position to threaten the US mainland and most of their intercontinental delivery systems based on bombers that would have difficulty penetrating North American air defence systems However they had already moved 158 warheads to Cuba between 95 and 100 would have been ready for use if the US had invaded Cuba most of which were short ranged The US had approximately 4 375 nuclear weapons deployed in Europe most of which were tactical weapons such as nuclear artillery with around 450 of them for ballistic missiles cruise missiles and aircraft the Soviets had more than 550 similar weapons in Europe 175 176 United States Edit SAC ICBM 182 at peak alert 121 Atlas D E F 53 Titan 1 8 Minuteman 1A Bombers 1 595 880 B 47 639 B 52 76 B 58 1 479 bombers and 1 003 refuelling tankers available at peak alert Atlantic Command 112 UGM 27 Polaris in seven SSBNs 16 each five submarines with Polaris A1 and two with A2 Pacific Command 4 8 Regulus cruise missiles 16 Mace cruise missiles Three aircraft carriers with some 40 bombs each Land based aircraft with some 50 bombs European Command IRBM 105 60 Thor UK 45 Jupiter 30 Italy 15 Turkey 48 90 Mace cruise missiles Two US Sixth Fleet aircraft carriers with some 40 bombs each Land based aircraft with some 50 bombsSoviet Union Edit Strategic for use against North America ICBM 42 four SS 6 R 7A at Plesetsk with two in reserve at Baikonur 36 SS 7 R 16 with 26 in silos and ten on open launch pads Bombers 160 readiness unknown 100 Tu 95 Bear 60 3M Bison B Regional mostly targeting Europe and others targeting US bases in east Asia MRBM 528 SS 4 R 12 492 at soft launch sites and 36 at hard launch sites approximately six to eight R 12s were operational in Cuba capable of striking the US mainland at any moment until the crisis was resolved IRBM 28 SS 5 R 14 Unknown number of Tu 16 Badger Tu 22 Blinder and MiG 21 aircraft tasked with nuclear strike missionsAftermath Edit The nuclear armed Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missile The US secretly agreed to withdraw the missiles from Italy and Turkey Cuban leadership Edit Cuba perceived the outcome as a betrayal by the Soviets as decisions on how to resolve the crisis had been made exclusively by Kennedy and Khrushchev Castro was especially upset that certain issues of interest to Cuba such as the status of the US Naval Base in Guantanamo were not addressed That caused Cuban Soviet relations to deteriorate for years to come 47 278 Historian Arthur Schlesinger believed that when the missiles were withdrawn Castro was more angry with Khrushchev than with Kennedy because Khrushchev had not consulted Castro before deciding to remove them note 2 Although Castro was infuriated by Khrushchev he planned on striking the US with the remaining missiles if an invasion of the island occurred 47 311 A few weeks after the crisis during an interview with the British communist newspaper the Daily Worker Guevara was still fuming over the perceived Soviet betrayal and told correspondent Sam Russell that if the missiles had been under Cuban control they would have fired them off 177 While expounding on the incident later Guevara reiterated that the cause of socialist liberation against global imperialist aggression would ultimately have been worth the possibility of millions of atomic war victims 178 The missile crisis further convinced Guevara that the world s two superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union used Cuba as a pawn in their own global strategies Afterward he denounced the Soviets almost as frequently as he denounced the Americans 179 Romanian leadership Edit During the crisis Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej general secretary of Romania s communist party sent a letter to President Kennedy dissociating Romania from Soviet actions This convinced the American administration of Bucharest s intentions of detaching itself from Moscow 1 Soviet leadership Edit The enormity of how close the world came to thermonuclear war impelled Khrushchev to propose a far reaching easing of tensions with the US 180 In a letter to President Kennedy dated October 30 1962 Khrushchev outlined a range of bold initiatives to forestall the possibility of a further nuclear crisis including proposing a non aggression treaty between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO and the Warsaw Pact or even disbanding these military blocs a treaty to cease all nuclear weapons testing and even the elimination of all nuclear weapons resolution of the hot button issue of Germany by both East and West formally accepting the existence of West Germany and East Germany and US recognition of the government of mainland China The letter invited counter proposals and further exploration of these and other issues through peaceful negotiations Khrushchev invited Norman Cousins the editor of a major US periodical and an anti nuclear weapons activist to serve as liaison with President Kennedy and Cousins met with Khrushchev for four hours in December 1962 181 Kennedy s response to Khrushchev s proposals was lukewarm but Kennedy expressed to Cousins that he felt constrained in exploring these issues due to pressure from hardliners in the US national security apparatus The United States and the Soviet Union did shortly thereafter agree on a treaty banning atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons known as the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 182 Further after the crisis the US and the USSR created the Moscow Washington hotline a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington The purpose was to have a way that the leaders of the two Cold War countries could communicate directly to solve such a crisis The compromise embarrassed Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the withdrawal of US missiles from Italy and Turkey was a secret deal between Kennedy and Khrushchev Khrushchev went to Kennedy as he thought that the crisis was getting out of hand but the Soviets were seen as retreating from circumstances that they had started Khrushchev s fall from power two years later was in part because of the Soviet Politburo s embarrassment at both Khrushchev s eventual concessions to the US and this ineptitude in precipitating the crisis in the first place According to Dobrynin the top Soviet leadership took the Cuban outcome as a blow to its prestige bordering on humiliation 183 US leadership Edit The worldwide US Forces DEFCON 3 status was returned to DEFCON 4 on November 20 1962 General Curtis LeMay told the President that the resolution of the crisis was the greatest defeat in our history his was a minority position 84 He had pressed for an immediate invasion of Cuba as soon as the crisis began and still favored invading Cuba even after the Soviets had withdrawn their missiles 184 Twenty five years later LeMay still believed that We could have gotten not only the missiles out of Cuba we could have gotten the Communists out of Cuba at that time 116 By 1962 President Kennedy faced four crisis situations the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion that he had approved of 185 settlement negotiations between the pro Western government of Laos and the Pathet Lao communist movement Kennedy sidestepped Laos whose rugged terrain was no battleground for American soldiers 186 265 the construction of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis Kennedy believed that yet another failure to gain control and stop communist expansion would irreparably damage US credibility He was determined to draw a line in the sand and prevent a communist victory in Vietnam He told James Reston of The New York Times immediately after his Vienna summit meeting with Khrushchev Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place 187 188 At least four contingency strikes were armed and launched from Florida against Cuban airfields and suspected missile sites in 1963 and 1964 although all were diverted to the Pinecastle Range Complex after the planes passed Andros island 189 Critics including Seymour Melman 190 and Seymour Hersh 191 suggested that the Cuban Missile Crisis encouraged the United States use of military means such as the case in the later Vietnam War Human casualties Edit U 2 pilot Anderson s body was returned to the US and was buried with full military honours in South Carolina He was the first recipient of the newly created Air Force Cross which was awarded posthumously Although Anderson was the only combatant fatality during the crisis 11 crew members of three reconnaissance Boeing RB 47 Stratojets of the 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing were also killed in crashes during the period between September 27 and November 11 1962 192 Seven crew died when a Military Air Transport Service Boeing C 135B Stratolifter delivering ammunition to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base stalled and crashed on approach on October 23 193 Later revelations EditSubmarine close call Edit Arguably the most dangerous moment in the crisis was not recognized until the Cuban Missile Crisis Havana conference in October 2002 Attended by many of the veterans of the crisis they all learned that on October 27 1962 USS Beale had tracked and dropped signalling depth charges the size of hand grenades on B 59 a Soviet Project 641 NATO designation Foxtrot submarine Unknown to the US it was armed with a 15 kiloton nuclear torpedo 194 Running out of air the Soviet submarine was surrounded by American warships and desperately needed to surface An argument broke out among three officers aboard B 59 including submarine captain Valentin Savitsky political officer Ivan Semyonovich Maslennikov and Deputy brigade commander Captain 2nd rank US Navy Commander rank equivalent Vasily Arkhipov An exhausted Savitsky became furious and ordered that the nuclear torpedo on board be made combat ready Accounts differ about whether Arkhipov convinced Savitsky not to make the attack or whether Savitsky himself finally concluded that the only reasonable choice left open to him was to come to the surface 195 303 317 During the conference McNamara stated that nuclear war had come much closer than people had thought Thomas Blanton director of the National Security Archive said A guy called Vasily Arkhipov saved the world Possibility of nuclear launch Edit In early 1992 it was confirmed that Soviet forces in Cuba had already received tactical nuclear warheads for their artillery rockets and Il 28 bombers when the crisis broke 196 Castro stated that he would have recommended their use if the US invaded despite Cuba being destroyed 196 Fifty years after the crisis Graham Allison wrote Fifty years ago the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear disaster During the standoff US President John F Kennedy thought the chance of escalation to war was between 1 in 3 and even and what we have learned in later decades has done nothing to lengthen those odds We now know for example that in addition to nuclear armed ballistic missiles the Soviet Union had deployed 100 tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba and the local Soviet commander there could have launched these weapons without additional codes or commands from Moscow The US air strike and invasion that were scheduled for the third week of the confrontation would likely have triggered a nuclear response against American ships and troops and perhaps even Miami The resulting war might have led to the deaths of over 100 million Americans and over 100 million Russians 197 198 BBC journalist Joe Matthews published the story on October 13 2012 behind the 100 tactical nuclear warheads mentioned by Graham Allison in the excerpt above 199 Khrushchev feared that Castro s hurt pride and widespread Cuban indignation over the concessions he had made to Kennedy might lead to a breakdown of the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States To prevent that Khrushchev decided to offer to give Cuba more than 100 tactical nuclear weapons that had been shipped to Cuba along with the long range missiles but crucially had escaped the notice of US intelligence Khrushchev determined that because the Americans had not listed the missiles on their list of demands keeping them in Cuba would be in the Soviet Union s interests 199 Anastas Mikoyan was tasked with the negotiations with Castro over the missile transfer deal that was designed to prevent a breakdown in the relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union While in Havana Mikoyan witnessed the mood swings and paranoia of Castro who was convinced that Moscow had made the agreement with the US at the expense of Cuba s defence Mikoyan on his own initiative decided that Castro and his military should not be given control of weapons with an explosive force equal to 100 Hiroshima sized bombs under any circumstances He defused the seemingly intractable situation which risked re escalating the crisis on November 22 1962 During a tense four hour meeting Mikoyan convinced Castro that despite Moscow s desire to help it would be in breach of an unpublished Soviet law which did not actually exist to transfer the missiles permanently into Cuban hands and provide them with an independent nuclear deterrent Castro was forced to give way and much to the relief of Khrushchev and the rest of the Soviet government the tactical nuclear weapons were crated and returned by sea to the Soviet Union during December 1962 199 In popular culture Edit A Soviet ship unloading a missile in the 1969 spy movie Topaz The American popular media especially television made frequent use of the events of the missile crisis in both fictional and documentary forms 200 Jim Willis includes the Crisis as one of the 100 media moments that changed America 201 Sheldon Stern finds that a half century later there are still many misconceptions half truths and outright lies that have shaped media versions of what happened in the White House during those harrowing two weeks 202 Historian William Cohn argued in a 1976 article that television programs are typically the main source used by the American public to know about and interpret the past 203 According to Cold War historian Andrei Kozovoi the Soviet media proved somewhat disorganized as it was unable to generate a coherent popular history Khrushchev lost power and was airbrushed out of the story Cuba was no longer portrayed as a heroic David against the American Goliath One contradiction that pervaded the Soviet media campaign was between the pacifistic rhetoric of the peace movement that emphasizes the horrors of nuclear war and the militancy of the need to prepare Soviets for war against American aggression 204 Media representations EditNon fiction Edit Thirteen Days Robert F Kennedy s memoir of the crisis posthumously released in 1969 It became the basis for numerous films and documentaries 205 The Missiles of October 1974 TV docudrama about the crisis 206 The Fog of War 2003 American documentary film about the life and times of former US Secretary of Defense Robert S McNamara directed by Errol Morris which won that year s Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature 207 Fiction Edit Topaz 1969 film by Alfred Hitchcock based on the 1967 novel by Leon Uris set during the run up to the crisis 208 Matinee 1993 film starring John Goodman set during the Cuban Missile Crisis in which an independent filmmaker decides to seize the opportunity to debut an atomic themed film 209 Thirteen Days film based on The Kennedy Tapes Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis a 2000 docudrama directed by Roger Donaldson about the crisis 210 Command amp Conquer Red Alert 3 a 2008 video game set in an alternate timeline where Einstein did not exist During the Allied Nations campaign an alternate version of the Cuban Missile Crisis occurs dubbed in game as the mission The Great Bear Trap where the Soviet Union had secretly planned and constructed an invasion force in Havana capped by specially designed Kirov Airships that were yielding 50 megaton bombs and intended to fly towards Allied controlled cities Mad Men the 2008 episode Meditations in an Emergency is set in the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis Ur a 2009 short novel by Stephen King is about three men who discover through a magic Kindle that in a parallel universe the Cuban Missile Crisis escalated into a nuclear war and ended that universe 211 Call of Duty Black Ops 2010 video game set during and after the Cuban Missile Crisis 212 The Kennedys TV miniseries 2011 production chronicling the lives of the Kennedy family including a dramatisation of the crisis 213 X Men First Class 2011 superhero film set during the Cuban Missile Crisis which depicts the crisis as being escalated by a group of mutants with the goal of establishing a mutant ruling class after the subsequent war 214 The Courier 2020 film tells the true story of the British businessman Greville Wynne played by Benedict Cumberbatch who helped MI6 penetrate the Soviet nuclear programme during the Cold War Wynne and his Russian source Oleg Penkovsky codenamed Ironbark provided crucial intelligence that ended the Cuban Missile Crisis 215 See also Edit Cuba portal Soviet Union portal United States portalBomber gap Cuban thaw Leninsky Komsomol class cargo ships List of nuclear close calls Norwegian rocket incident Nuclear disarmament Nuclear threats during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine Peaceful coexistence Soviet NavyNotes Edit McNamara mistakenly dates the shooting down of USAF Major Rudolf Anderson s U 2 on October 26 In his biography Castro did not compare his feelings for either leader at that moment but makes it clear that he was angry with Khrushchev for failing to consult with him Ramonet 1978 References Edit a b Holtsmark Sven G Neumann Iver B Westad Odd Arne July 27 2016 Sven G Holtsmark Iver B Neumann Odd Arne Westad Springer 27 iul 2016 The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe 1945 89 p 99 ISBN 9781349232345 Milestones 1961 1968 The Cuban Missile Crisis October 1962 history state gov Archived from the original on April 3 2019 Lescaze Lee October 1 1979 Castro Lists Soviet Military Strength In Cuba During 1962 Missile Crisis Washington Post ISSN 0190 8286 Retrieved February 8 2023 Scott Len Hughes R Gerald 2015 The Cuban Missile Crisis A Critical Reappraisal Taylor amp Francis p 17 ISBN 9781317555414 Archived from the original on July 29 2016 Retrieved December 31 2015 Society National Geographic April 21 2021 Kennedy Quarantines Cuba National Geographic Society Retrieved May 11 2022 a b Jonathan Colman April 1 2019 The U S Legal Case for the Blockade of Cuba during the Missile Crisis October November 1962 Journal of Cold War Studies William Taubman Khrushchev The Man and His Era 2004 p 579 Jeffery D Shields March 7 2016 The Malin Notes Glimpses Inside the Kremlin during the Cuban Missile Crisis PDF Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars The Kennedy Tapes Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis Norton 2002 p 421 ISBN 9780393322590 One Hell of a Gamble Khrushchev Castro and Kennedy 1958 1964 Journal of Cold War Studies 2002 Retrieved August 31 2015 a b Yaffe Helen 2020 We are Cuba How a Revolutionary People have Survived in a Post Soviet World New Haven Yale University Press pp 14 22 176 181 ISBN 978 0300230031 For the Cuban revolutionaries of the 1950s US imperialism was the principal explanation for the island s structural weaknesses Thus the Revolution of 1959 faced two real alternatives it could renounce all fundamental changes beyond expelling the dictator Fulgencio Batista so that it would be acceptable to Washington or it could pursue the deep structural changes necessary to address the island s socioeconomic ills and dependent development which would bring hostility from the United States Bolender Keith 2012 Cuba under siege American policy the revolution and its people New York Palgrave Macmillan pp x 14 18 20 45 57 63 64 et passim doi 10 1057 9781137275554 ISBN 978 1 137 27554 7 The economic inequality and social unrest was brought to a head under the brutal Batista dictatorship supported by American arms money and authority An estimated 20 000 were killed opposing the government from 1955 to his overthrow with even President John F Kennedy using this figure in a rare expression of sympathy for revolutionary goals Kennedy also came closest to recognizing America could not claim ignorance of the harm its neocolonial control was inflicting on the inhabitants Transformation came swiftly completely and often framed in direct conflict with American immoderations Popular support for radicalization was possible only by aiming it at the social inequalities associated with foreign domination of which the greater part of the Cuban population particularly in the rural areas had tired of finally The backing of the countryside permitted Castro to act ruthlessly to ensure his revolution would not suffer the same fate as Grau s Concurrently America s hostile reaction worked in harmony if not intentionally with Castro s political ambitions He comprehended the turmoil and incongruities of American dominated prerevolution society had to end Kapstein Ethan B December 2020 Private Enterprise International Development and the Cold War Journal of Cold War Studies Cambridge MA MIT Press 22 4 113 145 doi 10 1162 jcws a 00967 a b Yaffe Helen 2020 We are Cuba How a Revolutionary People have Survived in a Post Soviet World New Haven Yale University Press pp 67 176 181 ISBN 978 0300230031 What have Cuba s revolutionary people survived For six decades the Caribbean island has withstood manifold and unrelenting aggression from the world s dominant economic and political power overt and covert military actions sabotage and terrorism by US authorities and allied exiles The first Central Intelligence Agency CIA plan for paramilitary action in Cuba was developed in December 1959 less than a year after Batista fled the island and well before the US blockade was imposed The CIA recruited operatives inside Cuba to carry out terrorism and sabotage killing civilians and causing economic damage Piccone Ted Miller Ashley December 19 2016 Cuba the U S and the concept of sovereignty Toward a common vocabulary Report Washington Brookings Institution Archived from the original on July 7 2017 Retrieved January 6 2023 President Dwight D Eisenhower approved a plan to train Cuban exiles to commit violent acts of terrorism within Cuba against civilians and the CIA trained and commanded pilots to bomb civilian airfields U S government officials justified some of the terrorist attacks on Cuban soil on the grounds of coercive regime change Dominguez Lopez Ernesto Yaffe Helen November 2 2017 The deep historical roots of Cuban anti imperialism PDF Third World Quarterly Abingdon Taylor amp Francis 38 11 2517 2535 doi 10 1080 01436597 2017 1374171 S2CID 149249232 In international terms Cuba s Revolution dented the US sphere of influence weakening the US position as a global power These were the structural geopolitical motivations for opposing Cuba s hard won independence The Bay of Pigs Playa Giron invasion and multiple military invasion plans programmes of terrorism sabotage and subversion were part of Washington s reaction a b c d e f g Franklin Jane 2016 Cuba and the U S empire a chronological history New York New York University Press pp 45 63 388 392 et passim ISBN 978 1583676059 Retrieved February 2 2020 14 15 16 17 a b c Absher Kenneth Michael 2009 Mind Sets and Missiles A First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College Archived from the original on April 20 2010 Retrieved April 29 2010 Jason Steinhauer December 19 2014 A Historical Perspective on the Cuba U S Relationship Library of Congress Dominguez Jorge I April 2000 The amp Missile Crisis PDF Diplomatic History Boston Oxford Blackwell Publishers Oxford University Press 24 2 305 316 doi 10 1111 0145 2096 00214 Archived PDF from the original on September 7 2020 Retrieved September 6 2019 via Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Harvard University On the afternoon of 16 October Attorney General Robert F Kennedy convened in his office a meeting on Operation Mongoose the code name for a U S policy of sabotage and related covert operation aimed at Cuba The Kennedy administration returned to its policy of sponsoring terrorism against Cuba as the confrontation with the Soviet Union lessened Only once in these nearly thousand pages of documentation did a US official raise something that resembled a faint moral objection to US government sponsored terrorism Schoultz Lars 2009 State Sponsored Terrorism That infernal little Cuban republic the United States and the Cuban Revolution Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press pp 170 211 ISBN 978 0807888605 Retrieved February 2 2020 What more could be done How about a program of sabotage focused on blowing up such targets as refineries power plants micro wave stations radio and TV installations strategic highway bridges and railroad facilities military and naval installations and equipment certain industrial plants and sugar refineries The CIA proposed just that approach a month after the Bay of Pigs and the State Department endorsed the proposal In early November six months after the Bay of Pigs JFK authorized the CIA s Program of Covert Action now dubbed Operation Mongoose and named Lansdale its chief of operations A few days later President Kennedy told a Seattle audience We cannot as a free nation compete with our adversaries in tactics of terror assassination false promises counterfeit mobs and crises Perhaps but the Mongoose decision indicated that he was willing to try Prados John Jimenez Bacardi Arturo eds October 3 2019 Kennedy and Cuba Operation Mongoose National Security Archive Report Washington D C The George Washington University Archived from the original on November 2 2019 Retrieved April 3 2020 The Kennedy administration had been quick to set up a Cuba Task Force with strong representation from CIA s Directorate of Plans and on August 31 that unit decided to adopt a public posture of ignoring Castro while attacking civilian targets inside Cuba our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of targets important to the Cuban economy Document 4 While acting through Cuban revolutionary groups with potential for real resistance to Castro the task force will do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose destruction will have the maximum economic impact The memorandum showed no concern for international law or the unspoken nature of these operations as terrorist attacks Erlich Reese 2008 Dateline Havana the real story of U S policy and the future of Cuba Abingdon New York Routledge pp 26 29 ISBN 978 1317261605 Retrieved February 2 2020 Officially the United States favored only peaceful means to pressure Cuba In reality US leaders also used 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Press North Branch Minnesota 2005 ISBN 978 1 58007 071 3 page 178 Aviation Safety Archived from the original on October 6 2014 Retrieved October 19 2011 Evans Michael The Submarines of October nsarchive gwu edu Archived from the original on October 31 2016 Retrieved October 24 2016 Dobbs Michael 2008 One Minute to Midnight Kennedy Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War New York Alfred A Knopf ISBN 978 1 4000 4358 3 a b Arms Control Today Arms Control Association November 1 2002 Archived from the original on February 18 2004 Retrieved February 14 2004 Allison Graham 2012 The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50 Foreign Affairs 91 4 Archived from the original on February 15 2021 Retrieved July 9 2012 VZGLYaD SShA i Rossiya krizis 1962 go Archived from the original on December 14 2013 Retrieved December 14 2013 a b c Matthews Joe October 13 2012 Cuban missile crisis The other secret one BBC News Magazine Archived from the original on October 13 2012 Retrieved October 13 2012 Roberts Priscilla 2012 Cuban Missile Crisis The Essential Reference Guide ABC CLIO p 267 ISBN 9781610690669 Archived from the original on April 24 2016 Retrieved October 26 2015 Willis Jim 2010 100 Media Moments that Changed America ABC CLIO pp 97 99 Stern Sheldon 2012 The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory Myths versus Reality Stanford University Press p viii Cohn William H 1976 History for the masses Television portrays the past Journal of Popular Culture 10 2 280 89 doi 10 1111 j 0022 3840 1976 1002 280 x Kozovoi Andrei 2014 Dissonant Voices Journal of Cold War Studies 16 3 29 61 doi 10 1162 JCWS a 00470 S2CID 57567035 Haruya Anami Thirteen Days Thirty Years After Robert Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited Journal of American amp Canadian Studies 1994 Issue 12 pp 69 88 Albert Auster The Missiles of October A Case Study of Television Docudrama and Modern Memory Journal of Popular Film and Television 17 4 1990 164 172 James G Blight Janet M Lang The Fog of War Lessons from the Life of Robert S McNamara Rowman amp Littlefield 2005 ch 1 Michael Walker Topaz and Cold War Politics Hitchcock Annual 13 2004 127 153 Ronald Briley Reel history and the cold war OAH Magazine of History 8 2 1994 19 22 Aoki Inoue Cristina Yumie and Matthew Krain One World Two Classrooms Thirteen Days Film as an Active teaching and Learning Tool in Cross national Perspective Journal of Political Science Education 10 4 2014 424 442 Rocky Wood Stephen King A Literary Companion McFarland 2017 p 184 Holger Potzsch and Vit Sisler Playing Cultural Memory Framing History in Call of Duty Black Ops and Czechoslovakia 38 89 Assassination Games and Culture 14 1 2019 3 25 Gregory Frame The Myth of John F Kennedy in Film and Television Film amp History An Interdisciplinary Journal 46 2 2016 21 34 Martin Lund The mutant problem X Men confirmation bias and the methodology of comics and identity European journal of American studies 10 10 2 2015 document 4 Wiseman Andreas May 3 2018 Benedict Cumberbatch To Star As Cold War Spy Greville Wynne In FilmNation Thriller Ironbark Hot Cannes Pic Deadline Hollywood Retrieved May 3 2018 Further reading EditAllison Graham Zelikow Philip 1999 Essence of Decision Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis New York Addison Wesley Longman ISBN 978 0 321 01349 1 Barrett David M and Max Holland 2012 Blind Over Cuba The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis College Station TX Texas A amp M University Press 2012 Campus Leonardo 2014 I sei giorni che sconvolsero il mondo La crisi dei missili di Cuba e le sue percezioni internazionali Six Days that Shook the World The Cuban Missile Crisis and Its International Perceptions Florence Le Monnier ISBN 9788800745321 Chayes Abram 1974 The Cuban Missile Crisis International crises and the role of law London Oxford University Press ISBN 978 0 19 825320 4 Cockburn Andrew Defensive Not Aggressive review of Theodore Voorhees The Silent Guns of Two Octobers Kennedy and Khrushchev Play the Double Game Michigan September 2021 ISBN 978 0 472 03871 8 384 pp and Serhii Plokhy Nuclear Folly A New History of the Cuban Missile Crisis Allen Lane April 2021 ISBN 978 0 241 45473 2 464 pp London Review of Books vol 43 no 17 9 September 2021 pp 9 10 F or Kennedy the Cuban Missile crisis was entirely about internal US politics Voorhees argues convincingly that there was never any real danger of war since Kennedy and Khrushchev were equally determined to avoid one p 10 Diez Acosta Tomas 2002 October 1962 The Missile Crisis As Seen from Cuba New York Pathfinder ISBN 978 0 87348 956 0 Divine Robert A 1988 The Cuban Missile Crisis New York M Wiener Pub ISBN 978 0 910129 15 2 Dobbs Michael 2008 One Minute to Midnight Kennedy Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War New York Knopf ISBN 978 1 4000 7891 2 Feklisov Aleksandr Kostin Serguei 2001 The Man Behind the Rosenbergs By the KGB Spymaster Who Was the Case Officer of Julius Rosenberg Klaus Fuchs and Helped Resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis New York Enigma Books ISBN 978 1 929631 08 7 Frankel Max 2004 High Noon in the Cold War Kennedy Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis New York Ballantine Books ISBN 978 0 345 46505 4 Fursenko Aleksandr Naftali Timothy J 1998 One Hell of a Gamble Khrushchev Castro and Kennedy 1958 1964 New York Norton ISBN 978 0 393 31790 9 Fursenko Aleksandr Summer 2006 Night Session of the Presidium of the Central Committee 22 23 October 1962 Naval War College Review 59 3 Archived from the original on October 6 2011 George Alice L 2003 Awaiting Armageddon How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press ISBN 978 0 8078 2828 1 Gibson David R 2012 Talk at the Brink Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis Princeton NJ Princeton University Press ISBN 978 0 691 15131 1 Gonzalez Servando 2002 The Nuclear Deception Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis Oakland CA Spooks Books ISBN 978 0 9711391 5 2 Jones Milo Silberzahn Philppe 2013 Constructing Cassandra Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA 1947 2001 Stanford University Press ISBN 978 0804793360 Khrushchev Sergei October 2002 How My Father And President Kennedy Saved The World American Heritage 53 5 Kolbert Elizabeth This Close The day the Cuban missile crisis almost went nuclear a review of Martin J Sherwin s Gambling with Armageddon Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis New York Knopf 2020 The New Yorker 12 October 2020 pp 70 73 Article includes information from recently declassified sources Plokhy Serhii Nuclear Folly A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis W W Norton amp Company 2021 Polmar Norman Gresham John D 2006 DEFCON 2 Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis Foreword by Tom Clancy Hoboken NJ Wiley ISBN 978 0 471 67022 3 Pope Ronald R 1982 Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis Myth and Reality in Foreign Policy Analysis Washington DC Univ Press of America ISBN 978 0 8191 2584 2 Powers Thomas The Nuclear Worrier review of Daniel Ellsberg The Doomsday Machine Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner New York Bloomsbury 2017 ISBN 9781608196708 420 pp The New York Review of Books vol LXV no 1 January 18 2018 pp 13 15 Pressman Jeremy 2001 September Statements October Missiles November Elections Domestic Politics Foreign Policy Making and the Cuban Missile Crisis Security Studies 10 3 80 114 doi 10 1080 09636410108429438 S2CID 154854331 Radchenko Sergey Zubok Vladislav May June 2023 Blundering on the Brink The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis Foreign Affairs 102 3 44 63 Russell Bertrand 1963 Unarmed Victory London Allen amp Unwin ISBN 978 0 04 327024 0 Seydi SUleyman Turkish American Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1957 63 Middle Eastern Studies 46 3 2010 pp 433 455 online Stern Sheldon M 2003 Averting the Final Failure John F Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings Stanford nuclear age series Stanford Calif Stanford University Press ISBN 978 0 8047 4846 9 Retrieved November 4 2011 Stern Sheldon M 2005 The Week the World Stood Still Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Stanford nuclear age series Stanford Calif Stanford University Press ISBN 978 0 8047 5077 6 Archived from the original on October 14 2011 Retrieved November 4 2011 Stern Sheldon M 2012 The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory Myths versus Reality Stanford nuclear age series Stanford Calif Stanford University Press Trahair Richard C S Miller Robert L 2009 Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage Spies and Secret Operations New York Enigma Books ISBN 978 1 929631 75 9 Matthews Joe October 2012 Cuban missile crisis The other secret one BBC Weaver Michael E The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force An Example from the Cuban Missile Crisis Diplomatic History January 2014 Volume 38 Number 1 pp 137 81 The Relationship between Diplomacy and Military Force An Example from the Cuban Missile Crisis White Mark The Other Missiles of October Eisenhower Kennedy and the Jupiters 1957 1963 Diplomatic History 2002 26 1 pp 147 153 Historiography Edit Allison Graham T September 1969 Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis American Political Science Review 63 3 689 718 doi 10 2307 1954423 JSTOR 1954423 S2CID 251094337 Dorn A Walter Pauk Robert April 2009 Unsung Mediator U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis Diplomatic History 33 2 261 292 doi 10 1111 j 1467 7709 2008 00762 x Garthoff Raymond L Spring 2004 Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War Journal of Cold War Studies 6 2 21 56 doi 10 1162 152039704773254759 ISSN 1520 3972 S2CID 57563600 Gibson David R 2011 Avoiding Catastrophe The Interactional Production of Possibility during the Cuban Missile Crisis The American Journal of Sociology 117 2 361 419 CiteSeerX 10 1 1 374 2005 doi 10 1086 661761 JSTOR 10 1086 661761 S2CID 143717875 Jones John A Jones Virginia H Spring 2005 Through the Eye of the Needle Five Perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis Rhetoric amp Public Affairs 8 1 133 144 doi 10 1353 rap 2005 0044 S2CID 154894890 Jones Milo Silberzahn Philppe 2013 Constructing Cassandra Reframing Intelligence Failure at the CIA 1947 2001 Stanford University Press pp 135 191 ISBN 978 0804793360 Lebow Richard Ned October 1990 Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis The Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations Reevaluated Diplomatic History 14 4 471 492 doi 10 1111 j 1467 7709 1990 tb00103 x Primary sources Edit Getchell Michelle Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War A Short History with Documents Hackett Publishing 2018 200 pp online review permanent dead link Chang Laurence Kornbluh Peter eds 1998 Introduction The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 A National Security Archive Documents Reader 2nd ed New York New Press ISBN 978 1 56584 474 2 Cuban Missile Crisis JFK in History John F Kennedy Library Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 Presidential Recordings Program Miller Center of Public Affairs University of Virginia Archived from the original on August 16 2011 Cuban Missile Crisis Wilson Center Digital Archive Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Archived from the original on June 29 2015 Retrieved June 27 2015 Karnow Stanley 1997 Vietnam A History 2nd ed New York Penguin Books ISBN 978 0 14 026547 7 Keefer Edward C Sampson Charles S Smith Louis J eds 1996 Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath Foreign relations of the United States 1961 1963 Vol XI Washington D C U S Government Printing Office ISBN 978 0 16 045210 9 Archived from the original on December 23 2016 Retrieved December 8 2018 Kennedy Robert F 1969 Thirteen Days A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis New York W W Norton ISBN 978 0 393 31834 0 May Ernest R Zelikow Philip D eds 2002 1997 The Kennedy Tapes Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis 2nd ed New York Norton ISBN 978 0 393 32259 0 McAuliffe Mary S ed October 1992 CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 PDF Historical Review Program Washington DC Central Intelligence Agency Archived from the original PDF on December 24 2011 Retrieved May 11 2011 The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 The 40th Anniversary National Security Archive Special Exhibits Gelman Library The George Washington University The World On the Brink John F Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis Interactive Exhibits John F Kennedy Library Archived from the original on January 18 2011 Retrieved April 9 2011 Gavrov Sergei ed November 2013 America and Russia The Crisis of 1962 On the 50th anniversary of the missile crisis Moscow Vzglyad Russia Archived from the original on October 17 2016 Retrieved September 10 2016 Dallek Robert If We Listen to Them None of Us Will Be Alive In Camelot s Court 279 334 New York HarperCollins 2013 Lesson plans Edit Cuban Missile Crisis Slideshows for Educators Bureau of Public Affairs U S Department of State Archived from the original on January 5 2011 Moser John Hahn Lori July 15 2010 The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 The Missiles of October EDSITEment Lesson Plans National Endowment for the Humanities Archived from the original on January 16 2011 Retrieved January 26 2011 External links Edit Wikiquote has quotations related to Cuban Missile Crisis Wikimedia Commons has media related to Cuban Missile Crisis Cuban Missile Crisis Operaciya Anadyr Operation Anadyr on Flickr Cuban Missile Crisis and the Fallout from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives Cuban Missile Crisis Topics History Channel 2011 Cuban Missile Crisis Nuclear Weapons History Cold War Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Archived from the original on October 5 2018 Retrieved December 8 2018 Cuban Missile Crisis Bibliography Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues Archived from the original on August 7 2011 Retrieved May 11 2011 Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 October 1962 DEFCON 4 DEFCON 3 Spartacus Educational UK Cuban Missile Crisis Document Britain s Cuban Missile Crisis No Time to Talk The Cuban Missile Crisis Patrick J Kiger June 7 2019 Key Moments in the Cuban Missile Crisis A Timeline of the Cuban Missile C, wikipedia, 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