Annexation of Hyderabad

Operation Polo was the code name of the Hyderabad "police action" in September 1948,^[9] by the newly independent Dominion of India against Hyderabad State.^[10] It was a military operation in which the Indian Armed Forces invaded the Nizam-ruled princely state, annexing it into the Indian Union.^[11]

Operation Polo
The State of Hyderabad in 1909 (excluding Berar)
Date 13–18 September 1948 (5 days) Location Hyderabad State, (parts of South and Western India) 17°00′N 78°50′E / 17.000°N 78.833°E / 17.000; 78.833 Result Indian victory Annexation of Hyderabad to the Union of India
Belligerents
Dominion of India	Hyderabad
Commanders and leaders
Governor-General Chakravarti Rajagopalachari Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Minister of Defence Baldev Singh General Sir Roy Bucher Air Marshal Thomas Elmhirst Lieutenant-General Rajendrasinhji Jadeja^[1] Major General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri Major General Ajit Rudra Air Vice-Marshal Subroto Mukherjee^[2]	Nizam Mir Osman Ali Khan S.A. El Edroos  Qasim Razvi
Strength
35,000 Indian Armed Forces	22,000 Hyderabad State Forces est. 200,000 irregulars (Razakars)^[3]^: 8
Casualties and losses
Less than 10 killed^[4]	Hyderabad State forces: 807 killed unknown wounded 1,647 POWs^[5] Razakars: 1,373 killed 1,911 captured^[5]
Sunderlal Committee: 30,000–40,000 civilians killed^[6] Responsible observers: 200,000 civilians killed^[7]^[8]

At the time of Partition in 1947, the princely states of India, who in principle had self-government within their own territories, were subject to subsidiary alliances with the British, giving them control of their external relations. With the Indian Independence Act 1947, the British abandoned all such alliances, leaving the states with the option of opting for full independence.^[12][13] However, by 1948 almost all had acceded to either India or Pakistan. One major exception was that of the wealthiest and most powerful principality, Hyderabad, where the Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, Asaf Jah VII, a Muslim ruler who presided over a largely Hindu population, chose independence and hoped to maintain this with an irregular army.^[14]: 224 The Nizam was also beset by the Telangana rebellion, which he was unable to subjugate.^[14]: 224

In November 1947, Hyderabad signed a standstill agreement with the Dominion of India, continuing all previous arrangements except for the stationing of Indian troops in the state. Claiming that it feared the establishment of a Communist state in Hyderabad,^[15][16] India invaded the state in September 1948, following a crippling economic blockade, and multiple attempts at destabilizing the state through railway disruptions, the bombing of government buildings, and raids on border villages.^[17][18][3] Subsequently, the Nizam signed an instrument of accession, joining India.^[19]

The operation led to massive violence on communal lines, at times perpetrated by the Indian Army.^[20] The Sunderlal Committee, appointed by Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, concluded that between 30,000-40,000 people had died in total in the state, in a report which was not released until 2013.^[6] Other responsible observers estimated the number of deaths to be 200,000 or higher.^[7]

Background

After the Siege of Golconda by the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1687, the region was renamed as Deccan Subah (due to its geographical proximity in the Deccan Plateau) and in 1713 Qamar-ud-din Khan (later known as Asaf Jah I or Nizam I) was appointed its Subahdar and bestowed with the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk by the Mughal Emperor Farrukhsiyar. Hyderabad's nominal independence is dated to 1724, when the Nizam won a military victory over a rival military appointee.^[21] In 1798, Hyderabad became the first Indian princely state to accede to British protection under the policy of Subsidiary Alliance instituted by Arthur Wellesley, and was thus named as the State of Hyderabad.

The State of Hyderabad under the leadership of its 7th Nizam, Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, was the largest and most prosperous of all the princely states in India. With annual revenues of over Rs. 9 crore,^[22] it covered 82,698 square miles (214,190 km²) of fairly homogenous territory and comprised a population of roughly 16.34 million people (as per the 1941 census) of which a majority (85%) was Hindu. The state had its own army, airline, telecommunication system, railway network, postal system, currency and radio broadcasting service.^[5] Hyderabad was a multi-lingual state consisting of peoples speaking Telugu (48.2%), Marathi (26.4%), Kannada (12.3%) and Urdu (10.3%). In spite of the overwhelming Hindu majority, Hindus were severely under-represented in government, police and the military. Of 1765 officers in the State Army, 1268 were Muslims, 421 were Hindus, and 121 others were Christians, Parsis and Sikhs. Of the officials drawing a salary between Rs. 600 and 1200 per month, 59 were Muslims, 5 were Hindus and 38 were of other religions. The Nizam and his nobles, who were mostly Muslims, owned 40% of the total land in the state.^[23][5]

When the British departed from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, they offered the various princely states in the sub-continent the option of acceding to either India or Pakistan, or staying on as an independent state.^[12] As stated by Sardar Patel at a press conference in January 1948, "As you are all aware, on the lapse of Paramountcy every Indian State became a separate independent entity."^[24] In India, a small number of states, including Hyderabad, declined to join the new dominion.^[25][26] In the case of Pakistan, accession happened far more slowly.^[27] Hyderabad had been part of the calculations of all-India political parties since the 1930s.^[28] The leaders of the new Dominion of India were wary of a Balkanization of India if Hyderabad was left independent.^{[14]: 223 [failed verification]}

Hyderabad state had been steadily becoming more theocratic since the beginning of the 20th century. In 1926, Mahmud Nawazkhan, a retired Hyderabad official, founded the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (also known as Ittehad or MIM). Its objectives were to unite the Muslims in the State in support of Nizam and to reduce the Hindu majority by large-scale conversion to Islam.^[29] The MIM became a powerful communal organisation, with the principal focus to marginalise the political aspirations of the Hindus and moderate Muslims.^[29]

Events preceding hostilities

Main articles: Political integration of India and Partition of India

Political and diplomatic negotiations

Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, Nizam of Hyderabad, initially approached the British government with a request to take on the status of an independent constitutional monarchy within the Commonwealth of Nations. This request was, however, rejected by the last Viceroy of India, The 1st Viscount Mountbatten of Burma.^[30]

At the time of the British withdrawal from India, the Nizam announced that he did not intend to join either new dominion,^[31] and proceeded to appoint trade representatives in European countries and to begin negotiations with the Portuguese, seeking to lease or buy Goa to provide his state with access to the sea.^{[32][33][34][35][36]}

B.R.Ambedkar, the Law Minister in the first independent Indian government considered the state of Hyderabad to be "a new problem which may turn out to be worse than the Hindu-Muslim problem as it is sure to result in the further Balkanisation of India"^[37] According to the writer A. G. Noorani, Indian Prime Minister Nehru's concern was to defeat what he called Hyderabad's "secessionist venture", but he favoured talks and considered military option as a last resort. In Nehru's observation, the state of Hyderabad was "full of dangerous possibilities".^[37] Sardar Patel of the Indian National Congress, however, took a hard line, and had no patience with talks.^[38][39]

Accordingly, the Indian government offered Hyderabad a standstill agreement which made an assurance that the status quo would be maintained and no military action would be taken for one year. According to this agreement India would handle Hyderabad's foreign affairs, but Indian Army troops stationed in Secunderabad would be removed.^[3] In Hyderabad city there was a huge demonstration by Razakars led by Syed Qasim Razvi in October 1947, against the administration's decision to sign the Standstill Agreement. This demonstration in front of the houses of the main negotiators, the Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chattari, Sir Walter Monckton, advisor to the Nizam, and Minister Nawab Ali Nawaz Jung, forced them to call off their Delhi visit to sign the agreement at that time.^[40]

Hyderabad violated all clauses of the agreement: in external affairs, by carrying out intrigues with Pakistan, to which it secretly loaned 15 million pounds; in defence, by building up a large semi-private army; in communications, by interfering with the traffic at the borders and the through traffic of Indian railways.^[41] India was also accused of violating the agreement by imposing an economic blockade. It turned out that the state of Bombay was interfering with supplies to Hyderabad without the knowledge of Delhi. The Government promised to take up the matter with the provincial governments, but scholar Lucien Benichou states that it was never done. There were also delays in arms shipments to Hyderabad from India.^[42]

Muhammad Ali Jinnah was reported to have warned the then Viceroy Lord Mountbatten "If Congress attempted to exert any pressure on Hyderabad, every Muslim throughout the whole of India, yes, all the hundred million Muslims, would rise as one man to defend the oldest Muslim dynasty in India."^[37] According to Taylor C. Sherman, "India claimed that the government of Hyderabad was edging towards independence by divesting itself of its Indian securities, banning the Indian currency, halting the export of ground nuts, organising illegal gun-running from Pakistan, and inviting new recruits to its army and to its irregular forces, the Razakars." The Hyderabadi envoys accused India of setting up armed barricades on all land routes and of attempting to economically isolate their nation.^[3]

In the summer of 1948, Indian officials, especially Patel, signalled an intention to invade; Britain encouraged India to resolve the issue without the use of force, but refused the Nizam's requests to help.^[3]

The Nizam also made unsuccessful attempts to seek the intervention of the United Nations.^[43]

Telangana Rebellion

Main article: Telangana Rebellion

In late 1945, there started a peasant uprising in the Telangana area, led by communists. The communists drew their support from various quarters. Among the poor peasants, there were grievances against the jagirdari system, which covered 43% of land holding. Initially they also drew support from wealthier peasants who also fought under the communist banner, but by 1948, the coalition had disintegrated.^[3] According to the Indian intelligence Bureau Deputy Director, the social and economic programs of the communists were "positive and in some cases great...The communists redistributed land and livestock, reduced rates, ended forced labour and increased wages by one hundred percent. They inoculated the population and built public latrines; they encouraged women's organisations, discouraged sectarian sentiment and sought to abolish untouchability."^[3]

Initially, in 1945, the communists targeted zamindars and even the Hindu Deshmukhs, but soon they launched a full-fledged revolt against the Nizam. Starting in mid-1946, the conflict between the Razakars and the Communists became increasingly violent, with both sides resorting to increasingly brutal methods. According to an Indian government pamphlet, the communists had killed about 2,000 people by 1948.^[3]

Communal violence before the operation

In the 1936–37 Indian elections, the Muslim League under Muhammad Ali Jinnah had sought to harness Muslim aspirations, and had won the adherence of MIM leader Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung, who campaigned for an Islamic State centred on the Nizam as the Sultan dismissing all claims for democracy. The Arya Samaj, a Hindu revivalist movement, had been demanding greater access to power for the Hindu majority since the late 1930s, and was curbed by the Nizam in 1938. The Hyderabad State Congress joined forces with the Arya Samaj as well as the Hindu Mahasabha in the State.^[44]

Noorani regards the MIM under Nawab Bahadur Yar Jung as explicitly committed to safeguarding the rights of religious and linguistic minorities. However, this changed with the ascent of Qasim Razvi after the Nawab's death in 1944.^[45]

Even as India and Hyderabad negotiated, most of the sub-continent had been thrown into chaos as a result of communal Hindu-Muslim riots pending the imminent partition of India. Fearing a Hindu civil uprising in his own kingdom, the Nizam allowed Razvi to set up a voluntary militia of Muslims called the 'Razakars'. The Razakars – who numbered up to 200,000 at the height of the conflict – swore to uphold Islamic domination in Hyderabad and the Deccan plateau^[3]: 8 in the face of growing public opinion amongst the majority Hindu population favouring the accession of Hyderabad into the Indian Union.

According to an account by Mohammed Hyder, a civil servant in Osmanabad district, a variety of armed militant groups, including Razakars and Deendars and ethnic militias of Pathans and Arabs claimed to be defending the Islamic faith and made claims on the land. "From the beginning of 1948 the Razakars had extended their activities from Hyderabad city into the towns and rural areas, murdering Hindus, abducting women, pillaging houses and fields, and looting non-Muslim property in a widespread reign of terror."^[46][47] "Some women became victims of rape and kidnapping by Razakars. Thousands went to jail and braved the cruelties perpetuated by the oppressive administration. Due to the activities of the Razakars, thousands of Hindus had to flee from the state and take shelter in various camps".^[47] Precise numbers are not known, but 40,000 refugees were received by the Central Provinces.^[3]: 8 This led to terrorising of the Hindu community, some of whom went across the border into independent India and organised raids into Nizam's territory, which further escalated the violence. Many of these raiders were controlled by the Congress leadership in India and had links with extremist religious elements in the Hindutva fold.^[48] In all, more than 150 villages (of which 70 were in Indian territory outside Hyderabad State) were pushed into violence.

Hyder mediated some efforts to minimise the influence of the Razakars.^{[citation needed]} Razvi, while generally receptive, vetoed the option of disarming them, saying that with the Hyderabad state army ineffective, the Razakars were the only means of self-defence available. By the end of August 1948, a full blown invasion by India was imminent.^[49]

Nehru was reluctant to invade, fearing a military response by Pakistan. India was unaware that Pakistan had no plans to use arms in Hyderabad, unlike Kashmir where it had admitted its troops were present.^[3] Time magazine pointed out that if India invaded Hyderabad, the Razakars would massacre Hindus, which would lead to retaliatory massacres of Muslims across India.^[50]

Hyderabadi military preparations

The Nizam was in a weak position as his army numbered only 24,000 men, of whom only some 6,000 were fully trained and equipped.^[51] These included Arabs, Rohillas, North Indian Muslims and Pathans. The State Army consisted of three armoured regiments, a horse cavalry regiment, 11 infantry battalions and artillery. These were supplemented by irregular units with horse cavalry, four infantry battalions (termed as the Saraf-e-khas, paigah, Arab and Refugee) and a garrison battalion.^{[citation needed]} This army was commanded by Major General El Edroos, an Arab.^[52] 55 per cent of the Hyderabadi army was composed of Muslims, with 1,268 Muslims in a total of 1,765 officers as of 1941.^[5][53]

In addition to these, there were about 200,000 irregular militia called the Razakars under the command of civilian leader Kasim Razvi. A quarter of these were armed with modern small firearms, while the rest were predominantly armed with muzzle-loaders and swords.^[52]

Skirmish at Kodad

On 6 September an Indian police post near Chillakallu village came under heavy fire from Razakar units. The Indian Army command sent a squadron of The Poona Horse led by Abhey Singh and a company of 2/5 Gurkha Rifles to investigate who were also fired upon by the Razakars. The tanks of the Poona Horse then chased the Razakars to Kodad, in Hyderabad territory. Here they were opposed by the armoured cars of 1 Hyderabad Lancers. In a brief action the Poona Horse destroyed one armoured car and forced the surrender of the state garrison at Kodad.

Indian military preparations

On receiving directions from the government to seize and annex Hyderabad,^{[citation needed]} the Indian army came up with the Goddard Plan (laid out by Lt. Gen. E. N. Goddard, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Command). The plan envisaged two main thrusts – from Vijayawada in the East and Solapur in the West – while smaller units pinned down the Hyderabadi army along the border. Overall command was placed in the hands of Lt. Gen. Rajendrasinghji, DSO.

The attack from Solapur was led by Major General Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri and was composed of four task forces:

1. Strike Force comprising a mix of fast moving infantry, cavalry and light artillery,
2. Smash Force consisting of predominantly armoured units and artillery,
3. Kill Force composed of infantry and engineering units
4. Vir Force which comprised infantry, anti-tank and engineering units.

The attack from Vijayawada was led by Major General Ajit Rudra and comprised the 2/5 Gurkha Rifles, one squadron of the 17th (Poona) Horse, and a troop from the 19th Field Battery along with engineering and ancillary units. In addition, four infantry battalions were to neutralise and protect lines of communication. Two squadrons of Hawker Tempest aircraft were prepared for air support from the Pune base.

The date for the attack was fixed as 13 September, even though General Sir Roy Bucher, the Indian chief of staff, had objected on grounds that Hyderabad would be an additional front for the Indian army after Kashmir.

Commencement of hostilities

 

Indian Army movements during the Operation Polo

Day 1, 13 September

Indian forces entered the state at 4 a.m.^[54] The first battle was fought at Naldurg Fort on the Solapur Secundarabad Highway between a defending force of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and the attacking force of the 7th Brigade. Using speed and surprise, the 7th Brigade managed to secure a vital bridge on the Bori river intact, following which an assault was made on the Hyderabadi positions at Naldurg by the 2nd Sikh Infantry. The bridge and road secured, an armoured column of the 1st Armoured Brigade – part of the Smash force – moved into the town of Jalkot, 8 km from Naldurg, at 0900 hours, paving the way for the Strike Force units under Lt. Col Ram Singh Commandant of 9 Dogra (a motorised battalion) to pass through. This armoured column reached the town of Umarga, 61 km inside Hyderabad by 1515 hours, where it quickly overpowered resistance from Razakar units defending the town. Meanwhile, another column consisting of a squadron of 3rd Cavalry, a troop from 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry, a troop from 9 Para Field Regiment, 10 Field Company Engineers, 3/2 Punjab Regiment, 2/1 Gurkha Rifles, 1 Mewar Infantry, and ancillary units attacked the town of Tuljapur, about 34 km north-west of Naldurg. They reached Tuljapur at dawn, where they encountered resistance from a unit of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and about 200 Razakars who fought for two hours before surrendering. Further advance towards the town of Lohara was stalled as the river had swollen. The first day on the Western front ended with the Indians inflicting heavy casualties on the Hyderabadis and capturing large tracts of territory. Amongst the captured defenders was a British mercenary who had been tasked with blowing up the bridge near Naldurg.

In the East, forces led by Lt. Gen A.A. Rudra met with fierce resistance from two armoured car cavalry units of the Hyderabad State Forces. equipped with Humber armoured cars and Staghounds, namely the 2nd and 4th Hyderabad Lancers,^[55] but managed to reach the town of Kodar by 0830 hours. Pressing on, the force reached Munagala by the afternoon.

There were further incidents in Hospet – where the 1st Mysore assaulted and secured a sugar factory from units of Razakars and Pathans – and at Tungabhadra – where the 5/5 Gurkha attacked and secured a vital bridge from the Hyderabadi army.

Day 2, 14 September

The force that had camped at Umarga proceeded to the town of Rajeshwar, 48 km east. As aerial reconnaissance had shown well entrenched ambush positions set up along the way, the air strikes from squadrons of Tempests were called in. These air strikes effectively cleared the route and allowed the land forces to reach and secure Rajeshwar by the afternoon.

The assault force from the East was meanwhile slowed by an anti-tank ditch and later came under heavy fire from hillside positions of the 1st Lancers and 5th Infantry 6 km from Suryapet. The positions were assaulted by the 2/5 Gurkha – veterans of the Burma Campaign – and were neutralised, with the Hyderabadis taking severe casualties.

At the same time, the 3/11 Gurkha Rifles and a squadron of 8th Cavalry attacked Osmanabad and took the town after heavy street combat with the Razakars who determinedly resisted the Indians.^[56]

A force under the command of Maj. Gen. D.S. Brar was tasked with capturing the city of Aurangabad. The city was attacked by six columns of infantry and cavalry, resulting in the civil administration emerging in the afternoon and offering a surrender to the Indians.

There were further incidents in Jalna where 3 Sikh, a company of 2 Jodhpur infantry and some tanks from 18 Cavalry faced stubborn resistance from Hyderabadi forces.

Day 3, 15 September

Leaving a company of 3/11 Gurkhas to occupy the town of Jalna, the remainder of the force moved to Latur, and later to Mominabad where they faced action against the 3 Golconda Lancers who gave token resistance before surrendering.

At the town of Surriapet, air strikes cleared most of the Hyderabadi defences, although some Razakar units still gave resistance to the 2/5 Gurkhas who occupied the town. The retreating Hyderabadi forces destroyed the bridge at Musi to delay the Indians but failed to offer covering fire, allowing the bridge to be quickly repaired. Another incident occurred at Narkatpalli where a Razakar unit was decimated by the Indians.

Day 4, 16 September

The task force under Lt. Col. Ram Singh moved towards Zahirabad at dawn, but was slowed by a minefield, which had to be cleared. On reaching the junction of the Bidar road with the Solapur-Hyderabad City Highway, the forces encountered gunfire from ambush positions. However, leaving some of the units to handle the ambush, the bulk of the force moved on to reach 15 kilometres beyond Zahirabad by nightfall in spite of sporadic resistance along the way. Most of the resistance was from Razakar units who ambushed the Indians as they passed through urban areas. The Razakars were able to use the terrain to their advantage until the Indians brought in their 75 mm guns.

Day 5, 17 September

In the early hours of 17 September, the Indian army entered Bidar. Meanwhile, forces led by the 1st Armoured regiment were at the town of Chityal about 60 km from Hyderabad, while another column took over the town of Hingoli. By the morning of the 5th day of hostilities, it had become clear that the Hyderabad army and the Razakars had been routed on all fronts and with extremely heavy casualties. At 5 pm on 17 September, the Nizam announced a ceasefire, thus ending the armed action.^[56]

Capitulation and surrender

Consultations with Indian envoy

On 16 September, faced with imminent defeat, Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan summoned his Prime Minister, Mir Laiq Ali, and requested his resignation by the morning of the following day. The resignation was delivered along with the resignations of the entire cabinet.

On the noon of 17 September, a messenger brought a personal note from the Nizam to India's Agent General to Hyderabad, K. M. Munshi, summoning him to the Nizam's office at 1600 hours. At the meeting, the Nizam stated "The vultures have resigned. I don't know what to do". Munshi advised the Nizam to secure the safety of the citizens of Hyderabad by issuing appropriate orders to the Commander of the Hyderabad State Army, Major-General El Edroos. This was immediately done.

Radio broadcast after surrender by the Nizam

 

Major General Syed Ahmed El Edroos (at right) offers his surrender of the Hyderabad State Forces to Major General (later General and Army Chief) Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri at Secunderabad

It was Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan's first visit to the radio station. The Nizam of Hyderabad, in his radio speech on 23 September 1948, said "In November last [1947], a small group which had organized a quasi-military organization surrounded the homes of my Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chhatari, in whose wisdom I had complete confidence, and of Sir Walter Monkton, my constitutional Adviser, by duress compelled the Nawab and other trusted ministers to resign and forced the Laik Ali Ministry on me. This group headed by Kasim Razvi had no stake in the country or any record of service behind it. By methods reminiscent of Hitlerite Germany it took possession of the State, spread terror ... and rendered me completely helpless."^[57]

The surrender ceremony

According to the records maintained by the Indian Army, General Chaudhari led an armoured column into Hyderabad at around 4 p.m. on 18 September and the Hyderabad army, led by Major General El Edroos, surrendered.^[58]

Communal violence during and after the operation

Main article: Hyderabad Massacre

There were reports of looting, mass murder and rape of Muslims in reprisals by Hyderabadi Hindus.^[20][47] Jawaharlal Nehru appointed a mixed-faith committee led by Pandit Sunder Lal to investigate the situation. The findings of the report (Pandit Sunderlal Committee Report) were not made public until 2013 when it was accessed from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi.^[20][59]

The Committee concluded that while Muslim villagers were disarmed by the Indian Army, Hindus were often left with their weapons.^[20] The violence was carried out by Hindu residents, with the army sometimes indifferent, and sometimes participating in the atrocities.^[3]: 11 The Committee stated that large-scale violence against Muslims occurred in Marathwada and Telangana areas. It also concluded: "At a number of places members of the armed forces brought out Muslim adult males from villages and towns and massacred them in cold blood."^[20] The Committee generally credited the military officers with good conduct but stated that soldiers acted out of bigotry.^[3]: 11 The official "very conservative estimate" was that 27,000 to 40,000 died "during and after the police action."^[20] Other scholars have put the figure at 200,000, or even higher.^[8] Among Muslims some estimates were even higher and Smith says that the military government's private low estimates [of Muslim casualties] were at least ten times the number of murders with which the Razakars were officially accused.^[60]

Patel reacted angrily to the report and disowned its conclusions. He stated that the terms of reference were flawed because they only covered the part during and after the operation. He also cast aspersions on the motives and standing of the committee. These objections are regarded by Noorani as disingenuous because the commission was an official one, and it was critical of the Razakars as well.^[8][61]

According to Mohammed Hyder, the tragic consequences of the Indian operation were largely preventable. He faulted the Indian army with neither restoring local administration, nor setting up their own military administration. As a result, the anarchy led to several thousand "thugs", from the camps set up across the border, filling the vacuum. He stated "Thousands of families were broken up, children separated from their parents and wives, from their husbands. Women and girls were hunted down and raped."^[62]

According to the communist leader Puccalapalli Sundarayya, Hindus in villages rescued thousands of Muslim families from the Union Army's campaign of rape and murder.^{[63][non-primary source needed]}

Hyderabad after integration

Detentions and release of people involved

 

(From left to right): Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Nizam Mir Sir Osman Ali Khan, and Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri after Hyderabad's accession to the Dominion of India.

The Indian military detained thousands of people during the operation, including Razakars, Hindu militants, and communists. This was largely done on the basis of local informants, who used this opportunity to settle scores. The estimated number of people detained was close to 18,000, which resulted in overcrowded jails and a paralysed criminal system.^{[3]: 11–12}

The Indian government set up Special Tribunals to prosecute these. These strongly resembled the colonial governments earlier, and there were many legal irregularities, including denial or inability to access lawyers and delayed trials – about which the Red Cross was pressuring Nehru.^{[3]: 13–14}

The viewpoint of the government was: "in political physics, Razakar action and Hindu reaction have been almost equal and opposite." A quiet decision was taken to release all Hindus and for a review of all Muslim cases, aiming to let many of them out. Regarding atrocities by Muslims, Nehru considered the actions during the operation as "madness" seizing "decent people", analogous to experience elsewhere during the partition of India. Nehru was also concerned that disenfranchised Muslims would join the communists.^{[3]: 15–16}

The government was under pressure to not prosecute participants in communal violence, which often made communal relations worse. Patel had also died in 1950. Thus, by 1953 the Indian government released all but a few persons.^[3]: 16

Overhaul of bureaucracy

Junior officers from neighbouring Bombay, CP and Madras regions were appointed to replace the vacancies. They were unable to speak the language and were unfamiliar with local conditions. Nehru objected to this "communal chauvinism" and called them "incompetent outsiders", and tried to impose Hyderabadi residency requirements: however, this was circumvented by using forged documents.^{[3]: 17–18}

References

1. "Press Communique" (PDF). Press Information Bureau of India – Archive. 21 September 1948. Retrieved 16 February 2020.
2. "RIAF in Hyderabad" (PDF). Press Information Bureau of India – Archive. 23 September 1948. Retrieved 16 February 2020.
3. Sherman, Taylor C. (2007). "The integration of the princely state of Hyderabad and the making of the postcolonial state in India, 1948 – 56" (PDF). Indian Economic & Social History Review. 44 (4): 489–516. doi:10.1177/001946460704400404. S2CID 145000228.
4. "585 Mohan Guruswany, There once was a Hyderabad". www.india-seminar.com. Retrieved 28 May 2021.
5. Guruswamy, Mohan (May 2008). "There once was a Hyderabad!". Seminar Magazine. Retrieved 3 August 2010.
6. Noorani 2014, Appendix 15: Confidential notes attached to the Sunderlal Committee Report, pp. 372–373
7. Smith 1950, p. 46.
8. Noorani, A.G. (3–16 March 2001), "Of a massacre untold", Frontline, 18 (5), retrieved 8 September 2014, The lowest estimates, even those offered privately by apologists of the military government, came to at least ten times the number of murders with which previously the Razakars were officially accused...
9. "Hyderabad had tried 'NRC' 71 years ago, and failed". The Times of India. 15 September 2019.
10. "Hyderabad Police Action". Indian Army. Retrieved 13 September 2014.
11. B. Cohen (2007). Kingship and Colonialism in India's Deccan: 1850–1948. Springer. pp. 159–161. ISBN 978-0-230-60344-8.
12. Mehrotra, S.R. (1979). Towards Indias Freedom And Partition. Delhi: Vikash Publishing House. p. 247. Retrieved 17 August 2019.
13. See Section 7 (1) (b): "the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions exercisable by His Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His Majesty existing at that date towards Indian States or the rulers thereof, and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at that date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise."
14. Barbara D. Metcalf; Thomas R. Metcalf (2006). A Concise History of India (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521682251.
15. "Delhi felt Razakars, communists a threat to India". Deccan Chronicle. 15 September 2018. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
16. Ernst, Waltraud; Pati, Biswamoy (18 October 2007). India's Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-134-11988-2.
17. Purushotham, Sunil. "Internal Violence: The "Police Action" in Hyderabad - CSSH". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
18. "New book on Hyderabad's Invasion, 1948's Police Action". The Milli Gazette — Indian Muslims Leading News Source. Retrieved 4 February 2021.
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22. The India Office and Burma Office List: 1945. Harrison & Sons, Ltd. 1945. pp. 33–37.
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Bibliography

• Benichou, Lucien D. (2000), From Autocracy to Integration: Political Developments in Hyderabad State, 1938-1948, Orient Blackswan, ISBN 978-81-250-1847-6
• Chandra, Bipan; Mukherjee, Aditya; Mukherjee, Mridula (2008) [first published 1999], India Since Independence, Penguin Books India, ISBN 978-0-14-310409-4
• Hyder, Mohammed (2012), October Coup, A Memoir of the Struggle for Hyderabad, Roli Books, ISBN 978-8174368508
• Hodson, H. V. (1969), The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan, London: Hutchinson, ISBN 9780090971503
• Menon, V. P. (1956), The Story of Integration of the Indian States (PDF), Orient Longman
• Muralidharan, Sukumar (2014). "Alternate Histories: Hyderabad 1948 Compels a Fresh Evaluation of the Theology of India's Independence and Partition". History and Sociology of South Asia. 8 (2): 119–138. doi:10.1177/2230807514524091. S2CID 153722788.
• Noorani, A. G. (2014), The Destruction of Hyderabad, Hurst & Co, ISBN 978-1-84904-439-4
• Raghavan, Srinath (2010), War and Peace in Modern India, Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7
• Smith, Wilfred Cantwell (January 1950), "Hyderabad: Muslim Tragedy", Middle East Journal, 4 (1): 27–51, JSTOR 4322137
• Zubrzycki, John (2006), The Last Nizam: An Indian Prince in the Australian Outback, Australia: Pan Macmillan, ISBN 978-0-330-42321-2

External links

• Police Action in Hyderabad, 1948 September 13-18 :Should We Celebrate It?
• From the Sundarlal Report, Frontline, 3–16 March 2001
• Exclusive Sundar Lal report on Hyderabad police action, Deccan Chronicle, 30 November 2013.
• , by Bret Wallach, University of Oklahoma
• A Blog by Narendra Luther on Operation Polo
• Armchair Historian – Operation Polo (Monday, 18 September 2006) – Contributed by Sidin Sunny Vadukut – Last Updated (Monday, 18 September 2006)