Battle of Khanwa
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The Battle of Khanwa was fought at Khanwa on March 16, 1527. It was fought between the invading Timurid forces of Babur and the Rajput confederacy led by Rana Sanga for suprermacy of Northern India. The battle was a major event in Medieval Indian history although Timurids won at Panipat but at the time, the sultanate at Delhi was a spent force that was long crumbling. To the contrary Mewar kingdom, under the able rule of Rana Sanga, had turned into one of the strongest powers of northern India. Therefore the battle was among the most decisive battles in the Mughal conquest of northern India.[7][8][9][10][11][12]
| Battle of Khanwa | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Expansion of the Mughal Empire | |||||||||
Mughal painting depicting the Rajput Army (Left) battling the Mughal Army (Right) | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
| Mughal Empire | Rajput Confederation | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Babur Humayun Bairam Khan Ustad Ali Quli Mustafa Rumi Chin Timur Khan Mir Muhib Ali Khalifa Mir Abdul Aziz Mir Muhammed Ali Khan Khusrau Shah Kokultash Kasim Husein Khan Zaman Mirza Askari Mirza Hindal Mirza Sayyid Mahdi Khawaja Asad Malik Hast Raja Ali Khan | Rana Sanga (WIA) Prithviraj Kachwaha Maldev Rathore Uday Singh of Vagad † Raimal Rathore Medini Rai Hasan Khan Mewati † Ratan Singh of Merta † Manik Chand Chauhan † Chandrabhan Chauhan † Ratan Singh Chundawat † Raj Rana Ajja jhala † Rao Ramdas Gokaldas Parmar † Silhadi(Joined Mughal Army in the middle of battle) | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| Around 50,000 [a][2] horsemen, foot musketeers, Swivel guns, mortars and Indian allies[3][4] | 80,000 to 100,000 Rajput cavalrymen along with 500 armored War elephants.[5] | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| Heavy[6] | Heavy[6] | ||||||||
It was among the earliest battles in Northern India where gunpowder was used to a great extent. The battle resulted in heavy casualties for both Timurids and Rajputs.[13]
Background
Until 1524, Babur's aim was to expand his rule to Punjab, primarily to fulfil the legacy of his ancestor Timur, since it used to be part of his empire.[14] Large parts of north India were under the rule of Ibrahim Lodi of the Lodi dynasty, but the empire was crumbling and there were many defectors. Babur had already raided Punjab in 1504 and 1518. In 1519 he tried to invade Punjab but had to return to Kabul due to complications there.[15] In 1520–21 Babur again ventured to conquer Punjab, he easily captured Bhira and Sialkot which were known as the "twin gateways to Hindustan". Babur was able to annex towns and cities till Lahore but was again forced to stop due to rebellions in Qandhar.[16] In 1523 he received invitations from Daulat Khan Lodi, Governor of Punjab and Ala-ud-Din, Ibrahim's uncle, to invade the Delhi Sultanate. Daulat Khan later betrayed Babur and with a force of 40,000 he captured Sialkot from the Mughal garrison and marched towards Lahore. Daulat Khan was soundly defeated at Lahore and through this victory Babur became the unopposed lord of Punjab.,[17][15] Babur continued his conquest and annihilated the Lodi sultanate's army in the First Battle of Panipat, where he killed the Sultan and founded the Mughal Empire.[18]
According to Baburnama, Rana Sanga had also offered to help Babur against Ibrahim, however while Babur did attack Lodi and take over Delhi and Agra, Sanga made no move, apparently having changed his mind. Babur had resented this backsliding; in his autobiography, Babur accuses Rana Sanga of breaching their agreement. However Rajput sources claim the opposite and say that Sanga was successful against the Lodi Empire and did not require Baburs aid. Instead it was Babur who approached Rana Sanga and proposed an alliance against the Lodi Empire.[19] Historian Satish Chandra speculates that Sanga may have imagined a long, drawn-out struggle taking place between Babur and Lodi, following which he would be able to take control of the regions he coveted. Alternatively, writes Chandra, Sanga may have thought that in the event of a Mughal victory, Babur would withdraw from Delhi and Agra, like Timur, once he had seized the treasures of these cities. Once he realized that Babur intended to stay on in India, Sanga proceeded to build a grand coalition that would either force Babur out of India or confine him to Afghanistan. In early 1527, Babur started receiving reports of Sanga's advance towards Agra.[20]
According to Jadunath Sarkar, Babur did not need an invitation to invade Hindustan. After establishing himself in Kabul, Babur had started making inroads into Punjab which was governed by Daulat Khan Lodi, a courtier of Ibrahim Lodi. Daulat was unfaithful to his lord and formed an alliance with Babur against the Lodi Empire. This made it easy for Babur to enter Hindustan and oust both Daulat and Ibrahim.[21]
However, Indologist Gopinath Sharma who is well known for his scholarly work on Mewar Kings and Mughal Empire[22] ably rejected this theory of Rana Sanga sending his ambassador to Babur by providing various factual contemporary evidences for the same. Sharma added that Sanga already established himself as the most powerful Hindu king of Northern India of that time, while Babur was yet to establish his reputation in India. Under those circumstances it was in Babur's interest to seek an alliance with perhaps his greatest and most powerful enemy of Northern India. Also Babur gave no details of his alliance with Sanga while elsewhere he had provided details of his agreement with Daulat khan and Alam khan Lodhi. Baburnama itself was not a reliable book as it exaggerated many accounts like he did about number of armies in First Battle of Panipat to over glorify his victory which are too exaggerated in the context of modern researches.
The most important aspect of all is that there are no contemporary Hindu or Muslim writer who mentioned Sanga sending an ambassador to Kabul while all of them do that for Lodhi's. Therefore In Sharma's words It was a pity that all later writers have uncritically accepted Babur's version. [23]
Initial skirmishes
After the First Battle of Panipat, Babur had recognized that his primary threat came from two allied quarters: Rana Sanga and the Afghans ruling eastern India at the time. In a council that Babur called, it was decided that the Afghans represented the bigger threat, and consequently Humayun was sent at the head of an army to fight the Afghans in the east. However, upon hearing of Rana Sanga's advancement on Agra, Humayun was hastily recalled. Military detachments were then sent by Babur to conquer Dholpur, Gwaliar, and Bayana, strong forts forming the outer boundaries of Agra. The commanders of Dholpur and Gwalior surrendered their forts to Babur, accepting his generous terms. However, Nizam Khan, the commander of Bayana, opened negotiations with both Babur and Sanga. The force sent by Babur to Bayana was defeated and dispersed by Rana Sanga on 21 February 1527.[24]
In one of the earliest western scholarly account[25] of the Mughal rulers, 'A History of India Under the Two First Sovereigns of the House of Taimur Baber and Humayun', William Erskine, a 19th-century Scottish historian, quotes:[26]
They (Mughals) had some sharp encounters with the Rajputs, ... found that they had now to contend with a foe more formidable than the Afghans or any of the natives of India to whom they had yet been opposed. The Rajputs, ... were ready to meet, face to face,... all times prepared to lay down their lives for their honour.
— William Erskine, "Rana Sanga", 'A History of India Under the Two First Sovereigns of the House of Taimur Baber and Humayun' p. 464
Rana Sanga had destroyed all the Mughal contingents that were sent against him, this caused great fear in Babur's army as he has written "the fierceness and valour of the pagan army" made the troops "anxious and afraid". The Afghans in Baburs army started to leave and the Turks started complaining about defending a land that they hated, they requested Babur to leave to Kabul with the rich spoils that they had collected. Babur writes "no manly word or brave council was heard from any one soever".[6]
Prelude
Rana Sanga had built a formidable military alliance against Babur. He was joined by virtually all the leading Rajput kings from Rajasthan, including those from Harauti, Jalor, Sirohi, Dungarpur, and Dhundhar. Rao Ganga of Marwar did not join personally but sent a contingent on his behalf led by his son Maldev Rathore. Rao Medini Rai of Chanderi in Malwa also joined the alliance. Further, Mahmud Lodi, the younger son of Sikandar Lodi, whom the Afghans had proclaimed their new sultan also joined the alliance with a contingent of Afghan horsemen with him. Khanzada Hasan Khan Mewati, the ruler of Mewat, also joined the alliance with his men. Babur denounced the Afghans who joined the alliance against him as kafirs and murtads (those who had apostatized from Islam). Chandra also argues that the alliance weaved together by Sanga represented a Rajput-Afghan alliance with the proclaimed mission of expelling Babur and restoring the Lodi empire.[27] Rajasthan Indologist Dasharatha Sharma noted that Ibrahim's brother Mahmmud Lodhi went to Chittor with his small faction and asked for Sanga's assistance and Sanga in chivalrous manner agree for the purposal. Sharma further commented that this small factions of Afghan does not represented any united military pact but instead the pitty state of remaining disintigerated pact of Afghans at time who already witnessed the consequences of joining Babur as they did in Sack of Bayana where several of them were slaughtered. Sharma further explained that this small Afghan contingent along with Mahmmud fled from the battlefield of Khanua amidst the battle.[28]
According to K.V Krishna Rao, Rana Sanga wanted to overthrow Babur, because he considered him to be a foreigner ruling in India and also to extend his territories by annexing Delhi and Agra, the Rana was supported by some Afghan chieftains who felt that Babur had been deceptive towards them.[29]
According to Babur, Rana Sanga's army consisted of 200,000 soldiers. However, according to Alexander Kinloch, this is an exaggeration as the Rajput army did not exceed 40,000 men during the campaign in Gujarat.[30] Even if this figure is exaggerated, Chandra comments that it is indisputable that Sanga's army greatly outnumbered Babur's forces.[31] The greater numbers and reported courage of the Rajputs served to instil fear in Babur's army. An astrologer added to the general unease by his foolish predictions. To raise the flagging morale of his soldiers, Babur gave a religious colour to the battle against Hindus. Babur proceeded to renounce future consumption of wine, broke his drinking cups, poured out all the stores of liquor on the ground and promulgated a pledge of total abstinence.[27] In his autobiography, Babur writes that:[32][33]
It was a really good plan, and it had a favourable propagandistic effect on friend and foe.
Babur knew that his army would have been swept by the Rajput charge if he tried to fight them in the open, he therefore planned a defensive strategy to form a fortified encampment where he would use his muskets and artillery to weaken his foes and then strike when their morale had shattered.[34] Babur had carefully inspected the site. Like in Panipat, he strengthened his front by procuring carts that were fastened by iron chains (not leather straps, as at Panipat) and reinforced by mantlets. Gaps between the carts were used for horsemen to charge at the opponent at an opportune time. To lengthen the line, ropes made of rawhide were placed over wheeled wooden tripods. The flanks were given protection by digging ditches.[35] Foot-musketeers, falconets and mortars were placed behind the carts, from where they could fire and, if required, advance. The heavy Turkic horsemen stood behind them, two contingents of elite horsemen were kept in the reserve for the taulqama (flanking) tactic. Thus, a strong offensive-defensive formation had been prepared by Babur.[34]
Battle
Rana Sanga, fighting in a traditional manner, charged the Mughal ranks. His army was shot down in great numbers by the Mughal muskets, the noise of the muskets further caused fear amongst the horses and elephants of the Rajput army, causing them to trample their own men.[34] Rana Sanga finding it impossible to attack the Mughal centre, ordered his men to attack the Mughal flanks, the fighting continued on the two flanks for three hours, during which the Mughals fired at the Rajput ranks with muskets and arrows while the Rajputs could only retaliate in close quarters.[34] Babur writes:
Band after band of the Pagan troops followed each other to help their men, so we in our turn sent detachment after detachment to reinforce our fighters on that side.
Babur did make attempts to use his famous taulqama or pincer movement, however his men were unable to complete it, twice they pushed the Rajputs back however due to the relentless attacks of the Rajput horsemen they were forced to retreat to their positions.[34] At about this time Silhadi of Raisen deserted the Ranas army and went over to Baburs.[34] The betrayal of Silhadi forced the Rana to change his plans and issue new orders. According to some historians this betrayal never happened and was a later concoction.[36] During this time the Rana was shot by a bullet and fell unconscious, causing great confusion in the Rajput army and a lull in the fighting for a short period. Babur has written this event in his memoirs by saying "the accursed infidels remained confounded for one hour".[34] A Jhala chieftain called Ajja acted as the Rana and led the Rajput army, while the Rana was hidden within a circle of his trusted men. Jhala Ajja proved to be a poor general, as he continued the attacks on the Mughal flanks while ignoring his weak centre.[15] The Rajputs continued their attacks but failed to break the Mughal flanks [35] and their centre was unable to do anything against the fortified Mughal centre, Jadunath Sarkar has explained the struggle in the following words:
In the centre the Rajputs continued to fall without being able to retaliate in the least or advance to close grips. They were hopelessly outclassed in weapon and their dense masses only increased their hopeless slaughter, as every bullet found its billet.
Babur after noticing the weak Rajput centre ordered his men to take the offensive, the Mughal attack pushed the Rajputs back and forced the Rajput commanders to rush to the front, resulting in the death of many.[34] The Rajputs were now leaderless as most of their senior commanders were dead and their unconscious king had been moved out of the battle. The Rajputs made a desperate charge on the Mughal left and right flanks like before, "here their bravest were mown down and the battle ended in their irretrievable defeat".[34] The Rajputs and their allies had been defeated, dead bodies could be found as far as Bayana, Alwar and Mewat. The Mughals were too exhausted after the long fight to give chase and Babur himself gave up the idea of invading Mewar.[34]
Following his victory, Babur ordered a tower of enemy skulls to be erected, a practice formulated by Timur. According to Chandra, the objective of constructing a tower of skulls was not just to record a great victory, but also to terrorize opponents. Earlier, the same tactic had been used by Babur against the Afghans of Bajaur.[31][page needed]
Aftermath
The Battle of Khanwa demonstrated that Rajput bravery was not enough to counter Babur's superior generalship and organizational skills. Babur himself commented:[37]
Swordsmen though some Hindustanis maybe, most of them are ignorant and unskilled in military move and stand, in soldierly counsel and procedure.
Sanga was taken away from the battlefield in an unconscious state by Prithviraj Kachwaha and prince Maldev Rathore of Marwar. After regaining consciousness he took an oath to not return to Chittor until he had defeats Babur and ouster him. He also stopped wearing a Turban and just used to wrap a cloth over his head. While he was preparing to wage another war against Babur , he was poisoned by his own nobles who did not want another conflict with Babur. He died in Kalpi on January 1528.[38]
It is suggested that had it not been for the cannon of Babur, Rana Sanga might have achieved a Historic victory against Babur.[39] Pradeep Barua notes that Babur's cannon put an end to outdated trends in Indian warfare.[40]
See also
Notes
- ^ John F.Richards puts the Rajput army at 80,000 while Sarkar considers the Rana's army to be double the amount of Mughals. Therefore considering the two estimates the Mughals numbered around 50,000.
References
- ^ An Advanced History of India, Dr K. K. Datta, p. 429.
- ^ Military History of India by Jadunath Sarkar p. 56 – "Facing him was an enemy more than double his own number".
- ^ Military History of India by Jadunath Sarkar p. 58 – "Cavalry was formed in divisions, 5,000 under Humayun, 3,000 under Mahdi Khwaja, 10,000 under Babur and 2,000 elite horsemen in reserve for Taulqama"
- ^ Military History of India by Jadunath Sarkar p. 59 – "The Indian allies of Babur were posted in his left wing"
- ^ John F. Richards (1993). The Mughal Empire. The New Cambridge History of India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 8. ISBN 978-0-521-25119-8.
The next year near Agra, Babur led his troops to a landscape victory over confederacy of Rajput kings led by Rana Sangha of Mewar. Eigthy thousand Rajput cavalrymen and 500 armoured war elephants charged the much smaller Mughal force
- ^ a b c Eraly, Abrahim (2007). Emperors of the Peacock Throne: The Saga of the Great Moghuls. Penguin UK. ISBN 9789351180937.
The battle of Khanua was a virtual replay of the battle of Panipat, except that it lasted nearly double the time and was far more fiercely contested, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides
- ^ V.S Bhatnagar (1974). Life and Times of Sawai Jai Singh, 1688–1743. Impex India. p. 6.
From 1326, Mewar's grand recovery commenced under Lakha, and later under Kumbha and most notably under Sanga, till it became one of the greatest powers in northern India during the first quarter of sixteenth century
- ^ An Advanced History of India. By R.C. Majumdar ... H.C. Raychaudhuri ... Kalikinkar Datta. (Second Edition.). Macmillan & Company. 1950. p. 419.
The battle of khanua was one of the most decisive battles in Indian history certainly more than that of Panipat as Lodhi empire was already crumbling and Mewar had emerged as major power in northern India. Thus, Its at Khanua the fate of India was sealed for next two centuries
- ^ Radheyshyam Chaurasia (2002). History of Medieval India: From 1000 A.D. to 1707 A.D. Atlantic Publishers & Dist. p. 161. ISBN 978-81-269-0123-4.
The battle of Kanwaha was more important in its result even than the first battle of Panipat. While the former made Babur ruler of Delhi alone the later made him King of Hindustan. As a result of his success the Mughal empire was established firmly in India. The sovereignty of India now passed from Rajputs to Mughals
- ^ Wink 2012, p. 27: "The victory of Mughals at khanua can be seen as a landmark event in Mughal conquest of North India as the battle turned out to be more historic and eventful than one fought near Panipat. It made Babur undisputed master of North India while smashing Rajput powers. After the victory at khanua, the centre of Mughal power became Agra instead of Kabul and continue to remain till downfall of the Empire after Aalamgir's death."
- ^ Giles Tillotson (1991). Mughal India. Penguin Books. p. 4. ISBN 978-0-14-011854-4.
He was immediately challenged by assembled Rajput forces under Rana Sanga of Chittor who was reckoned by Babur as one of the two greatest Hindu rulers. It was only after this he met and defeat this second and greater force at the Battle of Khanua 1527, Mugh rule established in Indian contigent
- ^ Pradeep Barua (2005). The State at War in South Asia. University of Nebraska Press. p. 34. ISBN 978-0-8032-1344-9.
The battle of Khanwa bear more military significance for medieval India than does the Battle of Panipat. Unlike the ill organized force thrown up by Ibrahim Lodhi to confront Babur, Rana Sangha created a formidable military force
- ^ R.S Sharma (1999). Mughal Empire in India: A Systematic Study Including Source Material. Atlantic Publishers & Dist. p. 46. ISBN 978-81-7156-818-5.
Results: The victory of Babur, was nevertheless final and complete. 'Hardly a clan of the Rajputs was there but had lost the flower of its princely blood'. The consequences of the battle of Khanwa were most momentous. (i) The menace of the Rajput supremacy, which had loomed large before the eyes of the Muhammadans in India for the last ten years, was removed once for all
- ^ Eraly 2007, pp. 27–29.
- ^ a b c A Comprehensive History of India: Comprehensive history of medieval India p. 107.
- ^ Chandra 2006, p. 203.
- ^ Chandra 2006, p. 204.
- ^ Chaurasia, Radhey Shyam (2002). History of medieval India : from 1000 A.D. to 1707 A.D. New Delhi: Atlantic Publ. pp. 89–90. ISBN 81-269-0123-3.
- ^ Hooja, Rima (2006). A History of Rajasthan. Rupa and company. p. 453. ISBN 9788129115010.
In contrast, the traditional Rajput version holds that it was not Sanga, already powerful enough and mainly successful against various enemy states, who had sent an envoy to Babur....but rather, it was Babur who sought an ally of undoubted ability and strength against their common foe, Ibrahim Lodi.
- ^ Chandra 2006, pp. 32–33.
- ^ Military History of India by Jadunath Sarkar p. 49 – "established himself on Kabul, and from this base he began a series of raids into Punjab which was then governed by Daulat Khan on behalf of the Lodi Sultan of Delhi, Daulat was faithless to his master and courted Babur in the hope of making himself independent, but in the end his ally crushed him and seized the Punjab for himself."
- ^ "Whose history is it anyway: 'Padmaavat' taints Khilji". Business Standard India. Press Trust of India. 25 January 2018. Retrieved 19 March 2022.
History cannot be rewritten in any way, which is what they are doing, Chaturvedi said. He recalled how historian & Indologist Gopinath Sharma, known for his scholarly research on Mewar kings and Mughal emperors, was abused and manhandled at a seminar in Jodhpur for writing that the Battle of Haldighati was indecisive, though Akbar had an upper hand
- ^ Sharma 1954, pp. 21–22.
- ^ Chandra 2006, p. 33.
- ^ Erskine, William (2012). A History of India Under the Two First Sovereigns of the House of Taimur, Báber and Humáyun. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-04620-6.
- ^ "A history of India under the two first sovereigns of the house of Taimur, Báber and Humáyun". Indian Culture. Retrieved 11 July 2020.
- ^ a b Chandra 2006, p. 34.
- ^ Dasharatha Sharma (1970). Lectures on Rajput History and Culture. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 29–30. ISBN 978-0-8426-0262-4.
The alliance of Sanga with some Afghan nobles often mistaken by some of historians like Rusherbook Williams and Vincent Smith hardly represented any tactical alliance but rather pitty state of Afghans who already witnessed a brutual onslaught in hand of Sanga's troop at Biana fort. Nonethless, most of them fled from battlefield in middle of the battle fearing Mughal slaughter amidst a inevitable victory
- ^ Rao, K. V. Krishna (1991). Prepare Or Perish: A Study of National Security. Lancer Publishers. p. 453. ISBN 978-81-7212-001-6.
- ^ 8 Chaturkula Charitra, p. 25
- ^ a b Chandra 2006.
- ^ Damrosch, David; Alliston, April (2004). The Longman Anthology of World Literature. Longman. ISBN 978-0-321-16980-8.
- ^ Shahane, Girish. "Babur in India: An emperor who loved the monsoon breeze but wasn't impressed by the melons or grapes". Scroll.in. Retrieved 17 January 2021.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j Military History of India by Jadunath Sarkar pp. 56–61
- ^ a b Military History of India by Jadunath Sarkar p. 57
- ^ Majumdar, R.C.; Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan; Bhāratīya Itihāsa Samiti (1951). The History and Culture of the Indian People: The Delhi sultanate. The History and Culture of the Indian People. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. p. 346. Retrieved 19 April 2022.
- ^ Chandra 2006, p. 35.
- ^ Sharma 1954, pp. 38, 44.
- ^ Barua, Pradeep (2005). The State at War in South Asia. U of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-1344-9.
- ^ Barua, Pradeep (2005). The State at War in South Asia. University of Nebraska Press. pp. 33–34. ISBN 978-0-80321-344-9.
Bibliography
- Sharma, Gopinath (1954). Mewar & the Mughal Emperors (1526-1707 A.D.). S.L. Agarwala.
- Chandra, Satish (2006). Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals (1206–1526). Vol. 2. Har-Anand Publications. ISBN 9788124110669.
- Eraly, Abraham (2007). Emperors Of The Peacock Throne: The Saga of the Great Moghuls. Penguin Books Limited. ISBN 978-93-5118-093-7.
- Sarkar, Jadunath (1960). Military History of India. Orient Longmans. ISBN 978-0-86125-155-1.
- Wink, Andre (2012). Akbar. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 978-1-78074-209-0.