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Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist

January 22, 2023

For other uses, see Vilayat-e Faqih (disambiguation).

The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Persian: ولایت فقیه, romanized: Velâyat-e Faqih; Arabic: وِلاَيَةُ ٱلْفَقِيهِ, romanized: Wilāyat al-Faqīh) is a concept in Twelver Shia Islamic law which holds that until the reappearance of the "infallible Imam" (sometime before Judgement Day), at least some of the "religious and social affairs" of the Muslim world should be administered by righteous Shi'i jurists.[1] Shia disagree over whose "religious and social affairs" are to be administered and what those affairs are.[2]

Calligraphic of the Velâyat-e Faqih

Wilāyat al-Faqīh is associated in particular with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini[3] and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a series of lectures in 1970, Khomeini advanced the idea of guardianship in its "absolute" form as rule of the state and society. This version of guardianship now forms the basis of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which calls for a Vali-ye faqih (Guardian Jurist), to serve as the Supreme Leader of that country.[4][5]

Under the "absolute authority of the jurist" (velayat-e motlaqaye faqih), the jurist/faqih has control over all public matters including governance of states, all religious affairs including even being able to (temporary) suspend religious obligations, such as the salat prayer or hajj.[6][3] Obedience to him is more important (according to proponents) than performing those religious obligations.[7]

Other Shi'i Islamic scholars disagree, with some limiting guardianship to a much narrower scope[2] -- things like mediating disputes,[8] and providing guardianship for orphaned children, the mentally incapable, and others lacking someone to protect their interests.[9]

There is also disagreement over how widely supported Khomeini's doctrine is. Whether "the absolute authority and guardianship" of a high-ranking Islamic jurist is "universally accepted amongst all Shi’a theories of governance" and forms "a central pillar of Imami [Shi'i] political thought" (Ahmed Vaezi, Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi);[10] or whether there is no consensus in favor of the model of the Islamic Republic of Iran, either among the public in Iran (Alireza Nader, David E Thaler, S. R. Bohandy),[11] or among most religious leaders in the leading centers of Shia thought (i.e. Qom and Najaf), (Ali Mamouri).[12]

Terminology

Wilayat conveys several meanings which are involved in Twelver Islamic history.

Morphologically, Wilāyat is derived from the Arabic verbal root "w-l-y", wilaya, meaning “to be near or close to someone or something",[10] also, to be a friend, to be in charge, etc.[13]

Meanings of Wilayat include: rule, supremacy or sovereignty, "guardianship" or "authority",[14] "guardianship, mandate, governance and rulership" [note 1] or "governorship" or "province".[22] In another sense, wilayat means friendship, loyalty, or guardianship (see Wali).[23][note 2]

In Islam, jurists are (faqīh, plural fuquaha).[1]

For those who support a government based on rule of a faqih, Wilāyat al-Faqīh has been translated as "rule of the jurisconsult," "mandate of the jurist," "governance of the jurist", "the discretionary authority of the jurist".[26] More ambiguous translations are "guardianship of the jurist", "trusteeship of the jurist".[27] (Shaykh Murtadha al-Ansari and Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, for example, would talk of the "guardianship of the jurisprudent", not "the mandate of the jurisprudent".)[26]

Some definitions of uses of the term “Wilayat” (not necessarily involving jurists) in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) terminology (or at least Twelver terminology) are:

  • Wilayat al-Qaraba -- authority (Wilayat) given to a father or paternal grandfather over minors and the mentally ill.[10]
  • Wilayat al-Qada’ -- authority given to a just and capable faqih during the absence of the Imam to judge "amongst the people based upon God's law and revelation", and collect Islamic taxes/tithes (zakat, sadaqa, kharaj).[10]
  • Wilayat al-Hakim -- the guardian of those who have no guardian; authority given to a regular administrator of justice (hakim), to supervise the interests of a person who does not have a natural guardian and who is unable to take care of his own affairs; such as a mentally ill or mentally disabled person.[10]
  • Wilayat al-Usuba -- authority over administration of inheritance, and rights of inheritors in Sunni fiqh. (This authority is "not accepted by Imami scholars".)

Regarding jurist involvement in governance, definitions include:

  • Wilayat al-Mutlaqa (absolute rule/authority, الولایه المطلقه) of the supreme faqih/jurisprudent, also transliterated as velayat-e motlagh-e faghih, velayat-e motlaqeh-ye faqıh,[28] also called Wilayat al- Mutlaqa al-Elahiya,[10]
    • has been defined as discretionary authority bestowed on the prophet Muhammad and on the Imams (Ahmed Vaezi);[10]
    • has been defined (by the Ayatollah Khomeini circa 1988), to mean that the Islamic state has the religious mandate to suspend, if not revoke, substantive divine ordinances (ahkam-e far‘ıyeh-ye elahıyeh) such as hajj or fasting if sees the need to;[28]
    • it has also been used (by Iranian conservatives circa 2010) to mean that at least in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the head faqih has "the absolute right to make decisions for the state", notwithstanding the desires of any elected office holders or institutions or the general public.[29] It is a "new term", applied by Khomeini "publicly", in 1990 when it "was enshrined in the constitution of Islamic Iran".[30]
  • wilayat al-muqayada ("conditional" authority" of the faqih/jurisprudent) "restricts the right of the faqih for issuing governmental orders" to "permissibility cases" (mubahat), which must not be "in opposition" to "obligatory Islamic laws.[30]
  • Wilayat al-amma ("universal authority" of the faqih/jurisprudent). Supporters of this concept believe orders given by a jurist holder of "wilayat al-amma" are not restricted "to merely the administration of justice". They "may issue orders" and their orders are "incumbent upon all Muslims, even other fuqaha, to obey".[30] "right and duty to lead the Shi’a community and undertake the full function and responsibilities of an infallible Imam".[10] This is "the highest form of authority (Wilayat) bestowed upon the faqih" according to at least one cleric (Ahmed Vaezi).[note 3]
  • Wilayat al-siyasiyya -- political authority, is one of the elements included in Wilayat al-amma.[10]

In common use, Wilāyat al-Faqīh/velayat-e faqih may sometimes be used as shorthand for Ayatollah Khomeini's vision of velayat-e faqih in Islamic government, with those who support limited velayat-e faqih being described as "rejecting" velayat-e faqih.[31][note 4]

Arabic language phrases associated with Guardianship of the Jurist, such as Wilāyat al-Faqīh, Wali al-Faqīh, are widely used, Arabic being the original language of Islamic sources such as the Quran, hadith, and much other literature. However, the Persian language translation, Velayat-e Faqih, Vali-e-faqih are also commonly used in discussion about the concept and practice in Iran, which is both the largest Shi'i majority country, and as the Islamic Republic of Iran, is also the one country in the world where Wilāyat al-Faqīh is part of the structure of government.

The term "mullahcracy" (rule by mullahs, i.e. by Islamic clerics) has been used as a pejorative term to describe Wilāyat al-Faqīh as government and specifically the Islamic Republic of Iran.[32][33]

History

See also: History of political Islam in Iran

Early Islam

A foundational belief of Twelver Shi'ism is that the spiritual and political successors of (the Islamic prophet) Muhammad are not caliphs (as Sunni Muslims believe), but the "Imams" -- a line starting with Muhammad's cousin, son-in-law and companion, Ali (died 661 CE), and continuing with his male descendants. Imams were almost never in a position to rule territory, but did have the loyalty of their followers and delegated some of their functions, to "qualified members" of their community, "particularly in the judicial sphere.[3] In the late 9th century (873-874 CE) the Twelfth Imam, a boy at the time, mysteriously disappeared. Shi'i jurists "responded by developing the idea" of the "[[Occultation (Islam) |occultation]]",[34] whereby the 12th Imam was still alive but had "been withdrawn by God from the eyes of people" to protect his life until conditions were ripe for his reappearance.[34]

The Shi'i community (ummah), has had to determine who, if anyone, has his authority (wilayah) for what functions during the Imam's absence.[14] The delegation of some functions—for example, the collection and disbursement of religiously mandated tithes (zakat and khums) — continued during occultation,[3] but others were limited. Shi'i jurists, and especially al-Sharif al-Murtada (d. 1044 CE), forbade[14] "waging of offensive jihad or (according to some jurists) the holding of Friday prayers",[3] as this power was in abeyance (saqit) until the return of the Imam.[14] Al-Murtada also excluded implementing the penal code (hudud), leading the community in jihad, and giving allegiance to any leader.[14]

For many centuries, according to at least two historians (Moojan Momen, Ervand Abrahamian), Shia jurists have tended to stick to one of three approaches to the state: cooperated with it, trying to influence policies by becoming active in politics, or most commonly, remaining aloof from it.[35][note 5] Firm supporter of governance by jurist Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi describes the arrival of rule of jurist in Iran as a revolution after fourteen centuries of "lamentable" governance in the Islamic world.[37]

Others (Ahmed Vaezi) insist the idea that the governance by jurist is "new" is erroneous because it is the logical conclusion of arguments made by high-level Shia faqih of medieval times who argued that high-level Shia faqih be given authority, although their use of Taqiya (precautionary dissimulation) prevents this from being obvious to us.[38]

A significant event in Islamic and especially Shia history was the rise of the Safavid dynasty (1501–1702), ruling a vast area of modern day Iran and beyond at its height [note 6] and forcibly converting Iran's population to the state religion of Twelver Shi'ism,[43][44][45][46] (Iran's population continuing to have a large Shi'i majority). According to Hamid Algar, (a convert to Islam and supporter of Ruhollah Khomeini), under the Safavids, the general deputyship "occasionally was interpreted to include all the prerogatives of rule that in principle had belonged to the imams, but no special emphasis was placed on this." And in the nineteenth century, velayat-e faqih began "to be discussed as a distinct legal topic".[3]

Absolute Wilāyat al-Faqīh was probably first introduced in the Fiqh of Ja'far al-Sadiq in the famous textbook Javaher-ol-Kalaam (جواهر الکلام).[citation needed] Iranian Molla Mohammad Mahdee Naraqi, or at least his son Molla Ahmad Naraqi (1771-1829 C.E.), argued that "the scope of wilayat al-faqıh extends to political authority",[26] more than a century earlier than Khomeini,[26] but never tried to establish, nor called for the establishment of a state based on wilayat al-faqıh al-siyasıyah (the divine mandate of the jurisprudent to rule).[47]

Colonial and post-colonial era

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there were two major instances of jurist involvement in politics in Iran, (which continued to be the largest Shia-majority state and went on to be a major petroleum exporter).[48]

The Tobacco Protest and Constitutional Revolution (and not the Islamic revolution), have been described both as

  • exceptions to apolitical stance of leading Shia jurists (Ervand Abrahamian); and as
  • the beginning of the end of a 1000 years of quietism among Shi'i, or the "real shift in Shiite political thought"

"when Shiites began to see the possibility of freely experimenting with politics". (Khalid bin Sulieman Addadh).[50]

Ayatollah Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri who fought against a democratic law-making parliament in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (انقلاب مشروطه), predating Khomeini in supporting rule by sharia and opposing and Western influence in Iran.

Khomeini and Guardianship of the Islamic jurist as Islamic government

In early 1970, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leading cleric fighting the Shah of the secularist Pahlavi dynasty who was exiled to the holy Shia city of Najaf at the time, gave a series of lectures on how "Islamic Government" required Wilayat Al Faqih. Leading up to the revolution, a book based on the lectures (The Jurist's Guardianship, Islamic Government) was spread widely among his network of followers in Iran.[51]

Khomeini had originally supported an interpretation of Velayat-e faqih limited to "legal rulings, religious judgments, and intervention to protect the property of minors and the weak", even when "rulers are oppressive". In his 1941/1943 book Secrets Revealed;[52] he specifically stated "we do not say that government must be in the hands of the faqih".[53]

But in his 1970 book he argued not that Faqih should get involved in politics in special situations, but that they must rule the state and society, and that monarchy or any other sort of government are "systems of unbelief" "all traces" of which it is the duty of Muslims to "destroy".[54] In a true Islamic state (he maintained) only those who have knowledge of Sharia should hold government posts, and the country's ruler should be the faqih (a guardian jurist, Vali-ye faqih) who "surpasses all others in knowledge" of Islamic law and justice[55] — known as a Marjaʿ — as well as having intelligence and administrative ability. Not only is the rule of Islamic jurists and obedience toward them an obligation of Islam, it is as important a religious obligation as any a Muslim has. "Our obeying holders of authority", like Islamic jurists, "is actually an expression of obedience to God."[56] Preserving Islam — for which Wilāyat al-Faqīh is necessary — "is more necessary even than prayer and fasting".[57]

The necessity of a Jurist leader to serve the people as "a vigilant trustee", enforcing "law and order", is not an ideal to be sought after but a matter of survival for Islam and Muslims. Without him, Islam will fall victim "to obsolescence and decay", as heretics, "atheists and unbelievers" add and subtract rites, institutions, and ordinances from the religion;[58] Muslim society will stay divided "into two groups: oppressors and oppressed";[59] Muslim government(s) will continue to be infested with corruption, "constant embezzlement";[60] not just lacking in competence and virtue, but actively serving as agents to imperialist Western powers.

"Foreign experts have studied our country and have discovered all our mineral reserves -- gold, copper, petroleum, and so on. They have also made an assessment of our people's intelligence and come to the conclusion that the only barrier blocking their way [in exploiting Iran] are Islam and the religious leadership."[61]

Their goal is

"to keep us backward, to keep us in our present miserable state so they can exploit our riches, our underground wealth, our lands and our human resources. They want us to remain afflicted and wretched, and our poor to be trapped in their misery ... they and their agents wish to go on living in huge palaces and enjoying lives of abominable luxury".[62]

While these ideas sound "strange" to many,[63] it is because Westerns have set about deceiving Muslims, using their native "agents" to fool them into thinking "that Islam consists of a few ordinances concerning menstruation and parturition."[64] Because western habits of "banking on the basis of usury, ... consumption of alcohol, ... cultivation of sexual vice" keep people weak, they allow exploitation, and so Western imperialists and Jews, have worked hard to undermine the laws of Islam.[62]

Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Following the overthrow of the Shah by the Iranian Revolution, a modified form of this doctrine was incorporated into the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran,[65] adopted by referendum on 2 and 3 December 1979. It established the first country (and so far only) in history to apply the principal of velayat-e faqih to government.

"The plan of the Islamic government" is "based upon wilayat al-faqih, as proposed by Imam Khumaynî",[66] according to the constitution, which was drafted by an assembly made up primarily by disciples of Khomeini.[67]

While the constitution made concessions to popular sovereignty—including an elected president and parliament—"the Leader" was given "authority to dismiss the president, appoint the main military commanders, declare war and peace, and name senior clerics to the Guardian Council", (a powerful body which can veto legislation and disqualify candidates for office).[68][note 9]

Hezbollah of Lebanon

In the early 1980s, Ayatollah Khomeini sent some of his followers, including 1500 Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (pasdaran) instructors,[71] to Lebanon to form Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist political party and militant group, committed to bringing Islamic revolution[72] and rule of wilayat al-faqih in Lebanon.[73][74][75] A large fraction of Lebanon's population was Shia, and they had grown to become the largest confessional group in Lebanon, but had traditionally been subservient to Lebanese Christians and Sunni Muslims. Over time Hezbollah's para-military wing grew to be considered stronger than the Lebanese army,[76] and Hezbollah to become described as a "state within a state".[77] However, as of 2008, the goal of transforming Lebanon into "an Iranian-style" state" has been abandoned in favor of "a more inclusive approach".[78]

Under the Islamic Republic

The establishment of the Islamic Republic and Wilayat al-faqih rule was not without conflict. "More than 7900" political prisoners were executed between 1981 and 1985. (According to historian Ervand Abrahamian, this compares with the "less than 100" killed by the monarchy during the eight years leading up to the revolution.) In addition, the prison system was "drastically expanded" and prison conditions made "drastically worse" under the Islamic Republic.[79][80][81] Press freedom was also tightened, with the international group the Reporters Without Borders declaring Iran one of the world's most repressive countries for journalists" for the first 40 years after the revolution (1980-2020).[82]

Shortly before and after Khomeini died in June 1989, significant changes were made to the constitution and the concept of Wilāyat al-Faqīh.[68]

In January-February 1988 Khomeini publicly propounded the theory of velayat-e motlaqaye faqih ("the absolute authority of the jurist"), whereby obedience to the ruling jurist is to "be as incumbent on the believer as the performance of prayer", and the guardian jurist's powers "extend even to the temporary suspension of such essential rites of Islam as the hajj",[6][83] (despite the fact that his 1970 book insists that "in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty").[84] The new theory was instigated by the need "to break the stalemate" within the Islamic Government on controversial items of social and economic legislation".[3][7]

In March 1989 Khomeini declared that only those clerics knowledgeable about "the problems of the day" -- the contemporary world and economic, social and political matters -- should rule, not "religious" clerics,[85] despite the fact that he had spent decades denouncing secularism and the idea that the affairs of this world "were separate from the understanding of the sacred law".[85]

Also in that month, Khomeini's officially designated successor, Hussein-Ali Montazeri, was ousted,[86] after he called for "an open assessment of failures" of the Revolution and an end to the export of revolution.[87] As Montazeri was the only marjaʿ al-taqlid beside Khomeini who had been part of Khomeini's movement, and the only senior cleric trusted by Khomeini's network,[68] and the constitution called for the Leader/Wali Al Faqih to be a marja', after Khomeini died the Assembly of Experts amended the constitution to remove scholarly seniority from the qualifications of the leader, accommodating the appointment of a "mid-ranking cleric" (Ali Khamenei), to be Leader.[68]

In the 21st century, many have noted a severe loss of prestige in Iran for the fuqaha (Islamic jurists),[88] and for the concept of Wilayat al-faqih. "In the early 1980s, clerics were generally treated with elaborate courtesy." 20 years later, "clerics are sometimes insulted by school children and taxi drivers and they quite often put on normal clothes when venturing outside Qom."[89] In Iraq, another Shia-majority country that is smaller and less stable than Iran and shares a border with it, sentiment against Iranian influence in 2019 led to demonstrations and attacks with Molotov cocktails against the Iranian Consulate in Karbala. Political forces alleged to be under the control of Iran there have sometimes been disparagingly referred to as "the arms of Wilayat al-Faqih."[90] Protesters in Iran have been heard to chant ‘Death to the dictator’ (Marg Bar Diktator, dictator a reference to the Supreme Leader),[91] and “Death to velayat-e faqih”,[92] during protests, which have become serious enough to see as many as 1,500 protesters killed by security forces (in one series of protests in late 2019 and early 2020).[93][94][95]

Velayat-e Faqih in the Iranian constitution

According to the constitution of Iran, Islamic republic is defined as a state ruled by Islamic jurists (Fuqaha). Article Five reads

"During the Occultation of the Lord of the Age [that is, the Hidden Imam], the governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the pious and just jurist who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people"[96]

(Other articles -- 107 to 112 -- specify the procedure for selecting the leader and list his constitutional functions.)

Articles 57 and 110 deliniate the power of the ruling jurist. Article 57 states that there are other bodies/branches in the government but they are all under the control/supervision of the Leader.

The power of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive powers, functioning under the supervision of the absolute religious leader and the leadership of the ummah.[30]

According to article 110 the supervisory powers of the Supreme Leader as a Vali-e-faqih are:

  • The ruling Jurist appoints the jurists to the guardian council;
  • appointing the highest judicial authority in the country;
  • holding supreme command over the armed forces;
  • signing the certificate of appointment allowing the president to take office;
  • dismissal of the president if he feels it is in the national interest;
  • granting amnesty on the recommendation of the supreme court.[97]

The constitution quotes many verses of the Quran (21:92, 7:157, 21:105, 3:28, 28:5)[98] in support of its aims and goals. In support of "the continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad. ... [and working with] other Islamic and popular movements to prepare the way for the formation of a single world community", and "to assure the continuation of the struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed peoples in the world."[98] it quotes

  • "This your community is a single community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me" [21:92]), [98]

In support of "the righteous" assuming "the responsibility of governing and administering the country" it quotes Quranic verse Q.21:105:

  • "Verily My righteous servants shall inherit the earth"[98]

and on the basis of two principles of the trusteeship and the permanent Imamate, rule is counted as a function of jurists. Ruling jurists must hold the religious office of "source of imitation" (be a marja' al-taqlid) and be permitted to deliver independent judgments on general principles (fatwas). Furthermore they must be upright, pious, committed experts on Islam, informed of the demands of the times, known as God-fearing, brave and qualified for leadership.

Chapter one of the constitution, where fundamental principles are expressed, article 2, 6a, states that "continuous ijtihad of the fuqaha [jurists] possessing necessary qualifications, exercised on the basis of the Qur'an and the Sunnah" is a principle in Islamic government.[99]

Arguments and opinions

There is a wide spectrum of ideas about Wilāyat al-Faqīh among Ja'fari (the Twelver Shia school of law) scholars, starting from

  • restricting the scope of the doctrine to non-litigious matters (al-omour al-hesbiah),[2] people or things in Islamic society that lack a guardian over their interests (الامور الحسبیه), including unattended children, religious endowments (waqf),[9] and property for which no specific person is responsible, as well as judicial matters,[100] such as mediating disputes;

... and at the other extreme,

  • the "absolute authority of the jurist" (velayat-e motlaqaye faqih), over all public matters, where the mandate of the ruling jurisprudent "are among the primary ordinances of Islam".[101] Here the ruling faqih has control over all public matters including governance of states; has such power over religious affairs that he can (temporary) suspend religious obligations, such as the salat prayer or hajj;[6][3] and is owed such deference that the obligation of Muslims to obey him is as important as the obligation to perform those religious obligations he has the power to suspend.[7]

As of 2011, (at least according to authors Alireza Nader, David E. Thaler and S. R. Bohandy), those in Iran who believe in velayat-e faqih tend to fall into one of three categories:

  1. those (such as conservatives like Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi and vigilantes who attack reformers), who believe in "absolute" velayat-e faqih and think those who do not are "betraying Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution";[102]
  2. those (such as the late Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri) who believe that the leader exercising velayat-e-faghih should be a "religious-ideological guardian" not chief executive, subject to democratic constraints such as direct elections, term limits, etc.;[103] and
  3. those who believe faqih should not be involved in politics ("the "quietist" or "traditional concept") and question the need for a Supreme Leader — a view that is outside the "red lines" of the Islamic Republic, notwithstanding its acceptance elsewhere in the Shi'i world.[104]

The doctrinal basis of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist comes at least in part from hadith where the Islamic prophet Muhammad is reported to have said

العلماء ورثة الأنبياء
"The ulama are the inheritors of the prophets".[note 10][105]

The issue was mentioned by the earliest Shi'i mujtahids such as al-Shaykh Al-Mufid (948–1022), and enforced for a while by Muhaqqiq Karaki during the era of Tahmasp I (1524–1576).[citation needed] However, according to John Esposito in The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, the first Islamic scholar to advance the theory of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist (and who "developed a notion of 'rule of the jurist'") came much later -- Morteza Ansari (~1781–1864).[106] Mohamad Bazzi dates "the concept of wilayat al-faqih" as a model "of political rule" from "the early nineteenth century".[107]

Two kinds of Wilayah/velayat (guardianship) can be understood. The first kind mentioned in various chapters of Shia fiqh discusses Wilayah over the dead and Wilayah over those not deceased but having some disability in protecting their interests, such as the insane (سفيه), absentee (غائب), poor (فقير), etc. For example:

وَلَا تَقْتُلُوا۟ ٱلنَّفْسَ ٱلَّتِى حَرَّمَ ٱللَّهُ إِلَّا بِٱلْحَقِّ ۗ وَمَن قُتِلَ مَظْلُومًۭا فَقَدْ جَعَلْنَا لِوَلِيِّهِۦ سُلْطَـٰنًۭا فَلَا يُسْرِف فِّى ٱلْقَتْلِ ۖ إِنَّهُۥ كَانَ مَنصُورًۭا
Do not take a ˹human˺ life—made sacred by Allah—except with ˹legal˺ right. If anyone is killed unjustly, We have given their heirs the authority, but do not let them exceed limits in retaliation, for they are already supported ˹by law˺. (Q.17:33)[108][109]

refers to heirs of someone killed unjustly (not killed in accordance with sharia). This type of Wilayah does not applied to society at large, because none of mentioned conditions hold for the majority of a society.

The second kind of Wilayah which appears in principles of faith and kalam discusses Wilayah over sane people.

According to Ahmed Vaezi, "Imami [12er Shi'i] theologians refer to the Qur’an (especially Chapter 5, Verse 55) and prophetic traditions to support the exclusive authority (i.e. exclusive Wilayat) of the Imams".[10]

إِنَّمَا وَلِيُّكُمُ ٱللَّهُ وَرَسُولُهُۥ وَٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا۟ ٱلَّذِينَ يُقِيمُونَ ٱلصَّلَوٰةَ وَيُؤْتُونَ ٱلزَّكَوٰةَ وَهُمْ رَٰكِعُونَ
Your ally is none but Allah and [therefore] His Messenger and those who have believed - those who establish prayer and give zakah, and they bow [in worship]. (Q.5:55)[110][111]

In Q.5:55, "those who believe”, may sound like it refers to Muslim believers in general but actually refers to the Imams according to Shi’a commentators according to Ahmed Vaezi.[10] Sunni Muslims do not believe "those who believe" refers to the Imams.

Limited role for Guardianship

Traditionally Shi'i jurists have tended to this interpretation, and for most Muslims Wilayat al-Faqih "meant no more than legal guardianship of senior clerics over those deemed incapable of looking after their own interests — minors, widows, and the insane"[112] (known as ‘mawla alayh’, one who is need of a guardian).[10] Political power was to be left to Shi'i monarchs called "Sultans". They should defend the territory against the non-Shi'a. For example, according to Iranian historian Ervand Abrahamian, in centuries of debate among Shi'i scholars, none have "ever explicitly contended that monarchies per se were illegitimate or that the senior clergy had the authority to control the state.[112] Most scholars viewed the 'ulama's main responsibilities (i.e. their guardianship) as being:

  • to study the law based on the Qur'an, Sunnah and the teachings of the Twelve Imams.
  • to use reason
  • to update these laws;
  • issue pronouncements on new problems;
  • adjudicate in legal disputes; and
  • distribute the Khums contributions to worthy widows, orphans, seminary students, and indigent male descendants of the Prophet.[112]

Ahmed Vaezi (a supporter of the rule of the Islamic jurist) lists the "traditional roles and functions that qualified jurists undertake as deputies of the Imam", and that "in the history of Imami Shi’ism, marja’aiyya (authorative reference) has largely been restricted to":[10]

  1. providing fatwas ("legal and juridical decrees") as a “Marja’a taqleed”, for those who "lack sufficient knowledge of Islamic law and the legal system (Shari’ah)" (which Vaezi insists is not part of guardianship/Wilayat al-Faqih);[10]
  2. mediating disputes and judging in legal cases. (which Vaezi insists Imamis believe is a "function of Wilayat al-qada or al-hukuma);[10]
  3. Hisbiya Affairs (Al-Umur al-Hisbiya), i.e. providing a guardian for those who need one (for example, when the father of a minor or an insane person dies. Also religious endowments, inheritance and funerals). Imami jurists disagree (according to Vaezi) over whether this role is "appointed by the Shari’ah" or just a good idea because jurists are "naturally the best suited for the role".[10]

This view "dominated Shi’a discourse on issues of religion and governance for centuries before the Islamic Revolution", and still dominates it both in Najaf and Karbala -- "Shi’a centers of thought" away from the power of the Islamic Republic of Iran -- and even within the IRI is still influential in the Iranian holy city of Qom.[104]

Supporters of keeping Wilayat out of politics and governance argue univeral wilayat puts sane adults in the same category as those who are impotent in their affairs, and need a guardian to protect their interests.[10]

This is not to say that sane, adult Shi'i do not seek and follow religious guidance from faqih. A long standing doctrine in Shi'i is that (Shi'i) Muslims should have a faqih "source to follow" or "religious reference", known as a Marjaʿ al-taqlid.[113] Marjaʿ receive tithes from their followers and issue fatwa to them, but unlike Wali al-Faqih, it is the individual Muslim who chooses the marjaʿ, and the marja' do not have the power of the state or militias to enforce their commands.

A minority view was that senior faqih had the right to enter political disputes "but only temporarily and when the monarch endangered the whole community".[114] (An example being the December 1891 fatwa by Mirza Shirazi declaring tobacco forbidden, a successful effort to undermine the 1890 tobacco concession granted to the United Kingdom by Nasir al-Din Shah of Persia, giving British control over growth, sale and export of tobacco.)

Guardian as ruler

Khomeini

In an early work (Kashf al-Asrar, Secrets Revealed, published in the 1940s), Khomeini had made ambiguous statements, arguing that “the state must be administered with the divine law, which defines the interests of the country and the people, and this cannot be achieved without clerical supervision (nezarat-e rouhanı)”,[115] but had not called for Jurists to rule or for them to replace monarchs -- "we do not say that government must be in the hands of the faqih,[116][53] and had also asserted that the practical

"power of the mujtaheds" (i.e. faqih who have sufficient learning to conduct independent reasoning, known as Ijtihad)

excludes the government and includes only simple matters such as legal rulings, religious judgments, and intervention to protect the property of minors and the weak. Even when rulers are oppressive and against the people, they [the mujtaheds] will not try to destroy the rulers.[52]

While there are no sacred texts of Shia (or Sunni) Islam that include a straightforward statement that the Muslim community should or must be ruled over by Islamic jurists, Khomeini maintained there were "numerous traditions [hadith] that indicate the scholars of Islam are to exercise rule during the Occultation".[117] The first one he offered as proof was a saying addressed to a corrupt, but well-connected judge in early Islam, attributed to the first Imam, 'Ali --

  • "The seat you are occupying is filled by someone who is a prophet, the legatee of a prophet, or else a sinful wretch"[117]

—is given as evidence on the grounds that when the hadith says a judge is addressed, that must mean he is a trained Islamic jurist since they are "by definition learned in matters pertaining to the function of judge",[118] and since trained jurists are neither sinful wretches nor prophets, by process of elimination "we deduce from the tradition" not that Ali is shaming the judge for exceeding his authority but "that the fuqaha (jurists) are the legatees."[118] Since the prophet was given the power to rule over the Muslim community and all it conquered, his legacy includes that same power.

Other hadith Quranic verses and include

  • "Obey those among you who have authority" (Q.4:59)

where the authorities in the verse are religious judges according to Khomeini;[119]

  • when Ali said his successors were

"those who transmit my statements and my traditions and teach them to the people" and also ordered "all believers to obey his successors", this meant his successors were jurists and Muslim should obey not just their religious teachings but their orders as rulers;

  • the Seventh Imam had praised religious judges as "the fortress of Islam";[119]
  • The twelfth Imam had preached that future generations should obey those who knew his teachings since those people were his representatives among the people in the same way as he was God's representative among believers.[119]

Khomeini preached that God had created sharia to guide the Islamic community (ummah), the state to implement sharia, and faqih to understand and implement sharia.[119]

Shortly before he died, Khomeini gave perhaps his strongest statement about the power of the Wilayat al-Faqih in a letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (later the second Supreme Leader of Iran:

The government or the absolute guardianship (al-wilayat al-mutlaqa) that is delegated to the noblest messenger of Allah is the most important divine law and has priority over all other ordinances of the [divine] law. If the powers of the government were restricted to the framework of ordinances of the law then the delegation of the authority to the Prophet would be a senseless phenomenon. I have to say that government is a branch of the Prophet's absolute Wilayat and one of the primary (first order) rules of Islam that has priority over all ordinances of the law even praying, fasting and Hajj…The Islamic State could prevent implementation of everything – devotional and non- devotional – that so long as it seems against Islam's interests.[120]

Baqir Sharif al-Qurashi

Shi'i cleric Baqir Sharif al-Qurashi argues in Al-Islam that a hadith states Shia Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (founder of the Jaʿfarī school of Islamic jurisprudence) once told two Shi'a individuals who sought arbitration to a dispute and were thinking of taking it to the government magistrate, that "Almighty Allah ... has commanded shunning the tyrants,” so that any Shia who "presents his case to a tyrant" for arbitration, the "verdict that Shi'i receives "is invalid, even though it may be his lawful right". Instead they should take their disagreement to one "who relates our traditions and narrations to you and who considers our permitted and prohibited and who possesses knowledge and information about our commands".[121] Al Quarshi interpreted this to mean that al-Sadiq meant "those "who relates our traditions and narrations to you" were Shi'i jurists, and those jurists now had "a general Wilayat" (general guardianship) and "the authority as the ruler and point of reference for all Muslims in their social aspects". "The [singular] religious jurisprudent" should not only collect and distribute funds to the poor and needy, lead and fund "the colleges of religious sciences", but also "takes care" of and be "concerned for everything regarding the world of Islam", rising to defend Muslim lands from the attacks of infidels throughout the Muslim world[121]

Supporters of absolute guardianship cite verse 62 of sura 24[122] and believe that collective affairs (امر جامع) are under the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist at most. Those scholars who believe in the necessity of establishing an Islamic state say that within the boundary of public affairs the guardianship must be absolute, otherwise the state can not govern the country.[citation needed]

Ahmed Vaezi

Ahmed Vaezi (b. 1963), an Iranian Shi'i cleric and academic, defends the principle of the universal and absolute guardianship of the Wali al-Faqih (guardian jurist) in a number of ways. Shi'a should not say they have no need for a Wali because they already follow a Marja'. The two have different roles, with marja’aiyya having nothing to do with wilayat (guardianship). Marja' issue fatwa (answers to religious questions on practical matters in Islam by making deductions from their religious knowledge) while Wali issue hukm (decrees intended to "effectively organize and resolve difficulties within Muslim society").[10] While a fatwa may sometimes conflict with a hukm, the Muslim must obey the Wali over the marja' because the order/hukm "is binding upon all Muslims" -- including other faqih and including Muslims outside of the political jurisdiction of the Wali (i.e. outside Iran). This is because the Wali is a "the just and capable jurist ... appointed as hakim", a "wilayat al-qada' administering justice, and so must be obeyed, as explained in the hadith where Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq proclaims:

I have appointed him a hakim over you. If such a person orders (judges) according to our ruling and the person concerned does not accept it, then he has shown contempt for the ruling of God and rejects us; and he who rejects us, actually rejects Allah and such a person is close to association [Shirk] with Allah[123]

Vaezi reassures those who are worried by the "unlimited and absolute scope of authority" in absolute guardianship that it is "totally different" from "totalitarian and dictatorial government". Absolute guardianship will not be like an absolutism in the Western sense because the Wali will have the qualities of "justice, piety and the necessary socio-political perspicacity", and will be "dismissed" if "he fails to meet one of them".[note 11]

Concerning the controversy over "whether or not" the faqih possessing absolute guardianship "may issue orders that disregard the commands of the Shari’ah", Vaezi notes that laws of "the second order" (al-ahkam al sanavy) are only temporary commands reversing sacred law because of some "significant damage, distress and constriction or disorder"; ‘first order’ laws (al-ahkam al-awaly) remain intact. However, he then goes on to explain that under the "revolutionary view" of Ayatollah Khomeini, "Shari’ah … is not the ultimate goal". Islamic laws are only "a means" to an end. The end is "the protection of Islam and the extension of Justice". For Khomeini "the Islamic State is not merely one part of Islam amongst others, but it is Islam itself".[30]

Amongst his Vaezi's other defenses of absolute guardianship is that it is much superior to the institution of the Caliph -- the Sunni Islamic concept of ruler. Comparing the Sunni theory of the caliphate (based on historical Caliphates) with the Shi'i theory of the Wali (based on theory), Vaezi notes one important "distinction between" them is (according to Vaezi) comes as a logical consequence of Sunni belief in predestination, namely for Sunnis "it doesn't matter who governs or how he obtains authority, for in any case and circumstance it would be subject to the will of God". Consequently, "there are several means by which a caliph may be elected", so that "there is no unique way to legitimize political power" and also "no procedure for the people to depose an unjust ruler". In contrast the Shi'i Wali al-Faqih must be brought to power by "divine installation" (Vaezi doesn't specify how this would take place) because they are "representatives of the hidden Imam"; and must be just, fair, and have expertise is fiqh.[10]

The ruling Wali is a natural progression from God(who several verses in the Quran (Q.3:68, Q.2:257, Q.4:45), describe as a wali over the believers); to the Prophet Muhammad (who is also described as such (Q.5:55, Q.33:6)); to the Imams (who are described as Wali in numerous Shi'i hadith). So it is natural that the next religious figure down also have the "univeral" powers that Muhammad and the Imams had.[125] This argument is also applied again the complaint that giving a Faqih general powers over the public puts sane adults in the same category as minors and the mentally ill. God, Muhammad and the Imams' powers were total, despite the fact their subjects were sane adults. [10][125]

Ahmed Vaezi argues that various distinguished faqih scholars have insisted that faqih (or at least mujtahid) have the authority to judge, to collect taxes (Shaikh Zain ul-Din b.911 AH), lead prayers (Shaykh al-Mufid and others); lead "Jumah prayer (al-Karaki), judge, collect Islamic taxes (Muhammad ibn Makki d 786 AH); not only judge and sentence wrong doers but administer the punishment, (Muhaqqiq al-Karaki); be given authority for “all the affairs attendant upon the deputyship … of the infallible ones” (al-Muhaqqiq al-Karaki); that their “social status is the same as the Imam”, (Shaykh Muhammad Hassan); that there is "consensus (Ijmaa)… that the fuqaha (jurists) of integrity (Jame al-Sharayeti), who have all the perfect, necessary qualities to undertake the vicegerency are the deputy of the Imam of the time…" (Hajj Aqa Reza Hamedani). So these jurists are talking about how faqih should or are being deputy of the Imam, or attending to the affairs of the Shia, or "…carrying out Islamic sentences and implementing religious injunctions", these are duties that “require him to be entrusted with universal authority". And if they have universal authority they have authority to rule/govern! All of which demonstrates that the concept of universal wilayat of the jurist was not new with Ayatollah Khomeini.[38]

Criticism of guardian as ruler

While the use of scholars of fiqh as legal guardians for those not capable of looking after their own interest is universally accepted in 12er Islam, there have been a number of criticisms made against Islamic clerics serving as guardians over sane adults, specifically governing them, and especially about its application in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

All Shi'a agree that a good Muslim must have an Islamic jurist, known as a Marja’a e-taqleed, "as a source of guidance and imitation", in the absence of the infallible Imam.[10] But traditionally it was the individual (Shi'i) Muslim who decided what Marja’ they were going to follow (as of 2022 there were several dozen to choose from, mostly located in Iraq and Iran), and they were not punished by the state if they failed to obey them.[30] Following the establishment of the velayat-e faqih system in Iran, doctrinal differences between individual marjas and the Supreme Leader faqih caused conflicts. Differences of opinion between the Supreme leader and other Marjas over issues such as the permissibility in Islam of chess playing, listening to music, or whether to continue fighting a war with Iraq, have presented challenges for the velayat-e faqih system in Iran.

Shortly before and after Khomeini died, significant changes were made to the constitution and the concept of Wilāyat al-Faqīh, including at least one that "unwittingly undermined the intellectual foundations" of rule by Islamic jurist, according to one critic (Ervand Abrahamian).[68] Disputes within the Islamic Government compelled Khomeini himself to proclaim in January 1988 that 'I should state that the government, which is part of the absolute deputyship of the Prophet, is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all secondary injunctions, even prayers fasting and hajj".[126][127] which "elevated the state's preservation to a primary central injunction (al-ahkam al-awwaliyya) and downgraded rituals (e.g., the obligatory prayers and fasting) to secondary injunctions (al-ahkam al-thanawiyya)",[127] a major theological innovation and seemingly in contradiction for the rationale Khomeini gave for the need for an Islamic government of Wilāyat al-Faqīh:

... in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty. The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative power. No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator. ... The law of Islam, divine command, has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government. Everyone, including the Most Noble Messenger (s) and his successors, is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity—the law that has been revealed by God, Almighty and Exalted,... [128]

Although the constitution states that the leadership clauses, especially those stipulating that ultimate authority resides in the senior religious jurists, were to endure until the Mahdi reappeared on earth to rule; ten years after the constitution was approved the Assembly of Experts "drastically" revamped these clauses.[129]

Although the constitution states that the leadership clauses, especially those stipulating that ultimate authority resides in the senior religious jurists, were to endure until the Mahdi reappeared on earth to rule; ten years after the constitution was approved the Assembly of Experts "drastically" revamped these clauses.[129] In 1989 Khomeini's officially designated successor, Hussein-Ali Montazeri, was ousted[86] after calling for "an open assessment of failures" of the Revolution and an end to the export of revolution,[87] Khomeini responded by calling for a meeting of the Assembly of Experts to "discuss him."[87] Unfortunately Montazeri was the only marjaʿ-e taqlid beside Khomeini who had been part of Khomeini's movement and the only senior cleric who "trusted" the revolutionary movement's "version of Islam".[68] After Khomeini died, the Assembly of Experts quickly amended the constitution", modifying Article 109 to remove scholarly seniority from the qualifications of the leader, so a faqih whose scholarly ranking was lower but political standing much higher (former president Ali Khamenei), be appointed Leader.[68] It has been argued credibly that the resulting disjunction of political leadership from seniority in the learned hierarchy of Iranian Shiʿism effectively brings the implementation of velayat-e faqih to an end.

Khomeini preached that because Muslims accepted and recognized sharia law "as worthy of obedience", a government ruling according to sharia would "truly belong to the people",[84] unlike those secular states with "sham parliaments".[130] But despite his confidence in the support of the people for rule by Sharia via jurists, in public proclamations "during the revolution" and before the overthrow of the monarchy, Khomeini made "no mention" of velayat-e faqih.[3] When a campaign started to install velayat-e faqih in the new Iranian constitution, critics complained that he had become the leader of the revolution promising to advise, rather than rule, the country after the Shah was overthrown, when in fact he had developed his theory of rule by jurists not by democratic elections and spread it among his followers years before the revolution started;[131] It is a complaint that some continue to make.[132]

The execution of the theory of rule by Islamic jurists has been criticized on utilitarian grounds (as opposed to religious grounds), by those who argue that it has simply not done what Khomeini said his theory would do.[133] The goals of ending poverty,[note 12] corruption, [note 13] national debt,[note 14] or compelling un-Islamic government to capitulate before the Islamic government's armies,[note 15] have not been met; nor have even more modest and basic goals like downsizing the government bureaucracy,[note 16][140][139] using only senior religious jurists or [marja]s for the post of faqih guardian/Supreme Leader,[141][note 17]

Opposition among scholars

According to Ali Mamouri, writing in 2013, the Islamic Republic of Iran, "has never been able to establish a stable and harmonious relationship between the Shiite seminaries of Qom and Najaf". "Most" of the "spiritual references" aka marjaʿ in Qom (at least in 2013) do not supporting the regime's position on velayat-e faqih, even though it has led to a number of them being placed under house arrest and barred "from expressing their views and ideas or continuing their teaching and religious duties".[12] Najaf religious leaders present an even greater problem as Najaf is outside the border of Iran and so its marjaʿ cannot be incarcerated by Iran.

As of 2020, the "four leading Marja' of Najaf (Ali al-Sistani, Bashir al-Najafi, Muhammad al-Fayadh, Muhammad Saeed al-Hakim) actively oppose Ruhollah Khomeini's concept of guardianship,[142][143] and a large segment of the clerical Shia community in general does not accept the theory of velayat-e-faqih and believes the clergy should stay away from politics.[144] The majority of Shi'a accepted the late Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Borujerdi (1875–1961) as their Marja' al Taqlid (source of emulation), including his student, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Throughout his life, Borujerdi, who was a quietist and therefore refrained from taking political stances, forbid his student Khomeini from engaging in non-religious matters. It was only after Borujerdi's death that Khomeini published his first political and social treatise in which he explicitly called for active participation in political matters.

Regarding Guardianship, several senior faqih have written on the exclusivity of the authority of the Imams, the limits of the authority of faqih, and the dangers to faqih and to Islam of the corruption of power.

Al-Shaykh Al-Mufid

Unlike Sunnis who believe in appointment of the Islamic Caliph through Ijm'a or Shura, Imamiyya Shia say that the Imam and the legitimate Caliph of the Islamic nation must only be appointed by God; that appointment may be known through the declaration of the Prophet or the preceding Imam.[145]

Divine authority to rule an Islamic State, traditional Shia believe, is vested exclusively with the Infallible Imams of Ahlulbayt, making no exceptions for rule by jurists in their absence. In the words of Al-Shaykh Al-Mufid:

سلطان الإسلام المنصوب من قبل الله تعالى، وهم أئمة الهدى من آل محمد عليهم السلام
“The Islamic Ruler is he who is appointed divinely by the Almighty Allah and they are the Imams of Guidance from the Progeny of Muhammad, peace be upon them all.”[146]

Al-Sistani

According to one of the most senior scholars in Shia Islam,[147] Sayyid Sistani, Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist

means every jurisprudent (Faqih) has guardianship (wilayah) over non-litigious affairs. Non-litigious affairs are technically called al-omour al-hesbiah. As for general affairs with which social order is linked, wilayah of a Faqih and enforcement of wilayah depend on certain conditions one of which is popularity of acceptability of Faqih among majority of faithful (momeneen).[148]

Notwithstanding his indirect but decisive role in most major Iraqi political decisions, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has often been identified with the quietist school of thought, which seeks to keep religion out of the political sphere until the return of the Imam of the Age (the Mahdi).[149][150]

Al-Khoei

Similarly, Sistani's mentor the Late Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Abul Qasim al-Musawi al-Khoei (1899-1992), the leading Shia ayatollah at the time Khoemini's book on his theory of Wilayat al-Faqih was published, rejected Khomeini's argument on the grounds that

  • The authority of faqih — is limited to the guardianship of widows and orphans — could not be extended by human beings to the political sphere.[151]
  • In the absence of the Hidden Imam (the 12th and last Shi'a Imam), the authority of jurisprudence was not the preserve of one or a few fuqaha.[151] is deemed to be one of the most vocal modern day jurists against the innate nature of Wilayat al-Faqih.

In contrasting one-sentence mottos, Khomeini, preached that “only a good society can create good believers”, while Khoei, who championed the theory of a “civil state”, argued “only good men can create a good society.”[152]

Al-Khoei restricted the scope of Wilayat al-Faqih to the jurist's authority in terms of wakalah (i.e. protection, delegation, or authorization often agreed to in a legal contract) alone while dismissing the notion of the jurist inheriting the intrinsic authority to rule of the Infallibles (Imams).

Al-Khoei wrote:

إن الولاية لم تثبت للفقيه في عصر الغيبة بدليل، وإنما هي مختصة بالنبي والأئمة المعصومين (عليهم السلام)، بل الثابت حسبما يستفاد من الروايات أمران: نفوذ قضائه، وحجّية فتواه. وليس له التصرف في أموال القصّر أو غير ذلك مما هو من شؤون الولاية، إلاّ في الأمر الحسبي، فإن الفقيه له الولاية في ذلك لا بالمعنى المدعى
“Wilayah for the faqih in the age of ghaybah [occultation, i.e. from 939 CE until the coming of the Mahdi] is not approved by any evidence whatsoever - and it's only the prerogative of the Messenger and the Imams peace be upon them all, rather the established fact according to the narrations lies in two affairs: Him exercising the role of a judge and his fatwa being a proof - and he holds no authority over the property of a child or others which is from the affairs of wilayah except in the hisbi sense (wakalah), ie. the faqih holds wilayah in this sense not in the sense of being the claimant (al mudda'ee).”[153]

Furthermore, al-Khoei elaborates on the role of a well-qualified Islamic Jurist in the age of occultation of the Infallible Imam which has been traditionally endorsed by the Shia scholarship as follows:

أما الولاية على الأمور الحسبية كحفظ أموال الغائب واليتيم إذا لم يكن من يتصدى لحفظها كالولي أو نحوه، فهي ثابتة للفقيه الجامع للشرائط وكذا الموقوفات التي ليس لها متولي من قبل الواقف والمرافعات، فإن فصل الخصومة فيها بيد الفقيه وأمثال ذلك، وأما الزائد على ذلك فالمشهور بين الفقهاء على عدم الثبوت، والله العال
“As for wilayah (guardianship) of omour al-hesbiah (non-litigious affairs) such as the maintenance of properties of the missing and the orphans, if they are not addressed to preservation by a wali (guardian) or so, it is proven for the faqih jame'a li-sharaet and likewise waqf properties that do not have a mutawalli (trustee) on behalf of waqif (donor of waqf) and continuance pleadings, the judgement regarding litigation is in his hand and similar authorities, but with regards to the excess of that (guardianship) the most popular (opinion) among the jurists is on absence of its evidence, Allah knows best.” [154]

Nawishta-e-Akhoond

Muhammad Kazim Khurasani (1839-1911), commonly known as Akhund Khurasani, was a Shi'i Marjaʿ. based in Najaf who was the main clerical supporter and legitimizing force for the Persian Constitutional Revolution, Iran's democratic revolution of 1905–1911.[155] Traditional Shia scholarship has been historically critical with regard to the clergy relinquishing the role of advisory for the State and taking over absolute charge of the State affairs firsthand instead. Khurasani made a set of prudent observations in his famous Nawishta about the inevitable hazards that will arise owing to the hypothesis proposing clergymen employ religion to legitimize their rule. Some of these predictions are as follows:

  • چون مردم ما را نایبان امام زمان می دانند انتظار دارند حکومت دینی هم همان شرایط را ایجاد کند و وقتی نتوانیم در آن سطح عدالت را برقرار کنیم نسبت به امام زمان و دین سست عقیده می شون

Since the people consider the clergymen to be deputies of Imam al-Zaman, they will expect the religious government to create an exemplary system (closely matching the one supposed to be established by the Infallible Imam) and when they can not establish justice at that level, the Shia masses will become weak in their faith about Imam al-Zaman and religion.

  • وقتی روحانیون پا به حکومت بگذارند دیگر نمی توانند عیوب خود را ببینند و توجیه می کنند و فسادها را نادیده میگیرند

When the clergymen will come to power, they could no longer see their faults and justify and ignore corruption.

  • آمال وآرزوی ما تبعیت حکومت از دین است در حالیکه اگر حکومت را در دست گیریم، به تبعیت دین از حکومت دچار خواهیم شد

The clergy's aspiration is government's obedience to religion, while if the clergymen took over the charge of government, they are more likely to make religion subservient to the government.

  • اکنون که مناصب حکومتی نداریم ، اینهمه اختلاف نظر وجود دارد . اگر به حکومت برسیم این اختلاف نظر باعث چندپارگی دین و ایجاد فرقه های جدید و آسیب به دین می شود

At the time when clergymen do not have government positions, yet there exists so much disagreement. If they come to power, this disagreement will cause further division in religion and creation of new sects and hence cause damage to religion.

  • ذات حکومت کردن دروغ گفتن است و نمی شود حکومت با اخلاق داشت . لذا در شان روحانیت نیست که دروغ بگوید و دامن دین را بیالاید

The essence of fallible governance is to spew lies and it is technically impossible to govern morally. Therefore, it is against the moral character of clergymen to lie and thus defame religion.[156]

Muhammad Hussain Naini

Muhammad Hussain Naini, an aide to Akhund Khurasani, argued that while the ideal government is the rule of the divinely inspired and infallible leader of the community of believers, i.e. the Imam, this ideal form of government is unavailable during the occultation. Consequently, the choices available are between "despotic" and "constitutional" government. Despotism being tyranny, it is constitutional government that diverges "least from the ideal government of the Imam", and is "therefore the best type of government during the occultation[157]

List of scholars persecuted in Iran

  • Mohammad Taher al‐Shubayr al‐Khaqani[159]

Books

See also

Notes

  1. ^ see, for example, Amir Arjomand 1980;[15] Calder 1982;[16] Enayat 1983;[17] Rose 1983;[18] Mottahedeh 1995;[19] and Akhavi 1996[20][21]
  2. ^ ;Non-governmental Guardianship in Islam
    Some definitions of Guardian in Islam (Sunni not Shia) at least in Islamic Nigeria:
    • For Children: "The main role of a legal guardian under the Shari’a is to act in the child's best interests when the child's parents cannot do so. Legal guardians are usually relatives such as an aunt, uncle, or grandparent. This may be due to death, incapacitation, or incarceration for a crime."
    • Incapacitated adults: "In some situations, adults with severe handicaps may need a legal guardian to care for them and act on their behalf. This is known as an adult guardianship."[24]
    Another source (Sohaira Siddiqui) states that Hedaya (a 12th-century legal manual of Hanafi fiqh by Burhan al-Din al-Marghinan), "states that there are three forms of guardianship:
    1. Guardianship for contracting marriage;
    2. Guardianship of minor persons for custody and education; and
    3. Guardianship of the property of minors.[25]
  3. ^ This editor could not find any explanation giving a difference between Wilayat al-amma ("universal" authority) and Wilayat al-Mutlaqa ("absolute" rule/authority)
  4. ^ Example: "The conflict between the Iranian regime, which believes in velayat-e faqih, and Najaf, which rejects that notion, has made some researchers in Shiite affairs predict the end of the traditional Shiite reference with Sistani's death".[12]
  5. ^ Abrahamian offers three slightly different options: shunning the authorities as usurpers, accepting them grudgingly, accepting them wholeheartedly -- especially if the state was Shi'i.[36]
  6. ^ (all of what is now Iran, Republic of Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Armenia, eastern Georgia, parts of the North Caucasus including Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan, as well as parts of Turkey, Syria, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan),[39][40][41][42]
  7. ^ giving British control over growth, sale and export of tobacco
  8. ^ "... Khorasani was one of the most important of the clerical supporters of constitutionalism, and his aide, Na'ini (d. 1936) wrote the most important of the treatises legitimating constitutional government"[49]
  9. ^ Abrahamian states Khomeini was "described as the Supreme Religious Jurist" in the constitution. A translation of the constitution reproduced on constituteproject.org website mentions Khomeini (Khumaynî) several times as the leader of the revolution,[69] "the eminent marji' al-taqlid," "the blossoming of a glorious and massive uprising, which confirmed the central role of Imam Khumaynî as an Islamic leader", "the victorious Islamic Revolution led by the eminent marji' altaqlid, Ayatullah al-'Uzma Imam Khumayni",[69] "Imam Khumayni--quddisa sirruh al-sharif--who was recognised and accepted as marji' and Leader by a decisive majority of the people".[70] It also states that "After the demise of" Khomeini, "the task of appointing the Leader shall be vested with the experts elected by the people."[70] (The constitution never uses the term Supreme Leader, only Leader.)
  10. ^ Found in
    • at-Tirmidhi. "Jami' at-Tirmidhi Chapter 41 on Knowledge, Hadith 38, #2682". sunnah.com. Retrieved 27 July 2022. and
    • "Sunan Ibn Majah. Book of the Sunnah. v.1, book 1, 223". sunnah.com. Retrieved 27 July 2022.
    both hadith are rated da'if or weak.
  11. ^ In the Islamic Republic of Iran, at least, "there are no formal mechanisms—constitutionally-sanctioned or otherwise—through which the Assembly can challenge the supreme leader ..."[124]
  12. ^ In the first six years after the overthrow of the Shah (from 1979 through 1985), The Iranian government's "own Planning and Budget Organization reported that ... absolute poverty rose by nearly 45%!" [134]
  13. ^ After the mayor of Iran's largest city Tehran was arrested for corruption in 1998, ex-President Rafsanjani said in a sermon `Graft has always existed, there are always people who are corrupt....` [135])
  14. ^ Khomeini himself did not run up debt but in the decade after his death, under his faqih guardian successor Iran not only went back into debt, but built it up to almost four times the putatively shameful debt the monarchy left behind in 1979. Spending that Iranian economists criticized as "reckless."[136]
  15. ^ On the start of Iran's war with Saddam Hussein's secular state of Iraq, Khomeini stated there were no conditions for a truce except that "the regime in Baghdad must fall and must be replaced by an Islamic Republic"[137]
    Six years, hundreds of thousands of Iranian lives, and $100's of billions later, faced with desertions and resistance against the conscription, Khomeini signed a peace agreement stating "... we have no choice and we should give in to what God wants us to do ... I reiterate that the acceptance of this issue is more bitter than poison for me, but I drink this chalice of poison for the Almighty and for His satisfaction."[138]
  16. ^ "Khomeini had to preside over a state bureaucracy three times larger than that of Mohammad Reza Shah."[139]
  17. ^ On April 24, 1989, Article 109 of the Iranian constitution, requiring that the Leader be a marja'-e taqlid, was removed. New wording in constitutional articles 5, 107, 109, 111, required him to be `a pious and just faqih, aware of the exigencies of the time, courageous, and with good managerial skills and foresight.` If there are a number of candidates, the person with the best `political and jurisprudential` vision should have the priority.`

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Bibliography and further reading

  • Abrahamian, Ervand (1982). Iran between two revolutions. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0691101345.
  • Abrahamian, Ervand (1993). Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. California: University of California Press. ISBN 0520081730. Retrieved 30 December 2016.
  • Abrahamian, Ervand (1999). Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran. University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-21866-3.
  • Amuli, Ayatollah Jawadi (July 2016). "A Glance at the Fundamentals of the Trusteeship of the Jurisconsult (Wilayat al-faqih)". rafed.net. Retrieved 10 August 2022.
  • Hermann, Denis (1 May 2013). "Akhund Khurasani and the Iranian Constitutional Movement". Middle Eastern Studies. 49 (3): 430–453. doi:10.1080/00263206.2013.783828. ISSN 0026-3206. JSTOR 23471080. S2CID 143672216.
  • Keddie, Nikki (2003). Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. Yale University Press.
  • Imam Khomeini. Governance of the Jurist, Velayat-e Faqeeh; Islamic Government (PDF). Translated by Algar, Hamid. The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works. Retrieved 2 August 2022.
  • Khomeini, Ruhollah (1981). Algar, Hamid (ed.). Islam and Revolution : Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. Translated by Algar, Hamid. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press. ISBN 9781483547541.
  • Khomeini, Ruhollah (1981). "A Warning to the Nation". In Algar, Hamid (ed.). Islam and Revolution : Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini. Translated by Algar, Hamid. Berkeley, CA: Mizan Press. pp. 169–173. ISBN 9781483547541. (from Kashf Al-Asrar by Rullah Khomeini, 1941, p.221-224)
  • Moin, Baqer (1999). Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah. New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books. ISBN 9781466893061.
  • Momen, Moojan (1985). An Introduction to Shi'i Islam. New Haven, CT; London, England: Yale University Press. ISBN 0300035314.
  • A role-model of leadership by Imam Khomeini
  • Powers of the leader and government by Imam Khomeini
  • Vaezi, Ahmed (2004). "what wilayat al-faqih". Shia Political Thought. Al-Islam.org. Retrieved 11 August 2022.

External links

 
Look up Velayat-e faqih in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.
 
Wikiquote has quotations related to Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.
  • Iran's Elections Serve Mullahcracy, Not Democracy, the Heritage Foundation.
  • GlobalSecurity.org.
  • .


January 22, 2023
guardianship, islamic, jurist, other, uses, vilayat, faqih, disambiguation, persian, ولایت, فقیه, romanized, velâyat, faqih, arabic, لا, ٱل, يه, romanized, wilāyat, faqīh, concept, twelver, shia, islamic, which, holds, that, until, reappearance, infallible, im. For other uses see Vilayat e Faqih disambiguation The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist Persian ولایت فقیه romanized Velayat e Faqih Arabic و لا ي ة ٱل ف ق يه romanized Wilayat al Faqih is a concept in Twelver Shia Islamic law which holds that until the reappearance of the infallible Imam sometime before Judgement Day at least some of the religious and social affairs of the Muslim world should be administered by righteous Shi i jurists 1 Shia disagree over whose religious and social affairs are to be administered and what those affairs are 2 Calligraphic of the Velayat e Faqih Wilayat al Faqih is associated in particular with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 3 and the Islamic Republic of Iran In a series of lectures in 1970 Khomeini advanced the idea of guardianship in its absolute form as rule of the state and society This version of guardianship now forms the basis of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran which calls for a Vali ye faqih Guardian Jurist to serve as the Supreme Leader of that country 4 5 Under the absolute authority of the jurist velayat e motlaqaye faqih the jurist faqih has control over all public matters including governance of states all religious affairs including even being able to temporary suspend religious obligations such as the salat prayer or hajj 6 3 Obedience to him is more important according to proponents than performing those religious obligations 7 Other Shi i Islamic scholars disagree with some limiting guardianship to a much narrower scope 2 things like mediating disputes 8 and providing guardianship for orphaned children the mentally incapable and others lacking someone to protect their interests 9 There is also disagreement over how widely supported Khomeini s doctrine is Whether the absolute authority and guardianship of a high ranking Islamic jurist is universally accepted amongst all Shi a theories of governance and forms a central pillar of Imami Shi i political thought Ahmed Vaezi Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi 10 or whether there is no consensus in favor of the model of the Islamic Republic of Iran either among the public in Iran Alireza Nader David E Thaler S R Bohandy 11 or among most religious leaders in the leading centers of Shia thought i e Qom and Najaf Ali Mamouri 12 Contents 1 Terminology 2 History 2 1 Early Islam 2 2 Colonial and post colonial era 2 3 Khomeini and Guardianship of the Islamic jurist as Islamic government 2 4 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 2 5 Hezbollah of Lebanon 2 6 Under the Islamic Republic 3 Velayat e Faqih in the Iranian constitution 4 Arguments and opinions 4 1 Limited role for Guardianship 4 2 Guardian as ruler 4 2 1 Khomeini 4 2 2 Baqir Sharif al Qurashi 4 2 3 Ahmed Vaezi 4 3 Criticism of guardian as ruler 4 3 1 Opposition among scholars 4 3 2 Al Shaykh Al Mufid 4 3 3 Al Sistani 4 3 4 Al Khoei 4 3 5 Nawishta e Akhoond 4 3 6 Muhammad Hussain Naini 5 List of scholars persecuted in Iran 6 Books 7 See also 8 Notes 9 References 10 Bibliography and further reading 11 External linksTerminology EditWilayat conveys several meanings which are involved in Twelver Islamic history Morphologically Wilayat is derived from the Arabic verbal root w l y wilaya meaning to be near or close to someone or something 10 also to be a friend to be in charge etc 13 Meanings of Wilayat include rule supremacy or sovereignty guardianship or authority 14 guardianship mandate governance and rulership note 1 or governorship or province 22 In another sense wilayat means friendship loyalty or guardianship see Wali 23 note 2 In Islam jurists are faqih plural fuquaha 1 For those who support a government based on rule of a faqih Wilayat al Faqih has been translated as rule of the jurisconsult mandate of the jurist governance of the jurist the discretionary authority of the jurist 26 More ambiguous translations are guardianship of the jurist trusteeship of the jurist 27 Shaykh Murtadha al Ansari and Abu al Qasim al Khoei for example would talk of the guardianship of the jurisprudent not the mandate of the jurisprudent 26 Some definitions of uses of the term Wilayat not necessarily involving jurists in Islamic jurisprudence fiqh terminology or at least Twelver terminology are Wilayat al Qaraba authority Wilayat given to a father or paternal grandfather over minors and the mentally ill 10 Wilayat al Qada authority given to a just and capable faqih during the absence of the Imam to judge amongst the people based upon God s law and revelation and collect Islamic taxes tithes zakat sadaqa kharaj 10 Wilayat al Hakim the guardian of those who have no guardian authority given to a regular administrator of justice hakim to supervise the interests of a person who does not have a natural guardian and who is unable to take care of his own affairs such as a mentally ill or mentally disabled person 10 Wilayat al Usuba authority over administration of inheritance and rights of inheritors in Sunni fiqh This authority is not accepted by Imami scholars Regarding jurist involvement in governance definitions include Wilayat al Mutlaqa absolute rule authority الولایه المطلقه of the supreme faqih jurisprudent also transliterated as velayat e motlagh e faghih velayat e motlaqeh ye faqih 28 also called Wilayat al Mutlaqa al Elahiya 10 has been defined as discretionary authority bestowed on the prophet Muhammad and on the Imams Ahmed Vaezi 10 has been defined by the Ayatollah Khomeini circa 1988 to mean that the Islamic state has the religious mandate to suspend if not revoke substantive divine ordinances ahkam e far iyeh ye elahiyeh such as hajj or fasting if sees the need to 28 it has also been used by Iranian conservatives circa 2010 to mean that at least in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran the head faqih has the absolute right to make decisions for the state notwithstanding the desires of any elected office holders or institutions or the general public 29 It is a new term applied by Khomeini publicly in 1990 when it was enshrined in the constitution of Islamic Iran 30 wilayat al muqayada conditional authority of the faqih jurisprudent restricts the right of the faqih for issuing governmental orders to permissibility cases mubahat which must not be in opposition to obligatory Islamic laws 30 Wilayat al amma universal authority of the faqih jurisprudent Supporters of this concept believe orders given by a jurist holder of wilayat al amma are not restricted to merely the administration of justice They may issue orders and their orders are incumbent upon all Muslims even other fuqaha to obey 30 right and duty to lead the Shi a community and undertake the full function and responsibilities of an infallible Imam 10 This is the highest form of authority Wilayat bestowed upon the faqih according to at least one cleric Ahmed Vaezi note 3 Wilayat al siyasiyya political authority is one of the elements included in Wilayat al amma 10 In common use Wilayat al Faqih velayat e faqih may sometimes be used as shorthand for Ayatollah Khomeini s vision of velayat e faqih in Islamic government with those who support limited velayat e faqih being described as rejecting velayat e faqih 31 note 4 Arabic language phrases associated with Guardianship of the Jurist such as Wilayat al Faqih Wali al Faqih are widely used Arabic being the original language of Islamic sources such as the Quran hadith and much other literature However the Persian language translation Velayat e Faqih Vali e faqih are also commonly used in discussion about the concept and practice in Iran which is both the largest Shi i majority country and as the Islamic Republic of Iran is also the one country in the world where Wilayat al Faqih is part of the structure of government The term mullahcracy rule by mullahs i e by Islamic clerics has been used as a pejorative term to describe Wilayat al Faqih as government and specifically the Islamic Republic of Iran 32 33 History EditSee also History of political Islam in Iran Early Islam Edit A foundational belief of Twelver Shi ism is that the spiritual and political successors of the Islamic prophet Muhammad are not caliphs as Sunni Muslims believe but the Imams a line starting with Muhammad s cousin son in law and companion Ali died 661 CE and continuing with his male descendants Imams were almost never in a position to rule territory but did have the loyalty of their followers and delegated some of their functions to qualified members of their community particularly in the judicial sphere 3 In the late 9th century 873 874 CE the Twelfth Imam a boy at the time mysteriously disappeared Shi i jurists responded by developing the idea of the Occultation Islam occultation 34 whereby the 12th Imam was still alive but had been withdrawn by God from the eyes of people to protect his life until conditions were ripe for his reappearance 34 The Shi i community ummah has had to determine who if anyone has his authority wilayah for what functions during the Imam s absence 14 The delegation of some functions for example the collection and disbursement of religiously mandated tithes zakat and khums continued during occultation 3 but others were limited Shi i jurists and especially al Sharif al Murtada d 1044 CE forbade 14 waging of offensive jihad or according to some jurists the holding of Friday prayers 3 as this power was in abeyance saqit until the return of the Imam 14 Al Murtada also excluded implementing the penal code hudud leading the community in jihad and giving allegiance to any leader 14 For many centuries according to at least two historians Moojan Momen Ervand Abrahamian Shia jurists have tended to stick to one of three approaches to the state cooperated with it trying to influence policies by becoming active in politics or most commonly remaining aloof from it 35 note 5 Firm supporter of governance by jurist Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi describes the arrival of rule of jurist in Iran as a revolution after fourteen centuries of lamentable governance in the Islamic world 37 Others Ahmed Vaezi insist the idea that the governance by jurist is new is erroneous because it is the logical conclusion of arguments made by high level Shia faqih of medieval times who argued that high level Shia faqih be given authority although their use of Taqiya precautionary dissimulation prevents this from being obvious to us 38 A significant event in Islamic and especially Shia history was the rise of the Safavid dynasty 1501 1702 ruling a vast area of modern day Iran and beyond at its height note 6 and forcibly converting Iran s population to the state religion of Twelver Shi ism 43 44 45 46 Iran s population continuing to have a large Shi i majority According to Hamid Algar a convert to Islam and supporter of Ruhollah Khomeini under the Safavids the general deputyship occasionally was interpreted to include all the prerogatives of rule that in principle had belonged to the imams but no special emphasis was placed on this And in the nineteenth century velayat e faqih began to be discussed as a distinct legal topic 3 Absolute Wilayat al Faqih was probably first introduced in the Fiqh of Ja far al Sadiq in the famous textbook Javaher ol Kalaam جواهر الکلام citation needed Iranian Molla Mohammad Mahdee Naraqi or at least his son Molla Ahmad Naraqi 1771 1829 C E argued that the scope of wilayat al faqih extends to political authority 26 more than a century earlier than Khomeini 26 but never tried to establish nor called for the establishment of a state based on wilayat al faqih al siyasiyah the divine mandate of the jurisprudent to rule 47 Colonial and post colonial era Edit In the late 19th and early 20th centuries there were two major instances of jurist involvement in politics in Iran which continued to be the largest Shia majority state and went on to be a major petroleum exporter 48 A fatwa in 1891 by Mirza Shirazi declaring tobacco forbidden successfully undermining the overly generous 1890 tobacco concession granted to British imperialists by the monarch of Persia note 7 and the support by Marja Muhammad Kazim Khurasani see above for the democratic Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905 1911 note 8 The Tobacco Protest and Constitutional Revolution and not the Islamic revolution have been described both as exceptions to apolitical stance of leading Shia jurists Ervand Abrahamian and as the beginning of the end of a 1000 years of quietism among Shi i or the real shift in Shiite political thought when Shiites began to see the possibility of freely experimenting with politics Khalid bin Sulieman Addadh 50 Ayatollah Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri who fought against a democratic law making parliament in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution انقلاب مشروطه predating Khomeini in supporting rule by sharia and opposing and Western influence in Iran Khomeini and Guardianship of the Islamic jurist as Islamic government Edit In early 1970 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini the leading cleric fighting the Shah of the secularist Pahlavi dynasty who was exiled to the holy Shia city of Najaf at the time gave a series of lectures on how Islamic Government required Wilayat Al Faqih Leading up to the revolution a book based on the lectures The Jurist s Guardianship Islamic Government was spread widely among his network of followers in Iran 51 Khomeini had originally supported an interpretation of Velayat e faqih limited to legal rulings religious judgments and intervention to protect the property of minors and the weak even when rulers are oppressive In his 1941 1943 book Secrets Revealed 52 he specifically stated we do not say that government must be in the hands of the faqih 53 But in his 1970 book he argued not that Faqih should get involved in politics in special situations but that they must rule the state and society and that monarchy or any other sort of government are systems of unbelief all traces of which it is the duty of Muslims to destroy 54 In a true Islamic state he maintained only those who have knowledge of Sharia should hold government posts and the country s ruler should be the faqih a guardian jurist Vali ye faqih who surpasses all others in knowledge of Islamic law and justice 55 known as a Marjaʿ as well as having intelligence and administrative ability Not only is the rule of Islamic jurists and obedience toward them an obligation of Islam it is as important a religious obligation as any a Muslim has Our obeying holders of authority like Islamic jurists is actually an expression of obedience to God 56 Preserving Islam for which Wilayat al Faqih is necessary is more necessary even than prayer and fasting 57 The necessity of a Jurist leader to serve the people as a vigilant trustee enforcing law and order is not an ideal to be sought after but a matter of survival for Islam and Muslims Without him Islam will fall victim to obsolescence and decay as heretics atheists and unbelievers add and subtract rites institutions and ordinances from the religion 58 Muslim society will stay divided into two groups oppressors and oppressed 59 Muslim government s will continue to be infested with corruption constant embezzlement 60 not just lacking in competence and virtue but actively serving as agents to imperialist Western powers Foreign experts have studied our country and have discovered all our mineral reserves gold copper petroleum and so on They have also made an assessment of our people s intelligence and come to the conclusion that the only barrier blocking their way in exploiting Iran are Islam and the religious leadership 61 Their goal is to keep us backward to keep us in our present miserable state so they can exploit our riches our underground wealth our lands and our human resources They want us to remain afflicted and wretched and our poor to be trapped in their misery they and their agents wish to go on living in huge palaces and enjoying lives of abominable luxury 62 While these ideas sound strange to many 63 it is because Westerns have set about deceiving Muslims using their native agents to fool them into thinking that Islam consists of a few ordinances concerning menstruation and parturition 64 Because western habits of banking on the basis of usury consumption of alcohol cultivation of sexual vice keep people weak they allow exploitation and so Western imperialists and Jews have worked hard to undermine the laws of Islam 62 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran Edit Following the overthrow of the Shah by the Iranian Revolution a modified form of this doctrine was incorporated into the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran 65 adopted by referendum on 2 and 3 December 1979 It established the first country and so far only in history to apply the principal of velayat e faqih to government The plan of the Islamic government is based upon wilayat al faqih as proposed by Imam Khumayni 66 according to the constitution which was drafted by an assembly made up primarily by disciples of Khomeini 67 While the constitution made concessions to popular sovereignty including an elected president and parliament the Leader was given authority to dismiss the president appoint the main military commanders declare war and peace and name senior clerics to the Guardian Council a powerful body which can veto legislation and disqualify candidates for office 68 note 9 Hezbollah of Lebanon Edit In the early 1980s Ayatollah Khomeini sent some of his followers including 1500 Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps pasdaran instructors 71 to Lebanon to form Hezbollah a Shia Islamist political party and militant group committed to bringing Islamic revolution 72 and rule of wilayat al faqih in Lebanon 73 74 75 A large fraction of Lebanon s population was Shia and they had grown to become the largest confessional group in Lebanon but had traditionally been subservient to Lebanese Christians and Sunni Muslims Over time Hezbollah s para military wing grew to be considered stronger than the Lebanese army 76 and Hezbollah to become described as a state within a state 77 However as of 2008 the goal of transforming Lebanon into an Iranian style state has been abandoned in favor of a more inclusive approach 78 Under the Islamic Republic Edit The establishment of the Islamic Republic and Wilayat al faqih rule was not without conflict More than 7900 political prisoners were executed between 1981 and 1985 According to historian Ervand Abrahamian this compares with the less than 100 killed by the monarchy during the eight years leading up to the revolution In addition the prison system was drastically expanded and prison conditions made drastically worse under the Islamic Republic 79 80 81 Press freedom was also tightened with the international group the Reporters Without Borders declaring Iran one of the world s most repressive countries for journalists for the first 40 years after the revolution 1980 2020 82 Shortly before and after Khomeini died in June 1989 significant changes were made to the constitution and the concept of Wilayat al Faqih 68 In January February 1988 Khomeini publicly propounded the theory of velayat e motlaqaye faqih the absolute authority of the jurist whereby obedience to the ruling jurist is to be as incumbent on the believer as the performance of prayer and the guardian jurist s powers extend even to the temporary suspension of such essential rites of Islam as the hajj 6 83 despite the fact that his 1970 book insists that in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty 84 The new theory was instigated by the need to break the stalemate within the Islamic Government on controversial items of social and economic legislation 3 7 In March 1989 Khomeini declared that only those clerics knowledgeable about the problems of the day the contemporary world and economic social and political matters should rule not religious clerics 85 despite the fact that he had spent decades denouncing secularism and the idea that the affairs of this world were separate from the understanding of the sacred law 85 Also in that month Khomeini s officially designated successor Hussein Ali Montazeri was ousted 86 after he called for an open assessment of failures of the Revolution and an end to the export of revolution 87 As Montazeri was the only marjaʿ al taqlid beside Khomeini who had been part of Khomeini s movement and the only senior cleric trusted by Khomeini s network 68 and the constitution called for the Leader Wali Al Faqih to be a marja after Khomeini died the Assembly of Experts amended the constitution to remove scholarly seniority from the qualifications of the leader accommodating the appointment of a mid ranking cleric Ali Khamenei to be Leader 68 In the 21st century many have noted a severe loss of prestige in Iran for the fuqaha Islamic jurists 88 and for the concept of Wilayat al faqih In the early 1980s clerics were generally treated with elaborate courtesy 20 years later clerics are sometimes insulted by school children and taxi drivers and they quite often put on normal clothes when venturing outside Qom 89 In Iraq another Shia majority country that is smaller and less stable than Iran and shares a border with it sentiment against Iranian influence in 2019 led to demonstrations and attacks with Molotov cocktails against the Iranian Consulate in Karbala Political forces alleged to be under the control of Iran there have sometimes been disparagingly referred to as the arms of Wilayat al Faqih 90 Protesters in Iran have been heard to chant Death to the dictator Marg Bar Diktator dictator a reference to the Supreme Leader 91 and Death to velayat e faqih 92 during protests which have become serious enough to see as many as 1 500 protesters killed by security forces in one series of protests in late 2019 and early 2020 93 94 95 Velayat e Faqih in the Iranian constitution EditAccording to the constitution of Iran Islamic republic is defined as a state ruled by Islamic jurists Fuqaha Article Five reads During the Occultation of the Lord of the Age that is the Hidden Imam the governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the pious and just jurist who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age courageous resourceful and possessed of administrative ability and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people 96 Other articles 107 to 112 specify the procedure for selecting the leader and list his constitutional functions Articles 57 and 110 deliniate the power of the ruling jurist Article 57 states that there are other bodies branches in the government but they are all under the control supervision of the Leader The power of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature the judiciary and the executive powers functioning under the supervision of the absolute religious leader and the leadership of the ummah 30 According to article 110 the supervisory powers of the Supreme Leader as a Vali e faqih are The ruling Jurist appoints the jurists to the guardian council appointing the highest judicial authority in the country holding supreme command over the armed forces signing the certificate of appointment allowing the president to take office dismissal of the president if he feels it is in the national interest granting amnesty on the recommendation of the supreme court 97 The constitution quotes many verses of the Quran 21 92 7 157 21 105 3 28 28 5 98 in support of its aims and goals In support of the continuation of the Revolution at home and abroad and working with other Islamic and popular movements to prepare the way for the formation of a single world community and to assure the continuation of the struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed peoples in the world 98 it quotes This your community is a single community and I am your Lord so worship Me 21 92 98 In support of the righteous assuming the responsibility of governing and administering the country it quotes Quranic verse Q 21 105 Verily My righteous servants shall inherit the earth 98 and on the basis of two principles of the trusteeship and the permanent Imamate rule is counted as a function of jurists Ruling jurists must hold the religious office of source of imitation be a marja al taqlid and be permitted to deliver independent judgments on general principles fatwas Furthermore they must be upright pious committed experts on Islam informed of the demands of the times known as God fearing brave and qualified for leadership Chapter one of the constitution where fundamental principles are expressed article 2 6a states that continuous ijtihad of the fuqaha jurists possessing necessary qualifications exercised on the basis of the Qur an and the Sunnah is a principle in Islamic government 99 Arguments and opinions EditThere is a wide spectrum of ideas about Wilayat al Faqih among Ja fari the Twelver Shia school of law scholars starting from restricting the scope of the doctrine to non litigious matters al omour al hesbiah 2 people or things in Islamic society that lack a guardian over their interests الامور الحسبیه including unattended children religious endowments waqf 9 and property for which no specific person is responsible as well as judicial matters 100 such as mediating disputes and at the other extreme the absolute authority of the jurist velayat e motlaqaye faqih over all public matters where the mandate of the ruling jurisprudent are among the primary ordinances of Islam 101 Here the ruling faqih has control over all public matters including governance of states has such power over religious affairs that he can temporary suspend religious obligations such as the salat prayer or hajj 6 3 and is owed such deference that the obligation of Muslims to obey him is as important as the obligation to perform those religious obligations he has the power to suspend 7 As of 2011 at least according to authors Alireza Nader David E Thaler and S R Bohandy those in Iran who believe in velayat e faqih tend to fall into one of three categories those such as conservatives like Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi and vigilantes who attack reformers who believe in absolute velayat e faqih and think those who do not are betraying Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution 102 those such as the late Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri who believe that the leader exercising velayat e faghih should be a religious ideological guardian not chief executive subject to democratic constraints such as direct elections term limits etc 103 and those who believe faqih should not be involved in politics the quietist or traditional concept and question the need for a Supreme Leader a view that is outside the red lines of the Islamic Republic notwithstanding its acceptance elsewhere in the Shi i world 104 The doctrinal basis of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist comes at least in part from hadith where the Islamic prophet Muhammad is reported to have said العلماء ورثة الأنبياء The ulama are the inheritors of the prophets note 10 105 The issue was mentioned by the earliest Shi i mujtahids such as al Shaykh Al Mufid 948 1022 and enforced for a while by Muhaqqiq Karaki during the era of Tahmasp I 1524 1576 citation needed However according to John Esposito in The Oxford Dictionary of Islam the first Islamic scholar to advance the theory of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and who developed a notion of rule of the jurist came much later Morteza Ansari 1781 1864 106 Mohamad Bazzi dates the concept of wilayat al faqih as a model of political rule from the early nineteenth century 107 Two kinds of Wilayah velayat guardianship can be understood The first kind mentioned in various chapters of Shia fiqh discusses Wilayah over the dead and Wilayah over those not deceased but having some disability in protecting their interests such as the insane سفيه absentee غائب poor فقير etc For example و ل ا ت ق ت ل وا ٱلن ف س ٱل ت ى ح ر م ٱلل ه إ ل ا ب ٱل ح ق و م ن ق ت ل م ظ ل وم ا ف ق د ج ع ل ن ا ل و ل ي ه ۦ س ل ط ـ ن ا ف ل ا ي س ر ف ف ى ٱل ق ت ل إ ن ه ۥ ك ان م نص ور ا Do not take a human life made sacred by Allah except with legal right If anyone is killed unjustly We have given their heirs the authority but do not let them exceed limits in retaliation for they are already supported by law Q 17 33 108 109 refers to heirs of someone killed unjustly not killed in accordance with sharia This type of Wilayah does not applied to society at large because none of mentioned conditions hold for the majority of a society The second kind of Wilayah which appears in principles of faith and kalam discusses Wilayah over sane people According to Ahmed Vaezi Imami 12er Shi i theologians refer to the Qur an especially Chapter 5 Verse 55 and prophetic traditions to support the exclusive authority i e exclusive Wilayat of the Imams 10 إ ن م ا و ل ي ك م ٱلل ه و ر س ول ه ۥ و ٱل ذ ين ء ام ن وا ٱل ذ ين ي ق يم ون ٱلص ل و ة و ي ؤ ت ون ٱلز ك و ة و ه م ر ك ع ون Your ally is none but Allah and therefore His Messenger and those who have believed those who establish prayer and give zakah and they bow in worship Q 5 55 110 111 In Q 5 55 those who believe may sound like it refers to Muslim believers in general but actually refers to the Imams according to Shi a commentators according to Ahmed Vaezi 10 Sunni Muslims do not believe those who believe refers to the Imams Limited role for Guardianship Edit Traditionally Shi i jurists have tended to this interpretation and for most Muslims Wilayat al Faqih meant no more than legal guardianship of senior clerics over those deemed incapable of looking after their own interests minors widows and the insane 112 known as mawla alayh one who is need of a guardian 10 Political power was to be left to Shi i monarchs called Sultans They should defend the territory against the non Shi a For example according to Iranian historian Ervand Abrahamian in centuries of debate among Shi i scholars none have ever explicitly contended that monarchies per se were illegitimate or that the senior clergy had the authority to control the state 112 Most scholars viewed the ulama s main responsibilities i e their guardianship as being to study the law based on the Qur an Sunnah and the teachings of the Twelve Imams to use reason to update these laws issue pronouncements on new problems adjudicate in legal disputes and distribute the Khums contributions to worthy widows orphans seminary students and indigent male descendants of the Prophet 112 Ahmed Vaezi a supporter of the rule of the Islamic jurist lists the traditional roles and functions that qualified jurists undertake as deputies of the Imam and that in the history of Imami Shi ism marja aiyya authorative reference has largely been restricted to 10 providing fatwas legal and juridical decrees as a Marja a taqleed for those who lack sufficient knowledge of Islamic law and the legal system Shari ah which Vaezi insists is not part of guardianship Wilayat al Faqih 10 mediating disputes and judging in legal cases which Vaezi insists Imamis believe is a function of Wilayat al qada or al hukuma 10 Hisbiya Affairs Al Umur al Hisbiya i e providing a guardian for those who need one for example when the father of a minor or an insane person dies Also religious endowments inheritance and funerals Imami jurists disagree according to Vaezi over whether this role is appointed by the Shari ah or just a good idea because jurists are naturally the best suited for the role 10 This view dominated Shi a discourse on issues of religion and governance for centuries before the Islamic Revolution and still dominates it both in Najaf and Karbala Shi a centers of thought away from the power of the Islamic Republic of Iran and even within the IRI is still influential in the Iranian holy city of Qom 104 Supporters of keeping Wilayat out of politics and governance argue univeral wilayat puts sane adults in the same category as those who are impotent in their affairs and need a guardian to protect their interests 10 This is not to say that sane adult Shi i do not seek and follow religious guidance from faqih A long standing doctrine in Shi i is that Shi i Muslims should have a faqih source to follow or religious reference known as a Marjaʿ al taqlid 113 Marjaʿ receive tithes from their followers and issue fatwa to them but unlike Wali al Faqih it is the individual Muslim who chooses the marjaʿ and the marja do not have the power of the state or militias to enforce their commands A minority view was that senior faqih had the right to enter political disputes but only temporarily and when the monarch endangered the whole community 114 An example being the December 1891 fatwa by Mirza Shirazi declaring tobacco forbidden a successful effort to undermine the 1890 tobacco concession granted to the United Kingdom by Nasir al Din Shah of Persia giving British control over growth sale and export of tobacco Guardian as ruler Edit Khomeini Edit In an early work Kashf al Asrar Secrets Revealed published in the 1940s Khomeini had made ambiguous statements arguing that the state must be administered with the divine law which defines the interests of the country and the people and this cannot be achieved without clerical supervision nezarat e rouhani 115 but had not called for Jurists to rule or for them to replace monarchs we do not say that government must be in the hands of the faqih 116 53 and had also asserted that the practical power of the mujtaheds i e faqih who have sufficient learning to conduct independent reasoning known as Ijtihad excludes the government and includes only simple matters such as legal rulings religious judgments and intervention to protect the property of minors and the weak Even when rulers are oppressive and against the people they the mujtaheds will not try to destroy the rulers 52 While there are no sacred texts of Shia or Sunni Islam that include a straightforward statement that the Muslim community should or must be ruled over by Islamic jurists Khomeini maintained there were numerous traditions hadith that indicate the scholars of Islam are to exercise rule during the Occultation 117 The first one he offered as proof was a saying addressed to a corrupt but well connected judge in early Islam attributed to the first Imam Ali The seat you are occupying is filled by someone who is a prophet the legatee of a prophet or else a sinful wretch 117 is given as evidence on the grounds that when the hadith says a judge is addressed that must mean he is a trained Islamic jurist since they are by definition learned in matters pertaining to the function of judge 118 and since trained jurists are neither sinful wretches nor prophets by process of elimination we deduce from the tradition not that Ali is shaming the judge for exceeding his authority but that the fuqaha jurists are the legatees 118 Since the prophet was given the power to rule over the Muslim community and all it conquered his legacy includes that same power Other hadith Quranic verses and include Obey those among you who have authority Q 4 59 where the authorities in the verse are religious judges according to Khomeini 119 when Ali said his successors were those who transmit my statements and my traditions and teach them to the people and also ordered all believers to obey his successors this meant his successors were jurists and Muslim should obey not just their religious teachings but their orders as rulers the Seventh Imam had praised religious judges as the fortress of Islam 119 The twelfth Imam had preached that future generations should obey those who knew his teachings since those people were his representatives among the people in the same way as he was God s representative among believers 119 Khomeini preached that God had created sharia to guide the Islamic community ummah the state to implement sharia and faqih to understand and implement sharia 119 Shortly before he died Khomeini gave perhaps his strongest statement about the power of the Wilayat al Faqih in a letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei later the second Supreme Leader of Iran The government or the absolute guardianship al wilayat al mutlaqa that is delegated to the noblest messenger of Allah is the most important divine law and has priority over all other ordinances of the divine law If the powers of the government were restricted to the framework of ordinances of the law then the delegation of the authority to the Prophet would be a senseless phenomenon I have to say that government is a branch of the Prophet s absolute Wilayat and one of the primary first order rules of Islam that has priority over all ordinances of the law even praying fasting and Hajj The Islamic State could prevent implementation of everything devotional and non devotional that so long as it seems against Islam s interests 120 Baqir Sharif al Qurashi Edit Shi i cleric Baqir Sharif al Qurashi argues in Al Islam that a hadith states Shia Imam Ja far al Sadiq founder of the Jaʿfari school of Islamic jurisprudence once told two Shi a individuals who sought arbitration to a dispute and were thinking of taking it to the government magistrate that Almighty Allah has commanded shunning the tyrants so that any Shia who presents his case to a tyrant for arbitration the verdict that Shi i receives is invalid even though it may be his lawful right Instead they should take their disagreement to one who relates our traditions and narrations to you and who considers our permitted and prohibited and who possesses knowledge and information about our commands 121 Al Quarshi interpreted this to mean that al Sadiq meant those who relates our traditions and narrations to you were Shi i jurists and those jurists now had a general Wilayat general guardianship and the authority as the ruler and point of reference for all Muslims in their social aspects The singular religious jurisprudent should not only collect and distribute funds to the poor and needy lead and fund the colleges of religious sciences but also takes care of and be concerned for everything regarding the world of Islam rising to defend Muslim lands from the attacks of infidels throughout the Muslim world 121 Supporters of absolute guardianship cite verse 62 of sura 24 122 and believe that collective affairs امر جامع are under the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist at most Those scholars who believe in the necessity of establishing an Islamic state say that within the boundary of public affairs the guardianship must be absolute otherwise the state can not govern the country citation needed Ahmed Vaezi Edit Ahmed Vaezi b 1963 an Iranian Shi i cleric and academic defends the principle of the universal and absolute guardianship of the Wali al Faqih guardian jurist in a number of ways Shi a should not say they have no need for a Wali because they already follow a Marja The two have different roles with marja aiyya having nothing to do with wilayat guardianship Marja issue fatwa answers to religious questions on practical matters in Islam by making deductions from their religious knowledge while Wali issue hukm decrees intended to effectively organize and resolve difficulties within Muslim society 10 While a fatwa may sometimes conflict with a hukm the Muslim must obey the Wali over the marja because the order hukm is binding upon all Muslims including other faqih and including Muslims outside of the political jurisdiction of the Wali i e outside Iran This is because the Wali is a the just and capable jurist appointed as hakim a wilayat al qada administering justice and so must be obeyed as explained in the hadith where Imam Ja far al Sadiq proclaims I have appointed him a hakim over you If such a person orders judges according to our ruling and the person concerned does not accept it then he has shown contempt for the ruling of God and rejects us and he who rejects us actually rejects Allah and such a person is close to association Shirk with Allah 123 Vaezi reassures those who are worried by the unlimited and absolute scope of authority in absolute guardianship that it is totally different from totalitarian and dictatorial government Absolute guardianship will not be like an absolutism in the Western sense because the Wali will have the qualities of justice piety and the necessary socio political perspicacity and will be dismissed if he fails to meet one of them note 11 Concerning the controversy over whether or not the faqih possessing absolute guardianship may issue orders that disregard the commands of the Shari ah Vaezi notes that laws of the second order al ahkam al sanavy are only temporary commands reversing sacred law because of some significant damage distress and constriction or disorder first order laws al ahkam al awaly remain intact However he then goes on to explain that under the revolutionary view of Ayatollah Khomeini Shari ah is not the ultimate goal Islamic laws are only a means to an end The end is the protection of Islam and the extension of Justice For Khomeini the Islamic State is not merely one part of Islam amongst others but it is Islam itself 30 Amongst his Vaezi s other defenses of absolute guardianship is that it is much superior to the institution of the Caliph the Sunni Islamic concept of ruler Comparing the Sunni theory of the caliphate based on historical Caliphates with the Shi i theory of the Wali based on theory Vaezi notes one important distinction between them is according to Vaezi comes as a logical consequence of Sunni belief in predestination namely for Sunnis it doesn t matter who governs or how he obtains authority for in any case and circumstance it would be subject to the will of God Consequently there are several means by which a caliph may be elected so that there is no unique way to legitimize political power and also no procedure for the people to depose an unjust ruler In contrast the Shi i Wali al Faqih must be brought to power by divine installation Vaezi doesn t specify how this would take place because they are representatives of the hidden Imam and must be just fair and have expertise is fiqh 10 The ruling Wali is a natural progression from God who several verses in the Quran Q 3 68 Q 2 257 Q 4 45 describe as a wali over the believers to the Prophet Muhammad who is also described as such Q 5 55 Q 33 6 to the Imams who are described as Wali in numerous Shi i hadith So it is natural that the next religious figure down also have the univeral powers that Muhammad and the Imams had 125 This argument is also applied again the complaint that giving a Faqih general powers over the public puts sane adults in the same category as minors and the mentally ill God Muhammad and the Imams powers were total despite the fact their subjects were sane adults 10 125 Ahmed Vaezi argues that various distinguished faqih scholars have insisted that faqih or at least mujtahid have the authority to judge to collect taxes Shaikh Zain ul Din b 911 AH lead prayers Shaykh al Mufid and others lead Jumah prayer al Karaki judge collect Islamic taxes Muhammad ibn Makki d 786 AH not only judge and sentence wrong doers but administer the punishment Muhaqqiq al Karaki be given authority for all the affairs attendant upon the deputyship of the infallible ones al Muhaqqiq al Karaki that their social status is the same as the Imam Shaykh Muhammad Hassan that there is consensus Ijmaa that the fuqaha jurists of integrity Jame al Sharayeti who have all the perfect necessary qualities to undertake the vicegerency are the deputy of the Imam of the time Hajj Aqa Reza Hamedani So these jurists are talking about how faqih should or are being deputy of the Imam or attending to the affairs of the Shia or carrying out Islamic sentences and implementing religious injunctions these are duties that require him to be entrusted with universal authority And if they have universal authority they have authority to rule govern All of which demonstrates that the concept of universal wilayat of the jurist was not new with Ayatollah Khomeini 38 Criticism of guardian as ruler Edit While the use of scholars of fiqh as legal guardians for those not capable of looking after their own interest is universally accepted in 12er Islam there have been a number of criticisms made against Islamic clerics serving as guardians over sane adults specifically governing them and especially about its application in the Islamic Republic of Iran All Shi a agree that a good Muslim must have an Islamic jurist known as a Marja a e taqleed as a source of guidance and imitation in the absence of the infallible Imam 10 But traditionally it was the individual Shi i Muslim who decided what Marja they were going to follow as of 2022 there were several dozen to choose from mostly located in Iraq and Iran and they were not punished by the state if they failed to obey them 30 Following the establishment of the velayat e faqih system in Iran doctrinal differences between individual marjas and the Supreme Leader faqih caused conflicts Differences of opinion between the Supreme leader and other Marjas over issues such as the permissibility in Islam of chess playing listening to music or whether to continue fighting a war with Iraq have presented challenges for the velayat e faqih system in Iran Shortly before and after Khomeini died significant changes were made to the constitution and the concept of Wilayat al Faqih including at least one that unwittingly undermined the intellectual foundations of rule by Islamic jurist according to one critic Ervand Abrahamian 68 Disputes within the Islamic Government compelled Khomeini himself to proclaim in January 1988 that I should state that the government which is part of the absolute deputyship of the Prophet is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all secondary injunctions even prayers fasting and hajj 126 127 which elevated the state s preservation to a primary central injunction al ahkam al awwaliyya and downgraded rituals e g the obligatory prayers and fasting to secondary injunctions al ahkam al thanawiyya 127 a major theological innovation and seemingly in contradiction for the rationale Khomeini gave for the need for an Islamic government of Wilayat al Faqih in Islam the legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty The Sacred Legislator of Islam is the sole legislative power No one has the right to legislate and no law may be executed except the law of the Divine Legislator The law of Islam divine command has absolute authority over all individuals and the Islamic government Everyone including the Most Noble Messenger s and his successors is subject to law and will remain so for all eternity the law that has been revealed by God Almighty and Exalted 128 Although the constitution states that the leadership clauses especially those stipulating that ultimate authority resides in the senior religious jurists were to endure until the Mahdi reappeared on earth to rule ten years after the constitution was approved the Assembly of Experts drastically revamped these clauses 129 Although the constitution states that the leadership clauses especially those stipulating that ultimate authority resides in the senior religious jurists were to endure until the Mahdi reappeared on earth to rule ten years after the constitution was approved the Assembly of Experts drastically revamped these clauses 129 In 1989 Khomeini s officially designated successor Hussein Ali Montazeri was ousted 86 after calling for an open assessment of failures of the Revolution and an end to the export of revolution 87 Khomeini responded by calling for a meeting of the Assembly of Experts to discuss him 87 Unfortunately Montazeri was the only marjaʿ e taqlid beside Khomeini who had been part of Khomeini s movement and the only senior cleric who trusted the revolutionary movement s version of Islam 68 After Khomeini died the Assembly of Experts quickly amended the constitution modifying Article 109 to remove scholarly seniority from the qualifications of the leader so a faqih whose scholarly ranking was lower but political standing much higher former president Ali Khamenei be appointed Leader 68 It has been argued credibly that the resulting disjunction of political leadership from seniority in the learned hierarchy of Iranian Shiʿism effectively brings the implementation of velayat e faqih to an end Khomeini preached that because Muslims accepted and recognized sharia law as worthy of obedience a government ruling according to sharia would truly belong to the people 84 unlike those secular states with sham parliaments 130 But despite his confidence in the support of the people for rule by Sharia via jurists in public proclamations during the revolution and before the overthrow of the monarchy Khomeini made no mention of velayat e faqih 3 When a campaign started to install velayat e faqih in the new Iranian constitution critics complained that he had become the leader of the revolution promising to advise rather than rule the country after the Shah was overthrown when in fact he had developed his theory of rule by jurists not by democratic elections and spread it among his followers years before the revolution started 131 It is a complaint that some continue to make 132 The execution of the theory of rule by Islamic jurists has been criticized on utilitarian grounds as opposed to religious grounds by those who argue that it has simply not done what Khomeini said his theory would do 133 The goals of ending poverty note 12 corruption note 13 national debt note 14 or compelling un Islamic government to capitulate before the Islamic government s armies note 15 have not been met nor have even more modest and basic goals like downsizing the government bureaucracy note 16 140 139 using only senior religious jurists or marja s for the post of faqih guardian Supreme Leader 141 note 17 Opposition among scholars Edit According to Ali Mamouri writing in 2013 the Islamic Republic of Iran has never been able to establish a stable and harmonious relationship between the Shiite seminaries of Qom and Najaf Most of the spiritual references aka marjaʿ in Qom at least in 2013 do not supporting the regime s position on velayat e faqih even though it has led to a number of them being placed under house arrest and barred from expressing their views and ideas or continuing their teaching and religious duties 12 Najaf religious leaders present an even greater problem as Najaf is outside the border of Iran and so its marjaʿ cannot be incarcerated by Iran As of 2020 the four leading Marja of Najaf Ali al Sistani Bashir al Najafi Muhammad al Fayadh Muhammad Saeed al Hakim actively oppose Ruhollah Khomeini s concept of guardianship 142 143 and a large segment of the clerical Shia community in general does not accept the theory of velayat e faqih and believes the clergy should stay away from politics 144 The majority of Shi a accepted the late Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Borujerdi 1875 1961 as their Marja al Taqlid source of emulation including his student Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini Throughout his life Borujerdi who was a quietist and therefore refrained from taking political stances forbid his student Khomeini from engaging in non religious matters It was only after Borujerdi s death that Khomeini published his first political and social treatise in which he explicitly called for active participation in political matters Regarding Guardianship several senior faqih have written on the exclusivity of the authority of the Imams the limits of the authority of faqih and the dangers to faqih and to Islam of the corruption of power Al Shaykh Al Mufid Edit Unlike Sunnis who believe in appointment of the Islamic Caliph through Ijm a or Shura Imamiyya Shia say that the Imam and the legitimate Caliph of the Islamic nation must only be appointed by God that appointment may be known through the declaration of the Prophet or the preceding Imam 145 Divine authority to rule an Islamic State traditional Shia believe is vested exclusively with the Infallible Imams of Ahlulbayt making no exceptions for rule by jurists in their absence In the words of Al Shaykh Al Mufid سلطان الإسلام المنصوب من قبل الله تعالى وهم أئمة الهدى من آل محمد عليهم السلام The Islamic Ruler is he who is appointed divinely by the Almighty Allah and they are the Imams of Guidance from the Progeny of Muhammad peace be upon them all 146 Al Sistani EditAccording to one of the most senior scholars in Shia Islam 147 Sayyid Sistani Guardianship of the Islamic Juristmeans every jurisprudent Faqih has guardianship wilayah over non litigious affairs Non litigious affairs are technically called al omour al hesbiah As for general affairs with which social order is linked wilayah of a Faqih and enforcement of wilayah depend on certain conditions one of which is popularity of acceptability of Faqih among majority of faithful momeneen 148 Notwithstanding his indirect but decisive role in most major Iraqi political decisions Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has often been identified with the quietist school of thought which seeks to keep religion out of the political sphere until the return of the Imam of the Age the Mahdi 149 150 Al Khoei Edit Similarly Sistani s mentor the Late Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Abul Qasim al Musawi al Khoei 1899 1992 the leading Shia ayatollah at the time Khoemini s book on his theory of Wilayat al Faqih was published rejected Khomeini s argument on the grounds that The authority of faqih is limited to the guardianship of widows and orphans could not be extended by human beings to the political sphere 151 In the absence of the Hidden Imam the 12th and last Shi a Imam the authority of jurisprudence was not the preserve of one or a few fuqaha 151 is deemed to be one of the most vocal modern day jurists against the innate nature of Wilayat al Faqih In contrasting one sentence mottos Khomeini preached that only a good society can create good believers while Khoei who championed the theory of a civil state argued only good men can create a good society 152 Al Khoei restricted the scope of Wilayat al Faqih to the jurist s authority in terms of wakalah i e protection delegation or authorization often agreed to in a legal contract alone while dismissing the notion of the jurist inheriting the intrinsic authority to rule of the Infallibles Imams Al Khoei wrote إن الولاية لم تثبت للفقيه في عصر الغيبة بدليل وإنما هي مختصة بالنبي والأئمة المعصومين عليهم السلام بل الثابت حسبما يستفاد من الروايات أمران نفوذ قضائه وحج ية فتواه وليس له التصرف في أموال القص ر أو غير ذلك مما هو من شؤون الولاية إلا في الأمر الحسبي فإن الفقيه له الولاية في ذلك لا بالمعنى المدعى Wilayah for the faqih in the age of ghaybah occultation i e from 939 CE until the coming of the Mahdi is not approved by any evidence whatsoever and it s only the prerogative of the Messenger and the Imams peace be upon them all rather the established fact according to the narrations lies in two affairs Him exercising the role of a judge and his fatwa being a proof and he holds no authority over the property of a child or others which is from the affairs of wilayahexcept in the hisbi sense wakalah ie the faqih holds wilayah in this sense not in the sense of being the claimant al mudda ee 153 Furthermore al Khoei elaborates on the role of a well qualified Islamic Jurist in the age of occultation of the Infallible Imam which has been traditionally endorsed by the Shia scholarship as follows أما الولاية على الأمور الحسبية كحفظ أموال الغائب واليتيم إذا لم يكن من يتصدى لحفظها كالولي أو نحوه فهي ثابتة للفقيه الجامع للشرائط وكذا الموقوفات التي ليس لها متولي من قبل الواقف والمرافعات فإن فصل الخصومة فيها بيد الفقيه وأمثال ذلك وأما الزائد على ذلك فالمشهور بين الفقهاء على عدم الثبوت والله العال As for wilayah guardianship of omour al hesbiah non litigious affairs such as the maintenance of properties of the missing and the orphans if they are not addressed to preservation by a wali guardian or so it is proven for the faqih jame a li sharaet and likewise waqf properties that do not have a mutawalli trustee on behalf of waqif donor of waqf and continuance pleadings the judgement regarding litigation is in his hand and similar authorities but with regards to the excess of that guardianship the most popular opinion among the jurists is on absence of its evidence Allah knows best 154 Nawishta e Akhoond Edit Muhammad Kazim Khurasani 1839 1911 commonly known as Akhund Khurasani was a Shi i Marjaʿ based in Najaf who was the main clerical supporter and legitimizing force for the Persian Constitutional Revolution Iran s democratic revolution of 1905 1911 155 Traditional Shia scholarship has been historically critical with regard to the clergy relinquishing the role of advisory for the State and taking over absolute charge of the State affairs firsthand instead Khurasani made a set of prudent observations in his famous Nawishta about the inevitable hazards that will arise owing to the hypothesis proposing clergymen employ religion to legitimize their rule Some of these predictions are as follows چون مردم ما را نایبان امام زمان می دانند انتظار دارند حکومت دینی هم همان شرایط را ایجاد کند و وقتی نتوانیم در آن سطح عدالت را برقرار کنیم نسبت به امام زمان و دین سست عقیده می شونSince the people consider the clergymen to be deputies of Imam al Zaman they will expect the religious government to create an exemplary system closely matching the one supposed to be established by the Infallible Imam and when they can not establish justice at that level the Shia masses will become weak in their faith about Imam al Zaman and religion وقتی روحانیون پا به حکومت بگذارند دیگر نمی توانند عیوب خود را ببینند و توجیه می کنند و فسادها را نادیده میگیرندWhen the clergymen will come to power they could no longer see their faults and justify and ignore corruption آمال وآرزوی ما تبعیت حکومت از دین است در حالیکه اگر حکومت را در دست گیریم به تبعیت دین از حکومت دچار خواهیم شدThe clergy s aspiration is government s obedience to religion while if the clergymen took over the charge of government they are more likely to make religion subservient to the government اکنون که مناصب حکومتی نداریم اینهمه اختلاف نظر وجود دارد اگر به حکومت برسیم این اختلاف نظر باعث چندپارگی دین و ایجاد فرقه های جدید و آسیب به دین می شودAt the time when clergymen do not have government positions yet there exists so much disagreement If they come to power this disagreement will cause further division in religion and creation of new sects and hence cause damage to religion ذات حکومت کردن دروغ گفتن است و نمی شود حکومت با اخلاق داشت لذا در شان روحانیت نیست که دروغ بگوید و دامن دین را بیالایدThe essence of fallible governance is to spew lies and it is technically impossible to govern morally Therefore it is against the moral character of clergymen to lie and thus defame religion 156 Muhammad Hussain Naini Edit Muhammad Hussain Naini an aide to Akhund Khurasani argued that while the ideal government is the rule of the divinely inspired and infallible leader of the community of believers i e the Imam this ideal form of government is unavailable during the occultation Consequently the choices available are between despotic and constitutional government Despotism being tyranny it is constitutional government that diverges least from the ideal government of the Imam and is therefore the best type of government during the occultation 157 List of scholars persecuted in Iran EditMohammad Kazem Shariatmadari Ahmad Khonsari Hassan Tabatabaei Qomi Mohammad Rouhani 158 Mohammad Sadeq Rouhani Mohammad al Shirazi Hussein Ali MontazeriMohammed Ridha al ShiraziMohammad Taher al Shubayr al Khaqani 159 Yasubedin Rastegar JooybariHossein Kazemeyni Boroujerdi Mahmoud Abu al Hasan al Taleqani 160 Yousef Saanei Sheikh Muhammad Tahir Aal Shabbir Khan 161 Sheikh Muhammad Ali al Abtahi 162 Sheikh Sadiq al Shirazi 163 Mohsen Kadivar Abdolkarim Soroush and so on 164 165 Books EditVilayat e Faqih Ruhollah Khomeini Vilayat e Faqih Ahmad Azari Qomi Vilayat e Faqih Hussein Ali Montazeri Vilayat e Faqih Hasan Ali Nejabat Shirazi Vilayat e Faqih Javadi Amoli Vilayat e Faqih Kazem al HaeriSee also Edit1988 executions of Iranian political prisoners Chain murders of Iran Cinema Rex fire Mahshahr massacre Saravan massacre 166 167 Mahsa Amini protests 1981 Bahraini coup d etat attempt Blasphemy laws of Islamic Republic of Iran Da i al Mutlaq Islamic leadership Islamic republic Jaʽfari jurisprudence Nematollah Salehi Najafabadi Execution of Imam Khomeini s Order Setad Notes Edit see for example Amir Arjomand 1980 15 Calder 1982 16 Enayat 1983 17 Rose 1983 18 Mottahedeh 1995 19 and Akhavi 1996 20 21 Non governmental Guardianship in Islam Some definitions of Guardian in Islam Sunni not Shia at least in Islamic Nigeria For Children The main role of a legal guardian under the Shari a is to act in the child s best interests when the child s parents cannot do so Legal guardians are usually relatives such as an aunt uncle or grandparent This may be due to death incapacitation or incarceration for a crime Incapacitated adults In some situations adults with severe handicaps may need a legal guardian to care for them and act on their behalf This is known as an adult guardianship 24 Another source Sohaira Siddiqui states that Hedaya a 12th century legal manual of Hanafi fiqh by Burhan al Din al Marghinan states that there are three forms of guardianship Guardianship for contracting marriage Guardianship of minor persons for custody and education and Guardianship of the property of minors 25 This editor could not find any explanation giving a difference between Wilayat al amma universal authority and Wilayat al Mutlaqa absolute rule authority Example The conflict between the Iranian regime which believes in velayat e faqih and Najaf which rejects that notion has made some researchers in Shiite affairs predict the end of the traditional Shiite reference with Sistani s death 12 Abrahamian offers three slightly different options shunning the authorities as usurpers accepting them grudgingly accepting them wholeheartedly especially if the state was Shi i 36 all of what is now Iran Republic of Azerbaijan Bahrain Armenia eastern Georgia parts of the North Caucasus including Russia Iraq Kuwait and Afghanistan as well as parts of Turkey Syria Pakistan Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 39 40 41 42 giving British control over growth sale and export of tobacco Khorasani was one of the most important of the clerical supporters of constitutionalism and his aide Na ini d 1936 wrote the most important of the treatises legitimating constitutional government 49 Abrahamian states Khomeini was described as the Supreme Religious Jurist in the constitution A translation of the constitution reproduced on constituteproject org website mentions Khomeini Khumayni several times as the leader of the revolution 69 the eminent marji al taqlid the blossoming of a glorious and massive uprising which confirmed the central role of Imam Khumayni as an Islamic leader the victorious Islamic Revolution led by the eminent marji altaqlid Ayatullah al Uzma Imam Khumayni 69 Imam Khumayni quddisa sirruh al sharif who was recognised and accepted as marji and Leader by a decisive majority of the people 70 It also states that After the demise of Khomeini the task of appointing the Leader shall be vested with the experts elected by the people 70 The constitution never uses the term Supreme Leader only Leader Found in at Tirmidhi Jami at Tirmidhi Chapter 41 on Knowledge Hadith 38 2682 sunnah com Retrieved 27 July 2022 and Sunan Ibn Majah Book of the Sunnah v 1 book 1 223 sunnah com Retrieved 27 July 2022 both hadith are rated da if or weak In the Islamic Republic of Iran at least there are no formal mechanisms constitutionally sanctioned or otherwise through which the Assembly can challenge the supreme leader 124 In the first six years after the overthrow of the Shah from 1979 through 1985 The Iranian government s own Planning and Budget Organization reported that absolute poverty rose by nearly 45 134 After the mayor of Iran s largest city Tehran was arrested for corruption in 1998 ex President Rafsanjani said in a sermon Graft has always existed there are always people who are corrupt 135 Khomeini himself did not run up debt but in the decade after his death under his faqih guardian successor Iran not only went back into debt but built it up to almost four times the putatively shameful debt the monarchy left behind in 1979 Spending that Iranian economists criticized as reckless 136 On the start of Iran s war with Saddam Hussein s secular state of Iraq Khomeini stated there were no conditions for a truce except that the regime in Baghdad must fall and must be replaced by an Islamic Republic 137 Six years hundreds of thousands of Iranian lives and 100 s of billions later faced with desertions and resistance against the conscription Khomeini signed a peace agreement stating we have no choice and we should give in to what God wants us to do I reiterate that the acceptance of this issue is more bitter than poison for me but I drink this chalice of poison for the Almighty and for His satisfaction 138 Khomeini had to preside over a state bureaucracy three times larger than that of Mohammad Reza Shah 139 On April 24 1989 Article 109 of the Iranian constitution requiring that the Leader be a marja e taqlid was removed New wording in constitutional articles 5 107 109 111 required him to be a pious and just faqih aware of the exigencies of the time courageous and with good managerial skills and foresight If there are a number of candidates the person with the best political and jurisprudential vision should have the priority References Edit a b Review by Hossein Modarressi by THE JUST RULER OR THE GUARDIAN JURIST AN ATTEMPT TO LINK TWO DIFFERENT SHICITE CONCEPTS by Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina Journal of the American Oriental Society 3 3 549 562 July September 1991 JSTOR 604271 Retrieved 31 July 2022 a b c Archived copy in Persian sistani org Archived from the original on 13 September 2006 Retrieved 23 August 2006 a b c d e f g h i Algar Hamid Hooglund Eric VELAYAT E FAQIH Theory of governance in Shiʿite Islam Encyclopedia com Retrieved 31 July 2022 Taking Stock of a Quarter Century of the Islamic Republic of Iran Archived 27 February 2008 at the Wayback Machine Wilfried Buchta Harvard Law School June 2005 p 5 6 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran section 8 Archived 23 November 2010 at the Wayback Machine Article 109 states an essential qualification of the Leader is scholarship as required for performing the functions of mufti in different fields of fiqh a b c Keyhan January 8 1988 a b c Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 p 56 Interview Hamid al Bayati May 2003 Archived 9 December 2006 at the Wayback Machine a b Archived copy in Persian Archived from the original on 22 July 2011 Retrieved 8 December 2006 a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u Vaezi Ahmed 2004 What is Wilayat al Faqih Shia Political Thought Al Islam org Retrieved 11 August 2022 Nader Alireza Thaler David E Bohandy S R 2011 3 Factor 2 The Prevailing View of Velayat e Faghih The Next Supreme Leader RAND Corporation pp 21 30 ISBN 9780833051332 JSTOR 10 7249 mg1052osd 10 Retrieved 9 August 2022 a b c Mamouri Ali 12 August 2013 Iran on Quest to Legitimize Velayat e Faqih in Iraqi Seminaries Al Monitor Retrieved 8 August 2022 Hans Wehr A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic p 1099 a b c d e Akhavi Shahrough 1996 Contending Discourses in Shi i Law on the Doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih Iranian Studies 29 3 4 Summer Autumn 1996 229 268 doi 10 1080 00210869608701850 JSTOR 4310997 Retrieved 31 July 2022 Amir Arjomand Said 1980 The State and Khomeini s Islamic Order Iranian Studies 13 1 4 147 164 Calder Norman 1982 Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi i Jurisprudence Khumayni and the Classical Tradition Middle Eastern Studies 18 1 3 20 Enayat Hamid 1983 Iran Khumayni s Concept of the Guardianship of the Jurisconsult in James P Piscatori ed Islam in the Political Process Cambridge 160 180 Rose Gregory 1983 Velayat e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini in Nikki R Keddie ed Religion and Politics in Iran Shi ism from Quietism to Revolution New Haven 166 188 Mottahedeh Roy P 1995 Wilayat al Faqih in John L Esposito ed The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World Vol 4 New York and Oxford 320 322 Akhavi Shahrough 1996 Contending Discourses in Shi i Law on the Doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih Iranian Studies 29 3 4 229 268 MATSUNAGA Yasuyuki 2009 Revisiting Ayatollah Khomeini s Doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih Velayat e Faqih Orient XLIV 82 Retrieved 5 August 2022 Lewis Bernard 1988 The Political Language of Islam p 123 Ahmad Moussavi The Theory of Wilayat i Faqih OMAR MOHMED LAWAL 11 15 March 2019 CUSTODY AND GUARDIANSHIP OF CHILDREN SHARI A PERSPECTIVE PDF national judicial institute of Nigeria THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTE ABUJA Retrieved 1 August 2022 Siddiqui Sohaira 14 August 2021 Overturning Islamic Law Right of Guardianship of a Minor Islamic Law Blog Retrieved 1 August 2022 a b c d MATSUNAGA Yasuyuki 2009 Revisiting Ayatollah Khomeini s Doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih Velayat e Faqih Orient XLIV 84 Retrieved 5 August 2022 Akhavi Shahrough 1996 Contending Discourses in Shi i Law on the Doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih Iranian Studies 29 3 4 Summer Autumn 1996 229 268 231 doi 10 1080 00210869608701850 JSTOR 4310997 Retrieved 31 July 2022 a b Matsunaga Yasuyuki 2009 Revisiting Ayatollah Khomeini s Doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih Velayat e Faqih Orient XLIV 87 Retrieved 5 August 2022 Nader Alireza Thaler David E Bohandy S R 2011 3 Factor 2 The Prevailing View of Velayat e Faghih The Next Supreme Leader RAND Corporation p 22 ISBN 9780833051332 JSTOR 10 7249 mg1052osd 10 Retrieved 9 August 2022 a b c d e f Vaezi Ahmed 2004 The Dominion Of The Wali Al Faqih al Islam org Retrieved 11 August 2022 Vaezi Ahmed What is Wilayat al Faqih Shia Political Thought Al Islam org Retrieved 11 August 2022 Some people make the mistake of assuming that Wilayat al faqih refers only to the universal authority when in fact it refers to the total scope of the scholar s vicegerency in the absence of an infallible Imam Cannon Garland Hampton Kaye Alan S 1994 The Arabic Contributions to the English Language An Historical Dictionary Otto Harrassowitz Verlag p 263 ISBN 9783447034913 Retrieved 26 July 2022 Gilbert Lela 26 April 2019 Can The US Choke Iran s Radical Islamist Regime Hudson Institute Retrieved 26 July 2022 a b Sobhani Ja far 2001 Doctrines of Shi i Islam PDF Translated by Shah Kazemi Reza I B Tauris pp 118 119 ISBN 01860647804 a href Template Cite book html title Template Cite book cite book a CS1 maint ignored ISBN errors link Momen Introduction to Shi i Islam 1985 p 193 Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 p 18 19 Mesbah Yazdi Mohammad Taqi 2010 1 Wilayat al Faqih Exigency and Presuppositions A Cursory Glance at the Theory of Wilayat al Faqih Ahlul Bayt World Assembly Al Islam org Retrieved 25 August 2022 a href Template Cite book html title Template Cite book cite book a editor1 first missing editor1 last help a b Vaezi Ahmed 2004 What Is Wilayat al Faqih Historical background Shia Political Thought al islam org Retrieved 25 August 2022 Helen Chapin Metz ed Iran a Country study 1989 University of Michigan p 313 Emory C Bogle Islam Origin and Belief University of Texas Press 1989 p 145 Stanford Jay Shaw History of the Ottoman Empire Cambridge University Press 1977 p 77 Andrew J Newman Safavid Iran Rebirth of a Persian Empire IB Tauris March 30 2006 Arshin Adib Moghaddam 2017 Psycho nationalism Cambridge University Press p 40 ISBN 9781108423076 Shah Ismail pursued a relentless campaign of forced conversion of the majority Sunni population in Iran to Twelver Shia Islam Conversion and Islam in the Early Modern Mediterranean The Lure of the Other Routledge 2017 p 92 ISBN 9781317159780 Islam Art and Architecture Konemann 2004 p 501 ISBN 9783833111785 Shah persecuted the philosophers mystics and Sufis who had been promoted by his grandfather and unleashed fanatical campaigns of forcible conversion on Sunnis Jews Christians and other religious minorities Melissa L Rossi 2008 What Every American Should Know about the Middle East Penguin ISBN 9780452289598 Forced conversion in the Safavid Empire made Persia for the first time dominantly Shia and left a lasting mark Persia now Iran has been dominantly Shia ever since and for centuries the only country to have a ruling Shia majority Matsunaga Yasuyuki 2009 Revisiting Ayatollah Khomeini s Doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih Velayat e Faqih Orient XLIV 86 Retrieved 5 August 2022 Kurtis Glenn Eric Hooglund Iran a country study Washington D C Library of Congress pp 160 163 ISBN 978 0 8444 1187 3 Retrieved 21 November 2010 This article incorporates text from this source which is in the public domain Arjomand Said Amir 1980 The State and Khomeini s Islamic Order Iranian Studies 13 1 4 149 doi 10 1080 00210868008701568 JSTOR 4310339 Retrieved 6 August 2022 bin Sulieman Addadh Khalid 26 August 2019 A Theoretical Approach Wilayat al Faqih and IS European Eye on Radicalization Retrieved 11 August 2022 Moin Khomeini 1999 p 157 a b Kashf i Asrar Secrets Revealed Tehran n d p 186 quoted in Abrahamian Ervand Iran Between Two Revolutions p 476 a b Khomeini A Warning to the Nation 1981 p 170 Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 48 Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 59 Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 91 Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 75 Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 52 3 Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 49 Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 58 Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 139 40 a b Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 34 Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 p 25 Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 29 30 Iranian Government Constitution English Text Archived 2013 08 19 at the Wayback Machine iranonline com Iran Islamic Republic of s Constitution of 1979 with Amendments through 1989 Preamble Islamic Government PDF Constitute Project p 6 Retrieved 3 August 2022 Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 p 33 36 a b c d e f g Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 p 34 a b Iran Islamic Republic of s Constitution of 1979 with Amendments through 1989 PDF Constitute Project p 5 Retrieved 3 August 2022 a b Iran Islamic Republic of s Constitution of 1979 with Amendments through 1989 CHAPTER VIII The Leader or Leadership Council Article 107 PDF Constitute Project p 27 Retrieved 3 August 2022 Mariam Farida Religion and Hezbollah Political Ideology and Legitimacy Routledge 2019 ISBN 978 1 000 45857 2 pp 1 3 Wright Robin 13 July 2006 Options for U S Limited As Mideast Crises Spread The Washington Post p A19 Jamail Dahr 20 July 2006 Hezbollah s transformation Asia Times Archived from the original on 20 July 2006 Retrieved 23 October 2007 a href Template Cite web html title Template Cite web cite web a CS1 maint unfit URL link Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 11 April 1996 Hizbullah Retrieved 17 August 2006 Adam Shatz New York Review of Books 29 April 2004 In Search of Hezbollah Archived 22 August 2006 at the Wayback Machine Retrieved 15 August 2006 Barnard Anne 20 May 2013 Hezbollah s Role in Syria War Shakes the Lebanese New York Times Retrieved 20 June 2013 Hezbollah stronger than the Lebanese Army has the power to drag the country into war without a government decision as in 2006 when it set off the war by capturing two Israeli soldiers Iran Syria vs Israel Round 1 Assessments amp Lessons Learned Defense Industry Daily 13 September 2013 Retrieved 19 February 2013 Who Are Hezbollah BBC News 4 July 2010 Retrieved 15 August 2008 source Anonymous Prison and Imprisonment Mojahed 174 256 20 October 1983 8 August 1985 Abrahamian Tortured Confessions 1999 p 135 6 167 169 Mandates of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights 3 September 2020 Retrieved 22 January 2021 Iran Reporters Without Borders Retrieved 2 February 2021 MATSUNAGA Yasuyuki 2009 Revisiting Ayatollah Khomeini s Doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih Velayat e Faqih Orient XLIV 81 87 Retrieved 5 August 2022 a b Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 56 a b Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 p 35 a b Sciolino Elaine 29 March 1989 Montazeri Khomeini s Designated Successor in Iran Quits Under Pressure New York Times Retrieved 6 August 2022 a b c Keddie Nikki R Yann Richard 2003 Modern Iran Roots and Results of Revolution New Haven Connecticut Yale University Press p 260 ISBN 978 0 300 09856 3 Molavi Afshin The Soul of Iran Norton 2005 p 10 Who Rules Iran Christopher de Bellaigue New York Review of Books June 27 2002 Nabeel Gilgamesh 5 November 2019 Is Iran s honeymoon in Iraq over Al Monitor Retrieved 11 August 2022 ETEHAD MELISSA 14 January 2020 Death to the dictator What is Iran s future Los Angeles Times Retrieved 16 August 2022 Metro Protesters Chant Death to the Islamic Republic in Covid hit Tehran Iranwire 20 July 2021 Retrieved 16 August 2022 Special Report Iran s leader ordered crackdown on unrest Do whatever it takes to end it 23 December 2019 Archived from the original on 23 December 2019 Retrieved 23 December 2019 Williams Abigail U S says Iran may have killed up to 1 000 protesters NBC News Archived from the original on 8 December 2019 Retrieved 6 December 2019 McKenzie Sheena 3 December 2019 One of the worst crackdowns in decades is happening in Iran Here s what we know CNN Archived from the original on 3 December 2019 Retrieved 3 December 2019 Iran Islamic Republic of s Constitution of 1979 with Amendments through 1989 CHAPTER I General Principles Article 5 PDF Constitute Project p 10 Retrieved 3 August 2022 Asghar schirazi et al pp 12 13harvnb error no target CITEREFAsghar schirazithe constitution of Iran1997I B TAURIS help a b c d Iran Islamic Republic of s Constitution of 1979 with Amendments through 1989 Preamble The Form of Government in Islam PDF Constitute Project p 7 Retrieved 3 August 2022 Iran Islamic Republic of s Constitution of 1979 with Amendments through 1989 Chapter one Article 2 6a PDF Constitute Project p 10 Retrieved 3 August 2022 Interview Hamid al Bayati Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 5 5 May 2003 Archived from the original on 9 December 2006 MATSUNAGA Yasuyuki 2009 Revisiting Ayatollah Khomeini s Doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih Velayat e Faqih Orient XLIV 81 Retrieved 5 August 2022 Nader Alireza Thaler David E Bohandy S R 2011 3 Factor 2 The Prevailing View of Velayat e Faghih The Next Supreme Leader RAND Corporation p 23 4 ISBN 9780833051332 JSTOR 10 7249 mg1052osd 10 Retrieved 9 August 2022 Nader Alireza Thaler David E Bohandy S R 2011 3 Factor 2 The Prevailing View of Velayat e Faghih The Next Supreme Leader RAND Corporation p 25 26 ISBN 9780833051332 JSTOR 10 7249 mg1052osd 10 Retrieved 9 August 2022 a b Nader Alireza Thaler David E Bohandy S R 2011 3 Factor 2 The Prevailing View of Velayat e Faghih The Next Supreme Leader RAND Corporation p 27 ISBN 9780833051332 JSTOR 10 7249 mg1052osd 10 Retrieved 9 August 2022 Chapter 14 Usurped Esposito John Ansari Murtada Archived 7 April 2014 at the Wayback Machine The Oxford Dictionary of Islam 2003 Found in Oxford Islamic Studies Online Bazzi Mohamad 12 August 2014 The Sistani Factor How a struggle within Shiism will shape the future of Iraq Boston Review Retrieved 13 October 2022 Surat Al Isra 17 33 The Noble Qur an القرآن الكريم Archived from the original on 2 April 2015 Retrieved 31 March 2015 Quran Surah Al Israa Verse 33 Archived from the original on 27 January 2018 Retrieved 26 January 2018 Surat Al Ma idah 5 55 The Noble Qur an القرآن الكريم Archived from the original on 28 March 2015 Retrieved 31 March 2015 Quran Surah Al Maaida Verse 55 Archived from the original on 27 January 2018 Retrieved 26 January 2018 a b c Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 p 19 The Sunni Shia Divide Council on Foreign Relations Retrieved 18 August 2022 Shias believe that God always provides a guide first the Imams and then ayatollahs or experienced Shia scholars who have wide interpretative authority and are sought as a source of emulation The term ayatollah is associated with the clerical rulers in Tehran but it s primarily a title for a distinguished religious leader known as a marja or source of emulation Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 p 20 Khomeini Imam Seyyed Ruhollah Musavi n d 1944 Kashf al Asrar n p Tehran p 222 Quoted in MATSUNAGA Yasuyuki 2009 Revisiting Ayatollah Khomeini s Doctrine of Wilayat al Faqih Velayat e Faqih Orient XLIV 85 Retrieved 5 August 2022 Khomeini Imam Seyyed Ruhollah Musavi 1941 A Warning to the Nation in Khomeini Imam Seyyed Ruhollah Musavi Kashf al Asrar n p Tehran 1941 pp 221 224 Quoted in a b Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 81 a b Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 84 a b c d Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 p 24 25 Sahife Noor letters and lectures of Ayatollah Khomeini Volume 20 p 170 quoted in Vaezi Ahmed 2004 The Dominion Of The Wali Al Faqih Shia Political Thought al islam org Retrieved 11 August 2022 a b al Qurashi Baqir Sharif Guardianship of the Scholar Wilayat al Faqih The Life of Imam Al Mahdi Al Islam org Retrieved 29 July 2022 Cmje Archived from the original on 28 November 2008 Retrieved 31 March 2015 Muhammad ibn Hassan al Tusi Tahzib al Ahkam Kitab ul Qad a Volume 6 p 218 Hadith 514 quoted in vaezi Ahmed 2004 The Dominion Of The Wali Al Faqih Shia Political Thought al islam org Retrieved 11 August 2022 Borden Emma 9 February 2016 Everything you need to know about Iran s Assembly of Experts election Brookings Retrieved 14 August 2022 a b Vaezi Ahmed 2004 What is Wilayat al Faqih Imam as Wali wali Shia Political Thought Al Islam org Retrieved 11 August 2022 Shahir Shahidsaless 3 September 2015 The Khobar Towers bombing Its perpetrators and political fallout Middle East Eye Retrieved 19 May 2021 a b MAVANI HAMID September 2011 Ayatullah Khomeini s Concept of Governance wilayat al faqih and the Classical Shi i Doctrine of Imamate Middle Eastern Studies 47 5 808 doi 10 1080 00263206 2011 613208 JSTOR 23054264 S2CID 144976452 Retrieved 11 August 2022 Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 55 6 a b Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 p 33 Khomeini Islamic Government 1981 p 54 Abrahamian Iran between two revolutions 1982 p 534 5 Democracy I meant theocracy by Dr Jalal Matini Translation amp Introduction by Farhad Mafie August 5 2003 The Iranian What Happens When Islamists Take Power The Case of Iran Gems of Islamism Jahangir Amuzegar The Iranian Economy before and after the Revolution Middle East Journal 46 n 3 summer 1992 421 quoted in Reinventing Khomeini The Struggle for Reform in Iran by Daniel Brumberg University of Chicago Press 2001 p 130 Sciolino Elaine c 2000 Persian Mirrors the Elusive Face of Iran p 327 The Last Revolution by Robin Wright c2000 p 279 p 126 In the Name of God The Khomeini Decade by Robin Wright c1989 Tehran Radio 20 July 1988 from Khomeini Life of the Ayatollah by Baqer Moin p 267 a b Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 p 55 Arjomand Turban for the Crown 1988 p 173 Abrahamian Khomeinism 1993 pp 34 5 Dueling Ayatollahs Sistani Khamenei Shiite Iran Iraq Archived 2 February 2019 at the Wayback Machine al monitor com Shia split Sistani and Khamenei clash over Iraq s future Archived 2 February 2019 at the Wayback Machine alaraby co uk The Widening Rift Among Iran s Clerics Archived 2 February 2019 at the Wayback Machine nytimes com al Babu al Hadi Ashar by Allamah al Hilli p 12 Sheikh al Mufid in al Muqni a p 810 Watling Jack The Shia Militias of Iraq The Atlantic Retrieved 24 February 2017 ولاية الفقيه الاستفتاءات موقع مكتب سماحة المرجع الديني الأعلى السيد علي الحسيني السيستاني دام ظله www sistani org Retrieved 29 July 2022 Filkins Dexter 24 January 2005 The New York Times gt International gt Middle East gt Politics Shiites in Iraq Say Government Will Be Secular The New York Times Archived from the original on 6 October 2014 Retrieved 19 February 2017 Iraqi Sheik Struggles for Votes And Against Religious Tradition The Washington Post Archived from the original on 17 January 2016 Retrieved 31 March 2015 a b Moin Khomeini 1999 p 158 Mamouri Ali 11 April 2018 The dueling ayatollahs Al Monitor Retrieved 8 August 2022 Sayyid Abul Qasim al Musawi al Khoei Al Tanqih fi Sharh al Urwatil Wuthqa Kitab al Ijtihad wa al Taqlid p 360 صراط النجاة التبريزي الميرزا جواد کتابخانه مدرسه فقاهت lib eshia ir in Persian Retrieved 2 January 2022 Hermann 2013 p 431 مرحوم آیت الله العظمی آخوند خراسانی akhund blog ir Retrieved 29 July 2022 Mohammad Hosayn Na ini Tanbih al Umma va Tanzih al Milla M Taleqani ed Tehran 1955 1334 quoted in Arjomand Said Amir 1980 The State and Khomeini s Islamic Order Iranian Studies 13 1 4 150 doi 10 1080 00210868008701568 JSTOR 4310339 Retrieved 6 August 2022 Kunkler Mirjam 13 May 2009 The Special Court of the Clergy Dadgah Ye Vizheh Ye Ruhaniyat and the Repression of Dissident Clergy in Iran Rochester NY SSRN 1505542 a href Template Cite journal html title Template Cite journal cite journal a Cite journal requires journal help Kunkler Mirjam 13 May 2009 The Special Court of the Clergy Dadgah Ye Vizheh Ye Ruhaniyat and the Repression of Dissident Clergy in Iran Rochester NY SSRN 1505542 a href Template Cite journal html title Template Cite journal cite journal a Cite journal requires journal help موقف النظام الإيراني من المراجع ورجال الدين المخالفين المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإيرانية in Arabic Retrieved 16 December 2022 موقف النظام الإيراني من المراجع ورجال الدين المخالفين المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإيرانية in Arabic Retrieved 16 December 2022 موقف النظام الإيراني من المراجع ورجال الدين المخالفين المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإيرانية in Arabic Retrieved 16 December 2022 موقف النظام الإيراني من المراجع ورجال الدين المخالفين المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإيرانية in Arabic Retrieved 16 December 2022 موقف النظام الإيراني من المراجع ورجال الدين المخالفين المعهد الدولي للدراسات الإيرانية in Arabic Retrieved 16 December 2022 Kunkler Mirjam 13 May 2009 The Special Court of the Clergy Dadgah Ye Vizheh Ye Ruhaniyat and the Repression of Dissident Clergy in Iran Rochester NY SSRN 1505542 a href Template Cite journal html title Template Cite journal cite journal a Cite journal requires journal help Deaths Rising in Sistan and Baluchistan as Unrest Continues Amid Internet Shutdown Center for Human Rights in Iran 1 March 2021 Retrieved 16 December 2022 Pakistan s Baluchis Protest Iranian Treatment Of Ethnic Brethren After Border Shootings RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty Retrieved 16 December 2022 Bibliography and further reading EditAbrahamian Ervand 1982 Iran between two revolutions Princeton University Press ISBN 0691101345 Abrahamian Ervand 1993 Khomeinism Essays on the Islamic Republic California University of California Press ISBN 0520081730 Retrieved 30 December 2016 Abrahamian Ervand 1999 Tortured Confessions Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran University of California Press ISBN 0 520 21866 3 Amuli Ayatollah Jawadi July 2016 A Glance at the Fundamentals of the Trusteeship of the Jurisconsult Wilayat al faqih rafed net Retrieved 10 August 2022 Hermann Denis 1 May 2013 Akhund Khurasani and the Iranian Constitutional Movement Middle Eastern Studies 49 3 430 453 doi 10 1080 00263206 2013 783828 ISSN 0026 3206 JSTOR 23471080 S2CID 143672216 Keddie Nikki 2003 Modern Iran Roots and Results of Revolution Yale University Press Imam Khomeini Governance of the Jurist Velayat e Faqeeh Islamic Government PDF Translated by Algar Hamid The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini s Works Retrieved 2 August 2022 Khomeini Ruhollah 1981 Algar Hamid ed Islam and Revolution Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini Translated by Algar Hamid Berkeley CA Mizan Press ISBN 9781483547541 Khomeini Ruhollah 1981 A Warning to the Nation In Algar Hamid ed Islam and Revolution Writing and Declarations of Imam Khomeini Translated by Algar Hamid Berkeley CA Mizan Press pp 169 173 ISBN 9781483547541 from Kashf Al Asrar by Rullah Khomeini 1941 p 221 224 Moin Baqer 1999 Khomeini Life of the Ayatollah New York NY Thomas Dunne Books ISBN 9781466893061 Momen Moojan 1985 An Introduction to Shi i Islam New Haven CT London England Yale University Press ISBN 0300035314 A role model of leadership by Imam Khomeini Powers of the leader and government by Imam Khomeini Vaezi Ahmed 2004 what wilayat al faqih Shia Political Thought Al Islam org Retrieved 11 August 2022 External links Edit Look up Velayat e faqih in Wiktionary the free dictionary Wikiquote has quotations related to Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist Iran s Elections Serve Mullahcracy Not Democracy the Heritage Foundation GlobalSecurity org al Sistani s Web page on fiqh and beliefs Towards an Understanding of the Shiite Authoritative Sources Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist amp oldid 1131520643, 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