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Murray Moten

May 02, 2024

Brigadier Murray John Moten, CBE, DSO & Bar, ED (3 July 1899 – 14 September 1953) was a senior officer in the Australian Army during World War II who commanded the 2/27th Battalion during the Syria-Lebanon campaign in 1941, and the 17th Brigade during the Salamaua–Lae campaign in 1943 and the Aitape–Wewak campaign in 1944–1945.[1]

Brigadier

Murray John Moten

CBE, DSO & Bar, ED
Brigadier Murray Moten in New Guinea in late 1945
Born(1899-07-03)3 July 1899
Hawker, South Australia
Died14 September 1953(1953-09-14) (aged 54)
Adelaide, South Australia
AllegianceAustralia
Service/branchAustralian Army
Years of service1916–1918
1923–1953
RankBrigadier
Unit48th Battalion
Commands held
Battles/wars
Awards

Early life and World War I enlistment edit

Murray John Moten was born on 3 July 1899 at Hawker, South Australia, the eldest son of John Moten and Maude Mary Sophia, née Murray. Moten's father was an Australian-born railway porter and his mother was a nurse, originally from Ireland. Murray attended primary schools at Port Augusta, the state capital Adelaide, and in the far north town of Mingary, then Mount Gambier District High School in the south-east of the state.[1] In 1913 he joined the junior cadets.[2] He started as a messenger boy at the Mount Gambier post office in January 1915. Within six months he was working as a clerk in the town's branch of the Savings Bank of South Australia. In August 1916, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the senior cadets.[1][2]

In August 1917 Moten enlisted for overseas service in the Australian Imperial Force, not long after he turned 18,[1] by which time his mother had died.[3] Moten was sent on leave – apparently suffering from flat feet[1] – but was discharged as medically unfit due to heart problems and poor physique in January 1918.[4] Moten returned to civilian life and was transferred to the head office of the Savings Bank of South Australia in Adelaide.[1]

Between the wars edit

Having resigned from the senior cadets, Moten was appointed as a provisional lieutenant in the part-time 48th Battalion, Citizens Forces, in July 1923. He undertook further studies, studying accountancy at the University of Adelaide in 1924.[1] On 6 January 1926, Moten was promoted to captain.[5] Ten days later he married Kathleen Meegan, a 28-year-old musician, at St Mary's Catholic Church, Port Adelaide.[1] On 29 May 1929 Moten was promoted to major.[5]

In 1930, with austerity measures from the Great Depression biting and the election of the Scullin Labor government, universal service was suspended, and due to falling volunteer numbers, the 48th Battalion was amalgamated with the 43rd Battalion to form the 43rd/48th Battalion.[6] At the same time, the Citizens Forces were renamed the Militia.[7] Moten was elected the President of the Bank Officials' Association of South Australia in 1934.[1] On 17 December 1936,[5] Moten was promoted to lieutenant colonel and took command of the 43rd/48th Battalion. By October 1938, Moten was working as a sales clerk in the mortgage department of the Savings Bank of South Australia.[1]

World War II edit

Two months after the outbreak of World War II, the 43rd/48th Battalion was delinked to again form separate battalions. Moten took command of the 48th Battalion, which was not immediately mobilised and remained on part-time service.[8] On 29 February 1940, Moten was awarded the Efficiency Decoration,[9] which was issued to part-time officers for 20 years of efficient commissioned service.[10] On 26 April, Moten joined the all-volunteer Second Australian Imperial Force (Second AIF), and was appointed as the commanding officer of the 2/27th Battalion at the substantive rank of lieutenant colonel. He was accepted despite having reduced vision in one eye.[1] The battalion was raised at Woodside, South Australia, on 7 May, where it began basic training. Along with the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalions, the 2/27th was attached to the 21st Brigade, which formed part of the 7th Division,[11] the second infantry division raised as part of the Second AIF.[12] With an authorised strength of 910 men of all ranks,[13] it was organised into: four rifle companies designated "A" to "D"; a battalion headquarters; regimental aid post; and a headquarters company consisting of specialist signals, anti-aircraft, mortar, carrier, pioneer and administrative platoons.[14][15] In August Moten attended a tactical exercise without troops at Puckapunyal in central Victoria, then went on a week's pre-embarkation leave at the end of September.[9]

 
Troops of the 2/27th Battalion undergoing bayonet drills in Palestine in December 1940

Palestine and Egypt edit

The 2/27th Battalion entrained for Melbourne on 19 October and embarked there two days later aboard the requisitioned ocean liner Mauretania.[11][16] Sailing via British India, the 2/27th briefly made camp at Deolali outside of Bombay for a week before embarking on the Takliwa for the rest of the voyage to the Middle East.[17] The battalion arrived in Egypt on 24 November, disembarking at Kantara on the Suez Canal then moving to Julius Camp in Palestine for further training.[11][18] After completing its training, the unit moved with the rest of the 7th Division to the Western Desert fortresses at Mersa Matruh and nearby Maaten Bagush in April 1941. Their role was to bolster the Libyan-Egyptian border defences against an anticipated German attack.[11][19] The battalion did not experience direct ground combat during this period, but came under frequent air attack from Axis aircraft, improved their physical fitness, and gained useful experience in a war zone.[1] On 22 May, the battalion began moving back to Palestine in preparation for the invasion of Syria and Lebanon.[20] The main body of the unit crossed the Suez Canal at Kantara on 26 May, and reached its assembly area at Kfar Yehezkel in northern Palestine two days later.[21]

Syria-Lebanon campaign edit

Main article: Syria-Lebanon campaign

Brigadier Jack Stevens's 21st Brigade was given the task of advancing north up the 40 km (25 mi)-wide coastal route, and was split into two columns. Moten's column, consisting of the 2/27th Battalion and some light tanks, supported by artillery and engineers and with naval gunfire support, was given the task of clearing the coastal road after the 2/14th Battalion had captured the border posts, while a similar column based on the 2/16th Battalion advanced up the more difficult inland road. A subsidiary column formed by the British Cheshire Yeomanry horsed cavalry regiment would provide eastern flank protection to Moten's column and assist if his column was held up at the Litani River.[22]

Initial operations and capture of Innsariye edit

See also: Battle of the Litani River

The invasion began in the early hours of 8 June but Stevens decided not to push Moten's fully-motorised column through the 2/14th Battalion, but instead kept that unit moving forward to establish if the French had cratered the road or demolished bridges that would stop the 2/27th from advancing. By the end of the first day, the 2/14th Battalion had occupied the town of Tyre. The 2/27th began moving forward on 9 June once a large crater in the road at Iskandaroun had been filled by engineers.[23] In heavy fighting, the 2/16th crossed the Litani by boat on 9 June, and that evening, supported by a company of the 2/27th Battalion, they began clearing the opposite bank. During this fighting, the detached company of the 2/27th captured an entire company of Algerian colonial troops. That night the river was bridged by the engineers using pontoons, and the rest of the 2/27th began crossing in their vehicles on the morning of 10 June.[24]

On 10 June the 2/27th advanced along the coast road led by a squadron of cavalry mounted in carriers, while the 2/16th cleared the high ground to the east. The cavalry pushed on through sporadic resistance past Kafr Badda, but both infantry battalions met opposition among the hills east of the road, and suffered casualties.[25] Stevens, seeking to keep the French off-balance, ordered Moten to attack the French positions at Innsariye at midnight, which he did after a 30 minute artillery barrage with two companies leading. These met heavy resistance, and were also delayed while some enemy tanks were dispersed by the artillery, so a third company was swung around the leading companies on the right flank and pushed towards the battalion's final objective. Moten, who was forward with the third company, saw an opportunity to encircle the French still resisting the leading companies, and ordered the third company to take up a position on high ground overlooking a road running east from the French positions towards Es Sakiye, with his headquarters and the pioneer platoon deployed onto high ground above the coastal road to block that line of withdrawal for the French. The French surrendered at dawn on 11 June. The 2/14th Battalion then led the advance until the following day, when the 2/27th again took up the role.[26]

At this stage the advance was held up by the French north of Khan Saada, where they had established defensive positions in the Wadi Zaharani, which dominated the intersection with the road running east towards Merdjayoun. A frontal attack by the 2/14th aimed at cutting this road had been unsuccessful. Moten reconnoitered to the east of the French position, guided by the adjutant of the 2/14th. He then sent two companies forward, and their successful attack secured the bridge across the Zaharani River and captured about 200 French prisoners. The 2/27th continued to push forward along the coast road, with lead elements reaching the village of Rhaziye where they were stopped by heavy artillery fire. Two companies of the battalion managed to advance to the village of Darb es Sim near Ghazieh during the night of 12/13 June.[27]

Capture of Sidon edit

 
Troops of the 2/27th Battalion advancing on 13 June 1941

The task of capturing the key city of Sidon was initially given to the 2/16th Battalion, with the 2/27th companies at Darb es Sim to guard the approaches to Sidon from the east, although the orders to do so had not reached them. On 12 June, Moten had made an assessment that the best way to capture Sidon was not to attack frontally as the 2/16th was ordered to do by Stevens, but to push through the hills to the village of Miye ou Miye, 5 km (3.1 mi) east of Sidon, then attack Sidon from the flank. By the morning of 13 June, Moten's forward companies were on the southern bank of the Sataniq River, but he was unable to communicate with them in the rough terrain. He sent a patrol to locate them, and Stevens then ordered the rest of the 2/27th to join them and attack Sidon in accordance with Moten's appreciation of the best way to capture the city. All members of the battalion were very weary after five days of constant advancing and fighting, and when the trailing companies reached the lead ones before dawn on 14 June, they relieved them so they could prepare for the attack. After a gruelling cross-country march to the start line, the attack was met with significant resistance. On the same day the 2/14th was counter-attacked by a strong French force supported by tanks, but this was stopped with the assistance of the artillery. Acting on information from his advanced companies that Miye ou Miye had been abandoned, on the morning of 15 June Moten pushed his troops forward to the village and met no opposition. The 2/27th advanced to the outskirts of Sidon and a patrol was sent into the town which discovered that the French had withdrawn. Moten and his headquarters entered the city shortly afterwards, then Moten commandeered a taxi to report to Stevens who entered the city at 16:00.[28]

French counter-attacks edit

Initially successful French counter-attacks on the inland column around Merdjayoun resulted in Stevens being ordered on 17 June to hold any further advance and send the 2/14th Battalion to reinforce Australian troops at Jezzine. Stevens requested a replacement, and was allocated a British unit, the 2nd Battalion, King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster), transferred from the British 16th Infantry Brigade.[29] Despite the halt until the situation at Merdjayoun was resolved, the 21st Brigade pushed forward strong cavalry patrols and on 19 June the 2/16th captured the village of Jadra north of the Wadi Zeini. The 2/27th followed up and took up positions in the El Ouardaniye—Sebline-Kafr Maya area that afternoon. On 21 June Moten sent patrols to Sebline and Kafr Maya, and for the next few days the battalion picqueted the lateral roads and tracks further south protecting the eastern flank of the coastal column. On 25 June, Stevens sent the 2/27th and 2/16th forward to the El Haram ridgeline, and ordered Moten, who was to hold the right-hand position on the ridge, to send patrols towards Er Rezaniy. In the meantime, the 2/25th Battalion, supported by two companies of the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion, was tasked to clear the French from the area between the two columns. At dawn on 26 June, the 2/27th and 2/16th secured the ridge against minimal French resistance.[30]

On 28 June, the 7th Division, reinforced by the Australian 17th Brigade, was concentrated on the zones along the coast and north of Jezzine, leaving operations further east to the British 6th Division. This meant that Stevens' command was again reduced to two battalions, the 2/27th and 2/16th. He requested an additional battalion to sustain operations against the town of Damour on the road to Beirut, but this was not immediately forthcoming. He kept his units back from the Damour River to limit casualties from French artillery, but ordered his two battalions to patrol forward aggressively. On 29 June, Moten took his intelligence sergeant on a long reconnaissance of his right flank and identified a French position on a height known as Hill 394 which overlooked the Damour River. He tasked his nearest company commander to send a strong fighting patrol to the feature that night, and it was captured after brief resistance. A platoon-strength defensive position and observation post was established on the heights. Despite heavy French shelling over four hours, the platoon stayed in position. Stevens wanted to avoid another frontal attack, so Moten sent patrols forward to reconnoitre French positions and river crossing points on the right flank. Once these had been located, and similar reconnaissance of the crossings and French positions had been conducted by the 2/16th on the left, Stevens was allocated the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion, but it only had two companies at this point. On 1 July, the 2/14th Battalion returned to the 21st Brigade from fighting around Jezzine as part of the 25th Brigade. All three infantry battalions were significantly under-strength due to casualties.[31]

Capture of Damour and armistice edit

Main article: Battle of Damour

For the capture of Damour, the 2/27th was to conduct a single company preliminary operation to destroy French positions on a spur west of the village of El Mourhira, then after that company was relieved by two companies of the 2/14th Battalion, the 2/27th would cross the Damour River to El Boum and Four-à-Chaux and turn the French flank. Significant artillery support was to be provided for the brigade attack.[32] The lead company of the 2/27th moved off from El Haram at dusk on 5 June, and marched cross-country to El Batal where they rested for three hours. A little after midnight they set off again, crossed the Damour at a point identified during the earlier reconnaissance, and climbed up a goat track to El Boum. Fixing bayonets around dawn, the lead platoon stormed the village to find it empty, with a few French troops fleeing in the distance. The next company suffered casualties among key personnel and was scattered by artillery fire, but the third company swapped objectives with it. The lead company was held up by an enemy position, but the arrival of the third company bolstered the assault and the position surrendered. The rest of the battalion pushed on and achieved its objectives. A platoon was posted on a feature known as Hill 512 which overlooked the village of Daraya. After 24 hours of hard marching and climbing, along with some fighting, including steep ascents of 240 m (800 ft) and then 300 m (1,000 ft), the battalion had secured the corridor through which the 17th Brigade was to pass then attack, cutting the road leading north out of Damour towards Beirut. Ultimately, Stevens pushed the 2/14th Battalion, less the two companies at El Mourhira, through the corridor to secure the start line for the 17th Brigade attack, and the 17th Brigade followed.[33] The most advanced company of the 2/27th reached the eastern outskirts of Damour and sent two platoons into the town where they had several sharp exchanges of fire with French troops and captured more than their own number.[34] Attacks from the south prompted the French to withdraw, and the town was secured by the morning of 9 July.[35]

 
Moten (centre right) and his men were visited by the commander of the 7th Division, Major General Arthur "Tubby" Allen, at Hammana, Lebanon, on 2 September 1941

It soon became apparent that the French had withdrawn a considerable distance on all fronts of the campaign, and Stevens was ordered secure the villages of Abey and Kafra Matta overlooking Damour. Moten sent out a patrol that found the villages empty of French troops, which were then occupied by the 2/14th.[36] The French commander had been considering capitulation for a couple of weeks at this stage, and a message had been sent to him by the commander of the Australian I Corps, Lieutenant General John Lavarack, as early as 30 June urging him to negotiate. A ceasefire came into force at 00:01 on 12 July.[37] The 2/27th had suffered over 150 casualties during the campaign.[38] Following the surrender of Vichy forces, the 2/27th undertook garrison duties around Hammana, near Beirut, and Bakhaoun in the Tripoli sector, as part of the Allied occupation force.[11][39] In October, Moten spent two weeks in hospital with measles.[40]

Brigade command and awards edit

Moten was promoted to colonel and temporary brigadier on 27 December and left the 2/27th to be immediately appointed as the commander of the 17th Brigade, part of the 6th Division.[9] He "quietly and efficiently" took over the brigade from Stanley Savige,[1] who had been appointed Director of Recruiting and Propaganda in Australia.[41] The principal fighting units of the 17th Brigade were the 2/5th, 2/6th and 2/7th Battalions.[42] When Moten took command, the 17th Brigade was training and re-equipping in Syria with the rest of the 6th Division after the disastrous Greek campaign.[43] On 12 February 1942 Moten was mentioned in despatches for distinguished services in the Middle East and made a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for "excellent leadership and gallantry in the capture of Sidon".[44] The citation for the DSO read:[45]

To effect the capture of Saida [Sidon] in the face of a well organized and determined defence which blocked any progress along the Coast Road it was necessary to turn the position from the right flank. On 13 Jun., therefore, Lt.-Col. M. J. Moten was ordered to take his Bn. into high ground and capture Mey Ouimye. The terrain over which the Bn. was forced to move was extremely difficult and during the move fwd. it was dive-bombed and machine-gunned from the air and came under Arty. fire. Due to Lt.-Col. Moten's driving force and initiative the posn. was captured on 14 Jun. and the Bn. taken fwd. into such a posn. as to force the abandonment of the Saida defences. On the morning of 15 Jun. Col. Moten perceived that the Saida garrison had apparently withdrawn and immediately sent a patrol into the town. Throughout these two days his example, initiative and leadership contributed very largely to the abandonment of the Saida defences. This officer also showed excellent leadership skills, gallantry and devotion to duty at Battle of Damour.

— The London Gazette 12 February 1942

Ceylon edit

In early January 1942, it was agreed between the British and Australian governments that the 6th Division would be withdrawn from Syria and move to the Far East in response to the entry of Japan into the war.[46] In late January and early February, the Australian government agreed to the deployment of the 6th Division to Java to oppose the Japanese southward thrust.[47] These plans were soon changed when it was decided that two brigades should be diverted to defend Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka), and the 16th and 17th Brigades were chosen for this task.[48] Moten embarked from the Middle East with his headquarters on 10 March and disembarked at Colombo on 24 March.[49]

The Second AIF force in Ceylon was commanded by Major General Allan Boase, on promotion from commanding the 16th Brigade. The force was responsible for the southwest corner of Ceylon, the area considered most likely for a Japanese landing. The areas not covered by coconut, rubber and tea plantations consisted of thick bush or rice paddies. As future fighting would be vastly different from what they had experienced, Moten established a Jungle Warfare School to prepare his troops. The Australians were also involved in improving the weak transport infrastructure. Japanese carrier-borne aircraft attacked Ceylon on both 5 and 9 April, and sank several British and Australian ships operating in the region.[50] The 17th Brigade was stationed around Akuressa.[51] About this time, the newly-appointed Commander-in-Chief, Australian Military Forces, General Sir Thomas Blamey, decided that the brigades in Ceylon would return to Australia.[52] The 17th Brigade headquarters commenced its voyage back to Australia aboard the Athlone Castle in July,[51] and arrived in Melbourne on 4 August.[49]

Papua and New Guinea edit

The brigade went into camp near Seymour, Victoria, and after a brief period of leave, on 28 August a welcome home parade was held in Melbourne for the brigade. On the same day, Moten received a warning order for a brigade move to New South Wales.[53] Due to railway congestion and equipment deficiencies, the move to Greta in the Hunter Valley was not completed until 20 September. During the move, Moten visited Melbourne and was permitted to read a confidential report on the fighting on the Kokoda Trail in New Guinea written by the war correspondent Chester Wilmot. The brigade had barely consolidated at Greta and conducted an initial training exercise before it was ordered to Brisbane in Queensland.[54] By 6 October the brigade was consolidated in the northern suburbs of Brisbane, but its stay there was brief as it embarked two days later. Moten flew to Townsville in north Queensland, then on to Cairns then Port Moresby in the Territory of New Guinea on 12 October. The following day he flew to Milne Bay in the Territory of Papua, where the brigade was now heading.[55]

Despite the resounding Allied victory in the Battle of Milne Bay in August and September, and the need to deploy the whole 18th Brigade elsewhere, the Allied commanders were not willing to weaken the defences of the strategically-important base at Milne Bay. The 17th Brigade was therefore directed there to relieve the remaining battalion of the 18th Brigade, which was part of Major General Cyril Clowes' Milne Force, redesignated the 11th Division on 1 October. The advance party of the brigade arrived in mid-October and the battalions arrived soon afterwards.[56] There was little Japanese activity in the area, so the brigade was not involved in any significant fighting at Milne Bay. There was a significant spike in malaria infections in the area during the time the 17th Brigade was part of the garrison, peaking at over 80 cases per 1,000 men per week around Christmas 1942. This was due to a combination of the disease being endemic in the area, poor anti-malarial supervision by officers of fighting units, and inadequate anti-malarial supplies.[57] Moten administered command of the 11th Division from 29 December until he flew to Wau in the New Guinea on 9 January 1943 to conduct a reconnaissance for a planned brigade deployment to the area. The 29th Brigade arrived to relive the 17th Brigade, and brigade units began departing by sea for Port Moresby on 10 January.[49][58]

Defence of Wau edit

Main article: Battle of Wau

An ad hoc Australian formation known as Kanga Force had been monitoring and harassing the Japanese bases at Lae and Salamaua since early 1942. By the time Moten arrived in Wau, the core of the force consisted of the 2/5th and 2/7th Independent Companies, irregular units trained for long-range patrol and surveillance. In early January, a Japanese troop convoy sailed from Rabaul to Lae with reinforcements, and despite interdiction by Allied air attacks, successfully landed most of the troops on 7 January 1943. In response, Kanga Force launched a successful attack on the Japanese advanced position at Mubo and withdrew under Japanese pressure. The arrival of the Japanese reinforcements at Lae prompted the Allied decision to send the 17th Brigade to Wau to bolster Kanga Force ahead of an expected Japanese advance on Wau.[59][60] Moten returned to Port Moresby on 14 January and the following day he received written orders that he was to take over defences at Wau and command of Kanga Force.[61]

On 14 January, the first fighting elements of the 17th Brigade began arriving in Wau by air, led by B Company of the 2/6th Battalion and the advanced brigade headquarters. B Company was immediately pushed forward to support the independent companies while the bulk of the 2/6th had arrived in Wau by 19 January and another company was quickly placed astride another track leading from Lae to Wau. The air transport of the brigade was hampered by poor flying weather and accidents, and it took much of the following week for the rest of the brigade to concentrate in Wau. Moten's aircraft turned back on 15 January, and he did not reach Wau until the following day. He was scathing about the air transport arrangements, saying that they were "uneconomical and haphazard". By 19 January significant elements of the 2/6th were effectively deployed on the tracks leading towards Wau.[62]

On 21 January, a patrol from the 2/6th observed Japanese troops moving forward, but the enemy axis of advance was not clear. The last of the 2/6th arrived in Wau on 23 January, and the following day the lead elements of the 2/5th Battalion and some engineers flew in. Moten intensified patrolling to establish the Japanese main advance, and by 26 January had determined that they were using an old disused track labelled the "Jap Track". He decided that, despite a lack of reserves in Wau due to the slow buildup, he would attack the advancing Japanese from the forward positions of the 2/6th on the Black Cat Track. An aggressive enemy advance up the "Jap Track" completely derailed this plan, and Moten responded with piecemeal defensive deployments as troops arrived in Wau, including forward positions south east of Wau near Leahy's Farm. By late on 28 January, the rest of the 2/5th had not been able to get to Wau, and the 2/7th Battalion was also stuck on the ground in Port Moresby. Moten called most of his forward elements to withdraw to Wau and deployed them in close defence of the village and airfield. Finally on the morning of 29 January the weather broke enough for the rest of the 2/5th and the main body of the 2/7th Battalion to arrive. They were rushed into defensive positions around the airfield.[63]

Before dawn on 30 January the Japanese assault on the airfield began, beginning from the south east. Moten's positions held, and by mid-morning he considered that with the arrival of two guns of the 2/1st Field Regiment on aircraft earlier that morning he could take the initiative using a company of the 2/7th to forestall a Japanese flanking manoeuvre to the south of Leahy's Farm, leaving the remainder of the force to protect the airfield. This move, supported by strafing by Royal Australian Air Force Bristol Beaufighters, caused significant enemy casualties and stopped the Japanese in their tracks. The following day the 2/3rd Independent Company and 100 reinforcements for the 2/6th Battalion arrived to further bolster Kanga Force.[64] More reinforcements arrived on 1 February, bringing Kanga Force strength to 201 officers and 2,965 men. By nightfall on 3 February, the Wau defences were holding well, another company of the 2/7th had been pushed forward south of Leahy's Farm to block further Japanese advances, and their assaults were clearly weakening. That evening Moten signalled New Guinea Force that Wau was secure.[65]

Moten then committed the 2/5th Battalion to offensive action, and in hard fighting up to 9 February they cleared the area west of the Bulolo River, killing hundreds of Japanese and putting the rest to flight.[66] This effectively destroyed Japanese strength in the Wau Valley.[67] After consolidation, Moten rested part of the 2/5th and pushed the three platoons of the 2/3rd Independent Company along the three tracks leading towards Mubo. On the northern Black Cat Track, elements of the 2/6th largely held off a Japanese counter-attack on 10 February. Moten held them there rather than withdrawing them to Wau to rest, as the overall situation remained unclear. They were relieved by a 2/3rd Independent Company platoon on 15 February. The Japanese fell back in an orderly fashion towards Mubo, harassed by aircraft and patrols. On 26 February, an attack by the 2/5th Battalion and 2/7th Independent Company from the Australian right flank to clear the Japanese staging areas around Buibaining met with almost no opposition. By the end of the month Moten's force had driven the Japanese back to Mubo.[68] During the advance to Wau and retreat to Mubo, the main Japanese fighting force, the 102nd Infantry Regiment, had likely suffered around 1,200 killed, as well as some who had died of starvation.[69]

In early March, Moten was recommended by the General Officer Commanding New Guinea Force, Lieutenant General Sir Iven Mackay, for an immediate award of a bar to the DSO he had been awarded for his performance in the Syria-Lebanon campaign. The recommendation was supported by Blamey.[70] On 18 May 1943,[71] Moten was awarded the bar to his DSO for "a high order of leadership and control" during the Battle of Wau. The citation for the DSO read:[72]

Brigadier MOTEN, D.S.O., E.D. commanded 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. Group which successfully defeated the strong Japanese attack on WAU, between Jan 27 and Feb 20, 1943. From captured orders, it is known that the Japanese attack was made by 102 Regtl. Grp, of which two Infantry Battalions, augmented by the personnel of one Artillery Battery and one Engineer Company were forward, the Third Infantry Battalion being in reserve. When the Japanese attack suddenly developed at WANDUMI on Jan. 27, Brigadier MOTEN had with him only half of 17 Inf. Bde. personnel and no Artillery. On Jan 30. the enemy made a heavy attack and came within 400 yards of WAU airfield. This effort was, however, repelled by the infantry with its light weapons and 350 casualties inflicted on the Japanese. After the arrival of reinforcements on Jan 30-31, Brigadier MOTEN further defeated the enemy and proceeded to drive him back, eventually, by Feb. 20, forcing him back to WAIPALI-GAUDAGSAL AREA, more than 20 miles from WAU. It is estimated that the Japanese casualties in the whole operation were not less than 1200. Under critical circumstances Brigadier MOTEN showed a high order of leadership and control.

Salamaua–Lae campaign edit

Main article: Salamaua–Lae campaign

In early March Moten reminded his forward troops, the 2/7th Independent Company supported by the 2/5th Battalion, to maintain close contact with the Japanese. This they did via aggressive patrolling, and by the end of March were closed up on Mubo itself.[73] In early April Moten sent the 2/7th Battalion to relieve the forward troops.[74] Moten had decided that the main threat to Wau was now from the area of the Markham Valley, he deployed the 2/6th Battalion to cover those approaches, the 2/7th remained opposite Mubo, and the 2/3rd Independent Company was positioned in the Missim area. By this time, the 2/5th and 2/7th Independent Companies were being withdrawn, and the lead battalion of the 15th Brigade, the 24th, was arriving.[75] Throughout April, Moten's force continued to patrol the approaches to Mubo.[76] The terrain and weather were some of the most unpleasant faced by Australian troops during the war. Rugged mountains, almost impenetrable jungle, kunai grass, gloom and rain were the rule for much of the time. Moten established rest camps where his troops could sleep in dry conditions, have a few hot meals, and wash themselves and their uniforms. These were positioned rear of the forward positions, and one was established at Edie Creek. Such rest camps helped reduce the depression and illness that went hand-in-hand with the terrible conditions.[77]

On 23 April, Kanga Force was dissolved and the headquarters of Major General Stanley Savige's 3rd Division opened at Bulolo, taking command of Moten's brigade.[78] An abortive company attack on a Japanese-held feature called "The Pimple" by the 2/7th Battalion on 24 and 25 April showed that extensive reconnaissance, improved communication and pinpoint accuracy from supporting aircraft and artillery were required for such limited offensive actions to be successful. Savige's initial directions to Moten were that the 17th Brigade was to prevent the Japanese from entering the Bulolo Valley from the Mubo area, secure the Mubo-Guadagasal-Waipali area, and gain control of the coastal area immediate south of the Bitoli River.[79] Moten's concern about his left flank meant that he retained the 2/5th Battalion at Wau to patrol along the two tracks from Waipali, the "Jap Track" and "Black Cat Track". At this point Moten believed the best location for his headquarters remained at Wau, but Savige disagreed and urged him forward.[80] A further attempt on "The Pimple" by a company of the 2/7th Battalion on 2 May was also a failure, although the air support improved. This decided Savige on a policy of not attacking prepared defensive positions, but instead to use aggressive patrolling and minor limited attacks to outflank, neutralise and isolate the Japanese defenders.[81] Despite this, on 7 May the 2/7th mounted yet another fruitless attack on "The Pimple". Total casualties for the 2/7th Battalion from the three attacks amounted to 12 killed and 25 wounded. Two days later a company of the 2/7th Battalion was surrounded by a Japanese attack and the relieving force had to fight through to them with some difficulty over the following two days.[82] After a frank exchange of views between Savige and Moten regarding the location of Moten's headquarters, Savige clarified that Moten was not responsible for the defence of the Wau Valley itself, but only to prevent entry into the valley from Mubo, and Moten moved his headquarters forward to Skindewai. Despite their differences, Savige and Moten continued to work well together.[83]

On 12 May, Moten revised his plan based on his expectation that the Japanese would remain on a defensive footing around Salamaua and Mubo, and decided he would continue to use only one battalion forward, with a company securing the coast south from the Bitoli River to Nassau Bay through raiding. The 2/7th Battalion remained forward, with a company of the 2/6th attached for the coastal task, and the rest of the brigade would be held in reserve. Both Savige and Moten were concerned about the southern or right flank around Nassau Bay and Duali. Moten concentrated on aggressive patrolling, and soon this had restricted the Japanese to their defensive positions. Towards the end of May, Moten brought the 2/6th Battalion up to relieve the 2/7th Battalion in the brigade forward area.[84] By the first week in June, the 2/6th was deployed with companies on: Lababia Ridge – with a platoon at Napier; at Mat Mat; at Summit; and at the Saddle. The 2/5th and 2/7th Battalions were located in and around Wau. Moten was unhappy with the position of the 2/6th Battalion company at Lababia Ridge, and ordered adjustments so that Japanese activity near the Pimple would be easier to detect. At the same time, Moten was tasked with assisting the landing of a US battalion at Nassau Bay followed by an attack on Mubo as part of an upcoming offensive, and he tasked reconnaissance patrols to Nassau Bay.[85] Moten was tasked with coordinating the landing and then, taking the US battalion under command, capturing Mubo. On 15 June Moten briefed senior commanders – including the commander of New Guinea Force, Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Herring, and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major General Frank Berryman, on his five-phase plan for the operation, and Herring expressed his satisfaction with Moten's arrangements.[86]

The 17th Brigade repulsed Japanese assaults at Mubo and Lababia Ridge and following the capture of Komiatum and Mount Tambu in August, Moten was appointed Commander of the Order of the British Empire and again mentioned in despatches. The 17th Brigade returned to Australia for rest and regrouping and later returned to New Guinea for the Aitape–Wewak campaign. Moten took command of the 6th Division from 18 November 1945.

Later life edit

 
Moten's grave at Centennial Park Cemetery

After returning to Australia, Moten was transferred to the Regimental Supernumerary List on 17 January 1946 in Adelaide and he resumed his civilian career. He led the Australian army component of the Victory March in London in June. Moten became the Australian Army Representative of the Imperial War Graves Commission in 1947, and went on to command the 9th Brigade of the CMF and while serving in this capacity he was appointed honorary colonel of the 27th Battalion of the CMF in 1952.[1] He was promoted as the general manager of the Savings Bank of South Australia in December. He was appointed as an aide de camp to the Governor-General of Australia on 16 March 1953.

Moten collapsed at the 27th Battalion ball at the Torrens Drill Hall on 5 September 1953 and on 14 September, while in the Royal Adelaide Hospital, he died of a heart attack. He was buried with full military honours in Centennial Park Cemetery with Anglican and Catholic rites. He was survived by his wife, daughter and two sons. His son, John Moten, was Director-General of Security (the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation) from 1988 to 1991.

Footnotes edit

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Sutton 2006.
  2. ^ a b National Archives 2021, p. 27.
  3. ^ National Archives 2021, p. 23.
  4. ^ National Archives 2021, p. 35.
  5. ^ a b c National Archives 2021, p. 18.
  6. ^ Kuring 2004, p. 112.
  7. ^ Palazzo 2001, p. 110.
  8. ^ McKenzie-Smith 2018, p. 2248.
  9. ^ a b c National Archives 2021, p. 50.
  10. ^ The London Gazette 17 October 1930, pp. 6309–6311.
  11. ^ a b c d e Australian War Memorial 2021.
  12. ^ Kuring 2004, p. 117.
  13. ^ Palazzo 2004, p. 94.
  14. ^ Kuring 2004, p. 139.
  15. ^ Australian War Memorial 2014.
  16. ^ Burns 1960, p. 20.
  17. ^ Burns 1960, pp. 24–25.
  18. ^ Burns 1960, pp. 26–27.
  19. ^ Long 1953, p. 335.
  20. ^ 2/27th Battalion War Diary May 1941, p. 23.
  21. ^ 2/27th Battalion War Diary May 1941, pp. 27–28.
  22. ^ Long 1953, pp. 341–343.
  23. ^ Long 1953, pp. 348–351.
  24. ^ Long 1953, pp. 360–366.
  25. ^ Long 1953, pp. 366–367.
  26. ^ Long 1953, pp. 375–378.
  27. ^ Long 1953, pp. 378–379.
  28. ^ Long 1953, pp. 380–385.
  29. ^ Long 1953, pp. 412–413.
  30. ^ Long 1953, pp. 460–462.
  31. ^ Long 1953, pp. 465–474.
  32. ^ Long 1953, pp. 480–481.
  33. ^ Long 1953, pp. 482–484.
  34. ^ Long 1953, pp. 490–495.
  35. ^ Long 1953, pp. 495–502.
  36. ^ Long 1953, p. 503.
  37. ^ Long 1953, pp. 511–513.
  38. ^ Long 1953, p. 526.
  39. ^ Burns 1960, pp. 86–99.
  40. ^ National Archives 2021, pp. 50–51.
  41. ^ 17th Brigade War Diary December 1941, p. 2.
  42. ^ Australian War Memorial 2005.
  43. ^ Long 1953, pp. 535 & 544.
  44. ^ The London Gazette 12 February 1942, pp. 703 & 705.
  45. ^ National Archives 2021, p. 48.
  46. ^ Long 1953, p. 549–550.
  47. ^ Wigmore 1957, pp. 443–444.
  48. ^ Wigmore 1957, p. 460.
  49. ^ a b c National Archives 2021, p. 51.
  50. ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 77–79.
  51. ^ a b McKenzie-Smith 2018, p. 2085.
  52. ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 25–26.
  53. ^ 17th Brigade War Diary August 1942, pp. 2–4.
  54. ^ 17th Brigade War Diary September 1942, pp. 2–5.
  55. ^ 17th Brigade War Diary October 1942, pp. 2–4.
  56. ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 349.
  57. ^ Walker 1957, pp. 112–114.
  58. ^ 17th Brigade War Diary January 1943, p. 3.
  59. ^ Kuring 2004, pp. 140 & 176.
  60. ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 540–543.
  61. ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 545.
  62. ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 543–546.
  63. ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 547–554.
  64. ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 544–557.
  65. ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 558–563.
  66. ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 563–568.
  67. ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 573.
  68. ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 568–574.
  69. ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 576.
  70. ^ National Archives 2021, p. 16.
  71. ^ The London Gazette 18 May 1943.
  72. ^ National Archives 2021, p. 56.
  73. ^ McCarthy 1959, pp. 583–584.
  74. ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 586.
  75. ^ Dexter 1961, p. 24.
  76. ^ Dexter 1961, p. 18.
  77. ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 21–22.
  78. ^ McCarthy 1959, p. 588.
  79. ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 28–31.
  80. ^ Dexter 1961, p. 31.
  81. ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 34–35.
  82. ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 38–41.
  83. ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 42–43.
  84. ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 43–52.
  85. ^ Dexter 1961, pp. 59–62.
  86. ^ Dexter 1961, p. 71.

References edit

Books edit

  • Burns, John (1960). The Brown and Blue Diamond at War: The Story of the 2/27th Battalion A.I.F. Adelaide, South Australia: 2/27th Battalion Ex-servicemen's Association. OCLC 2104460.
  • Dexter, David St Alban (1961). The New Guinea Offensives. Australia in the War of 1939–1945, Series 1, Army. Vol. VI (1st online ed.). Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 220806033.
  • Kuring, Ian (2004). Redcoats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry 1788–2001. Loftus, New South Wales: Australian Military History Publications. ISBN 1-876439-99-8.
  • Long, Gavin (1953). Greece, Crete and Syria. Australia in the War of 1939–1945, Series 1, Army. Vol. II (1st online ed.). Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 3134080.
  • McCarthy, Dudley (1959). South-West Pacific Area—First Year: Kokoda to Wau. Australia in the War of 1939–45, Series 1, Army. Vol. V. Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 3134247.
  • McKenzie-Smith, Graham (2018). The Unit Guide: The Australian Army 1939–1945. Vol. 2. Warriewood, New South Wales: Big Sky Publishing. ISBN 978-1-925675-146.
  • Palazzo, Albert (2001). The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901–2001. Melbourne, Victoria: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-551506-0.
  • Palazzo, Albert (2004). "Organising for Jungle Warfare". In Dennis, Peter; Grey, Jeffrey (eds.). . Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: Army History Unit. pp. 86–101. ISBN 978-0-646-43590-9. Archived from the original on 9 March 2016.
  • Walker, Allan Seymour (1957). The Island Campaigns. Australia in the War of 1939–1945, Series 5, Medical. Vol. III (1st ed.). Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 1070821527. Retrieved 26 December 2021.
  • Wigmore, Lionel (1957). The Japanese Thrust. Australia in the War of 1939–1945, Series 1, Army. Vol. IV (1st ed.). Canberra, Australian Capital Territory: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 464084033. Retrieved 25 December 2021.

Websites edit

War diaries and gazettes edit

  • "17th Brigade War Diary December 1941". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 21 December 2021.
  • "17th Brigade War Diary August 1942". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 25 December 2021.
  • "17th Brigade War Diary September 1942". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 25 December 2021.
  • "17th Brigade War Diary October 1942". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 25 December 2021.
  • "17th Brigade War Diary January 1943". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 26 December 2021.
  • "2/27th Battalion War Diary May 1941". Australian War Memorial. Retrieved 21 December 2021.
  • "No. 33653". The London Gazette. 17 October 1930.
  • "No. 35452". The London Gazette (Supplement). 12 February 1942.
  • "No. 36018". The London Gazette (Supplement). 18 May 1943.

May 02, 2024
murray, moten, brigadier, murray, john, moten, july, 1899, september, 1953, senior, officer, australian, army, during, world, commanded, 27th, battalion, during, syria, lebanon, campaign, 1941, 17th, brigade, during, salamaua, campaign, 1943, aitape, wewak, ca. Brigadier Murray John Moten CBE DSO amp Bar ED 3 July 1899 14 September 1953 was a senior officer in the Australian Army during World War II who commanded the 2 27th Battalion during the Syria Lebanon campaign in 1941 and the 17th Brigade during the Salamaua Lae campaign in 1943 and the Aitape Wewak campaign in 1944 1945 1 BrigadierMurray John MotenCBE DSO amp Bar EDBrigadier Murray Moten in New Guinea in late 1945Born 1899 07 03 3 July 1899Hawker South AustraliaDied14 September 1953 1953 09 14 aged 54 Adelaide South AustraliaAllegianceAustraliaService wbr branchAustralian ArmyYears of service1916 19181923 1953RankBrigadierUnit48th BattalionCommands held9th Brigade 1948 1952 6th Division 1945 1946 17th Brigade 1941 1945 2 27th Battalion 1940 1941 48th Battalion 1939 1940 43rd 48th Battalion 1936 1939 Battles warsWorld War II Syria Lebanon campaign Battle of Wau Salamaua Lae campaign Aitape Wewak campaignAwardsCommander of the Order of the British EmpireDistinguished Service Order amp BarMentioned in Despatches 2 Efficiency Decoration Contents 1 Early life and World War I enlistment 2 Between the wars 3 World War II 3 1 Palestine and Egypt 3 2 Syria Lebanon campaign 3 2 1 Initial operations and capture of Innsariye 3 2 2 Capture of Sidon 3 2 3 French counter attacks 3 2 4 Capture of Damour and armistice 3 2 5 Brigade command and awards 3 3 Ceylon 3 4 Papua and New Guinea 3 4 1 Defence of Wau 3 4 2 Salamaua Lae campaign 4 Later life 5 Footnotes 6 References 6 1 Books 6 2 Websites 6 3 War diaries and gazettesEarly life and World War I enlistment editMurray John Moten was born on 3 July 1899 at Hawker South Australia the eldest son of John Moten and Maude Mary Sophia nee Murray Moten s father was an Australian born railway porter and his mother was a nurse originally from Ireland Murray attended primary schools at Port Augusta the state capital Adelaide and in the far north town of Mingary then Mount Gambier District High School in the south east of the state 1 In 1913 he joined the junior cadets 2 He started as a messenger boy at the Mount Gambier post office in January 1915 Within six months he was working as a clerk in the town s branch of the Savings Bank of South Australia In August 1916 he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the senior cadets 1 2 In August 1917 Moten enlisted for overseas service in the Australian Imperial Force not long after he turned 18 1 by which time his mother had died 3 Moten was sent on leave apparently suffering from flat feet 1 but was discharged as medically unfit due to heart problems and poor physique in January 1918 4 Moten returned to civilian life and was transferred to the head office of the Savings Bank of South Australia in Adelaide 1 Between the wars editHaving resigned from the senior cadets Moten was appointed as a provisional lieutenant in the part time 48th Battalion Citizens Forces in July 1923 He undertook further studies studying accountancy at the University of Adelaide in 1924 1 On 6 January 1926 Moten was promoted to captain 5 Ten days later he married Kathleen Meegan a 28 year old musician at St Mary s Catholic Church Port Adelaide 1 On 29 May 1929 Moten was promoted to major 5 In 1930 with austerity measures from the Great Depression biting and the election of the Scullin Labor government universal service was suspended and due to falling volunteer numbers the 48th Battalion was amalgamated with the 43rd Battalion to form the 43rd 48th Battalion 6 At the same time the Citizens Forces were renamed the Militia 7 Moten was elected the President of the Bank Officials Association of South Australia in 1934 1 On 17 December 1936 5 Moten was promoted to lieutenant colonel and took command of the 43rd 48th Battalion By October 1938 Moten was working as a sales clerk in the mortgage department of the Savings Bank of South Australia 1 World War II editTwo months after the outbreak of World War II the 43rd 48th Battalion was delinked to again form separate battalions Moten took command of the 48th Battalion which was not immediately mobilised and remained on part time service 8 On 29 February 1940 Moten was awarded the Efficiency Decoration 9 which was issued to part time officers for 20 years of efficient commissioned service 10 On 26 April Moten joined the all volunteer Second Australian Imperial Force Second AIF and was appointed as the commanding officer of the 2 27th Battalion at the substantive rank of lieutenant colonel He was accepted despite having reduced vision in one eye 1 The battalion was raised at Woodside South Australia on 7 May where it began basic training Along with the 2 14th and 2 16th Battalions the 2 27th was attached to the 21st Brigade which formed part of the 7th Division 11 the second infantry division raised as part of the Second AIF 12 With an authorised strength of 910 men of all ranks 13 it was organised into four rifle companies designated A to D a battalion headquarters regimental aid post and a headquarters company consisting of specialist signals anti aircraft mortar carrier pioneer and administrative platoons 14 15 In August Moten attended a tactical exercise without troops at Puckapunyal in central Victoria then went on a week s pre embarkation leave at the end of September 9 nbsp Troops of the 2 27th Battalion undergoing bayonet drills in Palestine in December 1940 Palestine and Egypt edit The 2 27th Battalion entrained for Melbourne on 19 October and embarked there two days later aboard the requisitioned ocean liner Mauretania 11 16 Sailing via British India the 2 27th briefly made camp at Deolali outside of Bombay for a week before embarking on the Takliwa for the rest of the voyage to the Middle East 17 The battalion arrived in Egypt on 24 November disembarking at Kantara on the Suez Canal then moving to Julius Camp in Palestine for further training 11 18 After completing its training the unit moved with the rest of the 7th Division to the Western Desert fortresses at Mersa Matruh and nearby Maaten Bagush in April 1941 Their role was to bolster the Libyan Egyptian border defences against an anticipated German attack 11 19 The battalion did not experience direct ground combat during this period but came under frequent air attack from Axis aircraft improved their physical fitness and gained useful experience in a war zone 1 On 22 May the battalion began moving back to Palestine in preparation for the invasion of Syria and Lebanon 20 The main body of the unit crossed the Suez Canal at Kantara on 26 May and reached its assembly area at Kfar Yehezkel in northern Palestine two days later 21 Syria Lebanon campaign edit Main article Syria Lebanon campaign Brigadier Jack Stevens s 21st Brigade was given the task of advancing north up the 40 km 25 mi wide coastal route and was split into two columns Moten s column consisting of the 2 27th Battalion and some light tanks supported by artillery and engineers and with naval gunfire support was given the task of clearing the coastal road after the 2 14th Battalion had captured the border posts while a similar column based on the 2 16th Battalion advanced up the more difficult inland road A subsidiary column formed by the British Cheshire Yeomanry horsed cavalry regiment would provide eastern flank protection to Moten s column and assist if his column was held up at the Litani River 22 Initial operations and capture of Innsariye edit See also Battle of the Litani River The invasion began in the early hours of 8 June but Stevens decided not to push Moten s fully motorised column through the 2 14th Battalion but instead kept that unit moving forward to establish if the French had cratered the road or demolished bridges that would stop the 2 27th from advancing By the end of the first day the 2 14th Battalion had occupied the town of Tyre The 2 27th began moving forward on 9 June once a large crater in the road at Iskandaroun had been filled by engineers 23 In heavy fighting the 2 16th crossed the Litani by boat on 9 June and that evening supported by a company of the 2 27th Battalion they began clearing the opposite bank During this fighting the detached company of the 2 27th captured an entire company of Algerian colonial troops That night the river was bridged by the engineers using pontoons and the rest of the 2 27th began crossing in their vehicles on the morning of 10 June 24 On 10 June the 2 27th advanced along the coast road led by a squadron of cavalry mounted in carriers while the 2 16th cleared the high ground to the east The cavalry pushed on through sporadic resistance past Kafr Badda but both infantry battalions met opposition among the hills east of the road and suffered casualties 25 Stevens seeking to keep the French off balance ordered Moten to attack the French positions at Innsariye at midnight which he did after a 30 minute artillery barrage with two companies leading These met heavy resistance and were also delayed while some enemy tanks were dispersed by the artillery so a third company was swung around the leading companies on the right flank and pushed towards the battalion s final objective Moten who was forward with the third company saw an opportunity to encircle the French still resisting the leading companies and ordered the third company to take up a position on high ground overlooking a road running east from the French positions towards Es Sakiye with his headquarters and the pioneer platoon deployed onto high ground above the coastal road to block that line of withdrawal for the French The French surrendered at dawn on 11 June The 2 14th Battalion then led the advance until the following day when the 2 27th again took up the role 26 At this stage the advance was held up by the French north of Khan Saada where they had established defensive positions in the Wadi Zaharani which dominated the intersection with the road running east towards Merdjayoun A frontal attack by the 2 14th aimed at cutting this road had been unsuccessful Moten reconnoitered to the east of the French position guided by the adjutant of the 2 14th He then sent two companies forward and their successful attack secured the bridge across the Zaharani River and captured about 200 French prisoners The 2 27th continued to push forward along the coast road with lead elements reaching the village of Rhaziye where they were stopped by heavy artillery fire Two companies of the battalion managed to advance to the village of Darb es Sim near Ghazieh during the night of 12 13 June 27 Capture of Sidon edit nbsp Troops of the 2 27th Battalion advancing on 13 June 1941 The task of capturing the key city of Sidon was initially given to the 2 16th Battalion with the 2 27th companies at Darb es Sim to guard the approaches to Sidon from the east although the orders to do so had not reached them On 12 June Moten had made an assessment that the best way to capture Sidon was not to attack frontally as the 2 16th was ordered to do by Stevens but to push through the hills to the village of Miye ou Miye 5 km 3 1 mi east of Sidon then attack Sidon from the flank By the morning of 13 June Moten s forward companies were on the southern bank of the Sataniq River but he was unable to communicate with them in the rough terrain He sent a patrol to locate them and Stevens then ordered the rest of the 2 27th to join them and attack Sidon in accordance with Moten s appreciation of the best way to capture the city All members of the battalion were very weary after five days of constant advancing and fighting and when the trailing companies reached the lead ones before dawn on 14 June they relieved them so they could prepare for the attack After a gruelling cross country march to the start line the attack was met with significant resistance On the same day the 2 14th was counter attacked by a strong French force supported by tanks but this was stopped with the assistance of the artillery Acting on information from his advanced companies that Miye ou Miye had been abandoned on the morning of 15 June Moten pushed his troops forward to the village and met no opposition The 2 27th advanced to the outskirts of Sidon and a patrol was sent into the town which discovered that the French had withdrawn Moten and his headquarters entered the city shortly afterwards then Moten commandeered a taxi to report to Stevens who entered the city at 16 00 28 French counter attacks edit Initially successful French counter attacks on the inland column around Merdjayoun resulted in Stevens being ordered on 17 June to hold any further advance and send the 2 14th Battalion to reinforce Australian troops at Jezzine Stevens requested a replacement and was allocated a British unit the 2nd Battalion King s Own Royal Regiment Lancaster transferred from the British 16th Infantry Brigade 29 Despite the halt until the situation at Merdjayoun was resolved the 21st Brigade pushed forward strong cavalry patrols and on 19 June the 2 16th captured the village of Jadra north of the Wadi Zeini The 2 27th followed up and took up positions in the El Ouardaniye Sebline Kafr Maya area that afternoon On 21 June Moten sent patrols to Sebline and Kafr Maya and for the next few days the battalion picqueted the lateral roads and tracks further south protecting the eastern flank of the coastal column On 25 June Stevens sent the 2 27th and 2 16th forward to the El Haram ridgeline and ordered Moten who was to hold the right hand position on the ridge to send patrols towards Er Rezaniy In the meantime the 2 25th Battalion supported by two companies of the 2 2nd Pioneer Battalion was tasked to clear the French from the area between the two columns At dawn on 26 June the 2 27th and 2 16th secured the ridge against minimal French resistance 30 On 28 June the 7th Division reinforced by the Australian 17th Brigade was concentrated on the zones along the coast and north of Jezzine leaving operations further east to the British 6th Division This meant that Stevens command was again reduced to two battalions the 2 27th and 2 16th He requested an additional battalion to sustain operations against the town of Damour on the road to Beirut but this was not immediately forthcoming He kept his units back from the Damour River to limit casualties from French artillery but ordered his two battalions to patrol forward aggressively On 29 June Moten took his intelligence sergeant on a long reconnaissance of his right flank and identified a French position on a height known as Hill 394 which overlooked the Damour River He tasked his nearest company commander to send a strong fighting patrol to the feature that night and it was captured after brief resistance A platoon strength defensive position and observation post was established on the heights Despite heavy French shelling over four hours the platoon stayed in position Stevens wanted to avoid another frontal attack so Moten sent patrols forward to reconnoitre French positions and river crossing points on the right flank Once these had been located and similar reconnaissance of the crossings and French positions had been conducted by the 2 16th on the left Stevens was allocated the 2 2nd Pioneer Battalion but it only had two companies at this point On 1 July the 2 14th Battalion returned to the 21st Brigade from fighting around Jezzine as part of the 25th Brigade All three infantry battalions were significantly under strength due to casualties 31 Capture of Damour and armistice edit Main article Battle of Damour For the capture of Damour the 2 27th was to conduct a single company preliminary operation to destroy French positions on a spur west of the village of El Mourhira then after that company was relieved by two companies of the 2 14th Battalion the 2 27th would cross the Damour River to El Boum and Four a Chaux and turn the French flank Significant artillery support was to be provided for the brigade attack 32 The lead company of the 2 27th moved off from El Haram at dusk on 5 June and marched cross country to El Batal where they rested for three hours A little after midnight they set off again crossed the Damour at a point identified during the earlier reconnaissance and climbed up a goat track to El Boum Fixing bayonets around dawn the lead platoon stormed the village to find it empty with a few French troops fleeing in the distance The next company suffered casualties among key personnel and was scattered by artillery fire but the third company swapped objectives with it The lead company was held up by an enemy position but the arrival of the third company bolstered the assault and the position surrendered The rest of the battalion pushed on and achieved its objectives A platoon was posted on a feature known as Hill 512 which overlooked the village of Daraya After 24 hours of hard marching and climbing along with some fighting including steep ascents of 240 m 800 ft and then 300 m 1 000 ft the battalion had secured the corridor through which the 17th Brigade was to pass then attack cutting the road leading north out of Damour towards Beirut Ultimately Stevens pushed the 2 14th Battalion less the two companies at El Mourhira through the corridor to secure the start line for the 17th Brigade attack and the 17th Brigade followed 33 The most advanced company of the 2 27th reached the eastern outskirts of Damour and sent two platoons into the town where they had several sharp exchanges of fire with French troops and captured more than their own number 34 Attacks from the south prompted the French to withdraw and the town was secured by the morning of 9 July 35 nbsp Moten centre right and his men were visited by the commander of the 7th Division Major General Arthur Tubby Allen at Hammana Lebanon on 2 September 1941 It soon became apparent that the French had withdrawn a considerable distance on all fronts of the campaign and Stevens was ordered secure the villages of Abey and Kafra Matta overlooking Damour Moten sent out a patrol that found the villages empty of French troops which were then occupied by the 2 14th 36 The French commander had been considering capitulation for a couple of weeks at this stage and a message had been sent to him by the commander of the Australian I Corps Lieutenant General John Lavarack as early as 30 June urging him to negotiate A ceasefire came into force at 00 01 on 12 July 37 The 2 27th had suffered over 150 casualties during the campaign 38 Following the surrender of Vichy forces the 2 27th undertook garrison duties around Hammana near Beirut and Bakhaoun in the Tripoli sector as part of the Allied occupation force 11 39 In October Moten spent two weeks in hospital with measles 40 Brigade command and awards editMoten was promoted to colonel and temporary brigadier on 27 December and left the 2 27th to be immediately appointed as the commander of the 17th Brigade part of the 6th Division 9 He quietly and efficiently took over the brigade from Stanley Savige 1 who had been appointed Director of Recruiting and Propaganda in Australia 41 The principal fighting units of the 17th Brigade were the 2 5th 2 6th and 2 7th Battalions 42 When Moten took command the 17th Brigade was training and re equipping in Syria with the rest of the 6th Division after the disastrous Greek campaign 43 On 12 February 1942 Moten was mentioned in despatches for distinguished services in the Middle East and made a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order DSO for excellent leadership and gallantry in the capture of Sidon 44 The citation for the DSO read 45 To effect the capture of Saida Sidon in the face of a well organized and determined defence which blocked any progress along the Coast Road it was necessary to turn the position from the right flank On 13 Jun therefore Lt Col M J Moten was ordered to take his Bn into high ground and capture Mey Ouimye The terrain over which the Bn was forced to move was extremely difficult and during the move fwd it was dive bombed and machine gunned from the air and came under Arty fire Due to Lt Col Moten s driving force and initiative the posn was captured on 14 Jun and the Bn taken fwd into such a posn as to force the abandonment of the Saida defences On the morning of 15 Jun Col Moten perceived that the Saida garrison had apparently withdrawn and immediately sent a patrol into the town Throughout these two days his example initiative and leadership contributed very largely to the abandonment of the Saida defences This officer also showed excellent leadership skills gallantry and devotion to duty at Battle of Damour The London Gazette 12 February 1942 Ceylon edit In early January 1942 it was agreed between the British and Australian governments that the 6th Division would be withdrawn from Syria and move to the Far East in response to the entry of Japan into the war 46 In late January and early February the Australian government agreed to the deployment of the 6th Division to Java to oppose the Japanese southward thrust 47 These plans were soon changed when it was decided that two brigades should be diverted to defend Ceylon modern day Sri Lanka and the 16th and 17th Brigades were chosen for this task 48 Moten embarked from the Middle East with his headquarters on 10 March and disembarked at Colombo on 24 March 49 The Second AIF force in Ceylon was commanded by Major General Allan Boase on promotion from commanding the 16th Brigade The force was responsible for the southwest corner of Ceylon the area considered most likely for a Japanese landing The areas not covered by coconut rubber and tea plantations consisted of thick bush or rice paddies As future fighting would be vastly different from what they had experienced Moten established a Jungle Warfare School to prepare his troops The Australians were also involved in improving the weak transport infrastructure Japanese carrier borne aircraft attacked Ceylon on both 5 and 9 April and sank several British and Australian ships operating in the region 50 The 17th Brigade was stationed around Akuressa 51 About this time the newly appointed Commander in Chief Australian Military Forces General Sir Thomas Blamey decided that the brigades in Ceylon would return to Australia 52 The 17th Brigade headquarters commenced its voyage back to Australia aboard the Athlone Castle in July 51 and arrived in Melbourne on 4 August 49 Papua and New Guinea edit The brigade went into camp near Seymour Victoria and after a brief period of leave on 28 August a welcome home parade was held in Melbourne for the brigade On the same day Moten received a warning order for a brigade move to New South Wales 53 Due to railway congestion and equipment deficiencies the move to Greta in the Hunter Valley was not completed until 20 September During the move Moten visited Melbourne and was permitted to read a confidential report on the fighting on the Kokoda Trail in New Guinea written by the war correspondent Chester Wilmot The brigade had barely consolidated at Greta and conducted an initial training exercise before it was ordered to Brisbane in Queensland 54 By 6 October the brigade was consolidated in the northern suburbs of Brisbane but its stay there was brief as it embarked two days later Moten flew to Townsville in north Queensland then on to Cairns then Port Moresby in the Territory of New Guinea on 12 October The following day he flew to Milne Bay in the Territory of Papua where the brigade was now heading 55 Despite the resounding Allied victory in the Battle of Milne Bay in August and September and the need to deploy the whole 18th Brigade elsewhere the Allied commanders were not willing to weaken the defences of the strategically important base at Milne Bay The 17th Brigade was therefore directed there to relieve the remaining battalion of the 18th Brigade which was part of Major General Cyril Clowes Milne Force redesignated the 11th Division on 1 October The advance party of the brigade arrived in mid October and the battalions arrived soon afterwards 56 There was little Japanese activity in the area so the brigade was not involved in any significant fighting at Milne Bay There was a significant spike in malaria infections in the area during the time the 17th Brigade was part of the garrison peaking at over 80 cases per 1 000 men per week around Christmas 1942 This was due to a combination of the disease being endemic in the area poor anti malarial supervision by officers of fighting units and inadequate anti malarial supplies 57 Moten administered command of the 11th Division from 29 December until he flew to Wau in the New Guinea on 9 January 1943 to conduct a reconnaissance for a planned brigade deployment to the area The 29th Brigade arrived to relive the 17th Brigade and brigade units began departing by sea for Port Moresby on 10 January 49 58 Defence of Wau edit Main article Battle of Wau An ad hoc Australian formation known as Kanga Force had been monitoring and harassing the Japanese bases at Lae and Salamaua since early 1942 By the time Moten arrived in Wau the core of the force consisted of the 2 5th and 2 7th Independent Companies irregular units trained for long range patrol and surveillance In early January a Japanese troop convoy sailed from Rabaul to Lae with reinforcements and despite interdiction by Allied air attacks successfully landed most of the troops on 7 January 1943 In response Kanga Force launched a successful attack on the Japanese advanced position at Mubo and withdrew under Japanese pressure The arrival of the Japanese reinforcements at Lae prompted the Allied decision to send the 17th Brigade to Wau to bolster Kanga Force ahead of an expected Japanese advance on Wau 59 60 Moten returned to Port Moresby on 14 January and the following day he received written orders that he was to take over defences at Wau and command of Kanga Force 61 On 14 January the first fighting elements of the 17th Brigade began arriving in Wau by air led by B Company of the 2 6th Battalion and the advanced brigade headquarters B Company was immediately pushed forward to support the independent companies while the bulk of the 2 6th had arrived in Wau by 19 January and another company was quickly placed astride another track leading from Lae to Wau The air transport of the brigade was hampered by poor flying weather and accidents and it took much of the following week for the rest of the brigade to concentrate in Wau Moten s aircraft turned back on 15 January and he did not reach Wau until the following day He was scathing about the air transport arrangements saying that they were uneconomical and haphazard By 19 January significant elements of the 2 6th were effectively deployed on the tracks leading towards Wau 62 On 21 January a patrol from the 2 6th observed Japanese troops moving forward but the enemy axis of advance was not clear The last of the 2 6th arrived in Wau on 23 January and the following day the lead elements of the 2 5th Battalion and some engineers flew in Moten intensified patrolling to establish the Japanese main advance and by 26 January had determined that they were using an old disused track labelled the Jap Track He decided that despite a lack of reserves in Wau due to the slow buildup he would attack the advancing Japanese from the forward positions of the 2 6th on the Black Cat Track An aggressive enemy advance up the Jap Track completely derailed this plan and Moten responded with piecemeal defensive deployments as troops arrived in Wau including forward positions south east of Wau near Leahy s Farm By late on 28 January the rest of the 2 5th had not been able to get to Wau and the 2 7th Battalion was also stuck on the ground in Port Moresby Moten called most of his forward elements to withdraw to Wau and deployed them in close defence of the village and airfield Finally on the morning of 29 January the weather broke enough for the rest of the 2 5th and the main body of the 2 7th Battalion to arrive They were rushed into defensive positions around the airfield 63 Before dawn on 30 January the Japanese assault on the airfield began beginning from the south east Moten s positions held and by mid morning he considered that with the arrival of two guns of the 2 1st Field Regiment on aircraft earlier that morning he could take the initiative using a company of the 2 7th to forestall a Japanese flanking manoeuvre to the south of Leahy s Farm leaving the remainder of the force to protect the airfield This move supported by strafing by Royal Australian Air Force Bristol Beaufighters caused significant enemy casualties and stopped the Japanese in their tracks The following day the 2 3rd Independent Company and 100 reinforcements for the 2 6th Battalion arrived to further bolster Kanga Force 64 More reinforcements arrived on 1 February bringing Kanga Force strength to 201 officers and 2 965 men By nightfall on 3 February the Wau defences were holding well another company of the 2 7th had been pushed forward south of Leahy s Farm to block further Japanese advances and their assaults were clearly weakening That evening Moten signalled New Guinea Force that Wau was secure 65 Moten then committed the 2 5th Battalion to offensive action and in hard fighting up to 9 February they cleared the area west of the Bulolo River killing hundreds of Japanese and putting the rest to flight 66 This effectively destroyed Japanese strength in the Wau Valley 67 After consolidation Moten rested part of the 2 5th and pushed the three platoons of the 2 3rd Independent Company along the three tracks leading towards Mubo On the northern Black Cat Track elements of the 2 6th largely held off a Japanese counter attack on 10 February Moten held them there rather than withdrawing them to Wau to rest as the overall situation remained unclear They were relieved by a 2 3rd Independent Company platoon on 15 February The Japanese fell back in an orderly fashion towards Mubo harassed by aircraft and patrols On 26 February an attack by the 2 5th Battalion and 2 7th Independent Company from the Australian right flank to clear the Japanese staging areas around Buibaining met with almost no opposition By the end of the month Moten s force had driven the Japanese back to Mubo 68 During the advance to Wau and retreat to Mubo the main Japanese fighting force the 102nd Infantry Regiment had likely suffered around 1 200 killed as well as some who had died of starvation 69 In early March Moten was recommended by the General Officer Commanding New Guinea Force Lieutenant General Sir Iven Mackay for an immediate award of a bar to the DSO he had been awarded for his performance in the Syria Lebanon campaign The recommendation was supported by Blamey 70 On 18 May 1943 71 Moten was awarded the bar to his DSO for a high order of leadership and control during the Battle of Wau The citation for the DSO read 72 Brigadier MOTEN D S O E D commanded 17 Aust Inf Bde Group which successfully defeated the strong Japanese attack on WAU between Jan 27 and Feb 20 1943 From captured orders it is known that the Japanese attack was made by 102 Regtl Grp of which two Infantry Battalions augmented by the personnel of one Artillery Battery and one Engineer Company were forward the Third Infantry Battalion being in reserve When the Japanese attack suddenly developed at WANDUMI on Jan 27 Brigadier MOTEN had with him only half of 17 Inf Bde personnel and no Artillery On Jan 30 the enemy made a heavy attack and came within 400 yards of WAU airfield This effort was however repelled by the infantry with its light weapons and 350 casualties inflicted on the Japanese After the arrival of reinforcements on Jan 30 31 Brigadier MOTEN further defeated the enemy and proceeded to drive him back eventually by Feb 20 forcing him back to WAIPALI GAUDAGSAL AREA more than 20 miles from WAU It is estimated that the Japanese casualties in the whole operation were not less than 1200 Under critical circumstances Brigadier MOTEN showed a high order of leadership and control Salamaua Lae campaign edit Main article Salamaua Lae campaign In early March Moten reminded his forward troops the 2 7th Independent Company supported by the 2 5th Battalion to maintain close contact with the Japanese This they did via aggressive patrolling and by the end of March were closed up on Mubo itself 73 In early April Moten sent the 2 7th Battalion to relieve the forward troops 74 Moten had decided that the main threat to Wau was now from the area of the Markham Valley he deployed the 2 6th Battalion to cover those approaches the 2 7th remained opposite Mubo and the 2 3rd Independent Company was positioned in the Missim area By this time the 2 5th and 2 7th Independent Companies were being withdrawn and the lead battalion of the 15th Brigade the 24th was arriving 75 Throughout April Moten s force continued to patrol the approaches to Mubo 76 The terrain and weather were some of the most unpleasant faced by Australian troops during the war Rugged mountains almost impenetrable jungle kunai grass gloom and rain were the rule for much of the time Moten established rest camps where his troops could sleep in dry conditions have a few hot meals and wash themselves and their uniforms These were positioned rear of the forward positions and one was established at Edie Creek Such rest camps helped reduce the depression and illness that went hand in hand with the terrible conditions 77 On 23 April Kanga Force was dissolved and the headquarters of Major General Stanley Savige s 3rd Division opened at Bulolo taking command of Moten s brigade 78 An abortive company attack on a Japanese held feature called The Pimple by the 2 7th Battalion on 24 and 25 April showed that extensive reconnaissance improved communication and pinpoint accuracy from supporting aircraft and artillery were required for such limited offensive actions to be successful Savige s initial directions to Moten were that the 17th Brigade was to prevent the Japanese from entering the Bulolo Valley from the Mubo area secure the Mubo Guadagasal Waipali area and gain control of the coastal area immediate south of the Bitoli River 79 Moten s concern about his left flank meant that he retained the 2 5th Battalion at Wau to patrol along the two tracks from Waipali the Jap Track and Black Cat Track At this point Moten believed the best location for his headquarters remained at Wau but Savige disagreed and urged him forward 80 A further attempt on The Pimple by a company of the 2 7th Battalion on 2 May was also a failure although the air support improved This decided Savige on a policy of not attacking prepared defensive positions but instead to use aggressive patrolling and minor limited attacks to outflank neutralise and isolate the Japanese defenders 81 Despite this on 7 May the 2 7th mounted yet another fruitless attack on The Pimple Total casualties for the 2 7th Battalion from the three attacks amounted to 12 killed and 25 wounded Two days later a company of the 2 7th Battalion was surrounded by a Japanese attack and the relieving force had to fight through to them with some difficulty over the following two days 82 After a frank exchange of views between Savige and Moten regarding the location of Moten s headquarters Savige clarified that Moten was not responsible for the defence of the Wau Valley itself but only to prevent entry into the valley from Mubo and Moten moved his headquarters forward to Skindewai Despite their differences Savige and Moten continued to work well together 83 On 12 May Moten revised his plan based on his expectation that the Japanese would remain on a defensive footing around Salamaua and Mubo and decided he would continue to use only one battalion forward with a company securing the coast south from the Bitoli River to Nassau Bay through raiding The 2 7th Battalion remained forward with a company of the 2 6th attached for the coastal task and the rest of the brigade would be held in reserve Both Savige and Moten were concerned about the southern or right flank around Nassau Bay and Duali Moten concentrated on aggressive patrolling and soon this had restricted the Japanese to their defensive positions Towards the end of May Moten brought the 2 6th Battalion up to relieve the 2 7th Battalion in the brigade forward area 84 By the first week in June the 2 6th was deployed with companies on Lababia Ridge with a platoon at Napier at Mat Mat at Summit and at the Saddle The 2 5th and 2 7th Battalions were located in and around Wau Moten was unhappy with the position of the 2 6th Battalion company at Lababia Ridge and ordered adjustments so that Japanese activity near the Pimple would be easier to detect At the same time Moten was tasked with assisting the landing of a US battalion at Nassau Bay followed by an attack on Mubo as part of an upcoming offensive and he tasked reconnaissance patrols to Nassau Bay 85 Moten was tasked with coordinating the landing and then taking the US battalion under command capturing Mubo On 15 June Moten briefed senior commanders including the commander of New Guinea Force Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Herring and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff Major General Frank Berryman on his five phase plan for the operation and Herring expressed his satisfaction with Moten s arrangements 86 The 17th Brigade repulsed Japanese assaults at Mubo and Lababia Ridge and following the capture of Komiatum and Mount Tambu in August Moten was appointed Commander of the Order of the British Empire and again mentioned in despatches The 17th Brigade returned to Australia for rest and regrouping and later returned to New Guinea for the Aitape Wewak campaign Moten took command of the 6th Division from 18 November 1945 Later life edit nbsp Moten s grave at Centennial Park Cemetery After returning to Australia Moten was transferred to the Regimental Supernumerary List on 17 January 1946 in Adelaide and he resumed his civilian career He led the Australian army component of the Victory March in London in June Moten became the Australian Army Representative of the Imperial War Graves Commission in 1947 and went on to command the 9th Brigade of the CMF and while serving in this capacity he was appointed honorary colonel of the 27th Battalion of the CMF in 1952 1 He was promoted as the general manager of the Savings Bank of South Australia in December He was appointed as an aide de camp to the Governor General of Australia on 16 March 1953 Moten collapsed at the 27th Battalion ball at the Torrens Drill Hall on 5 September 1953 and on 14 September while in the Royal Adelaide Hospital he died of a heart attack He was buried with full military honours in Centennial Park Cemetery with Anglican and Catholic rites He was survived by his wife daughter and two sons His son John Moten was Director General of Security the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation from 1988 to 1991 Footnotes edit a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Sutton 2006 a b National Archives 2021 p 27 National Archives 2021 p 23 National Archives 2021 p 35 a b c National Archives 2021 p 18 Kuring 2004 p 112 Palazzo 2001 p 110 McKenzie Smith 2018 p 2248 a b c National Archives 2021 p 50 The London Gazette 17 October 1930 pp 6309 6311 a b c d e Australian War Memorial 2021 Kuring 2004 p 117 Palazzo 2004 p 94 Kuring 2004 p 139 Australian War Memorial 2014 Burns 1960 p 20 Burns 1960 pp 24 25 Burns 1960 pp 26 27 Long 1953 p 335 2 27th Battalion War Diary May 1941 p 23 2 27th Battalion War Diary May 1941 pp 27 28 Long 1953 pp 341 343 Long 1953 pp 348 351 Long 1953 pp 360 366 Long 1953 pp 366 367 Long 1953 pp 375 378 Long 1953 pp 378 379 Long 1953 pp 380 385 Long 1953 pp 412 413 Long 1953 pp 460 462 Long 1953 pp 465 474 Long 1953 pp 480 481 Long 1953 pp 482 484 Long 1953 pp 490 495 Long 1953 pp 495 502 Long 1953 p 503 Long 1953 pp 511 513 Long 1953 p 526 Burns 1960 pp 86 99 National Archives 2021 pp 50 51 17th Brigade War Diary December 1941 p 2 Australian War Memorial 2005 Long 1953 pp 535 amp 544 The London Gazette 12 February 1942 pp 703 amp 705 National Archives 2021 p 48 Long 1953 p 549 550 Wigmore 1957 pp 443 444 Wigmore 1957 p 460 a b c National Archives 2021 p 51 McCarthy 1959 pp 77 79 a b McKenzie Smith 2018 p 2085 McCarthy 1959 pp 25 26 17th Brigade War Diary August 1942 pp 2 4 17th Brigade War Diary September 1942 pp 2 5 17th Brigade War Diary October 1942 pp 2 4 McCarthy 1959 p 349 Walker 1957 pp 112 114 17th Brigade War Diary January 1943 p 3 Kuring 2004 pp 140 amp 176 McCarthy 1959 pp 540 543 McCarthy 1959 p 545 McCarthy 1959 pp 543 546 McCarthy 1959 pp 547 554 McCarthy 1959 pp 544 557 McCarthy 1959 pp 558 563 McCarthy 1959 pp 563 568 McCarthy 1959 p 573 McCarthy 1959 pp 568 574 McCarthy 1959 p 576 National Archives 2021 p 16 The London Gazette 18 May 1943 National Archives 2021 p 56 McCarthy 1959 pp 583 584 McCarthy 1959 p 586 Dexter 1961 p 24 Dexter 1961 p 18 Dexter 1961 pp 21 22 McCarthy 1959 p 588 Dexter 1961 pp 28 31 Dexter 1961 p 31 Dexter 1961 pp 34 35 Dexter 1961 pp 38 41 Dexter 1961 pp 42 43 Dexter 1961 pp 43 52 Dexter 1961 pp 59 62 Dexter 1961 p 71 References editBooks edit Burns John 1960 The Brown and Blue Diamond at War The Story of the 2 27th Battalion A I F Adelaide South Australia 2 27th Battalion Ex servicemen s Association OCLC 2104460 Dexter David St Alban 1961 The New Guinea Offensives Australia in the War of 1939 1945 Series 1 Army Vol VI 1st online ed Canberra Australian Capital Territory Australian War Memorial OCLC 220806033 Kuring Ian 2004 Redcoats to Cams A History of Australian Infantry 1788 2001 Loftus New South Wales Australian Military History Publications ISBN 1 876439 99 8 Long Gavin 1953 Greece Crete and Syria Australia in the War of 1939 1945 Series 1 Army Vol II 1st online ed Canberra Australian Capital Territory Australian War Memorial OCLC 3134080 McCarthy Dudley 1959 South West Pacific Area First Year Kokoda to Wau Australia in the War of 1939 45 Series 1 Army Vol V Canberra Australian Capital Territory Australian War Memorial OCLC 3134247 McKenzie Smith Graham 2018 The Unit Guide The Australian Army 1939 1945 Vol 2 Warriewood New South Wales Big Sky Publishing ISBN 978 1 925675 146 Palazzo Albert 2001 The Australian Army A History of its Organisation 1901 2001 Melbourne Victoria Oxford University Press ISBN 978 0 19 551506 0 Palazzo Albert 2004 Organising for Jungle Warfare In Dennis Peter Grey Jeffrey eds The Foundations of Victory The Pacific War 1943 1944 Canberra Australian Capital Territory Army History Unit pp 86 101 ISBN 978 0 646 43590 9 Archived from the original on 9 March 2016 Walker Allan Seymour 1957 The Island Campaigns Australia in the War of 1939 1945 Series 5 Medical Vol III 1st ed Canberra Australian Capital Territory Australian War Memorial OCLC 1070821527 Retrieved 26 December 2021 Wigmore Lionel 1957 The Japanese Thrust Australia in the War of 1939 1945 Series 1 Army Vol IV 1st ed Canberra Australian Capital Territory Australian War Memorial OCLC 464084033 Retrieved 25 December 2021 Websites edit 17th Brigade Australian War Memorial Archived from the original on 25 November 2005 Retrieved 25 December 2021 2 27th Battalion Australian War Memorial Retrieved 19 December 2021 Army Detailed Structure Military Organisation and Structure Australian War Memorial Archived from the original on 9 January 2014 Retrieved 21 December 2021 NAA B2458 420451 National Archives of Australia Retrieved 19 December 2021 Sutton R 2006 Moten Murray John 1899 1953 Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol 15 National Centre of Biography Australian National University pp 429 430 ISSN 1833 7538 Retrieved 19 December 2021 SX2889 Brigadier Murray John Moten CBE DSO amp Bar Australian War Memorial Archived from the original on 6 March 2016 Retrieved 19 December 2021 War diaries and gazettes edit 17th Brigade War Diary December 1941 Australian War Memorial Retrieved 21 December 2021 17th Brigade War Diary August 1942 Australian War Memorial Retrieved 25 December 2021 17th Brigade War Diary September 1942 Australian War Memorial Retrieved 25 December 2021 17th Brigade War Diary October 1942 Australian War Memorial Retrieved 25 December 2021 17th Brigade War Diary January 1943 Australian War Memorial Retrieved 26 December 2021 2 27th Battalion War Diary May 1941 Australian War Memorial Retrieved 21 December 2021 No 33653 The London Gazette 17 October 1930 No 35452 The London Gazette Supplement 12 February 1942 No 36018 The London Gazette Supplement 18 May 1943 Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Murray Moten amp oldid 1182553528, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

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