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First Congo War

May 15, 2023

First Congo War
Part of the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and the spillover of the Burundian Civil War and the Second Sudanese Civil War

Map showing the AFDL offensive
Date24 October 1996 – 16 May 1997
(6 months, 3 weeks and 1 day)
Location
Zaire, with spillovers into Uganda and Sudan[5]
Result Decisive AFDL victory
Belligerents

 Zaire

 Sudan[1]
 Chad[2]
Ex-FAR/ALiR
Interahamwe
CNDD-FDD[3]
UNITA[4]
ADF[5]
FLNC[6]
Supported by:
 France[7][8]
 Central African Republic[8]
 China[9]
 Israel[9]
 Kuwait (denied)[9]

Mai-Mai[a]

AFDL
 Rwanda
 Uganda[13]
 Burundi[14]
 Angola[14]
SPLA[1]
 Eritrea[15]
Supported by:
 South Africa[16]
 Zambia[17]
 Zimbabwe[16]
 Ethiopia[18]
 Tanzania[19]
 United States (covertly)[20]

Mai-Mai[a]
Commanders and leaders
Mobutu Sese Seko
Donatien Mahele Lieko Bokungu 
Christian Tavernier
Omar al-Bashir
Jonas Savimbi
Paul Rwarakabije
Robert Kajuga
Tharcisse Renzaho		 Laurent-Désiré Kabila
André Kisase Ngandu †
Paul Kagame
James Kabarebe
Yoweri Museveni
Pierre Buyoya
José Eduardo dos Santos
Strength
Zaire: c. 50,000[b]
Interahamwe: 40,000–100,000 total[22]
UNITA: c. 1,000[22]–2,000[6]

AFDL: 57,000[23]

Rwanda: 3,500–4,000[23][25]
Angola: 3,000+[25]
Eritrea: 1 battalion[26]
Casualties and losses
10,000–15,000 killed
10,000 defected[25]
thousands surrender		 3,000–5,000 killed
222,000 refugees missing[27]
Total: 250,000 dead[28]

The First Congo War[c] (1996–1997), also nicknamed Africa's First World War,[29] was a civil war and international military conflict which took place mostly in Zaire (present-day Democratic Republic of the Congo), with major spillovers into Sudan and Uganda. The conflict culminated in a foreign invasion that replaced Zairean president Mobutu Sese Seko with the rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Kabila's unstable government subsequently came into conflict with his allies, setting the stage for the Second Congo War in 1998–2003.

Following years of internal strife, dictatorship and economic decline, Zaire was a dying state by 1996. The eastern parts of the country had been destabilized due to the Rwandan genocide which had perforated its borders, as well as long-lasting regional conflicts and resentments left unresolved since the Congo Crisis. In many areas state authority had in all but name collapsed, with infighting militias, warlords, and rebel groups (some sympathetic to the government, others openly hostile) wielding effective power.[30][31] The population of Zaire had become restless and resentful of the inept and corrupt regime; the Zairean Armed Forces were in a catastrophic condition.[32][21] Mobutu, who had become terminally ill, was no longer able to keep the different factions in the government under control, making their loyalty questionable. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War meant that Mobutu's strong anti-communist stance was no longer sufficient to justify the political and financial support he had received from the capitalist powers – his regime, therefore, was essentially politically and financially bankrupt.[33][20]

The situation finally escalated when Rwanda invaded Zaire in 1996 to defeat a number of rebel groups which had found refuge in the country. This invasion quickly escalated, as more states (including Uganda, Burundi, Angola, and Eritrea) joined the invasion, while a Congolese alliance of anti-Mobutu rebels was assembled.[30] Though the Zairean government attempted to put up an effective resistance, and was supported by allied militias as well as Sudan, Mobutu's regime collapsed in a matter of months.[34] Despite the war's short duration, it was marked by widespread destruction and extensive ethnic violence, with hundreds of thousands killed in the fighting and accompanying pogroms.[35]

A new government was installed, and Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but the termination of the Mobutu regime brought little political change, and Kabila found himself uneasy in the position of a proxy of his former benefactors. To avert a coup, Kabila expelled all Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian military units from the Congo, and moved to build a coalition including Namibian, Angolan, Zimbabwean and Zambian forces, soon encompassing a string of African nations from Libya to South Africa, although their support varied.[36] The tripartite coalition responded with a second invasion of the east, largely through proxy groups. These actions constituted the catalyst for the Second Congo War the following year, although some experts prefer to view the two conflicts as one continuous war whose aftereffects continue today.[37][38]

Background

Dying state in Zaire

Further information: Zaire and 1991 Zaire unrest
 
Mobutu Sese Seko, long-time dictator of Zaire

An ethnic Ngbandi, Mobutu came to power in 1965 and enjoyed support from the United States government because of his anti-communist stance while in office. However, Mobutu's totalitarian rule and corrupt policies allowed the Zairian state to decay, evidenced by a 65% decrease in Zairian GDP between independence in 1960 and the end of Mobutu's reign in 1997.[39] Following the end of the Cold War in 1992, the United States stopped supporting Mobutu in favour of what it called a "new generation of African leaders",[40] including Rwanda's Paul Kagame and Uganda's Yoweri Museveni.

A wave of democratisation swept across Africa during the 1990s.[citation needed] Under substantial internal and external pressure for a democratic transition in Zaire, Mobutu promised reform. He officially ended the one-party system he had maintained since 1967, but ultimately proved unwilling to implement broad reform, alienating allies both at home and abroad. In fact, the Zairian state had all but ceased to exist.[41] The majority of the Zairian population relied on an informal economy for their subsistence, since the official economy was not reliable.[41] Furthermore, the Zairian national army, Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ), was forced to prey upon the population for survival; Mobutu himself allegedly once asked FAZ soldiers why they needed pay when they had weapons.[42]

Mobutu's rule encountered considerable internal resistance, and given the weak central state, rebel groups could find refuge in Zaire's eastern provinces, far from the capital, Kinshasa. Opposition groups included leftists who had supported Patrice Lumumba (1925–1961), as well as ethnic and regional minorities opposed to the nominal dominance of Kinshasa. Laurent-Désiré Kabila, an ethnic Luba from Katanga province who would eventually overthrow Mobutu, had fought Mobutu's régime since its inception.[43] The inability of the Mobutuist régime to control rebel movements in its eastern provinces eventually allowed its internal and external foes to ally.

Ethnic tensions

Tensions had existed between various ethnic groups in eastern Zaire for centuries, especially between the agrarian tribes of Congo and the Banyarwanda in the Eastern region of Congo of Kivu. When colonial boundaries were drawn in the late nineteenth century many Banyarwanda found themselves on the Congolese side of the Rwandan border, in Kivu province.[44] The earliest of these migrants arrived before colonisation in the 1880s, followed by emigrants whom the Belgian colonizers forcibly relocated to Congo to perform manual labour (after 1908), and by another significant wave of emigrants fleeing the social revolution of 1959 that brought the Hutu to power in Kigali.[45]

Tutsi who emigrated to Zaire before Congolese independence in 1960 are known as Banyamulenge, meaning "from Mulenge", and had the right to citizenship under Zairian law.[46] Tutsi who emigrated to Zaire following independence are known as Banyarwanda, although the native locals often do not distinguish between the two, call them both Banyamulenge and consider them foreigners.[45]

After coming to power in 1965, Mobutu gave the Banyamulenge political power in the east in hopes that they, as a minority, would keep a tight grip on power and prevent more populous ethnicities from forming an opposition.[47] This move aggravated the existing ethnic tensions by strengthening the Banyamulenge's hold over important stretches of land in North Kivu that indigenous people claimed as their own.[47] From 1963 to 1966 the Hunde and Nande ethnic groups of North Kivu fought against Rwandan emigrants[48] — both Tutsi and Hutu – in the Kanyarwandan War, which involved several massacres.[49][50]

Despite a strong Rwandan presence in Mobutu's government, in 1981, Zaire adopted a restrictive citizenship law which denied the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda citizenship and therewith all political rights.[51] Though never enforced, the law greatly angered individuals of Rwandan descent and contributed to a rising sense of ethnic hatred.[47] From 1993 to 1996 Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga youth regularly attacked the Banyamulenge, leading to a total of 14,000 deaths.[52] In 1995 the Zairian Parliament ordered all peoples of Rwandan or Burundian descent repatriated to their countries of origin, including the Banyamulenge.[53] Due to political exclusion and ethnic violence, as early as 1991 the Banyamulenge developed ties to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a mainly Tutsi rebel movement based in Uganda but with aspirations to power in Rwanda.[54]

Rwandan genocide

Main articles: Rwandan Civil War and Rwandan Genocide
 
A Rwandan refugee camp in Zaire, 1994

The most deciding event in precipitating the war was the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda in 1994, which sparked a mass exodus of refugees known as the Great Lakes refugee crisis. During the 100-day genocide, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and sympathizers were massacred at the hands of predominantly Hutu aggressors. The genocide ended when the Hutu government in Kigali was overthrown by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

Of those who fled Rwanda during the crisis, about 1.5 million settled in eastern Zaire.[55] These refugees included Tutsi who fled the Hutu génocidaires as well as one million Hutus that fled the Tutsi RPF's subsequent retaliation.[47] Prominent among the latter group were the génocidaires themselves, such as elements of the former Rwandan Army, Forces armées rwandaises [fr] (FAR), and independent Hutu extremist groups known as Interahamwe.[56] Often, these Hutu forces allied themselves with local Mai Mai militias, who granted them access to mines and weapons. Though these were initially self-defense organizations, they quickly became aggressors.[47]

The Hutu set up camps in eastern Zaire from which they attacked both the newly arrived Rwandan Tutsi as well as the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda. These attacks caused about one hundred deaths a month during the first half of 1996.[57] Furthermore, the newly arrived militants were intent on returning to power in Rwanda and began launching attacks against the new regime in Kigali, which represented a serious security threat to the infant state.[58] Not only was the Mobutu government incapable of controlling the former génocidaires for previously mentioned reasons but actually supported them in training and supplying for an invasion of Rwanda,[59] forcing Kigali to act.

Banyamulenge rebellion

Given the exacerbated ethnic tensions and the lack of government control in the past, Rwanda took action against the security threat posed by génocidaires who had found refuge in eastern Zaire. The government in Kigali began forming Tutsi militias for operations in Zaire probably as early as 1995[60] and chose to act following an exchange of fire between Rwandan Tutsi and Zairian Green Berets that marked the outbreak of the Banyamulenge Rebellion on 31 August 1996.[61]

While there was general unrest in eastern Zaire, the rebellion was probably not a grassroots movement; Uganda president Yoweri Museveni, who supported and worked closely with Rwanda in the First Congo War, later recalled that the rebellion was incited by Zairian Tutsi who had been recruited by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA).[60] The initial goal of the Banyamulenge Rebellion was to seize power in Zaire's eastern Kivu provinces and combat the extremist Hutu forces attempting to continue the genocide in their new home. However, the rebellion did not remain Tutsi-dominated for long. Mobutu's harsh and selfish rule created enemies in virtually all sectors of Zairian society. As a result, the new rebellion benefited from massive public support and grew to be a general revolution rather than a mere Banyamulenge uprising.[62]

Banyamulenge elements and non-Tutsi militias coalesced into the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, who had been a long-time opponent of the Mobutu government and was a leader of one of the three main rebel groups that founded the AFDL. While the AFDL was an ostensibly Zairian rebel movement, Rwanda had played a key role in its formation. Observers of the war, as well as the Rwandan Defense Minister and Vice-President at the time, Paul Kagame, claim that the AFDL was formed in and directed from Kigali and contained not only Rwandan-trained troops but also regulars of the RPA.[63]

Foreign involvement

Rwanda

 
Map of Zaire in c.1996

According to expert observers, as well as Kagame himself, Rwanda played the largest role of a foreign actor, if not the largest role of all, in the First Congo War. Kigali was instrumental in the formation of the AFDL and sent its own troops to fight alongside the rebels. While its actions were originally sparked by the security threat posed by the Zairian-based génocidaires, Kigali was pursuing multiple goals during its invasion of Zaire.

The first and foremost of these was the suppression of génocidaires who had been launching attacks against the new Rwandan state from Zaire. Kagame claimed that Rwandan agents had discovered the plans to invade Rwanda with support from Mobutu; in response, Kigali began its intervention with the intention of dismantling the refugee camps in which the génocidaires often took refuge and destroying the structure of these anti-Rwandan elements.[63]

A second goal cited by Kagame was the overthrow of Mobutu. While partially a means to minimize the threat in eastern Zaire, the new Rwandan state also sought to set up a puppet regime in Kinshasa.[40] This goal was not particularly threatening to other states in the region because it was ostensibly a means to securing Rwandan stability and because many of them also opposed Mobutu. Kigali was further aided by the tacit support of the United States, which supported Kagame as a member of the new generation of African leaders.[40]

However, the true intentions of Rwanda are not entirely clear. Some authors have proposed that dismantling refugee camps was a means of replenishing Rwanda's depleted population and workforce following the genocide; because the destruction of the camps was followed by forced repatriation of Tutsi regardless of whether they were Rwandan or Zairian.[64] The intervention may also have been motivated by revenge; the Rwandan forces, as well as the AFDL, massacred retreating Hutu refugees in several known instances.[65] A commonly cited factor for Rwandan actions is that the RPF, which had recently come to power in Kigali, had come to see itself as the protector of the Tutsi nation and was therefore partially acting in defense of its Zairian brethren.[66][47]

Rwanda possibly also harbored ambitions to annex portions of eastern Zaire. Pasteur Bizimungu, president of Rwanda from 1994 to 2000, presented the then-US ambassador to Rwanda, Robert Gribbin, with the idea of a "Greater Rwanda." This idea purports that the ancient state of Rwanda included parts of eastern Zaire that should actually belong to Rwanda.[67] However, it appears that Rwanda never seriously attempted to annex these territories. The history of conflict in the Congo is often associated with illegal resource exploitation but, although Rwanda did benefit financially by plundering Zaire's wealth,[68] this is not usually considered their initial motivation for Rwandan intervention in the First Congo War.[69]

Uganda

As a close ally of the RPF, Uganda also played a major role in the First Congo War. Prominent members of the RPF had fought alongside Yoweri Museveni in the Ugandan Bush War that brought him to power, and Museveni allowed the RPF to use Uganda as a base during the 1990 offensive into Rwanda and subsequent civil war. Given their historical ties, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments were closely allied and Museveni worked closely with Kagame throughout the First Congo War. Ugandan soldiers were present in Zaire throughout the conflict and Museveni likely helped Kagame plan and direct the AFDL.[60]

Lt. Col. James Kabarebe of the AFDL, for example, was a former member of Uganda's National Resistance Army, the military wing of the rebel movement that brought Museveni to power, and French and Belgian intelligence reported that 15,000 Ugandan-trained Tutsi fought for the AFDL.[70] However, Uganda did not support Rwanda in all aspects of the war. Museveni was reportedly much less inclined to overthrow Mobutu, preferring to keep the rebellion in the East where the former génocidaires were operating.[71]

Angola

Angola remained on the sidelines until 1997, but its entrance into the fray greatly increased the already superior strength of anti-Mobutu forces. The Angolan government chose to act primarily through the original-Katanga Gendarmeries later called the Tigres, proxy groups formed from the remnants of police units exiled from Congo in the 1960s, fighting to return to their homeland.[72] Luanda did also deploy regular troops. Angola chose to participate in the First Congo War because members of Mobutu's government were directly involved in supplying the Angolan rebel group, UNITA.[73]

It is unclear exactly how the government benefited from this relationship, other than personal enrichment for several officials, but it is certainly possible that Mobutu was unable to control the actions of some members of his government. Regardless of the reasoning in Kinshasa, Angola entered the war on the side of the rebels and was determined to overthrow the Mobutu government, which it saw as the only way to address the threat posed by the Zairian-UNITA relationship.

UNITA

Due to its ties to the Mobutu government, UNITA also participated in the First Congo War. The greatest impact that it had on the war was probably that it gave Angola reason to join the anti-Mobutu coalition. However, UNITA forces fought alongside FAZ forces in at least several instances.[74] Among other examples, Kagame claimed that his forces fought a pitched battle against UNITA near Kinshasa towards the end of the war.[75]

Others

Numerous other external actors played lesser roles in the First Congo War. Burundi, which had recently come under the rule of a pro-Tutsi leader, supported Rwandan and Ugandan involvement in Zaire but provided very limited military support.[76] Zambia, Zimbabwe, and the South Sudanese rebel army, the SPLA, also gave measured amounts of military support to the rebel movement.[17] Eritrea, an ally of Rwanda under Kagame, sent an entire battalion of its army to support the invasion of Zaire.[15] Likewise, Tanzania, South Africa and Ethiopia provided support to the anti-Mobutu coalition.[19][16] Other than from UNITA, Mobutu also received some aid from Sudan, whom Mobutu had long supported against the SPLA, though the exact amount of aid is unclear and ultimately was unable to hinder the advance of opposing forces.[77] Zaire also employed foreign mercenaries from several African and European countries, including Chadian troops.[2] France also provided Mobutu's government with financial support and military aid, facilitated by the Central African Republic, and diplomatically advocated for international intervention to stop the AFDL's advance, but later backed down due to U.S. pressure.[7][8] China and Israel provided the Mobutu regime with technical assistance, while Kuwait also reportedly provided $64 million to Zaire for the purchase of weapons, but later denied doing so.[9]

In 1997 United States European Command supervised the U.S. Army's Southern Europe Task Force (SETAF) and elements of two Marine Expeditionary Units to carry out Operation Guardian Retrieval, to evacuate approximately 550 US citizens from the country.[78][79][80][81] SETAF prepared Joint Task Force Guardian Retrieval to carry out the non-combatant evacuation (NEO). The Marine Corps supported the evacuation with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), special operations capable, which had initially been sent to Albania, to support Operation Silver Wake. The 26th MEU was relieved two weeks early by the USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit.[82]

1996

See also: Massacres of Hutu refugees during the First Congo War

With active support from Rwanda, Uganda,[83] and Eritrea,[15] Kabila's AFDL was able to capture 800 x 100 km[clarification needed] of territory along the border with Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi by 25 December 1996.[83] This occupation temporarily satisfied the rebels, because it gave them power in the east and allowed them to defend themselves against the former génocidaires. Likewise, the external actors had successfully crippled the ability of the same génocidaires to use Zaire as a base for attacks. There was a pause in the rebel advance following the acquisition of this buffer territory that lasted until Angola entered the war in February 1997.[84]

During this time, Rwanda destroyed refugee camps the génocidaires had been using as safe-bases, and forcibly repatriated Tutsi to Rwanda. It also captured many lucrative diamond and coltan mines, which it later resisted relinquishing.[47][69] Rwandan and aligned forces committed multiple atrocities, mainly against Hutu refugees.[65] The true extent of the abuses is unknown because the AFDL and RPF carefully managed NGO and press access to areas where atrocities were thought to have occurred.[85] However Amnesty International said as many as 200,000 Rwandese Hutu refugees were massacred by them and the Rwandan Defence Forces and aligned forces.[86][verification needed]The United Nations similarly documented mass killings of civilians by Rwandan, Ugandan and the AFDL soldiers in the DRC Mapping Exercise Report.

1997

Further information: Operation Thunderbolt (1997)

Kabila's forces launched an offensive in March 1997, and demanded that the Kinshasa government surrender. The rebels took Kasenga on 27 March. The government denied the rebels' success, starting a long pattern of false statements from the Defense Minister on the progress and conduct of the war. Negotiations were proposed in late March, and on 2 April a new Prime Minister of Zaire, Étienne Tshisekedi—a longtime rival of Mobutu—was installed.[87] Kabila, by this point in control of roughly one-quarter of the country, dismissed this as irrelevant and warned Tshisekedi that he would have no part in a new government if he accepted the post.

 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila

There are two explanations for the restart of the rebel advance in 1997. The first, and most probable, is that Angola had joined the anti-Mobutu coalition, giving it numbers and strength far superior to the FAZ, and demanding that Mobutu be removed from power. Kagame presents another, possibly secondary, reason for the march on Kinshasa: that the employment of Serbian mercenaries in the battle for Walikale proved that "Mobutu intended to wage real war against Rwanda."[88] According to this logic, Rwanda's initial concerns had been to manage the security threat in eastern Zaire but it was now forced to dispose of the hostile government in Kinshasa.

Whatever the case, once the advance resumed in 1997, there was virtually no meaningful resistance from what was left of Mobutu's army. Kabila's forces were only held back by the dreadful state of Zaire's infrastructure. In some areas, no real roads existed; the only means of transport were infrequently used dirt paths.[89] The AFDL committed grave human rights violations, such as the carnage at a refugee camp of Hutus at Tingi-Tingi near Kisangani, where tens of thousands of refugees were massacred.[90]

Coming from the east, the AFDL advanced westward in two pincer movements. The northern one took Kisangani, Boende, and Mbandaka, while the southern one took Bakwanga, and Kikwit.[90] Around this time, Sudan attempted to coordinate with remnants of the FAZ and White Legion that were retreating northward to escape the AFDL. This was to prevent Zaire from becoming a safe haven for the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and its allies, which were fighting the Sudanese government in the Second Sudanese Civil War at the time. The Mobutu-loyal forces were collapsing so quickly, however, that they could not prevent the AFDL, SPLA and Ugandan military from occupying northeastern Zaire. Sudan-allied Ugandan insurgent groups which had been based in the region were forced to retreat into southern Sudan alongside FAZ troops that had not yet surrendered and a smaller number of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) soldiers. They attempted to reach the SAF base at Yei, not knowing that it had already been overrun by the SPLA. The column of about 4,000 fighters and their families was ambushed by the SPLA during Operation Thunderbolt on 12 March, and mostly destroyed; 2,000 were killed, and over 1,000 captured. The survivors fled to Juba.[1] Meanwhile, the AFDL reached Kinshasa by the middle of May. Another AFDL group captured Lubumbashi on April 19 and moved on by air to Kinshasa. Mobutu fled Kinshasa on May 16, and the "libérateurs" entered the capital without serious resistance.[90] The AFDL-allied Eritrean battalion had aided the rebels during the entire 1,500 km advance despite being not well equipped for the environment and lacking almost all logistical support. By the time the Eritreans arrived at Kinshasa along the AFDL, they were exhausted, starving and ill, having suffered heavy casualties as a result. They had to be evacuated from the country by the war's end.[26]

Throughout the rebel advance, there were attempts by the international community to negotiate a settlement. However, the AFDL did not take these negotiations seriously but instead partook so as to avoid international criticism for being unwilling to attempt a diplomatic solution while actually continuing its steady advance.[91] The FAZ, which had been weak all along, was unable to mount any serious resistance to the strong AFDL and its foreign sponsors.

Mobutu fled first to his palace at Gbadolite and then to Rabat, Morocco, where he died on 7 September 1997.[92] Kabila proclaimed himself president on 17 May, and immediately ordered a violent crackdown to restore order. He then attempted to reorganise the nation as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Aftermath

Main article: Second Congo War
See also: Republic of the Congo Civil War (1997–1999)

The new Congolese state under Kabila's rule proved to be disappointingly similar to Zaire under Mobutu. The economy remained in a state of severe disrepair and deteriorated further under Kabila's corrupt rule.[93] He failed to improve the government, which continued to be weak and corrupt. Instead, Kabila began a vigorous centralisation campaign, bringing renewed conflict with minority groups in the east who demanded autonomy.

Kabila also came to be seen as an instrument of the foreign regimes that put him in power. To counter this image and increase domestic support, he began to turn against his allies abroad. This culminated in the expulsion of all foreign forces from the DRC on 26 July 1998. The states with armed forces still in the DRC begrudgingly complied although some of them saw this as undermining their interests, particularly Rwanda, which had hoped to install a proxy-regime in Kinshasa.

Several factors that led to the First Congo War remained in place after Kabila's accession to power. Prominent among these were ethnic tensions in eastern DRC, where the government still had little control. There the historical animosities remained and the opinion that Banyamulenge, as well as all Tutsi, were foreigners was reinforced by the foreign occupation in their defence.[94] Furthermore, Rwanda had not been able to satisfactorily address its security concerns. By forcibly repatriating refugees, Rwanda had imported the conflict.[95]

This manifested itself in the form of a predominantly Hutu insurgency in Rwanda's western provinces that was supported by extremist elements in eastern DRC. Without troops in the DRC, Rwanda was unable to successfully combat the insurgents. In the first days of August 1998, two brigades of the new Congolese army rebelled against the government and formed rebel groups that worked closely with Kigali and Kampala. This marked the beginning of the Second Congo War.

In addition, elements of Mobutu's army and loyalists as well as other groups involved in the First Congo War retreated into the Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), where they fought in the 1997–1999 civil war.[96][97]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ a b Many Mai-Mai militias in eastern Zaire initially allied themselves with Rwanda and the AFDL against Hutu militants and refugees.[10] As soon as most Hutu were driven away, however, many Mai-Mai groups turned against Rwanda and the AFDL.[11] Despite this, some anti-Hutu Mai-Mai remained allied with Rwanda and the AFDL.[12]
  2. ^ Officially, the FAZ had c. 80,000 soldiers by the war's start,[21] though the actual number was closer to about 50,000.[21][22] Of these, just 25,000 were in a condition to fight, whereas the rest was likely to flee or desert upon the first signs of combat.[21]
  3. ^ French: Première guerre du Congo

References

  1. ^ a b c Prunier (2004), pp. 376–377.
  2. ^ a b Toïngar, Ésaïe (2014). Idriss Deby and the Darfur Conflict. p. 119. In 1996, President Mobutu of Zaire requested that mercenaries be sent from Chad to help defend his government from rebel forces led by Lauren Desiré Kabila. ... When a number of the troops were ambushed by Kabila and killed in defense of Mobutu's government, Mobutu paid Déby a fee in honor of their service.
  3. ^ Prunier (2009), pp. 116–118.
  4. ^ Duke, Lynne (20 May 1997). "Congo Begins Process of Rebuilding Nation". The Washington Post. p. A10. Archived from the original on 24 February 2011. Guerrillas of Angola's former rebel movement UNITA, long supported by Mobutu in an unsuccessful war against Angola's government, also fought for Mobutu against Kabila's forces.
  5. ^ a b Prunier (2004), pp. 375–377.
  6. ^ a b Reyntjens, Filip (2009). The Great African War. Cambridge University Press. pp. 112–113.
  7. ^ a b "Strategic Review for Southern Africa". University of Pretoria. 20–21. 1998. As the conflict developed, France provided financial support to Mobutu and pushed hard for foreign intervention. However, under US pressure, France eventually terminated its call for intervention.
  8. ^ a b c Carayannis, Tatiana (2015). Making Sense of the Central African Republic. Zed Books. In the waning days of Mobutu's rule, while Kabila's Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed putsch was rapidly making its way across Congo, France sought to prop up Mobutu's dying regime through covert military aid to the ailing dictator ... This covert aid was facilitated by Patassé
  9. ^ a b c d Reyntjens, Filip (2009). The Great African War. Cambridge University Press. p. 112.
  10. ^ Prunier (2009), pp. 117, 130, 143.
  11. ^ Prunier (2009), p. 130.
  12. ^ Prunier (2009), p. 143.
  13. ^ Prunier (2004), pp. 375–376.
  14. ^ a b Duke, Lynne (15 April 1997). "Passive Protest Stops Zaire's Capital Cold". The Washington Post. p. A14. Archived from the original on 24 February 2011. Kabila's forces – which are indeed backed by Rwanda, Angola, Uganda and Burundi, diplomats say – are slowly advancing toward the capital from the eastern half of the country, where they have captured all the regions that produce Zaire's diamonds, gold, copper and cobalt.
  15. ^ a b c Plaut (2016), pp. 54–55.
  16. ^ a b c "Consensual Democracy" in Post-genocide Rwanda. International Crisis Group. 2001. p. 8. In that first struggle in the Congo, Rwanda, allied with Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Burundi, had brought Laurent Désiré Kabila to power in Kinshasa
  17. ^ a b Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009. p. 65-66
  18. ^ Usanov, Artur (2013). Coltan, Congo and Conflict. Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. p. 36.
  19. ^ a b Makikagile, Godfrey (2006). Nyerere and Africa. New Africa Press. p. 173.
  20. ^ a b Prunier (2009), pp. 118, 126–127.
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Further reading

  • Abbott, Peter (2014). Modern African Wars (4): The Congo 1960–2002. Oxford; New York City: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-78200-076-1.
  • Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009.
  • Gribbin, Robert E. In the Aftermath of Genocide: the US Role in Rwanda. New York: IUniverse, 2005.
  • Clark, John F. (2002) The African Stakes in the Congo War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1-4039-6723-7.
  • Edgerton, Robert G. (2002) The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of the Congo St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0-312-30486-2.
  • Gondola, Ch. Didier. (2002) The History of Congo, Greenwood Press, ISBN 0-313-31696-1. Covers events up to January 2002.
  • Kennes, Erik. "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need." Rethinking the Economics of War. Ed. Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005
  • Michael Nest with François Grignon and Emizet F. Kisangani: The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace, Lynne Rienner, 2006 ISBN 1-58826-233-2
  • Prunier, Gérard (2009). Africa's World War : Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-970583-2.
  • Plaut, Martin (2016). Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa's Most Repressive State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190669591.
  • Prunier, Gérard (July 2004). "Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99)". African Affairs. 103 (412): 359–383. doi:10.1093/afraf/adh050. JSTOR 3518562.
  • Vlassenroot, Koen. "Citizenship, Identity Formation & Conflict in South Kivu: The Case of the Banyamulenge." Review of African Political Economy. 2002. 499–515.
  • Vlassenroot, Koen. "Conflict & Malitia Formation in Eastern Congo." Ed. Preben Kaarsholm. Violence, Political Culture & Development in Africa. Athens: Ohio UP, 2006. 49–65.
  • Lemarchand, René. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009.
  • Jackson, Stephen. ‘Making a Killing: Criminality & Coping in the Kivu War Economy.’ Review of African Political Economy. 2002.
  • Samset, Ingrid. ‘Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds & War in the DRC.’ Review of African Political Economy. 2002. 463–480
  • Stearns, Jason (2011). Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa. New York: PublicAffairs. ISBN 978-1-58648-929-8.
  • Auterresse, Séverine (2009). "Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention". International Organization. 63 (2): 249–280. doi:10.1017/S0020818309090080. S2CID 143365639.
  • Reyntjens, Filip (2005). "The Privatisation and Criminalisation of Public Space in the Geopolitics of the Great Lakes Region". Journal of Modern African Studies. 43 (4): 587–607. doi:10.1017/S0022278X05001230.
  • Autesserre, Séverine (2008). "The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict". Foreign Affairs. 87 (3): 94–110.
  • Thom, William G. (1999). "Congo-Zaire's 1996–97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence". Journal of Conflict Studies. 19 (2).

May 15, 2023
first, congo, part, aftermath, rwandan, genocide, spillover, burundian, civil, second, sudanese, civil, warmap, showing, afdl, offensivedate24, october, 1996, 1997, months, weeks, locationzaire, with, spillovers, into, uganda, sudan, resultdecisive, afdl, vict. First Congo WarPart of the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and the spillover of the Burundian Civil War and the Second Sudanese Civil WarMap showing the AFDL offensiveDate24 October 1996 16 May 1997 6 months 3 weeks and 1 day LocationZaire with spillovers into Uganda and Sudan 5 ResultDecisive AFDL victoryOverthrow of the Mobutu regime Zaire renamed back to the Democratic Republic of the Congo Installation of Laurent Desire Kabila as president Beginning of Second Congo WarBelligerents Zaire FAZ White Legion Sudan 1 Chad 2 Ex FAR ALiR Interahamwe CNDD FDD 3 UNITA 4 ADF 5 FLNC 6 Supported by France 7 8 Central African Republic 8 China 9 Israel 9 Kuwait denied 9 Mai Mai a AFDL Rwanda Uganda 13 Burundi 14 Angola 14 SPLA 1 Eritrea 15 Supported by South Africa 16 Zambia 17 Zimbabwe 16 Ethiopia 18 Tanzania 19 United States covertly 20 Mai Mai a Commanders and leadersMobutu Sese Seko Donatien Mahele Lieko Bokungu Christian Tavernier Omar al Bashir Jonas Savimbi Paul Rwarakabije Robert Kajuga Tharcisse RenzahoLaurent Desire Kabila Andre Kisase Ngandu Paul Kagame James Kabarebe Yoweri Museveni Pierre Buyoya Jose Eduardo dos SantosStrengthZaire c 50 000 b Interahamwe 40 000 100 000 total 22 UNITA c 1 000 22 2 000 6 AFDL 57 000 23 Kadogo child soldiers 10 000 15 000 24 Rwanda 3 500 4 000 23 25 Angola 3 000 25 Eritrea 1 battalion 26 Casualties and losses10 000 15 000 killed10 000 defected 25 thousands surrender3 000 5 000 killed222 000 refugees missing 27 Total 250 000 dead 28 The First Congo War c 1996 1997 also nicknamed Africa s First World War 29 was a civil war and international military conflict which took place mostly in Zaire present day Democratic Republic of the Congo with major spillovers into Sudan and Uganda The conflict culminated in a foreign invasion that replaced Zairean president Mobutu Sese Seko with the rebel leader Laurent Desire Kabila Kabila s unstable government subsequently came into conflict with his allies setting the stage for the Second Congo War in 1998 2003 Following years of internal strife dictatorship and economic decline Zaire was a dying state by 1996 The eastern parts of the country had been destabilized due to the Rwandan genocide which had perforated its borders as well as long lasting regional conflicts and resentments left unresolved since the Congo Crisis In many areas state authority had in all but name collapsed with infighting militias warlords and rebel groups some sympathetic to the government others openly hostile wielding effective power 30 31 The population of Zaire had become restless and resentful of the inept and corrupt regime the Zairean Armed Forces were in a catastrophic condition 32 21 Mobutu who had become terminally ill was no longer able to keep the different factions in the government under control making their loyalty questionable Furthermore the end of the Cold War meant that Mobutu s strong anti communist stance was no longer sufficient to justify the political and financial support he had received from the capitalist powers his regime therefore was essentially politically and financially bankrupt 33 20 The situation finally escalated when Rwanda invaded Zaire in 1996 to defeat a number of rebel groups which had found refuge in the country This invasion quickly escalated as more states including Uganda Burundi Angola and Eritrea joined the invasion while a Congolese alliance of anti Mobutu rebels was assembled 30 Though the Zairean government attempted to put up an effective resistance and was supported by allied militias as well as Sudan Mobutu s regime collapsed in a matter of months 34 Despite the war s short duration it was marked by widespread destruction and extensive ethnic violence with hundreds of thousands killed in the fighting and accompanying pogroms 35 A new government was installed and Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo but the termination of the Mobutu regime brought little political change and Kabila found himself uneasy in the position of a proxy of his former benefactors To avert a coup Kabila expelled all Rwandan Ugandan and Burundian military units from the Congo and moved to build a coalition including Namibian Angolan Zimbabwean and Zambian forces soon encompassing a string of African nations from Libya to South Africa although their support varied 36 The tripartite coalition responded with a second invasion of the east largely through proxy groups These actions constituted the catalyst for the Second Congo War the following year although some experts prefer to view the two conflicts as one continuous war whose aftereffects continue today 37 38 Contents 1 Background 1 1 Dying state in Zaire 1 2 Ethnic tensions 1 3 Rwandan genocide 2 Banyamulenge rebellion 3 Foreign involvement 3 1 Rwanda 3 2 Uganda 3 3 Angola 3 4 UNITA 3 5 Others 4 1996 5 1997 6 Aftermath 7 See also 8 Notes 9 References 10 Further readingBackground EditDying state in Zaire Edit Further information Zaire and 1991 Zaire unrest Mobutu Sese Seko long time dictator of Zaire An ethnic Ngbandi Mobutu came to power in 1965 and enjoyed support from the United States government because of his anti communist stance while in office However Mobutu s totalitarian rule and corrupt policies allowed the Zairian state to decay evidenced by a 65 decrease in Zairian GDP between independence in 1960 and the end of Mobutu s reign in 1997 39 Following the end of the Cold War in 1992 the United States stopped supporting Mobutu in favour of what it called a new generation of African leaders 40 including Rwanda s Paul Kagame and Uganda s Yoweri Museveni A wave of democratisation swept across Africa during the 1990s citation needed Under substantial internal and external pressure for a democratic transition in Zaire Mobutu promised reform He officially ended the one party system he had maintained since 1967 but ultimately proved unwilling to implement broad reform alienating allies both at home and abroad In fact the Zairian state had all but ceased to exist 41 The majority of the Zairian population relied on an informal economy for their subsistence since the official economy was not reliable 41 Furthermore the Zairian national army Forces Armees Zairoises FAZ was forced to prey upon the population for survival Mobutu himself allegedly once asked FAZ soldiers why they needed pay when they had weapons 42 Mobutu s rule encountered considerable internal resistance and given the weak central state rebel groups could find refuge in Zaire s eastern provinces far from the capital Kinshasa Opposition groups included leftists who had supported Patrice Lumumba 1925 1961 as well as ethnic and regional minorities opposed to the nominal dominance of Kinshasa Laurent Desire Kabila an ethnic Luba from Katanga province who would eventually overthrow Mobutu had fought Mobutu s regime since its inception 43 The inability of the Mobutuist regime to control rebel movements in its eastern provinces eventually allowed its internal and external foes to ally Ethnic tensions Edit Tensions had existed between various ethnic groups in eastern Zaire for centuries especially between the agrarian tribes of Congo and the Banyarwanda in the Eastern region of Congo of Kivu When colonial boundaries were drawn in the late nineteenth century many Banyarwanda found themselves on the Congolese side of the Rwandan border in Kivu province 44 The earliest of these migrants arrived before colonisation in the 1880s followed by emigrants whom the Belgian colonizers forcibly relocated to Congo to perform manual labour after 1908 and by another significant wave of emigrants fleeing the social revolution of 1959 that brought the Hutu to power in Kigali 45 Tutsi who emigrated to Zaire before Congolese independence in 1960 are known as Banyamulenge meaning from Mulenge and had the right to citizenship under Zairian law 46 Tutsi who emigrated to Zaire following independence are known as Banyarwanda although the native locals often do not distinguish between the two call them both Banyamulenge and consider them foreigners 45 After coming to power in 1965 Mobutu gave the Banyamulenge political power in the east in hopes that they as a minority would keep a tight grip on power and prevent more populous ethnicities from forming an opposition 47 This move aggravated the existing ethnic tensions by strengthening the Banyamulenge s hold over important stretches of land in North Kivu that indigenous people claimed as their own 47 From 1963 to 1966 the Hunde and Nande ethnic groups of North Kivu fought against Rwandan emigrants 48 both Tutsi and Hutu in the Kanyarwandan War which involved several massacres 49 50 Despite a strong Rwandan presence in Mobutu s government in 1981 Zaire adopted a restrictive citizenship law which denied the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda citizenship and therewith all political rights 51 Though never enforced the law greatly angered individuals of Rwandan descent and contributed to a rising sense of ethnic hatred 47 From 1993 to 1996 Hunde Nande and Nyanga youth regularly attacked the Banyamulenge leading to a total of 14 000 deaths 52 In 1995 the Zairian Parliament ordered all peoples of Rwandan or Burundian descent repatriated to their countries of origin including the Banyamulenge 53 Due to political exclusion and ethnic violence as early as 1991 the Banyamulenge developed ties to the Rwandan Patriotic Front RPF a mainly Tutsi rebel movement based in Uganda but with aspirations to power in Rwanda 54 Rwandan genocide Edit Main articles Rwandan Civil War and Rwandan Genocide A Rwandan refugee camp in Zaire 1994 The most deciding event in precipitating the war was the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda in 1994 which sparked a mass exodus of refugees known as the Great Lakes refugee crisis During the 100 day genocide hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and sympathizers were massacred at the hands of predominantly Hutu aggressors The genocide ended when the Hutu government in Kigali was overthrown by the Tutsi dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front RPF Of those who fled Rwanda during the crisis about 1 5 million settled in eastern Zaire 55 These refugees included Tutsi who fled the Hutu genocidaires as well as one million Hutus that fled the Tutsi RPF s subsequent retaliation 47 Prominent among the latter group were the genocidaires themselves such as elements of the former Rwandan Army Forces armees rwandaises fr FAR and independent Hutu extremist groups known as Interahamwe 56 Often these Hutu forces allied themselves with local Mai Mai militias who granted them access to mines and weapons Though these were initially self defense organizations they quickly became aggressors 47 The Hutu set up camps in eastern Zaire from which they attacked both the newly arrived Rwandan Tutsi as well as the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda These attacks caused about one hundred deaths a month during the first half of 1996 57 Furthermore the newly arrived militants were intent on returning to power in Rwanda and began launching attacks against the new regime in Kigali which represented a serious security threat to the infant state 58 Not only was the Mobutu government incapable of controlling the former genocidaires for previously mentioned reasons but actually supported them in training and supplying for an invasion of Rwanda 59 forcing Kigali to act Banyamulenge rebellion EditGiven the exacerbated ethnic tensions and the lack of government control in the past Rwanda took action against the security threat posed by genocidaires who had found refuge in eastern Zaire The government in Kigali began forming Tutsi militias for operations in Zaire probably as early as 1995 60 and chose to act following an exchange of fire between Rwandan Tutsi and Zairian Green Berets that marked the outbreak of the Banyamulenge Rebellion on 31 August 1996 61 While there was general unrest in eastern Zaire the rebellion was probably not a grassroots movement Uganda president Yoweri Museveni who supported and worked closely with Rwanda in the First Congo War later recalled that the rebellion was incited by Zairian Tutsi who had been recruited by the Rwandan Patriotic Army RPA 60 The initial goal of the Banyamulenge Rebellion was to seize power in Zaire s eastern Kivu provinces and combat the extremist Hutu forces attempting to continue the genocide in their new home However the rebellion did not remain Tutsi dominated for long Mobutu s harsh and selfish rule created enemies in virtually all sectors of Zairian society As a result the new rebellion benefited from massive public support and grew to be a general revolution rather than a mere Banyamulenge uprising 62 Banyamulenge elements and non Tutsi militias coalesced into the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo AFDL under the leadership of Laurent Desire Kabila who had been a long time opponent of the Mobutu government and was a leader of one of the three main rebel groups that founded the AFDL While the AFDL was an ostensibly Zairian rebel movement Rwanda had played a key role in its formation Observers of the war as well as the Rwandan Defense Minister and Vice President at the time Paul Kagame claim that the AFDL was formed in and directed from Kigali and contained not only Rwandan trained troops but also regulars of the RPA 63 Foreign involvement EditRwanda Edit Map of Zaire in c 1996 According to expert observers as well as Kagame himself Rwanda played the largest role of a foreign actor if not the largest role of all in the First Congo War Kigali was instrumental in the formation of the AFDL and sent its own troops to fight alongside the rebels While its actions were originally sparked by the security threat posed by the Zairian based genocidaires Kigali was pursuing multiple goals during its invasion of Zaire The first and foremost of these was the suppression of genocidaires who had been launching attacks against the new Rwandan state from Zaire Kagame claimed that Rwandan agents had discovered the plans to invade Rwanda with support from Mobutu in response Kigali began its intervention with the intention of dismantling the refugee camps in which the genocidaires often took refuge and destroying the structure of these anti Rwandan elements 63 A second goal cited by Kagame was the overthrow of Mobutu While partially a means to minimize the threat in eastern Zaire the new Rwandan state also sought to set up a puppet regime in Kinshasa 40 This goal was not particularly threatening to other states in the region because it was ostensibly a means to securing Rwandan stability and because many of them also opposed Mobutu Kigali was further aided by the tacit support of the United States which supported Kagame as a member of the new generation of African leaders 40 However the true intentions of Rwanda are not entirely clear Some authors have proposed that dismantling refugee camps was a means of replenishing Rwanda s depleted population and workforce following the genocide because the destruction of the camps was followed by forced repatriation of Tutsi regardless of whether they were Rwandan or Zairian 64 The intervention may also have been motivated by revenge the Rwandan forces as well as the AFDL massacred retreating Hutu refugees in several known instances 65 A commonly cited factor for Rwandan actions is that the RPF which had recently come to power in Kigali had come to see itself as the protector of the Tutsi nation and was therefore partially acting in defense of its Zairian brethren 66 47 Rwanda possibly also harbored ambitions to annex portions of eastern Zaire Pasteur Bizimungu president of Rwanda from 1994 to 2000 presented the then US ambassador to Rwanda Robert Gribbin with the idea of a Greater Rwanda This idea purports that the ancient state of Rwanda included parts of eastern Zaire that should actually belong to Rwanda 67 However it appears that Rwanda never seriously attempted to annex these territories The history of conflict in the Congo is often associated with illegal resource exploitation but although Rwanda did benefit financially by plundering Zaire s wealth 68 this is not usually considered their initial motivation for Rwandan intervention in the First Congo War 69 Uganda Edit As a close ally of the RPF Uganda also played a major role in the First Congo War Prominent members of the RPF had fought alongside Yoweri Museveni in the Ugandan Bush War that brought him to power and Museveni allowed the RPF to use Uganda as a base during the 1990 offensive into Rwanda and subsequent civil war Given their historical ties the Rwandan and Ugandan governments were closely allied and Museveni worked closely with Kagame throughout the First Congo War Ugandan soldiers were present in Zaire throughout the conflict and Museveni likely helped Kagame plan and direct the AFDL 60 Lt Col James Kabarebe of the AFDL for example was a former member of Uganda s National Resistance Army the military wing of the rebel movement that brought Museveni to power and French and Belgian intelligence reported that 15 000 Ugandan trained Tutsi fought for the AFDL 70 However Uganda did not support Rwanda in all aspects of the war Museveni was reportedly much less inclined to overthrow Mobutu preferring to keep the rebellion in the East where the former genocidaires were operating 71 Angola Edit Angola remained on the sidelines until 1997 but its entrance into the fray greatly increased the already superior strength of anti Mobutu forces The Angolan government chose to act primarily through the original Katanga Gendarmeries later called the Tigres proxy groups formed from the remnants of police units exiled from Congo in the 1960s fighting to return to their homeland 72 Luanda did also deploy regular troops Angola chose to participate in the First Congo War because members of Mobutu s government were directly involved in supplying the Angolan rebel group UNITA 73 It is unclear exactly how the government benefited from this relationship other than personal enrichment for several officials but it is certainly possible that Mobutu was unable to control the actions of some members of his government Regardless of the reasoning in Kinshasa Angola entered the war on the side of the rebels and was determined to overthrow the Mobutu government which it saw as the only way to address the threat posed by the Zairian UNITA relationship UNITA Edit Due to its ties to the Mobutu government UNITA also participated in the First Congo War The greatest impact that it had on the war was probably that it gave Angola reason to join the anti Mobutu coalition However UNITA forces fought alongside FAZ forces in at least several instances 74 Among other examples Kagame claimed that his forces fought a pitched battle against UNITA near Kinshasa towards the end of the war 75 Others Edit Numerous other external actors played lesser roles in the First Congo War Burundi which had recently come under the rule of a pro Tutsi leader supported Rwandan and Ugandan involvement in Zaire but provided very limited military support 76 Zambia Zimbabwe and the South Sudanese rebel army the SPLA also gave measured amounts of military support to the rebel movement 17 Eritrea an ally of Rwanda under Kagame sent an entire battalion of its army to support the invasion of Zaire 15 Likewise Tanzania South Africa and Ethiopia provided support to the anti Mobutu coalition 19 16 Other than from UNITA Mobutu also received some aid from Sudan whom Mobutu had long supported against the SPLA though the exact amount of aid is unclear and ultimately was unable to hinder the advance of opposing forces 77 Zaire also employed foreign mercenaries from several African and European countries including Chadian troops 2 France also provided Mobutu s government with financial support and military aid facilitated by the Central African Republic and diplomatically advocated for international intervention to stop the AFDL s advance but later backed down due to U S pressure 7 8 China and Israel provided the Mobutu regime with technical assistance while Kuwait also reportedly provided 64 million to Zaire for the purchase of weapons but later denied doing so 9 In 1997 United States European Command supervised the U S Army s Southern Europe Task Force SETAF and elements of two Marine Expeditionary Units to carry out Operation Guardian Retrieval to evacuate approximately 550 US citizens from the country 78 79 80 81 SETAF prepared Joint Task Force Guardian Retrieval to carry out the non combatant evacuation NEO The Marine Corps supported the evacuation with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit MEU special operations capable which had initially been sent to Albania to support Operation Silver Wake The 26th MEU was relieved two weeks early by the USS Kearsarge LHD 3 and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit 82 1996 EditSee also Massacres of Hutu refugees during the First Congo War With active support from Rwanda Uganda 83 and Eritrea 15 Kabila s AFDL was able to capture 800 x 100 km clarification needed of territory along the border with Rwanda Uganda and Burundi by 25 December 1996 83 This occupation temporarily satisfied the rebels because it gave them power in the east and allowed them to defend themselves against the former genocidaires Likewise the external actors had successfully crippled the ability of the same genocidaires to use Zaire as a base for attacks There was a pause in the rebel advance following the acquisition of this buffer territory that lasted until Angola entered the war in February 1997 84 During this time Rwanda destroyed refugee camps the genocidaires had been using as safe bases and forcibly repatriated Tutsi to Rwanda It also captured many lucrative diamond and coltan mines which it later resisted relinquishing 47 69 Rwandan and aligned forces committed multiple atrocities mainly against Hutu refugees 65 The true extent of the abuses is unknown because the AFDL and RPF carefully managed NGO and press access to areas where atrocities were thought to have occurred 85 However Amnesty International said as many as 200 000 Rwandese Hutu refugees were massacred by them and the Rwandan Defence Forces and aligned forces 86 verification needed The United Nations similarly documented mass killings of civilians by Rwandan Ugandan and the AFDL soldiers in the DRC Mapping Exercise Report 1997 EditFurther information Operation Thunderbolt 1997 Kabila s forces launched an offensive in March 1997 and demanded that the Kinshasa government surrender The rebels took Kasenga on 27 March The government denied the rebels success starting a long pattern of false statements from the Defense Minister on the progress and conduct of the war Negotiations were proposed in late March and on 2 April a new Prime Minister of Zaire Etienne Tshisekedi a longtime rival of Mobutu was installed 87 Kabila by this point in control of roughly one quarter of the country dismissed this as irrelevant and warned Tshisekedi that he would have no part in a new government if he accepted the post Laurent Desire Kabila There are two explanations for the restart of the rebel advance in 1997 The first and most probable is that Angola had joined the anti Mobutu coalition giving it numbers and strength far superior to the FAZ and demanding that Mobutu be removed from power Kagame presents another possibly secondary reason for the march on Kinshasa that the employment of Serbian mercenaries in the battle for Walikale proved that Mobutu intended to wage real war against Rwanda 88 According to this logic Rwanda s initial concerns had been to manage the security threat in eastern Zaire but it was now forced to dispose of the hostile government in Kinshasa Whatever the case once the advance resumed in 1997 there was virtually no meaningful resistance from what was left of Mobutu s army Kabila s forces were only held back by the dreadful state of Zaire s infrastructure In some areas no real roads existed the only means of transport were infrequently used dirt paths 89 The AFDL committed grave human rights violations such as the carnage at a refugee camp of Hutus at Tingi Tingi near Kisangani where tens of thousands of refugees were massacred 90 Coming from the east the AFDL advanced westward in two pincer movements The northern one took Kisangani Boende and Mbandaka while the southern one took Bakwanga and Kikwit 90 Around this time Sudan attempted to coordinate with remnants of the FAZ and White Legion that were retreating northward to escape the AFDL This was to prevent Zaire from becoming a safe haven for the Sudan People s Liberation Army SPLA and its allies which were fighting the Sudanese government in the Second Sudanese Civil War at the time The Mobutu loyal forces were collapsing so quickly however that they could not prevent the AFDL SPLA and Ugandan military from occupying northeastern Zaire Sudan allied Ugandan insurgent groups which had been based in the region were forced to retreat into southern Sudan alongside FAZ troops that had not yet surrendered and a smaller number of Sudanese Armed Forces SAF soldiers They attempted to reach the SAF base at Yei not knowing that it had already been overrun by the SPLA The column of about 4 000 fighters and their families was ambushed by the SPLA during Operation Thunderbolt on 12 March and mostly destroyed 2 000 were killed and over 1 000 captured The survivors fled to Juba 1 Meanwhile the AFDL reached Kinshasa by the middle of May Another AFDL group captured Lubumbashi on April 19 and moved on by air to Kinshasa Mobutu fled Kinshasa on May 16 and the liberateurs entered the capital without serious resistance 90 The AFDL allied Eritrean battalion had aided the rebels during the entire 1 500 km advance despite being not well equipped for the environment and lacking almost all logistical support By the time the Eritreans arrived at Kinshasa along the AFDL they were exhausted starving and ill having suffered heavy casualties as a result They had to be evacuated from the country by the war s end 26 Throughout the rebel advance there were attempts by the international community to negotiate a settlement However the AFDL did not take these negotiations seriously but instead partook so as to avoid international criticism for being unwilling to attempt a diplomatic solution while actually continuing its steady advance 91 The FAZ which had been weak all along was unable to mount any serious resistance to the strong AFDL and its foreign sponsors Mobutu fled first to his palace at Gbadolite and then to Rabat Morocco where he died on 7 September 1997 92 Kabila proclaimed himself president on 17 May and immediately ordered a violent crackdown to restore order He then attempted to reorganise the nation as the Democratic Republic of the Congo DRC Aftermath EditMain article Second Congo War See also Republic of the Congo Civil War 1997 1999 The new Congolese state under Kabila s rule proved to be disappointingly similar to Zaire under Mobutu The economy remained in a state of severe disrepair and deteriorated further under Kabila s corrupt rule 93 He failed to improve the government which continued to be weak and corrupt Instead Kabila began a vigorous centralisation campaign bringing renewed conflict with minority groups in the east who demanded autonomy Kabila also came to be seen as an instrument of the foreign regimes that put him in power To counter this image and increase domestic support he began to turn against his allies abroad This culminated in the expulsion of all foreign forces from the DRC on 26 July 1998 The states with armed forces still in the DRC begrudgingly complied although some of them saw this as undermining their interests particularly Rwanda which had hoped to install a proxy regime in Kinshasa Several factors that led to the First Congo War remained in place after Kabila s accession to power Prominent among these were ethnic tensions in eastern DRC where the government still had little control There the historical animosities remained and the opinion that Banyamulenge as well as all Tutsi were foreigners was reinforced by the foreign occupation in their defence 94 Furthermore Rwanda had not been able to satisfactorily address its security concerns By forcibly repatriating refugees Rwanda had imported the conflict 95 This manifested itself in the form of a predominantly Hutu insurgency in Rwanda s western provinces that was supported by extremist elements in eastern DRC Without troops in the DRC Rwanda was unable to successfully combat the insurgents In the first days of August 1998 two brigades of the new Congolese army rebelled against the government and formed rebel groups that worked closely with Kigali and Kampala This marked the beginning of the Second Congo War In addition elements of Mobutu s army and loyalists as well as other groups involved in the First Congo War retreated into the Republic of the Congo Congo Brazzaville where they fought in the 1997 1999 civil war 96 97 See also EditChild soldiers in the Democratic Republic of CongoNotes Edit a b Many Mai Mai militias in eastern Zaire initially allied themselves with Rwanda and the AFDL against Hutu militants and refugees 10 As soon as most Hutu were driven away however many Mai Mai groups turned against Rwanda and the AFDL 11 Despite this some anti Hutu Mai Mai remained allied with Rwanda and the AFDL 12 Officially the FAZ had c 80 000 soldiers by the war s start 21 though the actual number was closer to about 50 000 21 22 Of these just 25 000 were in a condition to fight whereas the rest was likely to flee or desert upon the first signs of combat 21 French Premiere guerre du CongoReferences Edit a b c Prunier 2004 pp 376 377 a b Toingar Esaie 2014 Idriss Deby and the Darfur Conflict p 119 In 1996 President Mobutu of Zaire requested that mercenaries be sent from Chad to help defend his government from rebel forces led by Lauren Desire Kabila When a number of the troops were ambushed by Kabila and killed in defense of Mobutu s government Mobutu paid Deby a fee in honor of their service Prunier 2009 pp 116 118 Duke Lynne 20 May 1997 Congo Begins Process of Rebuilding Nation The Washington Post p A10 Archived from the original on 24 February 2011 Guerrillas of Angola s former rebel movement UNITA long supported by Mobutu in an unsuccessful war against Angola s government also fought for Mobutu against Kabila s forces a b Prunier 2004 pp 375 377 a b Reyntjens Filip 2009 The Great African War Cambridge University Press pp 112 113 a b Strategic Review for Southern Africa University of Pretoria 20 21 1998 As the conflict developed France provided financial support to Mobutu and pushed hard for foreign intervention However under US pressure France eventually terminated its call for intervention a b c Carayannis Tatiana 2015 Making Sense of the Central African Republic Zed Books In the waning days of Mobutu s rule while Kabila s Rwandan and Ugandan backed putsch was rapidly making its way across Congo France sought to prop up Mobutu s dying regime through covert military aid to the ailing dictator This covert aid was facilitated by Patasse a b c d Reyntjens Filip 2009 The Great African War Cambridge University Press p 112 Prunier 2009 pp 117 130 143 Prunier 2009 p 130 Prunier 2009 p 143 Prunier 2004 pp 375 376 a b Duke Lynne 15 April 1997 Passive Protest Stops Zaire s Capital Cold The Washington Post p A14 Archived from the original on 24 February 2011 Kabila s forces which are indeed backed by Rwanda Angola Uganda and Burundi diplomats say are slowly advancing toward the capital from the eastern half of the country where they have captured all the regions that produce Zaire s diamonds gold copper and cobalt a b c Plaut 2016 pp 54 55 a b c Consensual Democracy in Post genocide Rwanda International Crisis Group 2001 p 8 In that first struggle in the Congo Rwanda allied with Uganda Angola Zimbabwe South Africa and Burundi had brought Laurent Desire Kabila to power in Kinshasa a b Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 65 66 Usanov Artur 2013 Coltan Congo and Conflict Hague Centre for Strategic Studies p 36 a b Makikagile Godfrey 2006 Nyerere and Africa New Africa Press p 173 a b Prunier 2009 pp 118 126 127 a b c d Prunier 2009 p 128 a b c Thom William G 1999 Congo Zaire s 1996 97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence XIX 2 Journal of Conflict Studies Archived from the original on 21 August 2006 a href Template Cite journal html title Template Cite journal cite journal a Cite journal requires journal help a b This number was self declared and was not independently verified Johnson Dominic Kongo Kriege Korruption und die Kunst des Uberlebens Brandes amp Apsel Frankfurt am Main 2 Auflage 2009 ISBN 978 3 86099 743 7 Prunier 2004 p 251 a b c Abbott 2014 p 35 a b Plaut 2016 p 55 CDI The Center for Defense Information The Defense Monitor The World At War January 1 1998 https www amnesty org ailib aipub 1998 AFR 16203698 html permanent dead link Prunier 2009 p 72 a b Abbott 2014 pp 33 35 Prunier 2009 pp 77 83 Abbott 2014 pp 23 24 33 Abbott 2014 pp 23 24 33 35 Abbott 2014 pp 34 35 Prunier 2009 pp 143 148 Abbott 2014 pp 36 39 e g Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 194 DISARMAMENT SADC Moves into Unknown Territory 19 August 1998 Archived from the original on 18 June 2020 Retrieved 23 November 2020 Gondola Ch Didier The History of Congo Westport Greenwood Press 2002 p 6 a b c Kennes Erik The Democratic Republic of the Congo Structures of Greed Networks of Need Rethinking the Economics of War Ed Cynthia J Arnson and I William Zartman Washington D C Woodrow Wilson Center 2005 p 147 a b Kennes Erik The Democratic Republic of the Congo Structures of Greed Networks of Need Rethinking the Economics of War Ed Cynthia J Arnson and I William Zartman Washington D C Woodrow Wilson Center 2005 p 157 Congo s Curse IRIN 5 October 2010 Archived from the original on 27 August 2010 Retrieved 15 October 2015 Ex president Mobutu once asked his soldiers why they needed salaries when they had guns Gribbin Robert E In the Aftermath of Genocide the U S Role in Rwanda New York IUniverse 2005 p 190 Vlassenroot Koen Conflict amp Malitia Formation in Eastern Congo Ed Preben Kaarsholm Violence Political Culture amp Development in Africa Athens Ohio UP 2006 49 65 p 53 a b Lemarchand Rene The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania 2009 p 32 Vlassenroot Koen Citizenship Identity Formation amp Conflict in South Kivu The Case of the Banyamulenge Review of African Political Economy 2002 499 515 a b c d e f g Autesserre Severine 2008 The Trouble With Congo How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict Foreign Affairs vol 87 no 3 Bronwen Manby 2013 Struggles for Citizenship in Africa African Arguments Zed Books Ltd ISBN 978 1848137868 Archived from the original on 7 May 2018 via Google Books no page numbers Lemarchand Rene The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania 2009 p 13 Conflict and environmental insecurity in the North Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ACCORD accord org za Archived from the original on 29 January 2018 Retrieved 7 May 2018 Lemarchand Rene The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania 2009 pp 15 16 Lemarchand Rene The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania 2009 pp 13 14 Lemarchand Rene The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania 2009 p 16 Vlassenroot Koen Citizenship Identity Formation amp Conflict in South Kivu The Case of the Banyamulenge Review of African Political Economy 2002 499 515 p 508 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 45 Mugnier David 3 December 2007 North Kivu How to End a War International Crisis Group Archived from the original on 14 October 2022 Retrieved 14 October 2022 Gribbin Robert E In the Aftermath of Genocide the U S Role in Rwanda New York IUniverse 2005 p 143 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 30 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 18 a b c Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 48 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 49 Afoaku Osita Congo s Rebels Their Origins Motivations and Strategies Ed John F Clark The Africa Stakes of the Congo War New York Palgrave Macmillan 2002 109 28 p 121 a b Pomfret John Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo Defense Minister Says Arms Troops Supplied for Anti Mobutu Drive Washington Post 9 July 1997 A1 Gribbin Robert E In the Aftermath of Genocide the U S Role in Rwanda New York IUniverse 2005 p 107 201 a b Gribbin Robert E In the Aftermath of Genocide the U S Role in Rwanda New York IUniverse 2005 p 213 14 Longman Timothy The Complex Reasons for Rwanda s Engagement in Congo Ed John F Clark The African Stakes of the Congo War New York Palgrave Macmillan 2002 129 44 p 131 Gribbin Robert E In the Aftermath of Genocide the U S Role in Rwanda New York IUniverse 2005 p 175 76 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 147 48 a b Samset Ingrid Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict Diamonds amp War in the DRC Review of African Political Economy 2002 463 480 pp 470 471 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 54 58 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 59 Gribbin Robert E In the Aftermath of Genocide the U S Role in Rwanda New York IUniverse 2005 p 218 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 62 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 63 Pomfret John Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo Defense Minister Says Arms Troops Supplied for Anti Mobutu Drive Washington Post 9 July 1997 A1 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 42 61 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 44 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit deployment history United States Marine Corps Archived from the original on 26 October 2020 Retrieved 7 November 2020 III Operational Primacy 1997 in Review United States Navy Archived from the original on 22 March 2018 Retrieved 22 March 2018 Walter J Boyne 26 June 2007 Beyond the Wild Blue A History of the U S Air Force 1947 2007 St Martin s Press p 512 ISBN 978 1 4299 0180 2 United States Congress Senate Committee on Armed Services 1 January 1998 Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997 and the Future Years Defense Program Military posture U S Government Printing Office ISBN 978 0 16 054389 0 Archived from the original on 1 March 2023 Retrieved 25 November 2022 Operation Guardian Retrieval Globalsecurity org Archived from the original on 13 November 2020 Retrieved 7 November 2020 a b Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 55 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 pp 61 63 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 100 Democratic Republic of Congo A long standing crisis spinning out of control Archived 22 November 2018 at the Wayback Machine Amnesty International 3 September 1998 p 9 AI Index AFR 62 33 98 Essays UK November 2018 Study on the First And Second Congo War History Essay Nottingham UK UKEssays com Archived from the original on 10 June 2020 Retrieved 29 October 2019 Gribbin Robert E In the Aftermath of Genocide the U S Role in Rwanda New York IUniverse 2005 p 213 Dickovick J Tyler 2008 The World Today Series Africa 2012 Lanham Maryland Stryker Post Publications ISBN 978 1 61048 881 5 a b c David van Reybrouck 25 March 2014 Congo The Epic History of a People HarperCollins 2012 p 423ff ISBN 978 0 06 220011 2 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 p 130 Howard W French 8 September 1997 Mobutu Sese Seko Zairian Ruler Is Dead in Exile in Morocco at 66 The New York Times Archived from the original on 31 December 2016 Retrieved 30 December 2016 Kennes Erik The Democratic Republic of the Congo Structures of Greed Networks of Need Rethinking the Economics of War Ed Cynthia J Arnson and I William Zartman Washington D C Woodrow Wilson Center 2005 p 154 Longman Timothy The Complex Reasons for Rwanda s Engagement in Congo Ed John F Clark The African Stakes of the Congo War New York Palgrave Macmillan 2002 129 44 pp 131 32 Vlassenroot Koen Citizenship Identity Formation amp Conflict in South Kivu The Case of the Banyamulenge Review of African Political Economy 2002 499 515 p 173 Political Handbook of Africa CQ Press 2006 p 259 Lissouba s own fighters also were reported to include former Mobutu forces Cook Alethia 2017 Conflict Dynamics University of Georgia Press p 61 Angola came to his aid with 2 500 troops in August 1997 Sassou also received help from Chad Gabon France and Elf Congo as well as South African and Serbian mercenaries the former Rwandan government forces Rwandan Interahamwe militia and elements of Mobutu s Zairian armyFurther reading EditAbbott Peter 2014 Modern African Wars 4 The Congo 1960 2002 Oxford New York City Osprey Publishing ISBN 978 1 78200 076 1 Reyntjens Filip The Great African War Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 2006 Cambridge Cambridge UP 2009 Gribbin Robert E In the Aftermath of Genocide the US Role in Rwanda New York IUniverse 2005 Clark John F 2002 The African Stakes in the Congo War New York Palgrave Macmillan ISBN 1 4039 6723 7 Edgerton Robert G 2002 The Troubled Heart of Africa A History of the Congo St Martin s Press ISBN 0 312 30486 2 Gondola Ch Didier 2002 The History of Congo Greenwood Press ISBN 0 313 31696 1 Covers events up to January 2002 Kennes Erik The Democratic Republic of the Congo Structures of Greed Networks of Need Rethinking the Economics of War Ed Cynthia J Arnson and I William Zartman Washington D C Woodrow Wilson Center 2005 Michael Nest with Francois Grignon and Emizet F Kisangani The Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Dimensions of War and Peace Lynne Rienner 2006 ISBN 1 58826 233 2 Prunier Gerard 2009 Africa s World War Congo the Rwandan Genocide and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe Congo the Rwandan Genocide and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe Oxford Oxford University Press ISBN 978 0 19 970583 2 Plaut Martin 2016 Understanding Eritrea Inside Africa s Most Repressive State Oxford Oxford University Press ISBN 9780190669591 Prunier Gerard July 2004 Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare Uganda Sudan and the Congo 1986 99 African Affairs 103 412 359 383 doi 10 1093 afraf adh050 JSTOR 3518562 Vlassenroot Koen Citizenship Identity Formation amp Conflict in South Kivu The Case of the Banyamulenge Review of African Political Economy 2002 499 515 Vlassenroot Koen Conflict amp Malitia Formation in Eastern Congo Ed Preben Kaarsholm Violence Political Culture amp Development in Africa Athens Ohio UP 2006 49 65 Lemarchand Rene The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania 2009 Jackson Stephen Making a Killing Criminality amp Coping in the Kivu War Economy Review of African Political Economy 2002 Samset Ingrid Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict Diamonds amp War in the DRC Review of African Political Economy 2002 463 480 Stearns Jason 2011 Dancing in the Glory of Monsters The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa New York PublicAffairs ISBN 978 1 58648 929 8 Auterresse Severine 2009 Hobbes and the Congo Frames Local Violence and International Intervention International Organization 63 2 249 280 doi 10 1017 S0020818309090080 S2CID 143365639 Reyntjens Filip 2005 The Privatisation and Criminalisation of Public Space in the Geopolitics of the Great Lakes Region Journal of Modern African Studies 43 4 587 607 doi 10 1017 S0022278X05001230 Autesserre Severine 2008 The Trouble With Congo How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict Foreign Affairs 87 3 94 110 Thom William G 1999 Congo Zaire s 1996 97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence Journal of Conflict Studies 19 2 Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title First Congo War amp oldid 1152980702, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

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