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Evolutionary ethics

January 07, 2023

Evolutionary ethics is a field of inquiry that explores how evolutionary theory might bear on our understanding of ethics or morality.[1] The range of issues investigated by evolutionary ethics is quite broad. Supporters of evolutionary ethics have claimed that it has important implications in the fields of descriptive ethics, normative ethics, and metaethics.

Descriptive evolutionary ethics consists of biological approaches to morality based on the alleged role of evolution in shaping human psychology and behavior. Such approaches may be based in scientific fields such as evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, or ethology, and seek to explain certain human moral behaviors, capacities, and tendencies in evolutionary terms. For example, the nearly universal belief that incest is morally wrong might be explained as an evolutionary adaptation that furthered human survival.

Normative (or prescriptive) evolutionary ethics, by contrast, seeks not to explain moral behavior, but to justify or debunk certain normative ethical theories or claims. For instance, some proponents of normative evolutionary ethics have argued that evolutionary theory undermines certain widely held views of humans' moral superiority over other animals.

Evolutionary metaethics asks how evolutionary theory bears on theories of ethical discourse, the question of whether objective moral values exist, and the possibility of objective moral knowledge. For example, some evolutionary ethicists have appealed to evolutionary theory to defend various forms of moral anti-realism (the claim, roughly, that objective moral facts do not exist) and moral skepticism.

History

The first notable attempt to explore links between evolution and ethics was made by Charles Darwin in The Descent of Man (1871). In Chapters IV and V of that work Darwin set out to explain the origin of human morality in order to show that there was no absolute gap between man and animals. Darwin sought to show how a refined moral sense, or conscience, could have developed through a natural evolutionary process that began with social instincts rooted in our nature as social animals.

Not long after the publication of Darwin's The Descent of Man, evolutionary ethics took a very different—and far more dubious—turn in the form of Social Darwinism. Leading Social Darwinists such as Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner sought to apply the lessons of biological evolution to social and political life. Just as in nature, they claimed, progress occurs through a ruthless process of competitive struggle and "survival of the fittest," so human progress will occur only if government allows unrestricted business competition and makes no effort to protect the "weak" or "unfit" by means of social welfare laws.[2] Critics such as Thomas Henry Huxley, G. E. Moore, William James, Charles Sanders Peirce,[3] and John Dewey roundly criticized such attempts to draw ethical and political lessons from Darwinism, and by the early decades of the twentieth century Social Darwinism was widely viewed as discredited.[4]

The modern revival of evolutionary ethics owes much to E. O. Wilson's 1975 book, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. In that work, Wilson argues that there is a genetic basis for a wide variety of human and nonhuman social behaviors. In recent decades, evolutionary ethics has become a lively topic of debate in both scientific and philosophical circles.

Descriptive evolutionary ethics

See also: Evolution of morality

The most widely accepted form of evolutionary ethics is descriptive evolutionary ethics. Descriptive evolutionary ethics seeks to explain various kinds of moral phenomena wholly or partly in genetic terms. Ethical topics addressed include altruistic behaviors, conservation ethics, an innate sense of fairness, a capacity for normative guidance, feelings of kindness or love, self-sacrifice, incest-avoidance, parental care, in-group loyalty, monogamy, feelings related to competitiveness and retribution, moral "cheating," and hypocrisy.

A key issue in evolutionary psychology has been how altruistic feelings and behaviors could have evolved, in both humans and nonhumans, when the process of natural selection is based on the multiplication over time only of those genes that adapt better to changes in the environment of the species. Theories addressing this have included kin selection, group selection, and reciprocal altruism (both direct and indirect, and on a society-wide scale). Descriptive evolutionary ethicists have also debated whether various types of moral phenomena should be seen as adaptations which have evolved because of their direct adaptive benefits, or spin-offs that evolved as side-effects of adaptive behaviors.

Normative evolutionary ethics

Normative evolutionary ethics is the most controversial branch of evolutionary ethics. Normative evolutionary ethics aims at defining which acts are right or wrong, and which things are good or bad, in evolutionary terms. It is not merely describing, but it is prescribing goals, values and obligations. Social Darwinism, discussed above, is the most historically influential version of normative evolutionary ethics. As philosopher G. E. Moore famously argued, many early versions of normative evolutionary ethics seemed to commit a logical mistake that Moore dubbed the naturalistic fallacy. This was the mistake of defining a normative property, such as goodness, in terms of some non-normative, naturalistic property, such as pleasure or survival.

More sophisticated forms of normative evolutionary ethics need not commit either the naturalistic fallacy or the is-ought fallacy. But all varieties of normative evolutionary ethics face the difficult challenge of explaining how evolutionary facts can have normative authority for rational agents. "Regardless of why one has a given trait, the question for a rational agent is always: is it right for me to exercise it, or should I instead renounce and resist it as far as I am able?"[5]

Evolutionary metaethics

Evolutionary theory may not be able to tell us what is morally right or wrong, but it might be able to illuminate our use of moral language, or to cast doubt on the existence of objective moral facts or the possibility of moral knowledge. Evolutionary ethicists such as Michael Ruse, E. O. Wilson, Richard Joyce, and Sharon Street have defended such claims.

Some philosophers who support evolutionary meta-ethics use it to undermine views of human well-being that rely upon Aristotelian teleology, or other goal-directed accounts of human flourishing. A number of thinkers have appealed to evolutionary theory in an attempt to debunk moral realism or support moral skepticism. Sharon Street is one prominent ethicist who argues that evolutionary psychology undercuts moral realism. According to Street, human moral decision-making is "thoroughly saturated" with evolutionary influences. Natural selection, she argues, would have rewarded moral dispositions that increased fitness, not ones that track moral truths, should they exist. It would be a remarkable and unlikely coincidence if "morally blind" ethical traits aimed solely at survival and reproduction aligned closely with independent moral truths. So we cannot be confident that our moral beliefs accurately track objective moral truth. Consequently, realism forces us to embrace moral skepticism. Such skepticism, Street claims, is implausible. So we should reject realism and instead embrace some antirealist view that allows for rationally justified moral beliefs.[6]

Defenders of moral realism have offered two sorts of replies. One is to deny that evolved moral responses would likely diverge sharply from moral truth. According to David Copp, for example, evolution would favor moral responses that promote social peace, harmony, and cooperation. But such qualities are precisely those that lie at the core of any plausible theory of objective moral truth. So Street's alleged "dilemma"—deny evolution or embrace moral skepticism—is a false choice.[7]

A second response to Street is to deny that morality is as "saturated" with evolutionary influences as Street claims. William Fitzpatrick, for instance, argues that "[e]ven if there is significant evolutionary influence on the content of many of our moral beliefs, it remains possible that many of our moral beliefs are arrived at partly (or in some cases wholly) through autonomous moral reflection and reasoning, just as with our mathematical, scientific and philosophical beliefs."[8] The wide variability of moral codes, both across cultures and historical time periods, is difficult to explain if morality is as pervasively shaped by genetic factors as Street claims.

Another common argument evolutionary ethicists use to debunk moral realism is to claim that the success of evolutionary psychology in explaining human ethical responses makes the notion of moral truth "explanatorily superfluous." If we can fully explain, for example, why parents naturally love and care for their children in purely evolutionary terms, there is no need to invoke any "spooky" realist moral truths to do any explanatory work. Thus, for reasons of theoretical simplicity we should not posit the existence of such truths and, instead, should explain the widely held belief in objective moral truth as "an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes in order to get us to cooperate with one another (so that our genes survive)."[9]

Combining Darwinism with moral realism does not lead to unacceptable results in epistemology.[10] No two worlds, that are non-normatively identical, can differ normatively. The instantiation of normative properties is metaphysically possible in a world like ours.[11] The phylogenetic adoption of moral sense does not deprive ethical norms of independent and objective truth-values.[12] A parallel with general theoretical principles exists, which being unchangeable in themselves are discovered during an investigation. Ethical a priori cognition is vindicated to the extent to which other a priori knowledge is available.[13] Scrutinizing similar situations, the developing mind pondered idealized models subject to definite laws. In social relation, mutually acceptable behavior was mastered. A cooperative solution in rivalry among competitors is presented by Nash equilibrium.[14] This behavioral pattern is not conventional (metaphysically constructive) but represents an objective relation similar to that of force or momentum equilibrium in mechanics.[15]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ William Fitzpatrick, "Morality and Evolutionary Biology." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Available online at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-biology/.
  2. ^ Gregory Bassham, The Philosophy Book: From the Vedas to the New Atheists, 250 Milestones in the History of Philosophy. New York: Sterling, 2015, p. 318.
  3. ^ "Charles Sanders Peirce". Anti-determinism, Tychism, and Evolutionism. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2022.
  4. ^ Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, rev. ed. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955, p. 203.
  5. ^ Fitzpatrick, "Morality and Evolutionary Biology," Section 3.2.
  6. ^ Sharon Street, "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value." Philosophical Studies, 127: 109–66.
  7. ^ David Copp, "Darwinian Skepticism about Moral Realism." Philosophical Issues, 18: 186–206.
  8. ^ Fitzpatrick, "Morality and Evolutionary Biology," Section 4.1.
  9. ^ Michael Ruse and E. O. Wilson, "The Evolution of Ethics." New Scientist, 102: 1478 (17 October 1985): 51–52.
  10. ^ Skarsaune Knut Olav. “Darwin and moral realism: survival of the iffiest”. Retrieved 26.01.2021 from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-009-9473-8
  11. ^ Coons, Christian. “How to prove that some acts are wrong (without making substantive moral premises)//”Philosophical Studies”, (2011), 155, (1), 83-98. ISSN 0031-8116
  12. ^ Lutz Matthew & Lenman James. ”Moral Naturalism”, “The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy” (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/naturalism-moral/
  13. ^ Shafer-Landau, R. Evolutionary debunking moral realism and moral knowledge//”J. Ethics and Social Philosophy”. ((2012), 7, (1), 1-37
  14. ^ Rosenberg, Alex. “Will genomics do more for metaphysics than Locke?”//Boniolo, Giovanni & De Anna, Gabriele, “Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology”, Cambridge University Press: [Cambridge etc., 2009], p.178-198. ISBN 978-0-521-12270-2
  15. ^ Mazlovskis Arnis, “Evolutionary, timeless. and current ethos”//”Reliģiski-filozofiski raksti” [Religious-Philosophical Articles] (2020), XXVIII, p.55-73. ISSN 1407-1908

References

Further reading

External links

January 07, 2023
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Evolutionary ethics is a field of inquiry that explores how evolutionary theory might bear on our understanding of ethics or morality 1 The range of issues investigated by evolutionary ethics is quite broad Supporters of evolutionary ethics have claimed that it has important implications in the fields of descriptive ethics normative ethics and metaethics Descriptive evolutionary ethics consists of biological approaches to morality based on the alleged role of evolution in shaping human psychology and behavior Such approaches may be based in scientific fields such as evolutionary psychology sociobiology or ethology and seek to explain certain human moral behaviors capacities and tendencies in evolutionary terms For example the nearly universal belief that incest is morally wrong might be explained as an evolutionary adaptation that furthered human survival Normative or prescriptive evolutionary ethics by contrast seeks not to explain moral behavior but to justify or debunk certain normative ethical theories or claims For instance some proponents of normative evolutionary ethics have argued that evolutionary theory undermines certain widely held views of humans moral superiority over other animals Evolutionary metaethics asks how evolutionary theory bears on theories of ethical discourse the question of whether objective moral values exist and the possibility of objective moral knowledge For example some evolutionary ethicists have appealed to evolutionary theory to defend various forms of moral anti realism the claim roughly that objective moral facts do not exist and moral skepticism Contents 1 History 2 Descriptive evolutionary ethics 3 Normative evolutionary ethics 4 Evolutionary metaethics 5 See also 6 Notes 7 References 8 Further reading 9 External linksHistory EditThe first notable attempt to explore links between evolution and ethics was made by Charles Darwin in The Descent of Man 1871 In Chapters IV and V of that work Darwin set out to explain the origin of human morality in order to show that there was no absolute gap between man and animals Darwin sought to show how a refined moral sense or conscience could have developed through a natural evolutionary process that began with social instincts rooted in our nature as social animals Not long after the publication of Darwin s The Descent of Man evolutionary ethics took a very different and far more dubious turn in the form of Social Darwinism Leading Social Darwinists such as Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner sought to apply the lessons of biological evolution to social and political life Just as in nature they claimed progress occurs through a ruthless process of competitive struggle and survival of the fittest so human progress will occur only if government allows unrestricted business competition and makes no effort to protect the weak or unfit by means of social welfare laws 2 Critics such as Thomas Henry Huxley G E Moore William James Charles Sanders Peirce 3 and John Dewey roundly criticized such attempts to draw ethical and political lessons from Darwinism and by the early decades of the twentieth century Social Darwinism was widely viewed as discredited 4 The modern revival of evolutionary ethics owes much to E O Wilson s 1975 book Sociobiology The New Synthesis In that work Wilson argues that there is a genetic basis for a wide variety of human and nonhuman social behaviors In recent decades evolutionary ethics has become a lively topic of debate in both scientific and philosophical circles Descriptive evolutionary ethics EditSee also Evolution of morality The most widely accepted form of evolutionary ethics is descriptive evolutionary ethics Descriptive evolutionary ethics seeks to explain various kinds of moral phenomena wholly or partly in genetic terms Ethical topics addressed include altruistic behaviors conservation ethics an innate sense of fairness a capacity for normative guidance feelings of kindness or love self sacrifice incest avoidance parental care in group loyalty monogamy feelings related to competitiveness and retribution moral cheating and hypocrisy A key issue in evolutionary psychology has been how altruistic feelings and behaviors could have evolved in both humans and nonhumans when the process of natural selection is based on the multiplication over time only of those genes that adapt better to changes in the environment of the species Theories addressing this have included kin selection group selection and reciprocal altruism both direct and indirect and on a society wide scale Descriptive evolutionary ethicists have also debated whether various types of moral phenomena should be seen as adaptations which have evolved because of their direct adaptive benefits or spin offs that evolved as side effects of adaptive behaviors Normative evolutionary ethics EditNormative evolutionary ethics is the most controversial branch of evolutionary ethics Normative evolutionary ethics aims at defining which acts are right or wrong and which things are good or bad in evolutionary terms It is not merely describing but it is prescribing goals values and obligations Social Darwinism discussed above is the most historically influential version of normative evolutionary ethics As philosopher G E Moore famously argued many early versions of normative evolutionary ethics seemed to commit a logical mistake that Moore dubbed the naturalistic fallacy This was the mistake of defining a normative property such as goodness in terms of some non normative naturalistic property such as pleasure or survival More sophisticated forms of normative evolutionary ethics need not commit either the naturalistic fallacy or the is ought fallacy But all varieties of normative evolutionary ethics face the difficult challenge of explaining how evolutionary facts can have normative authority for rational agents Regardless of why one has a given trait the question for a rational agent is always is it right for me to exercise it or should I instead renounce and resist it as far as I am able 5 Evolutionary metaethics EditEvolutionary theory may not be able to tell us what is morally right or wrong but it might be able to illuminate our use of moral language or to cast doubt on the existence of objective moral facts or the possibility of moral knowledge Evolutionary ethicists such as Michael Ruse E O Wilson Richard Joyce and Sharon Street have defended such claims Some philosophers who support evolutionary meta ethics use it to undermine views of human well being that rely upon Aristotelian teleology or other goal directed accounts of human flourishing A number of thinkers have appealed to evolutionary theory in an attempt to debunk moral realism or support moral skepticism Sharon Street is one prominent ethicist who argues that evolutionary psychology undercuts moral realism According to Street human moral decision making is thoroughly saturated with evolutionary influences Natural selection she argues would have rewarded moral dispositions that increased fitness not ones that track moral truths should they exist It would be a remarkable and unlikely coincidence if morally blind ethical traits aimed solely at survival and reproduction aligned closely with independent moral truths So we cannot be confident that our moral beliefs accurately track objective moral truth Consequently realism forces us to embrace moral skepticism Such skepticism Street claims is implausible So we should reject realism and instead embrace some antirealist view that allows for rationally justified moral beliefs 6 Defenders of moral realism have offered two sorts of replies One is to deny that evolved moral responses would likely diverge sharply from moral truth According to David Copp for example evolution would favor moral responses that promote social peace harmony and cooperation But such qualities are precisely those that lie at the core of any plausible theory of objective moral truth So Street s alleged dilemma deny evolution or embrace moral skepticism is a false choice 7 A second response to Street is to deny that morality is as saturated with evolutionary influences as Street claims William Fitzpatrick for instance argues that e ven if there is significant evolutionary influence on the content of many of our moral beliefs it remains possible that many of our moral beliefs are arrived at partly or in some cases wholly through autonomous moral reflection and reasoning just as with our mathematical scientific and philosophical beliefs 8 The wide variability of moral codes both across cultures and historical time periods is difficult to explain if morality is as pervasively shaped by genetic factors as Street claims Another common argument evolutionary ethicists use to debunk moral realism is to claim that the success of evolutionary psychology in explaining human ethical responses makes the notion of moral truth explanatorily superfluous If we can fully explain for example why parents naturally love and care for their children in purely evolutionary terms there is no need to invoke any spooky realist moral truths to do any explanatory work Thus for reasons of theoretical simplicity we should not posit the existence of such truths and instead should explain the widely held belief in objective moral truth as an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes in order to get us to cooperate with one another so that our genes survive 9 Combining Darwinism with moral realism does not lead to unacceptable results in epistemology 10 No two worlds that are non normatively identical can differ normatively The instantiation of normative properties is metaphysically possible in a world like ours 11 The phylogenetic adoption of moral sense does not deprive ethical norms of independent and objective truth values 12 A parallel with general theoretical principles exists which being unchangeable in themselves are discovered during an investigation Ethical a priori cognition is vindicated to the extent to which other a priori knowledge is available 13 Scrutinizing similar situations the developing mind pondered idealized models subject to definite laws In social relation mutually acceptable behavior was mastered A cooperative solution in rivalry among competitors is presented by Nash equilibrium 14 This behavioral pattern is not conventional metaphysically constructive but represents an objective relation similar to that of force or momentum equilibrium in mechanics 15 See also EditAnimal faith Appeal to nature Bioethics Eugenics Evolution of morality Game theory Social Darwinism Universal DarwinismNotes Edit William Fitzpatrick Morality and Evolutionary Biology Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Available online at https plato stanford edu entries morality biology Gregory Bassham The Philosophy Book From the Vedas to the New Atheists 250 Milestones in the History of Philosophy New York Sterling 2015 p 318 Charles Sanders Peirce Anti determinism Tychism and Evolutionism Metaphysics Research Lab Stanford University 2022 Richard Hofstadter Social Darwinism in American Thought rev ed Boston Beacon Press 1955 p 203 Fitzpatrick Morality and Evolutionary Biology Section 3 2 Sharon Street A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value Philosophical Studies 127 109 66 David Copp Darwinian Skepticism about Moral Realism Philosophical Issues 18 186 206 Fitzpatrick Morality and Evolutionary Biology Section 4 1 Michael Ruse and E O Wilson The Evolution of Ethics New Scientist 102 1478 17 October 1985 51 52 Skarsaune Knut Olav Darwin and moral realism survival of the iffiest Retrieved 26 01 2021 from http link springer com article 10 1007 s11098 009 9473 8 Coons Christian How to prove that some acts are wrong without making substantive moral premises Philosophical Studies 2011 155 1 83 98 ISSN 0031 8116 Lutz Matthew amp Lenman James Moral Naturalism The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2018 Edition Edward N Zalta ed URL https plato stanford edu archives fall2018 entries naturalism moral Shafer Landau R Evolutionary debunking moral realism and moral knowledge J Ethics and Social Philosophy 2012 7 1 1 37 Rosenberg Alex Will genomics do more for metaphysics than Locke Boniolo Giovanni amp De Anna Gabriele Evolutionary Ethics and Contemporary Biology Cambridge University Press Cambridge etc 2009 p 178 198 ISBN 978 0 521 12270 2 Mazlovskis Arnis Evolutionary timeless and current ethos Religiski filozofiski raksti Religious Philosophical Articles 2020 XXVIII p 55 73 ISSN 1407 1908References EditHuxley Thomas Henry 1893 Evolution and Ethics In Nitecki Matthew H Nitecki Doris V eds Evolutionary Ethics Albany State University of New York published 1993 ISBN 0 7914 1499 X Ruse Michael 1995 Evolutionary Ethics A Phoenix Arisen In Thompson Paul ed Issues in Evolutionary Ethics Albany State University of New York ISBN 0 7914 2027 2 Further reading EditCurry O 2006 Who s afraid of the naturalistic fallacy Evolutionary Psychology 4 234 247 Full text Usurped Dawkins Richard 1976 The Selfish Gene ISBN 1 155 16265 X Duntley J D amp Buss D M 2004 The evolution of evil In A Miller Ed The social psychology of good and evil New York Guilford 102 123 Full text Hauser Marc 2006 Moral Minds ISBN 0 06 078070 3 Hare D Blossey B amp Reeve H K 2018 Value of species and the evolution of conservation ethics Royal Society Open Science 5 11 https doi org 10 1098 rsos 181038 Full text Huxley Julian Evolutionary Ethics 1893 1943 Pilot London In USA as Touchstone for ethics Harper N Y 1947 includes text from both T H Huxley and Julian Huxley Katz L Ed Evolutionary Origins of Morality Cross Disciplinary Perspectives Imprint Academic 2000 ISBN 0 907845 07 X Kitcher Philip 1995 Four Ways of Biologicizing Ethics in Elliott Sober ed Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology The MIT Press Kitcher Philip 2005 Biology and Ethics in David Copp ed The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory Oxford University Press Krebs D L amp Denton K 2005 Toward a more pragmatic approach to morality A critical evaluation of Kohlberg s model Psychological Review 112 629 649 Full text Krebs D L 2005 An evolutionary reconceptualization of Kohlberg s model of moral development In R Burgess amp K MacDonald Eds Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Development pp 243 274 CA Sage Publications Full text Mascaro S Korb K B Nicholson A E Woodberry O 2010 Evolving Ethics The New Science of Good and Evil Exeter UK Imprint Academic Richerson P J amp Boyd R 2004 Darwinian Evolutionary Ethics Between Patriotism and Sympathy In Philip Clayton and Jeffrey Schloss Eds Evolution and Ethics Human Morality in Biological and Religious Perspective pp 50 77 Full text ISBN 0 8028 2695 4 Ridley Matt 1996 The Origins of Virtue Viking ISBN 0 14 026445 0 Ruse Michael January 1993 The New Evolutionary Ethics In Nitecki Matthew H Nitecki Doris V eds Evolutionary Ethics Albany State University of New York published 1993 ISBN 0 7914 1499 X Shermer Michael 2004 The Science of Good and Evil Why People Cheat Gossip Care Share and Follow the Golden Rule New York Henry Holt and Company ISBN 0 8050 7520 8 Teehan J amp diCarlo C 2004 On the Naturalistic Fallacy A conceptual basis for evolutionary ethics Evolutionary Psychology 2 32 46 Full text Usurped de Waal Frans 1996 Good Natured The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals London Harvard University Press ISBN 0 674 35660 8 Walter A 2006 The anti naturalistic fallacy Evolutionary moral psychology and the insistence of brute facts Evolutionary Psychology 4 33 48 Full text Usurped Wilson D S E Dietrich et al 2003 On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychology Biology and Philosophy 18 669 682 Full text Wilson D S 2002 Evolution morality and human potential Evolutionary Psychology Alternative Approaches S J Scher and F Rauscher Kluwer Press 55 70 Full text Wilson E O 1979 On Human Nature ISBN 0 671 54130 7 Wright Robert 1995 The Moral Animal ISBN 0 679 40773 1 External links EditThe Evolution of Ethics An Introduction to Cybernetic Ethics by S E Bromberg Evolutionary Ethics at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy FitzPatrick William Morality and Evolutionary Biology In Zalta Edward N ed Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Okasha Samir Biological Altruism In Zalta Edward N ed Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Evolutionary ethics amp oldid 1118197584, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

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