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China–Russia relations

October 28, 2023

"Sino-Russian relations since 1991" redirects here. For the state of Sino-Russian relations before 1991, see History of Sino-Russian relations.

China and Russia established diplomatic relations after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.[a] American scholar Joseph Nye states:

Vladimir Putin with Xi Jinping during a state visit to Moscow in May 2015.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that de facto US-China alliance ended, and a China–Russia rapprochement began. In 1992, the two countries declared that they were pursuing a "constructive partnership"; in 1996, they progressed toward a "strategic partnership"; and in 2001, they signed a treaty of "friendship and cooperation".[2]

The two countries share a land border which was demarcated in 1991, and they signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001, which was renewed in June 2021 for five more years.[3] On the eve of a 2013 state visit to Moscow by Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked that the two nations were forging a special relationship.[4] The two countries have enjoyed close relations militarily, economically, and politically, while supporting each other on various global issues.[5][6][7] Commentators have debated whether the bilateral strategic partnership constitutes an alliance.[8][9][10] Russia and China officially declared their relations "Not allies, but better than allies".[11] Ties have continued to deepen after Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, with Russia increasingly becoming dependent on China since it was hit with large-scale international sanctions.[12][13][14]

History edit

Main articles: History of Sino-Russian relations and China–Soviet Union relations
 
Map showing the original border (in pink) between Manchuria (later Russian Manchuria) and Russia according to the Treaty of Nerchinsk 1689, and subsequent loss of territory to Russia in the treaties of Aigun 1858 (beige) and Peking 1860 (red).

The relations between China and Russia go back to the 17th-century, when the Qing dynasty tried to drive Russian settlers out of Manchuria, ended by the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk. Russian Empire consolidated its control over the Russian Far East in the 19th century, after the annexation of part of Chinese Manchuria (1858-1860).[15]

During the Cold War, China and the USSR were rivals after the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, competing for control of the worldwide Communist movement. There was a serious possibility of a major war between the two nations in the early 1960s; a brief border war took place in 1969. This enmity began to lessen after the death of Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, but relations were poor until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

On December 23, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin made his first official visit to China, where he met with CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin and Chinese president Yang Shangkun.[16] In December 1996, at the end of Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to Moscow, Russia and China issued a joint communique pledging to build an "equal and reliable partnership."[17]

During the 1990s, cooperation between China and Russia was facilitated by the two countries' mutual desires to balance the influence of the United States and establish a multi-polar international system.[18]: 248 

 
Chinese Paramount leader Xi Jinping presented two pandas to Moscow Zoo at a ceremony with Vladimir Putin on 5 June 2019

In 2001, the close relations between the two countries were formalized with the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, a twenty-year strategic, economic, and – controversially and arguably – an implicit military treaty. A month before the treaty was signed, the two countries joined with junior partners Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Still active as of 2022, the organization is expected to counter the growing influence of the United States military outreach program in Central Asia. The PRC is currently a key purchaser and licensee of Russian military equipment, some of which have been instrumental in the modernization of the People's Liberation Army. The PRC is also a main beneficiary of the Russian Eastern Siberia – Pacific Ocean oil pipeline.

When China attempted to build closer relations with Russia in 2013, the Russian government initially had reservations.[19] However, the United States sanctions against Russia for its 2014 annexation of Crimea helped push Russia to a warmer relationship with China.[19] Although some Chinese banks and companies refused to fully cooperate with Russia because of the concern that secondary sanctions might be applied to them, Russian-Chinese economic ties grew once China itself faced sanctions concerns.[20]: 65 

Liam Carson, an emerging European economist at Capital Economics, said in 2019:

Policymakers in both countries have actively tried to strengthen trade ties in recent years. And it's no coincidence that this surge in Russia-China trade has come at the same time that the US has tightened sanctions on Russia and concerns about the US-China trade war have intensified.[21]

By 2019, both nations had serious grievances with the United States. For China, the issues were control of the South China Sea, trade policies, and technology policy. For Russia, the main issue was severe economic penalties imposed by the U.S. and Europe to punish its seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. China and Russia do, however, differ on some policies. China does not recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea,[22]: 4  and Russia does not support China's claims in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, China and Russia currently enjoy the best relations they have had since the late 1950s. Although they have no formal alliance, the two countries do have an informal agreement to coordinate diplomatic and economic moves, and build up an alliance against the United States.[23][24] Yaroslav Trofimov, the chief foreign-affairs correspondent of The Wall Street Journal, argued in 2019:

Though there is no overt ideological alignment between Russia and China today, the two governments share a hostility to dissent, deep suspicion of Western interference and a strong desire to impose tighter controls over their own societies. Mr. Xi has presided over a push to stamp out corruption and bolster the Communist party's role in the economy and the society at large—a campaign akin to Mr. Putin's earlier effort to tame Russian oligarchs and crush political opposition. China was inspired by Russia's legislation cracking down on nongovernmental organizations, while Russian officials have expressed admiration for China's comprehensive internet censorship and "social credit" plan to rank citizens based on their loyalty and behavior.[25]

 
Xi continued to meet Putin via videoconference during the Covid-19 crisis

During the COVID-19 pandemic, some tensions arose within the Chinese-Russian relationship.[20]: 71–72  For example, in October 2020, relying on the pretext of coronavirus allegedly found on the exterior of fish packaging, China greatly reduced the import of Russian seafood, causing a substantial price decrease in Russian seafood.[20]: 72  Chinese restrictions on Russian cargo traffic at border crossings also led to tensions, including a drivers' strike.[20]: 72 

Russian invasion of Ukraine edit

Further information: 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and China and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
 
Putin visited China and met with Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022

Xi and Putin met on February 4, 2022, during a massive Russian build-up of force on the Ukrainian border, with the two expressing that the two countries are nearly united in their anti-US alignment and that both nations shared "no limits" to their commitments.[26][27] Western Intelligence reports said that China had asked Russia to wait to invade Ukraine until after the Beijing Olympics ended on February 20.[27] Shortly before the invasion, Chinese media would repeat Russian statements that Russia's troops were being pulled away from the border with Ukraine.[28]

On February 22, two days prior to the invasion of Ukraine, a leaked post The Beijing News' Horizon News on Weibo detailed instructions on how to report on a crisis in Ukraine; the post asked editors to monitor unfavorable comments, to only use tags shared by Chinese state media and stated "Do not post anything unfavorable to Russia or pro-Western. Let me review your words before posting".[28][29] On February 25, 2022, one day following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Putin told Xi during a phone call that Russia is eager to engage in high-level negotiations with Ukraine, according to China's foreign ministry.[30]

China refused to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, repeated Russian propaganda about the war, opposed economic sanctions against Russia, and abstained or sided with Russia in UN votes on the war in Ukraine.[31]

In 2022, Russia added Taiwan to a list of foreign states and territories that commit "unfriendly actions" against its military invasion of Ukraine.[32] Chinese leader Xi Jinping has assured Vladimir Putin of China's support on Russian "sovereignty and security" in May.[33][34]

In April 2022, in an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov, who is considered close to Vladimir Putin, said that Russia "will be more integrated and more dependent on China", further stating that "Chinese are our close allies and friends and the biggest source of Russian strength after Russian people themselves."[35]

In June 2022, Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping had a call with Putin where he reaffirmed support for Russia on security issues while saying that "all parties should responsibly push for a proper settlement of the Ukraine crisis".[36][37]

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that China has the economic leverage to pressure Putin to end the war, adding "I'm sure that without the Chinese market for the Russian Federation, Russia would be feeling complete economic isolation. That's something that China can do – to limit the trade [with Russia] until the war is over." In August 2022, Zelenskyy said that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping had refused all his requests for direct talks with him.[38]

 
Putin welcomes Xi in Moscow during Xi's visit to Russia in March 2023

In February 2023, Putin's spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected the Chinese peace proposal, saying that "for now, we don't see any of the conditions that are needed to bring this whole story towards peace."[39]

In March 2023, Politico reported that Chinese state-owned weapons manufacturer Norinco shipped assault rifles, drone parts, and body armor to Russia between June and December 2022, with some of the shipments going through via third-countries including Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.[40] According to the US Department of Defense, Chinese ammunition has been used on battlefields in Ukraine.[41]

On 20–22 March 2023, Xi Jinping visited Russia and met with Vladimir Putin both in official and unofficial capacity.[42] It was the first international meeting of Vladimir Putin since the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest.[43]

In May 2023, the EU identified that Chinese and the UAE firms were supplying weapon components to Russia. The EU banned export of dual-use goods targeting 8 Chinese firms.[44]

On 20 July 2023, the Chinese general consulate in Odesa, Ukraine was damaged in a Russian attack on a grain terminal in a nearby port, plus other parts of the city.[45][46] China has been the largest importer of grains from Ukraine.[47]

Border edit

Main article: China–Russia border
See also: Sino-Soviet border conflict

On May 29, 1994, during the visit of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Beijing, Russian and Chinese officials signed an agreement on the Sino-Russian Border Management System intended to facilitate border trade and hinder criminal activity.[16] On September 3 of that year, a demarcation agreement was signed, fixing the boundary along a previously–disputed 55-km stretch of the western Sino-Russian border. After the final demarcation carried out in the early 2000s, it measures 4,209.3 kilometres (2,615.5 mi), and is the world's sixth-longest international border.[48]

The 2004 Complementary Agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Eastern Section of the China–Russia Boundary[49] stated that Russia agrees to transfer a part of Abagaitu Islet, all of Yinlong (Tarabarov) Island, about a half of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island, along with some adjacent islets, to China. A border dispute between Russia and China, standing since Japanese invasion of Manchuria of 1931, was thus resolved. These Amur River islands were, until then, administered by Russia and claimed by China. The event was meant to foster feelings of reconciliation and cooperation between the two countries by their leaders. The transfer has been ratified by both the Chinese National People's Congress and the Russian State Duma. The official transfer ceremony occurred on-site on October 14, 2008.

Rival claims over Vladivostok settled edit

See also: Convention of Peking and Tannu Uriankhai
 
Territories that have become part of Russia under the Aigun Treaty and the Beijing Treaty of 1860

In 2005, Beijing and Moscow ratified an agreement that ended more than three and half centuries of their struggle over territory and for dominance.[50] Russia is the only country that still controls the territory it acquired from Qing dynasty China via the unequal treaties.[18]: 249–250 

Economic relations edit

 
Putin and Xi Jinping at the 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit

Economic relations between Russia and China demonstrate mixed trends. Trade between the two countries was running between $5 billion and $8 billion per year in the 1990s, but grew steadily from then onwards. It was on course to hit $100 billion – the previous goal – until the 2008 crisis interceded. Trade slumped back to around $60 billion in 2015 and 2016 but started to recover again in 2017.[51] Both countries are expecting to raise the trade volume to $200 billion by 2024.[52]

Between 2008 and 2009, when Russia experienced a financial crisis, there was a sharp increase in borrowing from China. This trend, however, did not last. Starting in 2013, borrowing started to grow steadily.[53]

The main form of cooperation in the complex economic relations between Russia and China is trade. From 2003 until 2013, mutual trade increased 7.7 times; in 2014 the scale of bilateral operations increased even more. The aggravation of relations between Russia and Western countries contributed to the expansion of economic ties with China. By 2020, the parties planned to increase bilateral trade to $200 billion. According to the Federal Сustoms Service (FCS) of the Russian Federation, in 2016 the foreign trade turnover of Russia and China amounted to $66.1 billion (in 2015 – $63.6 billion). Russia has a negative trade balance with China: in 2016 exports amounted to 28 billion, whereas imports totaled 38.1 billion (in 2015, 28.6 and 35.9 billion, resoectively). The share of China in foreign trade with Russia grew from 12.1% in 2015 to 14.1% in 2016. Since 2010, China is the largest trading partner of Russia.[54]

Most of Russia's exports to China originate from the mining and petrochemicals sectors.[55] More than half of Russia's exports to China come from mineral fuels, oil, and petroleum products (60.7%), followed by wood and wood products (9.4%), non-ferrous metals (9%), fish and seafood (3.5%), and chemical products (3.3%). China is also gradually becoming a major consumer of Russian agricultural products.[20]: 64 

The main categories of imports to Russia from China are machinery and equipment (35.9%), clothing (13.7%), chemical products (9.1%), fur and fur products (5.6%), footwear (5.3%), and furniture (3%). Chinese electronics are steadily expanding their presence in Russian.[20]: 64 

According to the General Сustoms Administration of China, bilateral trade in January–May 2017 increased by 26.1% in annual terms, amounting to $32.3 billion, and mutual trade in 2017 may exceed $80 billion According to the Ministry of Commerce of China, as of January 1, 2016, the volume of accumulated direct Russian investments in China amounted to $946.9 million and Chinese investments totaled ten times more, estimated at $8.94 billion.[54]

 
Meeting of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) foreign ministers in New York City on 22 September 2022

Participation in such organizations as BRICS and RIC (Russia-India-China) has significant importance for Russian-Chinese economic relations. At the Russian-Chinese summit held in Shanghai[when?], Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping stressed that "Russia and China stand for the transformation of BRICS into a mechanism of cooperation and coordination on a wide range of global financial, economic and international political problems, including the establishment of a closer economic partnership, the early establishment of the BRICS development Bank and the formation of a; for the expansion of joint efforts of representation and voting rights of States with emerging markets and developing countries in the system of global economic governance, for the formation of an open world economy; for the deepening of cooperation in the field of foreign policy, including in the settlement of regional conflicts".[56]

To facilitate financial transactions in the regions, China and Russia will conduct a currency swap. Central banks, with whom China has signed currency swaps, are able to issue loans to their banks in yuan. A currency swap agreement was signed with Russia in the amount of 150 billion yuan ($25 billion). Currency swaps will make the ruble and the yuan more stable, which in turn will have a positive impact on the stability of the global financial system. Additionally, the expansion of currency trading may facilitate investment processes. By investing in an economy that is now facing certain problems due to the fall of the ruble and oil prices, China is carrying out soft expansion and supports one of its main partners. China and Russia have long advocated reducing the role of the dollar in international trade, and both aim to create conditions for the development of bilateral trade and mutual investment. The rate of de-dollarization chosen by the countries is due to the rapid growth of the RMB's share in international payments and settlements (Oct. 2013. – 0.84%, Dec. 2014. – 2.17%, Feb. 2015. – 1.81%).[57] The conclusion of a currency swap makes it possible to facilitate payments, as there is an imitation of the internal currency, which speeds up the transfer procedure and minimizes the cost of conversion.[citation needed]

In 2013, China initiated the creation of a new economic initiative – the "New silk road" or the Belt and Road Initiative. This project is designed primarily to strengthen economic ties and cooperation and to attract investors from Asia and other parts of the world to actively participate in the creation of the "silk road economic belt of the XXI century". The zone should extend from China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia, as it is an important transit logistical link between China and Europe, in which the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may play a significant role.[58] In recent years, China and Russia have stepped up cooperation in the construction of cross-border infrastructure. New Eurasian transport routes are being built as well, including the "Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe" railway and the "Western Europe – Western China" route, which will pass through Russia. In northeast China and the Russian far East, both countries are actively promoting the construction of bridges, ports, and other projects. It is planned to increase the volume of bilateral trade between China and Russia to $200 billion by the end of 2020.

 
Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in Beijing, China on 24 May 2023

Russia has also shown interest in cooperating with the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The creation of the EAEU is posed to serve as an important platform for multilateral cooperation in the region, as all participants are friendly neighbors and partners with Russia, as well as traditional partners with China. Russia is interested in creating a free trade zone of the EAEU and China, as well as the use of the national currency in this region.[59]

Following the implementation of international sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War, China provided economic relief to Russia.[28] China's total trade with Russia was a record $190 billion in 2022.[60] In the same year, China accounted for 40% of Russia's imports.[61] In the first half of 2023, models from Chinese car companies accounted for more than a third of all sales in Russia.[62]

In May 2023, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak visited Beijing and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Novak said that Russian energy supplies to China will increase by 40 percent year-on-year in 2023. Chinese Premier Li Qiang hailed the "comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between China and Russia in the new era", saying that bilateral trade between China and Russia had increased by more than 40% over the past year.[63]

Trade in national currencies edit

On November 23, 2010, at a meeting of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, it was announced that Russia and China have decided to use their own national currencies for bilateral trade, instead of the U.S. dollar. The move was aimed to further improve the relations between Beijing and Moscow and to protect their domestic economies during the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The trading of the Chinese yuan against the Russian ruble started in the Chinese interbank market, while the yuan's trading against the ruble started on the Russian foreign exchange market in December 2010.[64][65]

In coordination with other emerging economies, the 2010 BRIC summit was held in Brasília in April 2010.

In 2014, Beijing and Moscow signed a 150 billion yuan central bank liquidity swap line agreement to avoid and counter American sanctions.[66]

In December 2014, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledged to offer financial support to Russia and support the Ruble, if needed, in light of the currency's depreciation.[67]

Russia's dependence on the Chinese yuan increased heavily after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The share of Russian exports paid in yuan rose to 16% by December 2022, compared to 0.4% before the invasion, while share of imports paid in yuan increased to 23%, up from 4% before.[68][69] Yuan's share of stock market trading in Russia increased from 3% to 33%[61] Nearly 50 financial institutions were offering yuan saving accounts by 2023, and households were holding around $6 billion worth of yuan in Russian banks by the end of 2022.[61]

Tourism and cultural exchanges edit

Tourism, especially from China to Russia, has seen a massive spike over the years. More than 2 million Chinese tourists visited Russia in 2019, compared to 158,000 a decade ago. China is one of the most important tourist markets for Russia. Support for cooperation between Russian and Chinese investment organizations in tourism industry is provided in the context of the Joint Action Plan by the Russian Federal Agency for Tourism and China's State Administration of Tourism.[70] More than 2.3 million Chinese tourists flew into Moscow's Sheremetyevo – Alexander S. Pushkin international airport in 2019, including 1.26 million who transferred via the airport. Sheremetyevo, which offers flights to 29 Chinese cities served by eight Chinese airlines, expects their number to grow by 30 per cent a year in the years to come. Russia has played into this tourism boom by expanding capacity of Moscow's largest airport. "Russia has also allowed more flights from regional Chinese air companies to Moscow, which helps to turn the Russian capital into an air hub for Europe-bound Chinese tourism." Sheremetyevo is looking to capitalise on that growth. Pǔtōnghuà or standard Chinese is among the languages displayed on Sheremetyevo's signs and announcements, while duty-free stores accept popular Chinese payment methods, including UnionPay cards and online systems WeChat Pay and Alipay. As many as 70 per cent of tax-free receipts handed out at Russia's airports go to Chinese citizens. By 2019, Russia has become among the top 3 travel destinations for Chinese tourists.[71]

Energy relations edit

 
On 21 May 2014, China and Russia signed a $400 billion gas deal. Starting 2019, Russia plans to provide natural gas to China for the next 30 years.

Since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, energy relations between China and Russia have been generally marked by cooperation and regard for mutual geopolitical and strategic interests. China's fast-growing economy places increasing pressure on itself to secure energy imports, while Russia's economy is largely driven by the demand for the export of natural resources. China became a petroleum importer for the first time in 1993, had become the world's second-largest oil-consuming country as of 2011, and the world's largest overall energy consumer as of 2010.[72][73] In a report released in January 2012, the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation estimated that the country's crude oil consumption would increase to 480 million tonnes in 2012, or 9.6 million barrels per day. The group also forecast that natural gas consumption would rise 15.3 percent to 148.2 billion cubic meters (bcd).[74] Given its geographical proximity to China and position as one of the world's largest oil producers and natural gas exporters, Russia has been an obvious candidate for meeting this increased demand.[75] While energy relations have primarily related to oil, gas, and coal, there have also been partnerships with regard to nuclear and renewable (wind and water) energy technology.[76]

From the mid-1990s, when the tightening of global energy markets coincided with his rise to power, Russian President Vladimir Putin has signaled the importance of, oil and particularly natural gas, for Russia's emergence as a global power.[77] Long-term prospects for Russian gas exports to China will be affected by several global pricing trends.[78] Surges in liquefied natural gas (LNG) capacity, the increasingly competitive nature of Central Asian gas supplies, advances in shale gas technology, and potential greenhouse gas policies may all impact Chinese consumption.[79]

Despite frequent declarations of goodwill and bilateral energy cooperation, Chinese-Russian energy relations since 1991 have been limited by mutual suspicions, pricing concerns, inadequate transportation infrastructure, and competition for influence in Eurasia.[80][81]

 
Russian oil exports by destination in 2020.[82]

In 2014, Russia and China signed a 30-year gas deal worth $400 billion. Deliveries to China started in late 2019.[83] The Power of Siberia pipeline is designed to reduce China's dependence on coal, which is more carbon intensive and causes more pollution than natural gas.[84] For Russia, the pipeline allows another economic partnership in the face of resistance to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.[84] The proposed western gas route from Russia's West Siberian petroleum basin to North-Western China is known as Power of Siberia 2 (Altai gas pipeline).[85]

In 2022, China's imports of discounts of up to 30% oil from Russia rose 55% in May, Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China's biggest oil provider in recent months.[86][87]

History edit

The official relationship between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation has been upgraded three times since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1991. Beginning as "good-neighborly and mutually beneficial" in December 1992, it evolved into a "constructive partnership" in September 1994, and finally a "strategic partnership of coordination" in April 1996.[88] In September 1999, the two countries began joint construction of a nuclear power station at Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province with an installed capacity of 2 million kW, one of the first situations of mutual energy cooperation.[89]

The late 1990s also marked the beginning of feasibility studies for natural gas and oil pipeline projects in Western and Eastern Siberia. In 2001, Russian company Yukos proposed the unprecedented Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) Oil Pipeline Project, which would link Yukos's oil refinery in Angarsk to Daqing, in northern China.[90] At the time, rail routes were the only means of transporting oil into the growing Chinese market. The project stalled in October 2003 when Yukos chief executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested on charges including tax evasion and fraud, and the Russian government launched an immediate investigation into the company.[91][92] Many speculated that the series of events were politically motivated, given that Mr. Khodorkovsky had been a vocal opponent of President Putin.[93] A week after Mr. Khodorkovsky's arrest, China Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue publicly announced that the Kremlin investigation would not impact the proposed China-Russia oil pipeline project.[94]

In September 2004, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov in Moscow, where the two heads of government signed agreements affirming Russia's promise to set the route of a proposed pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific, with priority given to laying a pipeline spur to China, as well as increasing rail oil exports to China to 10 million tons (200,000 b/d) in 2005 and 15 million tons (300,000 b/d) in 2006.[95] Four days before Wen's visit, Yukos, then the largest supplier of Russian oil to China and Russia's biggest oil producer, publicly announced that rail shipments of crude oil to the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) would end beginning on September 28, 2004. The Kremlin had begun auctioning off the troubled company's operating assets a month prior in August.[96]

Gazprom, Soyuzneftegaz and the Chinese Embassy in Moscow all expressed interest in Yuganskneftegaz, a main arm of Yukos.[97] The subsidiary was ultimately acquired by Russia's state-owned oil company Rosneft for roughly $9.3 billion. In February 2005, Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin revealed that Chinese banks provided $6 billion in financing the Rosneft acquisition. This financing was reportedly secured by long-term oil delivery contracts between Rosneft and the CNPC.[98] In the same month, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denied that China provided "funds" for the deal. The Foreign Ministry could not confirm whether there were any "loans" involved, ministry spokesman Kong Quan said.[99]

State-owned Lukoil became China's largest Russian oil supplier when CNPC reached a strategic cooperation agreement with the company in September 2006.[100] As promised during Premier Wen's visit to Moscow in 2004, construction on a direct pipeline spur to China began in March 2006, when CNPC signed an agreement providing state oil producer Transneft $400 million for constructing a pipeline from Skovorodino, about 70 km (43 mi) from the Chinese border. In the same month, CNPC agreed to a set of principles establishing future joint ventures with Rosneft.[101][102]

In 2006, Gazprom was made responsible for all exports of gas from Russia's eastern Siberian fields, outside of sales made through production sharing agreements (PSAs). This was another move widely seen to be politically motivated, since successful commercial development of these fields and export to Asian markets would be impossible without Gazprom – and therefore Kremlin – involvement.[103][104] In an annual shareholder report two years prior, Gazprom acknowledged a plan for supplying natural gas to China. Two routes, roughly equal in capacity, would be constructed, with a total volume of 68 billion cubic meters of gas per annum. An Altai pipeline would link West Siberian fields with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China, while the eastern pipeline would run from Yakutia into northeastern China.[105][106]

Chinese domestic natural gas consumption roughly matched domestic production in 2004. Since then, however, its rate of growth and more sustainable energy profile compared to oil inevitably led to a surge in Chinese natural gas imports.[106] In March 2006, CNPC signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Gazprom for the delivery of natural gas to China, which officially began pricing negotiations between Gazprom chief executive Alexei Miller and Chen Geng, then head of the CNPC. In September 2007, the Russian Federation Industry and Energy Ministry approved a development plan for an integrated gas production, transportation, and supply system in Eastern Siberia and the Far East, taking into account potential gas exports to China and other Asia-Pacific countries. Gazprom was appointed by the Russian Government as the Eastern Gas Program execution coordinator.[107]

Russia's desire to diversify its export markets has been matched by China's willingness to invest in Russian energy production and infrastructure. Russian policymakers, however, have expressed reserve about increased Chinese influence in the energy sector. In 2002, CNPC attempted to bid for Russian oil firm Slavneft, but withdrew just weeks later.[108][109] International news sources suggested the bid failed partly due to anti-foreign sentiment in the Duma, Russia's lower parliamentary house.[110][111][112][113] Slavneft was privatized by parity owners TNK (later OAO TNK-BP) and Sibneft (later OAO Gazprom Neft) soon afterwards. In 2004, Slavneft was then acquired by TNK-BP, the product of a merger between the Alfa Access Renova Consortium (AAR, Alfa Group) and British Petroleum (BP).[114] In 2006, Russia denied CNPC a significant stake in OAO Rosneft. When the Russian company went public, CNPC was allowed to purchase $500 million worth of shares, one-sixth of the $3 billion it had sought. The financial crisis triggered in 2008 gave China its opportunity to invest in Russia on a grander scale through a loans for oil program.[115] In 2009 and 2010, China's long-term energy-backed loans (EBL) extended large sums of capital to companies and entities not only in Russia, but also in Brazil, Ecuador, Turkmenistan and Venezuela.[116][117]

Growing Chinese investment is speculated to be about more than energy security for China. Chinese news agency Xinhua reported in 2010 that many Chinese enterprises believe the Russian market will allow them to become truly global.[118] Gao Jixiang, Associate Research Fellow of the Russian Economy Research Office of the Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, reported that China's investments in Russia totaled $1.374 billion as of 2007, and were projected to reach $12 billion by 2020.[119] In 2008–09 alone, total investments rose 25.4% to $2.24 billion and direct investment went from $240 million to $410 million.[120]

 
Meeting between Dmitry Medvedev and Hu Jintao at the 2009 APEC Summit.

2009 marked the 60th anniversary of established diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing, and also coincided with the signing of over 40 contracts worth roughly $3 billion.[citation needed] Chinese leader Hu Jintao and President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia conferred three times in four days during mid-June at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Yekaterinburg, at the first-ever heads-of-state meeting of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), and again when Hu made a state visit to Moscow from June 16–18, representing what many saw to be a high-water mark in Chinese-Russian relations.[121]

Growing economic closeness also seemed to suggest a growing political alliance. A joint statement released by the two heads of state expanded upon how the two governments usually pledge mutual support for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Russian government explicitly affirmed that Tibet, along with Taiwan, are "inalienable parts of the Chinese territory", while the Chinese supported "Russia's efforts in maintaining peace and stability in the region of Caucasus."[122] During Hu's visit, however, Gazprom announced it could not begin delivering natural gas to China in 2011 as planned because of pricing disagreements. Construction of the Western Siberian Altai pipeline, which could deliver over 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to China, was originally scheduled to begin in 2008.[citation needed]

September 27, 2010 marked the completion of the 1,000-kilometre (620 mi) Russia-China Crude Pipeline. Stretching from Russia's Skovorodino station to China's Mohe station, it was the first pipeline ever built between China and Russia.[123] In April 2009, Rosneft and Transneft had signed deals with CNPC guaranteeing the pipeline's production of 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day for twenty years as part of a $25 billion loan-for-oil agreement.[124] Upon the pipeline's completion in 2010, CNPC also signed a general agreement with Transneft over the operation of the pipeline, a framework agreement with Gazprom to import natural gas to China from 2015 onwards, an agreement with Rosneft on extending oil supply to the Russia-China Crude Pipeline, and an agreement with Lukoil on expanding strategic cooperation. Both sides hailed the series of agreements as a "new era" in cooperation, and Russia's Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin told reporters in Beijing that Russia was "ready to meet China's full demand in gas" going forward.[125]

In September 2010, President Putin reaffirmed the potential nuclear future of Russia and China's energy relations, saying "Of course, our cooperation with China is not limited to just hydrocarbons ... Russia is China's main partner in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy, and equipment supplies here amount to billions of dollars".[126] As of 2011, however, Russian officials have remained reluctant to transfer nuclear energy technologies and other knowledge products to Chinese partners. Industry experts have pointed out that while proprietary technology would protect Russian exports from being displaced by lower-cost Chinese products in third-party markets, such an approach may reinforce Chinese doubts about Russia's reliability as a long-term energy partner.[81]

The Russian oil industry has not only been burdened by corporate struggles such as with Yukos and political disagreements between the countries, but also by the reoccurring breaches in safety. Some difficulties stem from the Kazakh riots[127] to endless environmental concerns,[128][129][130] but most recently the capsizing of an oil platform that was allowed to operate in the north late in the season, while towed under adverse maritime conditions.[131] Incidents such as these cannot help but give potential foreign investment, which the region needs, pause as to the reliability of Russian energy supplies.[according to whom?]

Russian Far East (RFE) edit

In 1996, the Russian Federation completed two production sharing agreements (PSA) for oil and gas exploration off the northeast coast of the Sakhalin Islands. The Sakhalin-I project, operated by Exxon Neftegas (EN), has estimated potential recoverable reserves at 307 million tons of oil (2.3 billion bbn) and 485 billion cubic meters of gas as of 2002.[132][133] EN, a subsidiary of US-based ExxonMobil, holds a 30 percent interest in the project, while Rosneft holds 20 percent via its affiliates RN-Astra (8.5 percent) and Sakhalinmorneftegas-Shelf (11.5 percent). Japanese consortium SODECO and the Indian state-owned oil company ONGC Videsh Ltd. holds the remaining 50 percent (30 and 20 percent, respectively).

The Sakhalin-II project is managed by the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. (Sakhalin Energy). As of 2011, Russian state monopoly Gazprom holds 50% plus 1 share, RoyalDutch Shell 27.5%, Mitsui 12.5% and Mitsubishi 10%.[134] Gazprom purchased its majority stake from Sakhalin-2 operator Royal Dutch Shell in 2006. The project had been placed permanently on hold by environmental regulators, but moved forward after the sale.[135] The series of events led to widespread speculation that environmental violations may have been used as a bargaining chip in the deal.[136] Sakhalin-II consists of two 800-km pipelines running from the northeast of the island to Prigorodnoye (Prigorodnoe) in Aniva Bay at the southern end. The consortium built Russia's first liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant at Prigorodnoye. Industry sources speculated that "some in Russia hope to sell China gas from Sakhalin-2's or other facilities' future LNG holdings now that it has mastered the technology".[137]

In December 2003, CNPC and Sakhalin Energy signed a frame agreement on exploration and development in Russia's Sakhalin oilfield.[138] ExxonMobil also looked towards the Chinese market, making preliminary agreements on supplying Sakhalin-I gas to China as early as 2002. On November 2, 2004, CNPC began negotiations with ExxonMobil for possible long-term gas deliveries from Sakhalin-1.[139] Negotiations were then concluded in October 2006, when Exxon and CNPC officially announced an agreement. Under the deal, Sakhalin-1 could sell up to 10 billion cubic meters of gas to China over 20 years by pipeline. The plan met strong opposition from Gazprom, which has a rival pipeline project and controls all Russian gas exports apart from sales through PSAs such as Sakhalin-1.[140] In August 2006, Sakhalin-I's De-Kastri oil terminal began exporting processed petroleum to markets including China, Japan, and South Korea.[141]

The influence of Russia's regional energy trade has led to a sense of local uneasiness about foreign countries' influence in the sector. In 2000, President Putin warned a Siberian audience that unless Russia intensified the region's development, the Russian Far East would end up speaking Chinese, Japanese and Korean.[142][143] In 2002, the Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Vladimir Potapov, expressed serious concerns about the region's combined remoteness, weak infrastructure, declining population, and wealth "in very diverse resources".[144][145] Political figures like Viktor Ozerov, Chairman of the Federation Council's Defense and Security Committee, warned of military threats in the Far East and decried the predatory use of the region's resources, and large-scale illegal immigration, though scholars pointed out that no imminent threat was visible.[146] Dmitri Trenin stated that, 'the principal domestic reason is the situation of eastern Russia, especially East Siberia and the Russian Far East. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the territories have been going through a deep crisis. The former model of their development is inapplicable; a new model is yet to be devised and implemented. Meanwhile, the vast region has been going through depopulation, deindustrialization, and general degradation. ... The quality of Moscow's statesmanship will be tested by whether it can rise up to the challenge in the East."[147] The RFE has been one of the most difficult areas to transition between the structure of the Soviet Union and the still developing Russian state due to the lack of economic self-sufficiency in the region or any prospects of stable growth.

In September 2005, the Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref promised a doubling of state support for the RFE to $612 million in 2006, and the consideration of allocating a new $2.5 billion infrastructure fund for projects in the region.[148] A year later, at the end of 2006, Putin reiterated that the socio-economic isolation of the RFE represented a threat to national security, and advocated yet another new socioeconomic commission and regional development strategy to be formed. He specifically pointed to the perceived threat of foreign immigration in the Far East.[149] Scholars and regional experts have suggested that China's rapid economic growth (especially relative to Russia's GDP growth rate) lies at the root of anxieties concerning the RFE. While the Russian and Chinese economies were roughly the same size in 1993, China's grew to over 3.5 times larger than Russia's by 2008. Even since 1998, when Russia began a rapid economic recovery, China has grown at a faster rate; the gap has only widened since the global economic crisis and falling energy prices of the late 2000s. China's growth has led to the creation of new productive capacity, whereas Russia's recovery has been based largely on reutilizing Soviet-era capacity that had idled in the early 1990s.[150][151]

Russian officials have repeatedly reiterated their opposition to being merely China's natural resources storehouse.[152] As early as 2001, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin warned that if Russia failed to become "a worthy economic partner" for Asia and the Pacific Rim, "China and the Southeast Asian countries will steamroll Siberia and the Far East."[153][154] At the start of his presidency in September 2008, Dmitri Medvedev echoed similar concerns, warning a Kamchatka audience that if Russia fails to develop the RFE, it could turn into a raw material base for more developed Asian countries and "unless we speed up our efforts, we can lose everything."[155][156] Regional experts have pointed out that despite these increasingly vocal concerns, the local economy of the RFE has become increasingly reliant on Chinese goods, services, and labor over the past decade; furthermore, local out-migration shows little sign of reversing. For all the early promises under Putin, Moscow's policy towards the RFE has not seemed effective as of 2008.[157]

Dmitri Trenin of the Moscow branch of the Carnegie Endowment has argued that Siberia's development could become Russia's most urgent challenge.[158] Failure to develop the region into more than a raw material outpost could lead to what he calls a "Chinese takeover of the region, not by migration but rather by economic means of trade and tourism."

Russia's plans for this region have revolved around building energy infrastructure to leverage exports and attracting investment so that the capital will be available for modernizing regional infrastructure.[159][160] These plans largely depend on foreign investments, which Russian companies have grudgingly acknowledged. In 2008, a consortium of Chinese engineering firms led by Harbin Turbine signed an agreement with Russian power producer OGK to produce coal-fired turbines in the RFE, adding 41,000 megawatts of new generating capacity by 2011. Stanislav Nevynitsyn, executive director of OGK, admitted, "It is simply a necessity for us to work with the Chinese – we will not get the capacity built otherwise."[161] Through loans to Russia's Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs, Vnesheconombank (VEB), China became a major stockholder in Lukoil in 2009.[162] In the same year, after having excluded foreign firms from bidding on the huge Udokan copper mine in Southeast Siberia, Moscow welcomed Chinese, South Korean, and Kazakh miners and refiners back into the bidding process.[163][164]

As part of the 'Russia's Energy Strategy till 2020' program, the Russian government launched a program of creating a unified gas production, transportation, and supply system in Eastern Siberia and the RFE in 2006. The program would ultimately provide affirmation of an all-Russia gas system from the Baltic Sea up to the Pacific Ocean."[165] Russian policymakers have also suggested building an international center for spent fuel and nuclear energy in the RFE, hoping to raise the profile in the export of nuclear energy to the global market.[166]

In 2009, Gazprom was awarded subsurface licenses for the Kirinsky, Vostochno-Odoptinsky and Ayashsky blocks to begin the Sakhalin-III project.[167] Geological exploration has been underway at the Kirinskoye field and, as of 2009, natural gas production is scheduled for 2014. The field will become one of the natural gas sources for the Sakhalin–Khabarovsk–Vladivostok gas transmission system (GTS). The first GTS start-up complex will be 1,350 km, with a capacity of 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year.[168]

Central Asia edit

 
Meeting of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin and Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh in Samarkand, Uzbekistan on 15 September 2022

China and Russia generally cooperate with each other regarding Central Asia affairs.[169] While they sometimes compete in Central Asia, those competitions are typically focused on economic matters and proceed in an orderly way within established norms.[169] Where competition in Central Asia does occur between the two powers, it typically arises as a product of the circumstances rather than as an intentional effort to contain the other country.[169]

In 1996, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan formed the Shanghai Five, a collaborative body that was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) with the addition of Uzbekistan in 2001.[170] As members of the SCO, China and Russia have cooperated in military exercises, such as counterterrorism drills in Kyrgyzstan in 2002 and similar exercises in Kazakhstan and China in 2003.[171]

Russian and Chinese leaders regularly call for greater cooperation and coordination through the SCO between their two countries in the context of their broader goal of promoting multilateral diplomacy.[172][173][174] In a joint statement issued on May 23, 2008, Russia and China asserted that "International security is comprehensive and inalienable, and some countries' security cannot be guaranteed at the cost of some others', including expanding military and political allies."[175] Zhao Huasheng, Director of Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University's Shanghai Cooperation Center, has argued that economic cooperation will ensure the long-term relevance of the SCO, as current security threats recede.[176] While China and Russia do enjoy some bilateral energy cooperation, which experts predict will continue to grow in the future, the two countries have emerged as rivals for Central Asian oil and gas supplies.[177] With the rising oil prices in the mid-2000s, Russia has sought to renew its influence in Central Asia, in particular the region's southern flank, to guarantee access to gas supplies for reexport to Europe and for its own domestic needs. As China's energy needs have grown and its policymakers have sought to develop its western provinces, China, too, has sought to expand its influence in Central Asia.[171]

In 2007, at a meeting of SCO prime ministers in Tashkent, Russian Premier Viktor Zubkov reiterated Moscow's desire to forge a Central Asian energy "club" within the SCO, comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The SCO energy club could be set up as soon as 2008, Russian Deputy Industry and Energy Minister Ivan Materov announced in Tashkent. Materov insisted, however, that the club would not amount to a sort of mini-OPEC. Political and economic analysts in Moscow believe the Kremlin is keen to establish an energy club as a means to prevent a possible clash with China over Central Asia's energy resources.[178]

At a May 2007 SCO summit in Turkmenbashi, Russian, Kazakh and Turkmen leaders announced the expansion of the Prikaspiisky gas pipeline from Turkmenistan into Russia.[179] The plan has stalled due to several obstacles, including price disagreements and the economic recession of the late 2000s.[180][181]

Uncertainty over the Prikaspiisky route has given China an opening into the region, especially in Turkmenistan. During a brief visit to Ashgabat, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called for efforts "to step up bilateral trade cooperation to a new level." Berdymukhamedov, in turn, expressed interest in "working closely" with China on a natural gas pipeline project, Xinhua News Agency reported. In December 2005, Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev inaugurated the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline to ship oil to China. The $800 million Atasu-Alashankou route still needs Russian crude oil from Western Siberia, transported via the Omsk-Pavlodar-Shymkent pipeline, to reach its full annual capacity of 20 million tons by 2010.[182] Although China and its Central Asian partners view their expanding cooperation as a means of diversifying their energy partnerships, Russia has enjoyed success in other major energy projects. In November 2007, two Russian companies (TNK-BP and GazpromNeft) signed an agreement with KazTransOil to ship up to 5 million tons of oil annually to China via the Omsk-Pavlodar-Atasu-Alanshakou pipeline. In the first quarter of 2008, 300,000 tons of Russian crude oil were exported to China along this route.[183] Moreover, a Russian engineering company, Stroytransgaz, won a tender to build Turkmenistan's section of the gas pipeline to China.[184]

China and Russia announced in May 2014 that they had reached a 30-year gas deal where "Russia would supply 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas each year to China".[185] These developments continue to show Russia and China's attempts to work together outside of USA confinements.

Military relations edit

After the EU arms embargo on China imposed as a consequence of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, China became a reliable client for Russian military exports, making up 25–50% of all foreign military sales.[186] On November 9, 1993, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian signed a five-year defense cooperation agreement paving the way for an increase in the number of military attachés stationed in their respective capitals. On July 12, 1994, the Russian and Chinese defence ministers signed a border security agreement designed to prevent potentially dangerous military incidents, such as unintentional radar jamming and airspace violations. In December 1996, Russia finalized "the sale of SU-27 fighters and related production technology to China."[17]

On October 19, 1999, Defence Minister of China, General Chi Haotian, after meeting with Syrian Defence Minister Mustafa Tlass in Damascus, Syria to discuss expanding military ties between Syria and China, flew directly to Israel and met with Ehud Barak, the then Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Israel where they discussed military relations. Among the military arrangements was a $1 billion Israeli-Russian sale of military aircraft to China, which were to be jointly produced by Russia and Israel.[187]

In 2004, the Russian Foreign Ministry blocked both the sale of the Su-35 and Tupolev Tu-22M bombers to China over concerns about the arrangements for Chinese production of the Sukhoi Su-27SK (known as the Shenyang J-11).[188] Originally, the licensing agreement required that engines and avionics be sourced by Russian suppliers; however, by 2004 these components were being produced domestically.[citation needed]

Currently, China focuses on domestic weapon designs and manufacturing, while still importing certain military products from Russia, such as jet engines. China sought to become independent in its defence sector and become competitive in global arms markets; its defence sector is rapidly developing and maturing. Gaps in certain capabilities remain, including development of electronic and reliable propulsion systems, although China's defense industry production has improved significantly, providing an advantage over other militaries in the Asia-Pacific region.[189] China's 2015 Defense White Paper called for "independent innovation" and the "sustainable development" of advanced weaponry and equipment.[189]

In September 2018, Russia hosted the militaries of China and Mongolia as a part of the Vostok 2018 military exercise to improve ties between the countries, making them the first two countries outside of the former Soviet Union to join the exercise.[190][191]

 
Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu visited the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia on 17 April 2023

In December 2019, Rostec officials accused China of intellectual property theft of a range of military technologies.[192] In June 2020, Russia charged one of its Arctic scientists of passing sensitive information to China.[193]

In July 2019, and again in December 2020, Russia and China flew joint bomber patrols over the Pacific.[194][195]

In November 2022, Russian and Chinese warplanes including the Tupolev-95 and XIAN H-6K long range strategic bombers conducted joint patrols over the Sea of Japan and East China sea.[196]

As early as February 2022, according to US authorities, Russia asked China for advanced military weaponry, in particular, armed drones for use in their invasion of Ukraine.[197][198] China and Russia have both denied these allegations.[199]

In September 2022, Russia hosted the military of China as a part of the Vostok-2022 [ru] military exercise.[200]

On 17 April 2023, Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu made his first overseas visit to Russia. As part of his four-day visit, he met with Russian president Vladimir Putin and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in Moscow. During his meeting, he stated the ties between China and Russia "surpass military-political alliances of the cold war era".[201][202]

Media communication agreements edit

In March 2013, the Voice of Russia and the People's Daily Online signed a news sharing agreement as Xi and Putin presided.[203][204] On October 13, 2014, Russia Today and the People's Daily signed a cooperation agreement.[204] In July 2021, the Russian-Chinese Commission for Humanitarian Cooperation agreed to mass-media cooperation.[205][206]

Mutual perceptions edit

Since 1995, Russians have consistently held positive views of China. As of September 2022, 88% of Russians surveyed by the Levada Center view China favorably, with only 5% expressing a negative opinion.[207]

According to a 2017 BBC World Service poll, 74% of the Chinese view Russia's influence positively, with 18% expressing a negative view, while 44% of Russians view China's influence positively and 23% negatively.[208]

According to a 2019 survey by the Pew Research Center, 71% of Russians have a favorable view of China, with 18% expressing an unfavorable view.[209] A YouGov survey conducted in the same year found that 71% of the Chinese think Russia has a positive effect on world affairs, while 15% view it negatively.[210]

During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, many social media users in China showed sympathy for Russian narratives due in part to distrust of US foreign policy.[211][212] Chinese company NetEase has published videos critical of Russia from Chinese in Ukraine and Ukrainians in China.[213][214]

According to a Genron NPO poll released in November 2022 asking about Chinese peoples' views on the Russian invasion, 39.5% of respondents said the Russian actions "are not wrong", 21.5% said "the Russian actions are a violation of the U.N. Charter and international laws, and should be opposed", and 29% said "the Russian actions are wrong, but the circumstances should be considered."[215][216]

See also edit

Notes edit

  1. ^ Territories under the control of the Republic of China (ROC): Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Islands are recognised by the Russian Federation as part of the PRC.[1]

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Further reading edit

  • Bernstein, Thomas P. and Hua-Yu Li, eds. China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present (2010).
  • Blank, Stephen. "Is Russia a great power in Asia?." in Great Powers and Geopolitics (Springer, Cham, 2015) pp. 161–182. online
  • Blank, Stephen. "Russo-Chinese relations in strategic perspective." in International Relations and Asia's Northern Tier (Palgrave, Singapore, 2018) pp. 93–108.
  • Blank, Stephen, and Younkyoo Kim. "Does Russo-Chinese partnership threaten America's interests in Asia?." Orbis 60.1 (2016): 112–127.
  • Contessi, Nicola P. "China, Russia and the Leadership of the SCO: A Tacit Deal Scenario" China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 8, 4 (2010): 101–123.
  • Efremenko D. "New Russian Government's Foreign Policy towards East Asia and the Pacific" Journal of East Asian Affairs (2012) 26#2 (Seoul: Institute for National Security )
  • Fravel, M. Taylor. Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton University Press, 2019) online reviews
  • Garver, John W. Foreign relations of the People's Republic of China (1992) online
  • Herbst, John. "The Coming Russian-Chinese Clash" The National Interest Aug. 21, 2020.
  • Hsu, Jing-Yun, and Jenn-Jaw Soong. "Development of China-Russia Relations (1949–2011) Limits, Opportunities, and Economic Ties." Chinese economy 47.3 (2014): 70–87. online
  • Jersild, Austin. The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History (U of North Carolina Press, 2014).
  • Kim, Younkyoo, and Stephen Blank. "Rethinking Russo-Chinese Relations in Asia: Beyond Russia's Chinese Dilemma." China: An International Journal(2013) 11#3 pp: 136–148.
  • Kim, Younkyoo; Indeo, Fabio (2013). "The new great game in Central Asia post 2014: The US "New Silk Road" strategy and Sino-Russian rivalry". Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 46 (2): 275–286. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2013.03.005.
  • Korolev, Alexander. "The Strategic Alignment between Russia and China: Myths and Reality." Singapore: Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper #15–19 (2015). online
  • Kuliabin A. Semine S. Russia — a counterbalancing agent to the Asia. Zavtra Rossii, #28, 17 July 1997.
  • March, G. Patrick. Eastern Destiny: Russia in Asia and the North Pacific (1996) online
  • Marsh, Christopher. Unparalleled Reforms. China's Rise, Russia's Fall and the Interdependence of Transition (2005).
  • Maxwell. Neville. "How the Sino-Russian boundary conflict was finally settled: From Nerchinsk 1689 to Vladivostok 2005 via Zhenbao Island 1969." Critical Asian Studies 39.2 (2007): 229–253. online
  • Moshes, Arkady and Matti Nojonen, eds. FIIA Report 30, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (September 2011)
  • Nye, Joseph. "A New Sino-Russian Alliance?" Project Syndicate 12 January 2015
  • Quested, Rosemary K.I. Sino-Russian relations: a short history (Routledge, 2014) online
  • Rozman, Gilbert. The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East versus West in the 2010s (2014) online review
  • Rozman, Gilbert. The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985 (Princeton UP, 1987).
  • Rozman, Gilbert and Sergey Radchenko, eds. International Relations and Asia's Northern Tier (Palgrave, Singapore, 2018) excerpt
  • Shen, Zhihua. A Short History of Sino-Soviet Relations, 1917–1991 (Springer Singapore;Palgrave Macmillan, 2020)
  • Snow, Philip. China and Russia: Four Centuries of Conflict and Concord (Yale UP, 2023) excerpt at Amazon
  • Tian, Hao. "Sino-Russian Relations: Conflict and Cooperation." (Lehigh University, 2016), bibliography pp 55–60; online
  • Trenin, Dmitri. Challenges and Opportunities: Russia and the Rise of China and India in Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers – China and India (September 2011)
  • Urbansky, Sören. Beyond the Steppe Frontier: A History of the Sino-Russian Border (2020) a comprehensive history; excerpt
  • Weitz, Richard. China-Russia security relations: strategic parallelism without partnership or passion? (Maroon Ebooks, 2015)
  • Wishnick, Elizabeth. Mending Fences. The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (2001)
  • Zubok, Vladislav. "The Soviet Union and China in the 1980s: reconciliation and divorce." Cold War History 17.2 (2017): 121–141.

October 28, 2023
china, russia, relations, sino, russian, relations, since, 1991, redirects, here, state, sino, russian, relations, before, 1991, history, sino, russian, relations, china, russia, established, diplomatic, relations, after, dissolution, soviet, union, 1991, amer. Sino Russian relations since 1991 redirects here For the state of Sino Russian relations before 1991 see History of Sino Russian relations China and Russia established diplomatic relations after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 a American scholar Joseph Nye states China Russia relationsRussia ChinaDiplomatic missionRussian Embassy BeijingChinese Embassy MoscowEnvoyAmbassador Igor MorgulovAmbassador Zhang HanhuiVladimir Putin with Xi Jinping during a state visit to Moscow in May 2015 With the collapse of the Soviet Union that de facto US China alliance ended and a China Russia rapprochement began In 1992 the two countries declared that they were pursuing a constructive partnership in 1996 they progressed toward a strategic partnership and in 2001 they signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation 2 The two countries share a land border which was demarcated in 1991 and they signed the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001 which was renewed in June 2021 for five more years 3 On the eve of a 2013 state visit to Moscow by Chinese leader Xi Jinping Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked that the two nations were forging a special relationship 4 The two countries have enjoyed close relations militarily economically and politically while supporting each other on various global issues 5 6 7 Commentators have debated whether the bilateral strategic partnership constitutes an alliance 8 9 10 Russia and China officially declared their relations Not allies but better than allies 11 Ties have continued to deepen after Russia s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 with Russia increasingly becoming dependent on China since it was hit with large scale international sanctions 12 13 14 Contents 1 History 1 1 Russian invasion of Ukraine 2 Border 2 1 Rival claims over Vladivostok settled 3 Economic relations 3 1 Trade in national currencies 3 2 Tourism and cultural exchanges 4 Energy relations 4 1 History 4 2 Russian Far East RFE 4 3 Central Asia 5 Military relations 6 Media communication agreements 7 Mutual perceptions 8 See also 9 Notes 10 References 11 Further readingHistory editMain articles History of Sino Russian relations and China Soviet Union relations nbsp Map showing the original border in pink between Manchuria later Russian Manchuria and Russia according to the Treaty of Nerchinsk 1689 and subsequent loss of territory to Russia in the treaties of Aigun 1858 beige and Peking 1860 red The relations between China and Russia go back to the 17th century when the Qing dynasty tried to drive Russian settlers out of Manchuria ended by the signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk Russian Empire consolidated its control over the Russian Far East in the 19th century after the annexation of part of Chinese Manchuria 1858 1860 15 During the Cold War China and the USSR were rivals after the Sino Soviet split in 1961 competing for control of the worldwide Communist movement There was a serious possibility of a major war between the two nations in the early 1960s a brief border war took place in 1969 This enmity began to lessen after the death of Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong in 1976 but relations were poor until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 On December 23 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin made his first official visit to China where he met with CCP general secretary Jiang Zemin and Chinese president Yang Shangkun 16 In December 1996 at the end of Chinese Premier Li Peng s visit to Moscow Russia and China issued a joint communique pledging to build an equal and reliable partnership 17 During the 1990s cooperation between China and Russia was facilitated by the two countries mutual desires to balance the influence of the United States and establish a multi polar international system 18 248 nbsp Chinese Paramount leader Xi Jinping presented two pandas to Moscow Zoo at a ceremony with Vladimir Putin on 5 June 2019In 2001 the close relations between the two countries were formalized with the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation a twenty year strategic economic and controversially and arguably an implicit military treaty A month before the treaty was signed the two countries joined with junior partners Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SCO Still active as of 2022 the organization is expected to counter the growing influence of the United States military outreach program in Central Asia The PRC is currently a key purchaser and licensee of Russian military equipment some of which have been instrumental in the modernization of the People s Liberation Army The PRC is also a main beneficiary of the Russian Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean oil pipeline When China attempted to build closer relations with Russia in 2013 the Russian government initially had reservations 19 However the United States sanctions against Russia for its 2014 annexation of Crimea helped push Russia to a warmer relationship with China 19 Although some Chinese banks and companies refused to fully cooperate with Russia because of the concern that secondary sanctions might be applied to them Russian Chinese economic ties grew once China itself faced sanctions concerns 20 65 Liam Carson an emerging European economist at Capital Economics said in 2019 Policymakers in both countries have actively tried to strengthen trade ties in recent years And it s no coincidence that this surge in Russia China trade has come at the same time that the US has tightened sanctions on Russia and concerns about the US China trade war have intensified 21 By 2019 both nations had serious grievances with the United States For China the issues were control of the South China Sea trade policies and technology policy For Russia the main issue was severe economic penalties imposed by the U S and Europe to punish its seizure of Crimea from Ukraine China and Russia do however differ on some policies China does not recognize Russia s annexation of Crimea 22 4 and Russia does not support China s claims in the South China Sea Nevertheless China and Russia currently enjoy the best relations they have had since the late 1950s Although they have no formal alliance the two countries do have an informal agreement to coordinate diplomatic and economic moves and build up an alliance against the United States 23 24 Yaroslav Trofimov the chief foreign affairs correspondent of The Wall Street Journal argued in 2019 Though there is no overt ideological alignment between Russia and China today the two governments share a hostility to dissent deep suspicion of Western interference and a strong desire to impose tighter controls over their own societies Mr Xi has presided over a push to stamp out corruption and bolster the Communist party s role in the economy and the society at large a campaign akin to Mr Putin s earlier effort to tame Russian oligarchs and crush political opposition China was inspired by Russia s legislation cracking down on nongovernmental organizations while Russian officials have expressed admiration for China s comprehensive internet censorship and social credit plan to rank citizens based on their loyalty and behavior 25 nbsp Xi continued to meet Putin via videoconference during the Covid 19 crisisDuring the COVID 19 pandemic some tensions arose within the Chinese Russian relationship 20 71 72 For example in October 2020 relying on the pretext of coronavirus allegedly found on the exterior of fish packaging China greatly reduced the import of Russian seafood causing a substantial price decrease in Russian seafood 20 72 Chinese restrictions on Russian cargo traffic at border crossings also led to tensions including a drivers strike 20 72 Russian invasion of Ukraine edit Further information 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and China and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine nbsp Putin visited China and met with Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022Xi and Putin met on February 4 2022 during a massive Russian build up of force on the Ukrainian border with the two expressing that the two countries are nearly united in their anti US alignment and that both nations shared no limits to their commitments 26 27 Western Intelligence reports said that China had asked Russia to wait to invade Ukraine until after the Beijing Olympics ended on February 20 27 Shortly before the invasion Chinese media would repeat Russian statements that Russia s troops were being pulled away from the border with Ukraine 28 On February 22 two days prior to the invasion of Ukraine a leaked post The Beijing News Horizon News on Weibo detailed instructions on how to report on a crisis in Ukraine the post asked editors to monitor unfavorable comments to only use tags shared by Chinese state media and stated Do not post anything unfavorable to Russia or pro Western Let me review your words before posting 28 29 On February 25 2022 one day following the Russian invasion of Ukraine Putin told Xi during a phone call that Russia is eager to engage in high level negotiations with Ukraine according to China s foreign ministry 30 China refused to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine repeated Russian propaganda about the war opposed economic sanctions against Russia and abstained or sided with Russia in UN votes on the war in Ukraine 31 In 2022 Russia added Taiwan to a list of foreign states and territories that commit unfriendly actions against its military invasion of Ukraine 32 Chinese leader Xi Jinping has assured Vladimir Putin of China s support on Russian sovereignty and security in May 33 34 In April 2022 in an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov who is considered close to Vladimir Putin said that Russia will be more integrated and more dependent on China further stating that Chinese are our close allies and friends and the biggest source of Russian strength after Russian people themselves 35 In June 2022 Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping had a call with Putin where he reaffirmed support for Russia on security issues while saying that all parties should responsibly push for a proper settlement of the Ukraine crisis 36 37 Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that China has the economic leverage to pressure Putin to end the war adding I m sure that without the Chinese market for the Russian Federation Russia would be feeling complete economic isolation That s something that China can do to limit the trade with Russia until the war is over In August 2022 Zelenskyy said that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine CCP general secretary Xi Jinping had refused all his requests for direct talks with him 38 nbsp Putin welcomes Xi in Moscow during Xi s visit to Russia in March 2023In February 2023 Putin s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov rejected the Chinese peace proposal saying that for now we don t see any of the conditions that are needed to bring this whole story towards peace 39 In March 2023 Politico reported that Chinese state owned weapons manufacturer Norinco shipped assault rifles drone parts and body armor to Russia between June and December 2022 with some of the shipments going through via third countries including Turkey and the United Arab Emirates 40 According to the US Department of Defense Chinese ammunition has been used on battlefields in Ukraine 41 On 20 22 March 2023 Xi Jinping visited Russia and met with Vladimir Putin both in official and unofficial capacity 42 It was the first international meeting of Vladimir Putin since the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest 43 In May 2023 the EU identified that Chinese and the UAE firms were supplying weapon components to Russia The EU banned export of dual use goods targeting 8 Chinese firms 44 On 20 July 2023 the Chinese general consulate in Odesa Ukraine was damaged in a Russian attack on a grain terminal in a nearby port plus other parts of the city 45 46 China has been the largest importer of grains from Ukraine 47 Border editMain article China Russia border See also Sino Soviet border conflict This article needs additional citations for verification Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources Unsourced material may be challenged and removed Find sources China Russia relations news newspapers books scholar JSTOR May 2021 Learn how and when to remove this template message On May 29 1994 during the visit of Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to Beijing Russian and Chinese officials signed an agreement on the Sino Russian Border Management System intended to facilitate border trade and hinder criminal activity 16 On September 3 of that year a demarcation agreement was signed fixing the boundary along a previously disputed 55 km stretch of the western Sino Russian border After the final demarcation carried out in the early 2000s it measures 4 209 3 kilometres 2 615 5 mi and is the world s sixth longest international border 48 The 2004 Complementary Agreement between the People s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Eastern Section of the China Russia Boundary 49 stated that Russia agrees to transfer a part of Abagaitu Islet all of Yinlong Tarabarov Island about a half of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island along with some adjacent islets to China A border dispute between Russia and China standing since Japanese invasion of Manchuria of 1931 was thus resolved These Amur River islands were until then administered by Russia and claimed by China The event was meant to foster feelings of reconciliation and cooperation between the two countries by their leaders The transfer has been ratified by both the Chinese National People s Congress and the Russian State Duma The official transfer ceremony occurred on site on October 14 2008 Rival claims over Vladivostok settled edit See also Convention of Peking and Tannu Uriankhai nbsp Territories that have become part of Russia under the Aigun Treaty and the Beijing Treaty of 1860In 2005 Beijing and Moscow ratified an agreement that ended more than three and half centuries of their struggle over territory and for dominance 50 Russia is the only country that still controls the territory it acquired from Qing dynasty China via the unequal treaties 18 249 250 Economic relations editThis section needs additional citations for verification Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources in this section Unsourced material may be challenged and removed May 2021 Learn how and when to remove this template message This article needs to be updated Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information September 2021 nbsp Putin and Xi Jinping at the 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summitEconomic relations between Russia and China demonstrate mixed trends Trade between the two countries was running between 5 billion and 8 billion per year in the 1990s but grew steadily from then onwards It was on course to hit 100 billion the previous goal until the 2008 crisis interceded Trade slumped back to around 60 billion in 2015 and 2016 but started to recover again in 2017 51 Both countries are expecting to raise the trade volume to 200 billion by 2024 52 Between 2008 and 2009 when Russia experienced a financial crisis there was a sharp increase in borrowing from China This trend however did not last Starting in 2013 borrowing started to grow steadily 53 The main form of cooperation in the complex economic relations between Russia and China is trade From 2003 until 2013 mutual trade increased 7 7 times in 2014 the scale of bilateral operations increased even more The aggravation of relations between Russia and Western countries contributed to the expansion of economic ties with China By 2020 the parties planned to increase bilateral trade to 200 billion According to the Federal Sustoms Service FCS of the Russian Federation in 2016 the foreign trade turnover of Russia and China amounted to 66 1 billion in 2015 63 6 billion Russia has a negative trade balance with China in 2016 exports amounted to 28 billion whereas imports totaled 38 1 billion in 2015 28 6 and 35 9 billion resoectively The share of China in foreign trade with Russia grew from 12 1 in 2015 to 14 1 in 2016 Since 2010 China is the largest trading partner of Russia 54 Most of Russia s exports to China originate from the mining and petrochemicals sectors 55 More than half of Russia s exports to China come from mineral fuels oil and petroleum products 60 7 followed by wood and wood products 9 4 non ferrous metals 9 fish and seafood 3 5 and chemical products 3 3 China is also gradually becoming a major consumer of Russian agricultural products 20 64 The main categories of imports to Russia from China are machinery and equipment 35 9 clothing 13 7 chemical products 9 1 fur and fur products 5 6 footwear 5 3 and furniture 3 Chinese electronics are steadily expanding their presence in Russian 20 64 According to the General Sustoms Administration of China bilateral trade in January May 2017 increased by 26 1 in annual terms amounting to 32 3 billion and mutual trade in 2017 may exceed 80 billion According to the Ministry of Commerce of China as of January 1 2016 the volume of accumulated direct Russian investments in China amounted to 946 9 million and Chinese investments totaled ten times more estimated at 8 94 billion 54 nbsp Meeting of BRICS Brazil Russia India China South Africa foreign ministers in New York City on 22 September 2022Participation in such organizations as BRICS and RIC Russia India China has significant importance for Russian Chinese economic relations At the Russian Chinese summit held in Shanghai when Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping stressed that Russia and China stand for the transformation of BRICS into a mechanism of cooperation and coordination on a wide range of global financial economic and international political problems including the establishment of a closer economic partnership the early establishment of the BRICS development Bank and the formation of a for the expansion of joint efforts of representation and voting rights of States with emerging markets and developing countries in the system of global economic governance for the formation of an open world economy for the deepening of cooperation in the field of foreign policy including in the settlement of regional conflicts 56 To facilitate financial transactions in the regions China and Russia will conduct a currency swap Central banks with whom China has signed currency swaps are able to issue loans to their banks in yuan A currency swap agreement was signed with Russia in the amount of 150 billion yuan 25 billion Currency swaps will make the ruble and the yuan more stable which in turn will have a positive impact on the stability of the global financial system Additionally the expansion of currency trading may facilitate investment processes By investing in an economy that is now facing certain problems due to the fall of the ruble and oil prices China is carrying out soft expansion and supports one of its main partners China and Russia have long advocated reducing the role of the dollar in international trade and both aim to create conditions for the development of bilateral trade and mutual investment The rate of de dollarization chosen by the countries is due to the rapid growth of the RMB s share in international payments and settlements Oct 2013 0 84 Dec 2014 2 17 Feb 2015 1 81 57 The conclusion of a currency swap makes it possible to facilitate payments as there is an imitation of the internal currency which speeds up the transfer procedure and minimizes the cost of conversion citation needed In 2013 China initiated the creation of a new economic initiative the New silk road or the Belt and Road Initiative This project is designed primarily to strengthen economic ties and cooperation and to attract investors from Asia and other parts of the world to actively participate in the creation of the silk road economic belt of the XXI century The zone should extend from China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia as it is an important transit logistical link between China and Europe in which the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may play a significant role 58 In recent years China and Russia have stepped up cooperation in the construction of cross border infrastructure New Eurasian transport routes are being built as well including the Chongqing Xinjiang Europe railway and the Western Europe Western China route which will pass through Russia In northeast China and the Russian far East both countries are actively promoting the construction of bridges ports and other projects It is planned to increase the volume of bilateral trade between China and Russia to 200 billion by the end of 2020 nbsp Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin in Beijing China on 24 May 2023Russia has also shown interest in cooperating with the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union EAEU The creation of the EAEU is posed to serve as an important platform for multilateral cooperation in the region as all participants are friendly neighbors and partners with Russia as well as traditional partners with China Russia is interested in creating a free trade zone of the EAEU and China as well as the use of the national currency in this region 59 Following the implementation of international sanctions during the Russo Ukrainian War China provided economic relief to Russia 28 China s total trade with Russia was a record 190 billion in 2022 60 In the same year China accounted for 40 of Russia s imports 61 In the first half of 2023 models from Chinese car companies accounted for more than a third of all sales in Russia 62 In May 2023 Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak visited Beijing and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping Novak said that Russian energy supplies to China will increase by 40 percent year on year in 2023 Chinese Premier Li Qiang hailed the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between China and Russia in the new era saying that bilateral trade between China and Russia had increased by more than 40 over the past year 63 Trade in national currencies edit On November 23 2010 at a meeting of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao it was announced that Russia and China have decided to use their own national currencies for bilateral trade instead of the U S dollar The move was aimed to further improve the relations between Beijing and Moscow and to protect their domestic economies during the financial crisis of 2007 2008 The trading of the Chinese yuan against the Russian ruble started in the Chinese interbank market while the yuan s trading against the ruble started on the Russian foreign exchange market in December 2010 64 65 In coordination with other emerging economies the 2010 BRIC summit was held in Brasilia in April 2010 In 2014 Beijing and Moscow signed a 150 billion yuan central bank liquidity swap line agreement to avoid and counter American sanctions 66 In December 2014 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledged to offer financial support to Russia and support the Ruble if needed in light of the currency s depreciation 67 Russia s dependence on the Chinese yuan increased heavily after its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 The share of Russian exports paid in yuan rose to 16 by December 2022 compared to 0 4 before the invasion while share of imports paid in yuan increased to 23 up from 4 before 68 69 Yuan s share of stock market trading in Russia increased from 3 to 33 61 Nearly 50 financial institutions were offering yuan saving accounts by 2023 and households were holding around 6 billion worth of yuan in Russian banks by the end of 2022 61 Tourism and cultural exchanges edit Tourism especially from China to Russia has seen a massive spike over the years More than 2 million Chinese tourists visited Russia in 2019 compared to 158 000 a decade ago China is one of the most important tourist markets for Russia Support for cooperation between Russian and Chinese investment organizations in tourism industry is provided in the context of the Joint Action Plan by the Russian Federal Agency for Tourism and China s State Administration of Tourism 70 More than 2 3 million Chinese tourists flew into Moscow s Sheremetyevo Alexander S Pushkin international airport in 2019 including 1 26 million who transferred via the airport Sheremetyevo which offers flights to 29 Chinese cities served by eight Chinese airlines expects their number to grow by 30 per cent a year in the years to come Russia has played into this tourism boom by expanding capacity of Moscow s largest airport Russia has also allowed more flights from regional Chinese air companies to Moscow which helps to turn the Russian capital into an air hub for Europe bound Chinese tourism Sheremetyevo is looking to capitalise on that growth Pǔtōnghua or standard Chinese is among the languages displayed on Sheremetyevo s signs and announcements while duty free stores accept popular Chinese payment methods including UnionPay cards and online systems WeChat Pay and Alipay As many as 70 per cent of tax free receipts handed out at Russia s airports go to Chinese citizens By 2019 Russia has become among the top 3 travel destinations for Chinese tourists 71 Energy relations edit nbsp On 21 May 2014 China and Russia signed a 400 billion gas deal Starting 2019 Russia plans to provide natural gas to China for the next 30 years Since the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 energy relations between China and Russia have been generally marked by cooperation and regard for mutual geopolitical and strategic interests China s fast growing economy places increasing pressure on itself to secure energy imports while Russia s economy is largely driven by the demand for the export of natural resources China became a petroleum importer for the first time in 1993 had become the world s second largest oil consuming country as of 2011 and the world s largest overall energy consumer as of 2010 72 73 In a report released in January 2012 the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation estimated that the country s crude oil consumption would increase to 480 million tonnes in 2012 or 9 6 million barrels per day The group also forecast that natural gas consumption would rise 15 3 percent to 148 2 billion cubic meters bcd 74 Given its geographical proximity to China and position as one of the world s largest oil producers and natural gas exporters Russia has been an obvious candidate for meeting this increased demand 75 While energy relations have primarily related to oil gas and coal there have also been partnerships with regard to nuclear and renewable wind and water energy technology 76 From the mid 1990s when the tightening of global energy markets coincided with his rise to power Russian President Vladimir Putin has signaled the importance of oil and particularly natural gas for Russia s emergence as a global power 77 Long term prospects for Russian gas exports to China will be affected by several global pricing trends 78 Surges in liquefied natural gas LNG capacity the increasingly competitive nature of Central Asian gas supplies advances in shale gas technology and potential greenhouse gas policies may all impact Chinese consumption 79 Despite frequent declarations of goodwill and bilateral energy cooperation Chinese Russian energy relations since 1991 have been limited by mutual suspicions pricing concerns inadequate transportation infrastructure and competition for influence in Eurasia 80 81 nbsp Russian oil exports by destination in 2020 82 In 2014 Russia and China signed a 30 year gas deal worth 400 billion Deliveries to China started in late 2019 83 The Power of Siberia pipeline is designed to reduce China s dependence on coal which is more carbon intensive and causes more pollution than natural gas 84 For Russia the pipeline allows another economic partnership in the face of resistance to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline 84 The proposed western gas route from Russia s West Siberian petroleum basin to North Western China is known as Power of Siberia 2 Altai gas pipeline 85 In 2022 China s imports of discounts of up to 30 oil from Russia rose 55 in May Russia displaced Saudi Arabia as China s biggest oil provider in recent months 86 87 History edit The official relationship between the People s Republic of China and the Russian Federation has been upgraded three times since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1991 Beginning as good neighborly and mutually beneficial in December 1992 it evolved into a constructive partnership in September 1994 and finally a strategic partnership of coordination in April 1996 88 In September 1999 the two countries began joint construction of a nuclear power station at Lianyungang Jiangsu Province with an installed capacity of 2 million kW one of the first situations of mutual energy cooperation 89 The late 1990s also marked the beginning of feasibility studies for natural gas and oil pipeline projects in Western and Eastern Siberia In 2001 Russian company Yukos proposed the unprecedented Eastern Siberia Pacific Ocean ESPO Oil Pipeline Project which would link Yukos s oil refinery in Angarsk to Daqing in northern China 90 At the time rail routes were the only means of transporting oil into the growing Chinese market The project stalled in October 2003 when Yukos chief executive Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested on charges including tax evasion and fraud and the Russian government launched an immediate investigation into the company 91 92 Many speculated that the series of events were politically motivated given that Mr Khodorkovsky had been a vocal opponent of President Putin 93 A week after Mr Khodorkovsky s arrest China Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue publicly announced that the Kremlin investigation would not impact the proposed China Russia oil pipeline project 94 In September 2004 Chinese premier Wen Jiabao met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov in Moscow where the two heads of government signed agreements affirming Russia s promise to set the route of a proposed pipeline from Eastern Siberia to the Pacific with priority given to laying a pipeline spur to China as well as increasing rail oil exports to China to 10 million tons 200 000 b d in 2005 and 15 million tons 300 000 b d in 2006 95 Four days before Wen s visit Yukos then the largest supplier of Russian oil to China and Russia s biggest oil producer publicly announced that rail shipments of crude oil to the China National Petroleum Corporation CNPC would end beginning on September 28 2004 The Kremlin had begun auctioning off the troubled company s operating assets a month prior in August 96 Gazprom Soyuzneftegaz and the Chinese Embassy in Moscow all expressed interest in Yuganskneftegaz a main arm of Yukos 97 The subsidiary was ultimately acquired by Russia s state owned oil company Rosneft for roughly 9 3 billion In February 2005 Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin revealed that Chinese banks provided 6 billion in financing the Rosneft acquisition This financing was reportedly secured by long term oil delivery contracts between Rosneft and the CNPC 98 In the same month the Chinese Foreign Ministry denied that China provided funds for the deal The Foreign Ministry could not confirm whether there were any loans involved ministry spokesman Kong Quan said 99 State owned Lukoil became China s largest Russian oil supplier when CNPC reached a strategic cooperation agreement with the company in September 2006 100 As promised during Premier Wen s visit to Moscow in 2004 construction on a direct pipeline spur to China began in March 2006 when CNPC signed an agreement providing state oil producer Transneft 400 million for constructing a pipeline from Skovorodino about 70 km 43 mi from the Chinese border In the same month CNPC agreed to a set of principles establishing future joint ventures with Rosneft 101 102 In 2006 Gazprom was made responsible for all exports of gas from Russia s eastern Siberian fields outside of sales made through production sharing agreements PSAs This was another move widely seen to be politically motivated since successful commercial development of these fields and export to Asian markets would be impossible without Gazprom and therefore Kremlin involvement 103 104 In an annual shareholder report two years prior Gazprom acknowledged a plan for supplying natural gas to China Two routes roughly equal in capacity would be constructed with a total volume of 68 billion cubic meters of gas per annum An Altai pipeline would link West Siberian fields with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in western China while the eastern pipeline would run from Yakutia into northeastern China 105 106 Chinese domestic natural gas consumption roughly matched domestic production in 2004 Since then however its rate of growth and more sustainable energy profile compared to oil inevitably led to a surge in Chinese natural gas imports 106 In March 2006 CNPC signed a memorandum of understanding MOU with Gazprom for the delivery of natural gas to China which officially began pricing negotiations between Gazprom chief executive Alexei Miller and Chen Geng then head of the CNPC In September 2007 the Russian Federation Industry and Energy Ministry approved a development plan for an integrated gas production transportation and supply system in Eastern Siberia and the Far East taking into account potential gas exports to China and other Asia Pacific countries Gazprom was appointed by the Russian Government as the Eastern Gas Program execution coordinator 107 Russia s desire to diversify its export markets has been matched by China s willingness to invest in Russian energy production and infrastructure Russian policymakers however have expressed reserve about increased Chinese influence in the energy sector In 2002 CNPC attempted to bid for Russian oil firm Slavneft but withdrew just weeks later 108 109 International news sources suggested the bid failed partly due to anti foreign sentiment in the Duma Russia s lower parliamentary house 110 111 112 113 Slavneft was privatized by parity owners TNK later OAO TNK BP and Sibneft later OAO Gazprom Neft soon afterwards In 2004 Slavneft was then acquired by TNK BP the product of a merger between the Alfa Access Renova Consortium AAR Alfa Group and British Petroleum BP 114 In 2006 Russia denied CNPC a significant stake in OAO Rosneft When the Russian company went public CNPC was allowed to purchase 500 million worth of shares one sixth of the 3 billion it had sought The financial crisis triggered in 2008 gave China its opportunity to invest in Russia on a grander scale through a loans for oil program 115 In 2009 and 2010 China s long term energy backed loans EBL extended large sums of capital to companies and entities not only in Russia but also in Brazil Ecuador Turkmenistan and Venezuela 116 117 Growing Chinese investment is speculated to be about more than energy security for China Chinese news agency Xinhua reported in 2010 that many Chinese enterprises believe the Russian market will allow them to become truly global 118 Gao Jixiang Associate Research Fellow of the Russian Economy Research Office of the Russia East Europe and Central Asia Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences reported that China s investments in Russia totaled 1 374 billion as of 2007 and were projected to reach 12 billion by 2020 119 In 2008 09 alone total investments rose 25 4 to 2 24 billion and direct investment went from 240 million to 410 million 120 nbsp Meeting between Dmitry Medvedev and Hu Jintao at the 2009 APEC Summit 2009 marked the 60th anniversary of established diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing and also coincided with the signing of over 40 contracts worth roughly 3 billion citation needed Chinese leader Hu Jintao and President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia conferred three times in four days during mid June at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Yekaterinburg at the first ever heads of state meeting of the BRIC countries Brazil Russia India and China and again when Hu made a state visit to Moscow from June 16 18 representing what many saw to be a high water mark in Chinese Russian relations 121 Growing economic closeness also seemed to suggest a growing political alliance A joint statement released by the two heads of state expanded upon how the two governments usually pledge mutual support for their sovereignty and territorial integrity The Russian government explicitly affirmed that Tibet along with Taiwan are inalienable parts of the Chinese territory while the Chinese supported Russia s efforts in maintaining peace and stability in the region of Caucasus 122 During Hu s visit however Gazprom announced it could not begin delivering natural gas to China in 2011 as planned because of pricing disagreements Construction of the Western Siberian Altai pipeline which could deliver over 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to China was originally scheduled to begin in 2008 citation needed September 27 2010 marked the completion of the 1 000 kilometre 620 mi Russia China Crude Pipeline Stretching from Russia s Skovorodino station to China s Mohe station it was the first pipeline ever built between China and Russia 123 In April 2009 Rosneft and Transneft had signed deals with CNPC guaranteeing the pipeline s production of 300 000 barrels of crude oil per day for twenty years as part of a 25 billion loan for oil agreement 124 Upon the pipeline s completion in 2010 CNPC also signed a general agreement with Transneft over the operation of the pipeline a framework agreement with Gazprom to import natural gas to China from 2015 onwards an agreement with Rosneft on extending oil supply to the Russia China Crude Pipeline and an agreement with Lukoil on expanding strategic cooperation Both sides hailed the series of agreements as a new era in cooperation and Russia s Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin told reporters in Beijing that Russia was ready to meet China s full demand in gas going forward 125 In September 2010 President Putin reaffirmed the potential nuclear future of Russia and China s energy relations saying Of course our cooperation with China is not limited to just hydrocarbons Russia is China s main partner in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy and equipment supplies here amount to billions of dollars 126 As of 2011 however Russian officials have remained reluctant to transfer nuclear energy technologies and other knowledge products to Chinese partners Industry experts have pointed out that while proprietary technology would protect Russian exports from being displaced by lower cost Chinese products in third party markets such an approach may reinforce Chinese doubts about Russia s reliability as a long term energy partner 81 The Russian oil industry has not only been burdened by corporate struggles such as with Yukos and political disagreements between the countries but also by the reoccurring breaches in safety Some difficulties stem from the Kazakh riots 127 to endless environmental concerns 128 129 130 but most recently the capsizing of an oil platform that was allowed to operate in the north late in the season while towed under adverse maritime conditions 131 Incidents such as these cannot help but give potential foreign investment which the region needs pause as to the reliability of Russian energy supplies according to whom Russian Far East RFE edit In 1996 the Russian Federation completed two production sharing agreements PSA for oil and gas exploration off the northeast coast of the Sakhalin Islands The Sakhalin I project operated by Exxon Neftegas EN has estimated potential recoverable reserves at 307 million tons of oil 2 3 billion bbn and 485 billion cubic meters of gas as of 2002 132 133 EN a subsidiary of US based ExxonMobil holds a 30 percent interest in the project while Rosneft holds 20 percent via its affiliates RN Astra 8 5 percent and Sakhalinmorneftegas Shelf 11 5 percent Japanese consortium SODECO and the Indian state owned oil company ONGC Videsh Ltd holds the remaining 50 percent 30 and 20 percent respectively The Sakhalin II project is managed by the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd Sakhalin Energy As of 2011 Russian state monopoly Gazprom holds 50 plus 1 share RoyalDutch Shell 27 5 Mitsui 12 5 and Mitsubishi 10 134 Gazprom purchased its majority stake from Sakhalin 2 operator Royal Dutch Shell in 2006 The project had been placed permanently on hold by environmental regulators but moved forward after the sale 135 The series of events led to widespread speculation that environmental violations may have been used as a bargaining chip in the deal 136 Sakhalin II consists of two 800 km pipelines running from the northeast of the island to Prigorodnoye Prigorodnoe in Aniva Bay at the southern end The consortium built Russia s first liquefied natural gas LNG plant at Prigorodnoye Industry sources speculated that some in Russia hope to sell China gas from Sakhalin 2 s or other facilities future LNG holdings now that it has mastered the technology 137 In December 2003 CNPC and Sakhalin Energy signed a frame agreement on exploration and development in Russia s Sakhalin oilfield 138 ExxonMobil also looked towards the Chinese market making preliminary agreements on supplying Sakhalin I gas to China as early as 2002 On November 2 2004 CNPC began negotiations with ExxonMobil for possible long term gas deliveries from Sakhalin 1 139 Negotiations were then concluded in October 2006 when Exxon and CNPC officially announced an agreement Under the deal Sakhalin 1 could sell up to 10 billion cubic meters of gas to China over 20 years by pipeline The plan met strong opposition from Gazprom which has a rival pipeline project and controls all Russian gas exports apart from sales through PSAs such as Sakhalin 1 140 In August 2006 Sakhalin I s De Kastri oil terminal began exporting processed petroleum to markets including China Japan and South Korea 141 The influence of Russia s regional energy trade has led to a sense of local uneasiness about foreign countries influence in the sector In 2000 President Putin warned a Siberian audience that unless Russia intensified the region s development the Russian Far East would end up speaking Chinese Japanese and Korean 142 143 In 2002 the Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Vladimir Potapov expressed serious concerns about the region s combined remoteness weak infrastructure declining population and wealth in very diverse resources 144 145 Political figures like Viktor Ozerov Chairman of the Federation Council s Defense and Security Committee warned of military threats in the Far East and decried the predatory use of the region s resources and large scale illegal immigration though scholars pointed out that no imminent threat was visible 146 Dmitri Trenin stated that the principal domestic reason is the situation of eastern Russia especially East Siberia and the Russian Far East Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the territories have been going through a deep crisis The former model of their development is inapplicable a new model is yet to be devised and implemented Meanwhile the vast region has been going through depopulation deindustrialization and general degradation The quality of Moscow s statesmanship will be tested by whether it can rise up to the challenge in the East 147 The RFE has been one of the most difficult areas to transition between the structure of the Soviet Union and the still developing Russian state due to the lack of economic self sufficiency in the region or any prospects of stable growth In September 2005 the Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref promised a doubling of state support for the RFE to 612 million in 2006 and the consideration of allocating a new 2 5 billion infrastructure fund for projects in the region 148 A year later at the end of 2006 Putin reiterated that the socio economic isolation of the RFE represented a threat to national security and advocated yet another new socioeconomic commission and regional development strategy to be formed He specifically pointed to the perceived threat of foreign immigration in the Far East 149 Scholars and regional experts have suggested that China s rapid economic growth especially relative to Russia s GDP growth rate lies at the root of anxieties concerning the RFE While the Russian and Chinese economies were roughly the same size in 1993 China s grew to over 3 5 times larger than Russia s by 2008 Even since 1998 when Russia began a rapid economic recovery China has grown at a faster rate the gap has only widened since the global economic crisis and falling energy prices of the late 2000s China s growth has led to the creation of new productive capacity whereas Russia s recovery has been based largely on reutilizing Soviet era capacity that had idled in the early 1990s 150 151 Russian officials have repeatedly reiterated their opposition to being merely China s natural resources storehouse 152 As early as 2001 Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin warned that if Russia failed to become a worthy economic partner for Asia and the Pacific Rim China and the Southeast Asian countries will steamroll Siberia and the Far East 153 154 At the start of his presidency in September 2008 Dmitri Medvedev echoed similar concerns warning a Kamchatka audience that if Russia fails to develop the RFE it could turn into a raw material base for more developed Asian countries and unless we speed up our efforts we can lose everything 155 156 Regional experts have pointed out that despite these increasingly vocal concerns the local economy of the RFE has become increasingly reliant on Chinese goods services and labor over the past decade furthermore local out migration shows little sign of reversing For all the early promises under Putin Moscow s policy towards the RFE has not seemed effective as of 2008 157 Dmitri Trenin of the Moscow branch of the Carnegie Endowment has argued that Siberia s development could become Russia s most urgent challenge 158 Failure to develop the region into more than a raw material outpost could lead to what he calls a Chinese takeover of the region not by migration but rather by economic means of trade and tourism Russia s plans for this region have revolved around building energy infrastructure to leverage exports and attracting investment so that the capital will be available for modernizing regional infrastructure 159 160 These plans largely depend on foreign investments which Russian companies have grudgingly acknowledged In 2008 a consortium of Chinese engineering firms led by Harbin Turbine signed an agreement with Russian power producer OGK to produce coal fired turbines in the RFE adding 41 000 megawatts of new generating capacity by 2011 Stanislav Nevynitsyn executive director of OGK admitted It is simply a necessity for us to work with the Chinese we will not get the capacity built otherwise 161 Through loans to Russia s Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank VEB China became a major stockholder in Lukoil in 2009 162 In the same year after having excluded foreign firms from bidding on the huge Udokan copper mine in Southeast Siberia Moscow welcomed Chinese South Korean and Kazakh miners and refiners back into the bidding process 163 164 As part of the Russia s Energy Strategy till 2020 program the Russian government launched a program of creating a unified gas production transportation and supply system in Eastern Siberia and the RFE in 2006 The program would ultimately provide affirmation of an all Russia gas system from the Baltic Sea up to the Pacific Ocean 165 Russian policymakers have also suggested building an international center for spent fuel and nuclear energy in the RFE hoping to raise the profile in the export of nuclear energy to the global market 166 In 2009 Gazprom was awarded subsurface licenses for the Kirinsky Vostochno Odoptinsky and Ayashsky blocks to begin the Sakhalin III project 167 Geological exploration has been underway at the Kirinskoye field and as of 2009 natural gas production is scheduled for 2014 The field will become one of the natural gas sources for the Sakhalin Khabarovsk Vladivostok gas transmission system GTS The first GTS start up complex will be 1 350 km with a capacity of 6 billion cubic meters bcm per year 168 Central Asia edit nbsp Meeting of Xi Jinping Vladimir Putin and Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh in Samarkand Uzbekistan on 15 September 2022China and Russia generally cooperate with each other regarding Central Asia affairs 169 While they sometimes compete in Central Asia those competitions are typically focused on economic matters and proceed in an orderly way within established norms 169 Where competition in Central Asia does occur between the two powers it typically arises as a product of the circumstances rather than as an intentional effort to contain the other country 169 In 1996 China Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Russia and Tajikistan formed the Shanghai Five a collaborative body that was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SCO with the addition of Uzbekistan in 2001 170 As members of the SCO China and Russia have cooperated in military exercises such as counterterrorism drills in Kyrgyzstan in 2002 and similar exercises in Kazakhstan and China in 2003 171 Russian and Chinese leaders regularly call for greater cooperation and coordination through the SCO between their two countries in the context of their broader goal of promoting multilateral diplomacy 172 173 174 In a joint statement issued on May 23 2008 Russia and China asserted that International security is comprehensive and inalienable and some countries security cannot be guaranteed at the cost of some others including expanding military and political allies 175 Zhao Huasheng Director of Russian and Central Asian Studies at Fudan University s Shanghai Cooperation Center has argued that economic cooperation will ensure the long term relevance of the SCO as current security threats recede 176 While China and Russia do enjoy some bilateral energy cooperation which experts predict will continue to grow in the future the two countries have emerged as rivals for Central Asian oil and gas supplies 177 With the rising oil prices in the mid 2000s Russia has sought to renew its influence in Central Asia in particular the region s southern flank to guarantee access to gas supplies for reexport to Europe and for its own domestic needs As China s energy needs have grown and its policymakers have sought to develop its western provinces China too has sought to expand its influence in Central Asia 171 In 2007 at a meeting of SCO prime ministers in Tashkent Russian Premier Viktor Zubkov reiterated Moscow s desire to forge a Central Asian energy club within the SCO comprising Russia China Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan and Uzbekistan The SCO energy club could be set up as soon as 2008 Russian Deputy Industry and Energy Minister Ivan Materov announced in Tashkent Materov insisted however that the club would not amount to a sort of mini OPEC Political and economic analysts in Moscow believe the Kremlin is keen to establish an energy club as a means to prevent a possible clash with China over Central Asia s energy resources 178 At a May 2007 SCO summit in Turkmenbashi Russian Kazakh and Turkmen leaders announced the expansion of the Prikaspiisky gas pipeline from Turkmenistan into Russia 179 The plan has stalled due to several obstacles including price disagreements and the economic recession of the late 2000s 180 181 Uncertainty over the Prikaspiisky route has given China an opening into the region especially in Turkmenistan During a brief visit to Ashgabat Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called for efforts to step up bilateral trade cooperation to a new level Berdymukhamedov in turn expressed interest in working closely with China on a natural gas pipeline project Xinhua News Agency reported In December 2005 Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev inaugurated the Atasu Alashankou pipeline to ship oil to China The 800 million Atasu Alashankou route still needs Russian crude oil from Western Siberia transported via the Omsk Pavlodar Shymkent pipeline to reach its full annual capacity of 20 million tons by 2010 182 Although China and its Central Asian partners view their expanding cooperation as a means of diversifying their energy partnerships Russia has enjoyed success in other major energy projects In November 2007 two Russian companies TNK BP and GazpromNeft signed an agreement with KazTransOil to ship up to 5 million tons of oil annually to China via the Omsk Pavlodar Atasu Alanshakou pipeline In the first quarter of 2008 300 000 tons of Russian crude oil were exported to China along this route 183 Moreover a Russian engineering company Stroytransgaz won a tender to build Turkmenistan s section of the gas pipeline to China 184 China and Russia announced in May 2014 that they had reached a 30 year gas deal where Russia would supply 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas each year to China 185 These developments continue to show Russia and China s attempts to work together outside of USA confinements Military relations editAfter the EU arms embargo on China imposed as a consequence of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 China became a reliable client for Russian military exports making up 25 50 of all foreign military sales 186 On November 9 1993 Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian signed a five year defense cooperation agreement paving the way for an increase in the number of military attaches stationed in their respective capitals On July 12 1994 the Russian and Chinese defence ministers signed a border security agreement designed to prevent potentially dangerous military incidents such as unintentional radar jamming and airspace violations In December 1996 Russia finalized the sale of SU 27 fighters and related production technology to China 17 On October 19 1999 Defence Minister of China General Chi Haotian after meeting with Syrian Defence Minister Mustafa Tlass in Damascus Syria to discuss expanding military ties between Syria and China flew directly to Israel and met with Ehud Barak the then Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Israel where they discussed military relations Among the military arrangements was a 1 billion Israeli Russian sale of military aircraft to China which were to be jointly produced by Russia and Israel 187 In 2004 the Russian Foreign Ministry blocked both the sale of the Su 35 and Tupolev Tu 22M bombers to China over concerns about the arrangements for Chinese production of the Sukhoi Su 27SK known as the Shenyang J 11 188 Originally the licensing agreement required that engines and avionics be sourced by Russian suppliers however by 2004 these components were being produced domestically citation needed Currently China focuses on domestic weapon designs and manufacturing while still importing certain military products from Russia such as jet engines China sought to become independent in its defence sector and become competitive in global arms markets its defence sector is rapidly developing and maturing Gaps in certain capabilities remain including development of electronic and reliable propulsion systems although China s defense industry production has improved significantly providing an advantage over other militaries in the Asia Pacific region 189 China s 2015 Defense White Paper called for independent innovation and the sustainable development of advanced weaponry and equipment 189 In September 2018 Russia hosted the militaries of China and Mongolia as a part of the Vostok 2018 military exercise to improve ties between the countries making them the first two countries outside of the former Soviet Union to join the exercise 190 191 nbsp Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu visited the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia on 17 April 2023In December 2019 Rostec officials accused China of intellectual property theft of a range of military technologies 192 In June 2020 Russia charged one of its Arctic scientists of passing sensitive information to China 193 In July 2019 and again in December 2020 Russia and China flew joint bomber patrols over the Pacific 194 195 In November 2022 Russian and Chinese warplanes including the Tupolev 95 and XIAN H 6K long range strategic bombers conducted joint patrols over the Sea of Japan and East China sea 196 As early as February 2022 according to US authorities Russia asked China for advanced military weaponry in particular armed drones for use in their invasion of Ukraine 197 198 China and Russia have both denied these allegations 199 In September 2022 Russia hosted the military of China as a part of the Vostok 2022 ru military exercise 200 On 17 April 2023 Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu made his first overseas visit to Russia As part of his four day visit he met with Russian president Vladimir Putin and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in Moscow During his meeting he stated the ties between China and Russia surpass military political alliances of the cold war era 201 202 Media communication agreements editIn March 2013 the Voice of Russia and the People s Daily Online signed a news sharing agreement as Xi and Putin presided 203 204 On October 13 2014 Russia Today and the People s Daily signed a cooperation agreement 204 In July 2021 the Russian Chinese Commission for Humanitarian Cooperation agreed to mass media cooperation 205 206 Mutual perceptions editSince 1995 Russians have consistently held positive views of China As of September 2022 88 of Russians surveyed by the Levada Center view China favorably with only 5 expressing a negative opinion 207 According to a 2017 BBC World Service poll 74 of the Chinese view Russia s influence positively with 18 expressing a negative view while 44 of Russians view China s influence positively and 23 negatively 208 According to a 2019 survey by the Pew Research Center 71 of Russians have a favorable view of China with 18 expressing an unfavorable view 209 A YouGov survey conducted in the same year found that 71 of the Chinese think Russia has a positive effect on world affairs while 15 view it negatively 210 During the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine many social media users in China showed sympathy for Russian narratives due in part to distrust of US foreign policy 211 212 Chinese company NetEase has published videos critical of Russia from Chinese in Ukraine and Ukrainians in China 213 214 According to a Genron NPO poll released in November 2022 asking about Chinese peoples views on the Russian invasion 39 5 of respondents said the Russian actions are not wrong 21 5 said the Russian actions are a violation of the U N Charter and international laws and should be opposed and 29 said the Russian actions are wrong but the circumstances should be considered 215 216 See also edit nbsp China portal nbsp Russia portal nbsp Politics portalForeign relations of China Foreign relations of Russia Embassy of China Moscow Ambassadors of China to Russia Ambassadors of Russia to China China Soviet Union relations Russia Taiwan relations History of Sino Russian relations Russia s turn to the East China and Russia Four Centuries of Conflict and Concord book Notes edit Territories under the control of the Republic of China ROC Taiwan Penghu Kinmen and Matsu Islands are recognised by the Russian Federation as part of the PRC 1 References edit Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People s Republic of China Retrieved 3 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2022 02 27 Archived from the original on 2022 07 09 西安生活7年的乌克兰留学生发声引热议 俄没资格为乌做决定 A Ukrainian student who has lived in Xi an for 7 years speaks out Russia is not qualified to make decisions for Ukraine NetEase 2022 02 27 Archived from the original on 2022 07 09 How do the Chinese view the Taiwan Strait issue and the Russian invasion of Ukraine Genron NPO November 30 2022 Archived from the original on January 26 2023 NOBUYOSHI SAKAJIRI December 22 2022 INTERVIEW NPO head details rare survey of Chinese views on Ukraine Taiwan The Asahi Shimbun Archived from the original on December 22 2022 Further reading editBernstein Thomas P and Hua Yu Li eds China Learns from the Soviet Union 1949 Present 2010 Blank Stephen Is Russia a great power in Asia in Great Powers and Geopolitics Springer Cham 2015 pp 161 182 online Blank Stephen Russo Chinese relations in strategic perspective in International Relations and Asia s Northern Tier Palgrave Singapore 2018 pp 93 108 Blank Stephen and Younkyoo Kim Does Russo Chinese partnership threaten America s interests in Asia Orbis 60 1 2016 112 127 Contessi Nicola P China Russia and the Leadership of the SCO A Tacit Deal Scenario China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 8 4 2010 101 123 Efremenko D New Russian Government s Foreign Policy towards East Asia and the Pacific Journal of East Asian Affairs 2012 26 2 Seoul Institute for National Security metaCode en m pub amp boardId a57b3ef8b2bff73bb9e00084 amp pkey 1 online Fravel M Taylor Active Defense China s Military Strategy since 1949 Princeton University Press 2019 online reviews Garver John W Foreign relations of the People s Republic of China 1992 online Herbst John The Coming Russian Chinese Clash The National Interest Aug 21 2020 Hsu Jing Yun and Jenn Jaw Soong Development of China Russia Relations 1949 2011 Limits Opportunities and Economic Ties Chinese economy 47 3 2014 70 87 online Jersild Austin The Sino Soviet Alliance An International History U of North Carolina Press 2014 Kim Younkyoo and Stephen Blank Rethinking Russo Chinese Relations in Asia Beyond Russia s Chinese Dilemma China An International Journal 2013 11 3 pp 136 148 online Kim Younkyoo Indeo Fabio 2013 The new great game in Central Asia post 2014 The US New Silk Road strategy and Sino Russian rivalry Communist and Post Communist Studies 46 2 275 286 doi 10 1016 j postcomstud 2013 03 005 Korolev Alexander The Strategic Alignment between Russia and China Myths and Reality Singapore Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper 15 19 2015 online Kuliabin A Semine S Russia a counterbalancing agent to the Asia Zavtra Rossii 28 17 July 1997 RUSSIA IN THE PACIFIC REGION SYSTEM March G Patrick Eastern Destiny Russia in Asia and the North Pacific 1996 online Marsh Christopher Unparalleled Reforms China s Rise Russia s Fall and the Interdependence of Transition 2005 Maxwell Neville How the Sino Russian boundary conflict was finally settled From Nerchinsk 1689 to Vladivostok 2005 via Zhenbao Island 1969 Critical Asian Studies 39 2 2007 229 253 online Moshes Arkady and Matti Nojonen eds Russia China relations Current state alternative futures and implications for the West FIIA Report 30 The Finnish Institute of International Affairs September 2011 Nye Joseph A New Sino Russian Alliance Project Syndicate 12 January 2015 Quested Rosemary K I Sino Russian relations a short history Routledge 2014 online Rozman Gilbert The Sino Russian Challenge to the World Order National Identities Bilateral Relations and East versus West in the 2010s 2014 online review Rozman Gilbert The Chinese Debate about Soviet Socialism 1978 1985 Princeton UP 1987 Rozman Gilbert and Sergey Radchenko eds International Relations and Asia s Northern Tier Palgrave Singapore 2018 excerpt Shen Zhihua A Short History of Sino Soviet Relations 1917 1991 Springer Singapore Palgrave Macmillan 2020 Snow Philip China and Russia Four Centuries of Conflict and Concord Yale UP 2023 excerpt at Amazon Tian Hao Sino Russian Relations Conflict and Cooperation Lehigh University 2016 bibliography pp 55 60 online Trenin Dmitri Challenges and Opportunities Russia and the Rise of China and India in Strategic Asia 2011 12 Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers China and India September 2011 Urbansky Soren Beyond the Steppe Frontier A History of the Sino Russian Border 2020 a comprehensive history excerpt Weitz Richard China Russia security relations strategic parallelism without partnership or passion Maroon Ebooks 2015 Wishnick Elizabeth Mending Fences The Evolution of Moscow s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin 2001 Zubok Vladislav The Soviet Union and China in the 1980s reconciliation and divorce Cold War History 17 2 2017 121 141 Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title China Russia relations amp oldid 1177302942, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

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