Religion in Turkey

Religion in Turkey consists of various religious beliefs. While it is known that Islam is the most common religion in the country, published data on the proportion of people belonging to this religion are contradictory. The state registering everyone as Muslim by birth misleads the percentage of Muslims in Turkey. There are many people who follow other religions or do not adhere to any religion but are officially classified as 'Muslim' in official records unless they make a contrary claim. According to the state, 99.8% of the population is initially registered as Muslim. As much as 90% of the population follows Sunni Islam. Most Turkish Sunni Muslims belong to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. The remaining 0.2% are Christians and adherents of other officially recognised religions like Judaism.^[1] The official number of Muslims include people who are irreligious; converted people and anyone who is of a different religion from their Muslim parents, but has not applied for a change of their individual records. These records can be changed or even blanked out on the request of the citizen (by filing an e-government application since May 2020)^[2] using a valid electronic signature to sign the electronic application.^[3]

Turkey's most recognizable religious building, the Hagia Sophia. Now used as a mosque, this building was originally built in Constantinople in the 6th century by Emperor Justinian of the Byzantine Empire.

Turkey is officially a secular country with no official religion since the constitutional amendment in 1928. This was later strengthened and entrenched with the wider appliance of laicism by founder Atatürk during the mid-1930s, as part of the Republican reforms. When Turkey eventually applied to join the European Union some member states questioned whether a Muslim country would fit in. Turkish politicians have accused the country's EU opponents of favoring a "Christian club".^[4]

While the state is officially secular, all primary and secondary schools have been required to teach religious studies since 1982, and the curriculum focuses mainly on Sunni Islam. The extent to which other religions are covered depends on the school. These policies have been met with controversy and criticism by both the foreign media and the Turkish public. The high school curriculum, however, teaches religious studies through a philosophy (Felsefe) course and incorporates more information about other religions. The country also has public Islamic schools called İmam Hatip schools, which came to prominence in the 1950s. The schools vary in their curriculum and whether they teach Arabic.

Beginning in the 1980s, the role of religion in the state has been a divisive issue, as influential religious factions challenged the complete secularization called for by Kemalism and the observance of Islamic practices experienced a substantial revival.^[5] In the early 2000s, Islamic groups challenged the concept of a secular state with increasing vigour after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into power in 2002. Turkey was historically a religiously diverse country in the past. On the eve of World War I, the predecessor of today's Turkey, the Ottoman Empire, had 20% of the population as non-Muslims. The non-Muslim population significantly decreased following the late Ottoman genocides, population exchange between Greece and Turkey and emigration of Jews and Christians.^{[citation needed]}

Religious statistics

Muslim and non-Muslim population in Turkey, 1914–2005 (in thousands)^[6]

Year	1914	1927	1945	1965	1990	2005
Muslims	12,941	13,290	18,511	31,139	56,860	71,997
Greeks	1,549	110	104	76	8	3
Armenians	1,204	77	60	64	67	50
Jews	128	82	77	38	29	27
Others	176	71	38	74	50	45
Total	15,997	13,630	18,790	31,391	57,005	72,120
Percentage non-Muslim	19.1	2.5	1.5	0.8	0.3	0.2

Religion in Turkey (TFRS study, 2023)^[7][8]

  None (6%)

  Islam (94%)

Turkey doesn't conduct censuses about religious denominations. Although 99.8% of the population initially were registered as Muslims,^{[citation needed]} academic research and polls give different results of the percentage of Muslims which are sometimes lower, most of which are above the 90% range.^{[citation needed]} Traditionally non-Muslim ethnic groups comprise about 0.2% of the country's population.^{[citation needed]}

In a poll conducted by Sabancı University in 2006, 98.3% of Turks revealed they were Muslim.^[9] Most Muslims in Turkey are Sunni Muslims forming about 90%, and Shia-Aleviler (Alevis, Ja'faris and Alawites) denominations in total form up to 10% of the Muslim population.^[10] Among Shia Muslim presence in Turkey there is a small but considerable minority of Muslims with Ismaili heritage and affiliation.^[11] Christians (Oriental Orthodoxy, Greek Orthodox and Armenian Apostolic) and Jews (Sephardi), who comprise the non-Muslim religious population, make up more than 0.2% of the total.

Situation of religions in Turkey

Religions	Estimated population	Expropriation measures^[12]	Official recognition through the Constitution or international treaties	Government Financing of places of worship and religious staff
Sunni Islam – Hanafi	more than 85% of the population^[13]^[14]	No	Yes through the Diyanet mentioned in the Constitution (art.136)^[15]	Yes^[table 1] through the Diyanet^[16]
Sunni Islam – Shafi'i
Alevite Islam^[17]	4%^[18] to 10%^[10]	Yes^[19]	Only by local municipalities, not constutituonal^[20]	Yes through some local municipalities^[20]
Shia Islam – Ja'fari	<1 Million^[21]		No^[22]	No^[22]
Shia Islam – Alawism^[17]	<1 Million^[23]		No^[22]	No^[16]
Christianity – Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople	65,000	Yes^[12]	Yes through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)^[22]	No^[16]
Judaism	18,000	Yes^[12]	Yes through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)^[22]	No^[16]
Christianity – Latin Catholicism	20,000		No^[22]	No^[16]
Christianity – Syriac Orthodox Church	15,000	Yes^[12]	No^[22]	No^[16]
Christianity – Greek Orthodox Church of Antioch	16,000	Yes^[24]	Yes through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)^[22]	No^[16]
Christianity – Chaldean Catholicism	8,000	Yes^[12]	No^[22]	No^[16]
Christianity – Protestantism in Turkey	5,500	Yes^[25]	Yes^[22]	Yes^[16]
Christianity – Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople	5,000	Yes^[12]	Yes through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)^[22]	No^[16]
Christianity – Armenian Catholic Archeparchy of Istanbul	3,500	Yes^[12]	Yes through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)^[22]	No^[16]
Christianity – Syriac Catholic Church	2,000	Yes^[12]	No^[22]	No^[16]
Christianity – Union of the Armenian Evangelical Churches in the Near East	1,500	Yes^[12]	Yes through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)^[22]	No^[16]
Tengrism	1,000		No^[22]	No^[16]
Yazidism	5,000		No^[22]	No^[16]
Christianity – Autocephalous Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate	400		Yes through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)^[22]	No^[16]
Christianity – Greek Byzantine Catholic Church	50	Yes^[12]	Yes through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)^[22]	No^[16]

1. This financing only covers the staff and permits. Electricity, water and other expenses are covered by citizen donations.

According to a poll made by MAK, which interviewed 5,400 people in face-to-face through the country, 86% of the Turkish population declared they believe in God and 76% declared they believe the Quran and other holy books came through revelation by God.^[26]

Another recent poll by OPTİMAR which interviewed 3,500 people in 26 cities, included a question about belief in God and found that 89.5% of the Turkish population believed in God, 4.5% believed in God but did not belong to an organized religion, 2.7% were agnostic, 1.7% were atheist, and 1.1% did not answer.^[18]

According to a survey by World Values Survey In 2018 98.0% Identified as Muslims, while 1.2% Identified with no Religion and 0.8 as other.^[27]

According to a survey by the pollster KONDA, the percentage of atheists in Turkey has tripled in 10 years and rose from 1% in 2008 to 3% in 2018, the percentage of non-believers or agnostics rose from 1% to 2%, and that 90% of irreligious Turks were under 35 years old. The survey was conducted in Turkey through face-to-face interviews with 5,793 people in their households, in April, 2018 while in 2008 6,482 people were interviewed in face-to-face in Turkey.^[13][14][28]

In a 2023 report, Faith and Religiosity in Türkiye, released by the Marmara University but involving Turkish academics from other institutions as well, the researchers, found that 94% of those who took part in the survey Identified as believing in God and 1.5% didn't believe in god, 2.5% were not sure god exists and 1.7% didn't believe in a personal god but believed in a higher power.^[7] According to the same study 62% Identified with the Hanafi school of thought, 15.1% said they were Non-denominational Muslim, 9.6% refused to give an answer, 9% followed the Shafi'i school of thought, 3.1% Identified with the Alevism sect, 0.2% with the Hanbali school of thought, 0.2% with the Maliki school of thought, 0.2% with the Ja'fari school of thought and 0.6% said other.^[7]

Data from various surveys

Source	Islam	No religion	Christianity	Other religions and no reply
Report on Faith and Religiosity in Turkey	94%	6%	N/A	N/A
KONDA (2021)^[10]^(rounded figures)	92%	6%	N/A	2%
Optimar (2019)	89%	8.9%	0.3%	1.1%
World Values Survey (2018)	98.0%	1.2%	N/A	0.8
MAK (2017)	86%	12.5%	0.5%	1%
Ipsos (2016)	82%	13%	2%	3%
Pew Research Center (2016)	98%	1.2%	0.4%	0.4%
KONDA (2008)	97%	2%	0.2%	0.8%
Sabancı University (2006)	98.3%	1.5%	0.2%	N/A
Government official numbers^[when?]^[citation needed]	99.8%	N/A	0.2%	N/A

Islam

Main articles: Islam in Turkey and Alevism

 

Islam is the predominant religion in Turkey. Interior view of the Yıldız Hamidiye Mosque in Istanbul.

 

A modern mosque in Ankara, Turkey

 

Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı is an Alevi cemevi.

Islam is the religion with the largest community of followers in the country, where most of the population is Muslim,^[29] of whom around 90% belong to the Sunni branch of Islam, predominantly following the Hanafi fiqh. About 10% of the Muslim population belongs to the Shia sects, mostly to the Alevi faith, thought by most of its adherents to be a form of Shia Islam while a minority considers it to have different origins (see Ishikism, Yazdanism). Closely related to Alevism is the small Bektashi community belonging to a Sufi order of Islam that is indigenous to Turkey, but also has numerous followers in the Balkan peninsula.^[30] Alawite, which is observed by some ethnic Arabs in southern provinces, and Jafari, which is the traditional sect of ethnic Azerbaijanis, are other sects that have significant population in Turkey. It's hard to estimate an exact number for religious minorities since Turkey doesn't conduct censuses about religious denominations. Although the Shia population of Turkey varies according to different sources from 4% to 10%.^[2][3][4]

Alevism, which is the dominant sect of Shia Islam in Turkey, is mostly concentrated in the provinces of Tunceli, Erzincan Malatya, Sivas, Çorum, Kahramanmaraş, Amasya and Tokat. Tunceli is the only province of Turkey with an Alevi majority. Ethnic Kurds and Zazas make up a significant share of Alevi population of Turkey, although majority of them are ethnic Turks.

Islam arrived in the region that comprises present-day Turkey, particularly the eastern provinces of the country, as early as the 7th century. The mainstream Hanafi school of Sunni Islam is largely organized by the state through the Presidency of Religious Affairs (known colloquially as Diyanet), which was established in 1924 following the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate and controls all mosques and Muslim clerics, and is officially the highest religious authority in the country.^[31] Shafi'i school of Sunni Islam is the dominant jurisprudence in Turkish Kurdistan.

As of today, there are thousands of historical mosques throughout the country which are still active. Notable mosques built in the Seljuk and Ottoman periods include the Sultan Ahmed Mosque and Süleymaniye Mosque in Istanbul, the Selimiye Mosque in Edirne, the Yeşil Mosque in Bursa, the Alâeddin Mosque and Mevlana Mosque in Konya, and the Great Mosque in Divriği, among many others. Large mosques built in the Republic of Turkey period include the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara and the Sabancı Mosque in Adana.

Minority religions

Main articles: Christianity in Turkey, History of the Jews in Turkey, Baháʼí Faith in Turkey, and Tengrism

 

St. Anthony of Padua Church in the Beyoğlu district of Istanbul.

 

Hemdat Israel Synagogue in Istanbul.

 

Interior of the Grand Synagogue of Edirne, Edirne

 

Yazidi temple in Bacin, Midyat District

The remainder of the population belongs to other faiths, particularly Christian denominations (Eastern Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, Syriac Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant), and Judaism (mostly Sephardi Jews, and a smaller Ashkenazi community).^[32] Today there are between 120,000 and 320,000 Christians in Turkey who belong to various Christian denominations,^[33] and around 26,000 Jews in Turkey.^[34]

Turkey has numerous important sites for Judaism and Christianity, being one of the birthplaces of the latter. Since the 4th century, Istanbul (Constantinople) has been the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (unofficially Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi), which is one of the fourteen autocephalous Eastern Orthodox churches, and the primus inter pares (first among equals) in the Eastern Orthodox communion.^[35] However, the Turkish government does not recognize the ecumenical status of Patriarch Bartholomew I. The Halki seminary remains closed since 1971 due to the Patriarchate's refusal to accept the supervision of the Turkish Ministry of Education on the school's educational curricula; whereas the Turkish government wants the school to operate as a branch of the Faculty of Theology at Istanbul University.^[36] Other Eastern Orthodox denomination is the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate with strong influences from Turkish nationalist ideology.

Istanbul, since 1461, is the seat of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople. There have been 85 individual patriarchs since establishment of the patriarchate. The first Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople was Hovakim I who ruled from 1461 to 1478. Sultan Mehmed II allowed the establishment of the Patriarchate in 1461, just eight years after the Fall of Constantinople in 1453. The Patriarch was recognized as the religious and secular leader of all Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, and carried the title of milletbaşı or ethnarch as well as patriarch. 75 patriarchs have ruled during the Ottoman period (1461–1908), 4 patriarchs in the Young Turks period (1908–1922) and 6 patriarchs in the current secular Republic of Turkey (1923–present). The current Armenian Patriarch is Sahak II Mashalian (Սահակ Բ. Մաշալեան), who has been in office since 2019.

There are many churches and synagogues throughout the country, such as the Church of St. George, the St. Anthony of Padua Church, the Cathedral of the Holy Spirit, the Neve Shalom Synagogue, the Italian Synagogue and the Ashkenazi Synagogue in Istanbul. There are also many historical churches which have been transformed into mosques or museums, such as the Hagia Sophia and Chora Church in Istanbul, the Church of St. Peter in Antakya, and the Church of St. Nicholas in Myra, among many others. 20 existing churches have been repaired by the government since 2002,^[37] such as the St. Giragos Armenian Church in Diyarbakır and the Vortvots Vorodman Church in Kumkapı.^[38] The Mor Ephrem Syriac Orthodox church, opened on 8 October 2023, is the first church built since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey.^[39] There is a small ethnic Turkish Protestant Christian community include about 4,000–5,000^[40] adherents, most of them came from Muslim Turkish background.^{[41][42][43][44]} Around 18,000 Antiochian Greek Christians lives in Turkey, they live mostly in Istanbul, Antioch, Mersin, İskenderun, Samandağ, and in the villages of Altınözü and Tocakli, and the seaside town of Arsuz,^[45] As of 2019, an estimated 18,000 of the country's 25,000 Turkish Assyrians live in Istanbul, while the rest live in Tur Abdin.^[46] Also, there are around 500 Mormons who live in Turkey.^[47]

The percentage of Christians in Turkey fell from 17.5% (three million followers) in a population of 16 million to 2.5% percent in 1927.^[6] The drop was the result of events that had a significant impact on the country's demographic structure, such as the Armenian genocide, the population exchange between Greece and Turkey^[48] and the emigration of Christians that began in the late 19th century and gained pace in the first quarter of the 20th century.^[49] The Wealth Tax on non-Muslims in 1942, the emigration of a portion of Turkish Jews to Israel after 1948, and the ongoing Cyprus dispute, which damaged relations between Turks and Greeks (culminating in the Istanbul pogrom of 6–7 September 1955), were other important events that contributed to the decline of Turkey's non-Muslim population.

The Baháʼí Faith in Turkey has roots in Bahá'u'lláh's, the founder of the Baháʼí Faith, being exiled to Constantinople, current-day Istanbul, by the Ottoman authorities. Baháʼís cannot register with the government officially,^[50] but there are probably 10^[51] to 20^{[citation needed]} thousand Baháʼís, and around a hundred Baháʼí Local Spiritual Assemblies in Turkey.^[52]

Tengrism is also one of the small religious minorities in Turkey. The interest in Tengrism, which is the old Turkic religion, has been increasing in recent years and the number of people who consider themselves Tengrists has increased.^[53]

A sizeable part of the autochthonous Yazidi population of Turkey fled the country for present-day Armenia and Georgia starting from the late 19th century.^[54] There are additional communities in Russia and Germany due to recent migration.^[55] The Yazidi community of Turkey declined precipitously during the 20th century. Most of them have immigrated to Europe, particularly Germany; those who remain reside primarily in villages in their former heartland of Tur Abdin.^[56]

Irreligion

Main article: Irreligion in Turkey

Irreligion in Turkey is uncommon among Turks as Islam is the predominant faith however some secular officials have also claimed that atheism and deism are growing among Turkish people in recent years.^{[57][58][59][60][61]}

According to a Ipsos survey conducted in 2017, which interviewed 17,180 adults across 22 countries polls showed that 82% of Turkey was Muslim and 7% of those who were interviewed from Turkey followed no religion whereas 6% identified as "Spiritual but not religious".^[62]

According to a poll made by MAK in 2017, 86% of the Turkish population declared they believe in God. 76% declared they believe Quran and other holy books came through revelation by God.^[63] According to another poll made in 2019 by OPTİMAR, which interviewed 3,500 people across 26 cities that 89.5% of those who were interviewed declared they believe in God while 4.5% said they believe in a God but do not believe in a religion.^[64] Since there is stigma attached to being an atheist in Turkey, many Turkish atheists communicate with each other via the Internet.^{[65][66][67][68]}

Another poll conducted by Gezici Araştırma in 2020 found that across 12 provinces and 18 districts in Turkey with the sample size of 1,062 people stated that 28.5% of Gen Z in Turkey identified with no religion.^[69][70]

In a 2023 report, Faith and Religiosity in Türkiye, released by the Marmara University but involving Turkish academics from other institutions as well, the researchers, who insisted on their methodology so to have a nationally representative survey, found out that irreligiosity in the general population stood at 5.7% (including 1.5% for atheism) while it was 6% for those aged 25-34 and 11% for those aged 18-24.^[7] Looking more specifically at the "typologies of belief and religiosity", the same report shows that among the 18-24, 18.4% are "devout Muslims", 39.9% are "mainstream Muslims", 29.1% are "secular Muslims" while 12.6% are "secular non-believer."^[7]

Secularism

Main article: Secularism in Turkey

See also: Human rights in Turkey and Freedom of religion in Turkey

 

Ortaköy Mosque in Istanbul

Turkey has a secular constitution, with no official state religion.^[71] Over the course of the 20th century, it developed a strong tradition of secularism similar to the French model of laïcité, with the main distinction being that the Turkish state "openly and publicly controls Islam through its State Directorate of Religious Affairs".^[72] The constitution recognizes the freedom of religion for individuals, whereas the religious communities are placed under the protection and jurisdiction of the state and cannot become involved in the political process (e.g. by forming a religious party) or establish faith-based schools. No political party can claim that it represents a form of religious belief; nevertheless, religious sensibilities are generally represented through conservative parties.^[71][73] For decades, the wearing of religious headcover and similar theopolitical symbolic garments was prohibited in universities and other public contexts such as military or police service.^[74] As a specific incarnation of an otherwise abstract principle, it accrued symbolic importance among both proponents and opponents of secularism and became the subject of various legal challenges^[75] before being dismantled in a series of legislative acts from 2010 to 2017.^[76]

Separation between mosque and state was established in Turkey soon after its founding in 1923, with an amendment to the Turkish constitution that mandated that Turkey had no official state religion and that the government and the state were to be free of religious influence. The modernizing reforms undertaken by President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1920s and 1930s further established secularism in Turkey.

Despite its official secularism, the Turkish government includes the state agency of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Turkish: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı),^[77] whose purpose is stated by law "to execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about their religion, and administer the sacred worshiping places".^[78] The institution, commonly known simply as Diyanet, operates 77,500 mosques, builds new ones, pays the salaries of imams, and approves all sermons given in mosques in Turkey.^[79] The Presidency of Religious Affairs finances only Sunni Muslim worship in Turkey. For example, Alevi, Câferî (mostly Azeris), and Bektashi Muslims (mostly Turkmen) participate in the financing of the mosques and the salaries of Sunni imams by paying taxes to the state, while their places of worship, which are not officially recognized, do not receive any state funding. The Presidency of Religious Affairs' budget rose from US$0.9 billion for the year 2006 to $2.5 billion in 2012.

Beginning in the 1980s, the role of religion in the state has been a divisive issue, as influential religious factions challenged the complete secularization called for by Kemalism and the observance of Islamic practices experienced a substantial revival. In the early 2000s (decade), Islamic groups challenged the concept of a secular state with increasing vigor after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into power in 2002.

Turkey, through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), recognizes the civil, political, and cultural rights of non-Muslim minorities. In practice, Turkey only recognizes Greek, Armenian, and Jewish religious minorities. Alevi, Bektashi, and Câferî Muslims among other Muslim sects,^[19] as well as Latin Catholics and Protestants, are not recognized officially. In 2013, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkey had discriminated against the religious freedom of Alevis.^[80]

With more than 100,000 employees, the Presidency of Religious Affairs has been described as state within the state.^[81]

 

Diyanet's Budget in 2013 - Source : TBMM, Turkish Parliament, 2013.^[82]

Religious organization

Main article: Presidency of Religious Affairs

 

The Blue Mosque, Istanbul, Turkey.

The mainstream Hanafite school of Sunni Islam is largely organised by the state, through the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Turkish: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı), which controls all mosques and pays the salaries of all Muslim clerics. The directorate is criticized by some Alevi Muslims for not supporting their beliefs and instead favouring only the Sunni faith.

The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople (Patrik) is the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Turkey, and also serves as the spiritual leader of all Orthodox churches throughout the world. The Armenian Patriarch is the head of the Armenian Church in Turkey, while the Jewish community is led by the Hahambaşı, Turkey's Chief Rabbi, based in Istanbul. These groups have also criticized the Presidency of Religious Affairs for only financially supporting Islam in Turkey.

Historical Christian sites

Antioch (modern Antakya), the city where "the disciples were first called Christians" according to the biblical Book of Acts, is located in modern Turkey, as are most of the areas visited by St. Paul during his missions. The Epistle to the Galatians, Epistle to the Ephesians, Epistle to the Colossians, First Epistle of Peter, and Book of Revelation are addressed to recipients in the territory of modern Turkey.

Additionally, all of the first Seven Ecumenical Councils that define Christianity for Eastern Orthodox and Catholic Christians took place in the territory that is now Turkey. Many titular sees exist in Turkey, as Anatolia was historically home to a large Christian population for centuries.

Religious freedom

Main article: Freedom of religion in Turkey

See also: Varlık Vergisi

 

Istanbul text with Abrahamic religions symbols.

 

Ottoman Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror and Greek Orthodox Patriarch Gennadios II. Mehmed II not only allowed the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople to remain active in the city after its conquest by the Ottoman Turks in 1453, he also established the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1461, as part of the Millet system. The Byzantines used to regard the Armenian Church as heretic and did not allow it to operate inside the Walls of Constantinople.

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and Turkey is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights.^[83]

Turkey has a democratic government and a strong tradition of secularism. Nevertheless, the Turkish state's interpretation of secularism has reportedly resulted in religious freedom violations for some of its non-Muslim citizens. The 2009 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom report placed Turkey on its watchlist with countries such as Afghanistan, Cuba, the Russian Federation, and Venezuela.^[84] Nevertheless, according to this report, the situation for Jews in Turkey is better than in other majority Muslim countries. Jews report being able to worship freely and their places of worship having the protection of the government when required. Jews also operate their own schools, hospitals, two elderly homes, welfare institutions, as well as a newspaper. Despite this, concerns have arisen in recent years because of attacks by extremists on synagogues in 2003, as well as growing anti-Semitism in some sectors of the Turkish media and society.

Catholic Christians have also occasionally been subjected to violent societal attacks. In February 2006, an Italian Catholic priest was shot to death in his church in Trabzon, reportedly by a youth angered over the caricatures of Muhammad in Danish newspapers. The government strongly condemned the killing. A 16-year-old boy was subsequently charged with the murder and sentenced to 19 years in prison. In December 2007, a 19-year-old stabbed a Catholic priest outside a church in İzmir; the priest was treated and released the following day. According to newspaper reports, the assailant, who was arrested soon afterward, admitted that he had been influenced by a recent television program that depicted Christian missionaries as "infiltrators" who took advantage of poor people.

The Armenian Patriarch, head of the Armenian Orthodox Church, also lacks the status of legal personality (unlike the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, who has a government-recognized role), and there is no seminary in Turkey to educate its clerics since the closure of the last remaining seminar by the state, as only 65,000 Armenian Orthodox people live in Turkey. In 2006, the Armenian Patriarch submitted a proposal to the Minister of Education to enable his community to establish a faculty in the Armenian language at a state university with instruction by the Patriarch. Under current restrictions, only the Sunni Muslim community can legally operate institutions to train new clergy in Turkey for future leadership.

Patriarch Bartholomew I, most senior bishop among equals in the traditional hierarchy of Orthodox Christianity, said that he felt "crucified" living in Turkey under a government that did not recognize the ecumenical status of Patriarch and which would like to see his Patriarchate die out.^[85] The AKP government under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan criticized Bartholomew I, with deputy prime minister Arınç saying that the Eastern Orthodox Church enjoyed their religious rights during the AKP's rule, and foreign minister Davutoğlu saying that he hoped that the Patriarch's remarks had been a "slip of the tongue".^[86][87] In response to the government's criticism, Bartholomew's lawyer said when the patriarchate was criticizing government, he was referring to the state, not the AKP government in particular.^[88] Prime Minister Erdoğan said that "When it comes to the question, 'Are you recognizing [him] as ecumenical?', I wouldn't be annoyed by it [this title]. Since it did not annoy my ancestors, it will not annoy me, either. But it may annoy some [people] in my country."^[89] The Greek Orthodox orphanage in Büyükada was closed by the government;^[90] however, following a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights, the deed to the orphanage was returned to the Ecumenical Patriarchate on 29 November 2010.^[91]

In 2022, Freedom House rated Turkey’s religious freedom as 2 out of 4,^[92] noting that apart from Sunni Islam, Judaism, Orthodox Christianity and Armenian Christianity are officially recognized, but there are regular disputes regarding property and training of clerics.

Religiosity

Religiosity among Turkish People (KONDA Research, 2021)^[93]

  Fully Devout (10%)

  Fully Religious (50%)

  Not Religious (33%)

  Non-believers & Atheists (7%)

In a poll conducted by Sabancı University in 2006, 98.3% of Turks revealed they were Muslim.^[9] Of that, 19% said they were "extremely religious", 45% said they were "somewhat religious", and 33% said they were "not very religious" and 3% had "no religious beliefs".^[9] 3% of Turks declare themselves with no religious beliefs.^[9]

According to Pew in 2020, 89% of Turks say religion plays an important role in their life (71% very important, 18% somewhat important), and 8% say religion doesn't play an important role in their life (3% not at all important, 5% not too important), 75% of Turks also say it is necessary to believe in God to be moral, compare to 84% in 2002.^[94]

According to the TFRS study in 2023^[7]

• 62% responded : "Religious or very religious."
• 24% responded : "Neither religious nor non-religious."
• 14 % responded : "Not religious."

According to a poll made by OPTİMAR in 2019 ^[95]

• 89.5 % responded : "I believe in God's existence and oneness." (Theist)
• 4.5 % responded : "I think there is a Creator, but I am not religious." (Deist)
• 2.7 % responded : "I'm not sure if there is a Creator." (agnostic)
• 1.7 % responded : "I don't think there is a Creator." (Atheist)
• 1.7 % responded no answer.

According to the Pew Research Center report 2015:^[96]

• 61 % of people in Turkey say religion is "very important" to their lives.
• 22 % of people in Turkey say religion is "somewhat important" to their lives.
• 07 % of people in Turkey say religion is "not too important" to their lives.
• 03 % of people in Turkey say religion is "not at all important" to their lives.

According to the Gallup Poll 2012:^[97]

• 23 % defined themselves as "a religious person".
• 73 % defined themselves as "not a religious person".
• 02 % defined themselves as "a convinced atheist".

According to the Eurobarometer Poll 2010:^[98]

• 94 % of Turkish citizens responded: "I believe there is a God". (theist)
• 01 % responded: "I believe there is some sort of spirit or life force". (spiritual)
• 01 % responded: "I do not believe there is any sort of spirit, God, or life force". (neither theist nor spiritual)

According to the KONDA Research and Consultancy survey carried out throughout Turkey in 2007:^[99]

• 52.8 % defined themselves as "a religious person who strives to fulfill religious obligations" (Practicing religious).
• 34.3 % defined themselves as "a believer who does not fulfill religious obligations" (Religious in the name).
• 09.7 % defined themselves as "a fully devout person fulfilling all religious obligations" (Fully devout).
• 02.3 % defined themselves as "someone who does not believe in religious obligations" (Non-believer).
• 00.9 % defined themselves as "someone with no religious conviction" (Irreligious).

Claims of increasing Islamization

The rise of Islamic religiosity in Turkey in the last two decades, under the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), has been discussed for the past several years.^{[100][101][102]} Many see Turkish society moving towards a more hardline Islamic identity and country,^[100][102] citing increasing religious criticisms against what is considered immoral behaviour and government policies seen as enforcing conservative Islamic morality, as well as the controversial blasphemy conviction of the pianist Fazıl Say for "insulting Islam" by retweeting a joke about the Islamic Friday prayer. The New York Times published a report about Turkey in 2012, noting an increased polarization between secular and religious groups in Turkish society and politics. Critics argue that Turkish public institutions, once staunchly secular, are shifting in favour of Islamists.^[101]

Turkish academic Ayhan Kaya, in his 2015 research article Islamisation of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith and Charity, summarizes the question by talking of "a subtle Islamisation of society and politics in everyday life through the debates on the headscarf issue, Imam Hatip schools, faith communities and Alevism, the rise of an Islamic bourgeoisie with its roots in Anatolian culture, the emergence of consumerist lifestyles, not only among the secular segments of the Turkish society but also among Islamists, and, finally, the weakening of the legitimacy of the Turkish military as ‘the guardian of national unity and the laicist order’."^[103]

Statistics

In a 2022 book chapter, Turkish political scientist S. Erdem Aytaç, while analyzing different nationally representative polls and surveys from 2002, when the AKP rule began, till 2018, when the latest data was available, noted "an increase in subjective religiosity during the AKP rule", as the share of "non-devout" respondents fell from 44% in 2002 to 28% in 2018 while the "devout" rose from 32% to 42% and the "very devout" from 24% to 30% during these years.^[104]

In education

The government of Erdoğan and the AKP pursue the explicit policy agenda of Islamization of education to "raise a devout generation" against secular resistance,^[105][106] in the process causing lost jobs and school for many non-religious citizens of Turkey.^[107]

In 2013, several books that were previously recommended for classroom use were found to be rewritten to include more Islamic themes, without the Ministry of Education's consent. Traditional stories of Pinocchio, Heidi, and Tom Sawyer were rewritten to include characters that wished each other a "God-blessed morning" and statements that included "in Allah's Name"; in one rewrite, one of the Three Musketeers converted to Islam.^[108]

Headscarf controversy

For most of the 20th century, Turkish law prohibited the wearing of headscarves and similar garments of religious symbolism in public governmental institutions.^[109] The law became a Wedge issue in the public discourse,^[110] culminating in an early effort to see the law overturned by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights failing in 2005 when the court deemed it legitimate in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey.^[75]

Subsequently, the issue formed a core of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's first campaign for the presidency in 2007, arguing that it was an issue of human rights and freedoms^[111][112] Following his victory, the ban was eliminated in a series of legislative acts starting with an amendment to the constitution in 2008 allowing women to wear headscarves in Turkish universities while upholding the prohibition of symbols of other religions in that context.^{[109][113][114]} Further changes saw the ban eliminated in some government buildings including parliament the next year, followed by the police forces and, finally, the military in 2017.^[76]

Restriction of alcohol sales and advertising

Main article: Alcohol laws of Turkey

In 2013, the parliament of Turkey passed legislation that bans all forms of advertising for alcoholic beverages and tightened restrictions on alcohol sales.^[115] This also includes the censoring of images on television, usually implemented by blurring, historically implemented by CNBC-e as flower placement. The law was sponsored by the ruling AKP.

Hagia Sophia conversion

In early July 2020, the Council of State annulled the Cabinet's 1934 decision to establish the museum, revoking the monument's status, and a subsequent decree by Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ordered the reclassification of Hagia Sophia as a mosque.^{[116][117][118]} The 1934 decree was ruled to be unlawful under both Ottoman and Turkish law as Hagia Sophia's waqf, endowed by Sultan Mehmed, had designated the site a mosque; proponents of the decision argued the Hagia Sophia was the personal property of the sultan.^{[119][120][121]} This redesignation is controversial, invoking condemnation from the Turkish opposition, UNESCO, the World Council of Churches, the International Association of Byzantine Studies, and many international leaders.^{[122][123][124][125][126]}

During his speech announcing the conversion of the monument, Erdoğan highlighted how the conversion would gratify the "spirit of conquest" of Mehmet II, and during the first sermon on 24 July 2020, Ali Erbaş, head of Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs, held a sword in his hand, symbolizing a tradition of conquest. This was perceived as a branding of the non-Muslim population of Turkey, especially the Greek Orthodox as "re-conquered subjects and second-class citizens".^[127]

Church of St. Saviour in Chora conversion

In August 2020, just a month after the Hagia Sophia, the president of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ordered the ancient Orthodox Church, the 1,000 year old Church of St. Saviour in Chora to be converted into a mosque. Similar to the Hagia Sophia, it had earlier been converted from a Church to a Mosque in 1453, and then into a museum known as the Kariye Museum after the Second World War.^[128][129]

Counterclaims

Many also see interest and support of secularism in Turkey as increasing, not decreasing.^{[130][131][132]} After Erdogan made a statement in January 2012 about his desire to "raise a religious youth," politicians of all parties condemned his statements as abandoning Turkish values. A petition reading "[O]f Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Alawite, Shafi’i, religious and non-religious, atheist and agnostic backgrounds, all joined with a firm belief in secularism, [we] find your recent remarks about raising a religious and conservative youth most alarming and dangerous" was signed by over 2,000 people. The pro-government newspaper Bugün ran a story stating "no one has the right to convert this society into a religious one, or the opposite." Surveys of the Turkish people also show a great support for maintaining secular lifestyles. The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation found that only 9% of Turks supported a religious state in 2006.^[130] A more recent 2015 poll by Metropoll found that over 80% of Turkish people supported the continuation of Turkey as a secular state, with even the majority of AKP voters supporting a secular state too.^[133] Furthermore, according to a 2016 Pew Research Center Report, only 13% of all Turks believe laws should "strictly follow the teachings of the Qur'an."^[134]

An early April 2018 report of the Turkish Ministry of Education, titled "The Youth is Sliding to Deism", observed that an increasing number of pupils in İmam Hatip schools was abandoning Islam in favour of deism. The report's publication generated large-scale controversy amongst conservative Muslim groups in Turkish society. Progressive Islamic theologian Mustafa Öztürk noted the deist trend a year earlier, arguing that the "very archaic, dogmatic notion of religion" held by the majority of those claiming to represent Islam was causing "the new generations [to get] indifferent, even distant, to the Islamic worldview." Despite lacking reliable statistical data, numerous anecdotes appear to point in this direction. Although some commentators claim the secularisation is merely a result of Western influence or even a "conspiracy", most commentators, even some pro-government ones, have come to conclude that "the real reason for the loss of faith in Islam is not the West but Turkey itself: It is a reaction to all the corruption, arrogance, narrow-mindedness, bigotry, cruelty and crudeness displayed in the name of Islam." Especially when the AKP Islamists are in power to enforce Islam upon society, this is making citizens turn their back on it.^[135] However, in the 2023 report Faith and Religiosity in Türkiye, the authors, who say that "a significant portion of society, particularly younger individuals, believes in God but distances themselves from religious institutions and practices", conclude that despite deism having some attraction among university students in particular (highest of 15% among BA students), in the overall society "the prevalence of deism in Türkiye is estimated to be less than 2%."^[7]

Yılmaz Esmer, a Turkish professor, did a survey on radicalism and fundamentalism in the country in 2009, on subjects such as Darwinian evolution (7% believed in it back then), but he noted that the results weren't different from a similar survey done in 1990, thus noting that there has been no real "recent Islamic resurgence encouraged by the rule of the AKP", just that religiosity was always there but now "has become more visible."^[136]

See also

• Christianity in Turkey
• Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople
• Greek (Ecumenical) Patriarchate of Constantinople
• Protestantism in Turkey
• Catholic Church in Turkey
• Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate
• Baháʼí Faith in Turkey
• Cultural Muslim
• Islam in Turkey
• Alevism
• Bektashism
• Judaism in Turkey
• Headscarf controversy in Turkey
• Mersin Interfaith Cemetery
• Religion by country
• Tengrism
• Yazidis in Turkey
• Buddhism in Turkey
• Hinduism in Turkey
• List of mosques in Turkey
• List of synagogues in Turkey

References

1. . World Factbook. CIA. 2007. Archived from the original on 10 January 2021.
2. "e-Devlet'te yeni hizmet: Din değişikliği yapılabilecek". A3 Haber (in Turkish). 23 May 2020. from the original on 22 November 2020. Retrieved 11 October 2020.
3. "Nüfus Kaydındaki Din Bilgisi Değişikliği Başvurusu". www.turkiye.gov.tr (in Turkish). from the original on 22 November 2020. Retrieved 11 October 2020.
4. "Muslims in Europe: Country guide". BBC.co.uk. from the original on 29 September 2009. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
5. Öztürk, Ahmet Erdi (26 February 2019). "An alternative reading of religion and authoritarianism: the new logic between religion and state in the AKP's New Turkey" (PDF). Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 19: 79–98. doi:10.1080/14683857.2019.1576370. ISSN 1468-3857. S2CID 159047564. (PDF) from the original on 22 November 2020. Retrieved 3 June 2020.
6. İçduygu, Ahmet; Toktaş, Şule; Ali Soner, B. (1 February 2008). "The politics of population in a nation-building process: emigration of non-Muslims from Turkey". Ethnic and Racial Studies. 31 (2): 358–389. doi:10.1080/01419870701491937. S2CID 143541451. from the original on 25 March 2020. Retrieved 27 May 2020.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
7. Nişancı, Zübeyir (21 March 2023). Ayşe Betül Aydın; Hatice Nur Keskin (eds.). Faith and Religiosity in Türkiye (PDF). Marmara University. ISBN 978-1-64205-906-9. (PDF) from the original on 20 April 2023. Retrieved 23 August 2023.
8. Çiçek, Nevzat (26 March 2023). ""Türkiye'de İnanç ve Dindarlık" araştırması yayımlandı: Dindarlaştık mı, sekülerleştik mi?" ["Faith and Religiosity in Turkey" research was published: Have we become religious or secularized?] (in Turkish). indyturk.com.
9. "Ankette Mezhep Soruları". www.selendi.com. Archived from the original on 2 February 2013. Retrieved 3 February 2022.
10. "TR100". interaktif.konda.com.tr. from the original on 25 June 2022. Retrieved 14 August 2022.
11. . Philtar.ucsm.ac.uk. Archived from the original on 10 January 2011. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
12. "Le gouvernement turc va restituer des biens saisis à des minorités religieuses". La Croix. 29 August 2011. from the original on 14 January 2021. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
13. "KONDA Toplumsal Değişim Raporu: Türkiye'de inançsızlık yükselişte". euronews (in Turkish). 3 January 2019. from the original on 4 January 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2020.
14. "Konda | Araştırma ve Danışmanlık". konda.com.tr. from the original on 22 November 2020. Retrieved 13 August 2020.
15. (in Turkish) http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/anayasa/anayasa_2011.pdf 8 December 2014 at the Wayback Machine
16. Cahiers de l'obtic (December 2012). [Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet): At the Crossroads of Islam, State action, and Turkish foreign policy] (PDF) (in French). Observatory of Interdisciplinary Research on Contemporary Turkey (OBTIC). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2 October 2013.
17. Not recognized as an Islamic fiqh madh'hab by the Amman Message.
18. ÖZKÖK, Ertuğrul (21 May 2019). "Türkiye artık yüzde 99'u müslüman olan ülke değil". www.hurriyet.com.tr (in Turkish). from the original on 23 May 2019. Retrieved 13 August 2020.
19. The World of the Alevis: Issues of Culture and Identity, Gloria L. Clarke
20. "cemevi ibadethane kabul edildi Haberleri ve cemevi ibadethane kabul edildi Gelişmeleri". Milliyet. 31 January 2013. from the original on 11 March 2016. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
21. Caferilik nedir? | Türkiye'de Şiiler: "Kadın İslam dünyasında hep bir adım geride, from the original on 13 October 2022, retrieved 13 October 2022
22. par Lisa Deheurles-Montmayeur · 18 avril 2010 (18 April 2010). "Les minorités non musulmanes en Turquie : "certains rapports d'ONG parlent d'une logique d'attrition", observe Jean-Paul Burdy – Observatoire de la vie politique turque". Ovipot.hypotheses.org. from the original on 28 November 2017. Retrieved 31 January 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
23. [Turkey and Nusayri in the world] (in Turkish). psakd.org. 16 August 2006. Archived from the original on 17 December 2011.
24. . minorityrights.org. 5 February 2005. Archived from the original on 16 January 2015.
25. "5 bin 500 protestan Türk var" [There are 5500 protestant Turks] (in Turkish). Hürriyet. 8 September 2014. from the original on 16 January 2018. Retrieved 8 December 2016.
26. "TÜRKİYE'DE TOPLUMUN DİNE VE DİNİ DEĞERLERE BAKIŞI" (PDF). www.makdanismanlik.org. (PDF) from the original on 22 November 2020. Retrieved 4 April 2020.
27. "WVS Database". www.worldvaluessurvey.org. from the original on 19 March 2021. Retrieved 6 August 2022.
28. "WHAT HAS CHANGED IN 10 YEARS?". interaktif.konda.com.tr. from the original on 22 November 2020. Retrieved 14 August 2020.
29. "Turkey". State.gov. from the original on 29 November 2020. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
30. "The Bektashis: A Sufi community that still stands for tolerance despit". euronews. 11 June 2018. from the original on 16 February 2022. Retrieved 23 March 2021.
31. . diyanet.gov.tr. Archived from the original on 19 December 2011.
32. . United Nations Population Fund. 2006. Archived from the original on 19 July 2007. Retrieved 27 December 2006.
33. . Pew Research Center. 2 April 2015. Archived from the original on 15 June 2020. Retrieved 27 November 2020.
34. (PDF). American Sephardi Federation. 2006. Archived from the original on 6 October 2013. Retrieved 11 June 2013.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
35. . cnewa.org. 30 May 2008. Archived from the original on 9 January 2010.
36. "The Patriarch Bartholomew". 60 Minutes. CBS. 20 December 2009. from the original on 4 November 2013. Retrieved 11 January 2010.
37. "Erdogan opens modern Turkish state's first new church". France 24. 8 October 2023. Retrieved 9 October 2023.
38. "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Nefret suçlarına göz yumanlar, farklı kültürlerin bir arada yaşama iradesini dinamitlemektedir". www.aa.com.tr. Retrieved 9 October 2023.
39. AA, Daily Sabah with (4 October 2023). "Türkiye's 1st Orthodox church built in post-republic era set to open". Daily Sabah. Retrieved 5 October 2023.
40. "International Institute for Religious Freedom: Single Post". Iirf.eu. from the original on 8 July 2015. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
41. "Turkish Protestants still face "long path" to religious freedom – The Christian Century". The Christian Century. from the original on 17 October 2014. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
42. . hurriyetdailynews.com. Archived from the original on 20 June 2017. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
43. White, Jenny (2014). Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks. Princeton University Press. p. 93. ISBN 978-1-4008-5125-6. Retrieved 12 January 2017.
44. . churchinchains.ie. Archived from the original on 22 August 2016. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
45. "Christen in der islamischen Welt – Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte" (PDF). 2008. from the original on 2 May 2014. Retrieved 11 June 2013.
46. DHA, Daily Sabah with (10 January 2019). "Assyrian community thrives again in southeastern Turkey". Daily Sabah. from the original on 10 January 2019. Retrieved 20 May 2020.
47. "Statistics and Church Facts | Total Church Membership". newsroom.churchofjesuschrist.org. from the original on 28 June 2019. Retrieved 24 August 2021.
48. Chapter The refugees question in Greece (1821–1930) in "Θέματα Νεοελληνικής Ιστορίας", ΟΕΔΒ ("Topics from Modern Greek History"). 8th edition (PDF), Nikolaos Andriotis, 2008
49. Quarterly, Middle East (2001). "'Editors' Introduction: Why a Special Issue?: Disappearing Christians of the Middle East" (PDF). Middle East Quarterly. Editors' Introduction. from the original on 11 May 2013. Retrieved 11 June 2013.
50. U.S. State Department (19 September 2008). "International Religious Freedom Report 2008: Turkey". The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs. from the original on 16 January 2021. Retrieved 15 December 2008.
51. . The Muslim Network for Baháʼí Rights. 13 December 2008. Archived from the original on 27 December 2008. Retrieved 15 December 2008.
52. Walbridge, John (March 2002). "Chapter Four: The Baháʼí Faith in Turkey". Occasional Papers in Shaykhi, Babi and Baháʼí Studies. 6 (1). from the original on 3 April 2007. Retrieved 12 July 2010.
53. . odatv.com. OdaTV. 9 April 2018. Archived from the original on 15 August 2019. Retrieved 15 August 2019.
54. Açikyildiz, Birgül (2014). The Yezidis: The History of a Community, Culture and Religion. London: I.B. Tauris & Company. ISBN 978-1-784-53216-1. OCLC 888467694.
55. Garnik S. Asatrian, Victoria Arakelova (2014). The Religion of the Peacock Angel: The Yezidis and Their Spirit World. Routledge. ISBN 978-1317544289. Retrieved 17 May 2019.
56. Allison, Christine (20 February 2004). "Yazidis i: General". Encyclopædia Iranica. Retrieved 20 August 2010.
57. . The Daily Telegraph. Archived from the original on 26 April 2012. Retrieved 12 November 2015.
58. Akyol, Mustafa (16 April 2018). "Why so many Turks are losing faith in Islam". Al-Monitor. from the original on 15 August 2021. Retrieved 21 April 2018.
59. "Atheism grows in Turkey as Recep Tayyip Erdogan urges Islam". Deutsche Welle. from the original on 19 April 2020. Retrieved 17 April 2020.
60. "The number of atheists increasing in Turkey". from the original on 6 April 2020. Retrieved 17 April 2020.
61. "The young Turks rejecting Islam". BBC News. 9 May 2018. from the original on 3 April 2019. Retrieved 17 April 2020.
62. . Ipsos. 2017. Archived from the original on 5 September 2017.
63. "TÜRKİYE'DE TOPLUMUN DİNE VE DİNİ DEĞERLERE BAKIŞI" (PDF). www.makdanismanlik.org. (PDF) from the original on 22 November 2020. Retrieved 4 April 2020.
64. "Optimar'dan din-inanç anketi: Yüzde 89 Allah'ın varlığına ve birliğine inanıyor". T24.com.tr. from the original on 29 March 2020. Retrieved 4 April 2020.
65. "Uneasy neighbors in Turkey: atheism and Islam". Deutsche Welle. from the original on 11 August 2018. Retrieved 12 November 2015.
66. "Turkey's Atheists Face Hostilities, Death Threats". VOA. from the original on 27 June 2016. Retrieved 12 November 2015.
67. "Atheists, the "Ultimate Other" in Turkey | Inter Press Service". Ipsnews.net. 24 June 2014. from the original on 15 September 2018. Retrieved 12 November 2015.
68. Semih Idiz (22 April 2014). "Turkey's atheists get organized – Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East". Al-Monitor. from the original on 8 December 2015. Retrieved 12 November 2015.
69. "Gezici Araştırma Merkezi Başkanı Murat Gezici SÖZCÜ'ye açıkladı: Türkiye'nin kaderi Z kuşağının elinde". 11 June 2020. from the original on 26 June 2020. Retrieved 21 December 2020.
70. "Gezici Araştırma Merkezi Başkanı Murat Gezici: Türkiye'nin kaderi Z kuşağının elinde". 11 June 2020. from the original on 11 September 2022. Retrieved 21 December 2020.
71. O'Toole, Pam (29 October 2003). "Headscarf row goes to Turkey's roots". bbc.co.uk. from the original on 28 August 2008. Retrieved 12 January 2017.
72. "EUI Working Papers : RSCAS 2008/20 : Mediterranean Programme Series". Cadmus.eui.eu. from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
73. Çarkoglu, Ali; Rubin, Barry (2004). Religion and Politics in Turkey. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-34831-5.
74. "The Islamic veil across Europe". bbc.co.uk. 17 November 2006. from the original on 22 February 2011. Retrieved 12 January 2017.
75. European Court of Human Rights (10 November 2005). "Leyla Şahin v. Turkey". European Court of Human Rights. ECHR. Retrieved 30 November 2006.
76. "Turkey lifts military headscarf ban". BBC News. 22 February 2017. from the original on 24 September 2022. Retrieved 30 July 2020.
77. "T.C. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı – İman – İbadet – Namaz – Ahlak". from the original on 25 October 2015. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
78. . Diyanet.gov.tr. Archived from the original on 18 January 2016. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
79. Samim Akgönül – Religions de Turquie, religions des Turcs: nouveaux acteurs dans l'Europe élargie – L'Harmattan – 2005 – 196 pages
80. "Turkey 'guilty of religious discrimination'". Al Jazeera English. 4 December 2014. from the original on 22 September 2020. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
81. Parlar Dal, Emel (2012). La politique turque en question: entre imperfections et adaptations [Turkish policy in question: between imperfections and adaptations] (in French). L'Harmattan. p. 220. ISBN 978-2-336-00305-4.
82. "2013 Yılı Merkezı Yönetım Bütçe Kanunu Tasarısı ve bağlı cetveller" [2013 Central Government Budget Draft Law and its rules] (PDF). The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (in Turkish). 2013. (PDF) from the original on 23 January 2013. Retrieved 15 June 2016.
83. "Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report 2007". International Religious Freedom Report 2007. U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 2007. from the original on 8 July 2019. Retrieved 12 January 2017.
84. (PDF). U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. May 2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on 9 May 2009.
85. "The Patriarch Bartholomew". 60 Minutes. CBS News. 20 December 2009. from the original on 4 November 2013. Retrieved 11 January 2010.
86. "Government Spokesman Criticizes Greek Patriarch Over Crucifixion Remarks". Turkishpress.com. 21 December 2009. from the original on 14 March 2012. Retrieved 17 August 2010.
87. "Gül backs minister's criticism of Patriarch Bartholomew". Today's Zaman. 22 December 2009. from the original on 25 December 2009. Retrieved 17 August 2010.
88. "Bartholomew crucified, Erdoğan suffers from Hellish torture!(1)". Today's Zaman. 25 December 2009. from the original on 12 October 2012. Retrieved 17 August 2010.
89. "Greece, Turkey mark a fresh start aimed at eventual partnership". Today's Zaman. 17 May 2010. from the original on 12 October 2012. Retrieved 17 August 2010.
90. "The Greek Orthodox Church In Turkey: A Victim Of Systematic Expropriation". United States Commission On Security And Cooperation In Europe. 16 March 2005. from the original on 4 July 2010. Retrieved 10 May 2010.
91. Hacaoğlu, Selcan (29 November 2010). "Turkey gives orphanage to Ecumenical Patriarchate". The Washington Post.
92. "Freedom House, Retrieved 2023-04-25". from the original on 3 May 2023. Retrieved 27 April 2023.
93. "TR100". from the original on 25 June 2022. Retrieved 14 August 2022.
94. "Is Belief in God Necessary for Good Values? Global Survey on Religion and Morality". 20 July 2020. from the original on 22 July 2020. Retrieved 9 February 2021.
95. "Türkiye artık yüzde 99'u müslüman olan ülke değil". 21 May 2019. from the original on 23 May 2019. Retrieved 4 August 2020.
96. "Religion is very important" (PDF). Global Attitudes Project. Pew Research Center. Spring 2015. (PDF) from the original on 26 December 2016. Retrieved 26 December 2016.
97. (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 October 2013. Retrieved 26 December 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
98. (PDF). European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication. October 2010. p. 204. Archived from the original (PDF) on 15 December 2010.
99. (PDF). KONDA Research and Consultancy. Milliyet. 9 September 2007. Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 March 2009.
100. Cook, Steven A. (13 May 2013). "Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia Are All Slowly Islamizing". The Atlantic. from the original on 13 March 2016. Retrieved 12 January 2017.
101. "In Turkey, Forging a New Identity". International Herald Tribune. 1 December 2012. from the original on 8 April 2018. Retrieved 31 January 2016 – via The New York Times.
102. "The Region: Turkey trots toward Islamism". The Jerusalem Post - JPost.com. from the original on 18 January 2016. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
103. Kaya, Ayhan (2 January 2015). "Islamisation of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith and Charity". South European Society and Politics. 20 (1): 47–69. doi:10.1080/13608746.2014.979031. ISSN 1360-8746. S2CID 144214590. from the original on 9 June 2023. Retrieved 9 June 2023.
104. Aytaç, Selim Erdem (2022). "Religiosity and Political Attitudes in Turkey during the AKP Era". In Cammett, Melani; Jones, Pauline (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Politics in Muslim Societies. Oxford University Press. p. 342. ISBN 9780190931056.
105. Sukru Kucuksahin (20 June 2016). "Turkish students up in arms over Islamization of education". Al-Monitor. from the original on 17 March 2021. Retrieved 10 December 2016.
106. Zülfikar Doğan (29 June 2016). "Erdogan pens education plan for Turkey's 'devout generation'". Al-Monitor. from the original on 17 March 2021. Retrieved 10 December 2016.
107. Hurtas, Sibel (13 October 2016). "Turkey's 'devout generation' project means lost jobs, schools for many". Al-Monitor. from the original on 17 March 2021. Retrieved 10 December 2016.
108. SPIEGEL ONLINE, Hamburg, Germany (2 November 2006). "Turkey in Transition: Less Europe, More Islam". SPIEGEL ONLINE. from the original on 18 January 2016. Retrieved 31 January 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
109. Ayman, Zehra; Knickmeyer, Ellen. Ban on Head Scarves Voted Out in Turkey: Parliament Lifts 80-Year-Old Restriction on University Attire 19 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine. The Washington Post. 10 February 2008. Page A17.
110. Steunebrink, Gerrit; van der Zweerde, Evert (2004). Civil Society, Religion, and the Nation: Modernization in Intercultural Context : Russia, Japan, Turkey. Rodopi. pp. 175–184. ISBN 978-90-420-1665-1. Retrieved 5 June 2013.
111. Tisdall, Simon. "Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey's elected sultan or an Islamic democrat?". The Guardian. from the original on 18 January 2016. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
112. Derakhshandeh, Mehran. Just a headscarf? Archived 4 September 2012 at archive.today Tehran Times. Mehr News Agency. 16 February 2008.
113. Jenkins, Gareth. Turkey's Constitutional Changes: Much Ado About Nothing? Archived 25 June 2007 at archive.today Eurasia Daily Monitor. The Jamestown Foundation. 11 February 2008.
114. Turkish president approves amendment lifting headscarf ban. The Times of India. 23 February 2008.
115. Ahren, Raphael (24 May 2013). "Turkey passes law restricting alcohol sales". The Times of Israel. from the original on 18 January 2016. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
116. "Presidential Decree on the opening of Hagia Sophia to worship promulgated on the Official Gazette". Presidency of the Republic of Turkey: Directorate of Communications. 10 July 2020. from the original on 5 April 2022. Retrieved 17 July 2020.
117. Gall, Carlotta (10 July 2020). "Erdogan Signs Decree Allowing Hagia Sophia to Be Used as a Mosque Again". The New York Times. from the original on 11 July 2020. Retrieved 4 August 2020.
118. Dal, Aylin; Karadag, Kemal (10 July 2020). "Turkey: Court strikes down Hagia Sophia museum decree". Anadolu Agency. from the original on 10 July 2020. Retrieved 17 July 2020.
119. "Turkey's Erdogan says Hagia Sophia becomes mosque after court ruling". CNBC. 10 July 2020. from the original on 16 July 2020. Retrieved 24 July 2020.
120. "Turning Hagia Sophia into museum violated will of its endower, Mehmed the Conquerer, Turkish court says". Daily Sabah. 11 July 2020. from the original on 20 August 2020. Retrieved 17 July 2020.
121. "Turkey's president formally makes Hagia Sophia a mosque". AP NEWS. 10 July 2020. from the original on 19 August 2020. Retrieved 17 July 2020.
122. "UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia, Istanbul". UNESCO. 10 July 2020. from the original on 26 July 2020. Retrieved 11 July 2020.
123. "Church body wants Hagia Sophia decision reversed". BBC News. 11 July 2020. from the original on 29 January 2022. Retrieved 13 July 2020.
124. "Pope 'pained' by Hagia Sophia mosque decision". BBC News. 12 July 2020. from the original on 20 February 2022. Retrieved 13 July 2020.
125. "World reacts to Turkey reconverting Hagia Sophia into a mosque". Al Jazeera. 10 July 2020. from the original on 11 July 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2020.
126. "Byzantine News, Issue 33, July 2020". us17.campaign-archive.com. from the original on 25 July 2020. Retrieved 25 July 2020.
127. Ors, Ilay Romain (15 September 2020). "Former Byzantine churches are being converted to mosques – this threatens Istanbul's cosmopolitan identity". The Conversation. from the original on 10 October 2020. Retrieved 9 October 2020.
128. "Turkey converts another former Istanbul church into a mosque". Al Jazeera. 21 August 2020. from the original on 10 October 2020. Retrieved 9 October 2020.
129. "Istanbul: Turkey is converting another former Byzantine church into a mosque". Euro News. 22 August 2020. from the original on 5 October 2020. Retrieved 9 October 2020.
130. Kayaoğlu, Turan (10 April 2012). "Secularism in Turkey: Stronger than Ever?". Brookings Institution. from the original on 26 May 2022. Retrieved 25 April 2017.
131. "Turkey is becoming more secular, not less". Al-Monitor. 2 March 2015. from the original on 1 March 2021. Retrieved 25 April 2017.
132. "Secular rally targets Turkish PM". BBC News. 14 April 2007. from the original on 18 December 2008. Retrieved 25 April 2017.
133. Sencar, Özer (January 2015). "Türkiye'nin Nabzı: Din, Şiddet ve Özgürlük [Pulse of Turkey: Religion, Violence and Freedom]" (PDF). Metropoll. p. 34. (PDF) from the original on 8 February 2015. Retrieved 25 April 2017.
134. "Is Turkey an Islamic or Secular Country?". Seeker Daily. 9 August 2016. from the original on 15 June 2018. Retrieved 5 October 2016.
135. Mustafa Akyol (16 April 2018). "Why so many Turks are losing faith in Islam". Al-Monitor. from the original on 15 August 2021. Retrieved 19 April 2018.
136. Karaveli, Halil (2013). "An Unfulfilled Promise: Kemalism and its Liberal Critics". In Rubin, Barry; Yesilada, Birol (eds.). Islamization of Turkey Under the AKP Rule. Taylor & Francis. p. 92.

Further reading

• Ramazan Kılınç, University of Nebraska, Omaha (10 October 2019). Alien Citizens The State and Religious Minorities in Turkey and France. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781108476942.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Altınlı-Macić, M., & Coleman, T. J. III, (2015). Spirituality and Religion: An Empirical Study Using a Turkish Muslim Sample. In Z. Agilkaya-Sahin, H. Streib, A. Ayten & R. Hood (Eds.), Psychology of Religion in Turkey (pp. 161–176). Leiden: Brill. doi: 10.1163/9789004290884_008
• Peker, E. 2020. "Beyond Positivism: Building Turkish Laiklik in the Transition from the Empire to the Republic (1908–38)." Social Science History
• "The Legal Status of the Ecumenical Patriarchate". Jaakko Husa, University of Joensuu. Ortodoksi.net.
• "Survey shows majority of Turks are devout believers". Hürriyet Daily News. 10 August 2012.