Gwangju Uprising

Not to be confused with Gwangju Student Independence Movement.

The Gwangju Massacre, known in Korean as May 18 (Korean: 오일팔; Hanja: 五一八; RR: Oilpal; lit. Five One Eight), took place in Gwangju, South Korea, in 1980. The massacre was a response to the coup d'état of May Seventeenth that installed Chun Doo-hwan as military dictator and implemented martial law. Following his ascent to power, Chun arrested opposition leaders, closed all universities, banned political activities, and suppressed the press. The massacre was violently suppressed by the South Korean military. The massacre is also known as the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement^[3] (Korean: 5·18 광주 민주화 운동; Hanja: 五一八光州民主化運動), the Gwangju Democratization Struggle (Korean: 광주 민주화 항쟁; Hanja: 光州民主化抗爭), the May 18 Democratic Uprising,^[4] or the Gwangju Uprising.^[5][6][7]

The Gwangju Massacre
Part of the Minjung movement
Memorial Hall in the May 18th National Cemetery in Gwangju where victims' bodies were buried
Date	18 May 1980 (1980-05-18) – 27 May 1980; 43 years ago (1980-05-27)
Location	Gwangju, South Korea
Caused by	Coup d'état of May Seventeenth Coup d'état of December Twelfth Assassination of Park Chung-hee Authoritarianism in South Korea Social and political discontent in the Cholla region
Goals	Democratization End of dictatorial rule in South Korea
Methods	Protests Demonstrations Civil disobedience Armed uprising
Resulted in	Uprising suppressed Pro-democracy protests escalate into an armed uprising after the South Korean government deploys the army to violently end demonstrations Long-term increase in support for the Minjung Movement, leading to the eventual end of South Korea's dictatorship in 1987
Parties
South Korean Government Hanahoe DSC ROK Army(rebelion) National Police(switched sides) Kwangju citizenry Protesters Armed citizens Citizens' Settlement Committee Students' Settlement Committee
Lead figures
Chun Doo-hwan Roh Tae-woo Jeong Ho-yong Lee Hee-seong Hwang Yeong-si Yoon Heung-jung Ahn Byung-ha(Switched sides due to witnessing brutalities done by the rebel and paratroopers) Decentralized leadership
Units involved
Initially: 7th Airborne Brigade 11th Airborne Brigade DSC 505th Defense Security Unit^[1] Jeonnam Police Gwangju Blockade: 3rd Airborne Brigade 7th Airborne Brigade 11th Airborne Brigade 31st Infantry Division 20th Mechanised Infantry Division Combat Arms Training Command^[2] Unknown (various civilian militias)
Number
Initially: 3,000 paratroopers Gwangju Blockade: 23,000 Rebel troops 200,000 demonstrators (estimated combined strength)
Casualties and losses
22 soldiers killed (including 13 by friendly fire) 4 policemen killed(fire with will by rebel troops and paratroopers) (several more killed by the army after the uprising ended) 109 soldiers wounded 144 policemen wounded Total: 26 killed 253 wounded 165 killed (South Korean government claim) 76 missing (presumed dead) 3,515 wounded 1,394 arrested
Up to 600–2,300 killed; see casualties section.

The massacre began after Chonnam National University students who were demonstrating against martial law were fired upon, killed, raped, and beaten by the South Korean military.^[8][9][10] Some Gwangju citizens took up arms, raiding local police stations and armories, and were able to take control of large sections of the city before soldiers re-entered the city and suppressed the massacre. While the South Korean government claimed 165 people were killed in the massacre, scholarship on the massacre today estimates 600 to 2,300 victims.^[11] Under the military dictatorship of Chun Doo-hwan, the South Korean government named the massacre the ''Gwangju Riot,'' and claimed that it was being instigated by "communist sympathizers and rioters" acting under the support of the North Korean government.^[12][13] As soon as May 8 the US Government was aware and, although they recognized the need for the military to maintain law and order against student demonstrations, they repeatedly stressed that the situation be resolved with "care and restraint" so to not destabilize the nation.^[14]

In 1997, 18 May was established as a national day of commemoration for the massacre and a national cemetery for the victims was established.^[15] Later investigations confirmed the various atrocities that had been committed by the army. In 2011, the documents of Gwangju Massacre were listed on the UNESCO Memory of the World Register. In contemporary South Korean politics, denial of the Gwangju Massacre is commonly espoused by conservative and far-right groups.^[16][17]

Background

The assassination of President Park Chung-hee on 26 October 1979 triggered a number of democracy movements that had previously been suppressed under Park's tenure. The abrupt end of Park's 18-year authoritarian rule left a power vacuum that created political and social instability.^[18] Park's successor, Choi Kyu-hah, had no real control over the government and Chun Doo-hwan, chief of the Defense Security Command (DSC), was able to seize control over the military in the coup d'état of December Twelfth. At the time, both the military and Chun denied any political motivations behind the coup and Chun had no clear influence over domestic politics.^[18][19]

In March 1980, the beginning of a new school year, professors and students who had been expelled for pro-democracy activity returned to university and formed student unions. These unions led nationwide demonstrations against martial law and in support of democratization, human rights, labor rights, and freedom of the press.^[20] These protests culminated in the 15 May 1980 demonstration against martial law at Seoul Station which involved 100,000 protesters.

General Chun Doo-hwan heavily suppressed these protests. On 18 February 1980, the army issued orders to a number of units to undergo severe riot control training, called "Loyalty Training" (Korean: 충정훈련; Hanja: 忠情訓練). This training was harsh and unconscionable, and was criticized as a factor behind the paratroopers' indiscriminate use of violence against the massacre.^[21] In the coup d'état of May Seventeenth Chun forced the Cabinet to extend martial law to the whole country and in the process closed universities, banned political activities, and further curtailed the press. To enforce martial law, troops were dispatched to the country's main cities. The same day, the DSC raided a national conference of student union leaders who had gathered to discuss their plans following the 15 May demonstration. Twenty-six politicians, including opposition leader and future president Kim Dae-jung were also arrested on charges of instigating protests. Chun minimized the scale of protests by cutting off all communication from Gwangju and used propaganda to depict the protests in Gwangju as the result of communist instigators.

South Jeolla Province, and its provincial capital Gwangju, was the center of anti-government and pro-democracy demonstrations. Jeolla had historically been the target of exploitation because of its abundant natural resources^[22] and the region was associated with political dissent and activism. Historically, the region was the site of the Donghak Peasant Revolution (1894–1895), the Gwangju Student Independence Movement (1929), and the Yeosu–Suncheon rebellion (1948). Under the military dictatorship of Park Chung-hee from 1961 to 1979, the government favored the development of Park's native Gyeongsang Province, while Jeolla Province was ignored. Among the protests against Chun's imposition of martial law, the protests in Gwangju were the most intense.^[23][24]

Uprising

18–21 May

 

The former South Jeolla Provincial Office

On the morning of 18 May, students gathered at the gate of Chonnam National University in protest of its closing. By 9:30 a.m., approximately 200 students had gathered in front of the school, opposed by 30 paratroopers. Sometime around 10 a.m., the soldiers charged against the students, moving the protest to downtown Gwangju, in front of the South Jeolla Province Provincial Office. Over the course of the day, the conflict broadened to around 2000 participants. Although local police had initially handled the protests, by 4 pm, paratroopers from the Republic of Korea Special Warfare Command (ROK-SWC) took over. The arrival of 686 soldiers from the 33rd and 35th battalions of the 7th Airborne Brigade marked the beginning of a brutal and infamous phase of suppression of the massacre.^[25]

During this phase, South Korean soldiers indiscriminately clubbed demonstrators and bystanders. Soldiers used bayonets to attack, torture, and kill residents indiscriminately. Soldiers raided buildings unrelated to the demonstration, including hotels, cafés, and barbershops.^[26] The first known fatality was a 29-year-old deaf man named Kim Gyeong-cheol, who was clubbed to death despite being a bystander. The violent suppression of the protests by the ROK-SWC led the number of protesters to rapidly increase, exceeding 10,000 by 20 May.

As the conflict escalated, the army opened fire on the citizens, killing an unknown number of protesters near Gwangju Station on 20 May. The same day, protesters burned down the local MBC television station, which had spread misinformation on the situation that had unfolded in Gwangju.^[27] Four policemen were killed at a police barricade near the Provincial Government Building after a car drove into them.^[28]

On the night of 20 May, hundreds of taxis led a parade of buses, trucks, and cars to the Provincial Office in protest. These "drivers of democracy" showed up to support the demonstrators because of the brutality of the South Korean government. In response, soldiers fired tear gas on them, pulled them out of their vehicles, and beat them. This only led more drivers to join the protest. Many taxi drivers were assaulted while trying to transport the injured to the hospital. Some taxi drivers were shot after the drivers attempted to use the taxicabs as weapons or as barricades.^[29]

The violence climaxed on 21 May. Some time around 1 p.m., the army fired on a crowd that had gathered in front of the South Jeolla Provincial Office building, causing numerous casualties. In response, some protesters raided the Reserve Force armories and police stations in nearby towns, arming themselves with M1 rifles and M1/M2 carbines. The militias also started to exercise caution against perceived North Korean provocateurs and raised placards reading "Don't misjudge, Northerners" (Korean: 북괴는 오판말라).^[30][28] Later that afternoon, gunfights between civilian militias and the army broke out in the Provincial Office Square. By 5:30 p.m., the militias had acquired two light machine guns and used them against the army, forcing them to retreat from the downtown area.

22–25 May

Blockade of Gwangju

By 22 May, all troops retreated to the rural outskirts outside of the city to wait for reinforcements. These reinforcements consisted of troops from the 3rd Airborne Brigade, the 11th Airborne Brigade, the 20th Mechanized Infantry Division, the 31st Infantry Division, and the Combat Arms Training Command (CATC; 전투병과교육사령부; 戰鬪兵科敎育司令部). Reinforcements from the CATC primarily consisted of three subordinate units based in the unit's headquarters in Sangmudae: the Army Infantry School (육군보병학교; 陸軍步兵學校), the Army Artillery School (육군포병학교; 陸軍砲兵學校), and the Army Armor School (육군기갑학교; 陸軍機甲學校).

The army blocked all routes and communications from the city and fighting between militias and the army temporarily died down. On 23 May, soldiers fired at a bus that attempted to break out of the city in Jiwon-dong, killing 15 of the 18 passengers, and summarily executing two wounded passengers.

On 24 May, two teenage boys, Jeon Jae-su^[31] and Bang Gwang-beom,^[32] attempted to swim across the Wonje reservoir, but the 11th Airborne Brigade Troopers opened fire and killed them.^[33] At 13:55 p.m., the South Korean military suffered the greatest number of casualties when troops from the 11th Airborne Brigade 63rd Special Operations Battalion and the CATC Army Infantry School Training Battalion mistakenly fired at each other in Songam-dong, resulting in the deaths of 13 soldiers.^[34] Troops from the 11th Airborne Brigade indiscriminately murdered unarmed civilians and residents near the village in Songam-dong and plundered nearby stores.^[35] Martial Law Command misinterpreted friendly fire at Songam-dong as the work of insurgents within the army, as the Airborne Brigade Troopers were using a different communications channel.^[36]

Settlement Committees

Meanwhile, in the liberated city of Gwangju, the Citizens' Settlement Committee and the Students' Settlement Committee were formed. The former was composed of about 20 preachers, lawyers, and professors and negotiated with the army, demanding the release of arrested citizens, compensation for victims, and the prohibition of retaliation in exchange for the disarmament of militias. The latter committee was formed by university students and took charge of funerals, public campaigns, traffic control, withdrawal of weapons, and medical aid.^[25][37]

• Kim Jong-bae (김종배) - Chief Executive^[38]
• Heo Kyu-jeong (허규정) - Secretary of Home Affairs^[38]
• Jeong Sang-yong (정상영) - Secretary of External Affairs^[38]
• Yoon Sang-won (윤상원) - Spokesperson for Militia^[38]
• Park Nam-sun (박남선) - Director of Militia Operations^[38]
  • Yoon Seok-ru (윤석루) - Militia QRF (Quick Reaction Force) Commander^[38]
  • Lee Jae-ho (이재호) - Militia QRF Deputy Commander^[38]
• Kim Jun-bong (김준봉) - Director of Investigations^[38]
• Gu Seong-ju (구성주) - Director of Provisions Supply^[38]

Order in the city was well maintained, but negotiations came to a deadlock as the army urged the militias to immediately and unconditionally disarm themselves. This created division within the Settlement Committees between those who wanted immediate surrender and those who called for continued resistance until their demands were met. After heated debates, those calling for continued resistance eventually took control.^[25]

Protests in other regions

As the news of the bloody crackdown spread, protests against the government broke out in nearby regions, including in Hwasun County, Naju, Haenam County, Mokpo, Yeongam County, Gangjin County, and Muan County, all in South Jeolla. While protests ended peacefully in most regions, protests in Haenam ended in gunfights between armed protesters and troops.^[25] Most of these protests died down by 24 May, although protests in Mokpo continued until 28 May.^[25]

26 May

By 26 May, the army was ready to reenter Gwangju. Members of the Citizens' Settlement Committee unsuccessfully tried to block the army's advance by lying down in the streets. Following news of the imminent attack, civil militias gathered in the Provincial Office and made preparations to make a last stand.^[25]

27 May

On 27 May, at 4:00 a.m., the Martial Law Command executed Operation Sangmu-Chungjeong (Korean: 상무충정작전; Hanja: 尙武忠正作戰; lit. Operation Martialism and Loyalty) to quell the protests. The operation mobilized members of the 3rd Airborne Brigade, the 7th Airborne Brigade, and the 11th Airborne Brigade Troopers, armed with M16A1 rifles and stun grenades. The soldiers disguised themselves with flak vests, leaf camouflage helmets with white bands, and ordinary army infantryman combat uniforms that were missing insignias and patches. Three Airborne Brigades were the vanguard of the operation, while the 20th Mechanised Infantry Division and the 31st Infantry Division joined the operation as backup reinforcements. Troops from three subordinate units of the CATC, the Army Infantry School, the Army Artillery School, and the Army Armor School, maintained their positions in the blockade during the operation.^{[citation needed]} The soldiers moved into the downtown and defeated the civil militias within 90 minutes.^[25][39]

Role of the police

The National Security Headquarters initially dealt with the protests, but were soon supplemented by paratroopers from the 7th Airborne Brigade, before being fully taken over and ordered to evacuate to allow the army. The police suffered some of the first casualties of the massacre when four policemen were killed during a car-ramming attack. However, the martial law forces were also not friendly to the local police of Gwangju city.

The Commissioner General of the Jeonnam Provincial Police, Ahn Byung-ha, refused to order the police to open fire on civilians as instructed by Chun Doo-hwan. As a result, he was replaced as police chief and was tortured by the Army Counterintelligence Corps, which caused his death eight years later.^[40] In addition, some paratroopers assaulted the police and some residents testified witnessing police officers being chased down by the military.^[41]

Casualties

 

The victims of the Gwangju Massacre were buried at the May 18 National Cemetery.

There is no universally accepted death toll for the Gwangju Massacre. Records of death for the city in May 1980 were an estimated 2,300 above the historical averages^[42] and the death toll has been estimated to be anywhere between 1,000 to 2,000 people.^[43][44] Estimates for the number of civilians wounded also vary heavily, including figures anywhere from 1,800 to 3,500 people.^[45]

Shortly after the massacre, the government's Martial Law Command released an official death toll at 144 civilians, 22 soldiers, and four police killed and 127 civilians, 109 troops and 144 police wounded. Individuals who attempted to dispute these figures were liable for arrest for "spreading false rumors".^[46]

According to the May 18 Family Association, at least 165 people died between 18 and 27 May, while another 76 are still missing and presumed dead. Twenty-two soldiers and four policemen were killed during the massacre, including 13 soldiers who were killed by friendly fire at Songam-dong. The number of police casualties is likely to be higher, due to reports of police officers being killed by soldiers for releasing captured protesters.^[47]

Aftermath

 

May 18 Minjung Struggle Memorial Tower

The government denounced the massacre as a rebellion instigated by Kim Dae-jung and his followers. Kim was convicted and sentenced to death, although his sentence was reduced following the intervention of US Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.^[48] A total of 1,394 people were arrested for their involvement in the Gwangju Massacre, and 427 were indicted. Seven people received death sentences and twelve received life sentences. Estimates following the massacre suggested that more than 200,000 people participated in the uprising, facing roughly 3,000 paratroopers and 18,000 police officers.^[49]

Handcarts and garbage trucks carried 137 bodies from the massacre to the Old Mangweol-dong Cemetery on the outskirts of Gwangju. The state established the New Mangweol-dong Cemetery to commemorate Gwangju's history.^[when?]

The Gwangju Massacre has had a profound impact on South Korean politics. Chun Doo-hwan, who was already unpopular because of his military coup, faced threats to his legitimacy following the dispatch of Special Forces paratroopers against demonstrators in Gwangju. The movement preceded other democratic movements during the late 1980s that pressured the regime into democratic reforms and paved the way for the election of President Kim Dae-jung in 1997, the first opposition candidate to win the office.

In 1995, in response to public pressure, the National Assembly passed the Special Law on May 18 Democratization Movement, which enabled the prosecution of those responsible for the Coup d'état of December Twelfth and the suppression of the Gwangju Uprising even though the statute of limitations had been exceeded.

 

 

On 3 December 1995, Chun, his ally and former President Roh Tae-woo, and 15 others were arrested on charges of conspiracy and insurrection. On 26 August 1996, the Seoul District Court issued a death sentence to both Chun,^[50][51] but his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment and a fine of ₩220 billion. Former President Roh Tae-Woo, was sentenced to 22.5 years, which was reduced to 17 years on appeal. On 17 April 1997, the judgment was accepted by the Supreme Court of Korea. Chun was officially convicted of leading an insurrection, conspiracy to commit insurrection, taking part in an insurrection, illegal troop movement orders, dereliction of duty during martial law, murder of superior officers, attempted murder of superior officers, murder of subordinate troops, leading a rebellion, conspiracy to commit rebellion, taking part in a rebellion, and murder for the purpose of rebellion, as well as assorted crimes relating to bribery. However, on 22 December 1997, all of the people convicted in the trials were pardoned in the name of national reconciliation by President Kim Young-sam on the advice of President-elect Kim Dae-jung.^[52]

Starting in 2000, the May 18 Memorial Foundation has offered an annual Gwangju Prize for Human Rights to notable defenders of human rights, in memory of the massacre.^[53]

On 25 May 2011, the documents of Gwangju Massacre were listed on the UNESCO Memory of the World Register.^[54] Following its inclusion, the Gwangju Metropolitan City government established May 18 Archives^[55] and passed the Management Act on the Archives of May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement.^[56] Between 2014 and 2015, the Gwangju Metropolitan City government also re-modeled the former Gwangju Catholic center building to conserve its former state.

Anti-Americanism

 

Barbed wire at the back of the memorial

The 1980s marked a surge in Anti-American sentiment in Korea, widely traced to the United States' support for Chun's government and its involvement in the suppression of the Gwangju Massacre.^[47][57] According to Bruce Cumings:

Gwangju convinced a new generation of young [Koreans] that the democratic movement had developed not with the support of Washington, as an older generation of more conservative Koreans thought, but in the face of daily American support for any dictator who could quell the democratic aspirations of the Korean people. The result was an anti-American movement in the 1980s that threatened to bring down the whole structure of American support for the ROK. American cultural centers were burned to the ground (more than once in Gwangju); students immolated themselves in protest of Reagan's support for Chun.^[58]

Fundamental to these beliefs are the perception of US complicity in Chun's rise to power and in the Gwangju Massacre. Although William H. Gleysteen, then US Ambassador to South Korea, stated in a letter to The New York Times that the United States authorized the Republic of Korea Army's 20th Division to retake Gwangju and restore martial law, the United States government has denied these claims.^[59][60] The United States has consistently denied any foreknowledge of the unit's deployment, and has stated that the US government would regardless have no right to interfere in the actions of the South Korean government.^[60][61][62]

Re-evaluation

At the Mangwol-dong cemetery in Gwangju, survivors of the demonstrations and bereaved families have held an annual memorial service, called the May Movement, on the anniversary of the massacre.^[63] Many pro-democracy demonstrations in the 1980s demanded official recognition of the massacre and punishment for those responsible.

The first official re-evaluation of the massacre began after the reinstatement of direct presidential elections in 1987. In 1988, the National Assembly held a public hearing on the massacre, officially renaming the massacre to the "Gwangju Uprising" or the "Gwangju People's Uprising".

Developments from 1997 to 2013

In 1997, 18 May was declared an official memorial day. In 2002, a law privileging bereaved families took effect, and the Mangwol-dong cemetery was elevated to the status of a national cemetery.

On 18 May 2013, President Park Geun-hye attended the 33rd anniversary of the Gwangju massacre and stated, "I feel the sorrow of family members and the city of Gwangju every time I visit the National May 18 Cemetery", and that "I believe achieving a more mature democracy is a way to repay the sacrifice paid by those [killed in the massacre]."^[64]

2017 investigation

In May 2017, newly elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in announced his plans to re-open investigations into the South Korean government's role in the suppression of the uprising.^[65]

In February 2018, it was revealed for the first time that the army had used McDonnell Douglas MD 500 Defender and Bell UH-1 Iroquois helicopters to fire on civilians. Defense Minister Song Young-moo delivered an apology.^[66][67] On 7 November 2018, Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo issued another apology for the South Korean military's role in suppressing the uprising and acknowledged that soldiers had engaged in acts of sexual violence during the crackdown.^[68][69]

In May 2019, Kim Yong-Jang, a former intelligence officer at the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade of the U.S. Army testified that Chun Doo-hwan personally ordered troops to shoot protesters based on the intelligence he saw at the time. According to Kim, Chun secretly came to Gwangju on 21 May 1980, by helicopter to meet four military leaders including commander of special operations Chung Ho-Yong and colonel of the Gwangju 505 security unit Lee Jae-woo. Kim also testified that there were undercover soldiers among the Gwangju citizens acting as agents provocateurs aiming to discredit the movement. These soldiers were "in their 20s and 30s with short hair, some wearing wigs" and "their faces were burnt and some wore worn-out clothes".^[70][71]

2020 Truth Commission

In May 2020, 40 years after the massacre, the independent May 18 Democratization Movement Truth Commission was launched to investigate the crackdown and the use of military force. Under legislation passed in 2018, it operated for two more years, with a one-year extension allowed if necessary.^[72] In an interview marking the massacre's 40th anniversary and following Democratic Party of Korea's landslide victory in the 2020 South Korean legislative election, President Moon announced his support for inscribing the historic value and significance of the Gwangju Massacre in a new constitution of South Korea.^[73]

May 18 Special Act

With its new three-fifths majority in the National Assembly, the Democratic Party implemented a series of reforms in December 2020, including revisions to the May 18 Special Act to penalize those involved in making false claims about the Gwangju Uprising.^[74]

Revelations of U.S. foreknowledge

Declassified United States Department of State documents in July 2021, requested by the South Korean government, revealed that the U.S. ambassador William H. Gleysteen was informed by the Chief Presidential Secretary Choi Kwang-soo of the plans for an army crackdown a day before it took place.^[75] The released documents showed that Gleysteen expressed Washington's concerns over growing anti-American sentiment in the Gwangju area, amid broadcasts asserting that the US was involved in the military crackdown. Prior to the declassification, the notion of American foreknowledge and involvement in the Gwangju Massacre had been officially denied by the United States.^[57]

In popular culture

Literature

• Dance Dance Revolution (2007), a poem by Cathy Park Hong
• There a Petal Silently Falls: Three Stories (2008) by Choe Yun^[76]
• The Old Garden (2009), a novel by Hwang Sok-yong
• The Seed of Joy (2015), a novel by William Amos
• Human Acts (2016), a novel by Han Kang^[77]

Compositions

• "Exemplum in memoriam Kwangju" for orchestra by Isang Yun

Television

• Sandglass (1995)
• 5th Republic (2005)
• Youth of May (2021)

Film

• Symphonic Poem for the Beloved [ko] (1991)
• A Petal (1996), adapted from the short story "There a Petal Silently Falls" by Choe Yun
• Peppermint Candy (1999)
• May 18 (2007)
• Sunny (2011)
• 26 Years (2012), based on the 2006 manhwa by Kang Full
• National Security (2012)
• The Attorney (2013)
• 1987: When the Day Comes (2017)
• Excavator (2017)
• A Taxi Driver (2017)
• The Man Standing Next (2020)
• Hunt (2022)

Music videos

• "That's My Fault" and "It's Over" by Speed, featuring Kang Min-kyung and Park Bo-young, respectively
• "May" by Wings of the ISANG

See also

• Busan–Masan Uprising
• Busan American Cultural Service building arson
• Gukpung 81
• Incheon Uprising [ko]
• June Democratic Struggle
• Jürgen Hinzpeter
• May 18 Memorial Foundation

Citations

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2. "38 years later, nobody convicted for the murder of civilians during Gwangju Massacre of 1980". from the original on 3 July 2022. Retrieved 16 May 2018.
3. Embassy of the United States in Seoul. . Archived from the original on 31 March 2013. Retrieved 16 May 2013.
4. "Human Rights Documentary Heritage 1980 Archives for the May 18th Democratic Uprising against Military Regime, in Gwangju, Republic of Korea". UNESCO. Archived from the original on 30 October 2012. Retrieved 23 February 2014.
5. "Scars still raw 40 years after dictator crushed South Korea uprising". South China Morning Post. Agence France-Presse. 17 May 2020. Retrieved 29 March 2022.
6. Seymour, Tom (29 March 2021). "South Korea confronts legacy of 1980 massacre at this year's Gwangju Biennale". The Art Newspaper. Retrieved 29 March 2022.
7. Gallo, William (27 May 2020). "As South Koreans Reexamine a 1980 Massacre, Some Ask US to Do the Same". VOA. Retrieved 29 March 2022.
8. "Gwangju apology: South Korea sorry for 'rape and torture' by troops". South China Morning Post. from the original on 7 November 2018. Retrieved 7 November 2018.
9. Sallie Yea, "Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea: The (Re)presentation of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising through Mangwol-dong Cemetery," Urban Studies, Vol. 39, no. 9, (2002): 1556–1557
10. Patricia Ebrey et al., "East Asia: A Cultural, Social, and Political History (Second Edition)" United States: Wadsworth Cengage Learning (2009): 500
11. 5월단체, "5.18 관련 사망자 606명" (in Korean). Yeonhap News. 13 May 2005. from the original on 2 December 2013. Retrieved 25 May 2013.
12. "TV shows tarnish Gwangju history," Joong Ang Daily, 21 May 2013: http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2971886 9 August 2014 at the Wayback Machine
13. Martin, Bradley K. (18 May 2021). "Gwangju massacre deniers still seek comfort in North plot". Asia Times. Retrieved 25 September 2021.
14. "Department of State outgoing telegram", 8 May 1980: https://timshorrock.com/wp-content/uploads/NODIS-CHEROKEE-Christopher-May-8-1980-.pdf
15. May, The Triumph of Democracy. Ed. Shin Bok-jin, Hwang Chong-gun, Kim Jun-tae, Na Kyung-taek, Kim Nyung-man, Ko Myung-jin. Gwangju: May 18 Memorial Foundation, 2004. p. 275.
16. Sallie Yea, "Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea: The (Re)presentation of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising through Mangwol-dong Cemetery," Urban Studies, Vol. 39, no. 9, (2002): 1556
17. "Dying for democracy: 1980 Gwangju uprising transformed South Korea," The Japan Times, 17 May 2014: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/05/17/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/dying-democracy-1980-gwangju-uprising-transformed-south-korea/#.U-SllvldWZg 11 August 2014 at the Wayback Machine
18. "Yet Another Assessment of ROK Stability and Political Development" (PDF). (PDF) from the original on 10 November 2015.
19. Scott-Stokes, Henry (10 April 1980). "South Korea Leader Voices Worry On Student Unrest; 'Students Are Waking Up Again'". The New York Times. from the original on 10 August 2016. Retrieved 8 February 2017.
20. May, The Triumph of Democracy. Ed. Shin Bok-jin, Hwang Chong-gun, Kim Jun-tae, Na Kyung-taek, Kim Nyung-man, Ko Myung-jin. Gwangju: May 18 Memorial Foundation, 2004. p. 22.
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General references

• Katsiaficas, George (2006). "Neoliberalism and the Gwangju Uprising". 민주주의와 인권. 6 (2): 191–229. from the original on 13 May 2009. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
• Lewis, L.S. (2002). Laying Claim to the Memory of May: A Look Back at the 1980 Kwangju Uprising. Hawaii studies on Korea. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 978-0-8248-2479-2. from the original on 18 June 2020. Retrieved 20 December 2017.

Further reading

• Chang, Edward (1988). "Korean Community Politics in Los Angeles: The Impact of the Kwangju Uprising". Amerasia Journal. 14 (1): 51–67. doi:10.17953/amer.14.1.gh65433165261483.
• Cheol, Kim Yong (2003). "The Shadow of the Gwangju Uprising in the Democratization of Korean Politics". New Political Science. 25 (2): 225. doi:10.1080/07393140307193. S2CID 144132434.
• Chʻoe, C. (2006). The Gwangju Uprising: The Pivotal Democratic Movement that Changed the History of Modern Korea. Homa & Sekey Books. ISBN 978-1-931907-36-1. from the original on 30 June 2020. Retrieved 20 December 2017.
• Chŏng, Sang-yong; Rhyu Simin; Saŏphoe, Minjuhwa Undong Kinyŏm (2003). Memories of May 1980: A Documentary History of the Kwangju Uprising in Korea. Seoul: Korea Democracy Foundation. ISBN 978-89-7778-203-7. from the original on 17 June 2020. Retrieved 20 December 2017.
• Gleysteen, William H. (2012) [1999]. Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-9109-6. from the original on 17 June 2020. Retrieved 20 December 2017.
• Jean, Ahn (2003). "The Socio-Economic Background of the Gwangju Uprising". New Political Science. 25 (2): 159. doi:10.1080/07393140307187. S2CID 143570080.
• Jong-cheol, Ahn (2002). "The significance of settling the past of the December 12 coup and the May 18 Gwangju uprising". Korea Journal. 42 (3): 112–138. from the original on 18 September 2017. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
• Jungwoon, Choi (1999). "The Kwangju People's Uprising: Formation of the "Absolute Community"". Korea Journal. 39 (2): 238–282. from the original on 18 September 2017. Retrieved 18 September 2017.
• Katsiaficas, George (2003). "Comparing the Paris Commune and the Gwangju Uprising". New Political Science. 25 (2): 261. doi:10.1080/07393140307195. S2CID 144513449.
• Katsiaficas, George (2007). "Remembering the Kwangju uprising". Socialism and Democracy. 14: 85. doi:10.1080/08854300008428256. S2CID 143917527.
• Katsiaficas, George (2013). South Korean Democracy: Legacy of the Gwangju Uprising. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-136-75923-9. from the original on 30 June 2020. Retrieved 20 December 2017.
• Katsiaficas, George; Kahn-chae, Na, eds. (2013) [2006]. South Korean Democracy: Legacy of the Gwangju Uprising. New York: Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-1-136-75922-2. from the original on 22 June 2020. Retrieved 20 December 2017.
• Kahn-Chae, Na (2001). "A New Perspective on the Gwangju People's Resistance Struggle: 1980–1997". New Political Science. 23 (4): 477. doi:10.1080/07393140120099598. S2CID 144089094.
• Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths of the Republic of Korea (2004). A Hard Journey to Justice: First Term Report. Seoul: Samin Books. from the original on 17 June 2020. Retrieved 20 December 2017.
• Shin, G.W.; Hwang, K.M. (2003). Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising in Korea's Past and Present. Asia/Pacific/Perspectives. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated. ISBN 978-0-7425-1962-6. from the original on 22 June 2020. Retrieved 20 December 2017.
• Stokes, Henry Scott; Lee Jai Eui, eds. (2016) [2000]. The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness press accounts of Korea's Tianaman. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-315-29175-8. from the original on 30 June 2020. Retrieved 20 December 2017.
• Wickham, John A. (2000). Korea on the brink: A memoir of political intrigue and military crisis. Washington, DC: Brassey's. ISBN 978-1-57488-290-2.
• Yea, Sallie (2016). "Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea: The (Re)presentation of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising through Mangwol-dong Cemetery". Urban Studies. 39 (9): 1551. doi:10.1080/00420980220151655. S2CID 153346105.

External links

 

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Gwangju Uprising.

• The May 18 Memorial Foundation (in Korean and English)
• 1980: The Kwangju uprising – article with comments on the self-administration people developed.
• (AHRC HRCS Educational Module)
• (AHRC HRCS Educational Module)
• (by Sanjeewa Liyanage)
• Photo gallery
• "Lingering legacy of Korean massacre", BBC News, 18 May 2005.
• "May 18 Documents - U.S. Embassy & Consulate in the Republic of Korea"
• "United States Government Statement on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980" 25 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine, 19 June 1989
•  – official website for the 2007 movie about the Gwangju Uprising
• "Ex-Leaders Go On Trial In Seoul" – A 27 February 1996 review of the Cherokee Files (contemporaneous with ex-presidents Chun and Roh's trials)
• Bibliography of Kwangju Uprising in English
• Facebook memorial page (in Korean)

•  South Korea portal
•  Society portal