Gelaohui

The Gelaohui, usually translated as the Elder Brothers Society,^[2] was a secret society and underground resistance movement against the Qing Dynasty. Although it was not associated with Sun Yat-sen's Tongmenghui, they both participated in the Xinhai Revolution. It was also known as Futaubang, or Hatchet Gang,^[3] as every member allegedly carried a small hatchet inside the sleeve.

Elder Brothers Society

Formation	Qianlong period (one theory)^[1]
Founded at	Sichuan
Dissolved	after 1949
Type	Secret society
Chinese name
Traditional Chinese	哥老會
Simplified Chinese	哥老会
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin Gēlǎohuì Wade–Giles Ko^1-lao^3-hui^4

Li Hanzhang (李瀚章), the governor of Hunan in the Qing Dynasty, stated in the memorial that the Gelaohui "originated in Sichuan and Guizhou for a long time",^[4] the society engaged in several uprisings across China, notably in Hunan province during 1870 and 1871. Numerous individuals notable in late-19th and early-20th Chinese history (including Zhu De, Wu Yuzhang, Liu Zhidan and He Long) were Gelaohui members.^[5]

Strongly xenophobic and anti-Manchu Qing, the Gelaohui were active in the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, as well as taking part in attacks on Catholic missions and converts in 1912.^[6][7][8]

Originally quite willing to take on other "oppressed" Chinese minorities, several Chinese Muslim Gelaohui members participated in the Ningxia Revolution,^[9] and there was a substantial number of Muslim Gelaohui in Shaanxi.^[10]

During the Xinhai Revolution of Xinjiang, there were fightings related to the Elder Brothers Society.^[11]

Origins

The question of the origins of the Gelaohui is a mystery that has long plagued historical researchers.^[12] The exact date of its establishment is still unknown.

Same origin with Tiandihui

It's believed that the Gelaohui had the same origin with Tiandihui, that railed against the Manchu Qing Dynasty,^[13] founded by Zheng Chenggong during the Kangxi period of the Qing Dynasty to "Oppose the Qing dynasty and restore the Ming dynasty" (反清复明). This has long been the most popular theory in Chinese historiography. This theory originated from the revolutionaries represented by Tao Chengzhang and others during the 1911 Revolution.^[14]

Qianlong period

It's believed that the Gelaohui can be traced back to the reign of Qianlong period, while its actual formation took place during the Jiaqing period and Daoguang period. Sichuan's Yansi (咽嗜) and Qianhui (钱会) can be regarded as the predecessors of the Gelaohui. The development of the organization from Sichuan to Huguang was basically realized simultaneously with the influx of Sichuan salt.^[15]

The Japanese Shū Hirayama (平山周) clearly affirmed that the Gelaohui was established during the Qianlong period. As a friend of Sun Yat-sen and a sympathizer of the Chinese Revolution, he visited the society many times to investigate the inner workings and wrote the book The Chinese Revolutionary Party and the secret societies, which was published in 1911.^[16]

Same as the Guoluhui

It's believed that the Gelaohui is the same as the Guoluhui (啯噜会), because "Gelao" is a phonetic transcription of the word "Guolu".^[17]

Outgrowth of the integration and development of Tiandihui and Bailianjiao

Some scholars in Japan and the United States believe that the Gelaohui was the outgrowth of the integration and development of Tiandihui and Bailianjiao in the late Qing Dynasty, but the Gelaohui did not have the same origin with the Tiandihui.^[18]

Developed from the Jianghuhui

It is believed that the Gelaohui was developed from the Jianghuhui (江湖会), which in turn came from the Renyihui (仁义会) and the Tiandihui.^[19]

Xiang Army

One view is that it is more likely it began as an offshoot or alternative name of the so-called "Brotherhood Clique" within the Xiang Army.^[13] It is believed that some 30% of the Xiang Army may have been Gelaohui members, and after the disbandment of the army in the aftermath of the Taiping Rebellion it spread along the Yangtze to become a Triad order. The Geolaohui became increasingly associated with the revolutionaries of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Tongmenhui during the early 1900s, participating in the Xinhai Revolution against the Qing, and infiltrating the army and education system.

Originating from the Guoluhui in Sichuan

It is believed that the Gelaohui originated from the Guoluhui in Sichuan in the early Qianlong period. In the Jiaqing period and Daoguang period, due to the northward movement of the Tiandihui forces, it merged with the forces of Bailianjiao and Guolu Party (啯噜党) in Chuan Chu(川楚) area. And they infiltrated and integrated with each other to form the name of the Gaolaohui. During the reign of the Tongzhi period and Guangxu period, with the demobilization of the Xiang Army and the rapid increase in the number of bankrupt laborers and unemployed vagrants, the Gelaohui flourished. It was not a mere reproduction or a variation of the name of the organizations of Guolu. Taking the Guolu as its embryo, the Gelaohui absorbed and merged some of the characteristics of the Tiandihui and the Bailianjiao, and was a rapid development of a vagrant organization in China under specific social conditions.^[20]

Anti-colonial movement

Three primary demographic factors combined in the 1860s to create the Gelaohui as a major sociopolitical force: (1) members from the Guolu, which had been a marginalized group in the 1840s, (2) members from the Hunan forces fighting the Taiping rebellion, and (3) members from the 1859-1865 major peasant uprising against the Qing empire led by Li Longhe and Lan Dashun.^[21]: 179

In the 1870s and 1880s, the Gelaohui began gradually accepting wealthy merchants and gentry into its membership.^[21]: 207 The 1880s and 1890s, new Gelaohui lodges tended to be led by men who were already respected community figures.^[22]: 208

Beginning as an anti-Manchu organization, by 1891 the Gelaohui had grown to encompass a wide variety of revolutionary aims. They were blamed for anti-foreign riots around the Yangtze delta, apparently in hope of provoking foreigners and damaging the Chinese government's international standing,^[13] and accused of infiltrating schools to foster anti-Western sentiment. After the German government took over Shandong many Chinese feared that the foreign missionaries and quite possibly all Christian activities were colonial attempts at "carving the melon", i.e., to divide and colonize China piece by piece.^[23] A Chinese official expressed the animosity towards foreigners succinctly, "Take away your missionaries and your opium and you will be welcome."^[24]

During and after the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, the Gelaohui participated in the massacre of Manchus in the Xi'an banner garrison in the northeast of the city and attacked the Manchu banner garrison in Ningxia. The Hui Muslims of Xi'an in Shaanxi sided with the Gelaohui in massacring and raping Manchus while the Hui Muslims of Gansu under general Ma Anliang and Ma Qi supported the status quo so Ma Anliang led an army of Hui to fight against the Hui and Han rebels in Shaanxi and Ma Qi helped relive the Ningxia garrison, but Ma Anliang and Ma Qi stood down and when Yuan Shikai forced the Qing dynasty to abdicate and swore allegiance to Yuan Shikai's government, supporting the new Republic of China.^[25] Ma Anliang, Changgeng and Shengyun failed to capture Shaanxi from the revolutionaries. In Ningxia, Qing forces were attacked by both Hui Muslim Gelaohui and Han Gelaohui members, while Hui general Ma Qi and Ma Yuanzhang were in the Qing forces fighting against them but Ma Yuanzhang defected to the republicans after Ma Anliang gave up on the Qing.^[26] Some Gansu Hui led by Ma Fuxiang joined the republicans. Gansu Hui general Ma Fuxiang did not participate with Ma Anliang in the battles with Shaanxi revolutionaries and refused to join the Qing Manchu Shengyun and Changgeng in their attempts to defend the Qing before the Qing abdication, instead the independence of Gansu from Qing control was jointly declared by non-Muslim gentry with Hui Muslim Ma Fuxiang.^[27] The Gelaohui called for Hui and Han of Xi'an to unite and kill Manchus.^[28]

Among the "tenets" of the Gelaohui was "hatred of the foreigner", from which "hatred of the Manchu" was derived, and it encouraged the killing of foreigners.^[29]

The Gelaohui hated foreigners and Christians. During the Xinhai Revolution in 1912, they attacked Catholic missions in Sandaohe, Ningxia, but the Chinese Muslim forces under Muslim General Ma Fuxiang protected the missions.^[6]

The Gelaohui and the Muslim warlord Ma Fuxiang came to an agreement in 1922, in which Ma Fuxiang agreed to allow the Gelaohui to extort protection money from wool merchants in Baotou.^[30]

The Muslim General Ma Lu (马禄) was a member of the Gelaohui. He fought against the Japanese in World War II along with Muslim General Ma Biao.

The Muslim General Ma Yuanlin (马元林) was a member of the Gelaohui.^[31]

The Hunan Army was extensively infiltrated by the anti Qing Gelaohui secret society, who started several mutinies during the Dungan Revolt (1862–1877), delaying crucial offensives. Zuo Zongtang put down the mutinies and executed those involved.^[32] Hubei Gelaohui soldiers mutinied in Suide in Zuo Zongtang's army in 1867.^[33] The Han Gelaohui had infiltrated the Qing military in Xinjiang during the Dungan revolt (1895–1896) and allegedly planned to help the Hui rebels before the Hui rebels were crushed.^[34]

Despite being staunchly against the production and sale of opium by foreign powers during the later Qing Dynasty, members of the Gelaohui became involved in domestic opium harvesting. A successor to Gelaohui in Sichuan, named the Gown Brotherhood (袍哥会) permeated all forms of local government in Songpan County until the Second Sino-Japanese War. Despite campaigns stemming from Chengdu to decrease opium production and consumption, mountainous regions in rural Sichuan which relied on trade used opium production to offset increased land taxation from the Nationalist government, of which Gown Brothers acted as security and distribution networks.^[35] Xi'an Hui Muslims managed tea shops in Songpan County, Sichuan.^[36] The Gelaohui in Sichuan attacked western Christian missionaries and promoted the growing and trafficking of opium against the Qing government which tried to crack down on opium.^{[37][38][21][39][40][22][41][42][43][44][45]} The Gelaohui was present in the Sichuan Hubei border and the Fuguhui group which promoted traditional Han hairstyle and clothes against modern western influence was present there as well.^[46]

Many Hui smoked opium in Yunnan in addition to dealing in it, despise denials by some Hui that they did not smoke it since it was against Islam.^[47] Opium is still produced in ethnic minority regions of Yunnan and other regions.^{[48][49][50][51][52][53][54][55][56][57][58]}

A year before the massacre of Manchus in October 1911, an oath against Manchus was sworn at the Great Goose Pagoda in Xi'an by the Gelaohui in 1911.^[59][60] Manchu banner garrisons were slaughtered in Nanjing, Zhenjiang, Taiyuan, Xi'an and Wuchang^{[61][62][63][64][65]} The Manchu quarter was located in the north eastern part of Xi'an and walled off while the Hui Muslim quarter was located in the northwestern part of Xi'an but did not have walls separating it from the Han parts. Southern Xi'an was entirely Han.^{[66][67][68][69]} Xi'an had the biggest Manchu banner garrison quarter by area before its destruction.^[70]

The revolutionaries were led by students of the military academy who overcame the guards at the gates of Xi'an and shut them, secured the arsenal and slaughtering all Manchus at their temple and then storming and slaughtering the Manchus in the Manchu banner quarter of the city. The Manchu quarter was set on fire and many Manchus were burned alive. Manchu men, women and girls were slaughtered for three days and then after that, only Manchu women and girls were spared while Manchu men and boys continued to be slaughtered. Many Manchus committed suicide by overdosing on opium and throwing themselves into wells. The revolutionaries were helped by the fact that Manchus stored gunpowder in their houses so they exploded when set on fire, killing the Manchus inside. 10,000 to 20,000 Manchus were slaughtered.^[71] The revolutionaries wore white badges to distinguish themselves when distributing guns at the captured arsenal. The Han Chinese revolutionaries suffered very few injuries or casualties while the Manchus were slaughtered since the Manchus were armed with inferior weapons while the revolutionaries had modern rifles from the arsenal. There were 5,000 Manchu adult men of fighting ability and they could do little as they were slaughtered. The revolutionaries killed all Manchu men, women and children untl Wednesday and after they continued killing all Manchu men while sparing only Manchu females.^[72]

The Gelaohui revolutionaries were known for being anti-foreign and anti-Manchu and Protestant missionaries said they distributed tracts against foreign missionaries and attacked some Protestant missions during the 1911 revolution with some missionaries getting killed but were reigned in by their superiors and told to only attack Manchus. The Gelaohui then attacked the 20,000 Manchus in the Manchu quarter of the city and slaughtered the majority of them (15,000), expelling the rest. The Manchu governor Sheng Yun flew into a rage as he escaped to Gansu and ordered Gansu Hui Muslim general Ma Anliang to lead Muslim Hui soldiers from Gansu to destroy and sack Xi'an in retaliation for the massacre of the Manchu quarter, but a messenger carried the message to Sheng Yun that the Qing court capitulated in Beijing with Yuan Shikai's agreement and Sheng Yun fell into a rage and reviled Yuan Shikai. Someone shot a letter attached to an arrows into Ma Anliang's camp notifying him of the Qing abdication, so Ma Anliang stopped the attack before it reached Xi'an and withdrew his soldiers to Xi'an was not sacked.^[73]

The Qing Manchu Gansu and Shaanxi Governor-general and Qing dynasty gave the title of Xian and Gansu chief general to Ma Anliang when it begged him to destroy the Shaanxi republicans from his Gansu base. The Shaanxi revolutionary commander was Zhang Yunshan. The two sides clashed in January 1912 at Qianzhou (Qian County) but neither side was winning the battle. A Hui Muslim revolutionary was appointed as governor of Shaanxi, Ma Yugui and he urged Ma Anliang to give up and not fight for the Qing by telling him and his soldiers "A Hui does not kill a Hui", appealing to religion. When the Qing Gansu Hui soldiers wearing their Hui white caps asked their Shaanxi opponents to defect, the Shaanxi Hui revolutionary governor Ma Yugui told them that further fighting between them would cause both of them to suffer and both Han and Hui and Allah would be saddened so they should give up and abandon the Qing. Ma Anliang was also approached and asked to defect from the Qing by the Hui Beijing Imam Wang Kuan who was summonsed by the revolutionaries. He told him "not to fall into the trap of some wicked man" (the Manchu governor general) and "not to elect one name and neglect the needs of millions" (referring to the Qing royal family as one name). Yuan Shikai, who became president after the Republic of China accepted the Qing court's abdication, sent the Shaanxi revolutionaries Henan reinforcements to press Ma Anliang into giving up. Ma Anliang in Gansu finally received news of the Qing abdication in Beijing and decided to stop the frozen battle neither side was winning, and joined the revolutionaries, ending the Qing cause in Gansu. Ma Anliang and Zhang Yunshan then met in March.^[74]

After October 1911, the Shaanxi revolutionaries were in a series of stalemates against the Gansu Qing loyalist army made out of Muslims under Ma Anliang and Manchu governor general Shengyun's command. Both sides suffered heavy casualties but Lichuan (Li-chuan) and Qianzhou (Chien-chou) fell to the Gansu army. The Qing emperor abdicated when Xianyang (Shien-yang) was about to be attacked by the Gansu army. The Manchu governor general Shengyun tried who wanted to keep fighting after the Qing abdication tried to hide the abdication, but Ma Anliang received news of it sent to him by Zhang Fengyi (Chang Feng-yi) via telegram. Shengyun was sarcastically asked by Ma Anliang, "Now that the emperor has abdicated, for whom shall we fight? Do you intend to succeed the emperor?^[75]

Ma Anliang fought in 1895 to relieve Xining with four ying of troops and served in the Gansu army under Dong Fuxiang. The Qing governor generals Changgeng (Chang-keng) and Shengyun had close relations with the Gansu army officers under Dong Fuxiang. The Qing ordered the Gansu-based Ma Anliang to fight against the revolutionaries in Shaanxi and the revolutionaries attacked Ningxia in Gansu and Ma Anliang recovered it, but that was the last victory for the loyalist side as the Qing abdicated and Shaanxi was not taken by the Gansu forces.^[76]

Ma Anliang was ordered to attack the revolutionaries in Shaanxi by the baoyi bondservant Chang Geng and Manchu Shengyun.^[77][78]

Eastern soldiers of the new republic were mobilized by Yuan Shikai when the attack against Shaanxi began by Ma Anliang, but news of the abdication of the Qing emperor reached Ma Anliang before he attacked Xi'an, so Ma Anliang ended all military operations and changed his allegiance to the Republic of China. All pro-Qing military activity in the northwest was put to an end by this.^[79]

Yuan Shikai managed to induce Ma Anliang to not attack Shaanxi after the Gelaohui took over the province and accept the Republic of China under his presidency in 1912. During the National Protection war in 1916 between republicans and Yuan Shikai's monarchy, Ma Anliang readied his soldiers and informed the republicans that he and the Muslims would stick to Yuan Shikai until the end.^[80] Yuan Shikai ordered Ma Anliang to block Bai Lang (White Wolf) from going into Sichuan and Gansu by blocking Hanzhong and Fengxiangfu.^[81]

The Protestant Shensi mission operated a hospital in Xian.^[82] Some American missionaries were reported killed in Xi'an.^[83] A report claimed Manchus massacred missionaries in the suburbs of Xi'an.^[84] Missionaries were reported killed in Xi'an and Taiyuan.^[85] Shaanxi joined the revolution on October 24.^[86] Sheng Yun was governor of Shaanxi in 1905.^{[87][88][89][90]}

1930s: years of decline

The Gelaohui continued to exist as a broad and loosely affiliated group of hundreds of thousands well into the 1930s, though its influence was severely curtailed by the end of the Warlord Era, Chiang Kai-shek's rise to power and the ravagement of the country during the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. Nevertheless, the society's influence remained substantial until the Communists seized power in 1949; in 1936, for example, Mao Zedong wrote an open letter to the Gelaohui declaring them legal under the Chinese Soviet government and asking for their assistance. Starting in 1949, however, the society was repressed and is believed to be defunct.

Organization

The Gelaohui was known for rewarding loyalty and dedication with advancement through its ranks which, according to academic Mark W. Driscoll, was the opposite of most members' prior socioeconomic experience: "relentless movement down and out."^{[21]: 176–177}

Guan Di was the tutelary divinity of the Gelaohui.^[21]: 177

A text called The Ocean Depths was the manual for starting a new Gelaohui lodge.^[21]: 175

Ranks

The top leader in a Gelaohui lodge was called the ship's captain or dragon head.^[21]: 177 This figure was to model himself after Liu Bei.^[21]: 177

The first rank of a lodge was composed of (typically four) men called the first uncles.^[21]: 177 They shared power with the lodge's top leader.^[21]: 177

The third rank was "manager" or "keeper of the lodge" and its role model was Zhang Fei.^{[21]: 177–178}

The fourth rank was vacant for cultural reasons.^{[21]: 176–178}

The fifth rank was the fifth uncle, whose role model was Shan Xiongxin.^[21]: 178

The six rank was "the carrier of the black flag" which gathered intelligence and evaluated the backgrounds of new members.^[21]: 178

The seventh rank was vacant for cultural reasons.^{[21]: 176–178}

The eighth rank was "the holder of the spirit flag," awarded to "the champion of the common people and the destroyer of tyrants."^[21]: 178

The ninth rank was the "ninth river," which acclimated new members to the group.^[21]: 178

The tenth rank was the "final tenth" or "tail of the phoenix," which provided instruction on security responsibilities as was to be available at all times in case of emergency.^[21]: 178

See also

• Tongmenghui
• Revive China Society
• Kuomintang
• History of the Republic of China
• Huaxinghui

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43. XIANG, HONGYAN (June 2013). "CATHOLICISM AND THE GELAOHUI IN LATE QING CHINA" (PDF). New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies. 15 (1): 93–113.
44. Williams, Devon O’Neal (August 2013). VIOLENCE UPON SEIZING THE RAILROAD: QINGP OLICY IN CREATING THE SICHUAN RAILWAY MOVEMENT (PDF) (A thesis submitted to the faculty of The University of Utah in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts). Department of History The University of Utah.
45. PIANCIOLA, N. (2020). "Illegal Markets and the Formation of a Central Asian Borderland: The Turkestan–Xinjiang opium trade (1881–1917)". Modern Asian Studies. 54 (6): 1828–1875. doi:10.1017/S0026749X18000227. S2CID 214365484.
46. Cheng, Weikun (1998). "6 politics of the queue: agitation and resistance in the beginning and end of qing china". In Hiltebeitel, Alf; Miller, Barbara D. (eds.). Hair: Its Power and Meaning in Asian Cultures. G – Reference,Information and Interdisciplinary Subjects Series. Gananath Obeyesekere (illustrated ed.). SUNY Press. p. 137. ISBN 0-7914-3741-8. A second incident included the Society for Restoring Ancient Ways ( Fuguhui ) in the border area of Hubei and Sichuan Provinces , where the Elder – Brother Society and the White Lotus sect were active . When local officials ordered ...
47. Kang, Xiaofei; Sutton, Donald S. (2016). Contesting the Yellow Dragon: Ethnicity, Religion, and the State in the Sino-Tibetan Borderland, 1379–2009. Religion in Chinese Societies. BRILL. p. 159. ISBN 978-9004319233. Although Hui elders we spoke to declared that opium smoking and growing were forbidden by their religion, ... wrote at length of the difficulties of governing a vast area of mixed Han and indigenes, who were equally proud and obstinate.
48. Oakes, Tim; Schein, Louisa, eds. (2006). Translocal China: Linkages, Identities and the Reimagining of Space. Routledge Studies on China in Transition (illustrated ed.). Routledge. ISBN 1-134-22404-4. I am very grateful to Feng Yi for helping me edit this chapter. ... Hou Hongrui is from the ... in mountainous areas used to plant opium, and some elderly villagers, especially when they got sick, smoked opium without getting addicted.
49. Marshall, Jonathan (1976). "Opium and the Politics of Gangsterism in Nationalist China, 1927–1945". Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. 8 (3): 19–48. doi:10.1080/14672715.1976.10404414.
50. Zhou, Yongming (1976). "Suppressing Opium and "Reforming" Minorities: Antidrug Campaigns in Ethnic Communities in the Early People's Republic of China". In Steinberg, Michael K; Hobbs, Joseph J; Mathewson, Kent (eds.). Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes. Oxford Academic. doi:10.1093/oso/9780195143201.003.0017. ISBN 978-0-19-514320-1.
51. OLIVOVA, LUCIE (2005). "Tobacco Smoking in Qing China". Asia Major. 18 (1): 225–60. JSTOR 41649901.
52. Bello, David A. (2001). "The Chinese Roots of Inner Asian Poppy". Drogue et Politique. 32: 39–68. doi:10.3406/cemot.2001.1598.
53. Bail, Hélène Le; Tournier, Abel (March 2010). "From Kunming to Mandalay: The New "Burma Road"" (PDF). Asie Visions. 24.
54. Baumler, Alan (2000). "Twelve : Opium Control versus Opium Suppression: The Origins of the 1935 Six-Year Plan to Eliminate Opium and Drugs". In Brook, Timothy; Carr, Patrick; Kefalas, Maria (eds.). Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952. Oakland, CA. pp. 270–291. doi:10.1525/california/9780520220096.003.0053.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
55. Baumler, Alan (2000). "Five : Opium in Xinjiang and Beyond". In Brook, Timothy; Carr, Patrick; Kefalas, Maria (eds.). Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952. Oakland, CA. pp. 127–151. doi:10.1525/california/9780520220096.003.0053.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
56. Li, Phoebe (2019). "Social Support and Discrimination: The Experiences of Recovering Heroin Addicts in Kunming, China". Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection. 3176.
57. Li, Cheng (October 2012). "The Political Mapping of China's Tobacco Industry and Anti-Smoking Campaign" (PDF). John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series. 5.
58. Bello, David Anthony (2005). "The Opium Problem in Southwestern China". Opium and the Limits of Empire. Brill. pp. 222–285. doi:10.1163/9781684174058_007. ISBN 978-1-68417-405-8.
59. Esherick, Joseph W. (2022). Accidental Holy Land: The Communist Revolution in Northwest China (illustrated ed.). Univ of California Press. pp. 29, 197. doi:10.1525/luminos.117. ISBN 978-0-520-38532-0. S2CID 244639814.
60. Esherick, Joseph W. (2022). Accidental Holy Land: The Communist Revolution in Northwest China (illustrated ed.). /: Univ of California Press. p. 197. doi:10.1525/luminos.117. ISBN 978-0-520-38532-0. S2CID 244639814.
61. Rhoads, Edward J. M. (2017). Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928. Studies on Ethnic Groups in China. University of Washington Press. p. 204. ISBN 978-0-295-99748-3.
62. Li, Xue (2018). Making Local China: A Case Study of Yangzhou, 1853–1928. Vol. 56 of Berliner China-Studienlocation=. LIT Verlag Münster. p. 237. ISBN 978-3-643-90894-0.
63. Shan, Patrick Fuliang (2018). Yuan Shikai: A Reappraisal. Contemporary Chinese Studies. UBC Press. p. 151. ISBN 978-0-7748-3781-1.
64. Witchard, Anne (2012). Lao She in London. RAS China in Shanghai series of China Monographs. Vol. 1 of RAS China in Shanghai (illustrated ed.). Hong Kong University Press. p. 18. ISBN 978-9888139606.
65. Harper, Tim (2021). Underground Asia: Global Revolutionaries and the Assault on Empire. Harvard University Press. p. 141. ISBN 978-0-674-72461-7.
66. China's Millions, Issues 79-90. Morgan and Scott. 1882. p. 113.
67. Broomhall, Marshall (1907). The Chinese Empire: A General and Missionary Survey, Volumes 678-679. The Chinese Empire: A General and Missionary Survey, Marshall Broomhall. Morgan at Scott. p. 201.
68. The Chinese Empire. p. 201.
69. China's Millions, Volume 28. China Inland Mission. 1902. p. 18.
70. Schinz, Alfred (1996). The Magic Square: Cities in Ancient China (illustrated ed.). Edition Axel Menges. p. 354. ISBN 3-930698-02-1.
71. Borst-Smith, Ernest F. (Ernest Frank), 1882- (1912). Caught in the Chinese revolution : a record of risks and rescue. London: T. Fisher Unwin. pp. 19, 20, 21. they must strike while they had the chance of doing so with success. Moreover, on that day a partial eclipse of the sun took place, and according to immemorial custom, all officials — civil and military, great and small, Manchu and Chinese — were expected to go to their respective temples to worship. They were thus away from the shelter of their residences, which were, accordingly, less strongly guarded. Man and mansion, being separated, were both more easily attacked. The movement was led by the pupils of the large Military Academy, and its method was as follows : Some of the soldiers were told off to overcome the guard and shut the heavy gates of the city ; the main body bombarded and secured the arsenal ; the General (all Generals were Manchus) was slaughtered on the very steps of the Temple ; and the attack on the inner city, which was occupied exclusively by the Manchus (the Tartars of "Robinson Crusoe"), was begun, the troops quartered outside the west suburb immediately joining the Revolutionary forces, in accordance with what was, doubtless, a pre-arranged plot. For many hours the Manchu troops offered effective resistance, but the odds against them were too great, for both their weapons and their methods were utterly obsolete. Then followed what must fill every civilised person with pain and disgust — viz., the virtual extermination of the Manchus. The fact that they lived in a city of their own afforded the opportunity, for escape was thus rendered impossible. Their city was set on fire, and multitudes of people were burned alive. For three whole days a deadly slaughter went on, men, women, and children being slain without mercy or discrimination. Even after that only women and girls were spared. No justification is here attempted of this ruthless massacre, nor can any be found. If the story of this slaughter goes down to history as one of its just retributions, that fact cannot excuse so much barbarity, still less the destruction of the lives of helpless women and children. Yet it cannot be forgotten that the Manchu rule of the past three centuries has been little else than a story of oppression. The entire Manchu population has been like a millstone about the neck of the Chinese nation. For they have been supported — and liberally supported — by the Government, and only military service from the men exacted in return. Living lives of comparative idleness, they have become thoroughly degenerate, the large majority being opium smokers. It is impossible to give the exact number of those killed, since it is impossible to know just how many did contrive to escape. The lowest possible estimate of the slain is 10,000, although a Pekin correspondent of the Times puts the figure as high as 20,000. Of this great number I have since heard it stated that many committed suicide by such methods as taking overdoses of opium, casting themselves into wells, and hanging, choosing this in prefer- ence to death at the hands of their enemies. Another thing which helped the assailants was the fact that many Manchus had supplies of gunpowder concealed in their houses, so that when the Manchu quarters were fired these exploded, causing innumerable deaths. Since so many perished, it is altogether remarkable to be able to relate that not one Christian or associate was harmed. The same gates and walls that made the escape of thousands of others impossible, kept them from danger. For hostilities began during the time of Sunday morning service, so that all those who had gone to the Christian church in the east suburb were away from the scene of bloodshed.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
72. Wallace, Harold Frank (1913). The big game of central and western China : being an account of a journey from Shanghai to London overland across the Gobi desert (PDF). London: J. Murray. pp. 46, 47, 48. Our hosts were most courteous, and though we could not speak directly to them, we thoroughly- enjoyed ourselves. Four days' march to the south of Sian lies the small mountain village of Ling-tai-miao, which we intended to make our headquarters. We left the city by the western gate, which was opened at dawn. Even in the provincial capital antiquated stands of arms, spears, billhooks, and other strange instruments are still placed by the guard-house for the defence of the gates. Little did we think as we rode out that morning past the Governor's yamen, what terrible scenes were to be enacted there so shortly. On Sunday, October 22nd, the revolution burst on the inhabitants. The city gates were closed at noon, and fighting commenced at once with the capture of the arsenal. The slaughter of the Manchus followed immediately. Foreigners in the suburbs could get no certain news of what was happening. They did not even know whether the outbreak was anti- dynastic, anti-foreign, or anti- Christian. Their danger was much accentu- ated by their ignorance, for had the policy of the revolutionists been known unnecessary troubles might have been averted. Firing continued all that day and night. A Mrs. Beckman, Mr. Watney, and six Swedish children were murdered by the mob in the south suburb ; but these, so far as I know, were the only foreigners who were killed in Shensi. Mr. Henne, as I have already mentioned, had a very narrow escape, but happily recovered. For three weeks previous to the outbreak the Manchu governor of the province was in a state of great anxiety, and did not sleep at all. lie hid the keys of the city gates, and at the outbreak of the troubles escaped, but was traced to a place called Ts'ao-t'an, where he was beheaded. The Manchu commander of the troops was spared owing to the regard in which he was held by his men. There were 3,000 trained troops at Sian-fu at the time of the outbreak, and the city was for some weeks completely isolated. The mountain passes were held by troops, and all communication stopped. On the Sunday of the outbreak — " The trouble broke out about 12 o'clock. The soldiers first took the arsenal, and served out arms and ammunition to every one who was willing to join them, the badge being white. Unfortunately, this was not sufficiently distinctive, for numbers of bad characters put a badge on, got arms, and used them only to rob and loot. The attack on the Manchu city began soon after, and continued until Wednesday morning, the object being to totally exterminate the JManchus — man, woman, and child. After Wednesday they ceased kiUing the women and girls, but continued to seek out the males. The position of the JManchus was hopeless from the first, for their quarter was not enclosed by a wall, and tliough every man is a soldier, they are soldiers of the old type, with very inferior weapons, so, although there were 5,000 Manchu men, they could do very little. Tiie Chinese fired their houses, and then killed all they could while they were escaping. Many climbed up the city wall, and dropped down on the other side, some to be maimed or killed by the fall, others to be killed subsequently, and some perhaps escaping. 1 have heard that a great many of the Manchus, especially the women, took their own lives. "At a low estimate probably 10,000 have been killed. The Chinese have received comparatively few injuries, which is not surprising in view of their superior weapons. There are many Manchus in hiding, and we know of the safety of all Manchu Christians."
73. John Harvey Kellogg, International Health and Temperance Association (1913). The Medical Missionary. International Health and Temperance Association. p. 17. Hsi An Fu This is in Shensi and is where the late Empress Dowager took refuge in 1900. While in Hankow at the C. I. M., Mr. and Mrs. Shorrock and Miss Mary ar-rived from there, and we "bailed them out" incessantly on the dramatic doings there. So many wondered why foreign-ers were killed only there, and why so few in the late uprising. In 1891 there was a fierce dreadful society called the "Ko Lao Hui." They had a double slo-gan, "Down with the Manchus and ex-terminate every foreigners!" They stir-red up riots all through the Yang Zu Valley, circulated vile stories about for-eigners, and vile publications, and wrote our word for Lord with the pig radical. That society is still strong in Shensi. Hearing of the hostilities at the South, they at once bore a hand and attacked the family of the Beckmans (Swedish). They killed the mothers, four girls and two boys, part of them pupils in Mrs. Beckman's school, from several different families, and a young Swedish gentle-man, a teacher. Only the father and baby escaped. At once this society was reined up. "You have exceeded orders! We are only aiming at Manchus this time :" so they desisted. These were killed Oct. 22, 1911. In Jan., 1912, a valiant rescue party of about nine young foreign men, including college profess-ors, business men and one missionary's son, made a difficult forty days' trip round through the distant stations of Shensi, to rescue all the missionaries and escort them to Pekin. Dr. Robertson, Dr. Young, English ; Mrs. Young, M. D., American, and the Shorrocks, Scotch, insisted on staying at their posts, though this course was strongly disap-proved of. The Chinese Red Cross Society The Chinese Red Cross Society came to the doctors and said, "May we do this work under your direction and we pay the bills?" Extra buildings were hired and soon 600 wounded soldiers were being cared for. These three doc-tors had not a single "qualified" assist-ant! The hearts of the bitter Ko Lao Hui soldiers were now won, and the Chinese overflowed with gratitude. There were about 20,000 Manchus there at the start. It was a great Manchu center, with many fine palaces, rich with great chests of treasures. Early in November came the awful massacre of 15,000 Man-chus. Two thousand escaped and 3,000 unhappy survivors remain. The Man-chus had no use for the missionaries, but discovered, in their time of need, where to look for their best friends, Mrs. Shorrock provided about 300 needy Manchu ladies with good, long, warm winter dresses. A Dramatic Incident One of the leading figures in this chapter of history was Sheng Yun, a Manchu, once governor of Shensi, later military commandant of two provinces. His palace was destroyed. Mr. Shor-rock walked through the ruins, and said all that was left of his treasures was the scattered lists of the former contents of the great chests which had been looted. He must have done some good in his career, for they took his family to a safe place, put a guard over them and later returned them to him in safety. Sheng Yung decided to take Mo-hammedan troops, arch on Hsi-An-fu and avenge the Manchus, by the most condign and dreadful punishment, lit-erally wiping out the city. He advanced to within fifteen miles of the doomed place. His guns could be heard by the waiting and terrified inhabitants. At that point Yuan Shih Ka, at Peking had made peace and stopped fighting, but Sheng Yun knew nothing of it. Here was Mr. Shorrock's opportunity. He offered to send the news to the furious man. The revolutionaries were only too glad. He sent an English letter, a Chin-ese translation and the dispatches which proved the authenticity of the news. Sheng Yun raged. He reviled Yuan for going over to the Chinese, and giving up the Manchu cause. He fell upon the courier and had him cut to pieces! People wished they could get word to the General of the Mohammedan troops. There were employments more popular than the courier service at that juncture! Somebody bound letter and translation and dispatches on to an arrow and shot it into the General's camp. He read, reflected and did not march on Hsi-An-Fu! The revolutionary leaders are said to be much ashamed of the Hsi-An-Fu massacre. One of them said, "Truly the affair was managed unrighteously," That may have referred to the fact that when the Manchus laid down their arms and knelt to surrender, the Chinese shot them kneeling! It seems to have been the one place where the nearly or quite lost their self-control. When the Shorrocks left, a few weeks since, for furlough, the Chinese paid their fair to Hankow, about a month's journey before the railways were built, and they were received enroute, with great distinction, by officials of rank, and feasted and sent on their way. So that door is open, too. Truly, "My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways."
74. Israeli, Raphael (2017). The Muslim Midwest in Modern China: The Tale of the Hui Communities in Gansu (Lanzhou, Linxia, and Lintan) and in Yunnan (Kunming and Dali). Wipf and Stock Publishers. pp. 71, 72. ISBN 978-1-5326-3752-0.
75. 中華學報. 中央文物供應社總經銷. 1978. p. 149. suffered great losses in the stalemated battles in the region.56 By mid-December, the Manchu Kansu Army overran Chien-chou and Li-chuan, and was heading for Shien-yang At this critical moment, the Manchu emperor had declared his abdication, but Shen Yun kept it secret from his army , and continued the attack on Shien – yang with full force . When advised of the abdication of the emperor , by a telegram from Chang Feng – yi , Ma An – liang asked Shen Yun : " Now that the emperor has abdicated , for whom shall we fight ? Do you intend to succeed the emperor ?
76. Chinese Republican Studies Newsletter, Volumes 1-7. Center for Asian Studies, University of Illinois. 1975. pp. 13, 15. took up arms on the monarchist side and participated in the nearly successful counter – offensive of the Kansu armies.13 Tung Fu – hsiang founded the Kansu Moslem military clique , His successors were his subordinates and their sons : gentry families from in and around Ho – chou where trade , seminaries , pilgrimage tombs and a cros8 section of different Moslem groups made it the natural institutional capital of the community as a whole . Thus Ma An – liang , the leading figure in Kansu from 1912 to his death in November 1919 , had led four ying to the relief of Sining in 1895 . In 1910 we find him promoted from the Barkul military command , perhaps the key cavalry posting in the empire , to that of Ninghsia . 14 During the revolution , Ma An – liang was ordered against the rebels in Kansu , but Ninghsia itself soon came under attack and its recovery was the last considerable military victory of the monarchy Under the last two imperial viceroys , Sheng – yun and Chang – keng , the Tung Fu – hsiang clique enjoyed good relations with the authorities , particularly with Sheng – yun who reemerged during the revolution to become its adviser and ... By combining the hereditary succession typical of a Sufi order with personal military power , Ma Anliang dominated Hezhou politics and thus Gansu Muslim politics . He allied himself with Qing officials such as Shengyun , with whom he ...
77. Lipman, Jonathan Neaman (1980). The Border World of Gansu, 1895–1935. Stanford University. p. 184. Sheng Yun , a Manchu , and Chang Geng , a life bondservant of the Qing house , agreed that an attack had to be undertaken swiftly , so Ma was ... Chang needed the Hui , and that meant trusting the loyalty of Ma Anliang and Ma Fuxiang .
78. National Review: Zhongguo Gong Lun Xi Bao, Volume 14. 1913. p. 251. ... will enter the Ministry of Commerce which will be A Peking telegram also states that Sheng Yun , the reorganized ... where is alleged to be coTsen Chun – hsuan . operating with General Ma An – liang in stirring up The " Peking Jih ...
79. Lipman, Jonathan N. (2011). Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China. Studies on Ethnic Groups in China. University of Washington Press. p. 170. ISBN 978-0-295-80055-4.
80. Teichman, Eric (1921). Travels of a Consular officer in North West China; with original maps of Shensi and Kansu and illus. by photographs. Cambridge, Univ. Press. p. 120 ,121 122. Ma An-liang, the famous leader of the Kansu Mahomedans, who thus found himself at the head of the province, together with Sheng Yiin, ex- Viceroy of the North West and one of the Manchu die-hards, despatched Moslem troops across the border into Shensi to fight the revolutionary forces of the Ko Lao Hui, but were eventually induced by the wise statesmanship of Yuan Shih-k'ai to withdraw them and accept the republic in name. Had Yuan Shih-k'ai not been at the head of affairs at that time, and had the Manchus been able to rally them- selves to the Mahomedans of the North West, the settlement of 19 1 2 might have been much delayed. The result of the Revolution was therefore to give the Mahomedans what they had failed to obtain by rebellion in the past, namely complete autonomy and control of the province under General Ma An-liang, who moved into Lanchou from his residence near Hochou. There was a republican Tutu at the same time, but he seems to have been a mere figure-head. General Ma's management of the affairs of the province during those critical times appears to have been admirable, and Kansu was spared many of the troubles which were afflicting the rest of China during that period. Early in 1914, however, Yuan Shih-k'ai, who was then engaged in centralising his power by replacing the republican Tutus by his own nominees, sent one of his Northern Generals to Lanchou as Governor, accompanied by a bodyguard of a couple of thousand good Northern soldiers. To avoid friction the latter travelled up to Kansu as Commissioner for the Kokonor, his appointment as Governor only being announced by telegraph when he was within a few days of the capital. For some months there was a period of great tension between the Mahomedans and the new Governor, but the latter was a true Northern soldier, strong and reliable, and the Mahomedans, under wise leadership, eventually accepted the situation, and General Ma retired again to Hochou. With the disappearance of the White Wolf rebels and the surrender of the nominal government by the Mahomedans to Yuan Shih-k'ai's Governor, peace returned to the province. During the anti-monarchical rebellion of 19 16 there was a renewal of unrest, especially after Shensi had joined the rebels, and influence was brought to bear on the Governor from various quarters, urging him to resign or secede from Peking. But a declaration of independence was success- fully staved off until Yuan Shih-k'ai's death relieved the situation, perhaps largely owing to the attitude of Ma An-liang, who prepared his troops for action, and let the republicans know that if anyone was to succeed the Governor it would be himself, and that he and his Mahomedans would stick by Yuan to the last.
81. The National Review, China: Literary and educational supplement, Volume 15. National Review. 1914. p. 482. General Ma An – liang to take his Muhammadan requesting that the disbandment be postponed troops to Fenghsiangfu and ... also that all latter reached Sianfu by forced marches from asking for information regarding the statements local ...
82. Keyte, J. C. (1924). Andrew Young of Shensi :Adventure in Medical Missions (PDF). London: The Carey Press. p. vi.
83. Thomson, John Stuart (1913). China Revolutionized. Bobbs-Merrill Company. p. 64.
84. Thomson, John Stuart (1913). China Revolutionized. Bobbs-Merrill Company. p. 46.
85. Thomson, John Stuart (1913). China Revolutionized. Bobbs-Merrill Company. p. 53.
86. Thomson, John Stuart (1913). China Revolutionized. Bobbs-Merrill Company. p. 37. On October 24th , ancient Singan , the capital of the northwestern province of Shensi , the original capital of China , where the empress dowager , Tse Hsi
87. Japan Weekly Mail. 1905. p. 206. That degradation of H. E. Sheng Yun , Governor of Shensi , A Peking correspondent , writing about the recent was delayed some three hours . A telegram was received on Feb. 18th in Japanese adventurers should be serving with to ihe post ...
88. Lipman, Jonathan N. (2011). Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China. Studies on Ethnic Groups in China. University of Washington Press. p. 263. ISBN 978-0-295-80055-4.
89. Thomson, John Stuart (1913). China Revolutionized. Bobbs-Merrill Company.
90. Thomson, John Stuart (1913). China Revolutionized. Bobbs-Merrill Company. p. 449.