History of the Afghan Armed Forces (2002–2021)

After the formation of the Karzai administration in late 2001, the Afghan Armed Forces were gradually reestablished by the United States and its allies.

Soldiers of the Afghan National Army, including members of its Commando Corps standing in the front.

Initially, a new land force, the Afghan National Army (ANA), was created, whose planned size grew from 70,000 in 2002 to, eventually, a target of 194,000 set in mid-2011.^[1][2] The army's air arm, the Afghan National Army Air Corps was renamed the Afghan Air Force (AAF) in 2010.^[3][4] Commandos and Special Forces were also trained as part of the army. The army was supervised by the Afghan Ministry of Defence. Training was managed initially by the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (2002–05);^[5] followed by the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (2005–06); and then Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (2006); then integrated into the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (2009), finally succeeded by the Resolute Support Mission from 2014.^[6] Sedra comments that the 'constant changes to the architecture of the reform process contributed to the 'institutional schizophrenia' that engulfed it.^[2] Constant turnover in the U.S. Army personnel supervising the programmes would not have helped.

By 2006, more than 60,000 former militiamen from around the country were disarmed. In 2007, it was reported that Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programmes had dismantled 274 paramilitary organizations, reintegrated over 62,000 militia members into civilian life, and recovered more than 84,000 weapons, including heavy weapons. But The New York Times also reported a rise in hoarded weapons and a growing Taliban threat, even in the north of the country.^[7] The Afghan National Development Strategy of 2008 explained that the aim of Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups programme was to ban all illegal armed groups in all provinces of the country. Approximately 2,000 such groups were identified; most of them surrendered to the Afghan government or joined the new armed forces.^{[citation needed]}

Army

 

Soldiers from the Afghan army patrolling a village in Khost Province in 2010

During the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan, on 1 December 2001, President Hamid Karzai issued a decree reestablishing a unified army, the Afghan National Army.^[6] The decree set a size target of 70,000 and laid out the planned army structure. There had been significant disagreement over the size of the army that was needed. A Ministry of Defense-issued paper said that at least 200,000 active troops were needed.^[8] The Afghan Ministry of Defence loudly objected to the smaller, volunteer, nature of the new army, a change from the previous usage of conscripts.^[9] Afghan factions jostled to either delay the development of the ANA, or acquire as much control over it as possible.^[10]

 

Afghan Commandos practice infiltration techniques, 1 April 2010 at Camp Morehead in the outer regions of Kabul.

In 2010, the army had limited fighting capacity.^[11] Even the best Afghan units lacked training, discipline and adequate reinforcements. In one new unit in Baghlan Province, soldiers had been found cowering in ditches rather than fighting.^[12] Some were suspected of collaborating with the Taliban.^[11] "They don't have the basics, so they lay down," said Capt. Michael Bell, who was one of a team of US and Hungarian mentors tasked with training Afghan soldiers. "I ran around for an hour trying to get them to shoot, getting fired on. I couldn't get them to shoot their weapons."^[11] In addition, 9 out of 10 soldiers in the Afghan National Army were illiterate.^[13]

The Afghan Army was plagued by inefficiency and endemic corruption.^[14] US training efforts were drastically slowed by the problems.^[15] US trainers reported missing vehicles, weapons and other military equipment, and outright theft of fuel.^[11] Death threats were leveled against US officers who tried to stop Afghan soldiers from stealing. Afghan soldiers often snipped the command wires of IEDs instead of marking them and waiting for US forces to come to detonate them. This allowed insurgents to return and reconnect them.^[11] US trainers frequently removed the cell phones of Afghan soldiers hours before a mission for fear that the operation would be compromised.^[16] American trainers often spent much time verifying that Afghan rosters were accurate — that they were not padded with "ghosts" being "paid" by Afghan commanders who stole the wages.^[17]

 

US Marines and Afghan National Army soldiers take cover in Marja on 13 February 2010 during their offensive to secure the city from the Taliban.

Desertion was a significant problem. One in every four combat soldiers quit the Afghan Army during the 12-month period ending in September 2009, according to data from the US Defense Department and the Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan.^[18]

 

An Afghan soldier surveying a valley during an anti-Taliban operation

The motto of the army was reported as “God, Country, Duty”^[19]

In early 2015, Philip Munch of the Afghanistan Analysts' Network wrote that "... the available evidence suggests that many senior ANSF members, in particular, use their positions to enrich themselves. Within the ANSF there are also strong external loyalties to factions who themselves compete for influence and access to resources. All this means that the ANSF may not work as they officially should. Rather it appears that the political economy of the ANSF prevents them from working like modern organisations – the very prerequisite of the Resolute Support Mission."^[20] Formal and informal income, Munch said, which can be generated through state positions, is rent-seeking – income without a corresponding investment of labour or capital. "Reportedly, ANA appointees also often maintain clients, so that patron-client networks, structured into competing factions, can be traced within the ANA down to the lowest levels. [...] There is evidence that Afghan officers and officials, especially in the higher echelons, appropriate large parts of the vast resource flows which are directed by international donors into the ANA."^[21]

Green-on-blue attacks

See also: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan § Green-on-blue attacks

"Green-on-blue" or "insider attacks," in which Afghan soldiers or police officers turned their weapons on American or European counterparts, became a major concern in 2010 and peaked in 2012—when they accounted for nearly 25% of ISAF casualties—before declining during 2013–2014 as international forces withdrew from the conflict. The scale of the insider attacks shocked CIA analysts, who could find no similar phenomenon during the Vietnam War, the Soviet–Afghan War, or any other counter-insurgency in modern history. The attacks accelerated during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan (which did not correlate with increased frequency of other kinds of militant activity in 2012) and a "copycat pattern" marked by an elevated risk of follow-up attacks within two days of the original incident was observed, but the underlying causes of this violence were debated. One theory—based on a 2011 study conducted by research psychologist Major Jeffrey T. Bordin, who interviewed Afghan and American troops regarding their perceptions of each other—posited that the insider attacks were the result of cultural incompatibility and resentment. However, a 2013 study by forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman, a former CIA officer and academic, based on the US military's "15–6" case files and other documentary evidence, found zero insider attacks during 2012 that escalated directly from a feud or cultural misunderstanding between two officers who worked together. While approximately 10% of the cases were linked to high-profile provocations such as the 2012 Afghanistan Quran burning protests and the Kandahar massacre, JWICS intercepts showed that 56% of inside attackers interacted with the Taliban before deciding to strike, and there was circumstantial evidence of Taliban contact in a further 19% of cases. According to Sageman, the attackers were not Taliban cadres sent to infiltrate the Afghan army, but rather defectors who were persuaded to kill their erstwhile allies on their way out; to the extent that they were motivated by grievances, these were collective affronts to "Afghans" or "Muslims" as such, not personal slights, and their retaliatory violence was often indiscriminate, following the profile of a mass shooter. To reduce "green-on-blue" violence, ISAF soldiers were reminded to "respect Islam" and "avoid arrogance," armed guards were deployed as "guardian angels" to watch over joint exercises, and counterintelligence surveillance of previously vetted Afghan troops was expanded, among other preventative measures.^[22]

Growth in size

 

Fourteen female ANA soldiers marching into their graduation ceremony at the Kabul Military Training Center

The U.S. original targets as of April 2002 were ambitious, aiming to have 12,000 trained men ready by April 2003.^[23] A few months later it became obvious that such target was never going to be met and the training schedule was revised down to 9,000 men ready by November 2003.

Among initial plans were 31 Kandaks, or battalions. At one point, 28 of 31 battalions were publicly declared as combat ready. Four regional corps headquarters were initially created, growing by 2019 to seven.

US policy called for boosting the army's size to 134,000 soldiers by October 2010. By May 2010 the Afghan Army had accomplished this interim goal and was on track to reach its ultimate number of 171,000 by 2011.^[24] Actual numbers (as opposed to planned numbers) were around 164,000 in May 2011.^[25] This increase in Afghan troops allowed the US to begin withdrawing its forces in July 2011.^[26][27]

Due to the strong Taliban insurgency and many other problems, the ANA steadily expanded. An increasing number of female soldiers joined. By early 2013, reports stated that there were 200,000 ANA troops. However, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) said in January 2013:^[28]

Determining ANSF strength is fraught with challenges. US and coalition forces rely on the Afghan forces to report their own personnel strength numbers. ..[T]he Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.. noted that.. there is "no viable method of validating [the ANA's] personnel numbers."

It was reported in 2016 that the Afghan National Army had close to 1,000 officers with the rank of general, more than the number of generals in the United States Army.^[29]

Troop levels

Number of soldiers on duty	Year(s)
90,000	1978^[30]
60,000 (All MOD troops)	1979^[30]
25 - 35,000	1980-1982^[31]^[32]
35 - 40,000	1983-1985^[33]^[34]
49,000 (4,000 regular/trained)^[35]	2003 (Hamid Karzai)
1,750	2003^[36]
13,000	2004^[37]
21,200	2005^[38]
26,900	2006^[39]
50,000	2007^[40]
80,000	2008
90,000	2009
134,000	2010^[41]
164,000	2011^[25]
200,000	2012^[42]
194,000	2014^[43]

Total Afghan Armed Forces manpower was approximately 186,000 as of 2021.^[44]

Human right abuses

According to American journalist Annie Jacobsen, most Afghan fighters being trained by the US habitually used opium, and it was a constant struggle to field them in a sober state. The same book claimed that rape of Afghan recruits by other Afghan soldiers occurred in US-run military facilities, undermining combat readiness. Jacobsen wrote that a 2018 report by a US inspector general noted 5,753 cases of "gross human rights abuses by Afghan forces", including "routine enslavement and rape of underage boys by Afghan commanders"^[45] Partly this reporting is referring to aggravated Bacha bazi type practices, which are centuries old.

According to a 2017 report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), between of 2010 and 2016, the Department of Defense made 5,753 Leahy Law vetting requests for Afghan security forces.^[46] The Leahy law prohibits U.S. funding of foreign security units if there are credible reports of gross violation of human rights. According to SIGAR, between 2010 and 2016, 75 allegations of gross violations of human rights by Afghan security forces, including murder and 16 cases of child sexual assault were reported to the Department of Defense. Around a dozen Afghan units accused of abuses continued to receive U.S. funding due to an exception in the law allowing funding to continue if units are deemed to be important for "national security concern."^[47][48]

Bases and facilities in the late 2010s

Main article: List of Afghan Armed Forces installations

 

Inside Camp Shaheen in Balkh province (2009)

Large numbers of military bases were found across the country, including major ones in the provinces of Balkh, Farah, Ghazni, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Maidan Wardak, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika and Parwan. Some of these were built by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) while others by ISAF and Afghans. It was reported in 2010 that there were at least 700 military bases and outposts in Afghanistan. About 400 of them were used by ISAF forces with the remaining 300 or so by Afghan National Security Forces.^[49]

 

Marshal Fahim National Defense University

The National Military Academy of Afghanistan was built to educate officers, modeled after the United States Military Academy. The Marshal Fahim National Defense University was located in Kabul province and consists of a headquarters building, classrooms, dining facility, library, and medical clinic. In addition to this, an $80 million central command center was built next to the Hamid Karzai International Airport. The National Military Command Center was mentored by Virginia Army National Guard soldiers.^[50]

Sizable numbers of Afghan officers were trained in India, either at the Indian Military Academy in Dehradun, the National Defence Academy near Pune or the Officers Training Academy in Chennai. The Officers Training Academy on the other hand provided a 49-week course to graduate officer candidates. The Indian Military Academy provided a four-year degree to army officers, while the National Defence Academy provided a three-year degree after which officers undergo a one-year specialization in their respective service colleges. In 2014 the number of Afghan officers in training in India was nearly 1,100.^[51]

Air Force

 

Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucano (A-29) attack aircraft of the Afghan Air Force

The Afghan Air Force was relatively capable before and during the 1980s but by late 2001, the number of operational aircraft available was minimal.^[52] The United States and its allies quickly eliminated the remaining strength and ability of the Taliban to operate aircraft in the opening stages of the United States invasion of Afghanistan. With the occupation of airbases by American forces it became clear how destitute the Air Force had become since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. Most aircraft were only remnants rusting away for a decade or more. Many others were relocated to neighboring countries for storage purposes or sold cheaply. The AAF was reduced to a very small force while the country was torn by civil war. It was gradually strengthened by CSTC-A's NATO-led multinational Combined Air Power Transition Force.^[53]

The Afghan Air Force had over 200 refurbished aircraft, which includes A-29 Super Tucano attack aircraft, Lockheed C-130 Hercules and Pilatus PC-12s military transport aircraft, as well as UH-60A Black Hawk, Mil Mi-17, Mi-24, and other types of helicopters. It also included trainers such as Aero L-39 Albatros and Cessna 182. The manpower of the Afghan Air Force was around 7,000, which includes over 450 pilots. It also had a small number of female pilots.

Military equipment

 

Construction of army base underway in Kandahar province.

The United States provided billions of dollars in military aid. One package included 2,500 Humvees, tens of thousands of M16 assault rifles and body armoured-jackets. It also included the building of a national military command center as well as training compounds in several provinces of the country. The Canadian Forces supplied some surplus Canadian-made Colt Canada C7 rifles but the Afghans returned the C7 in favor of the American-made M16 rifle, because the parts of the two rifles, despite being similar, were not fully interchangeable.

Besides the United States and its allies/partners, Afghanistan increasingly turned to India and Russia for assistance. Both countries had supported the Northern Alliance, with funding, training, supplies and medical treatment of wounded fighters, against the Taliban prior to 2002. India had been reluctant to provide military aid due to fears of antagonizing its regional rival Pakistan. In 2013, after years of subtle reminders, the Afghan government sent a wish list of heavy weapons to India.The list includes as many as 150 T-72 battle tanks, 120 (105 mm) field guns, a large number of 82 mm mortars, one Antonov An-32 medium lift transport aircraft, two squadrons of Mil Mi-17 medium lift and Mi-35 attack helicopters, and a large number of trucks. In 2014, India signed a deal with Russia and Afghanistan where it would pay Russia for all the heavy equipment requested by Afghanistan instead of directly supplying them. The deal also includes the refurbishment of heavy weapons left behind since the Soviet war.^[51][54]

The military budget reached $12 billion USD by 2011, mostly provided by aid.^[55] From 2001–2021, the United States spent an estimated $83 billion on the Afghan armed forces through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and an additional $36 billion to support the Afghan government.^[56]

Other state suppliers included Brazil; China; France; Germany; Italy; Pakistan; Turkey; the United Kingdom; and Uzbekistan.

As the size of the Armed Forces grew, so did the need for aircraft and vehicles. It was announced in 2011 that the Afghan Armed Forces would be provided with 145 aircraft, 21 helicopters and 23,000 vehicles.^{[citation needed]} In 2012, Afghanistan became a major non-NATO ally of the United States. This meant the country was able to purchase and receive weapons from the United States without restrictions. In the meantime, the Afghan Air Force began seeking fighter aircraft and other advanced weapons. Defense Minister Wardak explained that "what we are asking to acquire is just the ability to defend ourselves, and also to be relevant in the future so that our friends and allies can count on us to participate in peacekeeping and other operations of mutual interest."^[57]

Whatever foreign advisors perceived as the right equipment mix, Afghans wanted main battle tanks, more artillery, other heavy weapons, as well as fighter and ground attack aircraft, plus attack helicopters. Donors' protests that equipment serviceability rates were dire, and such forces implausible, did not stop the requests coming.^[58]

Senior officers circa 2019

 

Minister of Defense 15 September 2012 – 24 May 2015 Bismillah Khan Mohammadi stands with the Afghan National Army senior noncommissioned officer corps at the 9th annual Sergeant Major of the Army seminar held at the Kabul Military Training Center

 

Soldiers training on how to clear improvised explosive devices on roads

 

Afghan Commandos practice infiltration techniques, 1 April 2010 at Camp Morehead in the outer regions of Kabul.

• Defence Minister, General Bismillah Khan Mohammadi (acting)
• Defense Ministry Spokesman, Major General Dawlat Waziri
• Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Murad Ali Murad
• Vice Chief of the General Staff (VCoGS), Lieutenant General Yasin Zia ^[59]
• Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DoGS), Lieutenant General Mohammad Ikram
• Afghan Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Mohammad Dawran^[60]
• Command Sergeant Major of the ANA, Sergeant Major Roshan Safi
• General Staff Chief of Personnel (GSG1), Lieutenant General Murad Ali Murad
• General Staff Chief of Intelligence (GSG2), Major General Abdul Khaliq Faryad
• General Staff Chief of Operations (GSG3), Major General Afzal Aman
• General Staff Chief of Logistics (GSG4), Lieutenant General Azizuddin Farahee
• General Staff Chief of Plans (GSG5), Major General Jan Kahn
• General Staff Chief of Communications (GSG6), Major General Mehrab Ali
• General Staff Chief of Doctrine & Training (GSG7), Major General Kushiwal
• General Staff Chief of Engineering (GSEng), Major General Muslim Amid
• General Staff Inspector General, Major General Jalandar Shah
• Surgeon General, Lieutenant General Dr. Abdul Qayum Tutakhail
• 201st Selab ("Flood") Corps Commander, Major General Mohammad Rahim Wardak
• 203rd Tandar ("Thunder") Corps Commander, Major General Abdul Khaleq
• 205th Atal ("Hero") Corps Commander, Major General Sher Mohammad Zazai
• 207th Zafar ("Victory") Corps Commander, Major General Jalandar Shah Behnam
• 209th Shaheen ("Falcon") Corps Commander, Major General Murad Ali
• 215th Maiwand Corps Commander, Major Gen. Sayed Malouk
• Afghan National Army Training Command, Major General Aminullah Karim
• ANA Special Operations Command
• ANA Recruiting Command, Lieutenant General Mohammad Eshaq Noori
• Headquarters Security and Support Brigade, Brigadier General Sadiq
• Command and General Staff College, Major General Rizak
• National Military Academy of Afghanistan, Major General Mohammad Sharef
• Kabul Military Training Centre, Brigadier General Mohammad Amin Wardak^[61]

See also

• Military history of Afghanistan
• Soviet–Afghan War
• War in Afghanistan
• Ranks of the Afghan Armed Forces

References

1. Malkasian 2021, pp. 90–94.
2. Sedra 2016, p. 173.
3. Leese 2010.
4. United States. Department of Defense 2010, p. 31.
5. See Howk, 'Security Sector Reform/Building,'
6. Sedra 2016, p. 172.
7. Kirk Semple, 'Citing Taliban Threat, Afghan Ex-Militia Leaders Hoard Illegal Arms', The New York Times, Sunday, October 28, 2007, p.8
8. United Nations, The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security, A/56/875-S/2002/278, 2002, p10.
9. Giustozzi 2007, p. 46.
10. Giustozzi 2007, p. 47.
11. Cahn, Dianna (9 December 2009). . Stripes.com. Archived from the original on 11 April 2021. Retrieved 9 February 2010.
12. "US trainers bemoan Afghan corruption". UPI.com. 9 December 2009. from the original on 20 December 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2010.
13. "Illiteracy undermines Afghan army". Air Force Times. 14 September 2009. Archived from the original on 21 July 2012. Retrieved 9 February 2010.
14. . MSNBC. Associated Press. 5 December 2009. Archived from the original on 12 December 2009. Retrieved 9 February 2010.
15. "Corruption, indiscipline slow Afghan training". Army Times. 11 October 2009. Archived from the original on 30 July 2012. Retrieved 9 February 2010.
16. "Training Afghanistan troops gets tough for US troops as trust issues worsen". Daily News. New York. 13 December 2009. from the original on 21 August 2010. Retrieved 9 February 2010.
17. Filkins, Dexter (2 December 2009). "With Troop Pledge, New Demands on Afghans". The New York Times. from the original on 2 February 2011. Retrieved 9 April 2010.
18. "POLITICS: Afghan Army Turnover Rate Threatens US War Plans". 24 November 2009. Archived from the original on 11 October 2017. Retrieved 28 December 2009.
19. "ANA Recruits Commit Loyalty to God, Country and Duty". DVIDS.; "A Tale of Two Afghan Armies | Small Wars Journal". smallwarsjournal.com.; "Allah Duty Homeland", Afghanistan Ministry of Defence
20. Münch, Philipp. "Resolute Support Light. NATO's New Mission versus the Political Economy of the Afghan National Security Forces" (PDF).
21. Munch 2015, p.6, and Giustozzi, A. & Quentin, P., "The Afghan National Army: sustainability challenges beyond financial aspects." 20 February 2015 at the Wayback Machine Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, February 2014, 2014, p.30–37
22. Coll, Steve (2019). Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Penguin Group. pp. 586–624. ISBN 9780143132509.
23. Giustozzi 2007, p. 48.
24. O'Hanlon, Michael E. "A Bright Spot Among Afghan Woes" 15 June 2010 at the Wayback Machine, The Brookings Institution, 19 May 2010.
25. Pellerindate, Cheryl (May 23, 2011). . American Forces Press Service. United States Department of Defense. Archived from the original on 2014-04-14. Retrieved 2011-07-10.
26. What Mr. Obama changed. 20 October 2017 at the Wayback Machine The Washington Post. 3 December 2009.
27. Al Pessin (9 December 2009). . Voice of America. Archived from the original on 10 December 2009. Retrieved 17 July 2012.
28. SIGAR Report to Congress, January 30, 2013, pp. 73–74, cited in Cordesman, The Afghan War in 2013: Meeting the Challenges of Transition – Volume III Security and the ANSF, working draft, March 28, 2013, 58.
29. "Being an Afghan General Is Nice Work if You Can Get It. And Many Do". The New York Times. 19 December 2016. from the original on 7 October 2019.
30. Giustozzi 2016, p. 63.
31. Arnold, Anthony (1983). Afghanistan's Two-party Communism: Parcham and Khalq. Hoover Press. p. 111. ISBN 978-0-8179-7792-4.
32. Amtstutz 1986, p. 180.
33. Amtstutz 1986, p. 181.
34. Levite, Ariel; Jenteleson, Bruce; Berman, Larry (1992). Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict. Columbia University Press. p. 80. ISBN 978-0-231-07295-3.
35. Giustozzi, Antonio (November 2008). "Afghanistan: Transition Without End" (PDF). London School of Economics.
36. (PDF). Soldiers: The Official U.S. Army Magazine. Vol. 58, no. 3. March 2003. p. 16. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2009-04-18. Retrieved 2011-02-11.^{[clarification needed]}
37. Rumsfeld, Donald (August 6, 2004). . Archived from the original on 2012-04-14. Retrieved 2018-10-03.
38. US DoD: Afghan Army Has Made Great Progress, Says U.S. Officer. Washington. January 10, 2005 December 3, 2009, at the Wayback Machine
39. US Dept. of State: Afghanistan National Security Forces. 31 January 2006. February 28, 2011, at the Wayback Machine
40. "Over 153,000 troops fighting 20,000 combatants: NATO". Pajhwok Afghan News. June 6, 2007. Archived from the original on September 8, 2012. Retrieved December 14, 2011.
41. Khwaja Basir Ahmad (July 5, 2010). . Pajhwok Afghan News. Archived from the original on June 13, 2013. Retrieved December 14, 2011.
42. Blenkin, Max (June 28, 2012). "Afghan National Army a work in progress". The Australian. Retrieved 2012-07-15.
43. "Afghanistan: Karzais On The Run". StrategyPage. October 17, 2014. Retrieved October 20, 2014.
44. "Afghanistan". The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved 2021-07-26.
45. Annie Jacobsen, "Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Secret History of CIA Paramilitary Armies, Operators, and Assassins," (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2019), p. 409-411
46. "Child Sexual Assault in Afghanistan:Implementation of the Leahy Laws and Reports of Assault by Afghan Security Forces". Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 8 June 2017. from the original on September 12, 2021. Retrieved 12 September 2021.
47. "Implementation of the DoD Leahy Law Regarding Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse by Members of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces". Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. 17 November 2017. Retrieved 12 September 2021.
48. "Report: US Military Continues to Pay Afghan Units Despite Human Rights Abuses". 23 January 2018. Retrieved 12 September 2021.
49. Turse, Nick (11 February 2010). "The 700 Military Bases of Afghanistan". Foreign Police In Focus (FPIF). Retrieved 2013-07-01.
50. "Virginia National Guard's 29th Infantry Division mentors making a diff".
51. "India turns to Russia to help supply arms to Afghan forces". Reuters. 30 April 2014. Retrieved 2014-07-27.
52. Lukas Müller (2020). Wings Over the Hindu Kush: Air Forces, Aircraft and Air Warfare of Afghanistan, 1989–2001. Asia @ War. Helion. ISBN 9781913118662.
53. Tini Tran (January 24, 2008). . Department of Defense. Archived from the original on 2009-12-01. Retrieved 2009-03-13.
54. "India to pay Russia for arms, ammo it sells to Afghanistan". The Indian Express. 18 April 2014. Retrieved 2015-05-11.
55. C. J. Radin (2010-04-19). "Afghan Security Forces Order of Battle" (PDF). Retrieved 2017-08-28.
56. Kessler, Glenn (31 August 2021). "No, the Taliban did not seize $83 billion of U.S. weapons". Washington Post. Retrieved 31 August 2021.
57. "Afghanistan makes pitch for heavier weapons". Yahoo News. 18 October 2011. Retrieved 2015-05-11.
58. Robinson, Colin D. (2018). "What explains the failure of U.S. army reconstruction in Afghanistan?". Defence and Security Analysis. 34 (3): 8. doi:10.1080/14751798.2018.1500756. S2CID 158846498.
59. "Database". afghan-bios.info. Retrieved 2020-08-20.
60. "U.S. Builds Afghan Air Base, but Where Are the Planes?". The Wall Street Journal. 24 July 2012.
61. Air Force Link: Coalition forces conduct, supervise training exercise September 12, 2009, at the Wayback Machine

Sources

• Amtstutz, J. Bruce (1986). Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (PDF). Washington, DC.: National Defense University. (PDF) from the original on 2015-02-08. Retrieved 2015-02-08.
• Leese, Capt. Robert (14 June 2010). (Press release). US Air Force. Archived from the original on 31 August 2021.
• United States. Department of Defense (November 2010). Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan (PDF) (Report). OCLC 769299266. Retrieved 31 March 2024.

Further reading

• International Institute for Strategic Studies (15 February 2019). The Military Balance 2019. London: Routledge. ISBN 9781857439885.
• Bhatia, Michael; Sedra, Mark (2008). Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict: Armed groups, disarmament, and security in a postwar society. Abingdon: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-47734-5.
• Antonio Giustozzi (2016). The Army of Afghanistan: A Political History of a Fragile Institution. London: C Hurst & Co. ISBN 9781849044813. 288 pp.; £35.00.
• Giustozzi, Antonio (March 2007). "Auxiliary Force or National Army: Afghanistan 'ANA' and the COIN Effort 2002–2006". Small Wars and Insurgencies. 18 (1). doi:10.1080/09592310601173220. S2CID 143669542.
• Jalali, Ali A. (2016-05-20). "Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: Mission, Challenges and Sustainability [Peaceworks]". United States Institute of Peace.
• Jalali, Ali A. (2002). "Rebuilding Afghanistan's National Army". Parameters. 32 (3). U.S. Army.
• Jalali, Ali A. "Afghanistan: The Anatomy of an Ongoing Conflict". Parameters (Spring 2001). U.S. Army: 85–98. Archived from the original on February 9, 2015. Retrieved 7 February 2015.
• Kucera, Joshua (16 March 2005). "Afghan army development speeded up". Jane's Defence Weekly.
• Malkasian, Carter (2021). The American War in Afghanistan: A History. Oxford University Press.
• Sedra, Mark (2016-11-03). Security Sector Reform in Conflict-Affected Countries: The Evolution of a Model. Routledge. ISBN 9781317390800.

External links

• "Conscription in the Afghan Army [2011]" (PDF). CNA (nonprofit). April 2011. Retrieved 2021-07-24.
• In the name of Allah, the Compassionate and Merciful Decree of the President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan on the Afghan National Army, issued on 1 December 2002, Petersberg, Germany
• Official website to August 2021