One context in which the existence of further facts is debated is that of personal identity across time: in what sense is Alice today really the same person as Alice yesterday, given that across the two days the state of her brain is different and the atoms that constitute her are different? One may believe that at bottom, there is nothing more than the atoms and their arrangement at different points in time; while we may for practical purposes come up with some notion of sameness of a person, this notion does not reflect anything deeper about reality. Under this view there would be no further facts. Alternatively, one may believe that there is a deeper sense in which Alice yesterday and Alice today really are the same person. For example, if one believes in Cartesian souls, one may believe that Alice yesterday and Alice today are the same person if and only if they correspond to the same soul. Or one may not believe in Cartesian souls, but yet believe that whether Alice yesterday and Alice today are the same person is a question about something other than facts about which atoms constitute them and how they are arranged. These would both be further-fact views.
The debate about further facts about personal identity over time is most closely associated with Derek Parfit. In his Reasons and Persons, he describes the non-reductionist's view that "personal identity is a deep further fact, distinct from physical and psychological continuity".[1] Parfit takes a reductionist stance and argues against this further-fact view. As a result it is not clear whether a person has any reason to be worried about his or her future self in a special way that does not also apply to worrying about others, with Parfit arguing that it is plausible that "only the deep further fact gives me a reason to be specially concerned about my future" (his so-called "Extreme Claim").[1]Sydney Shoemaker objects that it is not clear how a further fact would give a reason for such special concerns, either.[3] Harold Langsam has attempted to give a positive account of how a further fact would give such a reason.[4]
David Chalmers lists a number of other types of candidates for further facts.[2] One is facts about conscious experience. For example, it is difficult to see how it follows from the physical facts what it is like to experience seeing red; indeed, inverted spectrum scenarios, where we imagine that experiences of colors are swapped without anything else changing, might suggest that things could have been different without the physical facts changing. Another candidate for a further fact is the fact that there is any conscious experience at all, rather than everyone being a philosophical zombie. Christopher Hill and Brian Mclaughlin have argued against the idea that facts about consciousness are further facts, disputing the logical possibility of a world physically identical to ours in which the facts about consciousness are different.[5]
Chalmers also considers facts about indexicality. He cites the fact that "I am David Chalmers", noting that its significance seems to go beyond the tautology that David Chalmers is David Chalmers. (See also Caspar Hare's egocentric presentism and Benj Hellie's vertiginous question.[6][7][8]) Similarly, in the philosophy of time, what date and time it is now might be considered a candidate for a further fact, in the sense that a being that knows everything about the full four-dimensional block of spacetime would still not know what time it is now. (See also the A-theory and the B-theory of time.)
A final type of fact that Chalmers considers is that of negative facts. For example, consider the following statement: there do not exist nonphysical angels. If in fact true, it does not seem that this logically follows from any of the physical facts by themselves; but, he argues, it would follow if one added a "That is all" statement at the end of the list of all the physical facts.
^ abcParfit, Derek (1986). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press. pp. 309–310. ISBN9780198249085.
^ abChalmers, David (1997). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 84–87. ISBN9780195117899.
^Shoemaker, Sydney (1985). "Critical notice of Reasons and Persons". Mind. 94: 443–453.
^Langsam, Harold (2001). "Pain, Personal Identity, and the Deep Further Fact". Erkenntnis. 54 (2): 247–271. doi:10.1023/A:1005683704853. S2CID 118044105.
^Hill, Christopher; Mclaughlin, Brian (1999). "Review: There are Fewer Things in Reality Than are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 59 (2): 445–454. doi:10.2307/2653682. JSTOR 2653682.
^Hare, Caspar (July 2007). "Self-Bias, Time-Bias, and the Metaphysics of Self and Time" (PDF). The Journal of Philosophy. 104 (7): 350–373. doi:10.5840/jphil2007104717.
^Hare, Caspar (2009). On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects. Princeton University Press. ISBN9780691135311.
Conitzer, Vincent. A Puzzle about Further Facts. Open access version of article in Erkenntnis.
January 20, 2023
further, facts, philosophy, further, facts, facts, that, follow, logically, from, physical, facts, world, reductionists, argue, that, bottom, there, nothing, more, than, physical, facts, thus, argue, against, existence, further, facts, concept, further, facts,. In philosophy further facts are facts that do not follow logically from the physical facts of the world 1 2 Reductionists who argue that at bottom there is nothing more than the physical facts thus argue against the existence of further facts The concept of further facts plays a key role in some of the major works in analytic philosophy of the late 20th century including in Derek Parfit s Reasons and Persons and David Chalmers s The Conscious Mind One context in which the existence of further facts is debated is that of personal identity across time in what sense is Alice today really the same person as Alice yesterday given that across the two days the state of her brain is different and the atoms that constitute her are different One may believe that at bottom there is nothing more than the atoms and their arrangement at different points in time while we may for practical purposes come up with some notion of sameness of a person this notion does not reflect anything deeper about reality Under this view there would be no further facts Alternatively one may believe that there is a deeper sense in which Alice yesterday and Alice today really are the same person For example if one believes in Cartesian souls one may believe that Alice yesterday and Alice today are the same person if and only if they correspond to the same soul Or one may not believe in Cartesian souls but yet believe that whether Alice yesterday and Alice today are the same person is a question about something other than facts about which atoms constitute them and how they are arranged These would both be further fact views Derek Parfit The debate about further facts about personal identity over time is most closely associated with Derek Parfit In his Reasons and Persons he describes the non reductionist s view that personal identity is a deep further fact distinct from physical and psychological continuity 1 Parfit takes a reductionist stance and argues against this further fact view As a result it is not clear whether a person has any reason to be worried about his or her future self in a special way that does not also apply to worrying about others with Parfit arguing that it is plausible that only the deep further fact gives me a reason to be specially concerned about my future his so called Extreme Claim 1 Sydney Shoemaker objects that it is not clear how a further fact would give a reason for such special concerns either 3 Harold Langsam has attempted to give a positive account of how a further fact would give such a reason 4 David Chalmers David Chalmers lists a number of other types of candidates for further facts 2 One is facts about conscious experience For example it is difficult to see how it follows from the physical facts what it is like to experience seeing red indeed inverted spectrum scenarios where we imagine that experiences of colors are swapped without anything else changing might suggest that things could have been different without the physical facts changing Another candidate for a further fact is the fact that there is any conscious experience at all rather than everyone being a philosophical zombie Christopher Hill and Brian Mclaughlin have argued against the idea that facts about consciousness are further facts disputing the logical possibility of a world physically identical to ours in which the facts about consciousness are different 5 Chalmers also considers facts about indexicality He cites the fact that I am David Chalmers noting that its significance seems to go beyond the tautology that David Chalmers is David Chalmers See also Caspar Hare s egocentric presentism and Benj Hellie s vertiginous question 6 7 8 Similarly in the philosophy of time what date and time it is now might be considered a candidate for a further fact in the sense that a being that knows everything about the full four dimensional block of spacetime would still not know what time it is now See also the A theory and the B theory of time A final type of fact that Chalmers considers is that of negative facts For example consider the following statement there do not exist nonphysical angels If in fact true it does not seem that this logically follows from any of the physical facts by themselves but he argues it would follow if one added a That is all statement at the end of the list of all the physical facts See also EditBenj Hellie s vertiginous question B theory of time Centered world Consciousness Personal identity Simulation hypothesisReferences Edit a b c Parfit Derek 1986 Reasons and Persons Oxford University Press pp 309 310 ISBN 9780198249085 a b Chalmers David 1997 The Conscious Mind In Search of a Fundamental Theory Oxford University Press pp 84 87 ISBN 9780195117899 Shoemaker Sydney 1985 Critical notice of Reasons and Persons Mind 94 443 453 Langsam Harold 2001 Pain Personal Identity and the Deep Further Fact Erkenntnis 54 2 247 271 doi 10 1023 A 1005683704853 S2CID 118044105 Hill Christopher Mclaughlin Brian 1999 Review There are Fewer Things in Reality Than are Dreamt of in Chalmers s Philosophy Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 2 445 454 doi 10 2307 2653682 JSTOR 2653682 Hare Caspar July 2007 Self Bias Time Bias and the Metaphysics of Self and Time PDF The Journal of Philosophy 104 7 350 373 doi 10 5840 jphil2007104717 Hare Caspar 2009 On Myself and Other Less Important Subjects Princeton University Press ISBN 9780691135311 Hellie Benj 2013 Against egalitarianism Analysis 73 2 304 320 doi 10 1093 analys ans101 External links EditConitzer Vincent A Puzzle about Further Facts Open access version of article in Erkenntnis Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Further facts amp oldid 1124307689, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,
