Basij

The Basij (Persian: بسيج, lit. "The Mobilization") or Niru-ye Moghāvemat-e Basij (Persian: نیروی مقاومت بسیج, "Resistance Mobilization Force"), full name Sâzmân-e Basij-e Mostaz'afin (سازمان بسیج مستضعفین, "The Organization for Mobilization of the Oppressed"),^[5][6] is a paramilitary volunteer militia within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and one of its five branches.^[7] The force is named Basij; an individual member is called basiji in the Persian language.^[1][8] As of July 2019^[update], Gholamreza Soleimani is the commander of the Basij.

Basij

بسیج
بسیج
Formation	26 November 1979; 44 years ago (1979-11-26) (decreed)^[1] 30 April 1980; 44 years ago (1980-04-30) (founded)^[1]
Founder	Ruhollah Khomeini^[1]
Type	Paramilitary volunteer militia^[1]
Purpose	Auxiliaries^[1]
Methods	"To create the necessary capabilities in all individuals believing in the constitution and goals of the Islamic revolution to defend the country, the regime of the Islamic Republic, and aid people in cases of disasters and unexpected events"^[1]
Fields	Internal security, law enforcement, moral policing, military reserves^[1]
Membership	Over 25 million reserves^[2] 600,000 available for immediate call-up^[3]
Commander	Brig. Gen. Gholamreza Soleimani or Unoffically Mojtaba Khamenei (alleged)
Parent organization	None (1980–81) Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (since 1981)
Budget (1395 SH)	$357.08 million^[4]
Staff (2005)	90,000 (CSIS estimate)^[1]
Website	basij.ir

A paramilitary volunteer militia established in Iran in 1979 by order of Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Iranian Revolution, the organization originally consisted of civilian volunteers, often from poor, rural backgrounds,^[9] who were urged by Khomeini to fight in the Iran–Iraq War.^[10] Khomeini would occasionally refer to Basij as "The Twenty Million Army", claiming that about 75% of the time's population are Basijis. He would elaborate saying, that a country with 20 million of its people as their army, will be undefeatable.^[11] Basij was an independent organization until 17 February 1981, when it was officially incorporated into the Revolutionary Guards organization structure by the Iranian Parliament^[12] in order to end the interservice rivalry between the two, according to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.^[1]

Today, the force consists of young Iranians, usually drawn from the traditionally religious and politically loyalist parts of Iran's society,^[9] who volunteer, often in exchange for official benefits. With branches in "virtually every" city and town in Iran,^[1][13] the Basij serve as an auxiliary force engaged in enforcing state control over society,^[14] acting as a morality police at checkpoints and parks, and suppressing dissident gathering,^[9] as well as serving as law enforcement auxiliary, providing social services, organizing public religious ceremonies.^[15][16] The force was often present and reacting to the widespread 2009 Iranian election protests, 2017–18 Iranian protests, and the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protests.^[17] The Basij are subordinate to and receive their orders from the IRGC and the Supreme Leader of Iran,^[18][19] They are said to be "tightly affiliated" with the Islamic Republic's "hardline" political faction,^[9] and "routinely" praised by the Supreme Leader,^[20] but also called a "profound source of disquiet and rancor" among the general public in Iran.^[21]

Basij, being part of the IRGC, is designated as a terrorist organization by the governments of the United States, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.^[22]

Terminology

Basij (Persian: بسيج) is a Persian word defined variously as mobilization, public preparation, nation will and popular determination, and the unity and preparation of the people to do important works.^[23]

Mustazafin or peasants means shia muslims who inherit the earth in Khamenei's speech while Khomeini had associated a universal invincible Islamic political party made of muslim people.^[24][25]

History

Iran–Iraq War

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called for the foundation of a youth militia in November 1979, during the Iranian Revolution.^[5] The Basij was established on 30 April 1980.^[8] It was open to those above the age of 18 and below the age of 45.

During the Iran–Iraq War hundreds of thousands volunteered for the Basij, including children as young as 12 and unemployed old men, some in their eighties. These volunteers were swept up in Shi'a love of martyrdom and the atmosphere of patriotism of the war mobilization; most often they came from poor, peasant backgrounds. They were encouraged through visits to schools and an intensive media campaign. During the war, the Revolutionary Guard Corps used Basiji members as a pool from which to draw manpower.^[26] The Basij may best be known for their employment of human wave attacks which cleared minefields or drew the enemy's fire.^[27] It is estimated that tens of thousands were killed through the use of this tactic.

The typical human wave tactic was for Basijis (often very lightly armed and unsupported by artillery or air power) to march forward in straight rows. While casualties were high, the tactic often worked when employed against poorly trained members of the Iraqi regular army.^[28][29]

According to Dilip Hiro, by the spring of 1983 the Basij had trained 2.4 million Iranians in the use of arms and sent 450,000 to the front.^[30] In 1985 the IRNA put the number of Basijis at 3 million, quoting from Hojjatoleslam Rahmani.^[5] Tehran Bureau estimates the peak number of Basijis at the front at 100,000 by December 1986.^[8]

According to Radio Liberty, by the end of the Iran-Iraq war, most of the Basijis left the service and were reintegrated back into their lives, often after years of being in the front.^[31] By 1988, the number of Basij checkpoints dramatically decreased,^[32] but the Basij were still enforcing the hijab, arresting women for violating the dress code, and arresting youths for attending mixed gender parties or being in public with unrelated members of the opposite sex.^[33]

In 1988, college Basiji organizations were established on college campuses to fight "Westoxification" and potential student agitation against the government.^[33]

Revival

Whether the Basij remained intact since their founding is disputed or were disbanded and revived is disputed. According to Reuters, the Basij were not disbanded after the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, but continued as a loyalist and religious paramilitary group that provides the regime "with manpower and a heavy presence during pro-government rallies".^[9] But according to The New York Times, the Basij were reactivated in the late 1990s when the spontaneous celebrations following Iran winning a spot in the 1998 FIFA World Cup, and the student protests in July 1999, gave the Islamic government the feeling that it had lost control of the streets.^[18] (Giving a slightly different timeline, GlobalSecurity.org reports that it was revived around 2005.)^[32]

Part of the Basij revival was an emphasis on concepts such as Development Basij (Basij-e-Sazandegi),^[32] but protecting the regime from unrest was a high priority. Along with the Iranian riot police and the Ansar-e-Hezbollah, the Basij have been active in suppressing student demonstrations in Iran. The Basij are sometimes differentiated from the Ansar in being more "disciplined" and not beating, or at least not being as quick to beat demonstrators.^[34] Other sources describe the Ansar-e-Hezbollah as part of the Basij.^[18]

Some believe the change in focus of the Basij from its original mission of fighting to defend Iran in the Iran-Iraq War to its current internal security concerns has led to a loss in its prestige and morale.^[35]

Syrian Civil War, 2011–2021

Further information: Iranian support for Syria in the Syrian Civil War

One foreign conflict the Basij were involved in was on the side of the IRI's ally the Syrian Baathist regime. A Western analyst believed thousands of Iranian paramilitary Basij fighters were stationed in Syria as of December 2013.^[36] Syria's geopolitical importance to Iran and its role as one of Iran's crucial allies prompted the involvement of Basij militiamen in the ongoing Syrian Civil War. The Basij militia, similar to Hezbollah fighters, work with the Syrian army against rebel forces. Such involvement poses new foreign policy challenges for a number of countries across the region, particularly Israel and Turkey as Iran's influence becomes more than just ideological and monetary on the ground in the Syrian conflict.^{[clarification needed][37]} The Basij involvement in the Syrian Civil War reflects previous uses of the militia as a proxy force for Iranian foreign policy in an effort to assert Iranian dominance in the region^[38] and frightens Salim Idriss, head of the Free Syrian Army.^[39]

Protest movements

Iran has seen a series of political/social/economic protest movements during the 21st century that its security forces have been active in crushing—the July 1999 student protests, 2009 presidential election protests, protests in 2011–2012, 2019–2020 and the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini protests. When protests erupt, the Basij often act as the state's "iron fist".^[9]

2009 election protests

The Basij have reportedly become "more important", more powerful, since the 2009 Iranian election—despite their "poor handing" of the protests over the election results.^[1] Mir Hussein Moussavi, opposition presidential candidate in 2009, decried violent attacks by the Basij during the 2009 Iranian election protests.^[18] There have also been reports of poor performance by Basij after the 2009 election.^[8] This was thought to be a reason for the replacement of commander Hossein Taeb and the Basij's formal integration into the Revolutionary Guards ground forces in October 2009.^[8] Following the protests, Hojjatoleslam Hossein Taeb, commander of the Basij, stated that eight people were killed and 300 wounded in the violence.^[40]

In 2010, an anonymous Norwegian student doing research in Iran claims he witnessed gruesome atrocities inside a Basij camp after being abducted by the unit while riding on a bus. According to the account the student gave to Norwegian embassy officials, he witnessed detained political dissidents being 'disemboweled', burned to death, and deliberately crushed by a riot control truck.^[41]

During the protests, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei created the Haydaryan, a new paramilitary force specifically dedicated to preserving his position; several of the founding Haydaryan members came from the Basij.^[42]

Mahsa Amini protests

Main article: Mahsa Amini protests

According to Reuters, Basij were at the "forefront" of the Islamic Republic's efforts to stamp out the protests over the death of Mahsa Amini and related lack of political and social freedoms the country.^[9] According to Tara Kangarlou of Time magazine, most of those "imprisoned, injured, and killed" during the protests have the Basij to thank.^[21] These protests, starting in September 2022 and dying out the following spring, led to over 500 deaths, including the deaths of 68 minors as of 15 September 2023^[update].^{[note 1]} Unlike some earlier protests they were "nationwide, spread across social classes, universities, the streets [and] schools".^[44]

Journalist and human rights activists have cataloged a number of serious human rights violations used to crush the unrest by the Basij and other IRI security forces. These included forced confessions, threats to uninvolved family members, and torture, including electric shocks, controlled drowning, and mock execution (based on CNN interviews);^[45] sexual violence/rape (based on testimony and social media videos corroborated by a CNN investigation),^[46] “systematic" attempts to blind protesters by shooting at their eye with projectiles such as "pellets, teargas canisters, paintball bullets" (activist media group IranWire documented at least 580 cases).^[47] Using ambulances to transport security forces and kidnapped protesters under the guise of rushing injured civilians to receive emergency medical attention.^[48][49]

The Iranian state media reports that security forces such as the Basij were targeted and killed by "rioters and gangs" mainly the members of a specific unknown organization that orchestrated this whole protest ^[9] in their efforts to restore order and stop the destruction of public property by protesters,^[9] and that by 6 January 2023, at least 68 security force members were killed in the unrest.^[50] (However, according to BBC Persian service, these figures may not be reliable as some of those reported by state media to be loyalist Basij militiamen killed by the "rioters", were actually protesters killed by security forces, whose families were pressured by security forces to go along with the false reporting, threatening them with death if they failed to cooperate.)^[51]

Organization, membership, duties, activities

Organization

Basij form the fifth branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Different sources divide the Basij into different categories. As of 2011, according to Saeid Golkar, there are "seventeen different Basij suborganizations (for students, workers, employees, engineers, etc.)".^[52] Members fall into a hierarchy of "regular, active, and special".^[52]

• regular members are at the lowest level and have "basic" ideological and military training.^[52]
• active members must pass a 45-day ideological and military training program and are "more engaged" in the organization's activities.^[52]
• special members are actually full-time IRGC members serving in the Basij.^[52]

Dealing with security threats are the Imam Hossein Brigades and the Imam Ali Brigades.^[8] Its security apparatus includes armed brigades, anti-riot police and an extensive network of informers.^[20]

Subgroupings of the Basij include the

• Primary Schools Basij Cadets [Basij-e Danesh-Amouzi],
• the Students Basij Cadets [Basij-e Daneshjouyi],
• the University Basij Cadets,
• the Public Service Basij (Basij-e Edarii), and
• the Tribal Basij.^[31]

Tehran Bureau also lists a "Guilds Basij Division" (Basij-e Asnaf), and a "Labor Basij" (Basij-e Karegaran).^[8] Australian Broadcasting Corporation lists them as having branches across the country, as well as "student organisations, trade guilds, and medical faculties".^[20]

The Fatehin serves as the Basij's special forces unit.^[53]

Size, bases

Estimates of the number of Basij vary, with its leadership giving higher figures than outside commentators. Official estimates are as high as 23.8 million.^[54] A scholar of the Basij, Saeid Golkar, estimates their total membership at approximately one million, and their security forces in the tens of thousands.^[20] As of 2020 there were reportedly between 40,000^[20] and 54,000 Basij bases (Paygha-e Basij) around Iran.^[55]

Economic power

According to the US Treasury, the Basij have a multi-billion-dollar "covert network" of businesses.^[20] According to Saeid Golkar, the influence of the Basij in the Iranian economy, has grown to extend to "every sector", from "construction and real estate to the stock market".^[52] In 1996, six organizations were put under the control of the Basij Cooperative Foundation (BCF)

1. The Basijis Housing Institution (Moassesseh-ye Tamin-e Maskan-e Basijian).
2. The Basijis Medical Institution (Moassesseh-ye Tamin-e darman-e Basijian).
3. The Basijis No-Interest Loan Institute (Moassesseh-ye Gharz al-Hassaneh-ye Basijian).
4. The Basijis Consumer-Goods Provision Institution (Moassesseh-ye Tamin-e Aghlam-e Masrafi-ye Basijian).
5. The Cultural Artistic Institute of the Warriors of Islam (Moassesseh-ye Farhangi Honari-ye Razmandegan-e Eslam).
6. The Scientific and Pedagogic Services Institute of the Fighters (Moassesseh-ye Khadamat-e Elmi va Amouzeshi-ye Razmandegan).^[56][52]

As the government privatized companies under president Hashemi Rafsanjani, The Basij Cooperative Foundation became the Basij’s main mechanism for "purchasing entire industries on the cheap".^[52]

Duties and activities

Duties vary by province. Basij are deployed against drug traffickers in the eastern border regions and smugglers in Hormuzgan and Bushehr, and on the border with Iraq.^[57]

The Ashura Brigades were created in 1993. These Islamic brigades were made up of both Revolutionary Guards and the Basij and by 1998 numbered 17,000.^[5]

According to Golkar,^[14] the Basij are used to spread the state's ideology, serve as propaganda machine in political campaigns, justify clerical rule, protect politicians, and enforce Islamic morality and rules. They are part of the Islamic Republic's of Iran's overall avowed plan to have millions of informers. The Basiji also undermine dissent; for instance, they play a key role in suppressing uprisings and demonstrations.^[14]

Basij are present at every Iranian university to monitor morality (primarily dress) and behaviour. (In part this is because Universities and other places of post-secondary education are where Iranian males and females "meet for the first time in a mixed educational environment").^[9]

Commanders

The Basij is currently commanded by Gholamreza Soleimani, who replaced Gholamhossein Gheybparvar in 2019.^[58]

No.	Portrait	Commander	Took office	Left office	Time in office	Ref.
1		Majd, AmirAmir Majd	December 1979	December 1981	1–2 years	^[59]
2		Salek, AhmadAhmad Salek (born c. 1946)	December 1981	February 1984	2–3 years	^[59]
3		Rahmani, Mohammad-AliMohammad-Ali Rahmani (born 1943)	16 February 1984	January 1990	5–6 years	^[59]^[60]
4		Afshar, AlirezaBrigadier general Alireza Afshar (born c. 1951)	1990	1998	7–8 years	–
5		Hejazi, MohammadBrigadier general Mohammad Hejazi (1956–2021)	1998	2007	8–9 years	–
6		Taeb, HosseinHossein Taeb (born 1963)	2007	2009	1–2 years	–
7		Naqdi, Mohammad RezaBrigadier general Mohammad Reza Naqdi (born c. 1952 or 1961)	2009	2016	6–7 years	–
8		Gheybparvar, GholamhosseinBrigadier general Gholamhossein Gheybparvar	2016	2019	2–3 years	–
9		Soleimani, GholamrezaBrigadier general Gholamreza Soleimani (born 1964)	2019	Incumbent	4–5 years	–

Motivation

While some joined the Basij because of genuine religious convictions, or loyalty to their pro-regime and traditional religious family and community background, others reportedly join Basij only to take advantage of the benefits of membership and to get admission to university or as a tool to get promotion in government jobs.^[14][61][20]

Benefits for members of the Basij reportedly include exemption from the 21 months of military service required for Iranian men, reserved spots in universities, and a small stipend.^[18] Members of Basij are more likely than non-members to obtain government positions, especially security related positions within government-controlled institutions.

In addition, recruits are also "put through heavy indoctrination". including an initial month and a half of "military and ideological training".^[20]

Politics

In theory, the Basij are banned from involvement in politics by the Iranian constitution, but its leadership is considered active, particularly during and after the 2005 election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.^[8] In past elections militia members have voted for both hardliners and reformists. President Ahmadinejad received significant support from militia members, many of whom have benefited from his policies during his presidency.^[62] Supreme Leader Khamenei described Basij as "the greatest hope of the Iranian nation" and "an immaculate tree".^[19]

See also

•  Iran portal
•  Asia portal

• Guidance Patrol
• Hezbollah of Iran
• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
• Killing of Neda Agha-Soltan
• List of armed groups in the Syrian Civil War
• Zahra Bani Yaghoub
• Red Guards (China)
• Shabiha (Syria)
• Colectivo (Venezuela)

Similar historical groups

• KGB and NKVD (Soviet Union)
• SAVAK (pre-revolutionary Iran)
• Schutzstaffel and Gestapo (Nazi Germany)
• Stasi (East Germany)

Notes

1. according to the non-profit organization Iran Human Rights^[43]

References

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Further reading

• Golkar, Saeid. (2012) Paramilitarization of the Economy: The Case of Iran's Basij Militia, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 38, No. 4
• Golkar, Saeid. (2015) Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran. Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Columbia University Press.

External links

• Video Archive of Basij
• Letters from Iran on YouTube – The Basij in the Universities
• . Archived from the original on 3 August 2004. Retrieved 2007-04-16.
• . Archived from the original on 23 April 2006. Retrieved 2006-04-16. from Rooz Online
• Alfoneh, Ali (21 October 2010). "Iran Primer: The Basij Resistance Force". PBS.