Universal prescriptivism (often simply called prescriptivism) is the meta-ethical view that claims that, rather than expressing propositions, ethical sentences function similarly to imperatives which are universalizable—whoever makes a moral judgment is committed to the same judgment in any situation where the same relevant facts pertain.[1][2]
Since prescriptivism was introduced by philosopher R. M. Hare in his 1952 book The Language of Morals, it has been compared to emotivism and to the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant.[4][5] Unlike Kant, however, Hare does not invoke universalizability as a test of moral permissibility. Instead, he sees it as a consistency requirement that is built into the logic of moral language and helps to make moral thinking a rational enterprise.
Hare originally proposed prescriptivism as a kind of amendment to emotivism.[6] Like emotivists, Hare believes that moral discourse is not primarily informative or fact-stating. But whereas emotivists claim that moral language is mainly intended to express feelings or to influence behavior, Hare believes that the central purpose of moral talk is to guide behavior by telling someone what to do. Its main purpose is to "prescribe" (recommend) a certain act, not to get someone to do that act or to express one's personal feelings or attitudes.[7]
To illustrate the prescriptivist view, consider the moral sentence, "Suicide is wrong." According to moral realism, such a sentence claims there to be some objective property of "wrongness" associated with the act of suicide. According to some versions of emotivism, such a sentence merely expresses an attitude of the speaker; it only means something like "Boo on suicide!" But according to prescriptivism, the statement "Suicide is wrong" means something more like "Do not commit suicide." What it expresses is thus not primarily a description or an emotion but an imperative. General value terms like "good", "bad", "right", "wrong" and "ought" usually also have descriptive and emotive meanings, but these are not its primary meanings according to prescriptivists.
Prescriptivism has been widely criticized and has few adherents today.[8] Many ethicists reject Hare's claim that moral language is not informative—that the purpose of moral talk is not to express moral truths or moral facts.[9] Numerous critics also question Hare's contention that providing guidance is always the main purpose of moral talk.[10] Hare seems to implicitly assume that moral language is always used in a context of discussion, debate, or command in which one person is telling another person, or persons, what to do. This, it is claimed, ignores the fact that moral talk is a "language-game" that is used for a wide variety of purposes. Finally, many critics have argued that prescriptivism conflicts with the commonsense distinction between good and bad reasons for moral beliefs.[11] According to Hare, a racist "fanatic" who claims that all minority-group members should be deported, and is willing to stick with this consistently (e.g., even if the racist herself were a member of the minority group),[12]cannot be faulted for either irrationality or falsehood. Ethics, for Hare, is thus ultimately a matter of non-rational choice and commitment.[13] Many of Hare's critics object that reason does and should play a larger role in ethics than he recognizes.
^Dahl, Norman O. (1987). "A Prognosis for Universal Prescriptivism". Philosophical Studies. 51 (3): 383–424. doi:10.1007/BF00354045. ISSN 0031-8116. JSTOR 4319897.
^Brandt, Theory, 221: "[The Language of Morals] by R. M. Hare has proposed a view, otherwise very similar to the emotive theory, with modifications ..."
^Brandt, Theory, 224: "Hare's [universalizability] proposal is reminiscent of Kant's view that an act is morally permissible if and only if the maxim in terms of which the agent thinks of it could possibly serve as a universal rule of conduct, and if the agent is prepared to accept it as such."
^Warnock, G. J., Contemporary MoralPhilosophy. London: Macmillan, 1967, p. 30.
^Norman, Richard. The Moral Philosophers: An Introduction to Ethics, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 166-67.
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Not to be confused with Linguistic prescription This article possibly contains original research Please improve it by verifying the claims made and adding inline citations Statements consisting only of original research should be removed January 2012 Learn how and when to remove this template message Universal prescriptivism often simply called prescriptivism is the meta ethical view that claims that rather than expressing propositions ethical sentences function similarly to imperatives which are universalizable whoever makes a moral judgment is committed to the same judgment in any situation where the same relevant facts pertain 1 2 This makes prescriptivism a universalist form of non cognitivism Prescriptivism stands in opposition to other forms of non cognitivism such as emotivism and quasi realism as well as to all forms of cognitivism including both moral realism and ethical subjectivism 3 Since prescriptivism was introduced by philosopher R M Hare in his 1952 book The Language of Morals it has been compared to emotivism and to the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant 4 5 Unlike Kant however Hare does not invoke universalizability as a test of moral permissibility Instead he sees it as a consistency requirement that is built into the logic of moral language and helps to make moral thinking a rational enterprise Contents 1 What prescriptivists claim 2 Criticisms 3 See also 4 Notes 5 References 6 External linksWhat prescriptivists claim EditHare originally proposed prescriptivism as a kind of amendment to emotivism 6 Like emotivists Hare believes that moral discourse is not primarily informative or fact stating But whereas emotivists claim that moral language is mainly intended to express feelings or to influence behavior Hare believes that the central purpose of moral talk is to guide behavior by telling someone what to do Its main purpose is to prescribe recommend a certain act not to get someone to do that act or to express one s personal feelings or attitudes 7 To illustrate the prescriptivist view consider the moral sentence Suicide is wrong According to moral realism such a sentence claims there to be some objective property of wrongness associated with the act of suicide According to some versions of emotivism such a sentence merely expresses an attitude of the speaker it only means something like Boo on suicide But according to prescriptivism the statement Suicide is wrong means something more like Do not commit suicide What it expresses is thus not primarily a description or an emotion but an imperative General value terms like good bad right wrong and ought usually also have descriptive and emotive meanings but these are not its primary meanings according to prescriptivists Criticisms EditThis article s tone or style may not reflect the encyclopedic tone used on Wikipedia See Wikipedia s guide to writing better articles for suggestions May 2020 Learn how and when to remove this template message Prescriptivism has been widely criticized and has few adherents today 8 Many ethicists reject Hare s claim that moral language is not informative that the purpose of moral talk is not to express moral truths or moral facts 9 Numerous critics also question Hare s contention that providing guidance is always the main purpose of moral talk 10 Hare seems to implicitly assume that moral language is always used in a context of discussion debate or command in which one person is telling another person or persons what to do This it is claimed ignores the fact that moral talk is a language game that is used for a wide variety of purposes Finally many critics have argued that prescriptivism conflicts with the commonsense distinction between good and bad reasons for moral beliefs 11 According to Hare a racist fanatic who claims that all minority group members should be deported and is willing to stick with this consistently e g even if the racist herself were a member of the minority group 12 cannot be faulted for either irrationality or falsehood Ethics for Hare is thus ultimately a matter of non rational choice and commitment 13 Many of Hare s critics object that reason does and should play a larger role in ethics than he recognizes See also EditNon cognitivismNotes Edit Ethics Existentialism Encyclopedia Britannica Retrieved 2020 05 28 Dahl Norman O 1987 A Prognosis for Universal Prescriptivism Philosophical Studies 51 3 383 424 doi 10 1007 BF00354045 ISSN 0031 8116 JSTOR 4319897 van Roojen Mark Moral Cognitivism vs Non Cognitivism The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2015 Edition Edward N Zalta ed URL lt http plato stanford edu archives fall2015 entries moral cognitivism gt Brandt Theory 221 The Language of Morals by R M Hare has proposed a view otherwise very similar to the emotive theory with modifications Brandt Theory 224 Hare s universalizability proposal is reminiscent of Kant s view that an act is morally permissible if and only if the maxim in terms of which the agent thinks of it could possibly serve as a universal rule of conduct and if the agent is prepared to accept it as such Warnock G J Contemporary Moral Philosophy London Macmillan 1967 p 30 Norman Richard The Moral Philosophers An Introduction to Ethics 2nd ed New York Oxford University Press pp 166 67 Price Anthony Richard Mervyn Hare The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Summer 2014 Edition Edward N Zalta ed URL lt http plato stanford edu archives sum2014 entries hare gt Feldman Fred Introductory Ethics Englewood Cliffs NJ Prentice Hall 1978 pp 246 47 Feldman ibid p 247 Warnock Contemporary Moral Philosophy p 35 Kerner George C The Revolution in Ethical Theory New York Oxford 1966 pp 192 96 Feldman Introductory Ethics pp 246 47 Hare R M Freedom and Reason Oxford Clarendon Press 1963 p 220 Kerner The Revolution in Ethical Theory p 193 References EditBrandt Richard 1959 Noncognitivism The Job of Ethical Sentences Is Not to State Facts Ethical Theory Englewood Cliffs Prentice Hall LCCN 59010075 External links EditMoral Cognitivism vs Non Cognitivism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Universal Prescriptivism FAQ Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Universal prescriptivism amp oldid 1123590196, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,
