In logic, anti-psychologism (also logical objectivism[1] or logical realism[2][3]) is a theory about the nature of logical truth, that it does not depend upon the contents of human ideas but exists independent of human ideas.
The psychologism dispute (German: Psychologismusstreit)[9] in 19th-century German-speaking philosophy is closely related to the contemporary internalism and externalism debate in epistemology; psychologism is often construed as a kind of internalism (the thesis that no fact about the world can provide reasons for action independently of desires and beliefs) and anti-psychologism as a kind of externalism (the thesis that reasons are to be identified with objective features of the world).[10]
Edmund Husserl was another important proponent of anti-psychologism, and this trait passed on to other phenomenologists, such as Martin Heidegger, whose doctoral thesis was meant to be a refutation of psychologism. They shared the argument that, because the proposition "no-p is a not-p" is not logically equivalent to "It is thought that 'no-p is a not-p'", psychologism does not logically stand.
Charles Sanders Peirce—whose fields included logic, philosophy, and experimental psychology[12]—could also be considered a critic of psychologism in logic.[13]
Psychologism is not widely held amongst logicians today, but something like it has some high-profile defenders especially among those who do research at the intersection of logic and cognitive science, for example Dov Gabbay and John Woods, who concluded that "whereas mathematical logic must eschew psychologism, the new logic cannot do without it".[14]
Notesedit
^Dermot Moran, Rodney K. B. Parker (eds.), Studia Phaenomenologica: Vol. XV / 2015 – Early Phenomenology, Zeta Books, 2016, p. 75: "Husserl was an exponent of logical objectivism and an opponent of logical psychologism".
^Edgar Morscher [de] (1972), "Von Bolzano zu Meinong: Zur Geschichte des logischen Realismus." In: Rudolf Haller (ed.), Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein: Beiträge zur Meinong-Forschung, Graz, pp. 69–102.
^Penelope Rush, "Logical Realism", in: Penelope Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 13–31.
^Matthias Rath, Der Psychologismusstreit in der deutschen Philosophie, 1994
^Giuseppina D'Oro, "Collingwood, psychologism and internalism," European Journal of Philosophy12(2):163–177 (2004): "internalism is often associated with psychologism".
^Psychologism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy): "Examples of Psychologistic Reasoning"
^Peirce (sometimes with Joseph Jastrow) investigated the probability judgments of experimental subjects, pioneering decision analysis. He and Jastrow wrote "On Small Differences in Sensation", Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences (1885), 3, 73–83, presented 17 October 1884, reprinted in Collected Papers v. 7, paragraphs 21–35. Classics in the History of Psychology. Eprint.
^Peirce attacked the idea, held by some logicians at that time, that rationality rests on a feeling of logicality, rather than on fact. See the first of Peirce's 1903 Lowell Institute Lectures "What Makes a Reasoning Sound?", Essential Peirce v. 2, pp. 242–257. See also the portion of Peirce's 1902 Minute Logic published in Collected Papers v. 2 (1931), paragraphs 18–19 and 39–43. Peirce held that mathematical and philosophical logics precede psychology as a special science and that they do not depend on it for principles.
^Gabbay, Dov M.; Woods, John (March 2001). (PDF). Logic Journal of the IGPL. 9 (2): 141–174. CiteSeerX10.1.1.5.9046. doi:10.1093/jigpal/9.2.141. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2005-05-16. See also: Gabbay, Dov M.; Woods, John (2005) [2003]. A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems. Amsterdam; Boston: North-Holland. doi:10.1016/s1874-5075(03)x8001-8. ISBN044451385X. OCLC 52127672.
Further readingedit
Vladimir Bryushinkin. Metapsychologism in the Philosophy of Logic. Proc. Logic and Philosophy of Logic, 20th World Congress in Philosophy, 2000.
Martin Kusch. Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
November 30, 2023
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In logic anti psychologism also logical objectivism 1 or logical realism 2 3 is a theory about the nature of logical truth that it does not depend upon the contents of human ideas but exists independent of human ideas Contents 1 Overview 2 The return of psychologism 3 Notes 4 Further readingOverview editThe anti psychologistic treatment of logic originated in the works of Immanuel Kant and Bernard Bolzano 4 The concept of logical objectivism or anti psychologism was further developed by Johannes Rehmke founder of Greifswald objectivism 5 and Gottlob Frege founder of logicism the most famous anti psychologist in the philosophy of mathematics and has been the centre of an important debate in early phenomenology and analytical philosophy Frege s work was influenced by Bolzano 6 Elements of anti psychologism in the historiography of philosophy can be found in the work of the members of the 1830s speculative theist movement 7 and the late work of Hermann Lotze 8 The psychologism dispute German Psychologismusstreit 9 in 19th century German speaking philosophy is closely related to the contemporary internalism and externalism debate in epistemology psychologism is often construed as a kind of internalism the thesis that no fact about the world can provide reasons for action independently of desires and beliefs and anti psychologism as a kind of externalism the thesis that reasons are to be identified with objective features of the world 10 Psychologism was defended by Theodor Lipps Gerardus Heymans Wilhelm Wundt Wilhelm Jerusalem Christoph von Sigwart Theodor Elsenhans and Benno Erdmann 11 Edmund Husserl was another important proponent of anti psychologism and this trait passed on to other phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger whose doctoral thesis was meant to be a refutation of psychologism They shared the argument that because the proposition no p is a not p is not logically equivalent to It is thought that no p is a not p psychologism does not logically stand Charles Sanders Peirce whose fields included logic philosophy and experimental psychology 12 could also be considered a critic of psychologism in logic 13 The return of psychologism editSee also Cognitive science and Naturalized epistemology Psychologism is not widely held amongst logicians today but something like it has some high profile defenders especially among those who do research at the intersection of logic and cognitive science for example Dov Gabbay and John Woods who concluded that whereas mathematical logic must eschew psychologism the new logic cannot do without it 14 Notes edit Dermot Moran Rodney K B Parker eds Studia Phaenomenologica Vol XV 2015 Early Phenomenology Zeta Books 2016 p 75 Husserl was an exponent of logical objectivism and an opponent of logical psychologism Edgar Morscher de 1972 Von Bolzano zu Meinong Zur Geschichte des logischen Realismus In Rudolf Haller ed Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein Beitrage zur Meinong Forschung Graz pp 69 102 Penelope Rush Logical Realism in Penelope Rush ed The Metaphysics of Logic Cambridge University Press 2014 pp 13 31 Bernard Bolzano Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1998 Ryle Gilbert 1900 76 Nikolay Milkov Early Analytic Philosophy and the German Philosophical Tradition London Bloomsbury 2020 p 157 Sundholm B G When and why did Frege read Bolzano LOGICA Yearbook 1999 164 174 2000 William R Woodward Hermann Lotze An Intellectual Biography Cambridge University Press 2015 pp 74 5 Sullivan David Hermann Lotze In Zalta Edward N ed Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Matthias Rath Der Psychologismusstreit in der deutschen Philosophie 1994 Giuseppina D Oro Collingwood psychologism and internalism European Journal of Philosophy 12 2 163 177 2004 internalism is often associated with psychologism Psychologism Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Examples of Psychologistic Reasoning Peirce sometimes with Joseph Jastrow investigated the probability judgments of experimental subjects pioneering decision analysis He and Jastrow wrote On Small Differences in Sensation Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences 1885 3 73 83 presented 17 October 1884 reprinted in Collected Papers v 7 paragraphs 21 35 Classics in the History of Psychology Eprint Peirce attacked the idea held by some logicians at that time that rationality rests on a feeling of logicality rather than on fact See the first of Peirce s 1903 Lowell Institute Lectures What Makes a Reasoning Sound Essential Peirce v 2 pp 242 257 See also the portion of Peirce s 1902 Minute Logic published in Collected Papers v 2 1931 paragraphs 18 19 and 39 43 Peirce held that mathematical and philosophical logics precede psychology as a special science and that they do not depend on it for principles Gabbay Dov M Woods John March 2001 The New Logic PDF Logic Journal of the IGPL 9 2 141 174 CiteSeerX 10 1 1 5 9046 doi 10 1093 jigpal 9 2 141 Archived from the original PDF on 2005 05 16 See also Gabbay Dov M Woods John 2005 2003 A Practical Logic of Cognitive Systems Amsterdam Boston North Holland doi 10 1016 s1874 5075 03 x8001 8 ISBN 044451385X OCLC 52127672 Further reading editVladimir Bryushinkin Metapsychologism in the Philosophy of Logic Proc Logic and Philosophy of Logic 20th World Congress in Philosophy 2000 Martin Kusch Psychologism A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge London and New York Routledge 1995 Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Anti psychologism amp oldid 1112290434, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,
