Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905

For the earlier treaties between Japan and Korea in 1905, see Japan–Korea Agreement of April 1905 and Japan–Korea Agreement of August 1905.

The Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905, also known as the Eulsa Treaty, Eulsa Unwilling Treaty or Japan–Korea Protectorate Treaty, was made between the Empire of Japan and the Korean Empire in 1905. Negotiations were concluded on November 17, 1905.^[1] The treaty deprived Korea of its diplomatic sovereignty and made Korea a protectorate of Imperial Japan. It resulted from Imperial Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.^[2]

Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905

The treaty on display
Drafted	November 9, 1905; 118 years ago (1905-11-09)
Signed	November 17, 1905; 118 years ago (1905-11-17)
Location	Jungmyeongjeon Hall, Hanseong, Korea
Effective	November 17, 1905; 118 years ago (1905-11-17)
Signatories	Empire of Japan  Korean Empire

Japan–Korea Treaty of 1905
Japanese name
Kanji	第二次日韓協約
Hiragana	だいにじにっかんきょうやく
Transcriptions Revised Hepburn Dai-niji nikkan kyōyaku
Korean name
Hangul	을사조약
Hanja	乙巳條約
Transcriptions Revised Romanization Eulsa joyak McCune–Reischauer Ŭlsa choyak
Alternative Korean name
Hangul	제2차 한일협약
Hanja	第二次韓日協約
Transcriptions Revised Romanization Je-i-cha Han-il Hyeop-yak McCune–Reischauer Che-i-ch'a Han-il Hyŏp-yak
Alternative Korean name
Hangul	을사늑약
Hanja	乙巳勒約
Transcriptions Revised Romanization Eulsa neugyak McCune–Reischauer Ŭlsa nŭkyak

Names

In the metonymy Eulsa Treaty,^[3] the word Eulsa or Ulsa derives the Sexagenary Cycle's 42nd year of the Korean calendar, in which the treaty was signed.^[4] The treaty is identified by several names including Second Japan–Korea Convention (Japanese: 第二次日韓協約, Korean: 제2차 한일협약; Hanja: 二次韓日協約),^[5] Eulsa Restriction Treaty (Korean: 을사늑약, 乙巳勒約),^[5] Eulsa Protection Treaty (Japanese: 乙巳保護条約, Korean: 을사보호조약),^{[citation needed]} and Korea Protection Treaty (Japanese: 韓国保護条約).^{[citation needed]}

Background

Following Imperial Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War, with its subsequent withdrawal of Russian influence, and the Taft–Katsura Agreement, in which the United States allegedly agreed not to interfere with Japan in matters concerning Korea, the Japanese government sought to formalize its sphere of influence over the Korean Peninsula.

Delegates of both Empires met in Seoul to resolve differences in matters pertaining to Korea's future foreign policy; however, with the Korean Imperial palace under occupation by Japanese troops, and the Imperial Japanese Army stationed at strategic locations throughout Korea, the Korean side was at a distinct disadvantage in the discussions.

Formation of treaty

 

Jungmyeongjeon Hall at Deoksugung, where the treaty was signed

On 9 November 1905, following the Russo-Japanese War, Itō Hirobumi arrived in Hanseong and gave a letter from the Emperor of Japan to Gojong, Emperor of Korea, asking him to sign the treaty. On 15 November 1905, he ordered Japanese troops to encircle the Korean imperial palace and threatened the emperor in order to force him to agree to the treaty.

On 17 November 1905, Ito and Japanese Field Marshal Hasegawa Yoshimichi entered the Jungmyeongjeon Hall, a Russian-designed building that was once part of Deoksu Palace, to persuade Gojong to agree, but he refused. Ito pressured the cabinet with the implied, and later stated, threat of bodily harm, to sign the treaty.^[6] According to 한계옥 (Han-Gyeok), Korean prime minister Han Gyu-seol disagreed, shouting loudly. Ito ordered the guards to lock him in a room and said if he continued screaming, they could kill him.^[7] The Korean cabinet signed an agreement that had been prepared by Ito in the Jungmyeongjeon. The Agreement gave Imperial Japan complete responsibility for Korea's foreign affairs,^[8] and placed all trade through Korean ports under Imperial Japanese supervision.

Treaty provisions

This treaty deprived Korea of its diplomatic sovereignty,^[9][10][11] in effect making Korea a protectorate of Imperial Japan.^[12] As a consequence, the Korean Empire had to close its diplomatic representations abroad, including its short-lived legation in Beijing,^[13] and its legation in Washington, D.C.

The provisions of the treaty took effect on November 17, 1905, and it laid the foundation for the Japan–Korea Treaty of 1907, and subsequent annexation of Korea in 1910.^[14]

The treaty was deemed to have gone into effect after it received the signature of five Korean ministers:

• Minister of Education Lee Wan-yong (이완용; 李完用)
• Minister of Army Yi Geun-taek (이근택; 李根澤)
• Minister of Interior Yi Ji-yong (이지용; 李址鎔)
• Minister of Foreign Affairs Park Je-sun (박제순; 朴齊純)
• Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry Gwon Jung-hyeon (권중현; 權重顯)

These five were later named the "Five Eulsa Traitors".

Emperor Gojong of Korea did not assent or sign the treaty. Other officials who disputed the treaty included:

• Prime Minister Han Kyu-seol (한규설; 韓圭卨)
• Minister of Finance Min Yeong-gi (민영기; 閔泳綺)
• Minister of Justice Yi Ha-yeong (이하영; 李夏榮

Controversy

 

Gojong's analysis of the "treaty of 1905"

Emperor Gojong sent personal letters to major heads of state to appeal for their support against the illegal signing.^[15] As of February 21, 1908, he had sent 17 letters bearing his imperial seal, to the following eight heads of state:^{[citation needed]}

• King Edward VII of the United Kingdom
• President Armand Fallières of France
• Emperor Nicholas II of Russia
• Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary
• King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy
• King Leopold II of Belgium
• Emperor Kuang-hsu (Guangxu) of China
• Emperor Wilhelm II of Germany, which was personally handwritten by Gojong^[15]

 

Letter written by Gojong sent to Wilhelm II of Germany.

In 1907, Emperor Gojong sent three secret emissaries to the second international Hague Peace Convention to protest the unfairness of the Eulsa Treaty. But the great powers of the world refused to allow Korea to take part in the conference.

Not only the Emperor but other Koreans protested against the Treaty. Jo Byeong-se and Min Yeong-hwan, who were high officials and led resistance against Eulsa treaty, killed themselves as resistance. Local yangbans and commoners joined righteous armies. They were called "Eulsa Euibyeong" (을사의병, 乙巳義兵) meaning "Righteous army against Eulsa Treaty".

After completing the treaty, Emperor Gojong tried to let the world know the unfairness of the treaty, including sending a special envoy to The Hague. This directly contributed to the forced retirement of King Gojong.

Rescission

Gojong's declaration of rescission

Thereafter, Gojong tried to inform the international community of the injustice of the 2nd Korea-Japan Agreement, but according to the logic of the international situation at the time, Gojong's secrets were not effective. Gojong's declaration of Rescission in the Eulsa Treaty had the following, but it was not recognized internationally:

• A national document written on January 29, 1906,
• Personal letter handed to Special Commissioner Hulbert on June 22, 1906,
• A letter sent to the President of France on June 22, 1906,
• Gojong's power of attorney given to the Hague Special Envoy Lee Sang-seol on April 20, 1907, etc.

This treaty, later, was confirmed to be "already null and void" by the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea concluded in 1965.^[16]

In a joint statement on June 23, 2005, officials of South Korea and North Korea reiterated their stance that the Eulsa treaty is null and void on a claim of coercion by the Japanese.

As of 2010, South Korea was seizing property and other assets from the descendants of people who have been identified as pro-Japanese collaborators (Chinilpa) at the time of the treaty.^[17]

Aftermath

After the treaty, Japanese influence on Korea dramatically increased. All of the diplomatic mission of Korea was disestablished. All of the foreign relation of Korea was administered by a Japanese Resident-General. Itō Hirobumi was appointed as the first Resident-General.^[18]

 

Residence of Resident-General in Jung District, Seoul

See also

•  Japan portal

• Japan–Korea Treaty of 1904
• Japan–Korea Agreement of August 1904
• Japan–Korea Agreement of April 1905
• Japan–Korea Agreement of August 1905
• Japan–Korea Treaty of 1907
• Japan–Korea Treaty of 1910
• Anglo-Japanese Alliance
• Taft–Katsura Agreement
• Treaty of Portsmouth
• Root–Takahira Agreement
• Unequal treaty
• Liancourt Rocks
• Governor-General of Korea

References

1. Korean Mission to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, DC, 1921–1922. (1922). Korea's Appeal , p. 35, at Google Books; excerpt, "Alleged Treaty, dated November 17, 1905."
2. Clare, Israel et al. (1910). Library of universal history and popular science, p. 4732., p. 4732, at Google Books
3. Pak, Chʻi-yŏng. (2000).Korea and the United Nations, p. 6, at Google Books; excerpt, "... as a first step towards the final annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan forced the Korean king, Kojong, to accept the protectorate treaty (known as the Ulsa Protectorate Treaty) after Japan had defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), following its victory in the Sino-Japanese War (1904–1995)"; Cordier, Henri et al. (1905). "Traité entre le Japon et la Corée," Revue internationale de Sinologie , p. 633, at Google Books
4. Kodansha encyclopedia of Japan, Vol 4, 1983, p. 289; "Ulsa is the designation in the sexagenary cycle for the year corresponding to 1905"
5. 을사조약 (in Korean). Naver/Doosan Encyclopedia.
6. McKenzie, F.A. (1920). Korea's Fight for Freedom. Fleming H. Revell Company.
7. 이토 히로부미는 직접~ :한계옥 (1998년 4월 10일). 〈무력을 앞장 세워 병탄으로〉, 《망언의 뿌리를 찾아서》, 조양욱, 1판 1쇄, 서울: (주)자유포럼, 97~106쪽쪽. ISBN 89-87811-05-0
8. United States. Dept. of State. (1919). Catalogue of treaties: 1814–1918, p. 273, at Google Books
9. "Deoksu Jungmyeongjeon". June 23, 2008. Retrieved May 4, 2009.
10. Uk Heo, Terence Roehrig (2010). South Korea Since 1980. Cambridge University Press. p. 9. ISBN 9780802091956.
11. "Independence leader Kim Koo". April 28, 2008. Retrieved May 4, 2009.
12. The history of Korea, pp. 461–62, Homer Hulbert
13. Sungwook Son (2016), "Qing-Joseon Relations as Viewed from Joseon's Legation in the Qing Dynasty －from 'Hoidonggwan(會同館)' to Korean Legation in Beijing", 동국사학
14. Carnegie Endowment (1921). Pamphlet 43: Korea, Treaties and Agreements, p. vii, at Google Books
15. Lee Hang-bok. "The King's Letter," English JoongAng Daily. September 22, 2009.
16. "Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea". "It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Japan and the Empire of Korea on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void."
17. Julian Ryall (July 14, 2010). "South Korea targets Japanese collaborators' descendants". telegraph.co.uk.
18. 사료로 본 한국사. "을사늑약(을사조약, 제2차 한일협약)".

Bibliography

• Beasley, William G. (1987). Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0198215754 ISBN 9780198215752; ISBN 9780198221685; OCLC 14719443
• Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law. (1921). Pamphlet 43: Korea, Treaties and Agreements." The Endowment: Washington, D.C. OCLC 1644278
• Clare, Israel Smith; Hubert Howe Bancroft and George Edwin Rines. (1910). Library of universal history and popular science. New York: The Bancroft society. OCLC 20843036
• Cordier, Henri and Edouard Chavannes. (1905). "Traité entre le Japon et la Corée," Revue internationale de Sinologie (International Journal of Chinese studies). Leiden: E. J. Brill. OCLC 1767648
• Duus, Peter (1995). The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 9780520086142 ISBN 0520086147; ISBN 978-0-520-21361-6; ISBN 0-520-21361-0; OCLC 232346524
• Korean Mission to the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, D.C., 1921–1922. (1922). Korea's Appeal to the Conference on Limitation of Armament. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. OCLC 12923609
• Pak, Chʻi-yŏng. (2000). Korea and the United Nations. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. ISBN 9789041113825; OCLC 247402192
• Tae-Jin, Yi. "Treaties Leading to Japan’s Annexation of Korea: What Are the Problems?." Korea Journal 56.4 (2016): 5-32. online