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Popular Mobilization Forces

January 01, 1970

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) (Arabic: قوات الحشد الشعبي, romanized: Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī),[35] also known as the People's Mobilization Committee (PMC) and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) is an Iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organization composed of approximately 67 different armed factions, with around 230,000 fighters that are mostly Shia Muslim groups, but also include Sunni Muslim, Christian, and Yazidi groups.[36][37][38][39] The Popular Mobilization Units as a group was formed in 2014 and have fought in nearly every major battle against ISIL.[40] Many of its main militias, in particular the Shias, trace their origins to the "Special Groups", Iranian-sponsored Shi'ite groups which previously fought an insurgency against the United States and the Coalition forces, as well as a sectarian conflict against Sunni Jihadist and Ba'athist insurgents.[36][41] It has been called the new Iraqi Republican Guard after it was fully reorganized in early 2018 by its then–Commander in Chief Haider al-Abadi, Prime Minister of Iraq from 2014 to 2018, who issued "regulations to adapt the situation of the Popular Mobilization fighters".[42]

Popular Mobilization Forces
الحشد الشعبي
al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī
Flag of the Popular Mobilization Forces
Active15 June 2014 – present[1]
Country Iraq
BranchParamilitary[2]
RoleCounter-insurgency
Raiding
Urban warfare
Size230,000[3]
Part ofIraqi Armed Forces[4][5]
Engagements
Websiteal-hashed.gov.iq
Commanders
LeadersFalih Al-Fayyadh
(Chairman of Popular Mobilization Committee)
See Structure
Notable fightersAbu Azrael
Abu Tahsin al-Salihi
Insignia
Patch
SpokesmanAhmed Al Asadi
Dates of operation15 June 2014–present[1]
Group(s)See Structure
HeadquartersBaghdad
Active regionsInternational
In Syria:
Aleppo Governorate
Deir ez-Zor Governorate
IdeologyFactions:
Shia Islamism
Islamic unity (claimed)[6][7]
Anti-Sunnism[8][9]
Anti-West[10]
Anti-LGBT[11]
AlliesState allies

Non-state allies

OpponentsState opponents

Non-state opponents

Designated as a terrorist group byCertain pro-Iran militant groups only:

Some of its component militias which are pro-Iran are considered terrorist groups by some states, while others have been accused of promoting sectarian violence.[43][44][45] Pro-Iran organizations in PMF include the Badr Organisation, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, Saraya Khorasani, etc.[46] During the 2019–2021 Iraqi protests, the pro-Iran factions of PMF organisation were responsible for killing and wounding large numbers of protesters and activists.[47][48][49][50][51] Pro-Iran paramilitary factions in the PMF have been engaged in political and ideological conflicts with pro-Sistani and Sadrist PMF factions, and their increasing rivalry has erupted into violent clashes.[52][53] This schism had caused pro-Iran factions to leave the PMF[failed verification] and form the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.[54][55]

Logos and flags edit

 
PMF troops enter Fallujah after the Third Battle of Fallujah with flags of Iraq and the local militia

While the factions have their own flags,[43] a yellow or white flag with the phrase "Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi" is also used by PMF[56] along with the Iraqi flag.[57][58][59][60]

Name edit

With regard to the official native name, the Arabic word الشعبي (ash-Shaʿbī) translates as "people's" or "popular", as referred to the people; the Arabic word الحشد (al-Ḥashd) translates as "mobilization", as in the group of people mobilized rather than the process of mobilization. In other contexts, al-hashd may translate as other terms such as "crowd", "horde", "throng", "gathering".

Background and formation edit

Further information: Special Groups (Iraq)

The PMF trace their origins to the so-called Special Groups, a US term to designate groups of the Iraqi insurgency which were Shiite, supported and funded by the Iranian Quds Force, as opposed to Ba'atahist loyalist or radical sunni salafi jihadist insurgents. The Special Groups fought both the US-led Coalition forces, but also the afforementioned Ba'ath and sunni insurgent in a sectarian conflict.[41] Originally, there were seven forces in the PMF, which had been operating with Nouri al-Maliki's support since early 2014.[37] These were:

According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for the Carnegie Middle East Center, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki used these forces to combat the emergence of ISIL and maintain his influence in predominantly Sunni areas.[37]

 
PMF troops enter re-captured Fallujah

The People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) were formed by the Iraqi government on 15 June 2014 after top Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani's non-sectarian[37] fatwa on "Sufficiency Jihad" on 13 June.[1] The fatwa called for defending Iraqi cities, particularly Baghdad, and to participate in the counter-offensive against ISIL, following the Fall of Mosul on 10 June 2014.[1][61] The forces brought together a number of Shia militias, most of which receive direct support from Iran, along with a small number of Sunni tribesmen by uniting existing militias under the "People's Mobilization Committee" of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in June 2014.[62] The forces would fall under the umbrella of the state's security services and within the legal frameworks and practices of the Ministry of Interior. On 19 December 2016, Iraqi President Fuad Masum approved a law passed by parliament in November that incorporated PMU in the country's armed forces. The pro-Assad website Al-Masdar News reports that, with this incorporation, the PMU are now subject to the supreme commander of the national armed forces and will no longer be affiliated to any political or social group.[63][better source needed] However, many of these irregulars have continued to operate independently of the Iraqi state.[64]

On 21 March 2017, the PMU announced the launch of a special forces course, in order to create a Special Forces Division. The training program covered a variety of missions with direction from the Iraqi Special Operations Forces.[65][better source needed] On December 11, 2017, the PMU began to be entirely consolidated under the Iraqi Armed Forces, following a call by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to integrate.[40] However, as late as May 2018, this integration had yet to take place, and PMF members remained without the same wages and privileges as soldiers in the regular Iraqi Armed Forces.[66]

According to some sources, the Popular Mobilization Forces have made a fundamental difference on the battlefield, as they have undermined the superiority of ISIL at the level of guerrilla warfare, as well as at the level of the psychological operations.[67]

Structure edit

The umbrella organization Tribal Mobilization (ar) is also a part of PMU.[68][69][70]

Unit Commander Parent militias, parties, and tribes
1st Brigade[71] Badr Organization and Liwa al-Imam Muhammad al-Jawad[71]
2nd Brigade[71] Kata'ib al-Imam Ali[71]
3rd Brigade[71] Tashkil Asad Amerli[71] Badr Organization[71]
4th Brigade[71] Badr Organization[71]
5th Brigade (Tashkil al-Karar unit)[71] Abu Dergham al-Maturi (formerly)[71] Badr Organization[71]
6th Brigade[71] Ahmad al-Asadi[71] Kata'ib Jund al-Imam (Islamic Movement in Iraq)[71]
7th Brigade[71] Dagher al-Mousawi[71] Liwa al-Muntadhar[71]
8th Brigade[71] Abu Ahmed Khadhim al-Jabiri[72] Saraya Ashura (ar)[71][73]
9th Brigade[71] Liwa Karbala' and Badr Organization[71]
10th Brigade[71] Badr Organization[71]
11th Brigade[71][74] Ali al-Hamdani[75] Liwa Ali al-Akbar (fr)[71]
12th Brigade[71] Akram al-Ka'abi[71] Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba[71]
13th Brigade[71] Qasim Muslih[71] Liwa al-Tafuf[71]
14th Brigade[71] Abu Ala al-Walai[76] Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada[71]
15th Brigade[71] Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr (ar) (Islamic Dawa Party) and Kata'ib al-Fatah al-Mubin[71]
16th Brigade[71] Turkmen Brigades and Badr Organization[71]
17th Brigade[71] Hassan al-Sari[77] Saraya al-Jihad[71]
18th Brigade[71] Ali al-Yasiri[78] Saraya al-Khorasani (ar)[71]
19th Brigade[71] Abd al-Zahra al-Swei'adi[71] Ansar Allah al-Awfiya' and Tashkil al-Hussein al-Tha'ir[71]
20th Brigade[71] Hashim Ahmad al-Tamimi[71] Liwa al-Taff[71]
21st Brigade[71] Badr Organization[71]
22nd Brigade[71] Abu Kawthar al-Muhammadawi[71] Badr Organization[71]
23rd Brigade[71] Badr Organization[71]
24th Brigade[71] Badr Organization[71]
25th Brigade[71] Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr (ar) (Islamic Dawa Party)[71]
26th Brigade[71] al-Abbas Combat Division[71]
27th Brigade[71] Badr Organization and Quwat al-Shaheed al-Qa'id Abu Muntadhar al-Muhammadawi[71]
28th Brigade[71] Jalal al-Din Ali al-Saghir[71] Saraya Ansar al-'Aqeeda (ar)[71]
29th Brigade[71] Ahmad al-Fariji[71] Kata'ib Ansar al-Hujja[71]
30th Brigade[71] Shabak Militia and Badr Organization[71]
31st Brigade[71] Adnan al-Shahmani[71][79] Kata'ib al-Tayyar al-Risali (ar) (Risaliyun/The Upholders of the Message)[71]
33rd Brigade[71] Sami al-Masoudi[79] Quwat Wa'ad Allah (Islamic Virtue Party)[71]
35th Brigade[71] Quwat al-Shaheed al-Sadr (ar) (Islamic Dawa Party)[71]
36th Brigade[71] Lalish Regiment, Liwa al-Hussein, and Badr Organization[71]
39th Brigade[71] Harakat al-Abdal (fr)[71]
40th Brigade[71] Shabal al-Zaidi[71] Kata'ib al-Imam Ali (Islamic Movement of Iraq)[71]
41st Brigade[71] Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq[71]
42nd Brigade[71] Quwat/Liwa [al-Shaheed] al-Qa'id Abu Mousa al-Amiri (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq)[71]
43rd Brigade[71] Saba' al-Dujail (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq)[71]
44th Brigade[71] Hamid al-Yasiri[71] Liwa Ansar al-Marja'iyya (ar)[71]
45th Brigade[71] Saraya al-Dafa al-Shaabi[80] Kata'ib Hezbollah[71]
46th Brigade[71] Saraya al-Difa' al-Sha'abi (Kata'ib Hezbollah)[71]
47th Brigade[71] Saraya al-Difa' al-Sha'abi (Kata'ib Hezbollah)[71]
50th Brigade[71][81][82] Rayan al-Kaldani[71] Babylon Brigade (Babylon Movement)[71]
51st Brigade[71] Salah al-Din Brigade (ar)[71]
52nd Brigade[71] Mahdi Taqi al-Amerli[71] Turkmen Brigades and Badr Organization[71]
53rd Brigade[71] Mukhtar al-Musawi[71] Liwa al-Hussein and Badr Organization[71]
55th Brigade[71] Tashkil Malik al-Ashtar.[71] Badr Organization[71]
56th Brigade[71] Hussein Ali Najm al-Juburi[71] Liwa Hashd Shuhada' Kirkuk (Union of National Forces Party)[71]
66th Brigade[71] Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda (ar)[71]
88th Brigade[71] Sheikh Wanas al-Jabara[71]
90th Brigade[71] Ahmad al-Juburi[71] Fursan al-Jubur[71]
91st Brigade[71] Abd al-Raheem al-Shammary[71]
Abd al-Khaliq al-Mutlak al-Jarba[83]		 Nawader Shammar[71] (Shammar tribal force)[83]
92nd Brigade[71] Abd al-Rahman al-Luwaizi[71] Turkmen Brigades
99th Brigade[71] Sa'ad Sawar[71] Jaysh al-Mu'ammal[71]
110th Brigade[71] Badr Organization[71]
201st Brigade[71] Ninawa Guards[71]
313th Brigade[71] Saraya al-Salam[71]
314th Brigade[71] Saraya al-Salam[71]
14th Regiment[84] Omar Fadhil al-Alaf[84] Mosul natives (mostly from al-Arabi neighbourhood)[84]
38th Regiment ("Banners of Iraq")[85] Sheikh Faris al-Sab'awi †[85]
Sheikh al-Meqdad Faris[85]		 Sab'aween tribe[85]
39th Regiment[86] Qayyarah branch of the Jubur tribe[86]
41st Regiment ("Force of Determination")[87] Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah al-Waka ("Abu al-Karar")[87] Jubur tribe[87]
80th Regiment[88] Sinjar Resistance Units[88]
Wathiq al-Firdousi[89] Quwat al-Bairaq – Kata'ib al-Shahid al-Awwal

In February 2019, (PMF) raided a base belonging to Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces, during the raid the group's leader Aws al-Khafaji was arrested by Iraqi forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces claimed that the raid was part of an ongoing operation to crack down on fake groups claiming to be part of PMF in order to commit crimes. The group also never formally declared itself as part of PMF nor had it ever registered as part of PMF with the Iraqi government.[90]

In 2020, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada formed the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.

Composition and organization edit

While there are no official data about the strength of the Popular Mobilization Forces, there are some estimates, differing significantly. Around Tikrit reports in 2015 suggested there were about 20,000 engaged militiamen, while the grand total ranges are from 2–5 million[91] to 300,000–450,000 Iraqi armed forces.[92] Higher estimates have included about 40,000 Sunni fighters in 2016,[93] a figure evolving from reports in early 2015, which counted 1,000 to 3,000 Sunni fighters.[94][95] By early March 2015 the Popular Mobilization Forces appeared to be strengthening its foothold in the Yazidis town of Shingal by recruiting and paying local people.[96]

The Popular Mobilization Forces consist of both new volunteers and pre-existing militias, which have been grouped within the umbrella organization formally under the control of the Ministry of Interior Popular Mobilization Units directorate.[97][98] Among these militias there are the Peace Companies (formerly known as the Mahdi Army), Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Organization.[99]

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi ordered on April 7, 2015, that the Popular Mobilization Forces be placed under the direct command of the prime minister's office,[100] thus giving a further official status to the militia.[101]

In 2015, the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee in the Iraqi government was Falih al-Fayyadh, who is also the National Security Adviser.[102] The Popular Mobilization Committee is under the Office of Prime Minister.[37] The PMF are said to have been led on the battlefields by Jamal Jaafar Mohammed, also known as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the head of Kata'ib Hezbollah,[103][104] but the chain of command runs through pre-existing leaders.[105] According to Iraqi sources, as well as to the London-based pro-Saudi Asharq Al-Awsat, the different militias rely on their own chain of command, and rarely work together[91] or follow regular Iraqi Army's orders.[106]

The Laws and conduct by which the PMF should abide are those of the Iraqi Government since the Iraqi Prime Minister has the final control over the PMF. Nonetheless, Marja' Ali al-Sistani issued an "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields" which included a 20 points form of how the PMF should conduct themselves. The main points were that the PMF should treat the liberated areas locals with the Islamic Law which is as quoted from the second point which is a Hadith of the Muslim Prophet Muhammed; "Do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill an elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do no not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise".[107] Other points included the same aforementioned guidance when treating non-Muslims and also not to steal or disrespect people even if they are the families of the ISIS fighters.[107][non-primary source needed]

Alongside Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, other people in charge of the PMF include Qais al-Khazali, commander of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Hadi Al-Amiri, the chief of the Badr Organization.[108] According to The New York Times, such organizational autonomy may present a challenge to the consolidation of Haider al-Abadi's authority.[109] Volunteers include Shia Arabs, and smaller numbers of Iraqi Christians, Sunni Arabs, and Shia Turkmen.[37]

The militias are trained and supported by military advisers from Turkey (for Sunni and Turkmeni troops),[110] Iran, and Hezbollah,[111] including prominent Quds Force figures, such as (until his 2020 death) Qasem Soleimani.[112] The PMF also appeared to have deployed at least a regiment under the command of Colonel Jumaa al-Jumaily in Al Anbar Governorate.[113] They are also said to have their own military intelligence, administrative systems,[91] a sort of "media war team" that provides morale boosting, battlefield updates and propaganda videos,[114] and a court of law.[115]

Shia Arab component edit

 
PMF commanders with IRGC advisors during the Hawija offensive (2017)

According to a Sunni newspaper, there are three main Shia components within the Popular Mobilization Forces: the first are the groups that were formed following Sistani's fatwa, without political roots or ambitions; the second are groups that were formed by political parties or are initially the military wings of these parties, with definite political characterization; the third is the armed groups that have been present in Iraq for years and have fought battles against US forces and also participated in operations in Syria.[97]

According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for The Carnegie Foundation, the Popular Mobilization Forces are factionally divided into three Shia components: a component pledging allegiance to Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei; a faction pledging allegiance to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani; and the faction headed by Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.[37]

The most powerful groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces are the groups which maintain strong ties with Iran and pledge spiritual allegiance to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[37] The pro-Khamanei faction would consist of already established parties and of relatively small paramilitaries: Saraya Khurasani, Kata'ib Hezbollah, Kata'ib Abu Fadhl al-Abbas, the Badr Organization and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. These groups serve as a kind of border guard—a sort of Iranian insurance policy against threats on its immediate border.[37] Their leaders publicly take pride in such affiliations, professing religious allegiance to Khamenei and his notion of Vilayat al-Faqih.[37]

According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour, the pro-Sistani faction consists of those armed groups formed by Sistani's fatwa to defend Shia holy sites and by paramilitary of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.[37] There are four major groups organized by Najaf: Saraya al-Ataba al-Abbasiya, Saraya al-Ataba al-Hussainiya, Saraya al-Ataba al-Alawiya, and Liwa 'Ali al-Akbar, corresponding to Shia holy sites in Kadhimiya, Karbala, and Najaf.[37] The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq also swears allegiance to Sistani. After the Badr Organization left the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, its leader Ammar al-Hakim formed new paramilitary units, including Saraya el-Jihad, Saraya el-'Aqida, and Saraya 'Ashura.[37]

Muqtada al-Sadr's Peace Companies (Saraya al-Salam) were founded in June 2014 from the Mahdi Army. According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour, the Sadrists have largely been cut off from Iranian funding.[37]

According to Shia P.M.F. officials, the recruitment campaign is successful also because it is administered by the religious establishment and Shia religious scholars from the hawza are instrumental in recruitment.[116] Recruitment via Shia Islamist political party structures and even individual clerics or members of parliament is pursued more the official PMF Commission, which lacks recruitment offices.[37]

Sunni Arab component edit

In early stages of the PMF, the Shia component was almost exclusive and the Sunni one was negligible since it counted only 1,000 to 3,000 men.[95] In January 2016, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi approved the appointment of 40,000 Sunni fighters to the Popular Mobilization Forces. According to Al-Monitor, his move was decided in order to give a multiconfessional image to the Forces; however, Sunni fighters began to volunteer even before the al-Abadi's decision. Adding Sunni fighters to the Popular Mobilization Units could set the stage for the force to become the core of the envisioned National Guard.[93] According to The Economist, as of late April 2016 the Hashd had approximately 16,000 Sunnis.[117]

It has been observed that the Sunni Arab tribes that took part in al-Hashd al-Shaabi 2015 recruitment are those which also had good relations with Nouri al-Maliki during his tenure as Prime Minister.[118]

According to Yazan al-Jabouri, a secular Sunni commander of anti-ISIS Liwa Salahaddin, as of November 2016, there were 30,000 Iraqi Sunnis fighting within the ranks of PMUs.[119]

Shia Turkmen component edit

The Turkmen Hashd overall constitute around four thousand members and are called “Brigade 12”.[12]

According to Faleh A. Jabar and Renad Mansour for The Carnegie Foundation, Shia Turkmen joined Popular Mobilization Forces in order to increase their local autonomy from the Kurdistan Region and in order to counter Sunni Turkmen, who joined the Islamic State.[37]

Christian component edit

There is also Christian and Shabak PMF units in Ninawa plains.[12] The Imam Ali Brigades trained two Christian units called Kata’ib Rouh Allah Issa Ibn Miriam Brigades and Babylon.[120]

Equipment edit

 
Popular Mobilization Forces fire a mortar during the Hawija offensive in 2017.

The equipment of the Popular Mobilization Forces is a major issue. At the end of January 2015, a video showed a large Kata'ib Hezbollah convoy transporting several American-made military vehicles, including an M1 Abrams Tank, M113 armoured personnel carriers, Humvees, and MRAP vehicles as well as Iranian-made Safir 4×4s and technicals with Kata'ib Hezbollah's flags flying.[121] According to some sources, the Iraqi government is supplying U.S.-provided military equipment to the militias.[122][123] Iraqi minister of transportation, and the head of the Badr Organization, Hadi Al-Amiri criticized the U.S. for the lack of providing arms.[124] On the other hand, U.S. officials argue that the operators of heavy weapons allegedly taken over by Kata'ib Hezbollah were regular Iraqi soldiers who raised the Hezbollah flag merely in solidarity with the militant group, while the same source acknowledged that it is generally difficult to monitor U.S.-made weapons.[125]

Alongside U.S.-made military equipment handed over to or fallen into the hands of Popular Mobilization Forces, Iran is a major supplier. According to some sources, in 2014 Tehran sold Baghdad nearly $10 billion worth of weapons and hardware. Furthermore, there is a daily supply of Iranian weapons,[126] including Iranian-made 106 mm anti-tank guns as well as 120 mm, 82 mm and 60 mm mortars.[127]

In May 2015, the United States started delivering about $1.6 billion worth of military equipment under the supervision of the Government of Iraq. According to some sources, the major beneficiaries of the weapons deliveries are to be the Popular Mobilization Forces.[128]

Heavy armour seemed to be operated by Popular Mobilization Forces in the operations surrounding the battle of Mosul.[129]

History and major engagements edit

The Popular Mobilization Forces have been involved in several battles of the military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant since their founding, the most important being the Second Battle of Tikrit. After the end of the battle of Tikrit, the complex of occupation forces handed over security issues to local police and security forces.[130]

On Monday April 6, 2015, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said that, while being heavily involved in the conquest of Tikrit, the Popular Mobilization Forces will not join the planned Mosul conquest.[131] This statement was reversed in March 2016, when al-Abadi reportedly rejected calls by Nineveh's provincial council to prohibit Popular Mobilization Forces from taking part in retaking Mosul.[132]

Shia volunteers reportedly entered Al Anbar Governorate on the first days of May 2015, among heavy protests of Sunnite personalities,[133][134] with limited operations continuing in 2016.[135]

In Autumn 2016, they participated in the Mosul Offensive acting as left flank of the anti-IS forces, and by November had captured a number of smaller towns and villages from IS, expanding roughly along a line from Qayyarah to Tal Afar, while keeping a distance (20+ km) to the city of Mosul itself.

In October 2017, the PMF was part of the Iraqi government forces that recaptured Kirkuk,[136] which had been under Kurdish control since 2014.[137]

Engagement in Syria edit

Khomeinist PMF militia factions loyal to the Iranian Supreme Leader have been heavily deployed in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime, often with the stated aim of defending Shi'ite shrines.[138] Although at the time of the formation of the PMF, most of its component groups were primarily engaged in Iraq against ISIL, after the reduction of the immediate ISIL threat in Iraq from 2015, many returned to Syria. For instance, in January 2015, pro-Iran Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada militant group announced the deaths of two of its fighters in defense of Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque in Damascus, and the militia's involvement in the 2015 Southern Syria offensive was documented by the Iraqi TV station Al-Anwar 2.[139] Between 2013 and early 2016, 1,200 Iraqi fighters died in Syria, including combatants of pro-Iran militias Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, among them senior commanders Abu al-Fadl and Abu Haider al-Nazari.[140]

On the other hand, pro-Sistani and Sadrist PMF militias wary of Iranian influence in Iraq are strongly opposed to the intervention in Syria and have been resisting recruitment attempts made by pro-Iran factions to send Iraqis to die on the side of Assad regime.[141]

Terrorism edit

Kata'ib Hizballah, one of the forces of the PMF, is listed by Japan's Public Security Intelligence Agency as a terrorist organization.[142] The United Arab Emirates also classifies it as terrorist.[143] Kata'ib Hizballah was designated a terrorist entity in 2009 by the United States.[144] Its leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was also designated a terrorist.[145] In 2019, U.S. designated Harakat al-Nujaba and its leader Akram al-Ka'abi Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT). In 2020, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, a powerful Iran-backed militia, part of the PMF, was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States.[146] In 2023, U.S. added PMF militia Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada to its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists.[147]

Involvement in 2019–2021 Iraqi protests edit

During the 2019–2021 Iraqi protests, which called for the end of the sectarian political system, the PMF militias took part in the protests by using live bullets, marksmen, hot water, hot pepper gas and tear gas against protesters, leading to over 1,000 deaths and over 30,000 injuries.[148][149][150][151]

Domestic criticisms and war crimes accusations edit

Some of the militias constituting the Popular Mobilization Forces have been accused of war crimes motivated by sectarian revenge. According to Amnesty International in 2014, Shia militias have abducted, tortured and killed numerous Sunni civilians[67][152] and, according to Western sources, in Tikrit militants have committed some violence, while being publicly praised;[95] In the wake of the conquest of Tikrit, Iraqi authorities declared that war crimes would be investigated and their perpetrators punished.[131]

High Shia authorities, such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Ayatollah Hussein Al-Sadr, called on the militants in the PMF to refrain from war crimes or other despicable behaviour.[153] In 2015, ad hoc government inquiry committees were established to investigate civilian deaths attributed to the militias.[154]

In 2016, Mosul Sunni dignitaries and officials accused the PMF of killings of Sunnis, takeovers of schools and forcing Sunnis to sell property in the prime real estate area close to the Mosul shrine. According to City council's deputy chairman Muzher Fleih, 650 Sunnis have disappeared. Militia leaders insist any abuses are isolated incidents,[115] and target only captured Islamic State's collaborators.[155]

Alongside war crimes accusations, concerns regarding the constitutionality and politicization of al-Hashd al-Shaabi have been raised. Sunni sources have called for depoliticization of the Popular Mobilization Forces, to be achieved under the proposed National Guard bill.[97] According to some critics in 2015, the Popular Mobilization Forces were not sanctioned by the Constitution of Iraq and nonetheless had a budget and were paid on regular basis by the Iraqi government, whilst the legally established Peshmerga had not received their wages.[156][157] The official status and actual dependence of the Popular Mobilization Forces on the Baghdad government and its help was not fully resolved as of late 2015.[158] However, by the end of 2016, a law was passed bringing the PMU under the auspices of the Supreme Commander of the Iraqi National Army, incorporating PMF units into the official army of Iraq and removing any official affiliation with any social, religious or political group.[63]

Recruitment of Yazidis in Kurdish areas has been deemed to go against official Kurdish policy against the move: in February 2015, Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani asked the Peshmerga minister to stop all militia activities in the area.[96]

Allegedly, clerics from the Najaf Seminary, including Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, also criticized the monopolistic conduct of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.[37]

Concerns about growth edit

The Popular Mobilization Forces are accused of accruing a power base in Iraq and of being Iran's instrument to dominate Iraq.[159] The main fears are that the permanent militia would turn themselves into enforcers of Shia domination.[115] The Iraqi Police headquarters in the Muthanna Governorate announced that they were in the process of commissioning Popular Mobilization battalions with security tasks in early January 2016. These tasks included protecting public and private establishments in open desert areas, among others. Other reports indicate that Popular Mobilization is securing border outlets and controlling security in liberated cities.[160]

According to General Ali Omran, commander of the army's 5th Infantry Division, P.M.F. militias are too entrenched in politics and at risk of "coming to blows" with the Armed Forces. In February 2016, militiamen refused orders to vacate a building in a military base north of Baghdad.[115]

According to AP-interviewed government officials and militia leaders, due to the fear of a return to Sunni minority rule over the Iraqi Shia majority, PMF militias want to remain a permanent, independent armed force; Hamed al-Jazaeery, head of the al-Khorasani Brigades militia, stated that the model is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.[115]

International reactions edit

  •   United Nations: In a 2015 speech of its Special Representative and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), Jan Kubis mentioned the Popular Mobilization Forces, saying that the Iraqi security forces, with the critical support of the Popular Mobilization Forces, tribal Sunni volunteers, and the International Coalition, have yet to significantly change the situation on the ground"[161]
  •   CJTF–OIR: In 2016, Commander of the CJTF-OIR Lt Gen. Stephen J. Townsend described the PMF militias as "remarkably disciplined" allies since he arrived. He added that the PMF could make Iraq more secure—if they become a national guard-like force, and not a "puppet" of Iran.[162]

American-led airstrikes edit

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, a member of the PMF, stated that their forces were bombed by US planes on 7 August 2017, in Al Anbar Governorate near the Iraq–Syria border and that Hashd al-Shaabi forces suffered many casualties.[163] The Baghdad-based spokesman of the U.S.-led coalition, Army Col. Ryan Dillon, dismissed the allegation, saying on Twitter that no coalition airstrikes took place in the area at the time. According to the militia's deputy, Ahmed al-Maksousi, they were hit by artillery fire in Syria's Jamouna area, about 12 kilometers (about 7.5 miles) from the Iraqi border. Along with 40 killed, many militiamen were wounded, al-Maksousi added.[164]

On 22 August 2019, The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), blamed the United States and Israel for a number of bombings on their warehouses and bases. The group accused the US of permitting Israeli drones to join its forces for executing attacks on Iraqi territory. The group pledged to counter any attack in the future.[165] On 23 August, a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri called for attacks against US troops in Iraq, "the presence of any US military force in Iraq is forbidden (haram) under any title: military training, advice or the rationale of fighting terrorism".[166]

On 29 December 2019, the United States bombed the headquarters of PMF member Kata'ib Hezbollah near Al-Qa'im, killing 25 militiamen.[167]

On 3 January 2020, PMF commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, PMF PR head Mohammed Redha al-Jabri,[168] and the Quds Force head, Qasem Soleimani, were among those killed in an assassination near Baghdad Airport.[169][170]

On 12 March 2020, the U.S. launched air raids against five Kata'ib Hezbollah weapons storage bases across Iraq in retaliation for the 2020 Camp Taji attacks.[171]

On 25 February 2021, a U.S. air raid killed one and wounded four while targeting PMF facilities on the Iraqi-Syrian border in Syria's eastern Deir ez-Zor Governorate. The facilities were used by PMF forces combatting ISIL in collaboration with the Iraqi and Syrian governments. U.S. officials described the PMF as an "Iranian-backed militia" and the air strike as a retaliation for purported Iranian military aggression against U.S. facilities in Iraq, while Iranian officials denied involvement. Iraqi officials repudiated any connection between the PMF and the insurgents who previously attacked U.S. facilities.[citation needed] The Pentagon asserted that the air raid followed consultation with the Iraqi government and other partners in the region,[172] but the Iraqi military denied providing the U.S. with information regarding locations within Syria.[173]

On 27 June 2021, U.S. forces bombed two locations after an increase in drone attacks. One location was a drone-making facility and the other a conventional weapons exchange depot. Four members of Kataib Sayyed al-Shuhada faction were claimed to have been killed in the action.[174]

On 4 January 2024, U.S. airstrikes on PMF's logistical headquarters killed two people, including the organization's deputy head of operations in Baghdad, Mushtaq Talib al-Saeedi, and wounded five others.[175]

On 2 February 2024, U.S. airstrikes targeted the headquarters of the PMF in Akashat in Anbar Governorate, killing 16 fighters and wounding 25.[176][177]

See also edit

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External links edit

  •   Media related to Hashed al-Shaabi at Wikimedia Commons
  • Official website

January 01, 1970
popular, mobilization, forces, arabic, قوات, الحشد, الشعبي, romanized, quwwāt, Ḥashd, shaʿbī, also, known, people, mobilization, committee, popular, mobilization, units, iraqi, state, sponsored, umbrella, organization, composed, approximately, different, armed. The Popular Mobilization Forces PMF Arabic قوات الحشد الشعبي romanized Quwwat al Ḥashd ash Shaʿbi 35 also known as the People s Mobilization Committee PMC and the Popular Mobilization Units PMU is an Iraqi state sponsored umbrella organization composed of approximately 67 different armed factions with around 230 000 fighters that are mostly Shia Muslim groups but also include Sunni Muslim Christian and Yazidi groups 36 37 38 39 The Popular Mobilization Units as a group was formed in 2014 and have fought in nearly every major battle against ISIL 40 Many of its main militias in particular the Shias trace their origins to the Special Groups Iranian sponsored Shi ite groups which previously fought an insurgency against the United States and the Coalition forces as well as a sectarian conflict against Sunni Jihadist and Ba athist insurgents 36 41 It has been called the new Iraqi Republican Guard after it was fully reorganized in early 2018 by its then Commander in Chief Haider al Abadi Prime Minister of Iraq from 2014 to 2018 who issued regulations to adapt the situation of the Popular Mobilization fighters 42 Popular Mobilization Forcesالحشد الشعبي al Ḥashd ash ShaʿbiFlag of the Popular Mobilization ForcesActive15 June 2014 present 1 Country IraqBranchParamilitary 2 RoleCounter insurgencyRaidingUrban warfareSize230 000 3 Part ofIraqi Armed Forces 4 5 EngagementsWar in Iraq 2013 2017 Syrian Civil War Islamic State insurgency in Iraq 2017 present Websiteal hashed gov iqCommandersLeadersFalih Al Fayyadh Chairman of Popular Mobilization Committee See StructureNotable fightersAbu Azrael Abu Tahsin al SalihiInsigniaPatchSpokesmanAhmed Al AsadiDates of operation15 June 2014 present 1 Group s See StructureHeadquartersBaghdadActive regionsInternational In Syria Aleppo GovernorateDeir ez Zor GovernorateIdeologyFactions Shia IslamismIslamic unity claimed 6 7 Anti Sunnism 8 9 Anti West 10 Anti LGBT 11 AlliesState allies Iran Artesh IRGC Quds Force 12 Basij 13 North Korea 14 Russia 15 16 Syria Non state allies Islamic Resistance in Iraq Hezbollah 17 Peshmerga only against ISIS Islamic Dawa Party Nouri al Maliki 18 Syrian Democratic Forces only against ISIS 19 February 14 Youth Coalition 20 21 Houthis alleged denied by PMF 22 Hezbollah Al Hejaz 23 Sinjar Resistance Units 24 OpponentsState opponents Israel 25 United States CJTF OIR Non state opponents Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant GMCIR until December 2014 Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order 26 Al Nusra Front until 28 January 2017 Free Syrian Army 27 Islamic Front until 2015 28 White Flags 29 Ansar al Islam 30 People s Mujahedin of Iran 31 Designated as a terrorist group byCertain pro Iran militant groups only United States 32 United Arab Emirates 33 Japan 34 Some of its component militias which are pro Iran are considered terrorist groups by some states while others have been accused of promoting sectarian violence 43 44 45 Pro Iran organizations in PMF include the Badr Organisation Asa ib Ahl al Haq Kata ib Hezbollah Kata ib al Imam Ali Saraya Khorasani etc 46 During the 2019 2021 Iraqi protests the pro Iran factions of PMF organisation were responsible for killing and wounding large numbers of protesters and activists 47 48 49 50 51 Pro Iran paramilitary factions in the PMF have been engaged in political and ideological conflicts with pro Sistani and Sadrist PMF factions and their increasing rivalry has erupted into violent clashes 52 53 This schism had caused pro Iran factions to leave the PMF failed verification and form the Islamic Resistance in Iraq 54 55 Contents 1 Logos and flags 2 Name 3 Background and formation 4 Structure 5 Composition and organization 5 1 Shia Arab component 5 2 Sunni Arab component 5 3 Shia Turkmen component 5 4 Christian component 6 Equipment 7 History and major engagements 7 1 Engagement in Syria 8 Terrorism 9 Involvement in 2019 2021 Iraqi protests 10 Domestic criticisms and war crimes accusations 10 1 Concerns about growth 11 International reactions 12 American led airstrikes 13 See also 14 References 15 External linksLogos and flags edit nbsp PMF troops enter Fallujah after the Third Battle of Fallujah with flags of Iraq and the local militia While the factions have their own flags 43 a yellow or white flag with the phrase Al Hashd Al Sha bi is also used by PMF 56 along with the Iraqi flag 57 58 59 60 Name editWith regard to the official native name the Arabic word الشعبي ash Shaʿbi translates as people s or popular as referred to the people the Arabic word الحشد al Ḥashd translates as mobilization as in the group of people mobilized rather than the process of mobilization In other contexts al hashd may translate as other terms such as crowd horde throng gathering Background and formation editFurther information Special Groups Iraq The PMF trace their origins to the so called Special Groups a US term to designate groups of the Iraqi insurgency which were Shiite supported and funded by the Iranian Quds Force as opposed to Ba atahist loyalist or radical sunni salafi jihadist insurgents The Special Groups fought both the US led Coalition forces but also the afforementioned Ba ath and sunni insurgent in a sectarian conflict 41 Originally there were seven forces in the PMF which had been operating with Nouri al Maliki s support since early 2014 37 These were Badr Organization Asa ib Ahl al Haq Kata ib Hezbollah Kata ib Sayyid al Shuhada Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Kata ib al Imam Ali Kata ib Jund al Imam According to Faleh A Jabar and Renad Mansour for the Carnegie Middle East Center Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki used these forces to combat the emergence of ISIL and maintain his influence in predominantly Sunni areas 37 nbsp PMF troops enter re captured Fallujah The People s Mobilization Forces PMF were formed by the Iraqi government on 15 June 2014 after top Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al Sistani s non sectarian 37 fatwa on Sufficiency Jihad on 13 June 1 The fatwa called for defending Iraqi cities particularly Baghdad and to participate in the counter offensive against ISIL following the Fall of Mosul on 10 June 2014 1 61 The forces brought together a number of Shia militias most of which receive direct support from Iran along with a small number of Sunni tribesmen by uniting existing militias under the People s Mobilization Committee of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in June 2014 62 The forces would fall under the umbrella of the state s security services and within the legal frameworks and practices of the Ministry of Interior On 19 December 2016 Iraqi President Fuad Masum approved a law passed by parliament in November that incorporated PMU in the country s armed forces The pro Assad website Al Masdar News reports that with this incorporation the PMU are now subject to the supreme commander of the national armed forces and will no longer be affiliated to any political or social group 63 better source needed However many of these irregulars have continued to operate independently of the Iraqi state 64 On 21 March 2017 the PMU announced the launch of a special forces course in order to create a Special Forces Division The training program covered a variety of missions with direction from the Iraqi Special Operations Forces 65 better source needed On December 11 2017 the PMU began to be entirely consolidated under the Iraqi Armed Forces following a call by Ayatollah Ali al Sistani to integrate 40 However as late as May 2018 this integration had yet to take place and PMF members remained without the same wages and privileges as soldiers in the regular Iraqi Armed Forces 66 According to some sources the Popular Mobilization Forces have made a fundamental difference on the battlefield as they have undermined the superiority of ISIL at the level of guerrilla warfare as well as at the level of the psychological operations 67 Structure editThe umbrella organization Tribal Mobilization ar is also a part of PMU 68 69 70 Unit Commander Parent militias parties and tribes 1st Brigade 71 Badr Organization and Liwa al Imam Muhammad al Jawad 71 2nd Brigade 71 Kata ib al Imam Ali 71 3rd Brigade 71 Tashkil Asad Amerli 71 Badr Organization 71 4th Brigade 71 Badr Organization 71 5th Brigade Tashkil al Karar unit 71 Abu Dergham al Maturi formerly 71 Badr Organization 71 6th Brigade 71 Ahmad al Asadi 71 Kata ib Jund al Imam Islamic Movement in Iraq 71 7th Brigade 71 Dagher al Mousawi 71 Liwa al Muntadhar 71 8th Brigade 71 Abu Ahmed Khadhim al Jabiri 72 Saraya Ashura ar 71 73 9th Brigade 71 Liwa Karbala and Badr Organization 71 10th Brigade 71 Badr Organization 71 11th Brigade 71 74 Ali al Hamdani 75 Liwa Ali al Akbar fr 71 12th Brigade 71 Akram al Ka abi 71 Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba 71 13th Brigade 71 Qasim Muslih 71 Liwa al Tafuf 71 14th Brigade 71 Abu Ala al Walai 76 Kata ib Sayyid al Shuhada 71 15th Brigade 71 Quwat al Shaheed al Sadr ar Islamic Dawa Party and Kata ib al Fatah al Mubin 71 16th Brigade 71 Turkmen Brigades and Badr Organization 71 17th Brigade 71 Hassan al Sari 77 Saraya al Jihad 71 18th Brigade 71 Ali al Yasiri 78 Saraya al Khorasani ar 71 19th Brigade 71 Abd al Zahra al Swei adi 71 Ansar Allah al Awfiya and Tashkil al Hussein al Tha ir 71 20th Brigade 71 Hashim Ahmad al Tamimi 71 Liwa al Taff 71 21st Brigade 71 Badr Organization 71 22nd Brigade 71 Abu Kawthar al Muhammadawi 71 Badr Organization 71 23rd Brigade 71 Badr Organization 71 24th Brigade 71 Badr Organization 71 25th Brigade 71 Quwat al Shaheed al Sadr ar Islamic Dawa Party 71 26th Brigade 71 al Abbas Combat Division 71 27th Brigade 71 Badr Organization and Quwat al Shaheed al Qa id Abu Muntadhar al Muhammadawi 71 28th Brigade 71 Jalal al Din Ali al Saghir 71 Saraya Ansar al Aqeeda ar 71 29th Brigade 71 Ahmad al Fariji 71 Kata ib Ansar al Hujja 71 30th Brigade 71 Shabak Militia and Badr Organization 71 31st Brigade 71 Adnan al Shahmani 71 79 Kata ib al Tayyar al Risali ar Risaliyun The Upholders of the Message 71 33rd Brigade 71 Sami al Masoudi 79 Quwat Wa ad Allah Islamic Virtue Party 71 35th Brigade 71 Quwat al Shaheed al Sadr ar Islamic Dawa Party 71 36th Brigade 71 Lalish Regiment Liwa al Hussein and Badr Organization 71 39th Brigade 71 Harakat al Abdal fr 71 40th Brigade 71 Shabal al Zaidi 71 Kata ib al Imam Ali Islamic Movement of Iraq 71 41st Brigade 71 Asa ib Ahl al Haq 71 42nd Brigade 71 Quwat Liwa al Shaheed al Qa id Abu Mousa al Amiri Asa ib Ahl al Haq 71 43rd Brigade 71 Saba al Dujail Asa ib Ahl al Haq 71 44th Brigade 71 Hamid al Yasiri 71 Liwa Ansar al Marja iyya ar 71 45th Brigade 71 Saraya al Dafa al Shaabi 80 Kata ib Hezbollah 71 46th Brigade 71 Saraya al Difa al Sha abi Kata ib Hezbollah 71 47th Brigade 71 Saraya al Difa al Sha abi Kata ib Hezbollah 71 50th Brigade 71 81 82 Rayan al Kaldani 71 Babylon Brigade Babylon Movement 71 51st Brigade 71 Salah al Din Brigade ar 71 52nd Brigade 71 Mahdi Taqi al Amerli 71 Turkmen Brigades and Badr Organization 71 53rd Brigade 71 Mukhtar al Musawi 71 Liwa al Hussein and Badr Organization 71 55th Brigade 71 Tashkil Malik al Ashtar 71 Badr Organization 71 56th Brigade 71 Hussein Ali Najm al Juburi 71 Liwa Hashd Shuhada Kirkuk Union of National Forces Party 71 66th Brigade 71 Saraya Ansar al Aqeeda ar 71 88th Brigade 71 Sheikh Wanas al Jabara 71 90th Brigade 71 Ahmad al Juburi 71 Fursan al Jubur 71 91st Brigade 71 Abd al Raheem al Shammary 71 Abd al Khaliq al Mutlak al Jarba 83 Nawader Shammar 71 Shammar tribal force 83 92nd Brigade 71 Abd al Rahman al Luwaizi 71 Turkmen Brigades 99th Brigade 71 Sa ad Sawar 71 Jaysh al Mu ammal 71 110th Brigade 71 Badr Organization 71 201st Brigade 71 Ninawa Guards 71 313th Brigade 71 Saraya al Salam 71 314th Brigade 71 Saraya al Salam 71 14th Regiment 84 Omar Fadhil al Alaf 84 Mosul natives mostly from al Arabi neighbourhood 84 38th Regiment Banners of Iraq 85 Sheikh Faris al Sab awi 85 Sheikh al Meqdad Faris 85 Sab aween tribe 85 39th Regiment 86 Qayyarah branch of the Jubur tribe 86 41st Regiment Force of Determination 87 Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah al Waka Abu al Karar 87 Jubur tribe 87 80th Regiment 88 Sinjar Resistance Units 88 Wathiq al Firdousi 89 Quwat al Bairaq Kata ib al Shahid al Awwal In February 2019 PMF raided a base belonging to Abu al Fadl al Abbas Forces during the raid the group s leader Aws al Khafaji was arrested by Iraqi forces the Popular Mobilization Forces claimed that the raid was part of an ongoing operation to crack down on fake groups claiming to be part of PMF in order to commit crimes The group also never formally declared itself as part of PMF nor had it ever registered as part of PMF with the Iraqi government 90 In 2020 Kata ib Hezbollah Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Asa ib Ahl al Haq and Kata ib Sayyid al Shuhada formed the Islamic Resistance in Iraq Composition and organization editWhile there are no official data about the strength of the Popular Mobilization Forces there are some estimates differing significantly Around Tikrit reports in 2015 suggested there were about 20 000 engaged militiamen while the grand total ranges are from 2 5 million 91 to 300 000 450 000 Iraqi armed forces 92 Higher estimates have included about 40 000 Sunni fighters in 2016 93 a figure evolving from reports in early 2015 which counted 1 000 to 3 000 Sunni fighters 94 95 By early March 2015 the Popular Mobilization Forces appeared to be strengthening its foothold in the Yazidis town of Shingal by recruiting and paying local people 96 The Popular Mobilization Forces consist of both new volunteers and pre existing militias which have been grouped within the umbrella organization formally under the control of the Ministry of Interior Popular Mobilization Units directorate 97 98 Among these militias there are the Peace Companies formerly known as the Mahdi Army Kata ib Hezbollah Kata ib Sayyid al Shuhada Kata ib al Imam Ali Asa ib Ahl al Haq and the Badr Organization 99 Prime Minister Haider al Abadi ordered on April 7 2015 that the Popular Mobilization Forces be placed under the direct command of the prime minister s office 100 thus giving a further official status to the militia 101 In 2015 the chairman of the Popular Mobilization Committee in the Iraqi government was Falih al Fayyadh who is also the National Security Adviser 102 The Popular Mobilization Committee is under the Office of Prime Minister 37 The PMF are said to have been led on the battlefields by Jamal Jaafar Mohammed also known as Abu Mahdi al Muhandis the head of Kata ib Hezbollah 103 104 but the chain of command runs through pre existing leaders 105 According to Iraqi sources as well as to the London based pro Saudi Asharq Al Awsat the different militias rely on their own chain of command and rarely work together 91 or follow regular Iraqi Army s orders 106 The Laws and conduct by which the PMF should abide are those of the Iraqi Government since the Iraqi Prime Minister has the final control over the PMF Nonetheless Marja Ali al Sistani issued an Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields which included a 20 points form of how the PMF should conduct themselves The main points were that the PMF should treat the liberated areas locals with the Islamic Law which is as quoted from the second point which is a Hadith of the Muslim Prophet Muhammed Do not indulge in acts of extremism do not disrespect dead corpses do not resort to deceit do not kill an elder do not kill a child do not kill a woman and do no not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise 107 Other points included the same aforementioned guidance when treating non Muslims and also not to steal or disrespect people even if they are the families of the ISIS fighters 107 non primary source needed Alongside Abu Mahdi al Muhandis other people in charge of the PMF include Qais al Khazali commander of Asa ib Ahl al Haq and Hadi Al Amiri the chief of the Badr Organization 108 According to The New York Times such organizational autonomy may present a challenge to the consolidation of Haider al Abadi s authority 109 Volunteers include Shia Arabs and smaller numbers of Iraqi Christians Sunni Arabs and Shia Turkmen 37 The militias are trained and supported by military advisers from Turkey for Sunni and Turkmeni troops 110 Iran and Hezbollah 111 including prominent Quds Force figures such as until his 2020 death Qasem Soleimani 112 The PMF also appeared to have deployed at least a regiment under the command of Colonel Jumaa al Jumaily in Al Anbar Governorate 113 They are also said to have their own military intelligence administrative systems 91 a sort of media war team that provides morale boosting battlefield updates and propaganda videos 114 and a court of law 115 Shia Arab component edit nbsp PMF commanders with IRGC advisors during the Hawija offensive 2017 According to a Sunni newspaper there are three main Shia components within the Popular Mobilization Forces the first are the groups that were formed following Sistani s fatwa without political roots or ambitions the second are groups that were formed by political parties or are initially the military wings of these parties with definite political characterization the third is the armed groups that have been present in Iraq for years and have fought battles against US forces and also participated in operations in Syria 97 According to Faleh A Jabar and Renad Mansour for The Carnegie Foundation the Popular Mobilization Forces are factionally divided into three Shia components a component pledging allegiance to Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei a faction pledging allegiance to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani and the faction headed by Iraqi cleric Muqtada al Sadr 37 The most powerful groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces are the groups which maintain strong ties with Iran and pledge spiritual allegiance to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei 37 The pro Khamanei faction would consist of already established parties and of relatively small paramilitaries Saraya Khurasani Kata ib Hezbollah Kata ib Abu Fadhl al Abbas the Badr Organization and Asa ib Ahl al Haq These groups serve as a kind of border guard a sort of Iranian insurance policy against threats on its immediate border 37 Their leaders publicly take pride in such affiliations professing religious allegiance to Khamenei and his notion of Vilayat al Faqih 37 According to Faleh A Jabar and Renad Mansour the pro Sistani faction consists of those armed groups formed by Sistani s fatwa to defend Shia holy sites and by paramilitary of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq 37 There are four major groups organized by Najaf Saraya al Ataba al Abbasiya Saraya al Ataba al Hussainiya Saraya al Ataba al Alawiya and Liwa Ali al Akbar corresponding to Shia holy sites in Kadhimiya Karbala and Najaf 37 The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq also swears allegiance to Sistani After the Badr Organization left the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq its leader Ammar al Hakim formed new paramilitary units including Saraya el Jihad Saraya el Aqida and Saraya Ashura 37 Muqtada al Sadr s Peace Companies Saraya al Salam were founded in June 2014 from the Mahdi Army According to Faleh A Jabar and Renad Mansour the Sadrists have largely been cut off from Iranian funding 37 According to Shia P M F officials the recruitment campaign is successful also because it is administered by the religious establishment and Shia religious scholars from the hawza are instrumental in recruitment 116 Recruitment via Shia Islamist political party structures and even individual clerics or members of parliament is pursued more the official PMF Commission which lacks recruitment offices 37 Sunni Arab component edit In early stages of the PMF the Shia component was almost exclusive and the Sunni one was negligible since it counted only 1 000 to 3 000 men 95 In January 2016 Prime Minister Haider al Abadi approved the appointment of 40 000 Sunni fighters to the Popular Mobilization Forces According to Al Monitor his move was decided in order to give a multiconfessional image to the Forces however Sunni fighters began to volunteer even before the al Abadi s decision Adding Sunni fighters to the Popular Mobilization Units could set the stage for the force to become the core of the envisioned National Guard 93 According to The Economist as of late April 2016 the Hashd had approximately 16 000 Sunnis 117 It has been observed that the Sunni Arab tribes that took part in al Hashd al Shaabi 2015 recruitment are those which also had good relations with Nouri al Maliki during his tenure as Prime Minister 118 According to Yazan al Jabouri a secular Sunni commander of anti ISIS Liwa Salahaddin as of November 2016 there were 30 000 Iraqi Sunnis fighting within the ranks of PMUs 119 Shia Turkmen component edit The Turkmen Hashd overall constitute around four thousand members and are called Brigade 12 12 According to Faleh A Jabar and Renad Mansour for The Carnegie Foundation Shia Turkmen joined Popular Mobilization Forces in order to increase their local autonomy from the Kurdistan Region and in order to counter Sunni Turkmen who joined the Islamic State 37 Christian component edit There is also Christian and Shabak PMF units in Ninawa plains 12 The Imam Ali Brigades trained two Christian units called Kata ib Rouh Allah Issa Ibn Miriam Brigades and Babylon 120 Equipment edit nbsp Popular Mobilization Forces fire a mortar during the Hawija offensive in 2017 The equipment of the Popular Mobilization Forces is a major issue At the end of January 2015 a video showed a large Kata ib Hezbollah convoy transporting several American made military vehicles including an M1 Abrams Tank M113 armoured personnel carriers Humvees and MRAP vehicles as well as Iranian made Safir 4 4s and technicals with Kata ib Hezbollah s flags flying 121 According to some sources the Iraqi government is supplying U S provided military equipment to the militias 122 123 Iraqi minister of transportation and the head of the Badr Organization Hadi Al Amiri criticized the U S for the lack of providing arms 124 On the other hand U S officials argue that the operators of heavy weapons allegedly taken over by Kata ib Hezbollah were regular Iraqi soldiers who raised the Hezbollah flag merely in solidarity with the militant group while the same source acknowledged that it is generally difficult to monitor U S made weapons 125 Alongside U S made military equipment handed over to or fallen into the hands of Popular Mobilization Forces Iran is a major supplier According to some sources in 2014 Tehran sold Baghdad nearly 10 billion worth of weapons and hardware Furthermore there is a daily supply of Iranian weapons 126 including Iranian made 106 mm anti tank guns as well as 120 mm 82 mm and 60 mm mortars 127 In May 2015 the United States started delivering about 1 6 billion worth of military equipment under the supervision of the Government of Iraq According to some sources the major beneficiaries of the weapons deliveries are to be the Popular Mobilization Forces 128 Heavy armour seemed to be operated by Popular Mobilization Forces in the operations surrounding the battle of Mosul 129 History and major engagements editThe Popular Mobilization Forces have been involved in several battles of the military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant since their founding the most important being the Second Battle of Tikrit After the end of the battle of Tikrit the complex of occupation forces handed over security issues to local police and security forces 130 On Monday April 6 2015 Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi said that while being heavily involved in the conquest of Tikrit the Popular Mobilization Forces will not join the planned Mosul conquest 131 This statement was reversed in March 2016 when al Abadi reportedly rejected calls by Nineveh s provincial council to prohibit Popular Mobilization Forces from taking part in retaking Mosul 132 Shia volunteers reportedly entered Al Anbar Governorate on the first days of May 2015 among heavy protests of Sunnite personalities 133 134 with limited operations continuing in 2016 135 In Autumn 2016 they participated in the Mosul Offensive acting as left flank of the anti IS forces and by November had captured a number of smaller towns and villages from IS expanding roughly along a line from Qayyarah to Tal Afar while keeping a distance 20 km to the city of Mosul itself In October 2017 the PMF was part of the Iraqi government forces that recaptured Kirkuk 136 which had been under Kurdish control since 2014 137 Engagement in Syria edit Khomeinist PMF militia factions loyal to the Iranian Supreme Leader have been heavily deployed in the Syrian civil war on the side of the Assad regime often with the stated aim of defending Shi ite shrines 138 Although at the time of the formation of the PMF most of its component groups were primarily engaged in Iraq against ISIL after the reduction of the immediate ISIL threat in Iraq from 2015 many returned to Syria For instance in January 2015 pro Iran Kata ib Sayyid al Shuhada militant group announced the deaths of two of its fighters in defense of Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque in Damascus and the militia s involvement in the 2015 Southern Syria offensive was documented by the Iraqi TV station Al Anwar 2 139 Between 2013 and early 2016 1 200 Iraqi fighters died in Syria including combatants of pro Iran militias Asa ib Ahl al Haq and Kata ib al Imam Ali among them senior commanders Abu al Fadl and Abu Haider al Nazari 140 On the other hand pro Sistani and Sadrist PMF militias wary of Iranian influence in Iraq are strongly opposed to the intervention in Syria and have been resisting recruitment attempts made by pro Iran factions to send Iraqis to die on the side of Assad regime 141 Terrorism editKata ib Hizballah one of the forces of the PMF is listed by Japan s Public Security Intelligence Agency as a terrorist organization 142 The United Arab Emirates also classifies it as terrorist 143 Kata ib Hizballah was designated a terrorist entity in 2009 by the United States 144 Its leader Abu Mahdi al Muhandis was also designated a terrorist 145 In 2019 U S designated Harakat al Nujaba and its leader Akram al Ka abi Specially Designated Global Terrorists SDGT In 2020 Asa ib Ahl al Haq a powerful Iran backed militia part of the PMF was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States 146 In 2023 U S added PMF militia Kata ib Sayyid al Shuhada to its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists 147 Involvement in 2019 2021 Iraqi protests editDuring the 2019 2021 Iraqi protests which called for the end of the sectarian political system the PMF militias took part in the protests by using live bullets marksmen hot water hot pepper gas and tear gas against protesters leading to over 1 000 deaths and over 30 000 injuries 148 149 150 151 Domestic criticisms and war crimes accusations editSome of the militias constituting the Popular Mobilization Forces have been accused of war crimes motivated by sectarian revenge According to Amnesty International in 2014 Shia militias have abducted tortured and killed numerous Sunni civilians 67 152 and according to Western sources in Tikrit militants have committed some violence while being publicly praised 95 In the wake of the conquest of Tikrit Iraqi authorities declared that war crimes would be investigated and their perpetrators punished 131 High Shia authorities such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani and Ayatollah Hussein Al Sadr called on the militants in the PMF to refrain from war crimes or other despicable behaviour 153 In 2015 ad hoc government inquiry committees were established to investigate civilian deaths attributed to the militias 154 In 2016 Mosul Sunni dignitaries and officials accused the PMF of killings of Sunnis takeovers of schools and forcing Sunnis to sell property in the prime real estate area close to the Mosul shrine According to City council s deputy chairman Muzher Fleih 650 Sunnis have disappeared Militia leaders insist any abuses are isolated incidents 115 and target only captured Islamic State s collaborators 155 Alongside war crimes accusations concerns regarding the constitutionality and politicization of al Hashd al Shaabi have been raised Sunni sources have called for depoliticization of the Popular Mobilization Forces to be achieved under the proposed National Guard bill 97 According to some critics in 2015 the Popular Mobilization Forces were not sanctioned by the Constitution of Iraq and nonetheless had a budget and were paid on regular basis by the Iraqi government whilst the legally established Peshmerga had not received their wages 156 157 The official status and actual dependence of the Popular Mobilization Forces on the Baghdad government and its help was not fully resolved as of late 2015 158 However by the end of 2016 a law was passed bringing the PMU under the auspices of the Supreme Commander of the Iraqi National Army incorporating PMF units into the official army of Iraq and removing any official affiliation with any social religious or political group 63 Recruitment of Yazidis in Kurdish areas has been deemed to go against official Kurdish policy against the move in February 2015 Kurdistan Region President Massoud Barzani asked the Peshmerga minister to stop all militia activities in the area 96 Allegedly clerics from the Najaf Seminary including Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani also criticized the monopolistic conduct of Abu Mahdi al Muhandis 37 Concerns about growth edit The Popular Mobilization Forces are accused of accruing a power base in Iraq and of being Iran s instrument to dominate Iraq 159 The main fears are that the permanent militia would turn themselves into enforcers of Shia domination 115 The Iraqi Police headquarters in the Muthanna Governorate announced that they were in the process of commissioning Popular Mobilization battalions with security tasks in early January 2016 These tasks included protecting public and private establishments in open desert areas among others Other reports indicate that Popular Mobilization is securing border outlets and controlling security in liberated cities 160 According to General Ali Omran commander of the army s 5th Infantry Division P M F militias are too entrenched in politics and at risk of coming to blows with the Armed Forces In February 2016 militiamen refused orders to vacate a building in a military base north of Baghdad 115 According to AP interviewed government officials and militia leaders due to the fear of a return to Sunni minority rule over the Iraqi Shia majority PMF militias want to remain a permanent independent armed force Hamed al Jazaeery head of the al Khorasani Brigades militia stated that the model is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 115 International reactions edit nbsp United Nations In a 2015 speech of its Special Representative and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq UNAMI Jan Kubis mentioned the Popular Mobilization Forces saying that the Iraqi security forces with the critical support of the Popular Mobilization Forces tribal Sunni volunteers and the International Coalition have yet to significantly change the situation on the ground 161 nbsp CJTF OIR In 2016 Commander of the CJTF OIR Lt Gen Stephen J Townsend described the PMF militias as remarkably disciplined allies since he arrived He added that the PMF could make Iraq more secure if they become a national guard like force and not a puppet of Iran 162 American led airstrikes editKata ib Sayyid al Shuhada a member of the PMF stated that their forces were bombed by US planes on 7 August 2017 in Al Anbar Governorate near the Iraq Syria border and that Hashd al Shaabi forces suffered many casualties 163 The Baghdad based spokesman of the U S led coalition Army Col Ryan Dillon dismissed the allegation saying on Twitter that no coalition airstrikes took place in the area at the time According to the militia s deputy Ahmed al Maksousi they were hit by artillery fire in Syria s Jamouna area about 12 kilometers about 7 5 miles from the Iraqi border Along with 40 killed many militiamen were wounded al Maksousi added 164 On 22 August 2019 The Popular Mobilization Forces PMF blamed the United States and Israel for a number of bombings on their warehouses and bases The group accused the US of permitting Israeli drones to join its forces for executing attacks on Iraqi territory The group pledged to counter any attack in the future 165 On 23 August a fatwa issued by Ayatollah Kazem al Haeri called for attacks against US troops in Iraq the presence of any US military force in Iraq is forbidden haram under any title military training advice or the rationale of fighting terrorism 166 On 29 December 2019 the United States bombed the headquarters of PMF member Kata ib Hezbollah near Al Qa im killing 25 militiamen 167 On 3 January 2020 PMF commander Abu Mahdi al Muhandis PMF PR head Mohammed Redha al Jabri 168 and the Quds Force head Qasem Soleimani were among those killed in an assassination near Baghdad Airport 169 170 On 12 March 2020 the U S launched air raids against five Kata ib Hezbollah weapons storage bases across Iraq in retaliation for the 2020 Camp Taji attacks 171 On 25 February 2021 a U S air raid killed one and wounded four while targeting PMF facilities on the Iraqi Syrian border in Syria s eastern Deir ez Zor Governorate The facilities were used by PMF forces combatting ISIL in collaboration with the Iraqi and Syrian governments U S officials described the PMF as an Iranian backed militia and the air strike as a retaliation for purported Iranian military aggression against U S facilities in Iraq while Iranian officials denied involvement Iraqi officials repudiated any connection between the PMF and the insurgents who previously attacked U S facilities citation needed The Pentagon asserted that the air raid followed consultation with the Iraqi government and other partners in the region 172 but the Iraqi military denied providing the U S with information regarding locations within Syria 173 On 27 June 2021 U S forces bombed two locations after an increase in drone attacks One location was a drone making facility and the other a conventional weapons exchange depot Four members of Kataib Sayyed al Shuhada faction were claimed to have been killed in the action 174 On 4 January 2024 U S airstrikes on PMF s logistical headquarters killed two people including the organization s deputy head of operations in Baghdad Mushtaq Talib al Saeedi and wounded five others 175 On 2 February 2024 U S airstrikes targeted the headquarters of the PMF in Akashat in Anbar Governorate killing 16 fighters and wounding 25 176 177 See also edit nbsp Iraq portal nbsp Asia portal Holy Shrine Defender Iranian intervention in Iraq 2014 present Iraqi insurgency List of armed groups in the Iraqi Civil War List of armed groups in the Syrian Civil War Private militias in Iraq 2019 2021 Iraqi protestsReferences 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Template Cite web cite web a CS1 maint archived copy as title link US kills powerful Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad airstrike www timesofisrael com Archived from the original on January 3 2020 Retrieved Jan 4 2020 Iraq base attack US in retaliatory strikes on Iran backed fighters BBC News 13 March 2020 Archived from the original on 14 January 2023 Retrieved 14 January 2023 Hjelmgaard Kim 26 February 2021 Biden s airstrikes are first test of role as world s police USA Today Archived from the original on 26 February 2021 Retrieved February 26 2021 After Syria air strikes Iraq military denies exchanging information with U S Reuters 26 February 2021 Archived from the original on 26 February 2021 Retrieved February 26 2021 U S warplanes strike Iran backed militia in Iraq Syria Reuters 27 June 2021 Archived from the original on 2021 11 01 Retrieved June 28 2021 Airstrike in Baghdad kills Iran backed militia leader as regional tensions escalate ABC News Retrieved 2024 01 04 America launches retaliatory strikes in Iraq and Syria in response to the Jordanian attack in Arabic Sky News Arabia 2 February 2024 Archived from the original on 2 February 2024 Retrieved 2 February 2024 16 martyrs and 25 wounded The Popular Mobilization Forces reveals the death toll of the American raids in Arabic almorageb 3 February 2024 Archived from the original on 4 February 2024 Retrieved 3 February 2024 External links edit nbsp Media related to Hashed al Shaabi at Wikimedia Commons Official website Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Popular Mobilization Forces amp oldid 1223951136, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

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