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Helsinki Accords

May 01, 2023

For the set of principles on human experimentation, see Declaration of Helsinki.

The Helsinki Final Act, also known as Helsinki Accords or Helsinki Declaration was the document signed at the closing meeting of the third phase of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki, Finland, between 30 July and 1 August 1975, following two years of negotiations known as the Helsinki Process.[1] All then-existing European countries (except Andorra and pro-Chinese Albania) as well as the United States and Canada, altogether 35 participating states, signed the Final Act in an attempt to improve the détente between the East and the West. The Helsinki Accords, however, were not binding as they did not have treaty status that would have to be ratified by parliaments.[2] Sometimes the term "Helsinki pact(s)" was also used unofficially.[3]

Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) Helmut Schmidt, Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) Erich Honecker, US president Gerald Ford and Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky
From left is Kissinger, Brezhnev, Ford, and Gromyko outside of the American Embassy, Helsinki, Finland, 1975.

Articles

In the CSCE terminology, there were four groupings or baskets. In the first basket, the "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States" (also known as "The Decalogue") enumerated the following 10 points:

  1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
  2. Refraining from the threat or use of force
  3. Inviolability of frontiers
  4. Territorial integrity of states
  5. Peaceful settlement of disputes
  6. Non-intervention in internal affairs
  7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
  8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
  9. Co-operation among States
  10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law

The second basket promised economic, scientific, and technological cooperation; facilitating business contacts and industrial cooperation; linking together transportation networks; and increasing the flow of information. The third basket involved commitments to improve the human context of family reunions, marriages and travel. It also sought to improve the conditions of journalists and expand cultural exchanges. The fourth basket dealt with procedures to monitor implementation, and to plan future meetings.[4]

Freedom of information

The United States had sought a provision that would prohibit radio jamming but it failed to find consensus due to Soviet opposition. Despite this, the West believed jamming was illegal under the agreed upon language for "expansion of the dissemination of information broadcast by radio". The Soviet Union believed that jamming was a legally justified response to broadcasts they argued were a violation of the Helsinki Accords' broad purpose to "meet the interest of mutual understanding among people and the aims set forth by the Conference".[5]

Ford administration

When President Gerald Ford came into office in August 1974, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations had been underway for nearly two years. Although the USSR was looking for a rapid resolution, none of the parties were quick to make concessions, particularly on human rights points. Throughout much of the negotiations, US leaders were disengaged and uninterested with the process. In August 1974, National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said to Ford "we never wanted it but we went along with the Europeans [...] It is meaningless — it is just a grandstand play to the left. We are going along with it."[6]

In the months leading up to the conclusion of negotiations and signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the American public, in particular Americans of Eastern European descent voiced their concerns that the agreement would mean the acceptance of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe and forced incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR. President Ford was concerned about this as well and sought clarification on this issue from the US National Security Council.[7]

The US Senate was also worried about the fate of the Baltic States and the CSCE in general. Several senators wrote to President Ford requesting that the final summit stage be delayed until all matters had been settled, and in a way favorable to the West.[8] Ford also attracted criticism from a wide range of political spectrum when he refused to meet with Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to avoid damaging Soviet Union–United States relations before the conference.[9]

Shortly before President Ford departed for Helsinki, he held a meeting with a group of Americans of Eastern European background, and stated definitively that US policy on the Baltic States would not change, but would be strengthened since the agreement denies the annexation of territory in violation of international law and allows for the peaceful change of borders.[10]

Ford in July 1975 told the delegation of Americans from East European backgrounds that:

The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between peoples of East and West. ... We are not committing ourselves to anything beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and by more formal treaty agreements such as the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights. ... If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off than it is now. If even a part of it succeeds, the lot the people in Eastern Europe will be that much better, and the cause of freedom will advance at least that far.[11]

His reassurances had little effect. The volume of negative mail continued to grow.[10] The American public was still unconvinced that American policy on the incorporation of the Baltic States would not be changed by the Helsinki Final Act. Despite protests from all around, Ford decided to move forward and sign the agreement.[12] As domestic criticism mounted, Ford hedged on his support for the Helsinki Accords, which had the impact of overall weakening his foreign-policy stature.[13]

Ronald Reagan made the Accords a centerpiece of his campaign against Ford for the 1976 Republican Party presidential primaries. During the general election, the Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter attacked the Accords as a legitimation of the "Soviet domination of Eastern Europe." A debate about the Accords in this vein during the 1976 United States presidential debates led to an infamous presidential gaffe in which Ford claimed that there was "no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, and there never will be under a Ford administration."[9] His blunder in the debate with Carter when he denied Kremlin control of Poland proved disastrous.[13]

Reception and impact

The document was seen both as a significant step toward reducing Cold War tensions and as a major diplomatic boost for the Soviet Union at the time, due to its clauses on the inviolability of national frontiers and respect for territorial integrity, which were seen to consolidate the USSR's territorial gains in Eastern Europe following World War II. Considering objections from Canada, Spain, Ireland and other states, the Final Act simply stated that "frontiers" in Europe should be stable but could change by peaceful internal means.[14]: 65  US president Gerald Ford also reaffirmed that US non-recognition policy of the Baltic States' (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) forced incorporation into the Soviet Union had not changed.[15] Leaders of other NATO member states made similar statements.[14]: 65 

However, the civil rights portion of the agreement provided the basis for the work of the Helsinki Watch, an independent non-governmental organization created to monitor compliance to the Helsinki Accords (which evolved into several regional committees, eventually forming the International Helsinki Federation and Human Rights Watch). While these provisions applied to all signatories, the focus of attention was on their application to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Soviet propaganda presented the Final Act as a great triumph for Soviet diplomacy and for Brezhnev personally.[14]: 65 

In practice, the Soviet government significantly curbed the rule of law, civil liberties, protection of law and guarantees of property,[16][17] which were considered examples of "bourgeois morality" by Soviet legal theorists such as Andrey Vyshinsky.[18] The Soviet Union signed legally-binding human rights documents, but they were neither widely known or accessible to people living under Communist rule, nor were they taken seriously by the Communist authorities.[19]: 117  Human rights activists in the Soviet Union were regularly subjected to harassment, repressions and arrests.

According to the Cold War scholar John Lewis Gaddis in his book The Cold War: A New History (2005), "Leonid Brezhnev had looked forward, Anatoly Dobrynin recalls, to the 'publicity he would gain... when the Soviet public learned of the final settlement of the postwar boundaries for which they had sacrificed so much'... '[Instead, the Helsinki Accords] gradually became a manifesto of the dissident and liberal movement'... What this meant was that the people who lived under these [communist] systems — at least the more courageous — could claim official permission to say what they thought."[20]

The then-People's Republic of Albania refused to participate in the Accords, its leader Enver Hoxha arguing, "All the satellites of the Soviets with the possible exception of the Bulgarians want to break the shackles of the Warsaw Treaty, but they cannot. Then their only hope is that which the Helsinki document allows them, that is, to strengthen their friendship with the United States of America and the West, to seek investments from them in the form of credits and imports of their technology without any restrictions, to allow the church to occupy its former place, to deepen the moral degeneration, to increase the anti-Sovietism, and the Warsaw Treaty will remain an empty egg-shell."[21]

The Helsinki Accords served as the groundwork for the later Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), established in 1995 under the Paris Charter of 1990.

Signatory states

Heads of state or government

The "undersigned High Representatives of the participating States" as well as seating at the conference were ordered alphabetically by the countries' short names in French (thus starting with the two Allemagnes followed by America, and Tchécoslovaquie separated from Union soviétique by Turquie etc.). This also influenced the act's headers consecutively in German, English, Spanish, French, Italian and Russian, which were also the conference's working languages and languages of the act itself.[22]

International organizations

See also

References

  1. ^ https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/The%20Helsinki%20Process%20Four%20Decade%20Overview.pdf[bare URL PDF]
  2. ^ Encyclopædia Britannica. Helsinki Accords. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/260615/Helsinki-Accords
  3. ^ "Helsinki pact: A three-way battle in Madrid". Christian Science Monitor. 9 September 1980.
  4. ^ Timothy J. Lynch, ed., The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History (2013) 1: 460-62.
  5. ^ Price, Rochelle B. (1984). "Jamming and the Law of International Communications". Michigan Journal of International Law. 5 (1).
  6. ^ Ford, Gerald; Kissinger, Henry; Scowcroft, Brent (August 15, 1974). President Ford–Henry Kissinger memcon (August 15, 1974) . Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. p. 5  – via Wikisource. [scan  ]
  7. ^ President's Inquiry on CSCE / Baltic States (Case File)
  8. ^ Request by Senators for a Delay of the Final Stage of Helsinki Final Act (Case File)
  9. ^ a b Wilentz, Sean (2008). The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008 (1 ed.). New York, NY: Harper. ISBN 978-0-06-074480-9. OCLC 182779124.
  10. ^ a b Memorandum for Henry Kissinger from A. Denis Clift, Re: Replies to Correspondence Critical of CSCE
  11. ^ Ford, Gerald R. (1977). Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Gerald R. Ford, 1975. pp. 1030–31. ISBN 9781623768485.
  12. ^ President Ford's Visit to Helsinki, July 29 - August 2, 1975, CSCE Briefing Book
  13. ^ a b Sarah B. Snyder, "Through the Looking Glass: The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President." Diplomacy & Statecraft 21.1 (2010): 87-106.
  14. ^ a b c Hiden, John; Vahur Made; David J. Smith (2008). The Baltic question during the Cold War. Routledge. p. 209. ISBN 978-0-415-37100-1.
  15. ^ McHugh, James T.; James S. Pacy (2001). Diplomats without a country: Baltic diplomacy, international law, and the Cold War. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 84. ISBN 978-0-313-31878-8.
  16. ^ Richard Pipes (2001) Communism Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 0-297-64688-5
  17. ^ Richard Pipes (1994) Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. Vintage. ISBN 0-679-76184-5., pages 401–403.
  18. ^ Wyszyński, Andrzej (1949). Teoria dowodów sądowych w prawie radzieckim (PDF). Biblioteka Zrzeszenia Prawników Demokratów. pp. 153, 162.
  19. ^ Thomas, Daniel C. (2005). "Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War". Journal of Cold War Studies. 7 (2): 110–141. doi:10.1162/1520397053630600. S2CID 57570614.
  20. ^ Gaddis, John Lewis (2005). The Cold War. London: Penguin. p. 190. ISBN 978-0-141-02532-2.
  21. ^ Enver Hoxha. The Superpowers. Tiranë: 8 Nëntori Publishing House. 1986.
  22. ^ https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/Helsinki%20Final%20Act.pdf[bare URL PDF]

Further reading

  • Korey, William. The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American Foreign Policy (St. Martin's Press, 1993).
  • Morgan, Michael Cotey. The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War. (Princeton UP, 2018).
  • Nuti, Leopoldo, ed. The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev 1975-1985 (Routledge, 2008).
  • Snyder, Sarah B. "Through the Looking Glass: The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President." Diplomacy & Statecraft 21.1 (2010): 87-106. it helped defeat Gerald Ford
  • Thomas, Daniel C. "The Helsinki accords and political change in Eastern Europe." Cambridge Studies in International Relations 66 (1999): 205–233.|
  • Thomas, Daniel C. The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism. Princeton UP, 2001. ISBN 9780691048598
  • Wenger, Andreas, Vojtech Mastny, and Christian Nünlist, eds. Origins of the European security system: the Helsinki Process revisited, 1965-75. (Routledge, 2008).
  • Kieninger, Stephan, Dynamic Détente: The United States and Europe, 1964–1975 (Lexington Books, 2016).
  • Badalassi, Nicolas, and Sarah B. Snyder, eds. The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972-1990 (Berghahn Books, 2018).

External links

 
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Helsinki Accords.
 
Wikisource has original text related to this article:
Helsinki Final Act
  • United States Helsinki Commission
  • Scan of the original copy with signatures (PDF)
  • Signing of the Final Act on August 1st 1975
  • OSCE Magazine October 2005: Special anniversary issue: 30 years of the Helsinki Final Act, 1975-2005
  • The Helsinki process and the death of communism
  • Interview with Henry Kissinger discusses Helsinki Accords during Soviet Repression in Poland from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives
  • The Helsinki Final Act: Resources for Understanding its Creation, Implementation and Legacy (see the nameplates at the photo)

May 01, 2023
helsinki, accords, principles, human, experimentation, declaration, helsinki, helsinki, final, also, known, helsinki, declaration, document, signed, closing, meeting, third, phase, conference, security, operation, europe, csce, held, helsinki, finland, between. For the set of principles on human experimentation see Declaration of Helsinki The Helsinki Final Act also known as Helsinki Accords or Helsinki Declaration was the document signed at the closing meeting of the third phase of the Conference on Security and Co operation in Europe CSCE held in Helsinki Finland between 30 July and 1 August 1975 following two years of negotiations known as the Helsinki Process 1 All then existing European countries except Andorra and pro Chinese Albania as well as the United States and Canada altogether 35 participating states signed the Final Act in an attempt to improve the detente between the East and the West The Helsinki Accords however were not binding as they did not have treaty status that would have to be ratified by parliaments 2 Sometimes the term Helsinki pact s was also used unofficially 3 Helsinki Final ActThe front page of the Helsinki AccordsHost country FinlandDate30 July 1 August 1975Venue s Finlandia HallCitiesHelsinkiParticipantsHelmut Schmidt Erich Honecker Gerald Ford Bruno Kreisky Leo Tindemans Todor Zhivkov Pierre Trudeau Makarios III Anker Jorgensen Carlos Arias Navarro Urho Kekkonen Valery Giscard d Estaing Harold Wilson Konstantinos Karamanlis Janos Kadar Liam Cosgrave Geir Hallgrimsson Aldo Moro Walter Kieber Gaston Thorn Dom Mintoff Andre Saint Mleux Trygve Bratteli Joop den Uyl Edward GierekFrancisco da Costa Gomes Nicolae Ceaușescu Gian Luigi Berti Agostino Casaroli Olof Palme Pierre Graber Gustav Husak Suleyman Demirel Leonid Brezhnev Josip Broz TitoPrecedesParis CharterChancellor of Federal Republic of Germany West Germany Helmut Schmidt Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic East Germany Erich Honecker US president Gerald Ford and Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky From left is Kissinger Brezhnev Ford and Gromyko outside of the American Embassy Helsinki Finland 1975 Contents 1 Articles 1 1 Freedom of information 2 Ford administration 3 Reception and impact 4 Signatory states 5 Heads of state or government 5 1 International organizations 6 See also 7 References 8 Further reading 9 External linksArticles EditIn the CSCE terminology there were four groupings or baskets In the first basket the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States also known as The Decalogue enumerated the following 10 points Sovereign equality respect for the rights inherent in sovereigntyRefraining from the threat or use of forceInviolability of frontiersTerritorial integrity of statesPeaceful settlement of disputesNon intervention in internal affairsRespect for human rights and fundamental freedoms including the freedom of thought conscience religion or beliefEqual rights and self determination of peoplesCo operation among StatesFulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law The second basket promised economic scientific and technological cooperation facilitating business contacts and industrial cooperation linking together transportation networks and increasing the flow of information The third basket involved commitments to improve the human context of family reunions marriages and travel It also sought to improve the conditions of journalists and expand cultural exchanges The fourth basket dealt with procedures to monitor implementation and to plan future meetings 4 Freedom of information Edit The United States had sought a provision that would prohibit radio jamming but it failed to find consensus due to Soviet opposition Despite this the West believed jamming was illegal under the agreed upon language for expansion of the dissemination of information broadcast by radio The Soviet Union believed that jamming was a legally justified response to broadcasts they argued were a violation of the Helsinki Accords broad purpose to meet the interest of mutual understanding among people and the aims set forth by the Conference 5 Ford administration EditWhen President Gerald Ford came into office in August 1974 the Conference on Security and Co operation in Europe CSCE negotiations had been underway for nearly two years Although the USSR was looking for a rapid resolution none of the parties were quick to make concessions particularly on human rights points Throughout much of the negotiations US leaders were disengaged and uninterested with the process In August 1974 National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said to Ford we never wanted it but we went along with the Europeans It is meaningless it is just a grandstand play to the left We are going along with it 6 In the months leading up to the conclusion of negotiations and signing of the Helsinki Final Act the American public in particular Americans of Eastern European descent voiced their concerns that the agreement would mean the acceptance of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe and forced incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR President Ford was concerned about this as well and sought clarification on this issue from the US National Security Council 7 The US Senate was also worried about the fate of the Baltic States and the CSCE in general Several senators wrote to President Ford requesting that the final summit stage be delayed until all matters had been settled and in a way favorable to the West 8 Ford also attracted criticism from a wide range of political spectrum when he refused to meet with Soviet dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to avoid damaging Soviet Union United States relations before the conference 9 Shortly before President Ford departed for Helsinki he held a meeting with a group of Americans of Eastern European background and stated definitively that US policy on the Baltic States would not change but would be strengthened since the agreement denies the annexation of territory in violation of international law and allows for the peaceful change of borders 10 Ford in July 1975 told the delegation of Americans from East European backgrounds that The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between peoples of East and West We are not committing ourselves to anything beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and by more formal treaty agreements such as the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights If it all fails Europe will be no worse off than it is now If even a part of it succeeds the lot the people in Eastern Europe will be that much better and the cause of freedom will advance at least that far 11 His reassurances had little effect The volume of negative mail continued to grow 10 The American public was still unconvinced that American policy on the incorporation of the Baltic States would not be changed by the Helsinki Final Act Despite protests from all around Ford decided to move forward and sign the agreement 12 As domestic criticism mounted Ford hedged on his support for the Helsinki Accords which had the impact of overall weakening his foreign policy stature 13 Ronald Reagan made the Accords a centerpiece of his campaign against Ford for the 1976 Republican Party presidential primaries During the general election the Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter attacked the Accords as a legitimation of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe A debate about the Accords in this vein during the 1976 United States presidential debates led to an infamous presidential gaffe in which Ford claimed that there was no Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and there never will be under a Ford administration 9 His blunder in the debate with Carter when he denied Kremlin control of Poland proved disastrous 13 Reception and impact EditThe document was seen both as a significant step toward reducing Cold War tensions and as a major diplomatic boost for the Soviet Union at the time due to its clauses on the inviolability of national frontiers and respect for territorial integrity which were seen to consolidate the USSR s territorial gains in Eastern Europe following World War II Considering objections from Canada Spain Ireland and other states the Final Act simply stated that frontiers in Europe should be stable but could change by peaceful internal means 14 65 US president Gerald Ford also reaffirmed that US non recognition policy of the Baltic States Lithuania Latvia and Estonia forced incorporation into the Soviet Union had not changed 15 Leaders of other NATO member states made similar statements 14 65 However the civil rights portion of the agreement provided the basis for the work of the Helsinki Watch an independent non governmental organization created to monitor compliance to the Helsinki Accords which evolved into several regional committees eventually forming the International Helsinki Federation and Human Rights Watch While these provisions applied to all signatories the focus of attention was on their application to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies including Bulgaria Czechoslovakia the German Democratic Republic East Germany Hungary Poland and Romania Soviet propaganda presented the Final Act as a great triumph for Soviet diplomacy and for Brezhnev personally 14 65 In practice the Soviet government significantly curbed the rule of law civil liberties protection of law and guarantees of property 16 17 which were considered examples of bourgeois morality by Soviet legal theorists such as Andrey Vyshinsky 18 The Soviet Union signed legally binding human rights documents but they were neither widely known or accessible to people living under Communist rule nor were they taken seriously by the Communist authorities 19 117 Human rights activists in the Soviet Union were regularly subjected to harassment repressions and arrests According to the Cold War scholar John Lewis Gaddis in his book The Cold War A New History 2005 Leonid Brezhnev had looked forward Anatoly Dobrynin recalls to the publicity he would gain when the Soviet public learned of the final settlement of the postwar boundaries for which they had sacrificed so much Instead the Helsinki Accords gradually became a manifesto of the dissident and liberal movement What this meant was that the people who lived under these communist systems at least the more courageous could claim official permission to say what they thought 20 The then People s Republic of Albania refused to participate in the Accords its leader Enver Hoxha arguing All the satellites of the Soviets with the possible exception of the Bulgarians want to break the shackles of the Warsaw Treaty but they cannot Then their only hope is that which the Helsinki document allows them that is to strengthen their friendship with the United States of America and the West to seek investments from them in the form of credits and imports of their technology without any restrictions to allow the church to occupy its former place to deepen the moral degeneration to increase the anti Sovietism and the Warsaw Treaty will remain an empty egg shell 21 The Helsinki Accords served as the groundwork for the later Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe OSCE established in 1995 under the Paris Charter of 1990 Signatory states Edit Austria Belgium Bulgaria Canada Cyprus Czechoslovakia Denmark East Germany Finland France Greece Holy See Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Liechtenstein Luxembourg Malta Monaco Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania San Marino Soviet Union Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States West Germany YugoslaviaHeads of state or government EditThe undersigned High Representatives of the participating States as well as seating at the conference were ordered alphabetically by the countries short names in French thus starting with the two Allemagne s followed by America and Tchecoslovaquie separated from Union sovietique by Turquie etc This also influenced the act s headers consecutively in German English Spanish French Italian and Russian which were also the conference s working languages and languages of the act itself 22 Helmut Schmidt Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Erich Honecker First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Gerald Ford President of the United States Bruno Kreisky Chancellor of Austria Leo Tindemans Prime Minister of Belgium Todor Zhivkov Chairman of the State Council of Bulgaria Pierre Trudeau Prime Minister of Canada Makarios III President of Cyprus Anker Jorgensen Prime Minister of Denmark Carlos Arias Navarro Prime Minister of Spain Urho Kekkonen President of Finland Valery Giscard d Estaing President of France who also serves as Co Prince of Andorra however no such function at all is mentioned in the declaration Harold Wilson Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Konstantinos Karamanlis Prime Minister of Greece Janos Kadar First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Liam Cosgrave Taoiseach of Ireland Geir Hallgrimsson Prime Minister of Iceland Aldo Moro Prime Minister of Italy Walter Kieber Prime Minister of Liechtenstein Gaston Thorn Prime Minister of Luxembourg Dom Mintoff Prime Minister of Malta Andre Saint Mleux Minister of State of Monaco Trygve Bratteli Prime Minister of Norway Joop den Uyl Prime Minister of the Netherlands Edward Gierek First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party Francisco da Costa Gomes President of Portugal Nicolae Ceaușescu President of Romania Gian Luigi Berti Captain Regent of San Marino Agostino Casaroli Cardinal Secretary of State Olof Palme Prime Minister of Sweden Pierre Graber President of the Swiss Confederation Gustav Husak President of Czechoslovakia Suleyman Demirel Prime Minister of Turkey Leonid Brezhnev General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Josip Broz Tito President of Yugoslavia International organizations Edit Kurt Waldheim Secretary General of the United Nations giving the opening speech as their guest of honour non signatory See also EditCharter 77 and Moscow Helsinki Group Czechoslovak and Soviet Russian dissident initiatives that appealed to the Helsinki AccordsReferences Edit https www csce gov sites helsinkicommission house gov files The 20Helsinki 20Process 20Four 20Decade 20Overview pdf bare URL PDF Encyclopaedia Britannica Helsinki Accords Available at https www britannica com EBchecked topic 260615 Helsinki Accords Helsinki pact A three way battle in Madrid Christian Science Monitor 9 September 1980 Timothy J Lynch ed The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Military and Diplomatic History 2013 1 460 62 Price Rochelle B 1984 Jamming and the Law of International Communications Michigan Journal of International Law 5 1 Ford Gerald Kissinger Henry Scowcroft Brent August 15 1974 President Ford Henry Kissinger memcon August 15 1974 Gerald R Ford Presidential Library p 5 via Wikisource scan President s Inquiry on CSCE Baltic States Case File Request by Senators for a Delay of the Final Stage of Helsinki Final Act Case File a b Wilentz Sean 2008 The Age of Reagan A History 1974 2008 1 ed New York NY Harper ISBN 978 0 06 074480 9 OCLC 182779124 a b Memorandum for Henry Kissinger from A Denis Clift Re Replies to Correspondence Critical of CSCE Ford Gerald R 1977 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Gerald R Ford 1975 pp 1030 31 ISBN 9781623768485 President Ford s Visit to Helsinki July 29 August 2 1975 CSCE Briefing Book a b Sarah B Snyder Through the Looking Glass The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President Diplomacy amp Statecraft 21 1 2010 87 106 a b c Hiden John Vahur Made David J Smith 2008 The Baltic question during the Cold War Routledge p 209 ISBN 978 0 415 37100 1 McHugh James T James S Pacy 2001 Diplomats without a country Baltic diplomacy international law and the Cold War Greenwood Publishing Group p 84 ISBN 978 0 313 31878 8 Richard Pipes 2001 Communism Weidenfeld amp Nicolson ISBN 0 297 64688 5 Richard Pipes 1994 Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime Vintage ISBN 0 679 76184 5 pages 401 403 Wyszynski Andrzej 1949 Teoria dowodow sadowych w prawie radzieckim PDF Biblioteka Zrzeszenia Prawnikow Demokratow pp 153 162 Thomas Daniel C 2005 Human Rights Ideas the Demise of Communism and the End of the Cold War Journal of Cold War Studies 7 2 110 141 doi 10 1162 1520397053630600 S2CID 57570614 Gaddis John Lewis 2005 The Cold War London Penguin p 190 ISBN 978 0 141 02532 2 Enver Hoxha The Superpowers Tirane 8 Nentori Publishing House 1986 https www csce gov sites helsinkicommission house gov files Helsinki 20Final 20Act pdf bare URL PDF Further reading EditKorey William The Promises We Keep Human Rights the Helsinki Process and American Foreign Policy St Martin s Press 1993 Morgan Michael Cotey The Final Act The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War Princeton UP 2018 Nuti Leopoldo ed The Crisis of Detente in Europe From Helsinki to Gorbachev 1975 1985 Routledge 2008 Snyder Sarah B Through the Looking Glass The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President Diplomacy amp Statecraft 21 1 2010 87 106 it helped defeat Gerald Ford Thomas Daniel C The Helsinki accords and political change in Eastern Europe Cambridge Studies in International Relations 66 1999 205 233 Thomas Daniel C The Helsinki Effect International Norms Human Rights and the Demise of Communism Princeton UP 2001 ISBN 9780691048598 Wenger Andreas Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nunlist eds Origins of the European security system the Helsinki Process revisited 1965 75 Routledge 2008 Kieninger Stephan Dynamic Detente The United States and Europe 1964 1975 Lexington Books 2016 Badalassi Nicolas and Sarah B Snyder eds The CSCE and the End of the Cold War Diplomacy Societies and Human Rights 1972 1990 Berghahn Books 2018 External links Edit Wikimedia Commons has media related to Helsinki Accords Wikisource has original text related to this article Helsinki Final Act Full text of the Final Act 1975 Conference on Security and Co operation in Europe United States Helsinki Commission Scan of the original copy with signatures PDF Signing of the Final Act on August 1st 1975 OSCE Magazine October 2005 Special anniversary issue 30 years of the Helsinki Final Act 1975 2005 The Helsinki process and the death of communism Interview with Henry Kissinger discusses Helsinki Accords during Soviet Repression in Poland from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives The Helsinki Final Act Resources for Understanding its Creation Implementation and Legacy see the nameplates at the photo Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Helsinki Accords amp oldid 1150129778, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

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