Grey-zone (international relations)

The grey-zone (also gray-zone) describes the space in between peace and war in which state and non-state actors engage in competition.

Definition

Use of the term grey-zone is widespread in national security circles, but there is no universal agreement on the definition of grey-zone, or even whether it is a useful term, with views about the term ranging from "faddish" or "vague", to "useful" or "brilliant".^[1]

The grey-zone is defined as "competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality" by the United States Special Operations Command.^[2] A key element of operations within the grey-zone is that they remain below the threshold of an attack which could have a legitimate conventional military response (jus ad bellum).^[3][4] One paper defined it as "coercive statecraft actions short of war", and a "mainly non-military domain of human activity in which states use national resources to deliberately coerce other states".^[1] The Center for Strategic and International Studies defines the grey-zone as "the contested arena somewhere between routine statecraft and open warfare."^[5] British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace called the grey-zone "that limbo land between peace and war."^[6]

According to Vincent Cable, examples of grey-zone activities include undermining industrial value chains or oil and gas supplies, money laundering, and the use of espionage and sabotage.^[7] According to Lee Hsi-ming "gray zone conflict is characterized by using the threat of force to create fear and intimidation."^[8]

History

The term grey-zone was coined by the United States Special Operations Command^[9][10] and published in a 2015 white paper.^[11] The concept of the grey-zone is built on existing military strategies; however, information technology has created radical new spaces which have expanded what is possible. Modern hybrid warfare and political warfare operations primarily occur in the grey-zone.^[12]

In the late 2010s, China escalated to grey-zone warfare with Taiwan in an attempt to force unification with the smaller country.^[13] Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration has had to expand rapidly to meet the rising grey-zone challenge.^[14] China's grey-zone operations against Taiwan in the maritime domain are meant to establish presence while maintaining plausible deniability.^[15]

Concerns

It is generally believed that non-democratic states can operate more effectively in the grey-zone as they are much less limited by domestic law and regulation. It can also be very hard for democratic states to respond to grey-zone threats because their legal and military systems are geared towards seeing conflicts through the sense of war and peace with little preparation or consideration for anything in between. This can lead democratic states to either dramatically overreact or under-react when faced with a grey-zone challenge.^[16]

Examples of Grey Zone Warfare

China's Grey Zone activities in the Arctic region

International situation

Disputes in the Arctic have been on the rise and mirrors a global trend found in other maritime regions such as the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea.^[17] A feature of the dispute is the growing great-power rivalry in the region between the United States and China.^[18] The U.S. views China's Arctic activities as a threat to its influence and military interests and is concerned that it will replicate in the Arctic the grey-zone tactics that it has used in the South China Sea.^{[19][20][21][22][23]} As with the United States, Norway, Canada, Finland and Denmark have all said that growing tensions in the region would lead to the Arctic becoming increasingly militarised.^{[24][25][26][27][28]}

China's interest and involvement in the Arctic region

China's focus on the Arctic is driven by strategic and economic considerations^[29][30] Global warming has created new shipping routes which is ideal for China as its commercial ships can reduce transportation costs and bypass the US-monitored Malacca-straits.^{[31][30][32][33][34]} In addition, it has made natural resources located in the region easier to access and extract.^[6]

China has conducted scientific expeditions in the Arctic since 1999 and in 2013 it was granted observer status in the Arctic Council.^[35][30] In 2018, China called itself a “near-Arctic” state.^[30] China has sent ships with increasingly sophisticated technology to the region and concerns have grown over their dual-use potential.^{[36][37][38][39][31][35]} For its part, China has downplayed those concerns and says it is not conducting military research.^[40] Furthermore, it has referred to UNCLOS to justify its research expeditions.^[41][42]

The military and greyzone nature of China's Arctic activities can be found in its “White Paper on Arctic Policy"^[31] The paper emphasises the role that Arctic research can play in helping modernise the Chinese military.^[35][38] Rebecca Pincus and Walter Berbrick have said that the Arctic is emerging as a frontier for gray-zone activities and that Chinese state-affiliated actors employ two major gray-zone techniques: strategic investment in infrastructure and resources that may serve military or security as well as commercial purposes (but which often make little economic sense), and scientific research that advances both military and commercial interests.^[43]

China's greyzone activities in the South China Sea

Little blue men

See also: Maritime Militia (China)

China has the world’s largest fishing fleet and the country has used a part of it as maritime militia in order to assert its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.^[44][45][46] China's claims to the South China Sea has been known as the nine dash line and it has intruded into the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of several other states who make competing claims to the waterway.^[47][48][49] As part of its efforts to strengthen its claim, China has built military facilities on rocks and islets in disputed areas.^[50] While China's South China Sea claims were overruled in 2016 by an international tribunal,^[51] it has redoubled its claim enforcement efforts by drawing on its fishing militia to safeguard its island-building endeavors and harass foreign vessels.^[52] The militia's increasing involvement in greyzone operations, coupled with its rapid expansion in size and enhanced resources,^[53] has caused neighboring countries as well as the US to bolster their military capabilities in the South China Sea.^[54] As such, concern about severe conflict escalation in the region have arisen.^[55]

The militia answers to the top of China’s military bureaucracy^[56] and President Xi Jinping has encouraged it to assist in bolstering the country's interests in the South China Sea.^[57] The militia operates in close collaboration with the Chinese Coast Guard and the Chinese Navy. It has therefore been described as China’s “Third Sea Force”^[58][59] and defined as a “State-organized, state-developed and state-controlled force operating under a direct military chain of command to conduct Chinese state-sponsored activities”.^[60]

The strength of the Chinese fishing militia has lied in its hybrid nature.^[61] Using fishing vessels and ordinary fishermen has allowed China to disavow direct affiliation with the militia.^[62] Due to the plausible deniability which the militia affords to the Chinese government, it has been dubbed China's “little blue men” by American scholars Andrew Erickson and Connor Kennedy in an allusion to Russia "little green men" which the country used to annex Crimea in 2014.^[63] The ostensibly civilian status of the militia and the incremental nature of its operations makes it difficult for other states to react and allows China to weaken its challengers without starting a war.^[64] Weaker nations might be reluctant to encounter the militia fearing a response from China, while more powerful nations might hesitate in confronting the militia due to the challenges of positively linking it to the Chinese government.^[65][66]

Views which differ from the prevailing one of what China's fishing militia is and does have been put forward. Shuxian Luo and Jonathan Panter have said that while China has used its maritime militia to support its South China Sea claims, it is among the least-funded, least-organized, and often least-professional of the forces that has been employed for that purpose.^[67][68] Hongzhou Zhang and Sam Bateman have argued that the mainstream narrative that the Chinese government uses its fishermen to pursue strategic and political objectives does not take into account domestic and international factors like pollution and overfishing from rival claimant states.^[69]

Competition with the United States

Since 2015 the US has conducted freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) to challenge China's territorial claims to the South China Sea.^[70] The United States justifies its FONOPS on the grounds that they uphold UNCLOS by protecting the right of all countries to freely navigate the high seas.^[71] Krista Wiegand and Hayoun Jessie Ryou-Ellison have said that given the U.S.'s status as the leader of the rules-based order, it could continue to justify its military presence to promote freedom of navigation, defend its allies and security partners and their maritime rights, and challenge China’s power projection.^[72] Scholars including Walter Mead have argued that revisionist states such as China have utilized grey-zone warfare to undermine the U.S.-led international order.^[73][74] A report by RAND said China viewed greyzone activities as natural extensions of how countries exercised power and recommended the U.S. holding discussions with key allies and partners to better understand their concerns, responses, and needs.^[75] Kristi Govella has said that while China has contested the status quo interpretation of UNCLOS with respect to military activities in claimed exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the South China Sea which the United States uses to justify its FONOPS, China has also been willing to use the status quo interpretation as demonstrated by the military activities it has conducted other states’ EEZs.^[76] Bo Hu has said that much of the tensions between the US and China arising from their differing interpretations of what and how maritime rules and laws should regulate activities and claims in the South China Sea comes down to their conflicting interests in the region.^[77]

Iran's greyzone activities near the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb

Iran is allegedly involved in greyzone activities in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb where there have been numerous incidents of mine attacks, drone strikes, sabotage, and ships being detained.^[78][79] The attacks and insecurity in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb cause great global economic stress as both locations are strategically important for the global oil supply.^[80][81] This means that many nations and shipping companies are interested in protecting vessels from being attacked. Consequently, this has led to increased security and monitoring in the regions by states like the US and Saudi Arabia but also private shipping companies.^[82] Since 2019, there has been an ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel which has been coined the “Shadow War” by scholars in international relations. Iran and Israel have accused each other of conducting clandestine tactics against one another such as drone strikes and sea mining which have caused much distress in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb.^[78][79]

The Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz plays an important role in the global economy as roughly a quarter of the world’s oil is shipped through that chokepoint. Because of its economic importance as well as its narrow chokepoint, some analysts fear a naval barricade by Iran or a military conflict would cause a massive disruption to the global oil supply, making prices extremely high until ships would be able to continue to sail through the strait without being attacked.^[81][83] This occurred in the 1980s in the Tanker War between Iraq and Iran where both nations conducted numerous attacks on ships that were trafficking oil to either Iran or Iraq.^[84]

In recent years, there have been numerous attacks occurring in the Persian Gulf near the strait including an alleged torpedo attack on a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel and an attack with two explosive devices towards a Panama-flagged vessel in 2019. Furthermore, there are multiple cases of sabotage attacks and even a case with a British-flagged oil tanker being detained by Iran.^[85] While experts believe that Iran does not have the capacity to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, they still think it possible that Iran would undermine global oil prices by sabotaging tankers in the strait with mines, small anti-ship missiles, and small craft with explosive devices, etc. Experts argue that Iran will manage to keep harassing and conducting the small, greyzone attacks without creating an all-out war with either the US or the Arab coalition countries.^[86][83] For the shipping industry, these attacks led to massive increases in insurance rates and oil prices. As a response, shipping companies utilize different methods of maneuvering such threats by hiring unarmed security experts. The US, UK, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and other nations have established a naval coalition to maintain maritime surveillance and communicate with merchant vessels as a means to countermeasure these threats.^[87][88]

The Bab el-Mandeb

The Bab el-Mandeb has geostrategic importance to global trade because of the connection between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The strait serves as an essential seaway for many oil tankers due to the strait’s small size, thereby making international shipping and trade an easy target for greyzone warfare tactics. Such tactics include missiles, bombs, sea mines, suicide boats, and remote-controlled explosive devices.^[89] The strait is important to global trade and the shipping industry as the Bab el-Mandeb serves as the third-largest maritime choke point in the world with ships trafficking around 6.2 barrels of oil daily in 2018. As such, the Bab el-Mandeb serves as a highly strategic route for natural gas and oil and a pivotal connection for Europe and Asia’s maritime commerce.^[90][91] In recent decades, the waters near the Bab el-Mandeb have been an extremely dangerous area for international commerce with many ships being attacked by either pirates or terrorist groups. However, in recent years those threats have diminished but instead have been replaced with the escalation of the civil war in Yemen with the government forces fighting against the Iran-backed Houthi forces. According to the US, Iran provides financial support, training, and material equipment such as drones, missiles, and bombs. The Houthis are seen as the largest security threat to navigation in those waters with numerous attacks such as the attack on two Saudi oil tankers in 2018, A suicide boat attack on a Spanish-flagged tanker in 2016, and a rocket-propelled grenade attack on a Tuvalu-flagged tanker in 2016. Furthermore, the Houthis have deployed sea mines that have detonated on commercial cargo ships as well as local fishing vessels.^[92]

The Shadow War in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb

• See also: Iran–Israel proxy conflict

Since 2019, there has been an ongoing 'Shadow War' between Israel and Iran in the waters near Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz, where there have been a series of greyzone attacks with sea mines, missile attacks, and drone strikes against commercial and navy vessels.^[79][78] Iran has been accused of attacking Israeli commercial vessels and container ships. Likewise, Israel is allegedly involved in greyzone attacks against Iranian tankers heading for Syria. In addition, an Iranian naval vessel was also attacked by Israel in 2021 with claims that the Iranian vessel was supporting the Houthi rebels while the Iranians claimed that the vessel was used to combat piracy. While Iran and Israel are the main belligerents, other nations such as the US, UK, and Syria are also involved as Iran continues their attempt to ship oil to Syria despite the US and EU oil embargo. Iran is dependent on safe passage through the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal. Iranian-flagged risk being seized by the UK if they try to ship oil into Syria by entering the Gibraltar Strait which happened in 2019 when the Iranian-flagged tanker Grace 1 was shipping around 2 million barrels of oil to Syria but was detained by the UK. The tanker was released a month later on the condition that the ship would not sail to Syria.^[93]

As a response to Israel’s war on Hamas since October 2023, the Houthi forces have intensified their attacks on ships in the Red Sea with drones and rockets. The rebels have also hijacked at least one ship. As a result, numerous firms from the shipping industry, including Maersk and the Mediterranean Shipping Company, stated that their vessels would avoid sailing in that area. The US has accused Iran of being involved in the planning of the Houthi forces’ operations. Iran has denied any involvement.^[94] According to the US, the Houthis’ attacks heavily affect global economic trade since 10-15% of the world’s global shipping passes through the Red Sea. In response, the US has formed Operation Prosperity Guardian (OPG) with the goal of protecting the freedom of navigation and maritime commerce in the Red Sea. The US states that the OPG will serve as a multinational security operation, forming a coalition of the willing with more than 20 nations volunteering in order to counter the Houthis’ attacks.^[95]

What makes these attacks a part of greyzone warfare is that it is legally difficult to substantiate the accusations that Iran is behind both the direct and indirect attacks in the international courts. Legal proceedings depend on conclusive evidence of an armed attack in order for the attacked flag-state to claim a right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The limpet sea mines are easy to conceal which makes it challenging for an attacked flag-state to prove that they were specifically targeted for this attack. As such, there has been a case where the US was unable to prove that Iran was behind a sea mine attack despite evidence that the mine was manufactured in Iran.^[96] The involvement of Houthi rebels complicates matters further because Article 51 of the UN Charter dictates a state’s right to self-defense but the charter does not account for actions committed by private actors. As such, this prevents neutral states from holding Iran accountable as the attacks are often committed by the Houthis whom Iran holds no responsibility over.^[97]

Relation with hybrid warfare

The concept of grey-zone conflicts or warfare is distinct from the concept of hybrid warfare,^[98] although the two are intimately linked as in the modern era states most often apply unconventional tools and hybrid techniques in the grey-zone.^[99] However, both concepts of ‘hybrid war’ and ‘grey zones’ strategies are built around the idea of the existence of some intermediate state between (negative) peace and international as well as non-international armed conflict.^[100] Many of the unconventional tools used by states in the grey-zone such as propaganda campaigns, economic pressure and the use of non-state entities do not cross over the threshold into formalized state-level aggression.^[16]

See also

• Gunboat diplomacy
• Proxy war
• Chinese salami slicing strategy
• Unrestricted Warfare

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Further reading

• Layton, Peter (2021). China's Enduring Grey-Zone Challenge (PDF) (Online PDF). Air and Space Power Centre. ISBN 9781925062502.