First Italo-Ethiopian War

This article is about the first Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1895–1896). For the precedent undeclared war between Italy and Ethiopia, see Italo-Ethiopian War of 1887–1889. For other wars between Italy and Ethiopia, see Italo-Ethiopian war (disambiguation).

The First Italo-Ethiopian War also referred to as the First Italo-Abyssinian War; Italian: Guerra d'Abissinia, lit. Abyssinian War, was a war fought between Italy and Ethiopia from 1895 to 1896. It originated from the disputed Treaty of Wuchale, which the Italians claimed turned Ethiopia into an Italian protectorate. Full-scale war broke out in 1895, with Italian troops from Italian Eritrea achieving initial successes against Tigrayan warlords at Coatit, Senafe and Debra Ailà, until they were reinforced by a large Ethiopian army led by Emperor Menelik II.^[15] The Italian defeat came about after the Battle of Adwa, where the Ethiopian army dealt the heavily outnumbered Italian soldiers and Eritrean askaris a decisive blow and forced their retreat back into Eritrea. The war concluded with the Treaty of Addis Ababa. Because this was one of the first decisive victories by African forces over a European colonial power,^[16] this war became a preeminent symbol of pan-Africanism and secured Ethiopia's sovereignty until the Second Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935–36.^[17]

First Italo-Ethiopian War
Part of the Scramble for Africa
Clockwise from top left: Menelik II at Adwa; The death of Major Toselli; Oreste Baratieri in Eritrea; Ras Mengesha on horseback; Illustration of Dabormida's last rally; Depiction of the Battle of Debra Ailà.
Date 13 January 1895 – 23 October 1896 (1 year, 10 months, 1 week and 1 day) Location Eritrea and Ethiopia Result Ethiopian victory Treaty of Addis Ababa Territorial changes Independence of Ethiopia confirmed; border with Italian Eritrea delineated
Belligerents
Italy	Ethiopia Supported by: Russia^[1]^[2]^[3]
Commanders and leaders
Umberto I Francesco Crispi Oreste Baratieri Vittorio Dabormida † Giuseppe Arimondi † Matteo Albertone  Giuseppe Ellena Giuseppe Galliano † Pietro Toselli †	Menelik II Taytu Betul Ras Makonnen Tekle Haymanot Mikael of Wollo Mengesha Yohannes Alula Engida Gugsa Welle Bashah Aboye †
Strength
35,000^[4]–43,700^[5]^[6]	80,000^[7]–125,000^[8]
Casualties and losses
9,313 killed^[a] 1,428 wounded^[11] 3,865 captured^[12]^[13]	~10,000 killed^[14]

Background

See also: Ethiopian-Egyptian War, Italo-Ethiopian War of 1887–1889, and Italian Eritrea

The Khedive of Egypt Isma'il Pasha, better known as "Isma'il the Magnificent" had conquered Eritrea as part of his efforts to give Egypt an African empire.^[18][19] Isma'il had tried to follow up that conquest with Ethiopia, but the Egyptian attempts to conquer that realm ended in humiliating defeat in the Egyptian–Ethiopian War. After Egypt's bankruptcy in 1876^[20] followed by the Ansar revolt under the leadership of the Mahdi in 1881, the Egyptian position in Eritrea was hopeless with the Egyptian forces cut off and unpaid for years. By 1884 the Egyptians began to pull out of both Sudan and Eritrea.^[19]

On 3 June 1884, the Hewett Treaty was signed between Britain, Egypt and Ethiopia that allowed the Ethiopians to occupy parts of the dissolved Habesh Eyalet which allowed Ethiopian goods to pass in and out of Massawa duty-free.^[19] From the viewpoint of Britain, it was highly undesirable that the French replace the Egyptians in Massawa as that would allow the French to have more naval bases on the Red Sea that could interfere with British shipping using the Suez Canal, and as the British did not want the financial burden of ruling Massawa, they looked for another power who would be interested in replacing the Egyptians.^[19] The Hewett treaty seemed to suggest that Massawa would fall into the Ethiopian sphere of influence as the Egyptians pulled out.^[19] After initially encouraging the Emperor Yohannes IV to move into Massawa to replace the Egyptians, London decided to have the Italians move into Massawa.^[19] In his history of Ethiopia, British historian Augustus Wylde wrote: "England made use of King John [Emperor Yohannes] as long as he was of any service and then threw him over to the tender mercies of Italy...It is one of our worst bits of business out of the many we have been guilty of in Africa...one of the vilest bites of treachery".^[19]

On 5 February 1885 Italian troops landed at Massawa to replace the Egyptians.^[19] The Italian government for its part was more than happy to embark upon an imperialist policy to distract its people from the failings in post Risorgimento Italy.^[19] In 1861, the unification of Italy was supposed to mark the beginning of a glorious new era in Italian life, and many Italians were gravely disappointed to find that not much had changed in the new Kingdom of Italy with the vast majority of Italians still living in abject poverty. To compensate, a chauvinist mood was rampant among the upper classes in Italy with the newspaper Il Diritto writing in an editorial: "Italy must be ready. The year 1885 will decide her fate as a great power. It is necessary to feel the responsibility of the new era; to become again strong men afraid of nothing, with the sacred love of the fatherland, of all Italy, in our hearts".^[19][21] The struggle against the Ansar from Sudan complicated Yohannes's relations with the Italians, whom he sometimes asked to provide him with guns to fight the Ansar and other times he resisted the Italians and proposed a truce with the Ansar.^[21]

On 18 January 1887, at a village named Saati, an advancing Italian army detachment defeated the Ethiopians in a skirmish, but it ended with the numerically superior Ethiopians surrounding the Italians in Saati after they retreated in face of the enemy's numbers.^[22] Some 500 Italian soldiers under Colonel de Christoforis together with 50 Eritrean auxiliaries were sent to support the besieged garrison at Saati.^[22] At Dogali on his way to Saati, de Christoforis was ambushed by an Ethiopian force under Ras Alula, whose men armed with spears skillfully encircled the Italians who retreated to one hill and then to another higher hill.^[22] After the Italians ran out of ammunition, Ras Alula ordered his men to charge and the Ethiopians swiftly overwhelmed the Italians in an action that featured bayonets against spears.^[22] The Battle of Dogali ended with the Italians losing 23 officers and 407 other ranks killed.^[22] As a result of the defeat at Dogali, the Italians abandoned Saati and retreated back to the Red Sea coast.^[23] Italian newspapers called the battle a "massacre" and excoriated the Regio Esercito for not assigning de Chistoforis enough ammunition.^[23] Having, at first, encouraged Emperor Yohannes to move into Eritrea, and then having encouraged the Italians to also do so, London realised a war was brewing and decided to try to mediate, largely out of the fear that the Italians might actually lose.^[19]

The defeat at Dogali made the Italians cautious for a moment, but on 10 March 1889, Emperor Yohannes died after being wounded in battle against the Ansar and on his deathbed admitted that Ras Mengesha, the supposed son of his brother, was actually his own son and asked that he succeed him.^[23] The revelation that the emperor had slept with his brother's wife scandalised intensely Orthodox Ethiopia, and instead the Negus Menelik was proclaimed emperor on 26 March 1889.^[23] Ras Mengesha, one of the most powerful Ethiopian noblemen, was unhappy about being by-passed in the succession and for a time allied himself with the Italians against the Emperor Menelik.^[23] Under the feudal Ethiopian system, there was no standing army, and instead, the nobility raised up armies on behalf of the Emperor. In December 1889, the Italians advanced inland again and took the cities of Asmara and Keren and in January 1890 took Adowa.^[23]

Outbreak of the war

Main article: Treaty of Wuchale

On 25 March 1889, the Shewa ruler Menelik II, having conquered Tigray and Amhara, declared himself Emperor of Ethiopia (or "Abyssinia", as it was commonly called in Europe at the time). Barely a month later, on 2 May he signed the Treaty of Wuchale with the Italians, which apparently gave them control over Eritrea, the Red Sea coast to the northeast of Ethiopia, in return for recognition of Menelik's rule. Menelik II continued the policy of Tewodros II of integrating Ethiopia.

However, the bilingual treaty did not say the same thing in Italian and Amharic; the Italian version did not give the Ethiopians the "significant autonomy" written into the Amharic translation.^[24] The Italian text stated that Ethiopia must conduct its foreign affairs through Italy (making it an Italian protectorate), but the Amharic version merely stated that Ethiopia could contact foreign powers and conduct foreign affairs using the embassy of Italy. Italian diplomats, however, claimed that the original Amharic text included the clause and Menelik knowingly signed a modified copy of the Treaty.^[25] In October 1889, the Italians informed all of the other European governments because of the Treaty of Wuchale that Ethiopia was now an Italian protectorate and therefore the other European nations could not conduct diplomatic relations with Ethiopia.^[26] With the exceptions of the Ottoman Empire, which still maintained its claim to Eritrea, and Russia, which disliked the idea of an Orthodox nation being subjugated to a Roman Catholic nation, all of the European powers accepted the Italian claim to a protectorate.^[26]

The Italian claim that Menelik was aware of Article XVII turning his nation into an Italian protectorate seems unlikely given that the Emperor Menelik sent letters to Queen Victoria and Emperor Wilhelm II in late 1889 and was informed in the replies in early 1890 that neither Britain nor Germany could have diplomatic relations with Ethiopia on the account of Article XVII of the Treaty of Wuchale, a revelation that came as a great shock to the Emperor.^[26] Victoria's letter was polite whereas Wilhelm's letter was somewhat more rude, saying that King Umberto I was a great friend of Germany and Menelik's violation of the supposed Italian protectorate was a grave insult to Umberto, adding that he never wanted to hear from Menelik again.^[26] Moreover, Menelik did not know Italian and only signed the Amharic text of the treaty, being assured that there were no differences between the Italian and Amharic texts before he signed.^[26] The differences between the Italian and Amharic texts were due to the Italian minister in Addis Ababa, Count Pietro Antonelli, who had been instructed by his government to gain as much territory as possible in negotiating with the Emperor Menelik. However, knowing Menelik was now enthroned as the King of Kings and had a strong position, Antonelli was in the unenviable situation of negotiating a treaty that his own government might disallow. Therefore, he inserted the statement making Ethiopia give up its right to conduct its foreign affairs to Italy as a way of pleasing his superiors who might otherwise have fired him for only making small territorial gains.^[26] Antonelli was fluent in Amharic and given that Menelik only signed the Amharic text he could not have been unaware that the Amharic version of Article XVII only stated that the King of Italy places the services of his diplomats at the disposal of the Emperor of Ethiopia to represent him abroad if he so wished.^[26] When his subterfuge was exposed in 1890 with Menelik indignantly saying he would never sign away his country's independence to anybody, Antonelli (who had left Addis Ababa in 1890) resorted to racist rhetoric, telling his superiors in Rome that as Menelik was a black man, he was thus intrinsically dishonest and it was only natural the Emperor would lie about the protectorate he supposedly willingly turned his nation into.^[26]

Francesco Crispi, the Italian Prime Minister was an ultra-imperialist who believed the newly unified Italian state required "the grandeur of a second Roman empire".^[23] Crispi believed that the Horn of Africa was the best place for the Italians to start building the new Roman empire.^[23] The American journalist James Perry wrote that "Crispi was a fool, a bigot and a very dangerous man".^[23] Because of the Ethiopian refusal to abide by the Italian version of the treaty and despite economic handicaps at home, the Italian government decided on a military solution to force Ethiopia to abide by the Italian version of the treaty. In doing so, they believed that they could exploit divisions within Ethiopia and rely on tactical and technological superiority to offset any inferiority in numbers. The efforts of Emperor Menelik, viewed as pro-French by London, to unify Ethiopia and thus bring the source of the Blue Nile under his control was perceived in Whitehall as a threat to their influence in Egypt.^[27] As Menelik became increasingly successful in unifying Ethiopia, the British government courted the Italians to counter Ethiopian expansion.^[27]

The only European ally of Ethiopia was Russia.^[1][2][3] The Ethiopian emperor sent his first diplomatic mission to St. Petersburg in 1895. In June 1895, the newspapers in St. Petersburg wrote, "Along with the expedition, Menelik II sent his diplomatic mission to Russia, including his princes and his bishop". Many citizens of the capital came to meet the train that brought Prince Damto, General Genemier, Prince Belyakio, Bishop of Harer Gabraux Xavier and other members of the delegation to St. Petersburg. On the eve of war, an agreement providing military help for Ethiopia was concluded. Russia had been trying to gain a foothold in Ethiopia,^[28] and in 1894, after denouncing the Treaty of Wuchale in July, it received an Ethiopian mission in St. Petersburg and sent arms and ammunition to Ethiopia.^[2] This support continued after the war ended.^[3] The Russian travel writer Alexander Bulatovich who went to Ethiopia to serve as a Red Cross volunteer with the Emperor Menelik made a point of emphasizing in his books that the Ethiopians converted to Christianity before any of the Europeans ever did, described the Ethiopians as a deeply religious people like the Russians, and argued the Ethiopians did not have the "low cultural level" of the other African peoples, making them equal to the Europeans.^[29]

In 1893, judging that his power over Ethiopia was secure, Menelik repudiated the treaty; in response the Italians ramped up the pressure on his domain in a variety of ways, including the annexation of small territories bordering their original claim under the Treaty of Wuchale, and finally culminating with a military campaign and across the Mareb River into Tigray (on the border with Eritrea) in December 1894. The Italians expected disaffected potentates like Negus Tekle Haymanot of Gojjam, Ras Mengesha Yohannes, and the Sultan of Aussa to join them; instead, all of the Ethiopians flocked to the Emperor Menelik's side in a display of both nationalism and anti-Italian feeling, while other peoples of dubious loyalty (e.g. the Sultan of Aussa) were watched by Imperial garrisons.^[30] In June 1894, Ras Mengesha and his generals had appeared in Addis Ababa carrying large stones which they dropped before the Emperor Menelik (a gesture that is a symbol of submission in Ethiopian culture).^[23] In Ethiopia, the popular saying at the time was: "Of a black snake's bite, you may be cured, but from the bite of a white snake, you will never recover."^[23] There was an overwhelming national unity in Ethiopia as various feuding noblemen rallied behind the emperor who insisted that Ethiopia, unlike the other African nations, would retain its freedom and not be subjugated by Italy.^[23] The ethnic rivalries between the Tigrians and the Amhara that the Italians were counting upon did not prove to be a factor as Menelik pointed out that the Italians held all ethnic Africans, regardless of their individual ethnic backgrounds, in contempt, noting the segregation policies in Eritrea applied to all ethnic Africans.^[23] Further, Menelik had spent much of the previous four years building up a supply of modern weapons and ammunition, acquired from the Russians, Germans, French, British, and even the Italians themselves, as the European colonial powers sought to keep each other's African aspirations in check.

Course of the war

 

Emperor Menelik II

 

Oreste Baratieri

In December 1894, Bahta Hagos led a rebellion against the Italians in Akkele Guzay, claiming support of Ras Mengesha Yohannes. Units of General Oreste Baratieri's army under Major Pietro Toselli crushed the rebellion and killed Bahta at the Battle of Halai. Baratieri suspected that Mengesha would invade Eritrea, and met him at the Battle of Coatit in January 1895. The victorious Italians chased the retreating Mengesha, defeating him again at the battle of Senafe. Baratieri would promptly march into Adigrat by the end of March and occupying Adwa on 2 April. He issued a proclamation, annexing Tigray province into Italian Eritrea, he then moved into Mekelle and fortified old church above the town's spur.^[15][31] At this point, Emperor Menelik turned to France, offering a treaty of alliance; the French response was to abandon the Emperor in order to secure Italian approval of the Treaty of Bardo which would secure French control of Tunisia. Virtually alone, on 17 September 1895, Emperor Menelik issued a proclamation calling up the men of Abyssinia to join his army at Were Ilu.^[32] Leaders of every region in Ethiopia were responding to Menelik's call to arms and would assemble an army of over 100,000 men before marching north to face the Italian invaders.^[15]

The next clash came at Amba Alagi on 7 December 1895, when Ras Makonnen brought up his largely Shewan army to the slopes of Amba Alagi in southern Tigray. They were confronted by Major Pietro Toselli with 2,000 Eritreans and local Tigrayan askaris that had joined the Italians for various reasons. Makonnen was joined by Ras Mengesha Yohannes and Welle Betul, together they overran the Italian positions on the natural fortress and killed Major Toselli and most of his men. General Giuseppe Arimondi, who had just arrived to reinforce Toselli, was barely able to escape and retreated with 400 survivors to the unfinished Italian fort at Mekele. Arimondi left there a small garrison of approximately 1,150 askaris and 200 Italians, commanded by Major Giuseppe Galliano, and took the bulk of his troops to Adigrat, where General Oreste Baratieri was concentrating the Italian army.^[15]

The first Ethiopian troops reached Mekele in the following days. Ras Makonnen surrounded the fort at Mekelle on 18 December. By the first days of January, Emperor Menelik II, accompanied by his Queen Taytu Betul, had led their massive imperial army into Tigray and joined Ras Makonnen at Mekele on 6 January 1896.^[33] While Italian journalists filled sensational reports of their brave country holding out against "war-crazed black barbarians", Menelik had established contact with the Italian commander and gave him the opportunity to leave peacefully to Adigrat. The commander was defiant until the Ethiopians cut off the water supply to the fort and on January 21, with permission from the Italian high command, agreed to surrender. Menelik allowed them to leave Mekelle with their weapons, and even provided the defeated Italians mules and pack animals to rejoin Baratieri. While some historians read this generous act as a sign that Emperor Menelik still hoped for a peaceful resolution to the war, Harold Marcus points out that this escort allowed him a tactical advantage: "Menelik craftily managed to establish himself in Hawzien, at Gendepata, near Adwa, where the mountain passes were not guarded by Italian fortifications."^[34][7]

Menelik decided against attacking the Italian headquarters at Adigrat and instead marched west towards the plateau of Adwa. Baratieri feared that the Emperor intended to invade Eritrea and hence abandoned his positions at Adigrat and moved towards the area. On February 28 1896, Baratieri then called an assembly of all his generals and informed them that their provisions would run out, and asked if the army should retreat back to Asmara or attack Menelik's army. All of his generals were opposed to retreat. Baratieri decided to rely on surprise by making up for his deficiency in manpower and issued a battle order on the next day.^[35]

Battle of Adwa

Main article: Battle of Adwa

 

Painting depicting the Battle of Adwa

The decisive battle of the war was the Battle of Adwa on March 1, 1896, which took place in the mountainous country north of the actual town of Adwa (or Adowa). The Italian army comprised four brigades totaling approximately 17,700 men, with fifty-six artillery pieces; the Ethiopian army comprised several brigades numbering between 73,000 and 120,000 men (80–100,000 with firearms: according to Richard Pankhurst, the Ethiopians were armed with approximately 100,000 rifles of which about half were quick-firing),^[8] with almost fifty artillery pieces. General Oreste Baratieri underestimated the size of the Ethiopian force, predicating that Menelik could only field 30,000 men;^[36] also, the Ethiopians were better armed, being equipped with thousands of modern rifles and Hotchkiss artillery guns together with ammunition and shells which were superior to the Italian rifles and artillery.^[36] Menelik had ensured that his infantry and artillerymen were properly trained in their use, giving the Ethiopians a crucial advantage as the Hotchkiss artillery could fire more rapidly than the Italian artillery.^[36]

On the night of 29 February and the early morning of 1 March, three Italian brigades advanced separately towards Adwa over narrow mountain tracks, while a fourth remained camped. However, the three leading Italian brigades had become separated during their overnight march and by dawn were spread across several miles of very difficult terrain. Unbeknownst to General Baratieri, Emperor Menelik knew his troops had exhausted the ability of the local peasants to support them and had planned to break camp the next day. The Emperor had risen early when spies from Ras Alula, brought him news that the Italians were advancing. The Emperor summoned the separate armies of his nobles and with the Empress Taytu Betul beside him, ordered his forces forward.^[37][38]

The Italian forces were hit by wave after wave of attacks, until Menelik released his reserve of 25,000 men, which overran an Italian brigade. Another brigade was cut off, and destroyed by a cavalry charge. The last two brigades were destroyed piecemeal in a devastating rout. By noon, the Italian survivors were in full retreat.^[39][40]

 

Italian prisoners of war waiting for repatriation

George Berkeley records that the Italian casualties were 6,133 men killed: 261 officers, 2,918 white NCOs and privates, 954 permanently missing, and about 2,000 ascari. Another 1,428 were wounded – 470 Italians (including 31 officers) and 958 ascari. With 1,865 Italians and 1,000–2,000 ascaris taken prisoner.^[41][42] Richard Caulk estimates that the number of Italians killed were 300 officers, 4,600 Italian rank and 1,000 askari for a total of 5,900 dead. As well as and 1,000 of those who escaped wounded and at least 2,000 captured. Citing contemporary figures, Caulk records Ethiopian losses to be 3,886 killed and 6,000 wounded.^[43] Whereas Berkeley estimates Ethiopian losses to be 7,000 killed and 10,000 wounded.^[44][40] In their flight to Eritrea, the Italians left behind all of their artillery and 11,000 rifles, as well as most of their transport.^[40] As Paul B. Henze notes, "Baratieri's army had been completely annihilated while Menelik's was intact as a fighting force and gained thousands of rifles and a great deal of equipment from the fleeing Italians."^[45] 800 captured Eritrean Ascari, regarded as traitors by the Ethiopians, had their right hands and left feet amputated, some were even castrated.^[46][47] The Italian prisoners were generally treated better. Although, about 70 Italian prisoners were massacred in retaliation for the death of Bashah Aboye, the officer responsible for the massacre was supposedly imprisoned by Menelik.^[48][49][50]

Outcome and consequences

Main article: Treaty of Addis Ababa

The Italian telegraph lines brought news of the disaster to Italy and the world almost immediately. Italy was shaken by political crisis and popular demonstrations. Riots broke out in several Italian cities, and within two weeks, Crispi was forced to resign amidst Italian disenchantment with "foreign adventures".^[51] Soon after the battle, Menelik II later sent a message to Antonio Baldissera informing him that he would conclude peace if Italy publicly renounced their protectorate claim over Ethiopia. Baldissera agreed to accept only if Ethiopia agreed to not accept protection from any other European powers. At this Italian arrogance, Menelik broke off talks and withdrew his original offer. Upon returning to his capital at Addis Ababa, Menelik secured the Treaty of Addis Ababa in October, which delineated the borders of Eritrea and forced Italy to recognize "absolutely and without any reserve" the independence of Ethiopia.^[45]

The Russian support for Ethiopia led to a Russian Red Cross mission, though conceived as a medical support for the Ethiopian troops it arrived too late for the actual fighting, which came to end with the Ethiopian victory, at Adwa, on 1 March 1896, the mission arrived in Addis Ababa some three months after Menelik's Adwa victory.^[52] Owing to Russia's diplomatic support of her fellow Orthodox nation, Russia's prestige greatly increased in Ethiopia. The adventuresome Seljan brothers, Mirko and Stjepan, who were actually Catholic Croats, were warmly welcomed when they arrived in Ethiopia in 1899 when they misinformed their hosts by saying they were Russians.^[53]

Following this victory, the European powers moved rapidly to adjust relations with the Ethiopian Empire. Delegations from the United Kingdom and France—whose colonial possessions lay next to Ethiopia—soon arrived in the Ethiopian capital to negotiate their own treaties with this newly proven power. Quickly taking advantage of the Italian defeat, French influence increased markedly and France became one of the most influential European powers in Menelik's court.^[27] In December 1896, a French diplomatic mission in Addis Ababa arrived and on 20 March 1897 signed a treaty that was described as "véritable traité d'alliance.^[27] In turn, the increase in French influence in Ethiopia led to fears in London that the French would gain control of the Blue Nile and would be able to "lever" the British out of Egypt.^[27] On the eve of the Battle of Adwa, two Sudanese envoys from the Mahdiyya state arrived at Menelik's camp in Adwa to discuss concentrated action against the Italians, in July 1896 an Ethiopian envoy was present at Abdallahi ibn Muhammad's court in Omdurman.^[27] The British, fearing that Menelik would support the Mahdist revolt, sent a diplomatic mission to Ethiopia and on 14 May 1897 signed the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 where Menelik assured the British that he would not support the Mahdists and declared the Mahdists as the enemy of his country. In December 1897, Ras Makonnen led an expedition against the Mahdists to seize the gold producing region of Benishangul-Gumuz.^[54][55]

In 1935, Italy launched a second invasion, which was an Abyssinian-British Victory though, Abyssinia was occupied and was claimed as apart of Italian East Africa. Ethiopia was 2/3 occupied by the Italians until the Italians were driven out in 1941 by the British Empire, with assistance from Ethiopian arbegnoch guerillas.^[56] Because the Italians never took full control of Ethiopia, Ethiopia stands as the only African nation that was never colonized but was occupied.^[57]

Gallery

•  

  Russian military officer Nikolay Leontiev with a member of the Ethiopian military

•  

  Battle of Adwa

•  

  An Ethiopian painting commemorating the Battle of Adwa

•  

  Two Italian soldiers captured and held captive after the Battle of Adwa

See also

• Ethiopia–Italy relations
• Italo-Ethiopian War of 1887–1889
• Second Italo-Ethiopian War
• Italian Empire
• Military history of Ethiopia
• Military history of Italy

Notes

1. 4,424 Italians^[9] and 4,889 Eritreans killed.^[10]

References

1. Patman 2009, pp. 27–30
2. Vestal, Theodore M. (2005). "Reflections on the Battle of Adwa and its Significance for Today". In Paulos Milkias; Getachew Metaferia (eds.). The Battle of Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopia's Historic Victory Against European Colonialism. Algora. pp. 21–35. ISBN 978-0-87586-414-3.
3. Eribo 2001, p. 55
4. Marcus, Harold G. (22 February 2002). A history of Ethiopia. University of California Press. p. 97. ISBN 9780520224797. Baratieri had a relatively small army of 35,000 men, mostly Eritreans
5. Marcus, Harold G. The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1844-1913. p. 168. the general's army consisted of 29,700 Italians, 14,000 colonial soldiers, and 70 field pieces
6. Caulk, Richard (2002). "Between the Jaws of Hyenas": A Diplomatic History of Ethiopia (1876-1896). Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden. p. 506. In all nearly 40,000 officers and men, 8,500 mules and 100,000 tons of material were scraped together for an expeditionary force{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
7. Henze 2000, p. 168.
8. Pankhurst 2001, p. 190
9. Dominioni, Matteo (2021). I prigionieri di Menelik, 1896-1897. Mimesis Edizioni. pp. Table 1.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
10. Negash, Tekeste (1987). Italian Colonialism in Eritrea 1882-1941. p. 23.
11. Milkias, Paulos; Metaferia, Getachew (2005). The Battle of Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopia's Historic Victory Against. Algora. p. 286. ISBN 9780875864150.
12. Berkeley, George. The Campaign of Adowa and the rise of Menelik. p. 345. 1,865 were Italians and 2,000 were Eritrean askari.
13. Mclachlan, Sean (20 September 2011). Armies of the Adowa Campaign 1896. Bloomsbury USA. p. 20. ISBN 978-1-84908-457-4.
14. Vandervort 1998, p. 160
15. Henze 2000, p. 167.
16. "5 Fascinating Battles of the African Colonial Era". Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved 14 June 2020.
17. Professor Kinfe Abraham, "The Impact of the Adowa Victory on The Pan-African and Pan-Black Anti-Colonial Struggle," Address delivered to The Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, 8 February 2006
18. Marsot, Afaf (1975). "The Porte and Ismail Pasha's Quest for Autonomy". Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt. 12 (1975): 89–96. doi:10.2307/40000011. JSTOR 40000011. Retrieved 23 December 2020.
19. Perry 2005, p. 196
20. Atkins, Richard (1974). "The Origins of the Anglo-French Condominium in Egypt, 1875-1876". The Historian. 36 (2): 264–282. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6563.1974.tb00005.x. JSTOR 24443685. Retrieved 23 December 2020.
21. Erlich, Haggai (2007). "Ethiopia and the Mahdiyya – You Call Me a Chicken?". Journal of Ethiopian Studies. 40 (1/2): 219–249. JSTOR 41988228.
22. Perry 2005, p. 200
23. Perry 2005, p. 201
24. Gardner 2015, p. 107
25. Pastoretto, Piero. (in Italian). Archived from the original on May 31, 2006. Retrieved 2006-06-04.
26. Rubenson, Sven (1964). "The Protectorate Paragraph of the Wichale Treaty". The Journal of African History. 5 (2): 243–283. doi:10.1017/S0021853700004837. JSTOR 179872.
27. Marcus, Harold G. (1963). "A Background to Direct British Diplomatic Involvement in Ethiopia, 1894–1896". Journal of Ethiopian Studies. 1 (2): 121–132. JSTOR 41965700.
28. Burke, Edmund (1892). "East Africa". The Annual Register of World Events: A Review of the Year. Annual Register, New Series. Vol. 133. Longmans, Green. pp. 397–399.
29. Mirzeler, Mustafa Kemal (2005). "Reading "Ethiopia through Russian Eyes": Political and Racial Sentiments in the Travel Writings of Alexander Bulatovich, 1896–1898". History in Africa. 32: 281–294. doi:10.1353/hia.2005.0017. JSTOR 20065745. S2CID 52044875.
30. Prouty 1986, p. 143
31. Berkeley 1969
32. Marcus 1995, p. 160
33. Prouty 1986, pp. 144–151
34. Marcus 1995, p. 167
35. Henze 2000, p. 169.
36. Perry 2005, p. 205.
37. "Sean McLachlan,page 15 "Armies of the Adowa Campaign 1896: The Italian Disaster in Ethiopia"" (PDF). (PDF) from the original on 16 May 2018. Retrieved 2 March 2019.
38. Lewis, Fashoda, p. 117.
39. "Sean McLachlan,page 15 "Armies of the Adowa Campaign 1896: The Italian Disaster in Ethiopia"" (PDF). (PDF) from the original on 16 May 2018. Retrieved 2 March 2019.
40. Pankhurst 2001, pp. 191–192
41. Berkeley, George. The Campaign of Adowa and the rise of Menelik. p. 345.
42. Mclachlan, Sean (20 September 2011). Armies of the Adowa Campaign 1896. Bloomsbury USA. p. 22. ISBN 978-1-84908-457-4.
43. Caulk, Richard (2002). "Between the Jaws of Hyenas": A Diplomatic History of Ethiopia (1876-1896). Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden. pp. 563, 566–567.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
44. von Uhlig, Encyclopaedia, p. 109.
45. Henze 2000, p. 170.
46. "Photo of some of the Eritrean Ascari mutilated". from the original on 23 September 2018. Retrieved 3 March 2019.
47. McLachlan, Sean (20 September 2011). Armies of the Adowa Campaign 1896. Bloomsbury USA. p. 23. ISBN 978-1-84908-457-4.
48. Ilg, Alfred (2000). Tafla, Bairu (ed.). Ethiopian records of the Menilek era: selected Amharic documents from the Nachlass of Alfred Ilg, 1884-1900. p. 460. ISBN 9783447042581. ISSN 0170-3196. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
49. Richard Caulk, "Between the Jaws of Hyenas": A Diplomatic History of Ethiopia (1876–1896), p. 568
50. McLachlan, Sean (20 September 2011). Armies of the Adowa Campaign 1896. Bloomsbury USA. p. 23. ISBN 978-1-84908-457-4.
51. Vandervort 1998, p. 164
52. Richard, Pankhurst. . The Pankhurst History Library. Archived from the original on 2011-10-03.
53. Molvaer, Reidulf K. (2010). "The Seljan Brothers and the Expansionist Policies of Emperor Minïlik II of Ethiopia". International Journal of Ethiopian Studies. 5 (2): 79–90. JSTOR 41757592.
54. Oliver, Ronald. The Cambridge History of Africa: Volume 6. Cambridge University Press. p. 663.
55. Milkias, Paulos (2005). The Battle of Adwa Reflections on Ethiopia's Historic Victory Against European Colonialism. B&T Database Management. p. 121. ISBN 9780875864150.
56. Stanton, Ramsamy & Seybolt 2012, p. 308
57. Pankhurst, Richard (1998). The Ethiopians: A History (2nd ed.). Great Britain: BlackwellPublishers. pp. 243–249. ISBN 0-631-22493-9.

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