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Dignāga

May 06, 2023

Dignāga (also known as Diṅnāga, c. 480 – c. 540 CE) was an Indian Buddhist scholar and one of the Buddhist founders of Indian logic (hetu vidyā). Dignāga's work laid the groundwork for the development of deductive logic in India and created the first system of Buddhist logic and epistemology (Pramana).[1]

Dignaga. A statue in Elista, Russia.

According to Georges B. Dreyfus, his philosophical school brought about an Indian "epistemological turn" and became the "standard formulation of Buddhist logic and epistemology in India and Tibet."[2] Dignāga's thought influenced later Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakirti and also Hindu thinkers of the Nyaya school. Dignāga's epistemology accepted only "perception" (pratyaksa) and "inference" (anumāṇa) as valid instruments of knowledge and introduced the widely influential theory of "exclusion" (apoha) to explain linguistic meaning.[3] His work on language, inferential reasoning and perception were also widely influential among later Indian philosophers.[4] According to Richard P. Hayes "some familiarity with Dinnaga's arguments and conclusions is indispensable for anyone who wishes to understand the historical development of Indian thought."[5]

Dignāga was born in Simhavakta near Kanchipuram and very little is known of his early years, except that he took Nagadatta of the Pudgalavada school as his spiritual preceptor, before being expelled and becoming a student of Vasubandhu.[6]

Philosophy

 
Buddhist epistemology holds that perception and inference are the means to correct knowledge.

Dignāga mature philosophy is expounded in his magnum opus, the Pramāṇa-samuccaya. In chapter one, Dignāga explains his epistemology which holds that there are only two 'instruments of knowledge' or 'valid cognitions' (pramāṇa); "perception" or "sensation" (pratyakṣa) and "inference" or "reasoning" (anumāṇa). In chapter one, Dignāga writes:

Sensation and reasoning are the only two means of acquiring knowledge, because two attributes are knowable; there is no knowable object other than the peculiar and the general attribute. I shall show that sensation has the peculiar attribute as its subject matter, while reasoning has the general attribute as its subject matter.[7]

Perception is a non-conceptual knowing of particulars which is bound by causality, while inference is reasonable, linguistic and conceptual.[8] This conservative epistemic theory was in contrast to the Nyaya school who accepted other means of knowledge such as upamāṇa (comparison and analogy).

Pratyakṣa

Pratyakṣa is a kind of awareness that acquires information about particulars, and is immediately present to one of the senses. This is the topic of the first chapter of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya.[9] For Dignāga, perception is pre-verbal, pre-conceptual and unstructured sense data. In chapter two of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya he writes:

Sensation is devoid of structure. That cognition in which there is no structure is sensation. What kind of thing is this so-called structure? Attaching a name, a universal and so forth.[10]

According to Dignāga our mind always takes raw sense data or particulars and interprets them or groups them together in more complex ways, compares them to past experiences, gives them names to classify them based on general attributes (samanyalaksana) and so forth. This process he terms kalpana (arranging, structuring).[11] This cognitive process is already different from sensation, which is a simple cognition based only on the immediately present. Thus pratyakṣa is only awareness of particular sense data such as a patch of green color and the sensation of hardness, never awareness of a macroscopic object such an apple which is always a higher level synthesis.[12] For Dignāga, sensation is also inerrant, it cannot "stray" because it is the most basic and simple phenomenon of experience or as he puts it:

"it is impossible too for the object of awareness itself to be errant, for errancy is only the content of misinterpretation by the mind."[13]

Also, for Dignaga, pratyakṣa is mostly phenomenalist and is not dependent on the existence of an external world. It is also inexpressible and private.[14]

Anumāṇa

Anumāṇa (inference or reasoning) for Dignāga is a type of cognition which is only aware of general attributes, and is constructed out of simpler sensations. Inference can also be communicated through linguistic conventions.[15]

A central issue which concerned Dignāga was the interpretation of signs (linga) or the evidence (hetu) which led one to an inference about states of affairs; such as how smoke can lead one to infer that there is a fire.[16] This topic of svārthānumāna (reasoning, literally "inference for oneself") is the subject of chapter two of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya while the topic of the third chapter is about demonstration (parārthānumāna, literally "inference for others"), that is, how one communicates one's inferences through proper argument.[17]

According to Richard Hayes, in Dignāga's system, to obtain knowledge that a property (the "inferable property", sadhya) is inherent in a "subject of inference" (paksa) it must be derived through an inferential sign (linga). For this to occur, the following must be true:[18]

  1. The inferential sign must be a property of the subject of the inference. That is, there exists in the subject of inference a property, which is different from the inferable property and which is furthermore evident to the person drawing the inference; this second property may serve as an inferential sign in case it has two further characteristics.
  2. The inferential sign must be known to occur in at least one locus, other than the subject of inference, in which the inferable property occurs.
  3. The inferential sign must not be known to occur in any other loci in which the inferable property is absent.

Richard Hayes interprets these criteria as overly strict and this is because he sees Dignāga's system as one of rational skepticism. Dignāga's epistemology, argues Hayes, is a way to express and practice the traditional Buddhist injunction to not become attached to views and opinions.[19] According to Hayes, for Dignāga, the role of logic is:

to counter dogmatism and prejudice. As a weapon in the battle against prejudice that rages in every mind that seeks wisdom--in minds of the vast majority of people who do not seek wisdom, prejudice simply takes full control without a contest-there is nothing as powerful as the kind of reason that lies at the heart of Dignaga's system of logic. For it should be clear that very few of our judgments in ordinary life pass the standards set by the three characteristics of legitimate' evidence. Taken in its strictest interpretation, none of the judgments of any but a fully omniscient being passes. And, since there is no evidence that there exist any fully omniscient beings, the best available working hypothesis is that no one's thinking is immune from errors that require revision in the face of newly discovered realities.[20]

Apohavada and language

Dignāga considered the interpretation of conventional and symbolic signs such as the words and sentences of human language to be no more than special or conventional instances of the general principles of inference or anumana.[21] He takes up several issues relating to language and its relationship to inference in the fifth chapter of his Pramāṇa-samuccaya.[22]

During Dignāga's time, the orthodox Indian Nyaya school and also Hindu Sanskrit grammarians (such as Bhartṛhari) had discussed issues of epistemology and language respectively, but their theories generally accepted the concept of universals which was rejected by most Buddhist philosophers. Influenced by the work of these thinkers as well as by Buddhist philosophers of the Sautrantika school who rejected Hindu theories of universals in favor of nominalism (prajñapti), Dignāga developed his own Buddhist theory of language and meaning based on the concept of "apoha" (exclusion).[23] Hattori Masaaki explains the doctrine thus:

a word indicates an object merely through the exclusion of other objects (anyapoha, -vyavrtti). For example, the word "cow" simply means that the object is not a non-cow. As such, a word cannot denote anything real, whether it be an individual (vyakti), a universal (jati), or any other thing. The apprehension of an object by means of the exclusion of other objects is nothing but an inference.[24]

Works

As noted by Hayes, the difficulty in studying the highly terse works of Dignāga is considerable, because none of them have survived in the original Sanskrit and the Tibetan and Chinese translations which do survive show signs of having been done by translators who were not completely certain of the meaning of the work.[25] This difficulty has also led scholars to read Dignaga through the lens of later authors such as Dharmakirti and their Indian and Tibetan interpreters as well as their Hindu Nyaya opponents. Because of this tendency in scholarship, ideas which are actually innovations of Dharmakirti and later authors have often been associated with Dignaga by scholars such as Fyodor Shcherbatskoy and S. Mookerjee, even though these thinkers often differ.[26]

Dignāga's magnum opus, the Pramāṇa-samuccaya (Compendium of Valid Cognition), examined perception, language and inferential reasoning. It presents perception as a bare cognition, devoid of conceptualization and sees language as useful fictions created through a process of exclusion (Apoha).[27]

Other works include:

  • Hetucakra (The wheel of reason), considered his first work on formal logic. It may be regarded as a bridge between the older doctrine of trairūpya and Dignāga's own later theory of vyapti which is a concept related to the Western notion of implication.
  • Alambana-parīkṣā, (The Treatise on the Objects of Cognition) and its auto commentary (vrtti).
  • Trikāla-parikṣa, (Treatise on the tri-temporality)
  • Nyāya-mukha (Introduction to logic).

Tradition and influence

Main article: Buddhist_logico-epistemology § The_Dignāga-Dharmakīrti_tradition

Dignāga founded a tradition of Buddhist epistemology and reasoning, and this school is sometimes called the "School of Dignāga" or "The school of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti" (due to the strong influence of Dharmakīrti as well).[28] In Tibetan it is often called "those who follow reasoning" (Tibetan: rigs pa rjes su ‘brang ba); in modern literature it is sometimes known by the Sanskrit 'pramāṇavāda', often translated as "the Epistemological School."[29] Many of the figures in these were commentators on the works of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti, but some of them also wrote original works and developed the tradition in new directions.[28][30][31]

The work of this tradition also went on to influence the Buddhist Madhyamaka school, through the work of figures like Bhāvaviveka (c. 500 – c. 578), Jñanagarbha (700-760), and Śāntarakṣita (725–788). These thinkers attempted to adopt the logical and epistemological insights of Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti to defend the tenets of the Madhyamaka school.

Dignāga's tradition of logic and epistemology continued in Tibet, where it was expanded by thinkers such as Cha-ba (1182–1251) and Sakya Pandita (1182–1251).

Dignāga also influenced non-Buddhist Sanskrit thinkers. According to Lawrence J. McCrea, and Parimal G. Patil, Dignāga set in motion an "epistemic turn" in Indian philosophy. After Dignāga, most Indian philosophers were now expected to defend their views by using a fully developed epistemological theory (which they also had to defend).[32]

See also

References

  1. ^ Zheng Wei-hong; Dignāga and Dharmakīrti: Two Summits of Indian Buddhist Logic. Research Institute of Chinese Classics; Fudan University; Shanghai, China
  2. ^ Recognizing Reality: Dharmakirti’s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations, (Suny: 1997), page 15-16.
  3. ^ Arnold, Dan. The Philosophical Works and Influence of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195393521/obo-9780195393521-0085.xml
  4. ^ Dunne, John. "Dignaga" in Buswell (ed.) ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUDDHISM. Volume One A-L
  5. ^ Hayes (1982), p. ix.
  6. ^ Karr, Andy (2007). Contemplating Reality: A Practitioner's Guide to the View in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Shambhala Publications. p. 212. ISBN 9781590304297.
  7. ^ Hayes (1982), p 133.
  8. ^ Tom Tillemans (2011), Dharmakirti, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  9. ^ Hayes (1982), p 132.
  10. ^ Hayes (1982), p 134.
  11. ^ Hayes (1982), p 135.
  12. ^ Hayes (1982), p 138.
  13. ^ Hayes (1982), p 139.
  14. ^ Hayes (1982), p 143.
  15. ^ Hayes (1982), p 143.
  16. ^ Hayes (1982), p 1.
  17. ^ Hayes (1982), p 132-33.
  18. ^ Hayes (1982), p 146, 153.
  19. ^ Hayes (1982), p 146, 167.
  20. ^ Hayes (1982), p 167.
  21. ^ Hayes (1982), p 1.
  22. ^ Hayes (1982), p 132.
  23. ^ Hayes (1982), p 27-28.
  24. ^ Hayes (1982), p 26.
  25. ^ Hayes, (1982), p. 6.
  26. ^ Hayes, (1982), p. 15.
  27. ^ Arnold, Dan. The Philosophical Works and Influence of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195393521/obo-9780195393521-0085.xml
  28. ^ a b Westerhoff, Jan (2018). The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy, p. 217. Oxford University Press.
  29. ^ Tillemans, Tom, "Dharmakīrti", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/dharmakiirti/>.
  30. ^ Garfield, Jay L; Edelglass, William (editors). The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy, p. 234.
  31. ^ Cluster of Excellence "Asia and Europe in a Global Context" of the University of Heidelberg, http://east.uni-hd.de/buddh/ind/7/16/
  32. ^ Lawrence J. McCrea, and Parimal G. Patil. Buddhist Philosophy of Language in India: Jnanasrimitra on Exclusion. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. p 5.

Further reading

  • Chu, Junjie (2006)., Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 29 (2), 211–254
  • Frauwallner, Erich, Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung. (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 2:83–164, 1959)
  • Hattori Masaaki, Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan Versions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968)
  • Hayes, Richard, Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, 1982)
  • Katsura Shoryu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on apoha in E. Steinkellner (ed.), Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition (Vienna, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991), pp. 129–146
  • Mookerjee, S. The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, an Exposition of the Philosophy of Critical Realism as expounded by the School of Dignāga (Calcutta, 1935)
  • Sastri, N. Aiyaswami, Diṅnāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā and Vṛtti. Restored with the commentary of Dharmapāla into Sanskrit from the Tibetan and Chinese versions and edited with English translations and notes with extracts from Vinītadeva's commentary. (Madras: The Adyar Library. 1942)
  • Tucci, Giuseppe, The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga, the oldest Buddhist Text on Logic after Chinese and Tibetan Materials (Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 15 Heft, Heidelberg, 1930)
  • Vidyabhusana, S.C. A History of Indian Logic – Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools (Calcutta, 1921)

External links

  • Dignaga's Logic of Invention, by Volker Peckhaus
  • Vidhabhusana, Satis Chandra (1907). History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic. Calcutta University.


May 06, 2023
dignāga, also, known, diṅnāga, indian, buddhist, scholar, buddhist, founders, indian, logic, hetu, vidyā, work, laid, groundwork, development, deductive, logic, india, created, first, system, buddhist, logic, epistemology, pramana, dignaga, statue, elista, rus. Dignaga also known as Diṅnaga c 480 c 540 CE was an Indian Buddhist scholar and one of the Buddhist founders of Indian logic hetu vidya Dignaga s work laid the groundwork for the development of deductive logic in India and created the first system of Buddhist logic and epistemology Pramana 1 Dignaga A statue in Elista Russia According to Georges B Dreyfus his philosophical school brought about an Indian epistemological turn and became the standard formulation of Buddhist logic and epistemology in India and Tibet 2 Dignaga s thought influenced later Buddhist philosophers like Dharmakirti and also Hindu thinkers of the Nyaya school Dignaga s epistemology accepted only perception pratyaksa and inference anumaṇa as valid instruments of knowledge and introduced the widely influential theory of exclusion apoha to explain linguistic meaning 3 His work on language inferential reasoning and perception were also widely influential among later Indian philosophers 4 According to Richard P Hayes some familiarity with Dinnaga s arguments and conclusions is indispensable for anyone who wishes to understand the historical development of Indian thought 5 Dignaga was born in Simhavakta near Kanchipuram and very little is known of his early years except that he took Nagadatta of the Pudgalavada school as his spiritual preceptor before being expelled and becoming a student of Vasubandhu 6 Contents 1 Philosophy 1 1 Pratyakṣa 1 2 Anumaṇa 1 3 Apohavada and language 2 Works 3 Tradition and influence 4 See also 5 References 6 Further reading 7 External linksPhilosophy Edit Buddhist epistemology holds that perception and inference are the means to correct knowledge Dignaga mature philosophy is expounded in his magnum opus the Pramaṇa samuccaya In chapter one Dignaga explains his epistemology which holds that there are only two instruments of knowledge or valid cognitions pramaṇa perception or sensation pratyakṣa and inference or reasoning anumaṇa In chapter one Dignaga writes Sensation and reasoning are the only two means of acquiring knowledge because two attributes are knowable there is no knowable object other than the peculiar and the general attribute I shall show that sensation has the peculiar attribute as its subject matter while reasoning has the general attribute as its subject matter 7 Perception is a non conceptual knowing of particulars which is bound by causality while inference is reasonable linguistic and conceptual 8 This conservative epistemic theory was in contrast to the Nyaya school who accepted other means of knowledge such as upamaṇa comparison and analogy Pratyakṣa Edit Pratyakṣa is a kind of awareness that acquires information about particulars and is immediately present to one of the senses This is the topic of the first chapter of the Pramaṇa samuccaya 9 For Dignaga perception is pre verbal pre conceptual and unstructured sense data In chapter two of the Pramaṇa samuccaya he writes Sensation is devoid of structure That cognition in which there is no structure is sensation What kind of thing is this so called structure Attaching a name a universal and so forth 10 According to Dignaga our mind always takes raw sense data or particulars and interprets them or groups them together in more complex ways compares them to past experiences gives them names to classify them based on general attributes samanyalaksana and so forth This process he terms kalpana arranging structuring 11 This cognitive process is already different from sensation which is a simple cognition based only on the immediately present Thus pratyakṣa is only awareness of particular sense data such as a patch of green color and the sensation of hardness never awareness of a macroscopic object such an apple which is always a higher level synthesis 12 For Dignaga sensation is also inerrant it cannot stray because it is the most basic and simple phenomenon of experience or as he puts it it is impossible too for the object of awareness itself to be errant for errancy is only the content of misinterpretation by the mind 13 Also for Dignaga pratyakṣa is mostly phenomenalist and is not dependent on the existence of an external world It is also inexpressible and private 14 Anumaṇa Edit Anumaṇa inference or reasoning for Dignaga is a type of cognition which is only aware of general attributes and is constructed out of simpler sensations Inference can also be communicated through linguistic conventions 15 A central issue which concerned Dignaga was the interpretation of signs linga or the evidence hetu which led one to an inference about states of affairs such as how smoke can lead one to infer that there is a fire 16 This topic of svarthanumana reasoning literally inference for oneself is the subject of chapter two of the Pramaṇa samuccaya while the topic of the third chapter is about demonstration pararthanumana literally inference for others that is how one communicates one s inferences through proper argument 17 According to Richard Hayes in Dignaga s system to obtain knowledge that a property the inferable property sadhya is inherent in a subject of inference paksa it must be derived through an inferential sign linga For this to occur the following must be true 18 The inferential sign must be a property of the subject of the inference That is there exists in the subject of inference a property which is different from the inferable property and which is furthermore evident to the person drawing the inference this second property may serve as an inferential sign in case it has two further characteristics The inferential sign must be known to occur in at least one locus other than the subject of inference in which the inferable property occurs The inferential sign must not be known to occur in any other loci in which the inferable property is absent Richard Hayes interprets these criteria as overly strict and this is because he sees Dignaga s system as one of rational skepticism Dignaga s epistemology argues Hayes is a way to express and practice the traditional Buddhist injunction to not become attached to views and opinions 19 According to Hayes for Dignaga the role of logic is to counter dogmatism and prejudice As a weapon in the battle against prejudice that rages in every mind that seeks wisdom in minds of the vast majority of people who do not seek wisdom prejudice simply takes full control without a contest there is nothing as powerful as the kind of reason that lies at the heart of Dignaga s system of logic For it should be clear that very few of our judgments in ordinary life pass the standards set by the three characteristics of legitimate evidence Taken in its strictest interpretation none of the judgments of any but a fully omniscient being passes And since there is no evidence that there exist any fully omniscient beings the best available working hypothesis is that no one s thinking is immune from errors that require revision in the face of newly discovered realities 20 Apohavada and language Edit Dignaga considered the interpretation of conventional and symbolic signs such as the words and sentences of human language to be no more than special or conventional instances of the general principles of inference or anumana 21 He takes up several issues relating to language and its relationship to inference in the fifth chapter of his Pramaṇa samuccaya 22 During Dignaga s time the orthodox Indian Nyaya school and also Hindu Sanskrit grammarians such as Bhartṛhari had discussed issues of epistemology and language respectively but their theories generally accepted the concept of universals which was rejected by most Buddhist philosophers Influenced by the work of these thinkers as well as by Buddhist philosophers of the Sautrantika school who rejected Hindu theories of universals in favor of nominalism prajnapti Dignaga developed his own Buddhist theory of language and meaning based on the concept of apoha exclusion 23 Hattori Masaaki explains the doctrine thus a word indicates an object merely through the exclusion of other objects anyapoha vyavrtti For example the word cow simply means that the object is not a non cow As such a word cannot denote anything real whether it be an individual vyakti a universal jati or any other thing The apprehension of an object by means of the exclusion of other objects is nothing but an inference 24 Works EditAs noted by Hayes the difficulty in studying the highly terse works of Dignaga is considerable because none of them have survived in the original Sanskrit and the Tibetan and Chinese translations which do survive show signs of having been done by translators who were not completely certain of the meaning of the work 25 This difficulty has also led scholars to read Dignaga through the lens of later authors such as Dharmakirti and their Indian and Tibetan interpreters as well as their Hindu Nyaya opponents Because of this tendency in scholarship ideas which are actually innovations of Dharmakirti and later authors have often been associated with Dignaga by scholars such as Fyodor Shcherbatskoy and S Mookerjee even though these thinkers often differ 26 Dignaga s magnum opus the Pramaṇa samuccaya Compendium of Valid Cognition examined perception language and inferential reasoning It presents perception as a bare cognition devoid of conceptualization and sees language as useful fictions created through a process of exclusion Apoha 27 Other works include Hetucakra The wheel of reason considered his first work on formal logic It may be regarded as a bridge between the older doctrine of trairupya and Dignaga s own later theory of vyapti which is a concept related to the Western notion of implication Alambana parikṣa The Treatise on the Objects of Cognition and its auto commentary vrtti Abhidharmakosa marma pradipa a condensed summary of Vasubandhu s seminal work the Abhidharmakosha A summary of the Mahayana Aṣṭasahasrika prajnaparamita sutraTrikala parikṣa Treatise on the tri temporality Nyaya mukha Introduction to logic Tradition and influence EditMain article Buddhist logico epistemology The Dignaga Dharmakirti traditionDignaga founded a tradition of Buddhist epistemology and reasoning and this school is sometimes called the School of Dignaga or The school of Dinnaga and Dharmakirti due to the strong influence of Dharmakirti as well 28 In Tibetan it is often called those who follow reasoning Tibetan rigs pa rjes su brang ba in modern literature it is sometimes known by the Sanskrit pramaṇavada often translated as the Epistemological School 29 Many of the figures in these were commentators on the works of Dinnaga and Dharmakirti but some of them also wrote original works and developed the tradition in new directions 28 30 31 The work of this tradition also went on to influence the Buddhist Madhyamaka school through the work of figures like Bhavaviveka c 500 c 578 Jnanagarbha 700 760 and Santarakṣita 725 788 These thinkers attempted to adopt the logical and epistemological insights of Dinnaga and Dharmakirti to defend the tenets of the Madhyamaka school Dignaga s tradition of logic and epistemology continued in Tibet where it was expanded by thinkers such as Cha ba 1182 1251 and Sakya Pandita 1182 1251 Dignaga also influenced non Buddhist Sanskrit thinkers According to Lawrence J McCrea and Parimal G Patil Dignaga set in motion an epistemic turn in Indian philosophy After Dignaga most Indian philosophers were now expected to defend their views by using a fully developed epistemological theory which they also had to defend 32 See also EditBuddhist logic Critical BuddhismReferences Edit Zheng Wei hong Dignaga and Dharmakirti Two Summits of Indian Buddhist Logic Research Institute of Chinese Classics Fudan University Shanghai China Recognizing Reality Dharmakirti s Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations Suny 1997 page 15 16 Arnold Dan The Philosophical Works and Influence of Dignaga and Dharmakirti http www oxfordbibliographies com view document obo 9780195393521 obo 9780195393521 0085 xml Dunne John Dignaga in Buswell ed ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUDDHISM Volume One A L Hayes 1982 p ix Karr Andy 2007 Contemplating Reality A Practitioner s Guide to the View in Indo Tibetan Buddhism Shambhala Publications p 212 ISBN 9781590304297 Hayes 1982 p 133 Tom Tillemans 2011 Dharmakirti Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Hayes 1982 p 132 Hayes 1982 p 134 Hayes 1982 p 135 Hayes 1982 p 138 Hayes 1982 p 139 Hayes 1982 p 143 Hayes 1982 p 143 Hayes 1982 p 1 Hayes 1982 p 132 33 Hayes 1982 p 146 153 Hayes 1982 p 146 167 Hayes 1982 p 167 Hayes 1982 p 1 Hayes 1982 p 132 Hayes 1982 p 27 28 Hayes 1982 p 26 Hayes 1982 p 6 Hayes 1982 p 15 Arnold Dan The Philosophical Works and Influence of Dignaga and Dharmakirti http www oxfordbibliographies com view document obo 9780195393521 obo 9780195393521 0085 xml a b Westerhoff Jan 2018 The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy p 217 Oxford University Press Tillemans Tom Dharmakirti The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition Edward N Zalta ed URL lt http plato stanford edu archives spr2014 entries dharmakiirti gt Garfield Jay L Edelglass William editors The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy p 234 Cluster of Excellence Asia and Europe in a Global Context of the University of Heidelberg http east uni hd de buddh ind 7 16 Lawrence J McCrea and Parimal G Patil Buddhist Philosophy of Language in India Jnanasrimitra on Exclusion New York Columbia University Press 2010 p 5 Further reading EditChu Junjie 2006 On Dignaga s theory of the object of cognition as presented in PS V 1 Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 29 2 211 254 Frauwallner Erich Dignaga sein Werk und seine Entwicklung Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud und Ostasiens 2 83 164 1959 Hattori Masaaki Dignaga On Perception being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignaga s Pramaṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan Versions Cambridge Mass Harvard University Press 1968 Hayes Richard Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs Dordrecht Reidel Publishing Company 1982 Katsura Shoryu Dignaga and Dharmakirti on apoha in E Steinkellner ed Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition Vienna Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften 1991 pp 129 146 Mookerjee S The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux an Exposition of the Philosophy of Critical Realism as expounded by the School of Dignaga Calcutta 1935 Sastri N Aiyaswami Diṅnaga s Alambanaparikṣa and Vṛtti Restored with the commentary of Dharmapala into Sanskrit from the Tibetan and Chinese versions and edited with English translations and notes with extracts from Vinitadeva s commentary Madras The Adyar Library 1942 1 Tucci Giuseppe The Nyayamukha of Dignaga the oldest Buddhist Text on Logic after Chinese and Tibetan Materials Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus 15 Heft Heidelberg 1930 Vidyabhusana S C A History of Indian Logic Ancient Mediaeval and Modern Schools Calcutta 1921 External links EditDignaga s Logic of Invention by Volker Peckhaus Vidhabhusana Satis Chandra 1907 History of the Mediaeval School of Indian Logic Calcutta University Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Dignaga amp oldid 1149545770, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

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