1959 Tibetan uprising

The 1959 Tibetan uprising (also known by other names) began on 10 March 1959, when a revolt erupted in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, which had been under the effective control of the People's Republic of China (PRC) since the Seventeen Point Agreement was reached in 1951.^[2] The initial uprising occurred amid general Chinese-Tibetan tensions and a context of confusion, because Tibetan protesters feared that the Chinese government might arrest the 14th Dalai Lama. The protests were also fueled by anti-Chinese sentiment and separatism.^{[3][4][5][6][7]} At first, the uprising mostly consisted of peaceful protests, but clashes quickly erupted and the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) eventually used force to quell the protests, some of the protesters had captured arms. The last stages of the uprising included heavy fighting, with high civilian and military losses. The 14th Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa, while the city was fully retaken by Chinese security forces on 23 March 1959. Thousands of Tibetans were killed during the 1959 uprising, but the exact number of deaths is disputed.

1959 Tibetan uprising
Part of the Cold War
Tsarong Dazang Dramdul and several Tibetan monks captured by the PLA during the uprising
Date 10–23 March 1959 Location Lhasa, Tibet Area, China^[a] Result Uprising suppressed Dissolution of Kashag Flight of the 14th Dalai Lama from Tibet to India
Belligerents
Tibetan and Khampa protesters and guerrillas Remnants of the Tibetan Army Simultaneous rebellion in Kham and Amdo: Chushi Gangdruk Supported by:  Republic of China  United States (CIA)  India (diplomatic)	People's Republic of China People's Liberation Army
Commanders and leaders
Several leaders^[1]	Tan Guansan
Casualties and losses
85,000–87,000 casualties (disputed, see below)	2,000 killed

1959 Tibetan uprising
Traditional Chinese	1959年西藏起義
Simplified Chinese	1959年西藏起义
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin 1959 nián Xīzàng qǐyì
1959 Tibetan armed rebellion
Traditional Chinese	1959年西藏武裝叛亂
Simplified Chinese	1959年西藏武装叛乱
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin 1959 nián Xīzàng wǔzhuāng pànluàn
1959 Tibetan anti-riot movement
Traditional Chinese	1959年西藏抗暴運動
Simplified Chinese	1959年西藏抗暴运动
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin 1959 nián Xīzàng kàngbào yùndòng
1959 Tibetan unrests
Traditional Chinese	1959年藏區騷亂
Simplified Chinese	1959年藏区骚乱
Transcriptions Standard Mandarin Hanyu Pinyin 1959 nián Zàngqū sāoluàn

Earlier in 1956, armed conflict between Tibetan guerillas and the PLA started in the Kham and Amdo regions, which had been subjected to socialist reform. The guerrilla warfare later spread to other areas of Tibet and lasted through 1962. Some regard the Xunhua Incident in 1958 as a precursor of the Tibetan uprising.^[8][9]

The annual 10 March anniversary of the uprising is observed by exiled Tibetans as Tibetan Uprising Day and Women's Uprising Day.^[10] On 19 January 2009, The PRC-controlled legislature in the Tibetan Autonomous Region chose 28 March as the national anniversary of Serfs Emancipation Day. American Tibetologist Warren W. Smith Jr. describes the move as a "counter-propaganda" celebration following the 10 March 2008 unrest in Tibet.^[11]

Names

• 1959 Tibetan uprising (used by the Central Tibetan Administration)
• 1959 Tibetan armed rebellion (used by the government of the People's Republic of China)
• 1959 Tibetan anti-riot movement (used by the government of the Republic of China)
• 1959 Tibetan unrests (commonly used in Chinese historiography)
• 1959 anti-Chinese uprising in Tibet^[5]
• Lhasa uprising^[12]

Armed resistance in Kham and Amdo

In 1951, the Seventeen Point Agreement between the People's Republic of China and representatives of the Dalai Lama was put into effect. Socialist reforms such as redistribution of land were delayed in Tibet proper. However, eastern Kham and Amdo (western Sichuan / Xikang and Qinghai provinces in the Chinese administrative hierarchy) were outside the administration of the Tibetan government in Lhasa, and were thus treated more like other Chinese provinces, with land redistribution implemented in full. The Khampas and nomads of Amdo traditionally owned their own land.^[13] Armed resistance broke out in Amdo and eastern Kham in June 1956.^{[citation needed]}

Prior to the PLA invasion, relations between Lhasa and the Khampa chieftains had deteriorated, although the Khampa remained spiritually loyal to the Dalai Lama throughout. Because of these strained relations, the Khampa had actually assisted the Chinese communists in their initial invasion, before becoming the guerrilla resistance they are now known for.^[14] Pandatsang Rapga, a pro-Kuomintang and pro-Republic of China Khampa revolutionary leader, offered the governor of Chamdo, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, some Khampa fighters in exchange for the Tibetan government recognizing the independence of Kham. Ngabo refused the offer. After the defeat of the Tibetan Army in Chamdo, Rapga started mediating in negotiations between the PRC and the Tibetan rebels.^{[citation needed]}

Rapga and Topgay engaged in negotiations with the Chinese during their assault on Chamdo. Khampas either defected to the Chinese PLA forces or did not fight at all. The PLA attack succeeded.^[15]

By 1957, Kham was in chaos. Resistance fighters' attacks and People's Liberation Army reprisals against Khampa resistance groups such as the Chushi Gangdruk became increasingly brutal.^[16] Kham's monastic networks came to be used by guerilla forces to relay messages and hide rebels.^[17] Punitive strikes were carried out by the Chinese government against Tibetan villages and monasteries. Tibetan exiles assert that threats to bomb the Potala Palace and the Dalai Lama were made by Chinese military commanders in an attempt to intimidate the guerrilla forces into submission.^[18]

Lhasa continued to abide by the seventeen-point agreement and sent a delegation to Kham to quell the rebellion. After speaking with the rebel leaders, the delegation instead joined the rebellion.^[19] Kham leaders contacted the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but the CIA under President Dwight D. Eisenhower insisted it required an official request from Lhasa to support the rebels. Lhasa did not act.^[19] Eventually the CIA began to provide covert support for the rebellion without word from Lhasa.^[20] By then the rebellion had spread to Lhasa which had filled with refugees from Amdo and Kham.^[21] Opposition to the Chinese presence in Tibet grew within the city of Lhasa.

In mid-February 1959 the CCP Central Committee's Administrative Office circulated the Xinhua News Agency internal report on how "the revolts in the Tibetan region have gathered pace and developed into a nearly full-scale rebellion," in a "situation report" for top CCP leaders.^[22]

The next day, the Chinese leader saw a report from the PLA General Staff's Operations Department describing rebellions by Tibetans in Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai. He again stressed that "rebellions like these are extremely favorable for us because they will benefit us in helping to train our troops, train the people, and provide a sufficient reason to crush the rebellion and carry out comprehensive reforms in the future."^[22]

The PLA used Hui soldiers, who formerly had served under Ma Bufang to crush the Tibetan revolt in Amdo.^[23] Hui cavalry were stationed in Southern Kham.^[24] The situation in all of Tibet became increasingly tense, as a growing number of Tibetans began to support the Khampa uprising,^[25] while "anti-Chinese communist agitation" spread among the Tibetans.^[6] The regional government in Lhasa neither wanted to back a rebellion nor publicly oppose it.^[25][12] Dissatisfied, the Chinese Communist Party put pressure on the Dalai Lama's government to join the operations against the rebels, and made it increasingly clear that a spread of the insurgency would lead to "all-out repression" in Tibet.^[12] In this unstable situation, the Chinese generals resident in Lhasa was summoned back to mainland China, leaving the inexperienced PLA commander Tan Guansen in charge,^[25] just as the date of the Monlam Prayer Festival approached. This festival had previously been used by participants to voice "anti-Chinese sentiments".^[12]

Lhasa uprising

 

The 14th Dalai Lama in 1956

According to historian Tsering Shakya, the Chinese government was pressuring the Dalai Lama to attend the National People's Congress in April 1959, in order to repair China's image in relation to ethnic minorities after the Khampa rebellion.^{[26][non-primary source needed]} On 7 February 1959, a significant day on the Tibetan calendar, the Dalai Lama attended a religious dance, after which the acting representative in Tibet, Tan Guansan, offered the Dalai Lama a chance to see a performance from a dance troupe native to Lhasa at the Norbulingka to celebrate the Dalai Lama's completion of his lharampa geshe degree.^[25] According to the Dalai Lama's memoirs, the invitation came from Chinese General Zhang Jingwu, who proposed that the performance be held at the Chinese military headquarters; the Dalai Lama states that he agreed.^{[27]: 130 [28]} However, Tibetologist Sam van Schaik stated that the Dalai Lama was the one who proposed that the dance should take place in the military headquarters as the Norbulingka was too small. Both parties did not yet agree on a date, and the Dalai Lama seemed to put the event "out of his mind", focusing instead on his ongoing examinations for his Geshe degree as well as the Monlam Prayer Festival.^[25]

Besides Tan and the Dalai Lama, nobody was seemingly informed of the plans for the dance.^[25] As a result, the date for the planned performance was only finalized 5^[4] or 3 days beforehand when Tan reminded the Dalai Lama of the dance; the latter then suggested 10 March. The decision was seemingly concluded on a whim.^[29] Neither the Kashag nor the Dalai Lama's bodyguards were informed of the Dalai Lama's plans^[29] until Chinese officials briefed them on 9 March, one day before the performance was scheduled, and insisted that they would handle the Dalai Lama's security.^[18] The Dalai Lama's memoirs state that on 9 March the Chinese told his chief bodyguard that they wanted the Dalai Lama's excursion to watch the production conducted "in absolute secrecy"^[27]: 132 and without any armed Tibetan bodyguards, which "all seemed strange requests and there was much discussion" amongst the Dalai Lama's advisors.^[27]: 132 Some members of the Kashag were alarmed and concerned that the Dalai Lama might be abducted, recalling a prophecy that told that the Dalai Lama should not exit his palace.^[4][29]

Tibet is independent! Chinese leave Tibet!

Slogans used by protesters during the early uprising^[3]

According to historian Tsering Shakya, some Tibetan government officials feared that plans were being laid for a Chinese abduction of the Dalai Lama, and spread word to that effect amongst the inhabitants of Lhasa.^[30] On 10 March, several thousand^[31][32][33] Tibetans surrounded the Dalai Lama's palace to prevent him from leaving or being removed. The huge crowd had gathered in response to a rumor that the Chinese were planning to arrest the Dalai Lama when he went to a cultural performance at the PLA's headquarters.^[34][35] This marked the beginning of the uprising in Lhasa, though Chinese forces had skirmished with guerrillas outside the city in December of the previous year.^[18] The protesters publicly pleaded that the Dalai Lama should not attend the meeting with the Chinese officials, claiming that he would be kidnapped.^[35] Although CCP officials insisted that the "reactionary upper stratum" in Lhasa was responsible for the rumor, there is no way to identify the precise source.^[36] At first, the violence was directed at Tibetan officials perceived not to have protected the Dalai Lama or to be pro-Chinese; attacks on Chinese started later.^[4] One of the first casualties of mob was a senior lama, Pagbalha Soinam Gyamco, who worked with the PRC as a member of the Preparatory Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, who was killed and his body dragged by a horse in front of the crowd for 2 kilometres (1.2 mi).^[3][35] The protesters also began to use openly anti-Chinese slogans such as "The Chinese must go, leave Tibet to Tibetans".^[35]

As protests and violence spread, the Dalai Lama informed the protesters that he would stay at the palace, yet this was no longer enough for the growing crowd. Protesters began to demand Tibetan independence, and urged the Dalai Lama's government to publicly endorse their actions.^[35] Barricades went up on the streets of Lhasa, and Chinese and Tibetan rebel forces began to fortify positions within and around Lhasa in preparation for conflict. A petition of support for the armed rebels outside the city was taken up, and an appeal for assistance was made to the Indian consul. Chinese and Tibetan troops continued moving into position over the next several days, with Chinese artillery pieces being deployed within range of the Dalai Lama's summer palace, the Norbulingka.^[35]

 

17 March 1959: Thousands of Tibetan women surround the Potala Palace, the main residence of the Dalai Lama, to protest against Chinese rule and repression in Lhasa, Tibet. Hours later, fighting broke out and the Dalai Lama was forced to flee to safety in India. Photograph: AP

On 12 March thousands of women gathered in front of the Potala Palace in Lhasa on the ground called Dri-bu-Yul-Khai Thang.^[10][37] The leader of this nonviolent demonstration was Pamo Kusang.^[38] This demonstration, now known as Women's Uprising Day, started the Tibetan women's movement for independence.^[10] On 14 March at the same location thousands of women assembled in a protest led by "Gurteng Kunsang, a member of the aristocratic Kundeling family and mother of six who was later arrested by the Chinese and executed by firing squad."^[39]

After consulting the state oracle and concluding that the situation had become too unstable, the Dalai Lama and his close confidants opted to flee Lhasa.^[40] On 15 March, preparations for the Dalai Lama's evacuation from the city were set in motion, with Tibetan troops being employed to secure an escape route from Lhasa. On 17 March, two artillery shells landed near the Dalai Lama's palace,^[4][41][42] triggering his flight into exile. The Dalai Lama secretly left the palace the following night and slipped out of Lhasa with his family and a small number of officials. The Chinese had not strongly guarded the Potala, as they did not believe it likely that the Dalai Lama would try to flee.^[43] After reaching Lhoka, the Dalai Lama linked up with Kham rebels who began protecting him, and when reaching Lhotse at the Indian border, he proclaimed the restoration of Tibet's independence.^[40]

 

The Jokhang, on whose roof the last Tibetan rebels had placed machine guns to defend themselves against the PLA^[44]

Rumours about the Dalai Lama's disappearance began to spread rapidly on the next day, though most still believed that he was in the palace. Meanwhile, the situation in the city became increasingly tense, as protesters had seized a number of machine guns.^[44] At this point, remnants of the Tibetan Army had joined the protesters' ranks.^[45] On 20 March, the Chinese army responded by shelling the Norbulingka to disperse the crowd, and placed its troops at a barricade that divided the city into a northern and southern part in the following night. The battle began early on the following day and proved to be "bloody". Fighting in the streets continued for the next three days.^[44][21] The last Tibetan resistance was centered on the Jokhang, where Khampa refugees had set up machine guns, while a large number of Tibetans circumambulated the temple in reverence. The PLA started to attack the Jokhang on 23 March, and a hard-fought, three hours-long battle with many casualties on both sides ensued. The Chinese eventually managed to break through using a tank, whereupon they raised the flag of China on the temple, ending the uprising.^[44] Lhasa's streets were reportedly littered with corpses, and at least 4,000 people were arrested.^[45]

Two British writers, Stuart and Roma Gelder, visited the Chensel Phodrang palace in the Norbulingka in 1962 and "found its contents meticulously preserved".^[46]

The Indian government under Nehru expressed concerns of the Tibetan people and condemned China as an aggressive power due to the violent suppression of the revolt by the PLA.^[47]

Involvement of the Republic of China

Pandatsang Rapga, a pro-Kuomintang and pro-Republic of China revolutionary Khampa leader, was instrumental in the revolt against the communists.^{[citation needed]} The Kuomintang had a history of using Khampa fighters to oppose both the Dalai Lama's Tibetan government, and battle the Chinese Red Army.^{[citation needed]} Rapga continued to cooperate with the ROC government after it fled to Taiwan.^[48][49]

The ROC government disagreed with the US government on whether Tibet should be independent, since the ROC claimed Tibet as part of its territory. Rapga agreed to a plan in which the revolt against the communists would include anti feudalism, land reform, a modern government, and to give power to the people.^[50]

The Republic of China continued to claim Tibet as an integral part of its territory in accordance with its constitution, contrary to the claims of the Dalai Lama's Central Tibetan Administration which claimed Tibetan independence.

After the 1959 Tibetan rebellion, Chiang Kai-shek announced in his "Letter to Tibetan Compatriots" (Chinese: 告西藏同胞書; pinyin: Gào Xīzàng Tóngbāo Shū) that the ROC's policy would be to help the Tibetan diaspora overthrow the People's Republic of China's rule in Tibet. The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission sent secret agents to India to disseminate pro-Kuomintang and anti-communist propaganda among Tibetan exiles. From 1971 to 1978, the MTAC also recruited ethnic Tibetan children from India and Nepal to study in Taiwan, with the expectation that they would work for a ROC government that returned to the mainland. In 1994, the veterans' association for the Tibetan guerrilla group Chushi Gangdruk met with the MTAC and agreed to the KMT's One China Principle. In response, the Dalai Lama's Central Tibetan Administration forbade all exiled Tibetans from contact with the MTAC.

Tibetans in Taiwan, who are mostly of Kham origin, support the Republic of China's position that Tibet is part of the ROC, and were against both the Tibetan exile community in India who live under the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGIE) and the communists in mainland China, with some regarding them as having compromised the Tibetan cause by recognizing the ROC's legal sovereignty. However, the Dalai Lama's first visit to Taiwan in 1997 was said to have somewhat improved the two communities' general relationship, although "tension" allegedly still exists between them due to considerable differences. The Dalai Lama's visit also allowed for Tibetans to visit Taiwan without directly contacting the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, and some Tibetans in Taiwan (such as Changa Tsering, an incumbent MTAC committee member) subsequently attended the celebration of the Dalai Lama's visit in 1997.^[51]

The Tibetan community in Taiwan was also formerly divided between loyalty to the Dalai Lama and Taiwan's MTAC, although the MTAC was formally dissolved in 2017. The employees and responsibilities of the commission were thus officially reassigned to two places: the Mongolian and Tibetan Cultural Center under the Ministry of Culture, and the expanded Department of Hong Kong, Macao, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet Affairs under the Mainland Affairs Council.^[52][53]

Casualties

Colin Mackerras states: "There was a major rebellion against Chinese rule in Tibet in March 1959, which was put down with the cost of much bloodshed and lasting bitterness on the part of the Tibetans."^[54] The TGIE reports variously, 85,000, 86,000, and 87,000 deaths for Tibetans during the rebellion, attributed to "secret Chinese documents captured by guerrillas".^[18][21] Tibetologist Tom Grunfeld said "the veracity of such a claim is difficult to verify."^[55] Warren W. Smith, a writer with Radio Free Asia, writes that the "secret documents" came from a 1960 PLA report captured by guerrillas in 1966, with the figures first published by the TGIE in India in 1990. Smith states that the documents said that 87,000 "enemies were eliminated", but he does not take "eliminated" to mean "killed", as the TGIE does.^[56] Demographer Yan Hao could find no reference to any such figure in the published speech, and he concluded, "If these TGIE sources are not reluctant to fabricate Chinese sources in open publications, how can they expect people to believe in their citations of so-called Chinese secret internal documents and speeches that are never available in originals to independent researchers?"^[56]

Around 2,000 PLA soldiers were killed in the uprising.^{[57][better source needed]}

Aftermath

Lhasa's three major monasteries—Sera, Ganden, and Drepung—were seriously damaged by shelling, with Sera and Drepung being damaged nearly beyond repair. According to the TGIE, members of the Dalai Lama's bodyguard who were remaining in Lhasa were disarmed and publicly executed, along with Tibetans who were found to be harbouring weapons in their homes. Thousands of Tibetan monks were executed or arrested, and monasteries and temples around the city were looted or destroyed.^[18]

After the 12 March Women's Uprising demonstration, many of the women who were involved in it were imprisoned, including the leader of the demonstration, Pamo Kusang. "Some of them were tortured, died in prison, or were executed."^[38] Known as Women's Uprising Day, this demonstration started the Tibetan women's movement for independence.^[10]

The CIA officer, Bruce Walker, who oversaw the operations of CIA-trained Tibetan agents, was troubled by the hostility which the Tibetans showed towards his agents: "the radio teams were experiencing major resistance from the population inside Tibet".^[58] The CIA trained Tibetans from 1957 to 1972, in the United States, and parachuted them back into Tibet to organise rebellions against the PLA. In one incident, one agent was immediately reported by his own brother and all three agents on the team were arrested. They were not mistreated. After less than a month of propaganda sessions, they were escorted to the Indian border and released.^[59]

In April 1959, the 19-year-old Panchen Lama, the second ranking spiritual leader in Tibet, residing in Shigatse, called on Tibetans to support the Chinese government.^[60] However, after a tour through Tibet in May 1962, he wrote a document which is known as the 70,000 Character Petition. The document was addressed to Zhou Enlai and in it, he criticized Chinese abuses in Tibet. Shortly afterward, he met with Zhou in order to have a discussion about the document. The outlined petition dealt with the brutal suppression of the Tibetan people both during and after the PLA's invasion of Tibet^[61] and the sufferings of the people in The Great Leap Forward. In this document, he criticized the suppression that the Chinese authorities had conducted in retaliation for the 1959 Tibetan uprising.^[62] But in October 1962, the PRC authorities who were dealing with the population criticized the petition. Chairman Mao called the petition "... a poisoned arrow shot at the Party by reactionary feudal overlords." In 1967, the Panchen Lama was formally arrested and imprisoned until his release in 1977.^[63]

In June 1959, the Buddhist monk Palden Gyatso was arrested for demonstrating during the March uprising by Chinese officials.^[64] He spent the next 33 years in Chinese prisons and laogai^[65] or "reform through labor" camps, the longest term of any Tibetan political prisoner.^[66][67] "He was forced to participate in barbarous re-education classes and He was tortured by various methods, which included being beaten with a club ridden with nails, shocked by an electric probe, which scarred his tongue and caused his teeth to fall out, whipped while being forced to pull an iron plow, and starved."^[68] leading to irreversible physical damage.^[69][70][71] Released in 1992, he escaped to Dharamsala in India, home of the TGIE, and became an internationally acclaimed activist for the Tibetan independence cause.^{[citation needed]}

Chinese authorities have interpreted the uprising as a revolt by the Tibetan elite against Communist reforms that were improving the lives of Tibetan serfs. Tibetan and third-party sources, on the other hand, have usually interpreted it as a popular uprising against the alien Chinese presence. Historian Tsering Shakya has argued that it was a popular revolt against both the Chinese and the Lhasa government, which was perceived as failing to protect the authority and safety of the Dalai Lama from the Chinese.^[72]

See also

• Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China
• History of Tibet (1950–present)
• Human rights in Tibet
  • International Campaign for Tibet
  • Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy
• Protests and uprisings in Tibet since 1950
  • 1987–1989 Tibetan unrest
  • 2008 Tibetan unrest
  • 2010 Tibetan language protest
• Events leading to the Sino-Indian War
• Ganden Phodrang
• List of wars involving the People's Republic of China
• Sinicization of Tibet
• Tibetan independence movement
• Tibetan sovereignty debate
• Xunhua Incident

Notes

1. A simultaneous rebellion occurred in Kham and Amdo

References

Citations

1. Van Schaik 2013, p. 234: "Meanwhile, the crowd outside the Norbulingka was beginning to appoint representatives and a leadership was emerging, drawn from the ordinary people rather than the aristocracy. Sixty of these representatives were invited inside, and the Dalai Lama’s message was relayed to them."
2. Jian 2006.
3. Van Schaik 2013, p. 234.
4. Shakya 1999, pp. 186–191.
5. Robin 2020, p. 13.
6. Croddy 2022, p. 687.
7. Guyot-Réchard 2017, pp. 165, 172.
8. Li, Jianglin (2016). Tibet in Agony. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-97370-1.
9. Luo, Siling (22 June 2016). "西藏的秘密战争，究竟发生了什么？（下）". The New York Times (in Chinese).
10. Gyatso, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin (18 November 2011). "The Genesis Of The Tibetan Women's Struggle For Independence". tibetanwomen.org. Tibetan Women’s Association.
11. Norbu, Jamyang (20 March 2009). "Warren Smith on "Serf Emancipation Day"". Shadow Tibet.
12. Guyot-Réchard 2017, p. 172.
13. Grunfeld 1996, p. 9.
14. Norbu, Dorwa (September 1978). "When the Chinese Came to Tibet | Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs". www.carnegiecouncil.org.
15. Knaus 1999, p. 71.
16. Knaus 1999, p. 134.
17. Knaus 1999, p. 86.
18. Official Website of the Tibetan Government in Exile. History Leading up to March 10th 1959. 7 September 1998. Retrieved 16 March 2008.
19. . Archived from the original on 25 March 2008.
20. "Status Report on Tibetan Operations". Office of the Historian. 26 January 1968.
21. . The American Spectator. December 1997. Archived from the original on 19 July 2011. Retrieved 28 February 2009.
22. Jian 2006, p. 69^{[dead link]}
23. Smith 1997, p. 443.
24. Smith 1997, p. 444.
25. Van Schaik 2013, p. 232.
26. Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme (1988). 1959年西藏叛乱真相 [The True Facts of the 10 March 1959 Event]. news.ifeng.com (in Simplified Chinese). Retrieved 27 November 2018. 达赖喇嘛在他的卧室会见他们时主动提出："听说西藏军区文工团在内地学习回来后演出的新节目很好，我想看一次，请你们给安排一下。"谭政委和邓副司令员当即欣然应允，并告诉达赖喇嘛，这事很好办，只要达赖喇嘛确定时间，军区可以随时派出文工团去罗布林卡为他演出专场。达赖喇嘛说，去罗布林卡不方便，那里没有舞台和设备，就在军区礼堂演出，他去看。 [While meeting with them (Tan Guansan and Deng Shaodong) in his room, the Dalai Lama initiated a request: "I have heard that after the Tibet Military District Cultural Workgroup completed their studies in China proper, their performance of their new program turned out very well, I would like to attend one such performance; please arrange for this."]
27. Lama, Dalai (1990). Freedom in exile: the autobiography of the Dalai Lama (1st ed.). HarperCollins. ISBN 0060391162. OCLC 21949769.
28. Dalai Lama's (1990) Freedom in Exile states that "General [Zhang Jingwu] ... announced ... a new dance troupe ... Might I be interested to see them? I replied that I would be. He then said that they could perform anywhere, but since there was a proper stage with footlights at the Chinese military headquarters, it might be better if I could go there. This made sense as there were no such facilities at the Norbulingka, so I indicated that I would be happy to do so" (p. 130)
29. Van Schaik 2013, p. 233.
30. Shakya 1999, p. 188-189.
31. Avedon 1997, p. 50 says 30,000
32. 1959 Tibetan Uprising | Free Tibet 5 May 2012 at the Wayback Machine goes as high as 300,000
33. Tell you a True Tibet – How Does the 1959 Armed Rebellion Occur?, People's Daily Online, 17 April 2008 (Excerpts from Tibet – Its Ownership And Human Rights Situation, published by the Information Office of the State Council of The People's Republic of China) : "The next morning, the rebels coerced more than 2,000 people to mass at Norbu Lingka, spreading the rumor that 'the Military Area Command is planning to poison the Dalai Lama' and shouting slogans such as 'Tibetan Independence' and 'Away with the Hans'."
34. Jian 2006, p. 71.
35. Guyot-Réchard 2017, p. 165.
36. Jian 2006, p. 72.
37. "The Tibetan uprising: 50 years of protest". The Guardian. 10 March 2009.
38. Vandenbrink, Rachel (5 March 2012). "Women Energize Tibetan Struggle". Radio Free Asia.
39. Li, Jianglin (2016). Tibet in Agony: Lhasa 1959. Harvard University Press. p. 157. ISBN 978-0674088894.
40. Guyot-Réchard 2017, pp. 165–166.
41. Smith 1997, p. 446.
42. Richardson 1984, pp. 209–210.
43. Van Schaik 2013, pp. 235, 236.
44. Van Schaik 2013, p. 236.
45. Guyot-Réchard 2017, p. 166.
46. Stuart and Roma Gelder, Timely Rain: Travels in New Tibet, in Monthly Review Press, New York, 1964, facing p. 160 : "He [the dalai-lama] was told this building with other palaces in the Jewel Park was reduced to ruin by Chinese gunfire soon after he left. We found its contents meticulously preserved."
47. "India and the Tibetan Revolt". The Atlantic. December 1959.
48. Garver 1997, p. 172.
49. Garver 1997, p. 170.
50. Garver 1997, p. 171.
51. Okawa, Kensaku (2007). (PDF). The Memoirs of the Institute of Oriental Culture. University of Tokyo. 152: 588–589, 596, 599, 602–603, 607. Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 April 2012.
52. Chung, Lawrence (16 August 2017). "Taiwan Calls Time on Mongolia and Tibet Affairs Commission". South China Morning Post. Retrieved 26 April 2020.
53. Charlier, Phillip (14 August 2017). "Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission to be Dissolved: Lim Applauds". Taiwan English News. Retrieved 14 August 2017.
54. Mackerras, Colin (1988). "Drama in the Tibetan Autonomous Region". Asian Theatre Journal. 5 (2): 198–219. JSTOR 25161492.
55. Grunfeld 1996, p. 247.
56. Hao, Yan (March 2000). "Tibetan Population in China: Myths and Facts Re-examined" (PDF). Asian Ethnicity. 1 (1): 20. doi:10.1080/146313600115054. S2CID 18471490.
57. "China/Tibet (1950–Present)". University of Central Arkansas .
58. Conboy & Morrison 2002, p. 220.
59. Conboy & Morrison 2002, p. 213.
60. Feigon 1996, pg. 163
61. The 10th Panchen Lama 23 November 2008 at the Wayback Machine
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External links

• March Winds 2 February 2019 at the Wayback Machine, 7 March 2009 – Jamyang Norbu
• Kopel, Dave. "The Dalai Lama's Army". National Review, April 5, 2007.
• Patterson, George N. The Situation in Tibet The China Quarterly, No. 6. (Apr.–Jun., 1961), pp 81–86.
• Ginsburg, George and Mathos, Michael. Communist China's Impact on Tibet: The First Decade. Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 29, No. 7. (July,1960), pp. 102–109.
• The Tibetan Uprising of 1959 5 October 2011 at the Wayback Machine