Stracin–Kumanovo operation

Stracin–Kumanovo operation
Part of World War II in Yugoslavia
Date October 8 – November 14, 1944 Location Kriva Palanka, Stracin, Kumanovo, Skopje Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Bulgaria Yugoslav Partisans	Germany Albanian Kingdom Chetniks
Commanders and leaders
Vladimir Stoychev	Alexander Löhr
Units involved
1st Bulgarian Army 1st Sofia Infantry Division 2nd Thracian Infantry Division 11th Infantry Division 1st Sofia Guard Division 2nd Cavalry Division	Army Group E 11th Luftwaffe Field Division 41st Infantry Division 22nd Air Landing Division Chetnik auxiliaries 21st SS Skanderbeg
Strength
	100 guns and mortars 35–40 tanks and vehicles

The Stracin–Kumanovo operation^[1] (Bulgarian: Страцинско-Кумановска операция) was an offensive operation conducted in 1944 by the Bulgarian Army against German forces in occupied Yugoslavia which culminated in the capture of Skopje in 1944.^[2] With the Bulgarian declaration of war on Germany on September 8, followed by Bulgarian withdrawal from the area, the German 1st Mountain Division moved north, occupied Skopje, and secured the strategic Belgrade–Nis–Salonika railroad line. On October 14, withdrawing from Greece, Army Group E faced Soviet and Bulgarian divisions advancing in Eastern Serbia and Vardar Macedonia; by November 2, the last German units left Northern Greece.^[3]

By early October, Bulgarian forces were breaking through into eastern Serbia, Vardar Macedonia and Kosovo in support of the Soviet advance towards Belgrade. Although the Bulgarian army drove the Germans out of Skopje and what is now North Macedonia, later the Yugoslav and today the Macedonian historiography has played down its role for ethnopolitical reasons.^{[4][5][6][7][8]} Accounts of these events in post-war Yugoslav literature give the impression that the Germans were driven out by the communist Partisans who liberated the area. There was some fighting by Yugoslav Partisans, but their actions were insignificant compared with Bulgarian military activity. The greeting of Bulgarian troops in Skopje as liberators at the end of the operation is still denied there.^[9]

After had captured Skopje, on 14 November the Bulgarian Second Army and the Yugoslav Partisans kept driving the Albanian SS Division and Balli Kombëtar back, until Kosovo had been seized.^[10]

Development

Bulgarian military activity

 

Map of the October–November 1944 Bulgarian offensive in Yugoslavia. Its main task was to cover up the Soviet advance to Belgrade.

 

Bulgarian troops entering Skopje. According to Bulgarian sources they were the first to enter the city (on November 13 at 6:30 pm).^[11] According to German historians, the city was abandoned to the Bulgarians early in the morning of November 14.^[12][13]

The operation, from October 8 to November 14, was conducted in parallel with three other Bulgarian offensives in Yugoslavia: the Niš operation, the Kosovo operation and the Bregalnitsa-Strumica operation. Bulgarians supported the Soviet offensive in the area, which was aided by Yugoslav, Albanian and Greek Partisans. It was conducted to close the road to retreat for Army Group E from Greece to central Europe. Bulgarian troops began the offensive on October 8, entering Kriva Palanka. They fought for the Stražin ridge on October 18 and seized Stracin on October 25 with support from the Bulgarian Air Force. The battle for Stražin against German air and ground forces was fierce, and it was captured after an attack by Bulgarian paratroopers.^[14] Thirty-five paratroopers were killed and 64 were injured, one-fourth of the Parachute Druzhina unit. Battles continued on the Pčinja River and in the city of Kumanovo (on 11 November), where portions of the Wehrmacht were pushed back. The Bulgarians developed the advance towards Skopje into a large-scale offensive, raising the possibility of cutting off Army Group E. The situation was desperate, and the town was evacuated finally during the night of November 13/14.^[15] On November 13 and 14, portions of the First and Fourth Bulgarian Armies entered Skopje.^{[16][17][18][19]} The onslaught continued as part of the Kosovo operation, and Bulgarian troops captured Pristina on November 19.^[20]

Capture of Skopje

Parallel to the Soviet advance in Eastern Serbia, Bulgarian forces south and south-west of Niš threatened the last German troop-withdrawal route from Skopje. To avoid being cut off, the German command in Mitrovica deployed portions of the 22nd Air Landing Division in the city, while the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division shielded the operational area to the north at Pristina. A crisis arose during the fighting at Pristina in early November, when the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division gave way under Bulgarian attacks. The army group established a new blocking line, enabling the German position at Skopje to be held. The offensive of the Bulgarians, which attacked well-equipped with the support of tanks and fighter planes in the Skopje area, forced the Germans to evacuate their forces, which they carried out on schedule; their main forces abandoned Skopje on 11–12 November.^[21] The German rearguard abandoned Skopje early on 14 November.^[22] Skopje was seized with the decisive role of Bulgarian troops.^[23][24] On a series of Army Group E maps of its withdrawal through Vardar Macedonia and southern Serbia and in the memoirs of its chief of staff, there is almost no indication of Yugoslav Partisan units.^[25] According to Allied Commission British commissioner in Sofia General Walter Oxley, who visited the front line in Stracin, the task of the Bulgarian army was to advance west and cut the Skopje-Pristina-Kraljevo rail line. Oxley noted that the Bulgarians were given freedom of action, and no Soviet troops were in the area of its offensive.^[26] Oxley reported that a small number of Yugoslav partisans were in the area of the Bulgarian operations, but it was difficult for them to take serious action against the well-organised German units.^[27] Impressed by the discipline of the Bulgarian soldiers, he noted that it was a problem for the partisans.^[28] Oxley said that Skopje was seized after weak German resistance with Bulgarian Army attacks, and the partisans held back until the Bulgarians entered the city. According to an agreement between Bulgarian and Yugoslav authorities, the Bulgarian troops coordinated their entry into the city with the Yugoslav partisans.^[29] The Bulgarians retained their prisoners of war, but gave weapons abandoned by the Germans to Josip Broz Tito's partisans.^[30] Units of the Fourth Bulgarian Army entered Skopje early in the morning of 14 November, and the last nests of German resistance were cleared. According to a November 15 summary by the Army Group E intelligence staff chief, units of the 4th Bulgarian Army (the 5th Infantry Division) and the 1st Bulgarian Army (the 2nd Infantry Division) seized the city after the withdrawal of German troops.^[31] News that Skopje was captured by the Bulgarians was reported on November 14 and 15 by Radio Moscow, Radio London, the Voice of America, and Radio Sofia.^[32]

After the liberation of Skopje, the new Macedonian authorities confiscated лв.430 million, stamps, and other securities from the former Bulgarian National Bank building. They refused to give the funds to Sofia, and General Damyan Velchev ordered a Bulgarian artillery regiment to return from South Serbia to shell Skopje and confiscate the funds. The order was rescinded after the intervention of Marshal of the Soviet Union Fyodor Tolbukhin, preventing an armed conflict.^[33] Bulgarian currency had been used by the short-lived pro-German puppet government, and remained in use by the new Macedonian communist authorities.^[34]

Controversy

Descriptions of events

 

Macedonian monument to the liberators of Skopje, a group of Partisans

In the autumn of 1944, the Bulgarian army was the primary force driving the Germans out of Vardar Macedonia. The Macedonian Partisans were not a significant military force; they were ill-equipped, lacked tanks, artillery and airplanes, and relied on guerrilla warfare.^[35] Before the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, General Mihajlo Apostolski wrote that it was tactically advantageous to include the reorganized Bulgarian army in the Macedonian war against the Germans.^[36] As a result of the Tito–Stalin split, however, Yugoslav and (later) Macedonian historiography has minimized Bulgaria's role.^[37] According to Macedonian sources, the Bulgarians did not participate in the capture of Skopje even as observers. According to Apostolski, Skopje was liberated by Yugoslav partisans after several days of heavy fighting.^[38] Partisan Jordan Cekov wrote that street battles to liberate western Skopje ended late in the evening of November 13, but continued in the city's eastern half.^[39] One Bulgarian unit had nearly reached the center of Skopje by about 3 am on November 14, but it was pushed back to the outskirts by Partisans and was not allowed to reenter the city until noon.^[40] According to Partisan Trajko Stamatoski, there were attempts by some Bulgarian units to claim credit for the liberation of Skopje but "we did not allow it then, or today".^[41] Boro Čuškar claimed that a parade by the Bulgarian troops was prevented and that they were not involved in the liberation of Skopje.^[42]

On the other hand, according to Macedonian Goce Delčev Brigade commander and first commandant of Skopje after its liberation, Petar Traykov, Apostolski said that he had liberated Skopje and did not allow Bulgarian troops to enter the city even, but this was not true.^[43] Goce Delčev Brigade member Metodi Karpachev said that his unit entered Skopje on the morning on November 14 to find it seized by Bulgarian troops. The population did not welcome the partisans with their expected enthusiasm, and Karpachev later joined the Bulgarian forces.^[44] Bulgarian sources say that the first unit, which entered Skopje on November 13 at 6:30 pm, was the cavalry intelligence platoon of the Second Infantry Division of the 4th Bulgarian Army after the main German force had left the city. The Second Infantry Division of the First Bulgarian Army took its southern and the eastern areas at 11 pm, and the Bulgarians seized the city center at midnight.^[45] Because the bridges and other approaches to Skopje had been destroyed by the Germans, only infantry and cavalry units entered the city first. Strategic parts of the city had been mined by the retreating Germans, and Bulgarian sappers de-mined them.^[46]

Present-day views

See also: Fascism in Bulgaria

 

Memorial column at Sofia's Georgi Rakovski Military Academy palisade, commemorating the 70th anniversary of the battle of Skopje.

Macedonian identity formed after World War II is deeply rooted in Yugoslav Partisan activity, and thus the Bulgarians are considered fascists.^{[47][better source needed]} Macedonian media, such as Vo Centar, continue to spread the untruth that Skopje was liberated by Yugoslav communist guerrillas from the Bulgarian fascist occupiers.^[48] According to the Bulgarian Association for Research and Development of Civil Society, the WW2 Macedonian film The Liberation of Skopje evokes anti-Bulgarian sentiment.^[49]

In October 2019, the Bulgarian government proposed strict terms for North Macedonia's EU admission. One condition is for both countries to "harmonize" their World War II historical narratives, with North Macedonia tempering its view of Bulgaria.^[50] In a November 2020 interview with Bulgarian media, North Macedonia's then-Prime Minister Zoran Zaev acknowledged the involvement of Bulgarian troops in the capture of Skopje and other towns during the war, and that the Bulgarians were not fascist occupiers.^[51] The interview was followed by a wave of nationalism in Skopje,^[52] with protests demanding Zaev's resignation; opposition leader Hristijan Mickoski accused him of threatening Macedonian national identity.^[53][54]

According to former Macedonian Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski, the reaction was the result of ignorance, hypocrisy or politics.^[55] Vlado Bučkovski, another former prime minister and chief negotiator with Bulgaria, stated a week later, amid the campaign against Zaev, that the Macedonians and Bulgarians were a single people, separated by the post-WWII Yugoslav policy.^[56] Journalist Dejan Azeski said in the weekly newspaper Fokus that Zaev's interview was politically unwise but factually accurate.^[57][58] Bulgaria denies any occupation during the war and insists on double liberation (in 1941 and 1944).^[59]

Gallery

•  
  Bulgarians re-entering occupied Yugoslavia
•  
  Bulgarian troops entering Kriva Palanka, Macedonia
•  
  Bulgarians advancing toward the ridge of Stražin
•  
  Vladimir Stoychev and the commander of the Parachute Company, after the breakthrough at Strazhin.
•  
  Bulgarian Messerschmitt Bf 109s in the autumn of 1944
•  
  Bulgarian soldiers in the battle for Kumanovo
•  
  Bulgarian Parachute Druzhina troops welcomed in Kumanovo
•  
  German soldiers captured by Bulgarians near Kumanovo
•  
  Bulgarian troops entering Skopje on November 13
•  
  Entry of the 42nd Macedonian Division into Skopje on November, 14.^[60]
•  
  Bulgarian troops greeted as liberators in Skopje on 14 November.
•  
  Bulgarian troops in Skopje on November 14, 1944.
•  
  Bulgarian troops in Skopje on November 14, 1944.
•  
  Bulgarian troops welcomed in Skopje on November, 14.
•  
  Bulgarian troops welcomed in Skopje on November 14
•  
  Monument to Bulgarian paratroopers who fell during the Stracin-Kumanovo operation in Sofia^[61]

See also

• World War II in Yugoslav Macedonia
• Bulgaria during World War II

References

1. Ivaylo Znepolski et al., Bulgaria under Communism Routledge Histories of Central and Eastern Europe, Routledge, 2018, ISBN 1351244892, chapter: Bulgaria in the shadow of Stalin, see also: Timeline of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.
2. Karl-Heinz Frieser, Klaus Schmider, The Eastern Front 1943-1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts, editor Karl-Heinz Frieser, translated by Barry Smerin, Oxford University Press, 2017, ISBN 0198723466, pp. 1096-1098.
3. Spencer C. Tucker as ed., (2016) World War II: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection [5 volumes]; ABC-CLIO, 2016; p. 1841, ISBN 1851099697.
4. "Until the Soviet-Yugoslav rift in 1948, a trilateral military-political alliance between the U.S.S.R, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria dominated the strategic situation in the Balkans. As a direct consequence of the Moscow talks, Tito met with a delegation from the Bulgarian government's Fatherland Front on October 5, 1944, in Krajova, and on the same day, concluded an agreement on the participation of the new battles on Yugoslav territory. The three armies took part in the Belgrade Operation, which was launched in late September 1944, and Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations flourished with the patronage of the Soviet Union. Southeastern Europe's fate was effectively secured." For more, see Norman Naimark, The Establishment Of Communist Regimes In Eastern Europe, 1944-1949, Routledge, 2018, ISBN 0429976216, p. 60.
5. "By the end of November, almost all of Macedonia and Serbia had been liberated and cleansed of German units. The Bulgarian army is largely responsible for achieving this goal. A military contingent of more than 450,000 troops participated in the campaign. Even though the Bulgarian offensive was undertaken with the cooperation of the Yugoslav Liberation Army, as all observers at the time noted, the latter's forces were absolutely insufficient and without Bulgarian participation, defeating the enemy would have been impossible. Another thing noted at the time was the wholly upright behavior of Bulgarian troops in Macedonia and Serbia. After conquering a given territory, the army turned over control to the new administration that was being formed from the ranks of the Yugoslav opposition. In contradiction to preliminary expectations, it was found that the whole local population, especially in urban areas, calmly accepted the Bulgarian military presence in the region. This generally positive attitude was connected to the idea of a future federation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria that was beginning to be promoted." For more, see Ivaylo Znepolski et al., Bulgaria under Communism, Routledge Histories of Central and Eastern Europe, Routledge, 2018, ISBN 1351244892.
6. "Military realities, however, made this incident look very ironic indeed, for Skopje was liberated by Bulgarian forces, while the Macedonian Partisans remained in the surrounding hills, and came down only to celebrate their entrance to the city. Similar scenes occurred in many other towns of Macedonia and Serbia, pointing to the fact that, from a military perspective the Russians were right: the Bulgarian army was the only force capable of driving the Germans quickly from Yugoslavia. Needless to say, the official Macedonian historiography, written mainly by Apostolski himself, understandably played down the crucial role of the Bulgarians. The glorification of the Partisan movement, an essential component of the post-war Yugoslav political culture-and more personal Partisan considerations left little room for such 'technicalities' ... For information on the military situation in Macedonia and Serbia and the role of the Bulgarian army see FO 371/43608, R17271, 24/11/1944; FO 371/44279, R16642,14/10/1944; FO 371/43630, R19495, 24/11/1944; WO 208, 113B, 12/9/1944. The sources, which contain intelligence reports from BLOs, confirm the decisive role of the Bulgarian army in the liberation of Skopje, Nis, Prilep, and the Morava Valley." For more, see Dimitris Livanios, The Macedonian Question: Britain and the Southern Balkans 1939–1949, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008; ISBN 9780199237685, p. 134.
7. "For a detailed description of the German withdrawal from Greece through Macedonia and the central Balkans to Bosnia ... see the account by one of the participants, Erich Schmidt-Richberg, 'Der Endkampf auf dem Balkan'. General Schmidt-Richberg was chief of staff of Army Group E, deployed in Greece ... The Yugoslavs' main criticism of the book was that it did not mention the Partisan units that fought the Germans as soon as they entered Yugoslav territory in Macedonia. Schmidt-Richberg only mentioned Bulgarian divisions, which had changed camps and were now fighting the Germans. But the Yugoslavs claimed that the main burden of fighting the Germans was theirs and that the Bulgarians did not have their heart in fighting their erstwhile allies. The claim applies to Partisan operations in the area between the Greek frontier on the south and the Drina River on the northwest – Macedonia, Southern Serbia, Kosovo and Sndjak. It is interesting to note that in a series of maps from Army Group E on its withdrawal through Macedonia and Serbia toward the Drina River and Bosnia, there is almost no indications on Yugoslav Partisan units… The contribution of Bulgarian troops in fighting the Germans in the fall of 1944 in Macedonia and Serbia is still much debated between Yugoslav and Bulgarian military historians." For more, see Jozo TomasevichWar and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Volume 2, Stanford University Press, 2002, ISBN 0804779244, pp. 751-752.
8. "Soviet arrogance was evident at all levels of the Red Army, beginning with its commander in chief. Stalin told Tito at a meeting that the Bulgarian army (which switched sides in the war in September 1944) was superior to Partisans, praising the professionalism of its officers. This was a pure provocation from the Soviet leader. The Bulgarians were Partisan wartime foes, and regardless of whether it was true, Stalin meant to put the assertive Yugoslav leadership in its place by insulting Tito's proudest achievement: his army. Furthermore, the Red Army's operational maps often excluded Partisan units, indicating the command's failure to even acknowledge that Yugoslavs played any role in the defeat of the Germans in the country. Further below in the chain of command, Partisan commanders had to appeal to the Red Army's political departments to include in their public statements the fact that Belgrade was liberated jointly by the Red Army and Partisans and not just by the Soviets, as well as to cease treating the Partisans as unknowledgeable and as a second-rate army." For more, see Majstorović, Vojin. "The Red Army in Yugoslavia, 1944–1945". p. 414 in Slavic Review, vol. 75, no. 2, 2016, pp. 396–421. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.5612/slavicreview.75.2.396. Accessed October 24, 2020.
9. "By 23 October the Bulgarians had reached the vicinity of Podujevo, in the north-eastern corner of Kosovo; another Bulgarian force was also closing on Kumanovo, a strategically important town just to the north-east of Skopje. For a crucial period of a fortnight, however, this front remained more or less static. This was thanks to two factors: the disruption of the Bulgarian army by the sudden removal (at Russian insistence) of its old officer corps, and the dogged resistance of the Scholz Group, which was assisted by up to 5,000 Albanians in the Prishtina-Mitrovica area (of whom some belonged to the security force recruited in Albania by Xhafer Deva, and 700 were members of the Skanderbeg division) as well as some local Chetnik formations. The Germans formed a plan for the orderly evacuation of their forces, which they were able to carry out on schedule, abandoning Skopje on 11 November, destroying installations at the Trepcha mine on the 12th and leaving Prishtina on the 19th, from where they retreated north-westwards into Bosnia. Accounts of these events published in post-war Yugoslavia give the impression that the Germans were driven out by the Partisans, who 'liberated' the cities of Kosovo by force. There was some fighting by a combined force of Yugoslav and Albanian Partisans in Western Kosovo, mainly against the remnants of the Skanderbeg division; but these actions were quite insignificant compared with the Soviet-Bulgarian advance. The war diary of the commander of the German Army Group 'E', with its detailed day-by-day record of military actions in Kosovo, contains hardly any references to Partisan actions at all. The general pattern was that the towns in Western Kosovo were 'liberated', i.e. taken over by Partisan forces, only after the Germans and their auxiliaries had left; in Eastern Kosovo it was the Soviet and Bulgarian forces (with some Yugoslav Partisans attached to them) who took over, also after the Germans had got out." For more, see Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, New York University Press, 1998, pp. 310-313, ISBN 0814755984.
10. Andrew Rawson, Balkan Struggles: A Century of Civil War, Invasion, Communism and Genocide; Pen and Sword Military, 2021, ISBN 1526761475, p. 86.
11. Македонски преглед: издава Македонският научен институт, Volume 28, 2005, стр. 11.
12. Egon Boshof, Kurt Düwell, Hans Kloft, Grundlagen des Studiums der Geschichte, Böhlau-Studien-Bücher: Grundlagen des Studiums, Böhlau, 1973, ISBN 3412864730, S. 487.
13. Karl Hnilicka, Das Ende auf dem Balkan 1944/45: Die militärische Räumung Jugoslaviens durch die deutsche. Wehrmacht Volume 13 of Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, ISSN 0562-3189, Musterschmidt, 1970, ISBN 3788114142, S. 372.
14. Андон Андонов, Димо Ангелев, История на военната авиация на България. Военно издателство, 1988, стр. 172.
15. Karl Hnilicka: Das Ende auf dem Balkan 1944/45 – Die militärische Räumung Jugoslaviens durch die deutsche Wehrmacht, Musterschmidt, Göttingen 1970. (Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Band 13) ìn German; pp. 90-91; 95.
16. Crawford, Steve. The Eastern Front Day by Day, 1941-45: A Photographic Chronology, Potomac Books, 2006, ISBN 1597970107, p. 170: "November 13, 1944: Greece, land war. The Bulgarian First Army ejects Army Group E from Skopje although, as most Axis forces have left Greece, this does not trap the army group."
17. Stone & Ston; An online database of World War II, books and information on the Web since 1995: War Diary for Monday, 13 November 1944: "German forces withdraw from Skopje as Bulgarian 1st Army advances. Bulgarian 1st Army captures Skopje. Southern flank of the Russian Front, 1944-1945; Balkan campaigns, the Aegean, and the Adriatic, 1942-1945."
18. Alexander Perry Biddiscombe, The SS Hunter Battalions: The Hidden History of the Nazi Resistance Movement 1944-45, History Press Series, Tempus, 2006, ISBN 0752439383, p. 155. "... By the late autumn of 1944, however, the Germans could no longer hold their base in Macedonia and they had to evacuate Skopje on 13 November, bringing covert operations against "Old Bulgaria" to a momentary hold."
19. Sfetas, Spyridon. "The Bulgarian-Yugoslav Dispute over the Macedonian Question as a Reflection of the Soviet-Yugoslav Controversy (1968-1980)". Balcanica. 2012. 241-271. 10.2298/BALC1243241S. "Indeed, the Soviets contributed heavily to Belgrade’s liberation in October 1944, and Bulgarians, though undesirable for the Yugoslav partisans, fought in the battles for the liberation Skopje in November 1944."
20. Великите битки и борби на българите след освобождението, Световна библиотека, София, 2007, стр.73 – 74.
21. Die Offensive der bulgarischen Divisionen, die gut ausgerüstet mit Unterstützung zahlreicher Panzer und Jagdflugzeuge deutscher Herkunft im Raum Skoplje angreifen, zwingt die deutschen Kräfte zur Rückzugsbewegung in die östlichen Seitentäler. In der Nacht vom 11./12. November 1944 wird Skoplje von der Heeresgruppe E geräumt.For more see: Janusz Piekałkiewicz (1984) Krieg auf dem Balkan, 1940-1945, Südwest, S. 285, ISBN 3517007900.
22. Germany and the Second World War. Volume VIII, The Eastern Front 1943-1944 : the war in the East and on the neighbouring fronts. The withdrawal battles in Macedonia.
23. Livanios, Dimitris, The Macedonian Question: Britain and the Southern Balkans 1939-1949, Oxford University Publishing, 2008, ISBN 0191528722, pp. 118-141.
24. Karl Hnilicka: Das Ende auf dem Balkan 1944/45 – Die militärische Räumung Jugoslaviens durch die deutsche Wehrmacht, Musterschmidt, Göttingen 1970. (Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Band 13) ìn German; pp. 90-91; 95.
25. War and revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: occupation and collaboration, Jozo Tomasevich, Stanford University Press, 2001, ISBN 0-8047-3615-4, pp. 751–752.
26. Витка Тошкова, България-непризнатият противник на Третия райх, Военно издателство, 1995, стр. 146.
27. Аврора Котева, Николай Котев, Британското разузнаване в България, 1939-1945; Издание 2, Военно издателство, 2003; ISBN 9545092661, стр. 168.
28. Игнат Криворов, Военното изкуство на българската армия 1885-1945, Военно издателство, 2003; ISBN 954509270X, ст. 117.
29. Ива Бурилкова, Цочо Билярски, БКП, Коминтернът и македонският въпрос (1917-1946): томове 1-2, Глав. управл. на архивите, 1998, ISBN 9549800040, стр. 1147.
30. Georgi Daskalov, Bulgarian-Yugoslav political relations, 1944-1945, Kliment Ohridski University Press, 1989, p. 114; (in Bulgarian).
31. Atanas Semerdzhiev et al., Otechestvenata voĭna na Bŭlgaria, 1944-1945; Volume 4, Voen. izd-vo, 1982, str. 482.
32. Livanios, Dimitris, The Macedonian Question: Britain and the Southern Balkans 1939-1949, Oxford University Publishing, 2008, ISBN 0191528722, pp. 134-135.
33. Въпреки намесата на съветското военно командуване, югославските ръководители продължиха да провеждат своята враждебна антибългарска политика. Те побързаха да сложат ръка върху 430 млн. български лева - собственост на Българската народна банка в Скопие в пари, марки, бандероли и други ценни книжа. Без малко във връзка с този дързък грабеж не се стигна до военно стълкновение, тъй като министърът на войната ген. Д.Велчев заповяда на един полк артилерия да се върне в Скопие и със сила да възвърне тази българска собственост. ЦК на БРП (к) успя обаче да предотврати този инцидент и се обърна за съдействие към маршал Толбухин. For more see: Добрин Мичев, Македонският въпрос и българо-югославските отношения: 9 септември 1944-1949, Унив. изд-во "Св. Климент Охридски", 1994, ISBN 9540701821, стр. 119.
34. Костадин Христов, За първите македонски банкноти. 20.09.2017, Управление на риска.
35. Michael Palairet, Macedonia: A Voyage through History (Vol. 2), Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016, ISBN 1443888494, p. 212.
36. Anatoliy Prokopiev, Bulgaria's Preordained Choice in 1941 and 1944, p. 83, in: Multinational Operations, Alliances, and International Military Cooperation Past and Future, Center for Military History, U.S. Army, Government Printing Office, ISBN 0160872421, 2006, pp. 77-85.
37. Sfetas, Spyridon. (2012). The Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute over the Macedonian question as a reflection of the Soviet-Yugoslav controversy (1968-1980). Balcanica. 2012. 241-271. 10.2298/BALC1243241S.
38. Михаило Апостолски, Завршните операции на НОВ за ослободување на Македонија, "Кочо Рацин", Скопје, 1953.
39. Како Бугарите "учествуваа" во ослободувањето на Скопје. Јордан Цеков-Дане
40. Skopje was liberated by Bulgarian forces, and the Macedonian Partisans came down from the surrounding hills to celebrate their entrance to the city; similar scenes occurred in other Macedonian and Serbian towns. The official Macedonian historiography, written primarily by Apostolski, played down the Bulgarian role and emphasized that of the Partisans. For information on the military situation in Macedonia and Serbia and the role of the Bulgarian army, see FO 371/43608, R17271, 24/11/1944; FO 371/44279, R16642,14/10/1944; FO 371/43630, R19495, 24/11/1944; WO 208, 113B, 12/9/1944. The sources, which contain intelligence reports from BLOs, confirm the role of the Bulgarian army in the liberation of Skopje, Nis, Prilep, and the Morava Valley. For more, see Dimitris Livanios, The Macedonian Question: Britain and the Southern Balkans 1939–1949, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008; ISBN 9780199237685, p. 134.
41. 70 години слободно Скопје! Мали битки за голема победа! ФАКТОР.МК, 13 Ноември, 2014.
42. Како не успеала бугарската парада за „ослободувањето“ на Скопје Pressing TV
43. Коста Църнушанов, Македонизмът и съпротивата на Македония срещу него, Университетско изд-во "Св. Климент Охридски", София, 1992, стр. 370.
44. Никола Стоянов, Генерал Михаило Апостолски: поучителна история на трите превъплъщения на Михаил Митев, злостен българомразец, в-к Струма, 11.02.2021г.
45. "The first unit to enter Skopje at 18:30, abandoned by the Germans under pressure from the Bulgarian army, was the intelligence cavalry platoon of the Second Infantry Division of the 4th Bulgarian Army; detachments of the Second Infantry Division of the First Bulgarian Army also contributed to the liberation. They forced the withdrawing Nazi detachments to retreat from the city, and on November 13 at 11 pm controlled the southern and southeastern areas of the city; at midnight, they seized the city center." Georgi Daskalov, Bulgarian-Yugoslav political relations, 1944-1945, Kliment Ohridski University Press, 1989, p. 113; (in Bulgarian).
46. Военно-исторически сборник, том 37, Институт за военна история, Военно-историческа комисия при Щаба на армията, 1968, стр. 34.
47. Katerina Kolozova, On the Macedonian-Bulgarian dispute and historical revisionism. 7 Dec 2020, Al Jazeera.
48. Захариевa: Бугарите не биле фашистички окупатори. Тогаш на 13 ноември партизаните го ослободиле или го окупирале Скопје од Бугарите Ное. 13, 2020, Во Центар. ^{[dead link]}
49. Македония с нов филм против българската окупация (трейлър); OFFNews.bg 27.09.2016.
50. Sinisa Jakov Marusic, Bulgaria Sets Tough Terms for North Macedonia’s EU Progress Skopje. BIRN; 10 October 2019.
51. Зоран Заев: Договорът с България ще бъде закон. Меdiapool публикува интервюто на Любчо Нешков, собственик на информационната агенция БГНЕС. 25 November, 2020; Mediapool.bg.
52. Sinisa Jakov Marusic, North Macedonia PM’s Remarks About History Hit a Nerve. BIRN, November 26, 2020.
53. Мария Атанасова: Мицкоски: Заев да внимава с приятелството с България, Факти.бГ. 25 Ноември, 2020г.
54. VMRO-DPMNE leader Mickoski demands PM Zaev's resignation, announces more protests. MIA, 26 November, 2020 2021-01-19 at the Wayback Machine.
55. Любчо Георгиевски: Хората са шокирани от Заев, защото не познават миналото. Епицентър, 28 ноем. 2020.
56. Владо Бучковски: Македонците съществуват от 1944 година, българите са по-стар народ. 2 дек. 2020, Епицентър.
57. Дејан Азески, Зошто Зоран Заев политички греши, а историски е во право? Fokus 02.12.2020
58. В Северна Македония: Българската армия бе едновременно окупационна и освободителна, Факти.бг. 4 Декември, 2020.
59. Boris Georgievski Bulgaria asks EU to stop 'fake' Macedonian identity. 23.09.2020, Deutsche Welle.
60. Военно-исторически сборник, Volume 64, Issues 1-3, Армия. Щаб. Военно-историческа комисия, Bulgaria. Министерство на народната отбрана, Институт за военна история, Военно-историческа комисия при Щаба на армията, 1995, стр. 162.
61. Тодор Атанасовски, Тито ја сакал Македонија како држава;списание Глобус; 01.12.2009 г. 2020-06-27 at the Wayback Machine