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Battle of Gettysburg

Battle of Gettysburg
Part of the Eastern theater of the American Civil War

The Battle of Gettysburg by Thure de Thulstrup
DateJuly 1–3, 1863
Location39°48′41″N 77°13′33″W / 39.81139°N 77.22583°W / 39.81139; -77.22583
Result Union victory[1]
Belligerents
United States (Union) Confederate States
Commanders and leaders
George Meade Robert E. Lee
Units involved
Army of the Potomac[2] Army of Northern Virginia[3]
Strength
93,500–104,256[4][5]
360 artillery pieces
36 cavalry regiments
71,000–75,000, possibly as many as 80,000.[6]
270 artillery pieces
9,500 cavalry
Casualties and losses
23,049[7][8] 23,000–28,000[9][10]
This 1863 oval-shaped map depicts the Gettysburg Battlefield during July 1–3, 1863, showing troop and artillery positions and movements, relief hachures, drainage, roads, railroads, and houses with the names of residents at the time of the Battle of Gettysburg.
This November 1862 Harper's Magazine illustration shows Confederate Army troops escorting captured African American civilians south into slavery. En route to Gettysburg, the Army of Northern Virginia kidnapped between 40 and nearly 60 Black civilians and sent them south into slavery.[11][12]

The Battle of Gettysburg (locally /ˈɡɛtɪsbɜːrɡ/ )[13] was a battle in the American Civil War fought by Union and Confederate forces between July 1 and July 3, 1863, in and around Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.

In the Battle of Gettysburg, Union Major General George Meade's Army of the Potomac defeated attacks by Confederate General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, halting Lee's invasion of the North and forcing his retreat. The battle involved the largest number of casualties of the entire war and is often described as the war's turning point, due to the Union's decisive victory and its almost simultaneous concurrence with the victorious conclusion of the Siege of Vicksburg.[fn 1][14]

After his success at Chancellorsville in Virginia in May 1863, Lee led his army through the Shenandoah Valley to begin his second invasion of the North—the Gettysburg Campaign. With his army in high spirits, Lee intended to shift the focus of the summer campaign from war-ravaged northern Virginia and hoped to influence Northern politicians to give up their prosecution of the war by penetrating as far as Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, or even Philadelphia. Prodded by President Abraham Lincoln, Major General Joseph Hooker moved his army in pursuit, but was relieved of command just three days before the battle and replaced by Meade.

Elements of the two armies initially collided at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863, as Lee urgently concentrated his forces there, his objective being to engage the Union army and destroy it. Low ridges to the northwest of town were defended initially by a Union cavalry division under Brigadier General John Buford, and soon reinforced with two corps of Union infantry. However, two large Confederate corps assaulted them from the northwest and north, collapsing the hastily developed Union lines, sending the defenders retreating through the streets of the town to the hills just to the south.[15] On the second day of battle, most of both armies had assembled. The Union line was laid out in a defensive formation resembling a fishhook. In the late afternoon of July 2, Lee launched a heavy assault on the Union left flank, and fierce fighting raged at Little Round Top, the Wheatfield, Devil's Den, and the Peach Orchard. On the Union right, Confederate demonstrations escalated into full-scale assaults on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. All across the battlefield, despite significant losses, the Union defenders held their lines.

On the third day of battle, fighting resumed on Culp's Hill, and cavalry battles raged to the east and south, but the main event was a dramatic infantry assault by around 12,000 Confederates against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, known as Pickett's Charge. The charge was repelled by Union rifle and artillery fire, at great loss to the Confederate army. Lee led his army on the torturous Retreat from Gettysburg to Virginia. Between 46,000 and 51,000 soldiers from both armies were casualties in the three-day battle, the most costly in US history. On November 19, President Lincoln used the dedication ceremony for the Gettysburg National Cemetery to honor the fallen Union soldiers and redefine the purpose of the war in his historic Gettysburg Address.

Background

Military situation

 
Gettysburg Campaign (through July 3) with cavalry movements shown with dashed lines
  Confederate
  Union

Shortly after the Army of Northern Virginia won a major victory over the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Chancellorsville (April 30 – May 6, 1863), General Robert E. Lee decided upon a second invasion of the North (the first was the unsuccessful Maryland campaign of September 1862, which ended in the bloody Battle of Antietam). Such a move would upset the Union's plans for the summer campaigning season and possibly reduce the pressure on the besieged Confederate garrison at Vicksburg. The invasion would allow the Confederates to live off the bounty of the rich Northern farms while giving war-ravaged Virginia a much-needed rest. In addition, Lee's 72,000-man army[6] could threaten Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, and possibly strengthen the growing peace movement in the North.[16]

Initial movements to battle

Thus, on June 3, Lee's army began to shift northward from Fredericksburg, Virginia. Following the death of Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, Lee reorganized his two large corps into three new corps, commanded by Lieutenant General James Longstreet (First Corps), Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell (Second), and Lieutenant General A.P. Hill (Third); both Ewell and Hill, who had formerly reported to Jackson as division commanders, were new to this level of responsibility. The cavalry division remained under the command of Major General J.E.B. Stuart.[17]

The Union Army of the Potomac under Major General Joseph Hooker consisted of seven infantry corps, a cavalry corps, and an artillery reserve, for a combined strength of more than 100,000 men.[5]

The first major action of the campaign took place on June 9 between cavalry forces at Brandy Station, near Culpeper, Virginia. The 9,500 Confederate cavalrymen under Stuart were surprised by Major General Alfred Pleasonton's combined arms force of two cavalry divisions (8,000 troopers) and 3,000 infantry, but Stuart eventually repelled the Union attack. The inconclusive battle, the largest predominantly cavalry engagement of the war, proved for the first time that the Union horse soldier was equal to his Southern counterpart.[18]

By mid-June, the Army of Northern Virginia was poised to cross the Potomac River and enter Maryland. After defeating the Union garrisons at Winchester and Martinsburg, Ewell's Second Corps began crossing the river on June 15. Hill's and Longstreet's corps followed on June 24 and 25. Hooker's army pursued, keeping between Washington, D.C., and Lee's army. The Union army crossed the Potomac from June 25 to 27.[19]

Lee gave strict orders for his army to minimize any negative effects on the civilian population.[20][21] Food, horses, and other supplies were generally not seized outright unless a citizen concealed property, although quartermasters reimbursing Northern farmers and merchants with Confederate money which was virtually worthless or with equally worthless promissory notes were not well received.[22] Various towns, most notably York, Pennsylvania, were required to pay indemnities in lieu of supplies, under threat of destruction.[23] During the invasion, the Confederates seized between 40 and nearly 60 northern African Americans. A few of them were escaped fugitive slaves, but many were freemen; all were sent south into slavery under guard.[11][12]

On June 26, elements of Major General Jubal Early's division of Ewell's corps occupied the town of Gettysburg after chasing off newly raised Pennsylvania militia in a series of minor skirmishes. Early laid the borough under tribute, but did not collect any significant supplies. Soldiers burned several railroad cars and a covered bridge, and destroyed nearby rails and telegraph lines. The following morning, Early departed for adjacent York County.[24]

Meanwhile, in a controversial move, Lee allowed Stuart to take a portion of the army's cavalry and ride around the east flank of the Union army. Lee's orders gave Stuart much latitude, and both generals share the blame for the long absence of Stuart's cavalry, as well as for the failure to assign a more active role to the cavalry left with the army. Stuart and his three best brigades were absent from the army during the crucial phase of the approach to Gettysburg and the first two days of battle. By June 29, Lee's army was strung out in an arc from Chambersburg (28 mi (45 km) northwest of Gettysburg) to Carlisle (30 mi (48 km) north of Gettysburg) to near Harrisburg and Wrightsville on the Susquehanna River.[25]

In a dispute over the use of the forces defending the Harpers Ferry garrison, Hooker offered his resignation, and Abraham Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, who were looking for an excuse to rid themselves of him, immediately accepted. They replaced Hooker early on the morning of June 28 with Major General George Gordon Meade, then commander of the V Corps.[26]

On June 29, when Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Potomac River, he ordered a concentration of his forces around Cashtown, located at the eastern base of South Mountain and eight mi (13 km) west of Gettysburg.[27] On June 30, while part of Hill's corps was in Cashtown, one of Hill's brigades (North Carolinians under Brigadier General J. Johnston Pettigrew) ventured toward Gettysburg. In his memoirs, Major General Henry Heth, Pettigrew's division commander, claimed that he sent Pettigrew to search for supplies in town—especially shoes.[28]

When Pettigrew's troops approached Gettysburg on June 30, they noticed Union cavalry under Major General John Buford arriving south of town, and Pettigrew returned to Cashtown without engaging them. When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth what he had seen, neither general believed that there was a substantial Union force in or near the town, suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia. Despite Lee's order to avoid a general engagement until his entire army was concentrated, Hill decided to mount a significant reconnaissance in force the following morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in his front. Around 5 a.m. on Wednesday, July 1, two brigades of Heth's division advanced to Gettysburg.[29]

Opposing forces

Union

The Army of the Potomac, initially under Hooker (Meade replaced Hooker in command on June 28), consisted of more than 100,000 men in the following organization:[30]

During the advance on Gettysburg, Reynolds was in operational command of the left, or advanced, wing of the Army, consisting of the I, III, and XI Corps.[31] Many other Union units (not part of the Army of the Potomac) were actively involved in the Gettysburg Campaign, but not directly involved in the Battle of Gettysburg. These included portions of the Union IV Corps, the militia and state troops of the Department of the Susquehanna, and various garrisons, including that at Harpers Ferry.

Confederate

In reaction to the death of Jackson after Chancellorsville, Lee reorganized his Army of Northern Virginia (75,000 men) from two infantry corps into three.[32]

First day of battle

Herr Ridge, McPherson Ridge and Seminary Ridge

 
Overview map of the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg

Anticipating that the Confederates would march on Gettysburg from the west on the morning of July 1, Buford laid out his defenses on three ridges west of the town: Herr Ridge, McPherson Ridge and Seminary Ridge. These were appropriate terrain for a delaying action by his small cavalry division against superior Confederate infantry forces, meant to buy time awaiting the arrival of Union infantrymen who could occupy the strong defensive positions south of town at Cemetery Hill, Cemetery Ridge, and Culp's Hill. Buford understood that if the Confederates could gain control of these heights, Meade's army would have difficulty dislodging them.[33]

Heth's division advanced with two brigades forward, commanded by brigadier generals James J. Archer and Joseph R. Davis. They proceeded easterly in columns along the Chambersburg Pike. Three mi (5 km) west of town, about 7:30 a.m. on July 1, the two brigades met light resistance from vedettes of Union cavalry, and deployed into line. According to lore, the Union soldier to fire the first shot of the battle was Lt. Marcellus Jones.[34] Eventually Heth's men encountered dismounted troopers of Col. William Gamble's cavalry brigade. The dismounted troopers resisted stoutly, delaying the Confederate advance with most firing their breech-loading Sharp's carbines from behind fences and trees. (A small number of troopers had other carbine models. A small minority of historians have written that some troopers had Spencer repeating carbines or Spencer repeating rifles but most sources disagree.)[35][fn 2] Still, by 10:20 a.m., the Confederates had pushed the Union cavalrymen east to McPherson Ridge, when the vanguard of the I Corps (Major General John F. Reynolds) finally arrived.[36]

North of the pike, Davis gained a temporary success against Brigadier General Lysander Cutler's brigade but was repelled with heavy losses in an action around an unfinished railroad bed cut in the ridge. South of the pike, Archer's brigade assaulted through Herbst (also known as McPherson's) Woods. The Union Iron Brigade under Brigadier General Solomon Meredith enjoyed initial success against Archer, capturing several hundred men, including Archer himself.[37]

General Reynolds was shot and killed early in the fighting while directing troop and artillery placements just to the east of the woods. Shelby Foote wrote that the Union cause lost a man considered by many to be "the best general in the army".[38] Major General Abner Doubleday assumed command. Fighting in the Chambersburg Pike area lasted until about 12:30 p.m. It resumed around 2:30 p.m., when Heth's entire division engaged, adding the brigades of Pettigrew and Col. John M. Brockenbrough.[39]

As Pettigrew's North Carolina Brigade came on line, they flanked the 19th Indiana and drove the Iron Brigade back. The 26th North Carolina (the largest regiment in the army with 839 men) lost heavily, leaving the first day's fight with around 212 men. By the end of the three-day battle, they had about 152 men standing, the highest casualty percentage for one battle of any regiment, North or South.[40] Slowly the Iron Brigade was pushed out of the woods toward Seminary Ridge. Hill added Major General William Dorsey Pender's division to the assault, and the I Corps was driven back through the grounds of the Lutheran Seminary and Gettysburg streets.[41]

As the fighting to the west proceeded, two divisions of Ewell's Second Corps, marching west toward Cashtown in accordance with Lee's order for the army to concentrate in that vicinity, turned south on the Carlisle and Harrisburg roads toward Gettysburg, while the Union XI Corps (Major General Oliver O. Howard) raced north on the Baltimore Pike and Taneytown Road. By early afternoon, the Union line ran in a semicircle west, north, and northeast of Gettysburg.[42]

However, the Union did not have enough troops; Cutler, whose brigade was deployed north of the Chambersburg Pike, had his right flank in the air. The leftmost division of the XI Corps was unable to deploy in time to strengthen the line, so Doubleday was forced to throw in reserve brigades to salvage his line.[43]

Around 2:00 p.m., the Confederate Second Corps divisions of Maj. Gens. Robert E. Rodes and Jubal Early assaulted and out-flanked the Union I and XI Corps positions north and northwest of town. The Confederate brigades of Colonel Edward A. O'Neal and Brigadier General Alfred Iverson suffered severe losses assaulting the I Corps division of Brigadier General John C. Robinson south of Oak Hill. Early's division profited from a blunder by Brigadier General Francis C. Barlow, when he advanced his XI Corps division to Blocher's Knoll (directly north of town and now known as Barlow's Knoll); this represented a salient[44] in the corps line, susceptible to attack from multiple sides, and Early's troops overran Barlow's division, which constituted the right flank of the Union Army's position. Barlow was wounded and captured in the attack.[45]

As Union positions collapsed both north and west of town, Howard ordered a retreat to the high ground south of town at Cemetery Hill, where he had left the division of Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr in reserve.[46] Major General Winfield S. Hancock assumed command of the battlefield, sent by Meade when he heard that Reynolds had been killed. Hancock, commander of the II Corps and Meade's most trusted subordinate, was ordered to take command of the field and to determine whether Gettysburg was an appropriate place for a major battle.[47] Hancock told Howard, "I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw." When Howard agreed, Hancock concluded the discussion: "Very well, sir, I select this as the battle-field." Hancock's determination had a morale-boosting effect on the retreating Union soldiers, but he played no direct tactical role on the first day.[48]

General Lee understood the defensive potential to the Union if they held this high ground. He sent orders to Ewell that Cemetery Hill be taken "if practicable". Ewell, who had previously served under Stonewall Jackson, a general well known for issuing peremptory orders, determined such an assault was not practicable and, thus, did not attempt it; this decision is considered by historians to be a great missed opportunity.[49]

The first day at Gettysburg, more significant than simply a prelude to the bloody second and third days, ranks as the 23rd biggest battle of the war by number of troops engaged. About one quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged.[50]

Second day of battle

Plans and movement to battle

 
Robert E. Lee's plan for July 2, 1863, the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg

Throughout the evening of July 1 and morning of July 2, most of the remaining infantry of both armies arrived on the field, including the Union II, III, V, VI, and XII Corps. Two of Longstreet's divisions were on the road: Brigadier General George Pickett, had begun the 22-mile (35 km) march from Chambersburg, while Brigadier General Evander M. Law had begun the march from Guilford. Both arrived late in the morning. Law completed his 28-mile (45 km) march in eleven hours.[51]

The Union line ran from Culp's Hill southeast of the town, northwest to Cemetery Hill just south of town, then south for nearly two miles (3 km) along Cemetery Ridge, terminating just north of Little Round Top.[52] Most of the XII Corps was on Culp's Hill; the remnants of I and XI Corps defended Cemetery Hill; II Corps covered most of the northern half of Cemetery Ridge; and III Corps was ordered to take up a position to its flank. The shape of the Union line is popularly described as a "fishhook" formation.[53]

The Confederate line paralleled the Union line about one mile (1,600 m) to the west on Seminary Ridge, ran east through the town, then curved southeast to a point opposite Culp's Hill. Thus, the Union army had interior lines, while the Confederate line was nearly five miles (8 km) long.[54]

Lee's battle plan for July 2 called for a general assault of Meade's positions. On the right, Longstreet's First Corps was to position itself to attack the Union left flank, facing northeast astraddle the Emmitsburg Road, and to roll up the Union line. The attack sequence was to begin with Maj. Gens. John Bell Hood's and Lafayette McLaws's divisions, followed by Major General Richard H. Anderson's division of Hill's Third Corps.[55]

On the left, Lee instructed Ewell to position his Second Corps to attack Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill when he heard the gunfire from Longstreet's assault, preventing Meade from shifting troops to bolster his left. Though it does not appear in either his or Lee's Official Report, Ewell claimed years later that Lee had changed the order to simultaneously attack, calling for only a "diversion", to be turned into a full-scale attack if a favorable opportunity presented itself.[56][57]

Lee's plan, however, was based on faulty intelligence, exacerbated by Stuart's continued absence from the battlefield. Though Lee personally reconnoitered his left during the morning, he did not visit Longstreet's position on the Confederate right. Even so, Lee rejected suggestions that Longstreet move beyond Meade's left and attack the Union flank, capturing the supply trains and effectively blocking Meade's escape route.[58]

Lee did not issue orders for the attack until 11:00 a.m.[55][fn 3] About noon, General Anderson's advancing troops were discovered by General Sickles's outpost guard and the Third Corps—upon which Longstreet's First Corps was to form—did not get into position until 1:00 p.m.[60]

Hood and McLaws, after their long march, were not yet in position and did not launch their attacks until just after 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., respectively.[61]

Attacks on the Union left flank

 
Overview map of the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 2, 1863

As Longstreet's left division, under Major General Lafayette McLaws, advanced, they unexpectedly found Major General Daniel Sickles's III Corps directly in their path. Sickles had been dissatisfied with the position assigned him on the southern end of Cemetery Ridge. Seeing ground better suited for artillery positions one-half mile (800 m) to the west—centered at the Sherfy farm's Peach Orchard—he violated orders and advanced his corp to the slightly higher ground along the Emmitsburg Road, moving away from Cemetery Ridge. The new line ran from Devil's Den, northwest to the Peach Orchard, then northeast along the Emmitsburg Road to south of the Codori farm. This created an untenable salient at the Peach Orchard; Brigadier General Andrew A. Humphreys's division (in position along the Emmitsburg Road) and Major General David B. Birney's division (to the south) were subject to attacks from two sides and were spread out over a longer front than their small corps could defend effectively.[62] The Confederate artillery was ordered to open fire at 3:00 p.m.[63] After failing to attend a meeting at this time of Meade's corps commanders, Meade rode to Sickles's position and demanded an explanation of the situation. Knowing a Confederate attack was imminent and a retreat would be endangered, Meade refused Sickles' offer to withdraw.[64]

Meade was forced to send 20,000 reinforcements:[65] the entire V Corps, Brigadier General John C. Caldwell's division of the II Corps, most of the XII Corps, and portions of the newly arrived VI Corps. Hood's division moved more to the east than intended, losing its alignment with the Emmitsburg Road,[66] attacking Devil's Den and Little Round Top. McLaws, coming in on Hood's left, drove multiple attacks into the thinly stretched III Corps in the Wheatfield and overwhelmed them in Sherfy's Peach Orchard. McLaws's attack eventually reached Plum Run Valley (the "Valley of Death") before being beaten back by the Pennsylvania Reserves division of the V Corps, moving down from Little Round Top. The III Corps was virtually destroyed as a combat unit in this battle, and Sickles's leg was amputated after it was shattered by a cannonball. Caldwell's division was destroyed piecemeal in the Wheatfield. Anderson's division, coming from McLaws's left and starting forward around 6 p.m., reached the crest of Cemetery Ridge, but could not hold the position in the face of counterattacks from the II Corps, including an almost suicidal bayonet charge by the 1st Minnesota regiment against a Confederate brigade, ordered in desperation by Hancock to buy time for reinforcements to arrive.[67]

As fighting raged in the Wheatfield and Devil's Den, Colonel Strong Vincent of V Corps had a precarious hold on Little Round Top, an important hill at the extreme left of the Union line. His brigade of four relatively small regiments was able to resist repeated assaults by Law's brigade of Hood's division. Meade's chief engineer, Brigadier General Gouverneur K. Warren, had realized the importance of this position, and dispatched Vincent's brigade, an artillery battery, and the 140th New York to occupy Little Round Top mere minutes before Hood's troops arrived. The defense of Little Round Top with a bayonet charge by the 20th Maine, ordered by Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain and possibly led down the slope by Lieutenant Holman S. Melcher, was one of the most fabled episodes in the Civil War and propelled Chamberlain into prominence after the war.[68][fn 4]

Attacks on the Union right flank

 
Union Army breastworks on Culp's Hill, 1863

Ewell interpreted his orders as calling only for a cannonade.[57] His 32 guns, along with A. P. Hill's 55 guns, engaged in a two-hour artillery barrage at extreme range that had little effect. Finally, about six o'clock, Ewell sent orders to each of his division commanders to attack the Union lines in his front.[69]

Major General Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's Division had contemplated an assault on Culp's Hill, but they were still a mile away and had Rock Creek to cross. The few possible crossings would make significant delays. Because of this, only three of Johnson's four brigades moved to the attack.[69] Most of the hill's defenders, the Union XII Corps, had been sent to the left to defend against Longstreet's attacks, leaving only a brigade of New Yorkers under Brigadier General George S. Greene behind strong, newly constructed defensive works. With reinforcements from the I and XI Corps, Greene's men held off the Confederate attackers, though giving up some of the lower earthworks on the lower part of Culp's Hill.[70]

Early was similarly unprepared when he ordered Harry T. Hays's and Isaac E. Avery's brigades to attack the Union XI Corps positions on East Cemetery Hill. Once started, fighting was fierce: Colonel Andrew L. Harris of the Union 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, XI Corps came under a withering attack, losing half his men. Avery was wounded early on, but the Confederates reached the crest of the hill and entered the Union breastworks, capturing one or two batteries. Seeing he was not supported on his right, Hays withdrew. His right was to be supported by Robert E. Rodes's Division, but Rodes—like Early and Johnson—had not been ordered up in preparation for the attack. He had twice as far to travel as Early; by the time he came in contact with the Union skirmish line, Early's troops had already begun to withdraw.[71]

Jeb Stuart and his three cavalry brigades arrived in Gettysburg around noon but had no role in the second day's battle. Brigadier General Wade Hampton's brigade fought a minor engagement with newly promoted 23-year-old Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer's Michigan cavalry near Hunterstown to the northeast of Gettysburg.[72]

Third day of battle

Lee's plan

 
Overview map of the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg, July 3, 1863

Lee wished to renew the attack on Friday, July 3, using the same basic plan as the previous day: Longstreet would attack the Union left, while Ewell attacked Culp's Hill.[73] However, before Longstreet was ready, Union XII Corps troops started a dawn artillery bombardment against the Confederates on Culp's Hill in an effort to regain a portion of their lost works. The Confederates attacked, and the second fight for Culp's Hill ended around 11 a.m. Harry Pfanz judged that, after some seven hours of bitter combat, "the Union line was intact and held more strongly than before".[74]

Lee was forced to change his plans. Longstreet would command Pickett's Virginia division of his own First Corps, plus six brigades from Hill's Corps, in an attack on the Union II Corps position at the right center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Prior to the attack, all the artillery the Confederacy could bring to bear on the Union positions would bombard and weaken the enemy's line.[75]

Much has been made over the years of General Longstreet's objections to General Lee's plan. In his memoirs, Longstreet states that he told Lee that there were not enough men to assault the strong left center of the Union line by McLaws's and Hood's divisions reinforced by Pickett's brigades. Longstreet thought the attack would be repulsed and a counterattack would put Union forces between the Confederates and the Potomac River. Longstreet wrote that he said it would take a minimum of thirty thousand men to attack successfully as well as close coordination with other Confederate forces. He noted that only about thirteen thousand men were left in the selected divisions after the first two days of fighting. They would have to walk a mile under heavy artillery and long-range musketry fire. Longstreet states that he further asked Lee: "the strength of the column. He [Lee] stated fifteen thousand. Opinion was then expressed [by Longstreet] that the fifteen thousand men who could make successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle; but he was impatient of listening, and tired of talking, and nothing was left but to proceed."[76][fn 5]

Largest artillery bombardment of the war

 
The high water mark on Cemetery Ridge with the 72nd Pennsylvania Infantry Monument commemorating the 72nd Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment at right and the Copse of Trees to the left, August 2005

Around 1 p.m., from 150 to 170 Confederate guns began an artillery bombardment that was probably the largest of the war. In order to save valuable ammunition for the infantry attack that they knew would follow, the Army of the Potomac's artillery, under the command of Brigadier General Henry Jackson Hunt, at first did not return the enemy's fire. After waiting about 15 minutes, about 80 Union cannons opened fire. The Army of Northern Virginia was critically low on artillery ammunition, and the cannonade did not significantly affect the Union position.[77]

Pickett's Charge

Around 3 p.m.,[78] the cannon fire subsided, and between 10,500 and 12,500 Southern soldiers[fn 6] stepped from the ridgeline and advanced the three-quarters of a mile (1,200 m) to Cemetery Ridge.[79] A more accurate name for the charge would be the "Pickett–Pettigrew–Trimble Charge" after the commanders of the three divisions taking part in the charge, but the role of Pickett's division has led to the attack generally being known as "Pickett's Charge".[80] As the Confederates approached, there was fierce flanking artillery fire from Union positions on Cemetery Hill and the Little Round Top area,[81] and musket and canister fire from Hancock's II Corps.[82] In the Union center, the commander of artillery had held fire during the Confederate bombardment (in order to save it for the infantry assault, which Meade had correctly predicted the day before), leading Southern commanders to believe the Northern cannon batteries had been knocked out. However, they opened fire on the Confederate infantry during their approach with devastating results.[83]

Although the Union line wavered and broke temporarily at a jog called the "Angle" in a low stone fence, just north of a patch of vegetation called the Copse of Trees, reinforcements rushed into the breach, and the Confederate attack was repelled. The farthest advance, by Brigadier General Lewis A. Armistead's brigade of Pickett's division at the Angle, is referred to as the "high-water mark of the Confederacy".[84] Union and Confederate soldiers locked in hand-to-hand combat, attacking with their rifles, bayonets, rocks and even their bare hands. Armistead ordered his Confederates to turn two captured cannons against Union troops, but discovered that there was no ammunition left, the last double canister shots having been used against the charging Confederates. Armistead was mortally wounded shortly afterward. Nearly one half of the Confederate attackers did not return to their own lines.[85] Pickett's division lost about two thirds of its men, and all three brigadiers were killed or wounded.[83]

Cavalry battles

There were two significant cavalry engagements on July 3. The first one was coordinated with Pickett's Charge, and the standoff may have prevented a disaster for Union infantry.[86] The site of this engagement is now known as the East Cavalry Field.[87] The second engagement was a loss for Union cavalry attacking Confederate infantry. It has been labeled as a "fiasco", and featured faulty cavalry tactics.[88] The site of this engagement is now known as the South Cavalry Field.[89]

Northeast of Gettysburg

Stuart's cavalry division (three brigades), with the assistance of Jenkins' brigade, was sent to guard the Confederate left flank. Stuart was also in position to exploit any success the Confederate infantry (Pickett's Charge) might achieve on Cemetery Hill by flanking the Union right and getting behind Union infantry facing the Confederate attack.[90] The cavalry fight took place about three miles (4.8 km) northeast of Gettysburg at about 3:00 pm—around the end of the Confederate artillery barrage that preceded Pickett's charge. Stuart's forces collided with Union cavalry: Brigadier General David McMurtrie Gregg's division and Custer's brigade from Kilpatrick's division.[91] The fight evolved into "a wild melee of swinging sabers and blazing pistols and carbines".[92] One of Custer's regiments, the 5th Michigan Cavalry Regiment, was armed with Spencer repeating rifles, and at least two companies from an additional regiment were also armed with repeaters.[93] The fight ended in a standoff, as neither side changed positions. However, Gregg and Custer prevented Stuart from gaining the rear of Union infantry facing Pickett.[86]

Southwest of Gettysburg

After hearing news of the Union's success against Pickett's charge, Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick launched a cavalry attack against the infantry positions of Longstreet's Corps southwest of Big Round Top. The terrain was difficult for a mounted attack because it was rough, heavily wooded, and contained huge boulders—and Longstreet's men were entrenched with artillery support.[94] Brigadier General Elon J. Farnsworth protested against the futility of such a move, but obeyed orders. Farnsworth was killed in the fourth of five unsuccessful attacks, and his brigade suffered significant losses.[95] Although Kilpatrick was described by at least one Union leader as "brave, enterprising, and energetic", incidents such as Farnsworth's charge earned him the nickname of "Kill Cavalry".[96]

Aftermath

Casualties

 
"The Harvest of Death": Union dead on the battlefield at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, photographed July 5 or July 6, 1863, by Timothy H. O'Sullivan
 
Gettysburg National Cemetery, July 2003
 
John L. Burns, veteran of the War of 1812, civilian who fought at the Battle of Gettysburg with Union troops.[97]

The two armies suffered between 46,000 and 51,000 casualties.[fn 7] Union casualties were 23,055 (3,155 killed, 14,531 wounded, 5,369 captured or missing),[8][fn 8] while Confederate casualties are more difficult to estimate. Many authors have referred to as many as 28,000 Confederate casualties,[fn 9] and Busey and Martin's more recent 2005 work, Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg, documents 23,231 (4,708 killed, 12,693 wounded, 5,830 captured or missing).[9] Nearly a third of Lee's general officers were killed, wounded, or captured.[98] The casualties for both sides for the 6-week campaign, according to Sears, were 57,225.[99]

In addition to being the deadliest battle of the war, Gettysburg also had the most generals killed in action. Several generals also were wounded. The Confederacy lost generals Paul Jones Semmes, William Barksdale, William Dorsey Pender, Richard Garnett, and Lewis Armistead, as well as J. Johnston Pettigrew during the retreat after the battle. Confederate generals who were wounded included Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood who lost the use of his left arm and Maj. Gen. Henry Heth who received a shot to the head on the first day of battle (though incapacitated for the rest of the battle, he remarkably survived without long-term injuries, credited in part due to his hat stuffed full of paper dispatches). Confederate generals James L. Kemper and Isaac R. Trimble were severely wounded during Pickett's charge and captured during the Confederate retreat. Confederate Brig. Gen. James J. Archer, in command of a brigade that most likely was responsible for killing Reynolds, was taken prisoner shortly after Reynolds' death. In the Confederate 1st Corps, eight of Longstreet's fourteen division and brigade commanders were killed or wounded, including Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson and Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson, who were wounded. In Ewell's 2nd Corps, Brig. Gen. Isaac E. Avery was mortally wounded and Brig. Gen. John M. Jones was wounded. In Hill's 3rd Corps, in addition to Pender and Pettigrew being killed, Maj. Gen. Henry Heth and Col. Birkett D. Fry (later brigadier general), in temporary brigade command were wounded. In Hill's 3rd Corp, Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Scales and Col. William L. J. Lowrance, in temporary brigade command, were wounded. In the Confederate Cavalry Division, Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton and Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins were wounded.[100]

Union generals killed were John Reynolds, Samuel K. Zook, and Stephen H. Weed, as well as Elon J. Farnsworth, assigned as brigadier general by Maj. Gen. Pleasanton based on his nomination although his promotion was confirmed posthumously, and Strong Vincent, who after being mortally wounded was given a deathbed promotion to brigadier general. Additional senior officer casualties included the wounding of Union Generals Dan Sickles (lost a leg), Francis C. Barlow, Daniel Butterfield, and Winfield Scott Hancock. Five of seven brigade commanders in Reynolds's First Corps were wounded. In addition to Hancock and Brig. Gen. John Gibbon being wounded in the Second Corps, three of ten brigade commanders were killed and three were wounded.[101]

The following tables summarize casualties by corps for the Union and Confederate forces during the three-day battle, according to Busey and Martin.[102]

Union Corps Casualties (k/w/m)
I Corps 6059 (666/3231/2162)
II Corps 4369 (797/3194/378)
III Corps 4211 (593/3029/589)
V Corps 2187 (365/1611/211)
VI Corps 242 (27/185/30)
XI Corps 3801 (369/1922/1510)
XII Corps 1082 (204/812/66)
Cavalry Corps 852 (91/354/407)
Artillery Reserve 242 (43/187/12)
Confederate Corps Casualties (k/w/m)
First Corps 7665 (1617/4205/1843)
Second Corps 6686 (1301/3629/1756)
Third Corps 8495 (1724/4683/2088)
Cavalry Corps 380 (66/174/140)

Bruce Catton wrote, "The town of Gettysburg looked as if some universal moving day had been interrupted by catastrophe."[103] But there was only one documented civilian death during the battle: Ginnie Wade (also widely known as Jennie), 20 years old, was hit by a stray bullet that passed through her kitchen in town while she was making bread.[104] Another notable civilian casualty was John L. Burns, a 69-year old veteran of the War of 1812 who walked to the front lines on the first day of battle and participated in heavy combat as a volunteer, receiving numerous wounds in the process. Though aged and injured, Burns survived the battle and lived until 1872.[105] Nearly 8,000 had been killed outright; these bodies, lying in the hot summer sun, needed to be buried quickly. More than 3,000 horse carcasses[106] were burned in a series of piles south of town; townsfolk became violently ill from the stench.[107] Meanwhile, the town of Gettysburg, with its population of just 2,400, found itself tasked with taking care of 14,000 wounded Union troops and an additional 8,000 Confederate prisoners.[108]

Confederates lost over 31–55 battle flags, with the Union possibly having lost slightly less than 40.[109]

Confederate retreat

 
Gettysburg Campaign (July 5 – July 14, 1863)

On the morning of July 4, with Lee's army still present, Meade ordered his cavalry to get to the rear of Lee's army.[110] In a heavy rain, the armies stared at one another across the bloody fields, on the same day that, some 920 miles (1,480 km) away, the Vicksburg garrison surrendered to Major General Ulysses S. Grant. Lee had reformed his lines into a defensive position on Seminary Ridge the night of July 3, evacuating the town of Gettysburg. The Confederates remained on the battlefield's west side, hoping that Meade would attack, but the cautious Union commander decided against the risk, a decision for which he would later be criticized. Both armies began to collect their remaining wounded and bury some of the dead. A proposal by Lee for a prisoner exchange was rejected by Meade.[111]

Late in the rainy afternoon, Lee started moving the non-fighting portion of his army back to Virginia. Cavalry under Brigadier General John D. Imboden was entrusted to escort the seventeen-mile long wagon train of supplies and wounded men, using a long route through Cashtown and Greencastle to Williamsport, Maryland. After sunset, the fighting portion of Lee's army began its retreat to Virginia using a more direct (but more mountainous) route that began on the road to Fairfield.[112] Although Lee knew exactly what he needed to do, Meade's situation was different. Meade needed to remain at Gettysburg until he was certain Lee was gone. If Meade left first, he could possibly leave an opening for Lee to get to Washington or Baltimore. In addition, the army that left the battlefield first was often considered the defeated army.[113]

"Now, if General Meade can complete his work so gloriously prosecuted thus far, by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee's army, the rebellion will be over."

Abraham Lincoln[114]

Union cavalry had some minor successes pursuing Lee's army. The first major encounter took place in the mountains at Monterey Pass on July 4, where Kilpatrick's cavalry division captured 150 to 300 wagons and took 1,300 to 1,500 prisoners.[115] Beginning July 6, additional cavalry fighting took place closer to the Potomac River in Maryland's Williamsport-Hagerstown area.[116] Lee's army was trapped and delayed from crossing the Potomac River because rainy weather had caused the river to swell, and the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters had been destroyed.[fn 10] Meade's infantry did not fully pursue Lee until July 7, and despite repeated pleas from Lincoln and Halleck, was not aggressive enough to destroy Lee's army.[118] A new pontoon bridge was constructed at Falling Waters, and lower water levels allowed the Confederates to begin crossing after dark on July 13.[119] Although Meade's infantry had reached the area on July 12, it was his cavalry that attacked the Confederate rear guard on the morning of July 14. Union cavalry took 500 prisoners, and Confederate Brigadier General Pettigrew was mortally wounded, but Lee's army completed its Potomac crossing.[120] The campaign continued south of the Potomac until the Battle of Manassas Gap on July 23, when Lee escaped and Meade abandoned the pursuit.[121]

Union reaction to the news of the victory

The news of the Union victory electrified the North. A headline in The Philadelphia Inquirer proclaimed "VICTORY! WATERLOO ECLIPSED!" New York diarist George Templeton Strong wrote:[122]

The results of this victory are priceless. ... The charm of Robert E. Lee's invincibility is broken. The Army of the Potomac has at last found a general that can handle it, and has stood nobly up to its terrible work in spite of its long disheartening list of hard-fought failures. ... Copperheads are palsied and dumb for the moment at least. ... Government is strengthened four-fold at home and abroad.

— George Templeton Strong, Diary, p. 330.

However, the Union enthusiasm soon dissipated as the public realized that Lee's army had escaped destruction and the war would continue. Lincoln complained to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles that "Our army held the war in the hollow of their hand and they would not close it!"[123] Brigadier General Alexander S. Webb wrote to his father on July 17, stating that such Washington politicians as "Chase, Seward and others," disgusted with Meade, "write to me that Lee really won that Battle!"[124]

Effect on the Confederacy

In fact, the Confederates had lost militarily and also politically. During the final hours of the battle, Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens was approaching the Union lines at Norfolk, Virginia, under a flag of truce. Although his formal instructions from Confederate President Jefferson Davis had limited his powers to negotiate on prisoner exchanges and other procedural matters, historian James M. McPherson speculates that he had informal goals of presenting peace overtures. Davis had hoped that Stephens would reach Washington from the south while Lee's victorious army was marching toward it from the north. President Lincoln, upon hearing of the Gettysburg results, refused Stephens's request to pass through the lines. Furthermore, when the news reached London, any lingering hopes of European recognition of the Confederacy were finally abandoned. Henry Adams, whose father was serving as the U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom at the time, wrote, "The disasters of the rebels are unredeemed by even any hope of success. It is now conceded that all idea of intervention is at an end."[125]

Compounding the effects of the defeat was the end of the Siege of Vicksburg, which surrendered to Grant's Federal armies in the West on July 4, the day after the Gettysburg battle, costing the Confederacy an additional 30,000 men, along with all their arms and stores.[126]

The immediate reaction of the Southern military and public sectors was that Gettysburg was a setback, not a disaster. The sentiment was that Lee had been successful on July 1 and had fought a valiant battle on July 2–3, but could not dislodge the Union Army from the strong defensive position to which it fled. The Confederates successfully stood their ground on July 4 and withdrew only after they realized Meade would not attack them. The withdrawal to the Potomac that could have been a disaster was handled masterfully. Furthermore, the Army of the Potomac had been kept away from Virginia farmlands for the summer and all predicted that Meade would be too timid to threaten them for the rest of the year. Lee himself had a positive view of the campaign, writing to his wife that the army had returned "rather sooner than I had originally contemplated, but having accomplished what I proposed on leaving the Rappahannock, viz., relieving the Valley of the presence of the enemy and drawing his Army north of the Potomac". He was quoted as saying to Maj. John Seddon, brother of the Confederate secretary of war, "Sir, we did whip them at Gettysburg, and it will be seen for the next six months that that army will be as quiet as a sucking dove." Some Southern publications, such as the Charleston Mercury, were critical of Lee's actions. On August 8, Lee offered his resignation to President Davis, who quickly rejected it.[127]

Gettysburg Address

 
On November 19, 1863, U.S. President Abraham Lincoln delivered the Gettysburg Address, considered one of the best-known speeches in American history.[128][129] A crowd of citizens and soldiers surround Lincoln (with a red arrow pointing to his location in photo).

The ravages of war were still evident in Gettysburg more than four months later when, on November 19, the Soldiers' National Cemetery was dedicated. During this ceremony, President Lincoln honored the fallen and redefined the purpose of the war in his historic Gettysburg Address.[130][fn 11]

Medal of Honor

There were 72 Medals of Honor awarded for the Gettysburg Campaign, 64 of which were for actions taken during the battle itself. The first recipient was awarded in December 1864, while the most recent was posthumously awarded to Lieutenant Alonzo Cushing in 2014.[131]

Historical assessment

Decisive victory controversies

The nature of the result of the Battle of Gettysburg has been the subject of controversy. Although not seen as overwhelmingly significant at the time, particularly since the war continued for almost two years, in retrospect it has often been cited as the "turning point", usually in combination with the fall of Vicksburg the following day.[14] This is based on the observation that, after Gettysburg, Lee's army conducted no more strategic offensives—his army merely reacted to the initiative of Ulysses S. Grant in 1864 and 1865—and by the speculative viewpoint of the Lost Cause writers that a Confederate victory at Gettysburg might have resulted in the end of the war.[132]

[The Army of the Potomac] had won a victory. It might be less of a victory than Mr. Lincoln had hoped for, but it was nevertheless a victory—and, because of that, it was no longer possible for the Confederacy to win the war. The North might still lose it, to be sure, if the soldiers or the people should lose heart, but outright defeat was no longer in the cards.

Bruce Catton, Glory Road[133]

It is currently a widely held view that Gettysburg was a decisive victory for the Union, but the term is considered imprecise. It is inarguable that Lee's offensive on July 3 was turned back decisively and his campaign in Pennsylvania was terminated prematurely (although the Confederates at the time argued that this was a temporary setback and that the goals of the campaign were largely met). However, when the more common definition of "decisive victory" is intended—an indisputable military victory of a battle that determines or significantly influences the ultimate result of a conflict—historians are divided. For example, David J. Eicher called Gettysburg a "strategic loss for the Confederacy" and James M. McPherson wrote that "Lee and his men would go on to earn further laurels. But they never again possessed the power and reputation they carried into Pennsylvania those palmy summer days of 1863."[134]

However, Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones wrote that the "strategic impact of the Battle of Gettysburg was ... fairly limited." Steven E. Woodworth wrote that "Gettysburg proved only the near impossibility of decisive action in the Eastern theater." Edwin Coddington pointed out the heavy toll on the Army of the Potomac and that "after the battle Meade no longer possessed a truly effective instrument for the accomplishments of his task. The army needed a thorough reorganization with new commanders and fresh troops, but these changes were not made until Grant appeared on the scene in March 1864." Joseph T. Glatthaar wrote that "Lost opportunities and near successes plagued the Army of Northern Virginia during its Northern invasion," yet after Gettysburg, "without the distractions of duty as an invading force, without the breakdown of discipline, the Army of Northern Virginia [remained] an extremely formidable force." Ed Bearss wrote, "Lee's invasion of the North had been a costly failure. Nevertheless, at best the Army of the Potomac had simply preserved the strategic stalemate in the Eastern Theater ..."[135] Historian Alan Guelzo notes that Gettysburg and Vicksburg did not end the war and that the war would go on for two more years.[136] He also noted that a little more than a year later Federal armies appeared hopelessly mired in sieges at Petersburg and Atlanta.[137]

Peter Carmichael refers to the military context for the armies, the "horrendous losses at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, which effectively destroyed Lee's offensive capacity," implying that these cumulative losses were not the result of a single battle. Thomas Goss, writing in the U.S. Army's Military Review journal on the definition of "decisive" and the application of that description to Gettysburg, concludes: "For all that was decided and accomplished, the Battle of Gettysburg fails to earn the label 'decisive battle'."[138] The military historian John Keegan agrees. Gettysburg was a landmark battle, the largest of the war and it would not be surpassed. The Union had restored to it the belief in certain victory, and the loss dispirited the Confederacy. If "not exactly a decisive battle", Gettysburg was the end of Confederate use of Northern Virginia as a military buffer zone, the setting for Grant's Overland Campaign.[139]

Lee vs. Meade

 
George Meade, the victorious Union Army general at the Battle of Gettysburg

Prior to Gettysburg, Robert E. Lee had established a reputation as an almost invincible general, achieving stunning victories against superior numbers—although usually at the cost of high casualties to his army—during the Seven Days, the Northern Virginia Campaign (including the Second Battle of Bull Run), Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. Only the Maryland Campaign, with its tactically inconclusive Battle of Antietam, had been less than successful. Therefore, historians such as Fuller, Glatthaar, and Sears have attempted to explain how Lee's winning streak was interrupted so dramatically at Gettysburg.[140] Although the issue is tainted by attempts to portray history and Lee's reputation in a manner supporting different partisan goals, the major factors in Lee's loss arguably can be attributed to: (1) his overconfidence in the invincibility of his men; (2) the performance of his subordinates, and his management thereof; (3) his failing health; and, (4) the performance of his opponent, George G. Meade, and the Army of the Potomac.[141]

Throughout the campaign, Lee was influenced by the belief that his men were invincible; most of Lee's experiences with the Army of Northern Virginia had convinced him of this, including the great victory at Chancellorsville in early May and the rout of the Union troops at Gettysburg on July 1. Since morale plays an important role in military victory when other factors are equal, Lee did not want to dampen his army's desire to fight and resisted suggestions, principally by Longstreet, to withdraw from the recently captured Gettysburg to select a ground more favorable to his army. War correspondent Peter W. Alexander wrote that Lee "acted, probably, under the impression that his troops were able to carry any position however formidable. If such was the case, he committed an error, such however as the ablest commanders will sometimes fall into." Lee himself concurred with this judgment, writing to President Davis, "No blame can be attached to the army for its failure to accomplish what was projected by me, nor should it be censured for the unreasonable expectations of the public—I am alone to blame, in perhaps expecting too much of its prowess and valor."[142]

 
Robert E. Lee, the Confederate Army general at the Battle of Gettysburg

The most controversial assessments of the battle involve the performance of Lee's subordinates. The dominant theme of the Lost Cause writers and many other historians is that Lee's senior generals failed him in crucial ways, directly causing the loss of the battle; the alternative viewpoint is that Lee did not manage his subordinates adequately, and did not thereby compensate for their shortcomings.[143] Two of his corps commanders—Richard S. Ewell and A.P. Hill—had only recently been promoted and were not fully accustomed to Lee's style of command, in which he provided only general objectives and guidance to their former commander, Stonewall Jackson; Jackson translated these into detailed, specific orders to his division commanders.[144] All four of Lee's principal commanders received criticism during the campaign and battle:[145]

  • James Longstreet suffered most severely from the wrath of the Lost Cause authors, not the least because he directly criticized Lee in postbellum writings and became a Republican after the war. His critics accuse him of attacking much later than Lee intended on July 2, squandering a chance to hit the Union Army before its defensive positions had firmed up. They also question his lack of motivation to attack strongly on July 2 and 3 because he had argued that the army should have maneuvered to a place where it would force Meade to attack them. The alternative view is that Lee was in close contact with Longstreet during the battle, agreed to delays on the morning of July 2, and never criticized Longstreet's performance. (There is also considerable speculation about what an attack might have looked like before Dan Sickles moved the III Corps toward the Peach Orchard.)[146]
  • J.E.B. Stuart deprived Lee of cavalry intelligence during a good part of the campaign by taking his three best brigades on a path away from the army's. This arguably led to Lee's surprise at Hooker's vigorous pursuit; the engagement on July 1 that escalated into the full battle prematurely; and it also prevented Lee from understanding the full disposition of the enemy on July 2. The disagreements regarding Stuart's culpability for the situation originate in the relatively vague orders issued by Lee, but most modern historians agree that both generals were responsible to some extent for the failure of the cavalry's mission early in the campaign.[147]
  • Richard S. Ewell has been universally criticized for failing to seize the high ground on the afternoon of July 1. Once again the disagreement centers on Lee's orders, which provided general guidance for Ewell to act "if practicable". Many historians speculate that Stonewall Jackson, if he had survived Chancellorsville, would have aggressively seized Culp's Hill, rendering Cemetery Hill indefensible, and changing the entire complexion of the battle. A differently worded order from Lee might have made the difference with this subordinate.[148]
  • A.P. Hill has received some criticism for his ineffective performance. His actions caused the battle to begin and then escalate on July 1, despite Lee's orders not to bring on a general engagement (although historians point out that Hill kept Lee well informed of his actions during the day). However, Hill's illness minimized his personal involvement in the remainder of the battle, and Lee took the explicit step of temporarily removing troops from Hill's corps and giving them to Longstreet for Pickett's Charge.[149]

In addition to Hill's illness, Lee's performance was affected by heart troubles, which would eventually lead to his death in 1870; he had been diagnosed with pericarditis by his staff physicians in March 1863, though modern doctors believe he had in fact suffered a heart attack.[150][151][152] As a final factor, Lee faced a new and formidable opponent in George G. Meade, and the Army of the Potomac fought well on its home territory. Although new to his army command, Meade deployed his forces relatively effectively; relied on strong subordinates such as Winfield S. Hancock to make decisions where and when they were needed; took great advantage of defensive positions; nimbly shifted defensive resources on interior lines to parry strong threats; and, unlike some of his predecessors, stood his ground throughout the battle in the face of fierce Confederate attacks.[153]

Lee was quoted before the battle as saying Meade "would commit no blunders on my front and if I make one ... will make haste to take advantage of it." That prediction proved to be correct at Gettysburg. Stephen Sears wrote, "The fact of the matter is that George G. Meade, unexpectedly and against all odds, thoroughly outgeneraled Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg." Edwin B. Coddington wrote that the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac received a "sense of triumph which grew into an imperishable faith in [themselves]. The men knew what they could do under an extremely competent general; one of lesser ability and courage could well have lost the battle."[154]

Meade had his own detractors as well. Similar to the situation with Lee, Meade suffered partisan attacks about his performance at Gettysburg, but he had the misfortune of experiencing them in person. Supporters of his predecessor, Hooker, lambasted Meade before the U.S. Congress's Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, where Radical Republicans suspected that Meade was a Copperhead and tried in vain to relieve him from command. Daniel E. Sickles and Daniel Butterfield accused Meade of planning to retreat from Gettysburg during the battle. Most politicians, including Lincoln, criticized Meade for what they considered to be his half-hearted pursuit of Lee after the battle. A number of Meade's most competent subordinates—Winfield S. Hancock, John Gibbon, Gouverneur K. Warren, and Henry J. Hunt, all heroes of the battle—defended Meade in print, but Meade was embittered by the overall experience.[155]

Battlefield preservation

 
M1857 12-Pounder "Napoleon" at Gettysburg National Military Park Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, September 2006
LocationAdams County, Pennsylvania, U.S.
WebsitePark Home (NPS.gov)

Gettysburg National Cemetery and Gettysburg National Military Park are maintained by the U.S. National Park Service as two of the nation's most revered historical landmarks. Although Gettysburg is one of the best known of all Civil War battlefields, it too faces threats to its preservation and interpretation. Many historically significant locations on the battlefield lie outside the boundaries of Gettysburg National Military Park and are vulnerable to residential or commercial development.[156]

Some preservation successes have emerged in recent years. Two proposals to open a casino at Gettysburg were defeated in 2006 and most recently in 2011, when public pressure forced the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board to reject the proposed gambling hub at the intersection of Routes 15 and 30, near East Cavalry Field.[157] The American Battlefield Trust, formerly the Civil War Trust, also successfully purchased and transferred 95 acres (38 ha) at the former site of the Gettysburg Country Club to the control of the U.S. Department of the Interior in 2011.[158]

Less than half of the over 11,500 acres on the old Gettysburg Battlefield have been preserved for posterity thus far. The American Battlefield Trust and its partners have acquired and preserved 1,242 acres (5.03 km2) of the battlefield in more than 40 separate transactions from 1997 to mid-2023.[159] Some of these acres are now among the 4,998 acres (2,023 ha) of the Gettysburg National Military Park.[160] In 2015, the Trust made one of its most important and expensive acquisitions, paying $6 million for a four-acre (1.6 ha) parcel that included the stone house that Confederate General Robert E. Lee used as his headquarters during the battle. The Trust razed a motel, restaurant and other buildings within the parcel to restore Lee's headquarters and the site to their wartime appearance, adding interpretive signs. It opened the site to the public in October 2016.[161]

In popular culture

 
Alfred Waud sketching the Battle of Gettysburg for Harper's Weekly[162]

At the 50th anniversary Gettysburg reunion (1913), 50,000 veterans attended according to a 1938 Army Medical report.[163] Historian Carol Reardon writes that attendance included at least 35,000 Union veterans and though estimates of attendees ran as high as 56,000, only a few more than 7,000 Confederate veterans, most from Virginia and North Carolina, attended.[164] Some veterans re-enacted Pickett's Charge in a spirit of reconciliation, a meeting that carried great emotional force for both sides. There was a ceremonial mass hand-shake across a stone wall on Cemetery Ridge.[165][166]

At the 75th anniversary Gettysburg reunion (1938), 1,333 Union veterans and 479 Confederate veterans attended.[163][167]

Film records survive of two Gettysburg reunions, held on the battlefield, in 1913.[168] and 1938.[169]

The children's novel Window of Time (1991), by Karen Weinberg, tells the story of a boy transported by time travel from the 1980s to the Battle of Gettysburg.[170]

The Battle of Gettysburg was depicted in the 1993 film Gettysburg, based on Michael Shaara's 1974 novel The Killer Angels.[171] The film and novel focused primarily on the actions of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, John Buford, Robert E. Lee, and James Longstreet during the battle. The first day focused on Buford's cavalry defense, the second day on Chamberlain's defense at Little Round Top, and the third day on Pickett's Charge.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ The Battle of Antietam, the culmination of Lee's first invasion of the North, had the largest number of casualties in a single day, about 23,000.
  2. ^ Historians who address the matter disagree on whether any troopers in Buford's division, and especially in William Gamble's brigade, had repeating carbines or repeating rifles. It is a minority view and most historians present creditable arguments against it. In support of the minority view, Stephen D. Starr wrote that most of the troopers in flanking companies had Spencer carbines, which had arrived a few days before the battle.The Union Cavalry in the Civil War: From Fort Sumter to Gettysburg, 1861–1863. Volume 1, citing Buckeridge, J. O. Lincoln's Choice. Harrisburg, Stackpole Books, 1956, p. 55. Shelby Foote in Fredericksburg to Meridian, The Civil War: a Narrative, Volume 2 New York, 1963, ISBN 978-0-394-74621-0, p. 465, also stated that some Union troopers had Spencer carbines. Richard S. Shue also claimed that a limited distribution of Spencer rifles had been made to some of Buford's troopers in his book Morning at Willoughby Run Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1995, ISBN 978-0-939631-74-2 p. 214.
    Edward G. Longacre wrote that in Gamble's brigade "a few squadrons of Federal troopers used [Spencer] repeating rifles" (rather than carbines) but most had single-shot breech-loading carbines. Longacre p. 60. Order of battle at Coddington, p. 585. Coddington, pp. 258-259, wrote that men in the 5th Michigan and at least two companies of the 6th Michigan regiment had Spencer repeating rifles (rather than carbines). Harry Hansen wrote that Thomas C. Devin's brigade of one Pennsylvania and three New York regiments "were equipped with new Spencer repeating carbines," without reference to Gamble's men. The Civil War: A History. New York: Bonanza Books, 1961. OCLC 500488542, p. 370.
    David G. Martin, in Gettysburg July 1 stated that all of Buford's men had single-shot breech-loading carbines which could be fired 5 to 8 times per minute, and fired from a prone position, as opposed to 2 to 3 rounds per minute with muzzle-loaders, "an advantage but not a spectacular one". p. 82. Cavalry historian Eric J. Wittenberg in The Devil's to Pay: John Buford at Gettysburg: A History and Walking Tour. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2014, 2015, 2018. ISBN 978-1-61121-444-4, stated that "while it is possible a handful of Spencer repeating rifles were present at Gettysburg" it is safe to conclude that Buford's troopers did not have them. He cited the fact that "only 64 percent of the companies in Gamble's and Devin's brigades filed their quarterly returns on June 30, 1863" in support of the possibility that some had repeaters but gave reasons for his rejection of that possibility. He dismissed Shelby Foote's statement as "mythology" because the Spencer carbines were not in mass production until September 1863, stated that Longacre credits Spencer repeating rifles to different regiments than the ordnance returns for the Army of the Potomac do, and discounted Shue's statement because he used "an unreliable source". pp. 209-210.
    In their books on the battle or on the war as a whole, many historians have not commented directly on whether any Federal troopers had repeating carbines or rifle. Some of them, such as Harry Pfanz, First Day, p. 67 specifically mentioned that the Union cavalry had breech-loading carbines enabling the troopers to fire slightly faster than soldiers with muzzle-loading rifles and made no mention of repeaters. Similar statements to that of Pfanz are found at Keegan, p. 191; Sears, p. 163; Eicher, p. 510; Symonds, p. 71, Hoptak, p. 53, Trudeau, p. 164. Others such as McPherson and Guelzo do not mention the weapons used by Buford's division.
  3. ^ Claims have been made that Lee intended for there to be an attack at sunrise, or at another point earlier in the day, but that the attack was delayed by Longstreet. Lee allegedly stated "What can detain Longstreet" not long after 9:00 am that morning, and Longstreet has been attributed as saying that "[Lee] wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett"; some writers have interpreted these statements as an indication that Lee intended the attack to take place earlier. Eicher rejects claims that Lee intended for the attack to begin at sunrise, although allowing that it is possible that Lee may have intended for an earlier attack. Eicher concludes that "preparations for the attack did not get underway until between 11 A.M. and noon". Sears notes that Lee "was said to be exasperated" by the late start of the attack, but also states that "having made plain by his orders to McLaws that he was assuming tactical command of the operation, Lee had not issued any earlier start-up order".[59]
  4. ^ Morgan, James. "Who saved Little Round Top?". Camp Chase Gazette. from the original on March 3, 2016. Retrieved February 21, 2016. Morgan addresses and rebuts certain conclusions made in With a Flash of His Sword: The Writings of Major Holman S. Melcher, 20th Maine Infantry. Edited by William B. Styple. The full text of Morgan's analysis of Styples's "point number 4" about who ordered and lead the charges is: "Number 4. Col. Chamberlain did not lead the charge. Lt. Holman Melcher was the first officer down the slope [according to Styples]. Though directly related to Mr. Styples argument, this is a very minor point and could even be called a quibble. Even granting Melcher the honor of being first down the slope (and such an interpretation is perfectly plausible), he did not "lead" the charge in a command sense, which is what the conclusion implies. Chamberlain probably was standing in his proper place behind the line when he yelled "Bayonets!," so if indeed "the word was enough" to get the men started, he could not have gone first as the entire line would have moved out ahead of him. But it does not matter. The questions, "who was first down the hill?" and "who led the charge?" are different questions which should not be posed as one....The question, therefore, remains: who saved Little Round Top? Given the available historical evidence, the answer likewise must remain: Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain.
  5. ^ Longstreet wrote in his memoirs that he estimated that his force would have "about thirteen thousand" men, not fifteen thousand. When asked by Longstreet the "strength of the column", Lee said the size would be fifteen thousand, which apparently included his estimate of the strength of two brigades of Anderson's Division of Hill's Third Corp that he would add to support Longstreet's men. Neither general knew the exact number of men available to attack at that tine because of casualties already sustained, merely the units. Longstreet did not write that he accepted that 15,000 would be the exact number of attackers. He merely said that no fifteen thousand men could take the Union position, that it would require 30,000. Historians give differing numbers of attackers for various reasons but all give numbers that are lower than 15,000 as shown in the next footnote.
  6. ^ Writing about the number of attackers in the charge, Carol Reardon, in Pickett's Charge in History & Memory, at page 6, wrote "Modern histories have reduced the number to a range somewhere between 10,500 and 13,000. No one 'knows' the number." Eicher, The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, at p. 544 gives the same range as Reardon does for the number of attackers. Stephen W. Sears in Gettysburg at p. 407 wrote "...George Meade thus had some 13,000 troops - as it happened, just about the same number as stepped off in Pickett's Charge..." Alan C. Guelzo, in Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, at p. 393 wrote "There would be around 13,000 men in the attack, if all of them could be gotten to move." He also notes in a footnote that estimates of the number vary widely. Among those giving a higher numbers of attackers, neither Guelzo nor Sears appear to take into account Ed Bearss's statement in Receding Tide p. 366 that Confederate casualties from Union Army artillery "overshoot" into the Confederate soldiers staged behind the front line before the charge amounted to almost 600 men. George R. Stewart, in Pickett's Charge: A microhistory of the final attack at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863 (1959), p. 173, after totaling the strength in the divisions and brigades in the charge considering earlier losses gives the lowest estimate of "troops in the assaulting column...at 10,500." Gary W. Gallagher, Stephen D. Engle, Robert K. Krick & Joseph T. Glatthaar in The American Civil War: This Might Scourge of War at page 180 wrote "About 12,000 Confederates tried, in the most renowned attack in all of American military history." Earl J. Hess in Pickett's Charge–The Last Attack at Gettysburg p. 335 wrote of "11,830 men engaged" in the charge. Noah Andre Trudeau wrote in Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage, p. 477, that with the addition of the very late advance of the brigades of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox and Brig. Gen. Edward A. Perry (led by Col. David Lang), the number of attackers could be said to approach 15,000, but with their subtraction, because the main charge had already been repulsed and accounting for Confederate casualties caused by Union Army artillery "overshoot", the number of attackers "approaches 11,800". Most references do not mention and cannot be adding about 1,400 men of the brigades of Brig. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox and Brig. Gen. Edward Perry, led by Col. David Lang, who started after the main charge had been repulsed with great casualties. Lang's (Perry's) three Florida regiments suffered hundreds of casualties, including many taken prisoner. Wilcox saw the futility of the attack and ordered his men back when he discovered the main attack had been repulsed and they would receive no artillery or other support. The brigade lost about 200 men before turning back. Gottfried, pp. 581, 588. McPherson, p. 662, gives a larger number than other modern historians of 14,000 Confederates going forward in the charge, scarcely half of whom returned. This may count the Wilcox and Perry (Lang) brigades, although he does not mention them.
  7. ^ McPherson, p. 664 states Union casualties were 23,000, "more than one-quarter of the army's effectives" and Confederate casualties were 28,000, "more than a third of Lee's army".
  8. ^ The number of Union casualties stated by the U.S. Adjutant General in 1888 was 23,003 (3,042 killed, 14,497 wounded, 5,464 captured or missing). Drum, Richard C. United States. Adjutant-General's Office. Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac, and co-operating forces in the Gettysburg campaign, June 5 - July 31, 1863; organization of the Army of the Potomac and Army of northern Virginia at the battle of Gettysburg; and return of casualties in the Union and Confederate forces. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1888. OCLC 6512586. p. 45. Other Union casualty figures stated by later historians were similar, including Murray and Hsieh, p. 290, 22,625; Trudeau, p. 529, 22,813; McPherson, p. 664, 23,000; Walsh, p. 285, 23,000; Guelzo, p. 445, 24,000 as rounded up by Meade in his later testimony before the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Sears p. 496 states that the Union Army also suffered about 7,300 casualties at the Second Battle of Winchester on June 13–15, 1863 during Ewell's advance to Gettysburg and in the Union Army pursuit of the Confederate Army after the battle.
  9. ^ Examples of the varying Confederate casualties for July 1–3 include Coddington, p. 536 (20,451, "and very likely more"). This is the same figure given by Drum, 1888, p. 69. Drum footnotes the casualty returns for some Confederate units as "Loss, if any, not recorded." For other units, he notes that brigade and regimental numbers sometimes differ and the brigade or larger Confederate unit totals are used. He states on p. 59 that the compilations of Confederate casualties can only be considered as "approximative". This lends weight to the higher numbers of Confederate casualties computed or estimated by historians including Busey and Martin cited in connection with the tables below, as well as Sears, p. 498 (22,625 plus just over 4,500 on the march north); Trudeau, p. 529 (22,874); Eicher, p. 550 (22,874, "but probably actually totaled 28,000 or more"); McPherson, p. 664 (28,000); Esposito, map 99 ("near 28,000"); Clark, p. 150 (20,448, "but probably closer to 28,000"); Woodworth, p. 209 ("at least equal to Meade's and possibly as high as 28,000"); (28,000).
  10. ^ Lee had left intact a pontoon bridge located at Falling Waters. This bridge had originally been used during the movement north into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Union cavalry under the command of Brigadier General William H. French destroyed the bridge on July 4. Lee's options for crossing the Potomac River were either a ferry at Williamsport that could handle only two wagons per crossing, or the Falling Waters location six miles (9.7 km) downstream.[117]
  11. ^ White, p.251. refers to Lincoln's use of the term "new birth of freedom" and writes, "The new birth that slowly emerged in Lincoln's politics meant that on November 19 at Gettysburg he was no longer, as in his inaugural address, defending an old Union but proclaiming a new Union. The old Union contained and attempted to restrain slavery. The new Union would fulfill the promise of liberty, the crucial step into the future that the Founders had failed to take."

Citations

  1. ^ Coddington, p. 573. See the discussion regarding historians' judgment on whether Gettysburg should be considered a decisive victory.
  2. ^ Official Records, Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 1, pages 155–168 July 24, 2017, at the Wayback Machine
  3. ^ Official Records, Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 2, pages 283–291 July 24, 2017, at the Wayback Machine
  4. ^ Official Records, Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 1, page 151 July 24, 2017, at the Wayback Machine
  5. ^ a b Coddington, p. 673, references the official number of the Union Army forces but says the number could have been in the "neighborhood" of 115,000. Busey and Martin, p. 125: "Engaged strength" at the battle was 93,921. Eicher, p. 503, gives a similar number of 93,500. Sears, p. 539 quotes the official number of just over 104,000 but with reinforcements of another 8,000 men about to arrive.
  6. ^ a b Busey and Martin, p. 260, state that Confederate "engaged strength" at the battle was 71,699; McPherson, p. 648, lists the Confederate strength at the start of the campaign as 75,000, while Eicher, p. 503 gives a lower number of 70,200. Noting that Confederate returns often did not include officers, Coddington, p. 676 states that estimated Confederate strength of 75,000 is "a conservative one". Confederate Captain John Esten Cooke in A Life of Gen. Robert E. Lee, New York: D. Appleton, 1871, p. 328, gives the number of the entire Confederate force "at about eighty thousand". Sears, p. 149 states that eyewitnesses observed the Confederate force to be about 100,000 but, although Meade used this in making his battle plans, it was an overcount of about 20 percent.
  7. ^ Official Records, Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 1, page 187 July 24, 2017, at the Wayback Machine
  8. ^ a b Busey and Martin, p. 125.
  9. ^ a b Busey and Martin, p. 260, cite 23,231 total (4,708 killed;12,693 wounded;5,830 captured/missing).
    See the section on casualties for a discussion of alternative Confederate casualty estimates, which have been cited as high as 28,000.
  10. ^ Official Records, Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 2, pages 338–346 July 24, 2017, at the Wayback Machine
  11. ^ a b Wynstra, p. 81
  12. ^ a b Symonds, pp. 53, 57
  13. ^ Robert D. Quigley, Civil War Spoken Here: A Dictionary of Mispronounced People, Places and Things of the 1860s (Collingswood, NJ: C. W. Historicals, 1993), p. 68. ISBN 0-9637745-0-6.
  14. ^ a b Rawley, p. 147; Sauers, p. 827; Gallagher, Lee and His Army, p. 83; McPherson, p. 665; Eicher, p. 550. Gallagher and McPherson cite the combination of Gettysburg and Vicksburg as the turning point. Eicher uses the arguably related expression, "High-water mark of the Confederacy".
  15. ^ Eicher, David J. (2001), The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 515–517, ISBN 978-0-684-84944-7
  16. ^ Coddington, pp. 8–9; Eicher, p. 490.
  17. ^ Eicher, pp. 489–491.
  18. ^ Symonds, p. 36.
  19. ^ Trudeau, pp. 45, 66.
  20. ^ Symonds, p. 49.
  21. ^ Moore, Frank (September 25, 1864). "The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events, with Documents, Narratives Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, Etc". Putnam – via Internet Archive.
  22. ^ Symonds, 49-50.
  23. ^ Symonds, p. 51.
  24. ^ Nye, pp. 272–278.
  25. ^ Symonds, pp. 41–43; Sears, pp. 103–106; Esposito, text for Map 94 (Map 34b in the online version); Eicher, pp. 504–507; McPherson, p. 649.
  26. ^ Sears, p. 123; Trudeau, p. 128.
  27. ^ Coddington, pp. 181, 189.
  28. ^ Eicher, pp. 508–509, discounts Heth's claim because the previous visit by Early to Gettysburg would have made the lack of shoe factories or stores obvious. However, many mainstream historians accept Heth's account: Sears, p. 136; Foote, p. 465; Clark, p. 35; Tucker, pp. 97–98; Martin, p. 25; Pfanz, First Day, p. 25.
  29. ^ Eicher, p. 508; Tucker, pp. 99–102.
  30. ^ Eicher, pp. 502–503.
  31. ^ Coddington, p. 122.
  32. ^ Eicher, p. 503.
  33. ^ Sears, pp. 155–158.
  34. ^ "Battle of Gettysburg: Who Really Fired the First Shot – HistoryNet". www.historynet.com. July 26, 2006. from the original on January 25, 2021. Retrieved April 20, 2012. Article by J. David Petruzzi, originally published in America's Civil War magazine, July 2006, which also includes text concerning a few other more dubious claimants.
  35. ^ Martin, pp. 80–81.
  36. ^ Symonds, p. 71; Coddington, p. 266; Eicher, pp. 510–511.
  37. ^ Tucker, pp. 112–117.
  38. ^ Foote, p. 468
  39. ^ Tucker, p. 184; Symonds, p. 74; Pfanz, First Day, pp. 269–275.
  40. ^ Busey and Martin, pp. 298, 501.
  41. ^ Pfanz, First Day, pp. 275–293.
  42. ^ Clark, p. 53.
  43. ^ Pfanz, First Day, p. 158.
  44. ^ Pfanz, First Day, p. 230.
  45. ^ Pfanz, First Day, pp. 156–238.
  46. ^ Pfanz, First Day, p. 294.
  47. ^ Pfanz, First Day, pp. 337–338; Sears, pp. 223–225.
  48. ^ Martin, pp. 482–488.
  49. ^ Pfanz, First Day, p. 344; Eicher, p. 517; Sears, p. 228; Trudeau, p. 253. Both Sears and Trudeau record "if possible".
  50. ^ Martin, p. 9, citing Thomas L. Livermore's Numbers & Losses in the Civil War in America (Houghton Mifflin, 1900).
  51. ^ Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, (Philadelphia:J. B. Lippincott, 1896), pp. 364, 365
  52. ^ "A Map Study of the Battle of Gettysburg | Historical Society of Pennsylvania". Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Retrieved December 17, 2022.
  53. ^ Eicher, p. 521; Sears, pp. 245-246.
  54. ^ Clark, p. 74; Eicher, p. 521.
  55. ^ a b James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox. (Philadelphia, PA: J. R. Lippincott company, 1896), p. 365.
  56. ^ Sears, p. 255; Clark, p. 69.
  57. ^ a b Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate. (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1907), p. 408
  58. ^ Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, (Philadelphia:J. B. Lippincott, 1896), pp. 364, 368
  59. ^ Eicher, p. 522; Sears, p. 257
  60. ^ Longstreet, From Mannassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, p. 366
  61. ^ Pfanz, Second Day, pp. 119–123.
  62. ^ Pfanz, Second Day, pp. 93–97; Eicher, pp. 523–524.
  63. ^ Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America, p. 369
  64. ^ Eicher
  65. ^ Harman, p. 59.
  66. ^ Harman, p. 57.
  67. ^ Sears, pp. 312–324; Eicher, pp. 530–535; Coddington, p. 423.
  68. ^ Eicher, pp. 527–530; Clark, pp. 81–85.
  69. ^ a b Edward Porter Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate. (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1907), p. 409
  70. ^ Eicher, pp. 537–538; Sauers, p. 835; Pfanz, Culp's Hill, pp. 205–234; Clark, pp. 115–116.
  71. ^ Report of Major General R. E. Rodes, CSA, commanding division. June 3 – August 1, 1863. The Gettysburg Campaign. O.R. – Series I – Volume XXVII/2 [S# 44]
  72. ^ Sears, p. 257; Longacre, pp. 198–199.
  73. ^ Harman, p. 63.
  74. ^ Pfanz, Culp's Hill, pp. 284–352; Eicher, pp. 540–541; Coddington, pp. 465–475.
  75. ^ Eicher, p. 542; Coddington, pp. 485–486.
  76. ^ Longstreet, James (1896). From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, US: J. B. Lippincott. pp. 386–387.
  77. ^ See discussion of varying gun estimates in Pickett's Charge article footnote.
  78. ^ Coddington, 402; McPherson, 662; Eicher, 546; Trudeau, 484; Walsh 281.
  79. ^ Wert, p.194
  80. ^ Sears, pp. 358–359.
  81. ^ Wert, pp. 198–199.
  82. ^ Wert, pp.205–207.
  83. ^ a b McPherson, p. 662.
  84. ^ McPherson, pp. 661–663; Clark, pp. 133–144; Symonds, pp. 214–241; Eicher, pp. 543–549.
  85. ^ Glatthaar, p. 281.
  86. ^ a b Starr p. 438
  87. ^ "Gettysburg - East Cavalry Field - July 3, 1863". American Battlefield Trust. from the original on September 28, 2022. Retrieved March 7, 2023.
  88. ^ Coddington pp. 524–525
  89. ^ "Gettysburg - East Cavalry Field - July 3, 1863". American Battlefield Trust. from the original on November 29, 2022. Retrieved March 7, 2023.
  90. ^ Starr pp. 437–438
  91. ^ Coddington, pp. 520-522
  92. ^ Sears p. 462
  93. ^ Coddington, pp. 258-259
  94. ^ Starr pp. 440–441
  95. ^ Eicher, pp. 549–550; Longacre, pp. 226–231, 240–44; Sauers, p. 836; Wert, pp. 272–280.
  96. ^ Starr, pp.417–418
  97. ^ Mathew Brady's National Photographic Portrait Galleries, photographer. From the Liljenquist Family Collection of Civil War Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress
  98. ^ Glatthaar, p. 282.
  99. ^ Sears, p. 513.
  100. ^ Sears, pp. 498-499.
  101. ^ Sears, p. 496.
  102. ^ Busey and Martin, pp. 125–147, 260–315. Headquarters element casualties account for the minor differences in army totals stated previously.
  103. ^ Catton, p. 325.
  104. ^ Sears, p. 391.
  105. ^ Martin, pp. 371-377; Pfanz, First Day, pp. 357-359.
  106. ^ Sears, p. 511.
  107. ^ Woodworth, p. 216.
  108. ^ Leonard, Pat (July 7, 2013). "Nursing the Wounded at Gettysburg". from the original on August 4, 2017. Retrieved July 12, 2017.
  109. ^ Nofi, Albert (August 19, 2017). The Blue & Gray Almanac: The Civil War in Facts & Figures, Recipes & Slang. Casemate Publishers. ISBN 978-1-61200-553-9.
  110. ^ Starr, p. 443.
  111. ^ Eicher, p. 550; Coddington, pp. 539–544; Clark, pp. 146–147; Sears, p. 469; Wert, p. 300.
  112. ^ Coddington, p. 538.
  113. ^ Coddington, p. 539.
  114. ^ Coddington, p. 564.
  115. ^ Starr, pp. 447-450.
  116. ^ Sears, pp. 481-484, Eicher, p.552.
  117. ^ Sears, p. 481.
  118. ^ Coddington, pp. 552, 564.
  119. ^ Sears, p. 490.
  120. ^ Eicher, p. 552.
  121. ^ Coddington, pp. 535–574; Sears, pp. 496–497; Eicher, p. 596; Wittenberg et al., One Continuous Fight, pp. 345–346.
  122. ^ McPherson, p. 664.
  123. ^ Donald, p. 446; Woodworth, p. 217.
  124. ^ Coddington, p. 573.
  125. ^ McPherson, pp. 650, 664.
  126. ^ "Vicksburg". American Battlefield Trust. from the original on June 2, 2022. Retrieved June 5, 2022.
  127. ^ Gallagher, Lee and His Army, pp. 86, 93, 102–05; Sears, pp. 501–502; McPherson, p. 665, in contrast to Gallagher, depicts Lee as "profoundly depressed" about the battle.
  128. ^ Conant, Sean (2015). The Gettysburg Address: Perspectives on Lincoln's Greatest Speech. New York: Oxford University Press. p. ix. ISBN 978-0-19-022745-6.
  129. ^ Holsinger, M. Paul (1999). War and American Popular Culture: A Historical Encyclopedia. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. p. 102. ISBN 978-0-313-29908-7.
  130. ^ White, p. 251.
  131. ^ Bradley, Mark. "Medal of Honor – 1st Lt. Alonzo H. Cushing". U.S. Army Center of Military History. from the original on September 21, 2018. Retrieved September 21, 2018.
  132. ^ McPherson, p. 665; Gallagher, Lee and His Generals, pp. 207–208.
  133. ^ Catton, p. 331.
  134. ^ Eicher, p. 550; McPherson, p. 665
  135. ^ Hattaway and Jones, p. 415; Woodworth, p. xiii; Coddington, p. 573; Glatthaar, p. 288; Bearss, p. 202.
  136. ^ Guelzo, p. 463.
  137. ^ Guelzo, p. 464.
  138. ^ Carmichael, p. xvii; Goss, Major Thomas (July–August 2004). "Gettysburg's "Decisive Battle"" (PDF). Military Review: 11–16. (PDF) from the original on February 2, 2007. Retrieved November 11, 2009.
  139. ^ Keegan, pp. 202, 239.
  140. ^ Glatthaar, p. 287; Fuller, pp. 195-198; Sears, pp. 499–504.
  141. ^ Walsh, pp. 286-287.
  142. ^ Sears, pp. 499–500; Glatthaar, p. 287; Fuller, p. 198, states that Lee's "overweening confidence in the superiority of his soldiers over his enemy possessed him."
  143. ^ For example, Sears, p. 504: "In the final analysis, it was Robert E. Lee's inability to manage his generals that went to the heart of the failed campaign." Glatthaar, pp. 285–286, criticizes the inability of the generals to coordinate their actions as a whole. Fuller, p. 198, states that Lee "maintained no grip over the operations" of his army.
  144. ^ Fuller, p. 195, for example, refers to orders to Stuart that "were as usual vague". Fuller, p. 197, wrote "As was [Lee's] custom, he relied on verbal instructions, and left all details to his subordinates."
  145. ^ Woodworth, pp. 209–210.
  146. ^ Sears, pp. 501–502; McPherson, pp. 656–657; Coddington, pp. 375–380; A more detailed collection of historical assessments of Longstreet at Gettysburg may be found in James Longstreet#Gettysburg.
  147. ^ Sears, p. 502; A more detailed collection of historical assessments of Stuart in the Gettysburg Campaign may be found in J.E.B. Stuart#Gettysburg.
  148. ^ McPherson, p. 654; Coddington, pp. 317–319; Eicher, pp. 517–518; Sears, p. 503.
  149. ^ Sears, pp. 502–503.
  150. ^ Mainwaring, R. D.; Tribble, C. G. (1992). "The cardiac illness of General Robert E. Lee". Surgery, Gynecology & Obstetrics. 174 (3): 237–244. PMID 1542842.
  151. ^ Sears, p. 500.
  152. ^ Murray and Hsieh, p. 234.
  153. ^ Murray and Hsieh, p. 285; Sears, p. 206.
  154. ^ Sears, p. 506; Coddington, p. 573.
  155. ^ Sears, pp. 505–507.
  156. ^ "10 Facts: Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863". American Battlefield Trust. February 18, 2023. Retrieved February 18, 2023.
  157. ^ . Penn State Civil War History Center. April 15, 2011. Archived from the original on April 20, 2013.
  158. ^ Pitzer, Scot Andrew (March 26, 2011). "Country club site acquisition ends 25-year Park Service effort". Gettysburg Times. from the original on August 16, 2019. Retrieved June 22, 2021.
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  163. ^ a b Army Medical Bulletin, No. 46 (Oct. 1938), "Blue and Gray reunion at Gettysburg, Pa, June 29 - July 6, 1938." p. 29-38 (OCoLC) 01778648.
  164. ^ Reardon, p. 188.
  165. ^ Reardon, p. 176.
  166. ^ Beitler, Lewis E. (1913). Fiftieth Anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg: Report of the Pennsylvania Commission. Harrisburg, PA: Wm. Stanley Ray, State Printer. p. 168. OCLC 475369.
  167. ^ Reardon, p. 202, rounds up the number to 1,800.
  168. ^ 1913 reunion film clips: "Gettysburg reunion 1913". You Tube: Ken Hendricksen. May 17, 2020. Retrieved February 19, 2023.
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  171. ^ . Turner Classic Movies. 2005. Archived from the original on April 19, 2019. Retrieved February 18, 2023.

References

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  • Gallagher, Gary W. Lee and His Generals in War and Memory. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-8071-2958-5.
  • Gallagher, Gary W., ed. Three Days at Gettysburg: Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1999. ISBN 978-0-87338-629-6.
  • Glatthaar, Joseph T. General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse. New York: Free Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-684-82787-2.
  • Guelzo, Allen C. Gettysburg: The Last Invasion. New York: Vintage Books, 2013. ISBN 978-0-307-74069-4. First published in 2013 by Alfred A. Knopf.
  • Gottfried, Bradley M. Brigades of Gettysburg: The Union and Confederate Brigades at the Battle of Gettysburg. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002. ISBN 978-0-306-81175-3
  • Harman, Troy D. Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2003. ISBN 0-8117-0054-2.
  • Hattaway, Herman, and Archer Jones. How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. ISBN 0-252-00918-5.
  • Hoptak, John David. Confrontation at Gettysburg: A Nation Saved, a Cause Lost. Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2012. ISBN 978-1-60949-426-1.
  • Keegan, John. The American Civil War: A Military History. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009. ISBN 978-0-307-26343-8.
  • Longacre, Edward G. The Cavalry at Gettysburg. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986. ISBN 0-8032-7941-8.
  • Longacre, Edward G. General John Buford: A Military Biography. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1995. ISBN 978-0-938289-46-3.
  • McPherson, James M. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. Oxford History of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. ISBN 0-19-503863-0.
  • Martin, David G. Gettysburg July 1. rev. ed. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1996. ISBN 0-938289-81-0.
  • Murray, Williamson and Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh. "A Savage War:A Military History of the Civil War". Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0-69-116940-8.
  • Nye, Wilbur S. Here Come the Rebels! Dayton, OH: Morningside House, 1984. ISBN 0-89029-080-6. First published in 1965 by Louisiana State University Press.
  • Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg – The First Day. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8078-2624-3.
  • Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg – The Second Day. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987. ISBN 0-8078-1749-X.
  • Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg: Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. ISBN 0-8078-2118-7.
  • Rawley, James A. (1966). Turning Points of the Civil War. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 0-8032-8935-9. OCLC 44957745.
  • Sauers, Richard A. "Battle of Gettysburg." In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X.
  • Sears, Stephen W. Gettysburg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. ISBN 0-395-86761-4.
  • Starr, Stephen Z. The Union Cavalry in the Civil War: From Fort Sumter to Gettysburg, 1861–1863. Volume 1. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007. Originally Published in 1979. ISBN 978-0-8071-0484-2.
  • Stewart, George R. Pickett's Charge: A Microhistory of the Final Attack at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959. Revised in 1963. ISBN 978-0-395-59772-9.
  • Symonds, Craig L. American Heritage History of the Battle of Gettysburg. New York: HarperCollins, 2001. ISBN 978-0-06-019474-1.
  • Tagg, Larry. . Campbell, CA: Savas Publishing, 1998. ISBN 1-882810-30-9.
  • Trudeau, Noah Andre. Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage. New York: HarperCollins, 2002. ISBN 0-06-019363-8.
  • Tucker, Glenn. High Tide at Gettysburg. Dayton, OH: Morningside House, 1983. ISBN 978-0-914427-82-7. First published 1958 by Bobbs-Merrill Co.
  • Walsh, George. Damage Them All You Can: Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. New York: Tom Doherty Associates, 2003. ISBN 978-0-7653-0755-2.
  • Wert, Jeffry D. Gettysburg: Day Three. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001. ISBN 0-684-85914-9.
  • White, Ronald C., Jr. The Eloquent President: A Portrait of Lincoln Through His Words. New York: Random House, 2005. ISBN 1-4000-6119-9.
  • Wittenberg, Eric J. The Devil's to Pay: John Buford at Gettysburg: A History and Walking Tour. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2014, 2015, 2018. ISBN 978-1-61121-444-4.
  • Wittenberg, Eric J., J. David Petruzzi, and Michael F. Nugent. One Continuous Fight: The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4–14, 1863. New York: Savas Beatie, 2008. ISBN 978-1-932714-43-2.
  • Woodworth, Steven E. Beneath a Northern Sky: A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign. Wilmington, DE: SR Books (scholarly Resources, Inc.), 2003. ISBN 0-8420-2933-8.
  • Wynstra, Robert J. At the Forefront of Lee's Invasion: Retribution, Plunder and Clashing Cultures on Richard S. Ewell's Road to Gettysburg. Kent. OH: The Kent State University Press, 2018. ISBN 978-1-60635-354-7.

Memoirs and primary sources

  • Paris, Louis-Philippe-Albert d'Orléans. The Battle of Gettysburg: A History of the Civil War in America. Digital Scanning, Inc., 1999. ISBN 1-58218-066-0. First published 1869 by Germer Baillière.
  • New York (State), William F. Fox, and Daniel Edgar Sickles. New York at Gettysburg: Final Report on the Battlefield of Gettysburg. Albany, NY: J.B. Lyon Company, Printers, 1900. OCLC 607395975.
  • U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1880–1901.

Further reading

External media
Images
  GettysburgPhotographs.com
  Battlefields.org maps & photos
  Gettysburg.edu paintings & photos
Video
  GettysburgAnimated.com
  • Adkin, Mark. The Gettysburg Companion: The Complete Guide to America's Most Famous Battle. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8117-0439-7.
  • Bachelder, John B. The Bachelder Papers: Gettysburg in Their Own Words. Edited by David L. Ladd and Audrey J. Ladd. 3 vols. Dayton, OH: Morningside Press, 1994. ISBN 0-89029-320-1.
  • Bachelder, John B. Gettysburg: What to See, and How to See It: Embodying Full Information for Visiting the Field. Boston: Bachelder, 1873. OCLC 4637523.
  • Ballard, Ted, and Billy Arthur. Gettysburg Staff Ride Briefing Book April 30, 2011, at the Wayback Machine. Carlisle, PA: United States Army Center of Military History, 1999. OCLC 42908450.
  • Boritt, Gabor S., ed. The Gettysburg Nobody Knows. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. ISBN 0-19-510223-1.
  • Desjardin, Thomas A. These Honored Dead: How the Story of Gettysburg Shaped American Memory. New York: Da Capo Press, 2003. ISBN 0-306-81267-3.
  • Frassanito, William A. Early Photography at Gettysburg. Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1995. ISBN 1-57747-032-X.
  • Lyon Fremantle, Arthur J. The Fremantle Diary: A Journal of the Confederacy. Edited by Walter Lord. Short Hills, NJ: Burford Books, 2002. ISBN 1-58080-085-8. First published 1954 by Capricorn Books.
  • Gottfried, Bradley M. The Maps of Gettysburg: An Atlas of the Gettysburg Campaign, June 3–13, 1863. New York: Savas Beatie, 2007. ISBN 978-1-932714-30-2.
  • Grimsley, Mark, and Brooks D. Simpson. Gettysburg: A Battlefield Guide. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999. ISBN 0-8032-7077-1.
  • Hall, Jeffrey C. The Stand of the U.S. Army at Gettysburg. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. ISBN 0-253-34258-9.
  • Haskell, Frank Aretas. The Battle of Gettysburg. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2006. ISBN 978-1-4286-6012-0.
  • Hawthorne, Frederick W. Gettysburg: Stories of Men and Monuments. Gettysburg, PA: Association of Licensed Battlefield Guides, 1988. ISBN 0-9657444-0-X.
  • Huntington, Tom. Pennsylvania Civil War Trails: The Guide to Battle Sites, Monuments, Museums and Towns. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2007. ISBN 978-0-8117-3379-3.
  • Laino, Philip, Gettysburg Campaign Atlas, 2nd ed. Dayton, OH: Gatehouse Press 2009. ISBN 978-1-934900-45-1.
  • McMurry, Richard M. "The Pennsylvania Gambit and the Gettysburg Splash". In The Gettysburg Nobody Knows, edited by Gabor Boritt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. ISBN 0-19-510223-1.
  • McPherson, James M. Hallowed Ground: A Walk at Gettysburg. New York: Crown Publishers, 2003. ISBN 0-609-61023-6.
  • Petruzzi, J. David, and Steven Stanley. The Complete Gettysburg Guide. New York: Savas Beatie, 2009. ISBN 978-1-932714-63-0.
  • Rhodes, James Ford. "The Battle of Gettysburg." American Historical Review 4#4 1899, pp. 665–677. online
  • Stackpole, General Edward J. They Met at Gettysburg. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1956, OCLC 22643644.

External links

  • Battle of Gettysburg: Battle Maps, histories, photos, and preservation news (American Battlefield Trust)
  • Animated map of the Battle of Gettysburg (American Battlefield Trust)
  • Gettysburg National Military Park (National Park Service)
  • U.S. Army's Interactive Battle of Gettysburg with Narratives
  • Military History Online: The Battle of Gettysburg
  • Official Records: The Battle of Gettysburg
  • Gettysburg Discussion Group archives February 1, 2009, at the Wayback Machine
  • List of 53 Confederate generals at Gettysburg December 26, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
  • Encyclopædia Britannica: Battle of Gettysburg
  • A film clip "Blue and Gray At 75th Anniversary of Great Battle, 1938/07/04 (1938)" is available for viewing at the Internet Archive

battle, gettysburg, other, uses, disambiguation, part, eastern, theater, american, civil, warthe, thure, thulstrupdatejuly, 1863locationgettysburg, pennsylvania, 81139, 22583, 81139, 22583resultunion, victory, belligerentsunited, states, union, confederate, st. For other uses see Battle of Gettysburg disambiguation Battle of GettysburgPart of the Eastern theater of the American Civil WarThe Battle of Gettysburg by Thure de ThulstrupDateJuly 1 3 1863LocationGettysburg Pennsylvania U S 39 48 41 N 77 13 33 W 39 81139 N 77 22583 W 39 81139 77 22583ResultUnion victory 1 BelligerentsUnited States Union Confederate StatesCommanders and leadersGeorge MeadeRobert E LeeUnits involvedArmy of the Potomac 2 Army of Northern Virginia 3 Strength93 500 104 256 4 5 360 artillery pieces36 cavalry regiments71 000 75 000 possibly as many as 80 000 6 270 artillery pieces9 500 cavalryCasualties and losses23 049 7 8 23 000 28 000 9 10 This 1863 oval shaped map depicts the Gettysburg Battlefield during July 1 3 1863 showing troop and artillery positions and movements relief hachures drainage roads railroads and houses with the names of residents at the time of the Battle of Gettysburg This November 1862 Harper s Magazine illustration shows Confederate Army troops escorting captured African American civilians south into slavery En route to Gettysburg the Army of Northern Virginia kidnapped between 40 and nearly 60 Black civilians and sent them south into slavery 11 12 The Battle of Gettysburg locally ˈ ɡ ɛ t ɪ s b ɜːr ɡ 13 was a battle in the American Civil War fought by Union and Confederate forces between July 1 and July 3 1863 in and around Gettysburg Pennsylvania In the Battle of Gettysburg Union Major General George Meade s Army of the Potomac defeated attacks by Confederate General Robert E Lee s Army of Northern Virginia halting Lee s invasion of the North and forcing his retreat The battle involved the largest number of casualties of the entire war and is often described as the war s turning point due to the Union s decisive victory and its almost simultaneous concurrence with the victorious conclusion of the Siege of Vicksburg fn 1 14 After his success at Chancellorsville in Virginia in May 1863 Lee led his army through the Shenandoah Valley to begin his second invasion of the North the Gettysburg Campaign With his army in high spirits Lee intended to shift the focus of the summer campaign from war ravaged northern Virginia and hoped to influence Northern politicians to give up their prosecution of the war by penetrating as far as Harrisburg Pennsylvania or even Philadelphia Prodded by President Abraham Lincoln Major General Joseph Hooker moved his army in pursuit but was relieved of command just three days before the battle and replaced by Meade Elements of the two armies initially collided at Gettysburg on July 1 1863 as Lee urgently concentrated his forces there his objective being to engage the Union army and destroy it Low ridges to the northwest of town were defended initially by a Union cavalry division under Brigadier General John Buford and soon reinforced with two corps of Union infantry However two large Confederate corps assaulted them from the northwest and north collapsing the hastily developed Union lines sending the defenders retreating through the streets of the town to the hills just to the south 15 On the second day of battle most of both armies had assembled The Union line was laid out in a defensive formation resembling a fishhook In the late afternoon of July 2 Lee launched a heavy assault on the Union left flank and fierce fighting raged at Little Round Top the Wheatfield Devil s Den and the Peach Orchard On the Union right Confederate demonstrations escalated into full scale assaults on Culp s Hill and Cemetery Hill All across the battlefield despite significant losses the Union defenders held their lines On the third day of battle fighting resumed on Culp s Hill and cavalry battles raged to the east and south but the main event was a dramatic infantry assault by around 12 000 Confederates against the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge known as Pickett s Charge The charge was repelled by Union rifle and artillery fire at great loss to the Confederate army Lee led his army on the torturous Retreat from Gettysburg to Virginia Between 46 000 and 51 000 soldiers from both armies were casualties in the three day battle the most costly in US history On November 19 President Lincoln used the dedication ceremony for the Gettysburg National Cemetery to honor the fallen Union soldiers and redefine the purpose of the war in his historic Gettysburg Address Contents 1 Background 1 1 Military situation 1 2 Initial movements to battle 2 Opposing forces 2 1 Union 2 2 Confederate 3 First day of battle 3 1 Herr Ridge McPherson Ridge and Seminary Ridge 4 Second day of battle 4 1 Plans and movement to battle 4 2 Attacks on the Union left flank 4 3 Attacks on the Union right flank 5 Third day of battle 5 1 Lee s plan 5 2 Largest artillery bombardment of the war 5 3 Pickett s Charge 5 4 Cavalry battles 5 4 1 Northeast of Gettysburg 5 4 2 Southwest of Gettysburg 6 Aftermath 6 1 Casualties 6 2 Confederate retreat 6 3 Union reaction to the news of the victory 6 4 Effect on the Confederacy 6 5 Gettysburg Address 6 6 Medal of Honor 7 Historical assessment 7 1 Decisive victory controversies 7 2 Lee vs Meade 8 Battlefield preservation 9 In popular culture 10 See also 11 Notes 12 Citations 13 References 13 1 Memoirs and primary sources 14 Further reading 15 External linksBackgroundMilitary situation Main articles Gettysburg campaign and Gettysburg Battlefield Further information Battle of Chancellorsville Eastern theater of the American Civil War and American Civil War nbsp Gettysburg Campaign through July 3 with cavalry movements shown with dashed lines Confederate UnionShortly after the Army of Northern Virginia won a major victory over the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Chancellorsville April 30 May 6 1863 General Robert E Lee decided upon a second invasion of the North the first was the unsuccessful Maryland campaign of September 1862 which ended in the bloody Battle of Antietam Such a move would upset the Union s plans for the summer campaigning season and possibly reduce the pressure on the besieged Confederate garrison at Vicksburg The invasion would allow the Confederates to live off the bounty of the rich Northern farms while giving war ravaged Virginia a much needed rest In addition Lee s 72 000 man army 6 could threaten Philadelphia Baltimore and Washington and possibly strengthen the growing peace movement in the North 16 Initial movements to battle Thus on June 3 Lee s army began to shift northward from Fredericksburg Virginia Following the death of Thomas J Stonewall Jackson Lee reorganized his two large corps into three new corps commanded by Lieutenant General James Longstreet First Corps Lieutenant General Richard S Ewell Second and Lieutenant General A P Hill Third both Ewell and Hill who had formerly reported to Jackson as division commanders were new to this level of responsibility The cavalry division remained under the command of Major General J E B Stuart 17 The Union Army of the Potomac under Major General Joseph Hooker consisted of seven infantry corps a cavalry corps and an artillery reserve for a combined strength of more than 100 000 men 5 The first major action of the campaign took place on June 9 between cavalry forces at Brandy Station near Culpeper Virginia The 9 500 Confederate cavalrymen under Stuart were surprised by Major General Alfred Pleasonton s combined arms force of two cavalry divisions 8 000 troopers and 3 000 infantry but Stuart eventually repelled the Union attack The inconclusive battle the largest predominantly cavalry engagement of the war proved for the first time that the Union horse soldier was equal to his Southern counterpart 18 By mid June the Army of Northern Virginia was poised to cross the Potomac River and enter Maryland After defeating the Union garrisons at Winchester and Martinsburg Ewell s Second Corps began crossing the river on June 15 Hill s and Longstreet s corps followed on June 24 and 25 Hooker s army pursued keeping between Washington D C and Lee s army The Union army crossed the Potomac from June 25 to 27 19 Lee gave strict orders for his army to minimize any negative effects on the civilian population 20 21 Food horses and other supplies were generally not seized outright unless a citizen concealed property although quartermasters reimbursing Northern farmers and merchants with Confederate money which was virtually worthless or with equally worthless promissory notes were not well received 22 Various towns most notably York Pennsylvania were required to pay indemnities in lieu of supplies under threat of destruction 23 During the invasion the Confederates seized between 40 and nearly 60 northern African Americans A few of them were escaped fugitive slaves but many were freemen all were sent south into slavery under guard 11 12 On June 26 elements of Major General Jubal Early s division of Ewell s corps occupied the town of Gettysburg after chasing off newly raised Pennsylvania militia in a series of minor skirmishes Early laid the borough under tribute but did not collect any significant supplies Soldiers burned several railroad cars and a covered bridge and destroyed nearby rails and telegraph lines The following morning Early departed for adjacent York County 24 Meanwhile in a controversial move Lee allowed Stuart to take a portion of the army s cavalry and ride around the east flank of the Union army Lee s orders gave Stuart much latitude and both generals share the blame for the long absence of Stuart s cavalry as well as for the failure to assign a more active role to the cavalry left with the army Stuart and his three best brigades were absent from the army during the crucial phase of the approach to Gettysburg and the first two days of battle By June 29 Lee s army was strung out in an arc from Chambersburg 28 mi 45 km northwest of Gettysburg to Carlisle 30 mi 48 km north of Gettysburg to near Harrisburg and Wrightsville on the Susquehanna River 25 In a dispute over the use of the forces defending the Harpers Ferry garrison Hooker offered his resignation and Abraham Lincoln and General in Chief Henry W Halleck who were looking for an excuse to rid themselves of him immediately accepted They replaced Hooker early on the morning of June 28 with Major General George Gordon Meade then commander of the V Corps 26 On June 29 when Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had crossed the Potomac River he ordered a concentration of his forces around Cashtown located at the eastern base of South Mountain and eight mi 13 km west of Gettysburg 27 On June 30 while part of Hill s corps was in Cashtown one of Hill s brigades North Carolinians under Brigadier General J Johnston Pettigrew ventured toward Gettysburg In his memoirs Major General Henry Heth Pettigrew s division commander claimed that he sent Pettigrew to search for supplies in town especially shoes 28 When Pettigrew s troops approached Gettysburg on June 30 they noticed Union cavalry under Major General John Buford arriving south of town and Pettigrew returned to Cashtown without engaging them When Pettigrew told Hill and Heth what he had seen neither general believed that there was a substantial Union force in or near the town suspecting that it had been only Pennsylvania militia Despite Lee s order to avoid a general engagement until his entire army was concentrated Hill decided to mount a significant reconnaissance in force the following morning to determine the size and strength of the enemy force in his front Around 5 a m on Wednesday July 1 two brigades of Heth s division advanced to Gettysburg 29 Opposing forcesUnion Further information Gettysburg Union order of battle The Army of the Potomac initially under Hooker Meade replaced Hooker in command on June 28 consisted of more than 100 000 men in the following organization 30 I Corps commanded by Maj Gen John F Reynolds with divisions commanded by Brig Gen James S Wadsworth Brig Gen John C Robinson and Maj Gen Abner Doubleday II Corps commanded by Maj Gen Winfield Scott Hancock with divisions commanded by Brig Gens John C Caldwell John Gibbon and Alexander Hays III Corps commanded by Maj Gen Daniel Sickles with divisions commanded by Maj Gen David B Birney and Maj Gen Andrew A Humphreys V Corps commanded by Maj Gen George Sykes George G Meade until June 28 with divisions commanded by Brig Gens James Barnes Romeyn B Ayres and Samuel W Crawford VI Corps commanded by Maj Gen John Sedgwick with divisions commanded by Brig Gen Horatio G Wright Brig Gen Albion P Howe and Maj Gen John Newton XI Corps commanded by Maj Gen Oliver Otis Howard with divisions commanded by Brig Gen Francis C Barlow Brig Gen Adolph von Steinwehr and Maj Gen Carl Schurz XII Corps commanded by Maj Gen Henry W Slocum with divisions commanded by Brig Gens Alpheus S Williams and John W Geary Cavalry Corps commanded by Maj Gen Alfred Pleasonton with divisions commanded by Brig Gens John Buford David McM Gregg and H Judson Kilpatrick Artillery Reserve commanded by Brig Gen Robert O Tyler The preeminent artillery officer at Gettysburg was Brig Gen Henry Jackson Hunt chief of artillery on Meade s staff During the advance on Gettysburg Reynolds was in operational command of the left or advanced wing of the Army consisting of the I III and XI Corps 31 Many other Union units not part of the Army of the Potomac were actively involved in the Gettysburg Campaign but not directly involved in the Battle of Gettysburg These included portions of the Union IV Corps the militia and state troops of the Department of the Susquehanna and various garrisons including that at Harpers Ferry Confederate Further information Confederate order of battle In reaction to the death of Jackson after Chancellorsville Lee reorganized his Army of Northern Virginia 75 000 men from two infantry corps into three 32 First Corps commanded by Lt Gen James Longstreet with divisions commanded by Maj Gens Lafayette McLaws George Pickett and John Bell Hood Second Corps commanded by Lt Gen Richard S Ewell with divisions commanded by Maj Gens Jubal A Early Edward Allegheny Johnson and Robert E Rodes Third Corps commanded by Lt Gen A P Hill with divisions commanded by Maj Gens Richard H Anderson Henry Heth and W Dorsey Pender Cavalry division commanded by Maj Gen J E B Stuart with brigades commanded by Brig Gens Wade Hampton Fitzhugh Lee Beverly H Robertson Albert G Jenkins William E Grumble Jones and John D Imboden and Col John R Chambliss First day of battleFurther information Battle of Gettysburg first day Herr Ridge McPherson Ridge and Seminary Ridge nbsp Overview map of the first day of the Battle of GettysburgAnticipating that the Confederates would march on Gettysburg from the west on the morning of July 1 Buford laid out his defenses on three ridges west of the town Herr Ridge McPherson Ridge and Seminary Ridge These were appropriate terrain for a delaying action by his small cavalry division against superior Confederate infantry forces meant to buy time awaiting the arrival of Union infantrymen who could occupy the strong defensive positions south of town at Cemetery Hill Cemetery Ridge and Culp s Hill Buford understood that if the Confederates could gain control of these heights Meade s army would have difficulty dislodging them 33 Heth s division advanced with two brigades forward commanded by brigadier generals James J Archer and Joseph R Davis They proceeded easterly in columns along the Chambersburg Pike Three mi 5 km west of town about 7 30 a m on July 1 the two brigades met light resistance from vedettes of Union cavalry and deployed into line According to lore the Union soldier to fire the first shot of the battle was Lt Marcellus Jones 34 Eventually Heth s men encountered dismounted troopers of Col William Gamble s cavalry brigade The dismounted troopers resisted stoutly delaying the Confederate advance with most firing their breech loading Sharp s carbines from behind fences and trees A small number of troopers had other carbine models A small minority of historians have written that some troopers had Spencer repeating carbines or Spencer repeating rifles but most sources disagree 35 fn 2 Still by 10 20 a m the Confederates had pushed the Union cavalrymen east to McPherson Ridge when the vanguard of the I Corps Major General John F Reynolds finally arrived 36 North of the pike Davis gained a temporary success against Brigadier General Lysander Cutler s brigade but was repelled with heavy losses in an action around an unfinished railroad bed cut in the ridge South of the pike Archer s brigade assaulted through Herbst also known as McPherson s Woods The Union Iron Brigade under Brigadier General Solomon Meredith enjoyed initial success against Archer capturing several hundred men including Archer himself 37 General Reynolds was shot and killed early in the fighting while directing troop and artillery placements just to the east of the woods Shelby Foote wrote that the Union cause lost a man considered by many to be the best general in the army 38 Major General Abner Doubleday assumed command Fighting in the Chambersburg Pike area lasted until about 12 30 p m It resumed around 2 30 p m when Heth s entire division engaged adding the brigades of Pettigrew and Col John M Brockenbrough 39 As Pettigrew s North Carolina Brigade came on line they flanked the 19th Indiana and drove the Iron Brigade back The 26th North Carolina the largest regiment in the army with 839 men lost heavily leaving the first day s fight with around 212 men By the end of the three day battle they had about 152 men standing the highest casualty percentage for one battle of any regiment North or South 40 Slowly the Iron Brigade was pushed out of the woods toward Seminary Ridge Hill added Major General William Dorsey Pender s division to the assault and the I Corps was driven back through the grounds of the Lutheran Seminary and Gettysburg streets 41 As the fighting to the west proceeded two divisions of Ewell s Second Corps marching west toward Cashtown in accordance with Lee s order for the army to concentrate in that vicinity turned south on the Carlisle and Harrisburg roads toward Gettysburg while the Union XI Corps Major General Oliver O Howard raced north on the Baltimore Pike and Taneytown Road By early afternoon the Union line ran in a semicircle west north and northeast of Gettysburg 42 However the Union did not have enough troops Cutler whose brigade was deployed north of the Chambersburg Pike had his right flank in the air The leftmost division of the XI Corps was unable to deploy in time to strengthen the line so Doubleday was forced to throw in reserve brigades to salvage his line 43 Around 2 00 p m the Confederate Second Corps divisions of Maj Gens Robert E Rodes and Jubal Early assaulted and out flanked the Union I and XI Corps positions north and northwest of town The Confederate brigades of Colonel Edward A O Neal and Brigadier General Alfred Iverson suffered severe losses assaulting the I Corps division of Brigadier General John C Robinson south of Oak Hill Early s division profited from a blunder by Brigadier General Francis C Barlow when he advanced his XI Corps division to Blocher s Knoll directly north of town and now known as Barlow s Knoll this represented a salient 44 in the corps line susceptible to attack from multiple sides and Early s troops overran Barlow s division which constituted the right flank of the Union Army s position Barlow was wounded and captured in the attack 45 As Union positions collapsed both north and west of town Howard ordered a retreat to the high ground south of town at Cemetery Hill where he had left the division of Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr in reserve 46 Major General Winfield S Hancock assumed command of the battlefield sent by Meade when he heard that Reynolds had been killed Hancock commander of the II Corps and Meade s most trusted subordinate was ordered to take command of the field and to determine whether Gettysburg was an appropriate place for a major battle 47 Hancock told Howard I think this the strongest position by nature upon which to fight a battle that I ever saw When Howard agreed Hancock concluded the discussion Very well sir I select this as the battle field Hancock s determination had a morale boosting effect on the retreating Union soldiers but he played no direct tactical role on the first day 48 General Lee understood the defensive potential to the Union if they held this high ground He sent orders to Ewell that Cemetery Hill be taken if practicable Ewell who had previously served under Stonewall Jackson a general well known for issuing peremptory orders determined such an assault was not practicable and thus did not attempt it this decision is considered by historians to be a great missed opportunity 49 The first day at Gettysburg more significant than simply a prelude to the bloody second and third days ranks as the 23rd biggest battle of the war by number of troops engaged About one quarter of Meade s army 22 000 men and one third of Lee s army 27 000 were engaged 50 Second day of battleFurther information Battle of Gettysburg second day Little Round Top Culp s Hill and Cemetery Hill Plans and movement to battle nbsp Robert E Lee s plan for July 2 1863 the second day of the Battle of GettysburgThroughout the evening of July 1 and morning of July 2 most of the remaining infantry of both armies arrived on the field including the Union II III V VI and XII Corps Two of Longstreet s divisions were on the road Brigadier General George Pickett had begun the 22 mile 35 km march from Chambersburg while Brigadier General Evander M Law had begun the march from Guilford Both arrived late in the morning Law completed his 28 mile 45 km march in eleven hours 51 The Union line ran from Culp s Hill southeast of the town northwest to Cemetery Hill just south of town then south for nearly two miles 3 km along Cemetery Ridge terminating just north of Little Round Top 52 Most of the XII Corps was on Culp s Hill the remnants of I and XI Corps defended Cemetery Hill II Corps covered most of the northern half of Cemetery Ridge and III Corps was ordered to take up a position to its flank The shape of the Union line is popularly described as a fishhook formation 53 The Confederate line paralleled the Union line about one mile 1 600 m to the west on Seminary Ridge ran east through the town then curved southeast to a point opposite Culp s Hill Thus the Union army had interior lines while the Confederate line was nearly five miles 8 km long 54 Lee s battle plan for July 2 called for a general assault of Meade s positions On the right Longstreet s First Corps was to position itself to attack the Union left flank facing northeast astraddle the Emmitsburg Road and to roll up the Union line The attack sequence was to begin with Maj Gens John Bell Hood s and Lafayette McLaws s divisions followed by Major General Richard H Anderson s division of Hill s Third Corps 55 On the left Lee instructed Ewell to position his Second Corps to attack Culp s Hill and Cemetery Hill when he heard the gunfire from Longstreet s assault preventing Meade from shifting troops to bolster his left Though it does not appear in either his or Lee s Official Report Ewell claimed years later that Lee had changed the order to simultaneously attack calling for only a diversion to be turned into a full scale attack if a favorable opportunity presented itself 56 57 Lee s plan however was based on faulty intelligence exacerbated by Stuart s continued absence from the battlefield Though Lee personally reconnoitered his left during the morning he did not visit Longstreet s position on the Confederate right Even so Lee rejected suggestions that Longstreet move beyond Meade s left and attack the Union flank capturing the supply trains and effectively blocking Meade s escape route 58 Lee did not issue orders for the attack until 11 00 a m 55 fn 3 About noon General Anderson s advancing troops were discovered by General Sickles s outpost guard and the Third Corps upon which Longstreet s First Corps was to form did not get into position until 1 00 p m 60 Hood and McLaws after their long march were not yet in position and did not launch their attacks until just after 4 p m and 5 p m respectively 61 Attacks on the Union left flank nbsp Overview map of the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg July 2 1863As Longstreet s left division under Major General Lafayette McLaws advanced they unexpectedly found Major General Daniel Sickles s III Corps directly in their path Sickles had been dissatisfied with the position assigned him on the southern end of Cemetery Ridge Seeing ground better suited for artillery positions one half mile 800 m to the west centered at the Sherfy farm s Peach Orchard he violated orders and advanced his corp to the slightly higher ground along the Emmitsburg Road moving away from Cemetery Ridge The new line ran from Devil s Den northwest to the Peach Orchard then northeast along the Emmitsburg Road to south of the Codori farm This created an untenable salient at the Peach Orchard Brigadier General Andrew A Humphreys s division in position along the Emmitsburg Road and Major General David B Birney s division to the south were subject to attacks from two sides and were spread out over a longer front than their small corps could defend effectively 62 The Confederate artillery was ordered to open fire at 3 00 p m 63 After failing to attend a meeting at this time of Meade s corps commanders Meade rode to Sickles s position and demanded an explanation of the situation Knowing a Confederate attack was imminent and a retreat would be endangered Meade refused Sickles offer to withdraw 64 Meade was forced to send 20 000 reinforcements 65 the entire V Corps Brigadier General John C Caldwell s division of the II Corps most of the XII Corps and portions of the newly arrived VI Corps Hood s division moved more to the east than intended losing its alignment with the Emmitsburg Road 66 attacking Devil s Den and Little Round Top McLaws coming in on Hood s left drove multiple attacks into the thinly stretched III Corps in the Wheatfield and overwhelmed them in Sherfy s Peach Orchard McLaws s attack eventually reached Plum Run Valley the Valley of Death before being beaten back by the Pennsylvania Reserves division of the V Corps moving down from Little Round Top The III Corps was virtually destroyed as a combat unit in this battle and Sickles s leg was amputated after it was shattered by a cannonball Caldwell s division was destroyed piecemeal in the Wheatfield Anderson s division coming from McLaws s left and starting forward around 6 p m reached the crest of Cemetery Ridge but could not hold the position in the face of counterattacks from the II Corps including an almost suicidal bayonet charge by the 1st Minnesota regiment against a Confederate brigade ordered in desperation by Hancock to buy time for reinforcements to arrive 67 As fighting raged in the Wheatfield and Devil s Den Colonel Strong Vincent of V Corps had a precarious hold on Little Round Top an important hill at the extreme left of the Union line His brigade of four relatively small regiments was able to resist repeated assaults by Law s brigade of Hood s division Meade s chief engineer Brigadier General Gouverneur K Warren had realized the importance of this position and dispatched Vincent s brigade an artillery battery and the 140th New York to occupy Little Round Top mere minutes before Hood s troops arrived The defense of Little Round Top with a bayonet charge by the 20th Maine ordered by Colonel Joshua L Chamberlain and possibly led down the slope by Lieutenant Holman S Melcher was one of the most fabled episodes in the Civil War and propelled Chamberlain into prominence after the war 68 fn 4 Attacks on the Union right flank nbsp Union Army breastworks on Culp s Hill 1863Ewell interpreted his orders as calling only for a cannonade 57 His 32 guns along with A P Hill s 55 guns engaged in a two hour artillery barrage at extreme range that had little effect Finally about six o clock Ewell sent orders to each of his division commanders to attack the Union lines in his front 69 Major General Edward Allegheny Johnson s Division had contemplated an assault on Culp s Hill but they were still a mile away and had Rock Creek to cross The few possible crossings would make significant delays Because of this only three of Johnson s four brigades moved to the attack 69 Most of the hill s defenders the Union XII Corps had been sent to the left to defend against Longstreet s attacks leaving only a brigade of New Yorkers under Brigadier General George S Greene behind strong newly constructed defensive works With reinforcements from the I and XI Corps Greene s men held off the Confederate attackers though giving up some of the lower earthworks on the lower part of Culp s Hill 70 Early was similarly unprepared when he ordered Harry T Hays s and Isaac E Avery s brigades to attack the Union XI Corps positions on East Cemetery Hill Once started fighting was fierce Colonel Andrew L Harris of the Union 2nd Brigade 1st Division XI Corps came under a withering attack losing half his men Avery was wounded early on but the Confederates reached the crest of the hill and entered the Union breastworks capturing one or two batteries Seeing he was not supported on his right Hays withdrew His right was to be supported by Robert E Rodes s Division but Rodes like Early and Johnson had not been ordered up in preparation for the attack He had twice as far to travel as Early by the time he came in contact with the Union skirmish line Early s troops had already begun to withdraw 71 Jeb Stuart and his three cavalry brigades arrived in Gettysburg around noon but had no role in the second day s battle Brigadier General Wade Hampton s brigade fought a minor engagement with newly promoted 23 year old Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer s Michigan cavalry near Hunterstown to the northeast of Gettysburg 72 Third day of battleFurther information Culp s Hill Pickett s Charge and Battle of Gettysburg third day cavalry battles Lee s plan nbsp Overview map of the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg July 3 1863Lee wished to renew the attack on Friday July 3 using the same basic plan as the previous day Longstreet would attack the Union left while Ewell attacked Culp s Hill 73 However before Longstreet was ready Union XII Corps troops started a dawn artillery bombardment against the Confederates on Culp s Hill in an effort to regain a portion of their lost works The Confederates attacked and the second fight for Culp s Hill ended around 11 a m Harry Pfanz judged that after some seven hours of bitter combat the Union line was intact and held more strongly than before 74 Lee was forced to change his plans Longstreet would command Pickett s Virginia division of his own First Corps plus six brigades from Hill s Corps in an attack on the Union II Corps position at the right center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge Prior to the attack all the artillery the Confederacy could bring to bear on the Union positions would bombard and weaken the enemy s line 75 Much has been made over the years of General Longstreet s objections to General Lee s plan In his memoirs Longstreet states that he told Lee that there were not enough men to assault the strong left center of the Union line by McLaws s and Hood s divisions reinforced by Pickett s brigades Longstreet thought the attack would be repulsed and a counterattack would put Union forces between the Confederates and the Potomac River Longstreet wrote that he said it would take a minimum of thirty thousand men to attack successfully as well as close coordination with other Confederate forces He noted that only about thirteen thousand men were left in the selected divisions after the first two days of fighting They would have to walk a mile under heavy artillery and long range musketry fire Longstreet states that he further asked Lee the strength of the column He Lee stated fifteen thousand Opinion was then expressed by Longstreet that the fifteen thousand men who could make successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle but he was impatient of listening and tired of talking and nothing was left but to proceed 76 fn 5 Largest artillery bombardment of the war nbsp The high water mark on Cemetery Ridge with the 72nd Pennsylvania Infantry Monument commemorating the 72nd Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment at right and the Copse of Trees to the left August 2005Around 1 p m from 150 to 170 Confederate guns began an artillery bombardment that was probably the largest of the war In order to save valuable ammunition for the infantry attack that they knew would follow the Army of the Potomac s artillery under the command of Brigadier General Henry Jackson Hunt at first did not return the enemy s fire After waiting about 15 minutes about 80 Union cannons opened fire The Army of Northern Virginia was critically low on artillery ammunition and the cannonade did not significantly affect the Union position 77 Pickett s Charge Around 3 p m 78 the cannon fire subsided and between 10 500 and 12 500 Southern soldiers fn 6 stepped from the ridgeline and advanced the three quarters of a mile 1 200 m to Cemetery Ridge 79 A more accurate name for the charge would be the Pickett Pettigrew Trimble Charge after the commanders of the three divisions taking part in the charge but the role of Pickett s division has led to the attack generally being known as Pickett s Charge 80 As the Confederates approached there was fierce flanking artillery fire from Union positions on Cemetery Hill and the Little Round Top area 81 and musket and canister fire from Hancock s II Corps 82 In the Union center the commander of artillery had held fire during the Confederate bombardment in order to save it for the infantry assault which Meade had correctly predicted the day before leading Southern commanders to believe the Northern cannon batteries had been knocked out However they opened fire on the Confederate infantry during their approach with devastating results 83 Although the Union line wavered and broke temporarily at a jog called the Angle in a low stone fence just north of a patch of vegetation called the Copse of Trees reinforcements rushed into the breach and the Confederate attack was repelled The farthest advance by Brigadier General Lewis A Armistead s brigade of Pickett s division at the Angle is referred to as the high water mark of the Confederacy 84 Union and Confederate soldiers locked in hand to hand combat attacking with their rifles bayonets rocks and even their bare hands Armistead ordered his Confederates to turn two captured cannons against Union troops but discovered that there was no ammunition left the last double canister shots having been used against the charging Confederates Armistead was mortally wounded shortly afterward Nearly one half of the Confederate attackers did not return to their own lines 85 Pickett s division lost about two thirds of its men and all three brigadiers were killed or wounded 83 Cavalry battles There were two significant cavalry engagements on July 3 The first one was coordinated with Pickett s Charge and the standoff may have prevented a disaster for Union infantry 86 The site of this engagement is now known as the East Cavalry Field 87 The second engagement was a loss for Union cavalry attacking Confederate infantry It has been labeled as a fiasco and featured faulty cavalry tactics 88 The site of this engagement is now known as the South Cavalry Field 89 Northeast of Gettysburg Stuart s cavalry division three brigades with the assistance of Jenkins brigade was sent to guard the Confederate left flank Stuart was also in position to exploit any success the Confederate infantry Pickett s Charge might achieve on Cemetery Hill by flanking the Union right and getting behind Union infantry facing the Confederate attack 90 The cavalry fight took place about three miles 4 8 km northeast of Gettysburg at about 3 00 pm around the end of the Confederate artillery barrage that preceded Pickett s charge Stuart s forces collided with Union cavalry Brigadier General David McMurtrie Gregg s division and Custer s brigade from Kilpatrick s division 91 The fight evolved into a wild melee of swinging sabers and blazing pistols and carbines 92 One of Custer s regiments the 5th Michigan Cavalry Regiment was armed with Spencer repeating rifles and at least two companies from an additional regiment were also armed with repeaters 93 The fight ended in a standoff as neither side changed positions However Gregg and Custer prevented Stuart from gaining the rear of Union infantry facing Pickett 86 Southwest of Gettysburg After hearing news of the Union s success against Pickett s charge Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick launched a cavalry attack against the infantry positions of Longstreet s Corps southwest of Big Round Top The terrain was difficult for a mounted attack because it was rough heavily wooded and contained huge boulders and Longstreet s men were entrenched with artillery support 94 Brigadier General Elon J Farnsworth protested against the futility of such a move but obeyed orders Farnsworth was killed in the fourth of five unsuccessful attacks and his brigade suffered significant losses 95 Although Kilpatrick was described by at least one Union leader as brave enterprising and energetic incidents such as Farnsworth s charge earned him the nickname of Kill Cavalry 96 AftermathCasualties nbsp The Harvest of Death Union dead on the battlefield at Gettysburg Pennsylvania photographed July 5 or July 6 1863 by Timothy H O Sullivan nbsp Gettysburg National Cemetery July 2003 nbsp John L Burns veteran of the War of 1812 civilian who fought at the Battle of Gettysburg with Union troops 97 The two armies suffered between 46 000 and 51 000 casualties fn 7 Union casualties were 23 055 3 155 killed 14 531 wounded 5 369 captured or missing 8 fn 8 while Confederate casualties are more difficult to estimate Many authors have referred to as many as 28 000 Confederate casualties fn 9 and Busey and Martin s more recent 2005 work Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg documents 23 231 4 708 killed 12 693 wounded 5 830 captured or missing 9 Nearly a third of Lee s general officers were killed wounded or captured 98 The casualties for both sides for the 6 week campaign according to Sears were 57 225 99 In addition to being the deadliest battle of the war Gettysburg also had the most generals killed in action Several generals also were wounded The Confederacy lost generals Paul Jones Semmes William Barksdale William Dorsey Pender Richard Garnett and Lewis Armistead as well as J Johnston Pettigrew during the retreat after the battle Confederate generals who were wounded included Maj Gen John Bell Hood who lost the use of his left arm and Maj Gen Henry Heth who received a shot to the head on the first day of battle though incapacitated for the rest of the battle he remarkably survived without long term injuries credited in part due to his hat stuffed full of paper dispatches Confederate generals James L Kemper and Isaac R Trimble were severely wounded during Pickett s charge and captured during the Confederate retreat Confederate Brig Gen James J Archer in command of a brigade that most likely was responsible for killing Reynolds was taken prisoner shortly after Reynolds death In the Confederate 1st Corps eight of Longstreet s fourteen division and brigade commanders were killed or wounded including Brig Gen George T Anderson and Brig Gen Jerome B Robertson who were wounded In Ewell s 2nd Corps Brig Gen Isaac E Avery was mortally wounded and Brig Gen John M Jones was wounded In Hill s 3rd Corps in addition to Pender and Pettigrew being killed Maj Gen Henry Heth and Col Birkett D Fry later brigadier general in temporary brigade command were wounded In Hill s 3rd Corp Brig Gen Alfred M Scales and Col William L J Lowrance in temporary brigade command were wounded In the Confederate Cavalry Division Brig Gen Wade Hampton and Brig Gen Albert G Jenkins were wounded 100 Union generals killed were John Reynolds Samuel K Zook and Stephen H Weed as well as Elon J Farnsworth assigned as brigadier general by Maj Gen Pleasanton based on his nomination although his promotion was confirmed posthumously and Strong Vincent who after being mortally wounded was given a deathbed promotion to brigadier general Additional senior officer casualties included the wounding of Union Generals Dan Sickles lost a leg Francis C Barlow Daniel Butterfield and Winfield Scott Hancock Five of seven brigade commanders in Reynolds s First Corps were wounded In addition to Hancock and Brig Gen John Gibbon being wounded in the Second Corps three of ten brigade commanders were killed and three were wounded 101 The following tables summarize casualties by corps for the Union and Confederate forces during the three day battle according to Busey and Martin 102 Union Corps Casualties k w m I Corps 6059 666 3231 2162 II Corps 4369 797 3194 378 III Corps 4211 593 3029 589 V Corps 2187 365 1611 211 VI Corps 242 27 185 30 XI Corps 3801 369 1922 1510 XII Corps 1082 204 812 66 Cavalry Corps 852 91 354 407 Artillery Reserve 242 43 187 12 Confederate Corps Casualties k w m First Corps 7665 1617 4205 1843 Second Corps 6686 1301 3629 1756 Third Corps 8495 1724 4683 2088 Cavalry Corps 380 66 174 140 Bruce Catton wrote The town of Gettysburg looked as if some universal moving day had been interrupted by catastrophe 103 But there was only one documented civilian death during the battle Ginnie Wade also widely known as Jennie 20 years old was hit by a stray bullet that passed through her kitchen in town while she was making bread 104 Another notable civilian casualty was John L Burns a 69 year old veteran of the War of 1812 who walked to the front lines on the first day of battle and participated in heavy combat as a volunteer receiving numerous wounds in the process Though aged and injured Burns survived the battle and lived until 1872 105 Nearly 8 000 had been killed outright these bodies lying in the hot summer sun needed to be buried quickly More than 3 000 horse carcasses 106 were burned in a series of piles south of town townsfolk became violently ill from the stench 107 Meanwhile the town of Gettysburg with its population of just 2 400 found itself tasked with taking care of 14 000 wounded Union troops and an additional 8 000 Confederate prisoners 108 Confederates lost over 31 55 battle flags with the Union possibly having lost slightly less than 40 109 Confederate retreat Further information Retreat from Gettysburg nbsp Gettysburg Campaign July 5 July 14 1863 On the morning of July 4 with Lee s army still present Meade ordered his cavalry to get to the rear of Lee s army 110 In a heavy rain the armies stared at one another across the bloody fields on the same day that some 920 miles 1 480 km away the Vicksburg garrison surrendered to Major General Ulysses S Grant Lee had reformed his lines into a defensive position on Seminary Ridge the night of July 3 evacuating the town of Gettysburg The Confederates remained on the battlefield s west side hoping that Meade would attack but the cautious Union commander decided against the risk a decision for which he would later be criticized Both armies began to collect their remaining wounded and bury some of the dead A proposal by Lee for a prisoner exchange was rejected by Meade 111 Late in the rainy afternoon Lee started moving the non fighting portion of his army back to Virginia Cavalry under Brigadier General John D Imboden was entrusted to escort the seventeen mile long wagon train of supplies and wounded men using a long route through Cashtown and Greencastle to Williamsport Maryland After sunset the fighting portion of Lee s army began its retreat to Virginia using a more direct but more mountainous route that began on the road to Fairfield 112 Although Lee knew exactly what he needed to do Meade s situation was different Meade needed to remain at Gettysburg until he was certain Lee was gone If Meade left first he could possibly leave an opening for Lee to get to Washington or Baltimore In addition the army that left the battlefield first was often considered the defeated army 113 Now if General Meade can complete his work so gloriously prosecuted thus far by the literal or substantial destruction of Lee s army the rebellion will be over Abraham Lincoln 114 Union cavalry had some minor successes pursuing Lee s army The first major encounter took place in the mountains at Monterey Pass on July 4 where Kilpatrick s cavalry division captured 150 to 300 wagons and took 1 300 to 1 500 prisoners 115 Beginning July 6 additional cavalry fighting took place closer to the Potomac River in Maryland s Williamsport Hagerstown area 116 Lee s army was trapped and delayed from crossing the Potomac River because rainy weather had caused the river to swell and the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters had been destroyed fn 10 Meade s infantry did not fully pursue Lee until July 7 and despite repeated pleas from Lincoln and Halleck was not aggressive enough to destroy Lee s army 118 A new pontoon bridge was constructed at Falling Waters and lower water levels allowed the Confederates to begin crossing after dark on July 13 119 Although Meade s infantry had reached the area on July 12 it was his cavalry that attacked the Confederate rear guard on the morning of July 14 Union cavalry took 500 prisoners and Confederate Brigadier General Pettigrew was mortally wounded but Lee s army completed its Potomac crossing 120 The campaign continued south of the Potomac until the Battle of Manassas Gap on July 23 when Lee escaped and Meade abandoned the pursuit 121 Union reaction to the news of the victory The news of the Union victory electrified the North A headline in The Philadelphia Inquirer proclaimed VICTORY WATERLOO ECLIPSED New York diarist George Templeton Strong wrote 122 The results of this victory are priceless The charm of Robert E Lee s invincibility is broken The Army of the Potomac has at last found a general that can handle it and has stood nobly up to its terrible work in spite of its long disheartening list of hard fought failures Copperheads are palsied and dumb for the moment at least Government is strengthened four fold at home and abroad George Templeton Strong Diary p 330 However the Union enthusiasm soon dissipated as the public realized that Lee s army had escaped destruction and the war would continue Lincoln complained to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles that Our army held the war in the hollow of their hand and they would not close it 123 Brigadier General Alexander S Webb wrote to his father on July 17 stating that such Washington politicians as Chase Seward and others disgusted with Meade write to me that Lee really won that Battle 124 Effect on the Confederacy In fact the Confederates had lost militarily and also politically During the final hours of the battle Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens was approaching the Union lines at Norfolk Virginia under a flag of truce Although his formal instructions from Confederate President Jefferson Davis had limited his powers to negotiate on prisoner exchanges and other procedural matters historian James M McPherson speculates that he had informal goals of presenting peace overtures Davis had hoped that Stephens would reach Washington from the south while Lee s victorious army was marching toward it from the north President Lincoln upon hearing of the Gettysburg results refused Stephens s request to pass through the lines Furthermore when the news reached London any lingering hopes of European recognition of the Confederacy were finally abandoned Henry Adams whose father was serving as the U S ambassador to the United Kingdom at the time wrote The disasters of the rebels are unredeemed by even any hope of success It is now conceded that all idea of intervention is at an end 125 Compounding the effects of the defeat was the end of the Siege of Vicksburg which surrendered to Grant s Federal armies in the West on July 4 the day after the Gettysburg battle costing the Confederacy an additional 30 000 men along with all their arms and stores 126 The immediate reaction of the Southern military and public sectors was that Gettysburg was a setback not a disaster The sentiment was that Lee had been successful on July 1 and had fought a valiant battle on July 2 3 but could not dislodge the Union Army from the strong defensive position to which it fled The Confederates successfully stood their ground on July 4 and withdrew only after they realized Meade would not attack them The withdrawal to the Potomac that could have been a disaster was handled masterfully Furthermore the Army of the Potomac had been kept away from Virginia farmlands for the summer and all predicted that Meade would be too timid to threaten them for the rest of the year Lee himself had a positive view of the campaign writing to his wife that the army had returned rather sooner than I had originally contemplated but having accomplished what I proposed on leaving the Rappahannock viz relieving the Valley of the presence of the enemy and drawing his Army north of the Potomac He was quoted as saying to Maj John Seddon brother of the Confederate secretary of war Sir we did whip them at Gettysburg and it will be seen for the next six months that that army will be as quiet as a sucking dove Some Southern publications such as the Charleston Mercury were critical of Lee s actions On August 8 Lee offered his resignation to President Davis who quickly rejected it 127 Gettysburg Address Main article Gettysburg Address nbsp On November 19 1863 U S President Abraham Lincoln delivered the Gettysburg Address considered one of the best known speeches in American history 128 129 A crowd of citizens and soldiers surround Lincoln with a red arrow pointing to his location in photo The ravages of war were still evident in Gettysburg more than four months later when on November 19 the Soldiers National Cemetery was dedicated During this ceremony President Lincoln honored the fallen and redefined the purpose of the war in his historic Gettysburg Address 130 fn 11 Medal of Honor Main article List of Medal of Honor recipients for the Gettysburg Campaign There were 72 Medals of Honor awarded for the Gettysburg Campaign 64 of which were for actions taken during the battle itself The first recipient was awarded in December 1864 while the most recent was posthumously awarded to Lieutenant Alonzo Cushing in 2014 131 Historical assessmentFurther information Lost Cause of the Confederacy Decisive victory controversies The nature of the result of the Battle of Gettysburg has been the subject of controversy Although not seen as overwhelmingly significant at the time particularly since the war continued for almost two years in retrospect it has often been cited as the turning point usually in combination with the fall of Vicksburg the following day 14 This is based on the observation that after Gettysburg Lee s army conducted no more strategic offensives his army merely reacted to the initiative of Ulysses S Grant in 1864 and 1865 and by the speculative viewpoint of the Lost Cause writers that a Confederate victory at Gettysburg might have resulted in the end of the war 132 The Army of the Potomac had won a victory It might be less of a victory than Mr Lincoln had hoped for but it was nevertheless a victory and because of that it was no longer possible for the Confederacy to win the war The North might still lose it to be sure if the soldiers or the people should lose heart but outright defeat was no longer in the cards Bruce Catton Glory Road 133 It is currently a widely held view that Gettysburg was a decisive victory for the Union but the term is considered imprecise It is inarguable that Lee s offensive on July 3 was turned back decisively and his campaign in Pennsylvania was terminated prematurely although the Confederates at the time argued that this was a temporary setback and that the goals of the campaign were largely met However when the more common definition of decisive victory is intended an indisputable military victory of a battle that determines or significantly influences the ultimate result of a conflict historians are divided For example David J Eicher called Gettysburg a strategic loss for the Confederacy and James M McPherson wrote that Lee and his men would go on to earn further laurels But they never again possessed the power and reputation they carried into Pennsylvania those palmy summer days of 1863 134 However Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones wrote that the strategic impact of the Battle of Gettysburg was fairly limited Steven E Woodworth wrote that Gettysburg proved only the near impossibility of decisive action in the Eastern theater Edwin Coddington pointed out the heavy toll on the Army of the Potomac and that after the battle Meade no longer possessed a truly effective instrument for the accomplishments of his task The army needed a thorough reorganization with new commanders and fresh troops but these changes were not made until Grant appeared on the scene in March 1864 Joseph T Glatthaar wrote that Lost opportunities and near successes plagued the Army of Northern Virginia during its Northern invasion yet after Gettysburg without the distractions of duty as an invading force without the breakdown of discipline the Army of Northern Virginia remained an extremely formidable force Ed Bearss wrote Lee s invasion of the North had been a costly failure Nevertheless at best the Army of the Potomac had simply preserved the strategic stalemate in the Eastern Theater 135 Historian Alan Guelzo notes that Gettysburg and Vicksburg did not end the war and that the war would go on for two more years 136 He also noted that a little more than a year later Federal armies appeared hopelessly mired in sieges at Petersburg and Atlanta 137 Peter Carmichael refers to the military context for the armies the horrendous losses at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg which effectively destroyed Lee s offensive capacity implying that these cumulative losses were not the result of a single battle Thomas Goss writing in the U S Army s Military Review journal on the definition of decisive and the application of that description to Gettysburg concludes For all that was decided and accomplished the Battle of Gettysburg fails to earn the label decisive battle 138 The military historian John Keegan agrees Gettysburg was a landmark battle the largest of the war and it would not be surpassed The Union had restored to it the belief in certain victory and the loss dispirited the Confederacy If not exactly a decisive battle Gettysburg was the end of Confederate use of Northern Virginia as a military buffer zone the setting for Grant s Overland Campaign 139 Lee vs Meade nbsp George Meade the victorious Union Army general at the Battle of GettysburgPrior to Gettysburg Robert E Lee had established a reputation as an almost invincible general achieving stunning victories against superior numbers although usually at the cost of high casualties to his army during the Seven Days the Northern Virginia Campaign including the Second Battle of Bull Run Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville Only the Maryland Campaign with its tactically inconclusive Battle of Antietam had been less than successful Therefore historians such as Fuller Glatthaar and Sears have attempted to explain how Lee s winning streak was interrupted so dramatically at Gettysburg 140 Although the issue is tainted by attempts to portray history and Lee s reputation in a manner supporting different partisan goals the major factors in Lee s loss arguably can be attributed to 1 his overconfidence in the invincibility of his men 2 the performance of his subordinates and his management thereof 3 his failing health and 4 the performance of his opponent George G Meade and the Army of the Potomac 141 Throughout the campaign Lee was influenced by the belief that his men were invincible most of Lee s experiences with the Army of Northern Virginia had convinced him of this including the great victory at Chancellorsville in early May and the rout of the Union troops at Gettysburg on July 1 Since morale plays an important role in military victory when other factors are equal Lee did not want to dampen his army s desire to fight and resisted suggestions principally by Longstreet to withdraw from the recently captured Gettysburg to select a ground more favorable to his army War correspondent Peter W Alexander wrote that Lee acted probably under the impression that his troops were able to carry any position however formidable If such was the case he committed an error such however as the ablest commanders will sometimes fall into Lee himself concurred with this judgment writing to President Davis No blame can be attached to the army for its failure to accomplish what was projected by me nor should it be censured for the unreasonable expectations of the public I am alone to blame in perhaps expecting too much of its prowess and valor 142 nbsp Robert E Lee the Confederate Army general at the Battle of GettysburgThe most controversial assessments of the battle involve the performance of Lee s subordinates The dominant theme of the Lost Cause writers and many other historians is that Lee s senior generals failed him in crucial ways directly causing the loss of the battle the alternative viewpoint is that Lee did not manage his subordinates adequately and did not thereby compensate for their shortcomings 143 Two of his corps commanders Richard S Ewell and A P Hill had only recently been promoted and were not fully accustomed to Lee s style of command in which he provided only general objectives and guidance to their former commander Stonewall Jackson Jackson translated these into detailed specific orders to his division commanders 144 All four of Lee s principal commanders received criticism during the campaign and battle 145 James Longstreet suffered most severely from the wrath of the Lost Cause authors not the least because he directly criticized Lee in postbellum writings and became a Republican after the war His critics accuse him of attacking much later than Lee intended on July 2 squandering a chance to hit the Union Army before its defensive positions had firmed up They also question his lack of motivation to attack strongly on July 2 and 3 because he had argued that the army should have maneuvered to a place where it would force Meade to attack them The alternative view is that Lee was in close contact with Longstreet during the battle agreed to delays on the morning of July 2 and never criticized Longstreet s performance There is also considerable speculation about what an attack might have looked like before Dan Sickles moved the III Corps toward the Peach Orchard 146 J E B Stuart deprived Lee of cavalry intelligence during a good part of the campaign by taking his three best brigades on a path away from the army s This arguably led to Lee s surprise at Hooker s vigorous pursuit the engagement on July 1 that escalated into the full battle prematurely and it also prevented Lee from understanding the full disposition of the enemy on July 2 The disagreements regarding Stuart s culpability for the situation originate in the relatively vague orders issued by Lee but most modern historians agree that both generals were responsible to some extent for the failure of the cavalry s mission early in the campaign 147 Richard S Ewell has been universally criticized for failing to seize the high ground on the afternoon of July 1 Once again the disagreement centers on Lee s orders which provided general guidance for Ewell to act if practicable Many historians speculate that Stonewall Jackson if he had survived Chancellorsville would have aggressively seized Culp s Hill rendering Cemetery Hill indefensible and changing the entire complexion of the battle A differently worded order from Lee might have made the difference with this subordinate 148 A P Hill has received some criticism for his ineffective performance His actions caused the battle to begin and then escalate on July 1 despite Lee s orders not to bring on a general engagement although historians point out that Hill kept Lee well informed of his actions during the day However Hill s illness minimized his personal involvement in the remainder of the battle and Lee took the explicit step of temporarily removing troops from Hill s corps and giving them to Longstreet for Pickett s Charge 149 In addition to Hill s illness Lee s performance was affected by heart troubles which would eventually lead to his death in 1870 he had been diagnosed with pericarditis by his staff physicians in March 1863 though modern doctors believe he had in fact suffered a heart attack 150 151 152 As a final factor Lee faced a new and formidable opponent in George G Meade and the Army of the Potomac fought well on its home territory Although new to his army command Meade deployed his forces relatively effectively relied on strong subordinates such as Winfield S Hancock to make decisions where and when they were needed took great advantage of defensive positions nimbly shifted defensive resources on interior lines to parry strong threats and unlike some of his predecessors stood his ground throughout the battle in the face of fierce Confederate attacks 153 Lee was quoted before the battle as saying Meade would commit no blunders on my front and if I make one will make haste to take advantage of it That prediction proved to be correct at Gettysburg Stephen Sears wrote The fact of the matter is that George G Meade unexpectedly and against all odds thoroughly outgeneraled Robert E Lee at Gettysburg Edwin B Coddington wrote that the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac received a sense of triumph which grew into an imperishable faith in themselves The men knew what they could do under an extremely competent general one of lesser ability and courage could well have lost the battle 154 Meade had his own detractors as well Similar to the situation with Lee Meade suffered partisan attacks about his performance at Gettysburg but he had the misfortune of experiencing them in person Supporters of his predecessor Hooker lambasted Meade before the U S Congress s Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War where Radical Republicans suspected that Meade was a Copperhead and tried in vain to relieve him from command Daniel E Sickles and Daniel Butterfield accused Meade of planning to retreat from Gettysburg during the battle Most politicians including Lincoln criticized Meade for what they considered to be his half hearted pursuit of Lee after the battle A number of Meade s most competent subordinates Winfield S Hancock John Gibbon Gouverneur K Warren and Henry J Hunt all heroes of the battle defended Meade in print but Meade was embittered by the overall experience 155 Battlefield preservation nbsp M1857 12 Pounder Napoleon at Gettysburg National Military Park Gettysburg Pennsylvania September 2006LocationAdams County Pennsylvania U S WebsitePark Home NPS gov Gettysburg National Cemetery and Gettysburg National Military Park are maintained by the U S National Park Service as two of the nation s most revered historical landmarks Although Gettysburg is one of the best known of all Civil War battlefields it too faces threats to its preservation and interpretation Many historically significant locations on the battlefield lie outside the boundaries of Gettysburg National Military Park and are vulnerable to residential or commercial development 156 Some preservation successes have emerged in recent years Two proposals to open a casino at Gettysburg were defeated in 2006 and most recently in 2011 when public pressure forced the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board to reject the proposed gambling hub at the intersection of Routes 15 and 30 near East Cavalry Field 157 The American Battlefield Trust formerly the Civil War Trust also successfully purchased and transferred 95 acres 38 ha at the former site of the Gettysburg Country Club to the control of the U S Department of the Interior in 2011 158 Less than half of the over 11 500 acres on the old Gettysburg Battlefield have been preserved for posterity thus far The American Battlefield Trust and its partners have acquired and preserved 1 242 acres 5 03 km2 of the battlefield in more than 40 separate transactions from 1997 to mid 2023 159 Some of these acres are now among the 4 998 acres 2 023 ha of the Gettysburg National Military Park 160 In 2015 the Trust made one of its most important and expensive acquisitions paying 6 million for a four acre 1 6 ha parcel that included the stone house that Confederate General Robert E Lee used as his headquarters during the battle The Trust razed a motel restaurant and other buildings within the parcel to restore Lee s headquarters and the site to their wartime appearance adding interpretive signs It opened the site to the public in October 2016 161 In popular culture nbsp Alfred Waud sketching the Battle of Gettysburg for Harper s Weekly 162 At the 50th anniversary Gettysburg reunion 1913 50 000 veterans attended according to a 1938 Army Medical report 163 Historian Carol Reardon writes that attendance included at least 35 000 Union veterans and though estimates of attendees ran as high as 56 000 only a few more than 7 000 Confederate veterans most from Virginia and North Carolina attended 164 Some veterans re enacted Pickett s Charge in a spirit of reconciliation a meeting that carried great emotional force for both sides There was a ceremonial mass hand shake across a stone wall on Cemetery Ridge 165 166 At the 75th anniversary Gettysburg reunion 1938 1 333 Union veterans and 479 Confederate veterans attended 163 167 Film records survive of two Gettysburg reunions held on the battlefield in 1913 168 and 1938 169 The children s novel Window of Time 1991 by Karen Weinberg tells the story of a boy transported by time travel from the 1980s to the Battle of Gettysburg 170 The Battle of Gettysburg was depicted in the 1993 film Gettysburg based on Michael Shaara s 1974 novel The Killer Angels 171 The film and novel focused primarily on the actions of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain John Buford Robert E Lee and James Longstreet during the battle The first day focused on Buford s cavalry defense the second day on Chamberlain s defense at Little Round Top and the third day on Pickett s Charge See also nbsp American Civil War portal nbsp Pennsylvania portalGettysburg Cyclorama a painting by the French artist Paul Philippoteaux depicting Pickett s Charge List of costliest American Civil War land battles Troop engagements of the American Civil War 1863Notes The Battle of Antietam the culmination of Lee s first invasion of the North had the largest number of casualties in a single day about 23 000 Historians who address the matter disagree on whether any troopers in Buford s division and especially in William Gamble s brigade had repeating carbines or repeating rifles It is a minority view and most historians present creditable arguments against it In support of the minority view Stephen D Starr wrote that most of the troopers in flanking companies had Spencer carbines which had arrived a few days before the battle The Union Cavalry in the Civil War From Fort Sumter to Gettysburg 1861 1863 Volume 1 citing Buckeridge J O Lincoln s Choice Harrisburg Stackpole Books 1956 p 55 Shelby Foote in Fredericksburg to Meridian The Civil War a Narrative Volume 2 New York 1963 ISBN 978 0 394 74621 0 p 465 also stated that some Union troopers had Spencer carbines Richard S Shue also claimed that a limited distribution of Spencer rifles had been made to some of Buford s troopers in his book Morning at Willoughby Run Gettysburg PA Thomas Publications 1995 ISBN 978 0 939631 74 2 p 214 Edward G Longacre wrote that in Gamble s brigade a few squadrons of Federal troopers used Spencer repeating rifles rather than carbines but most had single shot breech loading carbines Longacre p 60 Order of battle at Coddington p 585 Coddington pp 258 259 wrote that men in the 5th Michigan and at least two companies of the 6th Michigan regiment had Spencer repeating rifles rather than carbines Harry Hansen wrote that Thomas C Devin s brigade of one Pennsylvania and three New York regiments were equipped with new Spencer repeating carbines without reference to Gamble s men The Civil War A History New York Bonanza Books 1961 OCLC 500488542 p 370 David G Martin in Gettysburg July 1 stated that all of Buford s men had single shot breech loading carbines which could be fired 5 to 8 times per minute and fired from a prone position as opposed to 2 to 3 rounds per minute with muzzle loaders an advantage but not a spectacular one p 82 Cavalry historian Eric J Wittenberg in The Devil s to Pay John Buford at Gettysburg A History and Walking Tour El Dorado Hills CA Savas Beatie 2014 2015 2018 ISBN 978 1 61121 444 4 stated that while it is possible a handful of Spencer repeating rifles were present at Gettysburg it is safe to conclude that Buford s troopers did not have them He cited the fact that only 64 percent of the companies in Gamble s and Devin s brigades filed their quarterly returns on June 30 1863 in support of the possibility that some had repeaters but gave reasons for his rejection of that possibility He dismissed Shelby Foote s statement as mythology because the Spencer carbines were not in mass production until September 1863 stated that Longacre credits Spencer repeating rifles to different regiments than the ordnance returns for the Army of the Potomac do and discounted Shue s statement because he used an unreliable source pp 209 210 In their books on the battle or on the war as a whole many historians have not commented directly on whether any Federal troopers had repeating carbines or rifle Some of them such as Harry Pfanz First Day p 67 specifically mentioned that the Union cavalry had breech loading carbines enabling the troopers to fire slightly faster than soldiers with muzzle loading rifles and made no mention of repeaters Similar statements to that of Pfanz are found at Keegan p 191 Sears p 163 Eicher p 510 Symonds p 71 Hoptak p 53 Trudeau p 164 Others such as McPherson and Guelzo do not mention the weapons used by Buford s division Claims have been made that Lee intended for there to be an attack at sunrise or at another point earlier in the day but that the attack was delayed by Longstreet Lee allegedly stated What can detain Longstreet not long after 9 00 am that morning and Longstreet has been attributed as saying that Lee wishes me to attack I do not wish to do so without Pickett some writers have interpreted these statements as an indication that Lee intended the attack to take place earlier Eicher rejects claims that Lee intended for the attack to begin at sunrise although allowing that it is possible that Lee may have intended for an earlier attack Eicher concludes that preparations for the attack did not get underway until between 11 A M and noon Sears notes that Lee was said to be exasperated by the late start of the attack but also states that having made plain by his orders to McLaws that he was assuming tactical command of the operation Lee had not issued any earlier start up order 59 Morgan James Who saved Little Round Top Camp Chase Gazette Archived from the original on March 3 2016 Retrieved February 21 2016 Morgan addresses and rebuts certain conclusions made in With a Flash of His Sword The Writings of Major Holman S Melcher 20th Maine Infantry Edited by William B Styple The full text of Morgan s analysis of Styples s point number 4 about who ordered and lead the charges is Number 4 Col Chamberlain did not lead the charge Lt Holman Melcher was the first officer down the slope according to Styples Though directly related to Mr Styples argument this is a very minor point and could even be called a quibble Even granting Melcher the honor of being first down the slope and such an interpretation is perfectly plausible he did not lead the charge in a command sense which is what the conclusion implies Chamberlain probably was standing in his proper place behind the line when he yelled Bayonets so if indeed the word was enough to get the men started he could not have gone first as the entire line would have moved out ahead of him But it does not matter The questions who was first down the hill and who led the charge are different questions which should not be posed as one The question therefore remains who saved Little Round Top Given the available historical evidence the answer likewise must remain Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain Longstreet wrote in his memoirs that he estimated that his force would have about thirteen thousand men not fifteen thousand When asked by Longstreet the strength of the column Lee said the size would be fifteen thousand which apparently included his estimate of the strength of two brigades of Anderson s Division of Hill s Third Corp that he would add to support Longstreet s men Neither general knew the exact number of men available to attack at that tine because of casualties already sustained merely the units Longstreet did not write that he accepted that 15 000 would be the exact number of attackers He merely said that no fifteen thousand men could take the Union position that it would require 30 000 Historians give differing numbers of attackers for various reasons but all give numbers that are lower than 15 000 as shown in the next footnote Writing about the number of attackers in the charge Carol Reardon in Pickett s Charge in History amp Memory at page 6 wrote Modern histories have reduced the number to a range somewhere between 10 500 and 13 000 No one knows the number Eicher The Longest Night A Military History of the Civil War at p 544 gives the same range as Reardon does for the number of attackers Stephen W Sears in Gettysburg at p 407 wrote George Meade thus had some 13 000 troops as it happened just about the same number as stepped off in Pickett s Charge Alan C Guelzo in Gettysburg The Last Invasion at p 393 wrote There would be around 13 000 men in the attack if all of them could be gotten to move He also notes in a footnote that estimates of the number vary widely Among those giving a higher numbers of attackers neither Guelzo nor Sears appear to take into account Ed Bearss s statement in Receding Tide p 366 that Confederate casualties from Union Army artillery overshoot into the Confederate soldiers staged behind the front line before the charge amounted to almost 600 men George R Stewart in Pickett s Charge A microhistory of the final attack at Gettysburg July 3 1863 1959 p 173 after totaling the strength in the divisions and brigades in the charge considering earlier losses gives the lowest estimate of troops in the assaulting column at 10 500 Gary W Gallagher Stephen D Engle Robert K Krick amp Joseph T Glatthaar in The American Civil War This Might Scourge of War at page 180 wrote About 12 000 Confederates tried in the most renowned attack in all of American military history Earl J Hess in Pickett s Charge The Last Attack at Gettysburg p 335 wrote of 11 830 men engaged in the charge Noah Andre Trudeau wrote in Gettysburg A Testing of Courage p 477 that with the addition of the very late advance of the brigades of Brig Gen Cadmus M Wilcox and Brig Gen Edward A Perry led by Col David Lang the number of attackers could be said to approach 15 000 but with their subtraction because the main charge had already been repulsed and accounting for Confederate casualties caused by Union Army artillery overshoot the number of attackers approaches 11 800 Most references do not mention and cannot be adding about 1 400 men of the brigades of Brig Gen Cadmus Wilcox and Brig Gen Edward Perry led by Col David Lang who started after the main charge had been repulsed with great casualties Lang s Perry s three Florida regiments suffered hundreds of casualties including many taken prisoner Wilcox saw the futility of the attack and ordered his men back when he discovered the main attack had been repulsed and they would receive no artillery or other support The brigade lost about 200 men before turning back Gottfried pp 581 588 McPherson p 662 gives a larger number than other modern historians of 14 000 Confederates going forward in the charge scarcely half of whom returned This may count the Wilcox and Perry Lang brigades although he does not mention them McPherson p 664 states Union casualties were 23 000 more than one quarter of the army s effectives and Confederate casualties were 28 000 more than a third of Lee s army The number of Union casualties stated by the U S Adjutant General in 1888 was 23 003 3 042 killed 14 497 wounded 5 464 captured or missing Drum Richard C United States Adjutant General s Office Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac and co operating forces in the Gettysburg campaign June 5 July 31 1863 organization of the Army of the Potomac and Army of northern Virginia at the battle of Gettysburg and return of casualties in the Union and Confederate forces Washington Government Printing Office 1888 OCLC 6512586 p 45 Other Union casualty figures stated by later historians were similar including Murray and Hsieh p 290 22 625 Trudeau p 529 22 813 McPherson p 664 23 000 Walsh p 285 23 000 Guelzo p 445 24 000 as rounded up by Meade in his later testimony before the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War Sears p 496 states that the Union Army also suffered about 7 300 casualties at the Second Battle of Winchester on June 13 15 1863 during Ewell s advance to Gettysburg and in the Union Army pursuit of the Confederate Army after the battle Examples of the varying Confederate casualties for July 1 3 include Coddington p 536 20 451 and very likely more This is the same figure given by Drum 1888 p 69 Drum footnotes the casualty returns for some Confederate units as Loss if any not recorded For other units he notes that brigade and regimental numbers sometimes differ and the brigade or larger Confederate unit totals are used He states on p 59 that the compilations of Confederate casualties can only be considered as approximative This lends weight to the higher numbers of Confederate casualties computed or estimated by historians including Busey and Martin cited in connection with the tables below as well as Sears p 498 22 625 plus just over 4 500 on the march north Trudeau p 529 22 874 Eicher p 550 22 874 but probably actually totaled 28 000 or more McPherson p 664 28 000 Esposito map 99 near 28 000 Clark p 150 20 448 but probably closer to 28 000 Woodworth p 209 at least equal to Meade s and possibly as high as 28 000 NPS 28 000 Lee had left intact a pontoon bridge located at Falling Waters This bridge had originally been used during the movement north into Maryland and Pennsylvania Union cavalry under the command of Brigadier General William H French destroyed the bridge on July 4 Lee s options for crossing the Potomac River were either a ferry at Williamsport that could handle only two wagons per crossing or the Falling Waters location six miles 9 7 km downstream 117 White p 251 refers to Lincoln s use of the term new birth of freedom and writes The new birth that slowly emerged in Lincoln s politics meant that on November 19 at Gettysburg he was no longer as in his inaugural address defending an old Union but proclaiming a new Union The old Union contained and attempted to restrain slavery The new Union would fulfill the promise of liberty the crucial step into the future that the Founders had failed to take Citations Coddington p 573 See the discussion regarding historians judgment on whether Gettysburg should be considered a decisive victory Official Records Series I Volume XXVII Part 1 pages 155 168 Archived July 24 2017 at the Wayback Machine Official Records Series I Volume XXVII Part 2 pages 283 291 Archived July 24 2017 at the Wayback Machine Official Records Series I Volume XXVII Part 1 page 151 Archived July 24 2017 at the Wayback Machine a b Coddington p 673 references the official number of the Union Army forces but says the number could have been in the neighborhood of 115 000 Busey and Martin p 125 Engaged strength at the battle was 93 921 Eicher p 503 gives a similar number of 93 500 Sears p 539 quotes the official number of just over 104 000 but with reinforcements of another 8 000 men about to arrive a b Busey and Martin p 260 state that Confederate engaged strength at the battle was 71 699 McPherson p 648 lists the Confederate strength at the start of the campaign as 75 000 while Eicher p 503 gives a lower number of 70 200 Noting that Confederate returns often did not include officers Coddington p 676 states that estimated Confederate strength of 75 000 is a conservative one Confederate Captain John Esten Cooke in A Life of Gen Robert E Lee New York D Appleton 1871 p 328 gives the number of the entire Confederate force at about eighty thousand Sears p 149 states that eyewitnesses observed the Confederate force to be about 100 000 but although Meade used this in making his battle plans it was an overcount of about 20 percent Official Records Series I Volume XXVII Part 1 page 187 Archived July 24 2017 at the Wayback Machine a b Busey and Martin p 125 a b Busey and Martin p 260 cite 23 231 total 4 708 killed 12 693 wounded 5 830 captured missing See the section on casualties for a discussion of alternative Confederate casualty estimates which have been cited as high as 28 000 Official Records Series I Volume XXVII Part 2 pages 338 346 Archived July 24 2017 at the Wayback Machine a b Wynstra p 81 a b Symonds pp 53 57 Robert D Quigley Civil War Spoken Here A Dictionary of Mispronounced People Places and Things of the 1860s Collingswood NJ C W Historicals 1993 p 68 ISBN 0 9637745 0 6 a b Rawley p 147 Sauers p 827 Gallagher Lee and His Army p 83 McPherson p 665 Eicher p 550 Gallagher and McPherson cite the combination of Gettysburg and Vicksburg as the turning point Eicher uses the arguably related expression High water mark of the Confederacy Eicher David J 2001 The Longest Night A Military History of the Civil War New York Simon amp Schuster pp 515 517 ISBN 978 0 684 84944 7 Coddington pp 8 9 Eicher p 490 Eicher pp 489 491 Symonds p 36 Trudeau pp 45 66 Symonds p 49 Moore Frank September 25 1864 The Rebellion Record A Diary of American Events with Documents Narratives Illustrative Incidents Poetry Etc Putnam via Internet Archive Symonds 49 50 Symonds p 51 Nye pp 272 278 Symonds pp 41 43 Sears pp 103 106 Esposito text for Map 94 Map 34b in the online version Eicher pp 504 507 McPherson p 649 Sears p 123 Trudeau p 128 Coddington pp 181 189 Eicher pp 508 509 discounts Heth s claim because the previous visit by Early to Gettysburg would have made the lack of shoe factories or stores obvious However many mainstream historians accept Heth s account Sears p 136 Foote p 465 Clark p 35 Tucker pp 97 98 Martin p 25 Pfanz First Day p 25 Eicher p 508 Tucker pp 99 102 Eicher pp 502 503 Coddington p 122 Eicher p 503 Sears pp 155 158 Battle of Gettysburg Who Really Fired the First Shot HistoryNet www historynet com July 26 2006 Archived from the original on January 25 2021 Retrieved April 20 2012 Article by J David Petruzzi originally published in America s Civil War magazine July 2006 which also includes text concerning a few other more dubious claimants Martin pp 80 81 Symonds p 71 Coddington p 266 Eicher pp 510 511 Tucker pp 112 117 Foote p 468 Tucker p 184 Symonds p 74 Pfanz First Day pp 269 275 Busey and Martin pp 298 501 Pfanz First Day pp 275 293 Clark p 53 Pfanz First Day p 158 Pfanz First Day p 230 Pfanz First Day pp 156 238 Pfanz First Day p 294 Pfanz First Day pp 337 338 Sears pp 223 225 Martin pp 482 488 Pfanz First Day p 344 Eicher p 517 Sears p 228 Trudeau p 253 Both Sears and Trudeau record if possible Martin p 9 citing Thomas L Livermore s Numbers amp Losses in the Civil War in America Houghton Mifflin 1900 Longstreet From Manassas to Appomattox Memoirs of the Civil War in America Philadelphia J B Lippincott 1896 pp 364 365 A Map Study of the Battle of Gettysburg Historical Society of Pennsylvania Historical Society of Pennsylvania Retrieved December 17 2022 Eicher p 521 Sears pp 245 246 Clark p 74 Eicher p 521 a b James Longstreet From Manassas to Appomattox Philadelphia PA J R Lippincott company 1896 p 365 Sears p 255 Clark p 69 a b Edward Porter Alexander Military Memoirs of a Confederate New York Charles Scribner amp Sons 1907 p 408 Longstreet From Manassas to Appomattox Memoirs of the Civil War in America Philadelphia J B Lippincott 1896 pp 364 368 Eicher p 522 Sears p 257 Longstreet From Mannassas to Appomattox Memoirs of the Civil War in America p 366 Pfanz Second Day pp 119 123 Pfanz Second Day pp 93 97 Eicher pp 523 524 Longstreet From Manassas to Appomattox Memoirs of the Civil War in America p 369 Eicher Harman p 59 Harman p 57 Sears pp 312 324 Eicher pp 530 535 Coddington p 423 Eicher pp 527 530 Clark pp 81 85 a b Edward Porter Alexander Military Memoirs of a Confederate New York Charles Scribner amp Sons 1907 p 409 Eicher pp 537 538 Sauers p 835 Pfanz Culp s Hill pp 205 234 Clark pp 115 116 Report of Major General R E Rodes CSA commanding division June 3 August 1 1863 The Gettysburg Campaign O R Series I Volume XXVII 2 S 44 Sears p 257 Longacre pp 198 199 Harman p 63 Pfanz Culp s Hill pp 284 352 Eicher pp 540 541 Coddington pp 465 475 Eicher p 542 Coddington pp 485 486 Longstreet James 1896 From Manassas to Appomattox Memoirs of the Civil War in America Philadelphia Pennsylvania US J B Lippincott pp 386 387 See discussion of varying gun estimates in Pickett s Charge article footnote Coddington 402 McPherson 662 Eicher 546 Trudeau 484 Walsh 281 Wert p 194 Sears pp 358 359 Wert pp 198 199 Wert pp 205 207 a b McPherson p 662 McPherson pp 661 663 Clark pp 133 144 Symonds pp 214 241 Eicher pp 543 549 Glatthaar p 281 a b Starr p 438 Gettysburg East Cavalry Field July 3 1863 American Battlefield Trust Archived from the original on September 28 2022 Retrieved March 7 2023 Coddington pp 524 525 Gettysburg East Cavalry Field July 3 1863 American Battlefield Trust Archived from the original on November 29 2022 Retrieved March 7 2023 Starr pp 437 438 Coddington pp 520 522 Sears p 462 Coddington pp 258 259 Starr pp 440 441 Eicher pp 549 550 Longacre pp 226 231 240 44 Sauers p 836 Wert pp 272 280 Starr pp 417 418 Mathew Brady s National Photographic Portrait Galleries photographer From the Liljenquist Family Collection of Civil War Photographs Prints and Photographs Division Library of Congress Glatthaar p 282 Sears p 513 Sears pp 498 499 Sears p 496 Busey and Martin pp 125 147 260 315 Headquarters element casualties account for the minor differences in army totals stated previously Catton p 325 Sears p 391 Martin pp 371 377 Pfanz First Day pp 357 359 Sears p 511 Woodworth p 216 Leonard Pat July 7 2013 Nursing the Wounded at Gettysburg Archived from the original on August 4 2017 Retrieved July 12 2017 Nofi Albert August 19 2017 The Blue amp Gray Almanac The Civil War in Facts amp Figures Recipes amp Slang Casemate Publishers ISBN 978 1 61200 553 9 Starr p 443 Eicher p 550 Coddington pp 539 544 Clark pp 146 147 Sears p 469 Wert p 300 Coddington p 538 Coddington p 539 Coddington p 564 Starr pp 447 450 Sears pp 481 484 Eicher p 552 Sears p 481 Coddington pp 552 564 Sears p 490 Eicher p 552 Coddington pp 535 574 Sears pp 496 497 Eicher p 596 Wittenberg et al One Continuous Fight pp 345 346 McPherson p 664 Donald p 446 Woodworth p 217 Coddington p 573 McPherson pp 650 664 Vicksburg American Battlefield Trust Archived from the original on June 2 2022 Retrieved June 5 2022 Gallagher Lee and His Army pp 86 93 102 05 Sears pp 501 502 McPherson p 665 in contrast to Gallagher depicts Lee as profoundly depressed about the battle Conant Sean 2015 The Gettysburg Address Perspectives on Lincoln s Greatest Speech New York Oxford University Press p ix ISBN 978 0 19 022745 6 Holsinger M Paul 1999 War and American Popular Culture A Historical Encyclopedia Westport CT Greenwood Press p 102 ISBN 978 0 313 29908 7 White p 251 Bradley Mark Medal of Honor 1st Lt Alonzo H Cushing U S Army Center of Military History Archived from the original on September 21 2018 Retrieved September 21 2018 McPherson p 665 Gallagher Lee and His Generals pp 207 208 Catton p 331 Eicher p 550 McPherson p 665 Hattaway and Jones p 415 Woodworth p xiii Coddington p 573 Glatthaar p 288 Bearss p 202 Guelzo p 463 Guelzo p 464 Carmichael p xvii Goss Major Thomas July August 2004 Gettysburg s Decisive Battle PDF Military Review 11 16 Archived PDF from the original on February 2 2007 Retrieved November 11 2009 Keegan pp 202 239 Glatthaar p 287 Fuller pp 195 198 Sears pp 499 504 Walsh pp 286 287 Sears pp 499 500 Glatthaar p 287 Fuller p 198 states that Lee s overweening confidence in the superiority of his soldiers over his enemy possessed him For example Sears p 504 In the final analysis it was Robert E Lee s inability to manage his generals that went to the heart of the failed campaign Glatthaar pp 285 286 criticizes the inability of the generals to coordinate their actions as a whole Fuller p 198 states that Lee maintained no grip over the operations of his army Fuller p 195 for example refers to orders to Stuart that were as usual vague Fuller p 197 wrote As was Lee s custom he relied on verbal instructions and left all details to his subordinates Woodworth pp 209 210 Sears pp 501 502 McPherson pp 656 657 Coddington pp 375 380 A more detailed collection of historical assessments of Longstreet at Gettysburg may be found in James Longstreet Gettysburg Sears p 502 A more detailed collection of historical assessments of Stuart in the Gettysburg Campaign may be found in J E B Stuart Gettysburg McPherson p 654 Coddington pp 317 319 Eicher pp 517 518 Sears p 503 Sears pp 502 503 Mainwaring R D Tribble C G 1992 The cardiac illness of General Robert E Lee Surgery Gynecology amp Obstetrics 174 3 237 244 PMID 1542842 Sears p 500 Murray and Hsieh p 234 Murray and Hsieh p 285 Sears p 206 Sears p 506 Coddington p 573 Sears pp 505 507 10 Facts Gettysburg July 1 3 1863 American Battlefield Trust February 18 2023 Retrieved February 18 2023 Gettysburg casino plan defeated Penn State Civil War History Center April 15 2011 Archived from the original on April 20 2013 Pitzer Scot Andrew March 26 2011 Country club site acquisition ends 25 year Park Service effort Gettysburg Times Archived from the original on August 16 2019 Retrieved June 22 2021 Gettysburg Battlefield American Battlefield Trust Retrieved June 20 2023 Gettysburg American Battlefield Trust Archived from the original on August 24 2022 Retrieved May 24 2018 Wheeler Linda September 15 2016 Lee s Gettysburg headquarters restored set to open Oct 28 The Washington Post Archived from the original on July 8 2018 Retrieved May 24 2018 Gettysburg Pa Alfred R Waud artist of Harper s Weekly sketching on battlefield Library of Congress 1863 Archived from the original on May 22 2022 Retrieved May 22 2022 a b Army Medical Bulletin No 46 Oct 1938 Blue and Gray reunion at Gettysburg Pa June 29 July 6 1938 1 p 29 38 OCoLC 01778648 Reardon p 188 Reardon p 176 Beitler Lewis E 1913 Fiftieth Anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg Report of the Pennsylvania Commission Harrisburg PA Wm Stanley Ray State Printer p 168 OCLC 475369 Reardon p 202 rounds up the number to 1 800 1913 reunion film clips Gettysburg reunion 1913 You Tube Ken Hendricksen May 17 2020 Retrieved February 19 2023 1938 reunion sound film clips Rare Motion Pictures Show Civil War Veterans at the 75th Gettysburg Battle Anniversary Reunion National Park Traveler February 11 2009 Retrieved February 19 2023 Baublitz Ellie September 1 1991 Window of Time is window of opportunity for author The Baltimore Sun Gettysburg 1993 Turner Classic Movies 2005 Archived from the original on April 19 2019 Retrieved February 18 2023 ReferencesBearss Edwin C Fields of Honor Pivotal Battles of the Civil War Washington D C National Geographic Society 2006 ISBN 0 7922 7568 3 Bearss Edwin C Receding Tide Vicksburg and Gettysburg The Campaigns That Changed the Civil War Washington D C National Geographic Society 2010 ISBN 978 1 4262 0510 1 Busey John W and David G Martin Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg 4th ed Hightstown NJ Longstreet House 2005 ISBN 0 944413 67 6 Carmichael Peter S ed Audacity Personified The Generalship of Robert E Lee Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press 2004 ISBN 0 8071 2929 1 Catton Bruce Glory Road Garden City NY Doubleday and Company 1952 ISBN 0 385 04167 5 Clark Champ and the Editors of Time Life Books Gettysburg The Confederate High Tide Alexandria VA Time Life Books 1985 ISBN 0 8094 4758 4 Coddington Edwin B The Gettysburg Campaign a study in command New York Scribner s 1968 ISBN 0 684 84569 5 Donald David Herbert Lincoln New York Simon amp Schuster 1995 ISBN 0 684 80846 3 Eicher David J The Longest Night A Military History of the Civil War New York Simon amp Schuster 2001 ISBN 0 684 84944 5 Esposito Vincent J West Point Atlas of American Wars New York Frederick A Praeger 1959 OCLC 5890637 The collection of maps without explanatory text is available online at the West Point website Foote Shelby The Civil War A Narrative Vol 2 Fredericksburg to Meridian New York Random House 1958 ISBN 0 394 49517 9 Fuller Major General J F C Grant and Lee A Study in Personality and Generalship Bloomington Indiana University Press 1957 ISBN 0 253 13400 5 Gallagher Gary W Lee and His Army in Confederate History Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press 2001 ISBN 978 0 8078 2631 7 Gallagher Gary W Lee and His Generals in War and Memory Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press 1998 ISBN 0 8071 2958 5 Gallagher Gary W ed Three Days at Gettysburg Essays on Confederate and Union Leadership Kent OH Kent State University Press 1999 ISBN 978 0 87338 629 6 Glatthaar Joseph T General Lee s Army From Victory to Collapse New York Free Press 2008 ISBN 978 0 684 82787 2 Guelzo Allen C Gettysburg The Last Invasion New York Vintage Books 2013 ISBN 978 0 307 74069 4 First published in 2013 by Alfred A Knopf Gottfried Bradley M Brigades of Gettysburg The Union and Confederate Brigades at the Battle of Gettysburg Cambridge MA Da Capo Press 2002 ISBN 978 0 306 81175 3 Harman Troy D Lee s Real Plan at Gettysburg Mechanicsburg PA Stackpole Books 2003 ISBN 0 8117 0054 2 Hattaway Herman and Archer Jones How the North Won A Military History of the Civil War Urbana University of Illinois Press 1983 ISBN 0 252 00918 5 Hoptak John David Confrontation at Gettysburg A Nation Saved a Cause Lost Charleston SC The History Press 2012 ISBN 978 1 60949 426 1 Keegan John The American Civil War A Military History New York Alfred A Knopf 2009 ISBN 978 0 307 26343 8 Longacre Edward G The Cavalry at Gettysburg Lincoln University of Nebraska Press 1986 ISBN 0 8032 7941 8 Longacre Edward G General John Buford A Military Biography Conshohocken PA Combined Publishing 1995 ISBN 978 0 938289 46 3 McPherson James M Battle Cry of Freedom The Civil War Era Oxford History of the United States New York Oxford University Press 1988 ISBN 0 19 503863 0 Martin David G Gettysburg July 1 rev ed Conshohocken PA Combined Publishing 1996 ISBN 0 938289 81 0 Murray Williamson and Wayne Wei siang Hsieh A Savage War A Military History of the Civil War Princeton Princeton University Press 2016 ISBN 978 0 69 116940 8 Nye Wilbur S Here Come the Rebels Dayton OH Morningside House 1984 ISBN 0 89029 080 6 First published in 1965 by Louisiana State University Press Pfanz Harry W Gettysburg The First Day Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press 2001 ISBN 0 8078 2624 3 Pfanz Harry W Gettysburg The Second Day Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press 1987 ISBN 0 8078 1749 X Pfanz Harry W Gettysburg Culp s Hill and Cemetery Hill Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press 1993 ISBN 0 8078 2118 7 Rawley James A 1966 Turning Points of the Civil War University of Nebraska Press ISBN 0 8032 8935 9 OCLC 44957745 Sauers Richard A Battle of Gettysburg In Encyclopedia of the American Civil War A Political Social and Military History edited by David S Heidler and Jeanne T Heidler New York W W Norton amp Company 2000 ISBN 0 393 04758 X Sears Stephen W Gettysburg Boston Houghton Mifflin 2003 ISBN 0 395 86761 4 Starr Stephen Z The Union Cavalry in the Civil War From Fort Sumter to Gettysburg 1861 1863 Volume 1 Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press 2007 Originally Published in 1979 ISBN 978 0 8071 0484 2 Stewart George R Pickett s Charge A Microhistory of the Final Attack at Gettysburg July 3 1863 Boston Houghton Mifflin Company 1959 Revised in 1963 ISBN 978 0 395 59772 9 Symonds Craig L American Heritage History of the Battle of Gettysburg New York HarperCollins 2001 ISBN 978 0 06 019474 1 Tagg Larry The Generals of Gettysburg Campbell CA Savas Publishing 1998 ISBN 1 882810 30 9 Trudeau Noah Andre Gettysburg A Testing of Courage New York HarperCollins 2002 ISBN 0 06 019363 8 Tucker Glenn High Tide at Gettysburg Dayton OH Morningside House 1983 ISBN 978 0 914427 82 7 First published 1958 by Bobbs Merrill Co Walsh George Damage Them All You Can Robert E Lee s Army of Northern Virginia New York Tom Doherty Associates 2003 ISBN 978 0 7653 0755 2 Wert Jeffry D Gettysburg Day Three New York Simon amp Schuster 2001 ISBN 0 684 85914 9 White Ronald C Jr The Eloquent President A Portrait of Lincoln Through His Words New York Random House 2005 ISBN 1 4000 6119 9 Wittenberg Eric J The Devil s to Pay John Buford at Gettysburg A History and Walking Tour El Dorado Hills CA Savas Beatie 2014 2015 2018 ISBN 978 1 61121 444 4 Wittenberg Eric J J David Petruzzi and Michael F Nugent One Continuous Fight The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee s Army of Northern Virginia July 4 14 1863 New York Savas Beatie 2008 ISBN 978 1 932714 43 2 Woodworth Steven E Beneath a Northern Sky A Short History of the Gettysburg Campaign Wilmington DE SR Books scholarly Resources Inc 2003 ISBN 0 8420 2933 8 Wynstra Robert J At the Forefront of Lee s Invasion Retribution Plunder and Clashing Cultures on Richard S Ewell s Road to Gettysburg Kent OH The Kent State University Press 2018 ISBN 978 1 60635 354 7 Memoirs and primary sources Paris Louis Philippe Albert d Orleans The Battle of Gettysburg A History of the Civil War in America Digital Scanning Inc 1999 ISBN 1 58218 066 0 First published 1869 by Germer Bailliere New York State William F Fox and Daniel Edgar Sickles New York at Gettysburg Final Report on the Battlefield of Gettysburg Albany NY J B Lyon Company Printers 1900 OCLC 607395975 U S War Department The War of the Rebellion a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies Washington DC U S Government Printing Office 1880 1901 Further readingExternal mediaImages nbsp GettysburgPhotographs com nbsp Battlefields org maps amp photos nbsp Gettysburg edu paintings amp photosVideo nbsp GettysburgAnimated comAdkin Mark The Gettysburg Companion The Complete Guide to America s Most Famous Battle Mechanicsburg PA Stackpole Books 2008 ISBN 978 0 8117 0439 7 Bachelder John B The Bachelder Papers Gettysburg in Their Own Words Edited by David L Ladd and Audrey J Ladd 3 vols Dayton OH Morningside Press 1994 ISBN 0 89029 320 1 Bachelder John B Gettysburg What to See and How to See It Embodying Full Information for Visiting the Field Boston Bachelder 1873 OCLC 4637523 Ballard Ted and Billy Arthur Gettysburg Staff Ride Briefing Book Archived April 30 2011 at the Wayback Machine Carlisle PA United States Army Center of Military History 1999 OCLC 42908450 Boritt Gabor S ed The Gettysburg Nobody Knows New York Oxford University Press 1997 ISBN 0 19 510223 1 Desjardin Thomas A These Honored Dead How the Story of Gettysburg Shaped American Memory New York Da Capo Press 2003 ISBN 0 306 81267 3 Frassanito William A Early Photography at Gettysburg Gettysburg PA Thomas Publications 1995 ISBN 1 57747 032 X Lyon Fremantle Arthur J The Fremantle Diary A Journal of the Confederacy Edited by Walter Lord Short Hills NJ Burford Books 2002 ISBN 1 58080 085 8 First published 1954 by Capricorn Books Gottfried Bradley M The Maps of Gettysburg An Atlas of the Gettysburg Campaign June 3 13 1863 New York Savas Beatie 2007 ISBN 978 1 932714 30 2 Grimsley Mark and Brooks D Simpson Gettysburg A Battlefield Guide Lincoln University of Nebraska Press 1999 ISBN 0 8032 7077 1 Hall Jeffrey C The Stand of the U S Army at Gettysburg Bloomington Indiana University Press 2003 ISBN 0 253 34258 9 Haskell Frank Aretas The Battle of Gettysburg Whitefish MT Kessinger Publishing 2006 ISBN 978 1 4286 6012 0 Hawthorne Frederick W Gettysburg Stories of Men and Monuments Gettysburg PA Association of Licensed Battlefield Guides 1988 ISBN 0 9657444 0 X Huntington Tom Pennsylvania Civil War Trails The Guide to Battle Sites Monuments Museums and Towns Mechanicsburg PA Stackpole Books 2007 ISBN 978 0 8117 3379 3 Laino Philip Gettysburg Campaign Atlas 2nd ed Dayton OH Gatehouse Press 2009 ISBN 978 1 934900 45 1 McMurry Richard M The Pennsylvania Gambit and the Gettysburg Splash In The Gettysburg Nobody Knows edited by Gabor Boritt New York Oxford University Press 1997 ISBN 0 19 510223 1 McPherson James M Hallowed Ground A Walk at Gettysburg New York Crown Publishers 2003 ISBN 0 609 61023 6 Petruzzi J David and Steven Stanley The Complete Gettysburg Guide New York Savas Beatie 2009 ISBN 978 1 932714 63 0 Rhodes James Ford The Battle of Gettysburg American Historical Review 4 4 1899 pp 665 677 online Stackpole General Edward J They Met at Gettysburg Harrisburg PA Stackpole Books 1956 OCLC 22643644 External links nbsp Wikimedia Commons has media related to wbr Gettysburg Battlefield and wbr Gettysburg National Military Park Battle of Gettysburg at Wikipedia s sister projects nbsp Definitions from Wiktionary nbsp Media from Commons nbsp News from Wikinews nbsp Quotations from Wikiquote nbsp Texts from Wikisource nbsp Textbooks from Wikibooks nbsp Resources from Wikiversity nbsp Travel information from Wikivoyage Battle of Gettysburg Battle Maps histories photos and preservation news American Battlefield Trust Animated map of the Battle of Gettysburg American Battlefield Trust Gettysburg National Military Park National Park Service Papers of the Gettysburg National Military Park seminars U S Army s Interactive Battle of Gettysburg with Narratives Military History Online The Battle of Gettysburg Official Records The Battle of Gettysburg The Brothers War The Battle of Gettysburg Gettysburg Discussion Group archives Archived February 1 2009 at the Wayback Machine List of 53 Confederate generals at Gettysburg Archived December 26 2008 at the Wayback Machine Encyclopaedia Britannica Battle of Gettysburg National Park Service battle description A film clip Blue and Gray At 75th Anniversary of Great Battle 1938 07 04 1938 is available for viewing at the Internet Archive Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Battle of Gettysburg amp oldid 1176441531, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

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