al-Qaeda safe houses, Kabul

American counter-terrorism analysts justified the continued extrajudicial detention of many Guantanamo captives because they were suspected of staying in al-Qaeda safe houses, or guest houses—or because names matching theirs, or their "known alias" were found in the suspect houses.

Claims nuclear blueprints were found in a Kabul safehouse

During a November 15, 2001, press briefing by Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy, and Tom Ridge, Director of Homeland Security Ridge confirmed a report published by The Times that the U.S. had captured nuclear blueprints in an al Qaeda guest house in Kabul.^[1][2][3] Ridge stated that the capture of the nuclear blueprints in this al-Qaeda guesthouse was consistent with Osama bin Laden's plans to become a nuclear threat.

David Rohde, writing for The New York Times News Service, reported on November 17, 2001, that in addition to nuclear plans, safe houses contained flight simulator programs, documents about the handling of biological and chemical weapons, and information about flight training schools in Florida.^[3]

CNN claimed to have found and gone through the Kabul safe house used by Abu Khabbab, who they described as "Osama bin Laden's top chemical and biological weapons commander."^[4][5]CNN hired the Institute for Science and International Security to examine the documents they found, and its president, David Albright, confirmed the abandoned documents included plans for a nuclear bomb, and extensive training notes on the handling of radiological material.

The Combating Terrorism Center reported that Abu Hafs al Masri (aka Mohammed Atef), al Qaida's military chief, was killed in an air strike on an "al Qa'ida safehouse" in Kabul, in November 2001.^[6]

Alleged to have stayed in Kabul safe houses associated with the Taliban or al-Qaeda

American counter-terrorism analysts called many of the houses "safe houses", even when the captives stayed in these houses during the time the Taliban was in power. Individuals alleged to have stayed in Kabul safe houses associated with the Taliban or al Qaeda include: Musa Ali Said Al Said Al Umari,^[7]Ridouane Khalid Abd Al Rahman Al Zahri^[8]Mamdouh Habib.^[9]

Alleged to have stayed in Kabul guest houses that had ties to terrorism

Intelligence analysts described a number of other individuals as having stayed in Kabul guest houses tied to terrorism, without an explicit tie to either the Taliban or al Qaeda: Muaz Hamza Ahmad Al Alawi^[10]Faruq Ali Ahmed Samir Naji Al Hasan Moqbel^[11]Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi Abdul Rahman Ma Ath Thafir Al Amri Atag Ali Abdoh Al-Haj>^[12]Djamel Ameziane^[13]Abd Al Hadio Omar Mahmoud Faraj^[14]Bessam Muhammed Saleh Al Dubaikey^[15]Abdallah Tohtasinovich Magrupov^[16]Abdul Khaled Ahmed Sahleh Al Bedani^[17][18]Abdullah Mohammad Khan^[19][20]Adel Noori^[21][22]Ayoub Murshid Ali Saleh^[23] Mohammed Yacoub.^[24]

Alleged to have stayed in Kabul houses, without any explicit allegation of ties to terrorism

Some Guantanamo captives faced the allegation that they stayed in Afghan guest houses that were not explicitly tied to terrorism. They include: Arkin Mahmud^[25]Issam Hamid Al Bin Ali Al Jayfi^[26]Richard Belmar^[27]Shawki Awad Balzuhair.^[28]

Managers of suspect guest houses

Some Guantanamo captives were alleged to have managed guest houses or safe houses on behalf of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or other organizations American counter-terrorism analysts asserted had ties to terrorism.

isn	name	allegations
	Hassan Maksum	Alleged to have been the emir of a Uighur safe house in Kabul.^[21] Alleged to have been the leader of the East Tajikistan Islamic Party and also the East Turkistan Islamic Party.^[21] Alleged to have provided a limited amount of one on one rifle training to some of the Uyghur captives in Guantanamo.^[21]
	Abu Musab al-Suri	On January 19th, 2009, FBI interrogator Robert Fuller testified during a hearing before Canadian Omar Khadr's Guantanamo military commission that Khadr, during interrogations in October 2002, confessed to staying at a Kabul guest house run by "Abu Musab al-Suri".^[29] Fuller testified that Khadr said he saw fellow Canadian Maher Arar at this guest house. This report stirred controversy in Canada, because an official inquiry had cleared Arar of all the US justification for his extraordinary rendition to Syria, where he was tortured. In particular, his assertion that he had never been to Afghanistan.
330	Maasoum Abdah Mouhammad Kari Bilal	One of the allegation on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for Maasoum Abdah Mouhammad's (aka Kari Bilal) Combatant Status Review Tribunal was:^[30] The detainee operated a safe house where 5-20 personnel armed with AK-47 rifles could be found at any given time.
342	Mohammed Mubarek Salah Al Qurbi	One of the allegations on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal was:^[31] "The detainee served as the manager of the "Al Qaida frontline's guesthouse in Kabul", Afghanistan."
10017	Abu Faraj al-Libbi	One of the allegations on the Summary of Evidence memo prepared for his Combatant Status Review Tribunal was:^[32] "A Federal Bureau of Investigation source stated he met the detainee in July–August 2001 at the al Qaida guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The same source also stated the detainee managed the guest house, and the guest house also served as the Kabul communications hub for Al-Qaida."
10025	Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi	During his 2005 annual review Sa id Salih Sa id Nashir faced the following allegations:^[33] The detainee worked as a guard at the Kandahar airport from 12 September 2001 until sometime in November 2001. The detainee identified a man who was a group leader of about 10 people at the airport area in Kandahaar. The airport group leader is an al Qaeda leader, a veteran Afghan fighter and head of the Kabul, Afghanistan guesthouse named Khan Ghulam Bashah. During his 2005 annual review Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi faced the allegations that:^[34] Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was a veteran Afghan fighter who was the head of the Kabul, Afghanistan guesthouse named Khan Ghulam Bashah and who later took charge of the Northern front in Kabul in 2000. During his 2006 annual review Mohammad Ahmed Abdullah Saleh Al Hanashi faced the allegations that:^[35] Upon the detainee's arrival in Kabul, the detainee stayed in another Taliban house called Darol Alaman House, where he became aware that he would be fighting against the Northern Alliance. While fighting for the Taliban, the detainee was under the leadership of Abdul Salam and saw Abdul Hadi Al Araqi whom the detainee describes as the General of the non Afghan Taliban troops positioned on the front line. Abdul al Hadi Al-Iraqi was transferred to Guantanamo from CIA custody in 2007.^[36]^[37] Abdul al Hadi Al-Iraqi, and the six other captives transferred to Guantanamo in 2007 and 2008 have not had Combatant Status Review Tribunals or Administrative Review Board hearings.

References

1. Spencer Abraham, Tom Ridge (2001-11-15). . Department of Homeland Security. Archived from the original on 2009-08-30.
2. Alison Mitchell (2002-11-16). "Ridge Agrees Taliban Losses May Lead to New Terrorism". The New York Times. Retrieved 2009-08-26. Mr. Ridge confirmed reports that designs for missiles, bombs and nuclear weapons were found in a Qaeda safe house in Kabul, but played down their significance. He said he was told that much of the information was widely available. Mr. Ridge said a report in The Times of London that the information was found half-burned in Kabul was certainly consistent with other signs that Mr. bin Laden wanted to obtain nuclear weapons.
3. David Rohde (2001-11-17). "Abandoned houses reveal evil-doings". Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. Retrieved 2009-08-26.
4. "CNN Discovers al Qaeda's Blueprints for Bombs". CNN. 2002-06-10. Retrieved 2009-08-26.
5. "Was Al Qaeda Working on a Super Bomb?". CNN. 2002-01-24. Retrieved 2009-08-26.
6. "Abu Hafs Al Masri" (PDF). Combating Terrorism Center. (PDF) from the original on 15 April 2010. Retrieved 2010-04-29. Fortunately, Abu Hafs was killed in an al-Qa'ida safehouse in Kabul, Afghanistan, in November of 2001, when it was bombed by coalition aircraft. This was a significant blow to al-Qa'ida, as they lost one of their most stalwart and capable members. Moreover, it was a huge loss to bin Laden who lost not only his senior military commander, but also a close companion who had been with him since the very beginning of the al-Qa'ida organization.
7. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Musa Ali Said Al Said Al Umari Administrative Review Board - page 69
8. OARDEC (21 November 2005). (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 39–42. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 May 2008. Retrieved 2008-05-15.
9. Unclassified documents (.pdf)^{[permanent dead link]} from Mamdouh Habib's, Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 16-17 - mirror - pages 28-29 2010-02-09 at the Wayback Machine
10. Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) 2006-07-31 at the Wayback Machine prepared for Muaz Hamza Ahmad Al Alawi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - October 16, 2004 page 230
11. Summarized transcripts (.pdf) 2008-05-07 at the Wayback Machine, from Samir Naji Al Hasan Moqbel's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 63-69
12. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) 2008-07-16 at the Wayback Machine of Riyad Atiq Ali Abdu Al Haj Al Radai Administrative Review Board - page 34
13. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) of Djamel Ameziane Administrative Review Board - pages 11-13
14. Summarized transcript (.pdf) 2011-06-29 at the Wayback Machine, from Abd Al Hadio Omar Mahmoud Faraj's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 56
15. Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Bessam Muhammed Saleh Al Dubaikey's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 86
16. Summarized transcripts (.pdf) 2010-01-14 at the Wayback Machine, from Abdallah Tohtasinovich Magrupov's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 7-11
17. Summary of Evidence (.pdf)^{[permanent dead link]} from Abdul Khaled Ahmed Sahleh Al Bedani's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, pages 14-15
18. Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf) 2008-07-16 at the Wayback Machine of Abdul Khaled Ahmed Sahleh Al Bedani Administrative Review Board - page 12
19. Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Abdullah Mohammad Khan's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 107-115
20. Summarized transcript (.pdf) 2008-05-10 at the Wayback Machine, from Abdullah Mohammad Khan's Administrative Review Board hearing - page 98
21. OARDEC (1 July 2005). (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 42–44. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 December 2007. Retrieved 2007-12-19.
22. OARDEC (18 September 2004). (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 4. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 December 2007. Retrieved 2007-12-20.
23. Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) 2006-07-31 at the Wayback Machine prepared for Ayoub Murshid Ali Saleh's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - October 16, 2004 - page 152
24. Summarized transcripts (.pdf) 2010-01-14 at the Wayback Machine, from Mohammed Yacoub'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 51-64
25. Summary of Evidence memo (.pdf) prepared for Arkin Mahmud's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - November 9, 2004 - page 49
26. Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Issam Hamid Al Bin Ali Al Jayfi'sCombatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 13-22
27. Summarized transcripts (.pdf)^{[permanent dead link]}, from Richard Dean Belmar's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 10-17
28. OARDEC (18 October 2004). (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 28. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 December 2007. Retrieved 2008-01-08.
29. Omar el Akkad, Colin Freeze (2009-01-19). "Khadr said Arar was at Afghan camp, court told". The Globe and Mail. from the original on 20 January 2009. Retrieved 2009-01-20. Robert Fuller, who interrogated Mr. Khadr in October of 2002, while the then-15-year-old was detained at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, testified that Mr. Khadr said he saw Mr. Arar in a Kabul guesthouse run by a suspected al-Qaeda operative known as Abu Musab al-Suri.
30. OARDEC (5 October 2004). (PDF). United States Department of Defense. p. 66. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 March 2008. Retrieved 2008-03-12.
31. Summarized transcripts (.pdf), from Mohammed Mubarek Salah Al Qurbi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal - pages 10-13
32. Summary of Evidence prepared for Abu Faraj al-Libbi's Combatant Status Review Tribunal, February 8, 2007
33. OARDEC (2005-11-23). (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 7–9. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2008-12-01. Retrieved 2008-12-07.
34. OARDEC (2005-04-18). (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 81–83. Archived from the original (PDF) on 25 January 2009. Retrieved 2009-01-30.
35. OARDEC (2006-03-02). (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. 54–57. Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 September 2008. Retrieved 2008-09-28.
36. "Pentagon: Top al Qaeda leader taken to Guantanamo". CNN. April 27, 2007. from the original on 29 April 2007. Retrieved 2007-04-27.
37. "US holds 'senior al-Qaeda figure'". BBC News Online. 2007-04-27. from the original on 14 May 2007. Retrieved 2007-04-27.