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History of Germany during World War I

March 03, 2023

During World War I, the German Empire was one of the Central Powers. It began participation in the conflict after the declaration of war against Serbia by its ally, Austria-Hungary. German forces fought the Allies on both the eastern and western fronts, although German territory itself remained relatively safe from widespread invasion for most of the war, except for a brief period in 1914 when East Prussia was invaded. A tight blockade imposed by the Royal Navy caused severe food shortages in the cities, especially in the winter of 1916–17, known as the Turnip Winter. At the end of the war, Germany's defeat and widespread popular discontent triggered the German Revolution of 1918–1919 which overthrew the monarchy and established the Weimar Republic.

Overview

Main articles: German entry into World War I and German Empire § World War I
 
World War I mobilization, 1 August 1914

The German population responded to the outbreak of war in 1914 with a complex mix of emotions, in a similar way to the populations in other countries of Europe; notions of overt enthusiasm known as the Spirit of 1914 have been challenged by more recent scholarship.[1] The German government, dominated by the Junkers, saw the war as a way to end being surrounded by hostile powers France, Russia and Britain. The war was presented inside Germany as the chance for the nation to secure "our place under the sun," as the Foreign Minister Bernhard von Bülow had put it, which was readily supported by prevalent nationalism among the public. The German establishment hoped the war would unite the public behind the monarchy, and lessen the threat posed by the dramatic growth of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, which had been the most vocal critic of the Kaiser in the Reichstag before the war. Despite its membership in the Second International, the Social Democratic Party of Germany ended its differences with the Imperial government and abandoned its principles of internationalism to support the war effort. The German state spent 170 billion Marks during the war. The money was raised by borrowing from banks and from public bond drives. Symbolic purchasing of nails which were driving into public wooden crosses spurred the aristocracy and middle class to buy bonds. These bonds became worthless with the 1923 hyperinflation.

It soon became apparent that Germany was not prepared for a war lasting more than a few months. At first, little was done to regulate the economy for a wartime footing, and the German war economy would remain badly organized throughout the war. Germany depended on imports of food and raw materials, which were stopped by the British blockade of Germany. First food prices were limited, then rationing was introduced. In 1915 five million pigs were massacred in the so-called Schweinemord, both to produce food and to preserve grain. The winter of 1916/17 was called the "turnip winter" because the potato harvest was poor and people ate animal food, including vile-tasting turnips. From August 1914 to mid-1919, the excess deaths compared to peacetime caused by malnutrition and high rates of exhaustion and disease and despair came to about 474,000 civilians.[2][3]

 
Bethmann Hollweg in uniform. He never served in the army, but after the war started, he was appointed to an honorary rank with a general's uniform.[4]

Government

Main articles: German entry into World War I and Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg

According to biographer Konrad H. Jarausch, a primary concern for Bethmann Hollweg in July 1914 was the steady growth of Russian power, and the growing closeness of the British and French military collaboration. Under these circumstances he decided to run what he considered a calculated risk to back Vienna in a local small-scale war against Serbia, while risking a major war with Russia. He calculated that France would not support Russia. It failed when Russia decided on general mobilization, and his own Army demanded the opportunity to use the Schlieffen Plan for quick victory against a poorly prepared France. By rushing through Belgium, Germany expanded the war to include England. Bethmann thus failed to keep France and Britain out of the conflict.[5]

The crisis came to a head on 5 July 1914 when the Count Hoyos Mission arrived in Berlin in response to Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold's plea for friendship. Bethmann Hollweg was assured that Britain would not intervene in the frantic diplomatic rounds across the European powers. However, reliance on that assumption encouraged Austria to demand Serbian concessions. His main concern was Russian border manoeuvres, conveyed by his ambassadors at a time when Raymond Poincaré himself was preparing a secret mission to St Petersburg. He wrote to Count Sergey Sazonov, "Russian mobilisation measures would compel us to mobilise and that then European war could scarcely be prevented."[6]

Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, Bethmann Hollweg and his foreign minister, Gottlieb von Jagow, were instrumental in assuring Austria-Hungary of Germany's unconditional support, regardless of Austria's actions against Serbia. While Grey was suggesting a mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, Bethmann Hollweg wanted Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia and so he tampered with the British message and deleted the last line of the letter: "Also, the whole world here is convinced, and I hear from my colleagues that the key to the situation lies in Berlin, and that if Berlin seriously wants peace, it will prevent Vienna from following a foolhardy policy.[7]

When the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was presented to Serbia, Kaiser Wilhelm II ended his vacation and hurried back to Berlin.

When Wilhelm arrived at the Potsdam station late in the evening of July 26, he was met by a pale, agitated, and somewhat fearful Chancellor. Bethmann Hollweg's apprehension stemmed not from the dangers of the looming war, but rather from his fear of the Kaiser's wrath when the extent of his deceptions were revealed. The Kaiser's first words to him were suitably brusque: "How did it all happen?" Rather than attempt to explain, the Chancellor offered his resignation by way of apology. Wilhelm refused to accept it, muttering furiously, "You've made this stew, now you're going to eat it!"[8]

Bethmann Hollweg, much of whose foreign policy before the war had been guided by his desire to establish good relations with Britain, was particularly upset by Britain's declaration of war following the German violation of Belgium's neutrality during its invasion of France. He reportedly asked the departing British Ambassador Edward Goschen how Britain could go to war over a "scrap of paper" ("ein Fetzen Papier"), which was the 1839 Treaty of London guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality.

Bethmann Hollweg sought public approval from a declaration of war. His civilian colleagues pleaded for him to register some febrile protest, but he was frequently outflanked by the military leaders, who played an increasingly important role in the direction of all German policy.[9] However, according to historian Fritz Fischer, writing in the 1960s, Bethmann Hollweg made more concessions to the nationalist right than had previously been thought. He supported the ethnic cleansing of Poles from the Polish Border Strip as well as Germanisation of Polish territories by settlement of German colonists.[10]

A few weeks after the war began Bethmann presented the Septemberprogramm, which was a survey of ideas from the elite should Germany win the war. Bethmann Hollweg, with all credibility and power now lost, conspired over Falkenhayn's head with Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff (respectively commander-in-chief and chief of staff for the Eastern Front) for an Eastern Offensive. They then succeeded, in August 1916 in securing Falkenhayn's replacement by Hindenburg as Chief of the General Staff, with Ludendorff as First Quartermaster-General (Hindenburg's deputy). Thereafter, Bethmann Hollweg's hopes for US President Woodrow Wilson's mediation at the end of 1916 came to nothing. Over Bethmann Hollweg's objections, Hindenburg and Ludendorff forced the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare in March 1917, adopted as a result of Henning von Holtzendorff's memorandum. Bethmann Hollweg had been a reluctant participant and opposed it in cabinet. The US entered the war in April 1917.

According to Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Bethmann Hollweg weakened his own position by failing to establish good control over public relations. To avoid highly intensive negative publicity, he conducted much of his diplomacy and secret, thereby failed to build strong support for it. In 1914 he was willing to risk a world war to win public support.[11]

Bethmann Hollweg remained in office until July 1917, when a Reichstag revolt resulted in the passage of Matthias Erzberger's Peace Resolution by an alliance of the Social Democratic, Progressive, and Centre parties. That same July the strong opposition to him from high-level military leaders – including Hindenburg and Ludendorff who both threatened to resign – was exacerbated when Bethmann Hollweg convinced the Emperor to agree publicly to the introduction of equal manhood suffrage in Prussian state elections.[12] The combination of political and military opposition forced Bethmann Hollweg's resignation and replacement by a relatively unknown figure, Georg Michaelis.[13]

1914–15

 
German soldiers on the way to the front in 1914. A message on the freight car spells out "Trip to Paris"; early in the war, all sides expected the conflict to be a short one.
 
In this contemporary drawing by Heinrich Zille, the German soldiers bound westwards to France and those bound eastwards to Russia smilingly salute each other.
Main article: Western Front (World War I)

The German army opened the war on the Western Front with a modified version of the Schlieffen Plan, designed to quickly attack France through neutral Belgium before turning southwards to encircle the French army on the German border. The Belgians fought back, and sabotaged their rail system to delay the Germans. The Germans did not expect this and were delayed, and responded with systematic reprisals on civilians, killing nearly 6,000 Belgian noncombatants, including women and children, and burning 25,000 houses and buildings.[14] The plan called for the right flank of the German advance to converge on Paris and initially, the Germans were very successful, particularly in the Battle of the Frontiers (14–24 August). By 12 September, the French with assistance from the British forces halted the German advance east of Paris at the First Battle of the Marne (5–12 September). The last days of this battle signified the end of mobile warfare in the west. The French offensive into Germany launched on 7 August with the Battle of Mulhouse had limited success.[15]

In the east, only one Field Army defended East Prussia and when Russia attacked in this region it diverted German forces intended for the Western Front. Germany defeated Russia in a series of battles collectively known as the First Battle of Tannenberg (17 August – 2 September), but this diversion exacerbated problems of insufficient speed of advance from rail-heads not foreseen by the German General Staff. The Central Powers were thereby denied a quick victory and forced to fight a war on two fronts. The German army had fought its way into a good defensive position inside France and had permanently incapacitated 230,000 more French and British troops than it had lost itself. Despite this, communications problems and questionable command decisions cost Germany the chance of obtaining an early victory.

1916

 
German soldiers digging trenches

1916 was characterized by two great battles on the Western front, at Verdun and the Somme. They each lasted most of the year, achieved minimal gains, and drained away the best soldiers of both sides. Verdun became the iconic symbol of the murderous power of modern defensive weapons, with 280,000 German casualties, and 315,000 French. At the Somme, there were over 400,000 German casualties, against over 600,000 Allied casualties. At Verdun, the Germans attacked what they considered to be a weak French salient which nevertheless the French would defend for reasons of national pride. The Somme was part of a multinational plan of the Allies to attack on different fronts simultaneously. German woes were also compounded by Russia's grand "Brusilov offensive", which diverted more soldiers and resources. Although the Eastern front was held to a standoff and Germany suffered fewer casualties than their allies with ~150,000 of the ~770,000 Central powers casualties, the simultaneous Verdun offensive stretched the German forces committed to the Somme offensive. German experts are divided in their interpretation of the Somme. Some say it was a standoff, but most see it as a British victory and argue it marked the point at which German morale began a permanent decline and the strategic initiative was lost, along with irreplaceable veterans and confidence.[16]

1917

 
German soldiers operating a flamethrower in 1917

In early 1917 the SPD leadership became concerned about the activity of its anti-war left-wing which had been organising as the Sozialdemokratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft (SAG, "Social Democratic Working Group"). On 17 January they expelled them, and in April 1917 the left-wing went on to form the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (German: Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands). The remaining faction was then known as the Majority Social Democratic Party of Germany. This happened as the enthusiasm for war faded with the enormous numbers of casualties, the dwindling supply of manpower, the mounting difficulties on the homefront, and the never-ending flow of casualty reports. A grimmer and grimmer attitude began to prevail amongst the general population. The only highlight was the first use of mustard gas in warfare, in the Battle of Ypres.

After, morale was helped by victories against Serbia, Greece, Italy, and Russia which made great gains for the Central Powers. Morale was at its greatest since 1914 at the end of 1917 and beginning of 1918 with the defeat of Russia following her rise into revolution, and the German people braced for what General Erich Ludendorff said would be the "Peace Offensive" in the west.[17][18]

1918

Further information: German spring offensive

In spring 1918, Germany realized that time was running out. It prepared for the decisive strike with new armies and new tactics, hoping to win the war on the Western front before millions of American soldiers appeared in battle. General Erich Ludendorff and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg had full control of the army, they had a large supply of reinforcements moved from the Eastern front, and they trained storm troopers with new tactics to race through the trenches and attack the enemy's command and communications centers. The new tactics would indeed restore mobility to the Western front, but the German army was too optimistic.

During the winter of 1917-18 it was "quiet" on the Western Front—British casualties averaged "only" 3,000 a week. Serious attacks were impossible in the winter because of the deep caramel-thick mud. Quietly the Germans brought in their best soldiers from the eastern front, selected elite storm troops, and trained them all winter in the new tactics. With stopwatch timing, the German artillery would lay down a sudden, fearsome barrage just ahead of its advancing infantry. Moving in small units, firing light machine guns, the stormtroopers would bypass enemy strongpoints, and head directly for critical bridges, command posts, supply dumps and, above all, artillery batteries. By cutting enemy communications they would paralyze response in the critical first half hour. By silencing the artillery they would break the enemy's firepower. Rigid schedules sent in two more waves of infantry to mop up the strong points that had been bypassed. The shock troops frightened and disoriented the first line of defenders, who would flee in panic. In one instance an easy-going Allied regiment broke and fled; reinforcements rushed in on bicycles. The panicky men seized the bikes and beat an even faster retreat. The stormtrooper tactics provided mobility, but not increased firepower. Eventually—in 1939 and 1940—the formula would be perfected with the aid of dive bombers and tanks, but in 1918 the Germans lacked both.[19]

Ludendorff erred by attacking the British first in 1918, instead of the French. He mistakenly thought the British to be too uninspired to respond rapidly to the new tactics. The exhausted, dispirited French perhaps might have folded. The German assaults on the British were ferocious—the largest of the entire war. At the Somme River in March, 63 divisions attacked in a blinding fog. No matter, the German lieutenants had memorized their maps and their orders. The British lost 270,000 men, fell back 40 miles, and then held. They quickly learned how to handle the new German tactics: fall back, abandon the trenches, let the attackers overextend themselves, and then counterattack. They gained an advantage in firepower from their artillery and from tanks used as mobile pillboxes that could retreat and counterattack at will. In April Ludendorff hit the British again, inflicting 305,000 casualties—but he lacked the reserves to follow up. Ludendorff launched five great attacks between March and July, inflicting a million British and French casualties. The Western Front now had opened up—the trenches were still there but the importance of mobility now reasserted itself. The Allies held. The Germans suffered twice as many casualties as they inflicted, including most of their precious stormtroopers. The new German replacements were under-aged youth or embittered middle-aged family men in poor condition. They were not inspired by the elan of 1914, nor thrilled with battle—they hated it, and some began talking of revolution. Ludendorff could not replace his losses, nor could he devise a new brainstorm that might somehow snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. The British likewise were bringing in reinforcements from the whole Empire, but since their home front was in good condition, and since they could see inevitable victory, their morale was higher. The great German spring offensive was a race against time, for everyone could see the Americans were training millions of fresh young men who would eventually arrive on the Western Front.[20][21]

 
German troops in Kiev, March 1918

The attrition warfare now caught up to both sides. Germany had used up all the best soldiers they had, and still had not conquered much territory. The British likewise were bringing in youths of 18 and unfit and middle-aged men, but they could see the Americans arriving steadily. The French had also nearly exhausted their manpower. Berlin had calculated it would take months for the Americans to ship all their men and equipment—but the U.S. troops arrived much sooner, as they left their heavy equipment behind, and relied on British and French artillery, tanks, airplanes, trucks and equipment. Berlin also assumed that Americans were fat, undisciplined and unaccustomed to hardship and severe fighting. They soon realized their mistake. The Germans reported that "The qualities of the [Americans] individually may be described as remarkable. They are physically well set up, their attitude is good... They lack at present only training and experience to make formidable adversaries. The men are in fine spirits and are filled with naive assurance."[22]

By September 1918, the Central Powers were exhausted from fighting, the American forces were pouring into France at a rate of 10,000 a day, the British Empire was mobilised for war peaking at 4.5 million men and 4,000 tanks on the Western Front. The decisive Allied counteroffensive, known as the Hundred Days Offensive, began on 8 August 1918—what Ludendorff called the "Black Day of the German army." The Allied armies advanced steadily as German defenses faltered.[23]

Although German armies were still on enemy soil as the war ended, the generals, the civilian leadership—and indeed the soldiers and the people—knew all was hopeless. They started looking for scapegoats. The hunger and popular dissatisfaction with the war precipitated revolution throughout Germany. By 11 November Germany had virtually surrendered, the Kaiser and all the royal families had abdicated, and the German Empire had been replaced by the Weimar Republic.

Home front

War fever

 
Military propaganda postcard: Wounded soldiers cheer to the German Emperor Wilhelm II, who is in a car.

The "spirit of 1914" was the overwhelming, enthusiastic support of all elements of the population for war in 1914. In the Reichstag, the vote for credits was unanimous, with all the Socialists but one (Karl Liebknecht) joining in. One professor testified to a "great single feeling of moral elevation of soaring of religious sentiment, in short, the ascent of a whole people to the heights."[24] At the same time, there was a level of anxiety; most commentators predicted the short victorious war – but that hope was dashed in a matter of weeks, as the invasion of Belgium bogged down and the French Army held in front of Paris. The Western Front became a killing machine, as neither army moved more than a few hundred yards at a time. Industry in late 1914 was in chaos, unemployment soared while it took months to reconvert to munitions productions. In 1916, the Hindenburg Program called for the mobilization of all economic resources to produce artillery, shells, and machine guns. Church bells and copper roofs were ripped out and melted down.[25]

According to historian William H. MacNeil:

By 1917, after three years of war, the various groups and bureaucratic hierarchies which had been operating more or less independently of one another in peacetime (and not infrequently had worked at cross purposes) were subordinated to one (and perhaps the most effective) of their number: the General Staff. Military officers controlled civilian government officials, the staffs of banks, cartels, firms, and factories, engineers and scientists, workingmen, farmers-indeed almost every element in German society; and all efforts were directed in theory and in large degree also in practice to forwarding the war effort.[26]

Economy

Germany had no plans for mobilizing its civilian economy for the war effort, and no stockpiles of food or critical supplies had been made. Germany had to improvise rapidly. All major political sectors initially supported the war, including the Socialists.

Early in the war industrialist Walter Rathenau held senior posts in the Raw Materials Department of the War Ministry, while becoming chairman of AEG upon his father's death in 1915. Rathenau played the key role in convincing the War Ministry to set up the War Raw Materials Department (Kriegsrohstoffabteilung - 'KRA'); he was in charge of it from August 1914 to March 1915 and established the basic policies and procedures. His senior staff were on loan from industry. KRA focused on raw materials threatened by the British blockade, as well as supplies from occupied Belgium and France. It set prices and regulated the distribution to vital war industries. It began the development of ersatz raw materials. KRA suffered many inefficiencies caused by the complexity and selfishness KRA encountered from commerce, industry, and the government.[27][28]

 
Collecting scrap metal for the war effort, 1916

While the KRA handled critical raw materials, the crisis over food supplies grew worse. The mobilization of so many farmers and horses, and the shortages of fertilizer, steadily reduced the food supply. Prisoners of war were sent to work on farms, and many women and elderly men took on work roles. Supplies that had once come in from Russia and Austria were cut off.[29]

The concept of "total war" in World War I, meant that food supplies had to be redirected towards the armed forces and, with German commerce being stopped by the British blockade, German civilians were forced to live in increasingly meager conditions. Food prices were first controlled. Bread rationing was introduced in 1915 and worked well; the cost of bread fell. Allen says there were no signs of starvation and states, "the sense of domestic catastrophe one gains from most accounts of food rationing in Germany is exaggerated."[30] However Howard argues that hundreds of thousands of civilians died from malnutrition—usually from a typhus or a disease their weakened body could not resist. (Starvation itself rarely caused death.)[31] A 2014 study, derived from a recently discovered dataset on the heights and weights of German children between 1914 and 1924, found evidence that German children suffered from severe malnutrition during the blockade, with working-class children suffering the most.[32] The study furthermore found that German children quickly recovered after the war due to a massive international food aid program.[32]

Conditions deteriorated rapidly on the home front, with severe food shortages reported in all urban areas. The causes involved the transfer of so many farmers and food workers into the military, combined with the overburdened railroad system, shortages of coal, and the British blockade that cut off imports from abroad. The winter of 1916-1917 was known as the "turnip winter," because that hardly-edible vegetable, usually fed to livestock, was used by people as a substitute for potatoes and meat, which were increasingly scarce. Thousands of soup kitchens were opened to feed the hungry people, who grumbled that the farmers were keeping the food for themselves. Even the army had to cut the rations for soldiers.[33] Morale of both civilians and soldiers continued to sink.

 
Wartime ration stamps in Bavaria

The drafting of miners reduced the main energy source, coal. The textile factories produced Army uniforms, and warm clothing for civilians ran short. The device of using ersatz materials, such as paper and cardboard for cloth and leather proved unsatisfactory. Soap was in short supply, as was hot water. All the cities reduced tram services, cut back on street lighting, and closed down theaters and cabarets.

The food supply increasingly focused on potatoes and bread, it was harder and harder to buy meat. The meat ration in late 1916 was only 31% of peacetime, and it fell to 12% in late 1918. The fish ration was 51% in 1916, and none at all by late 1917. The rations for cheese, butter, rice, cereals, eggs and lard were less than 20% of peacetime levels.[34] In 1917 the harvest was poor all across Europe, and the potato supply ran short, and Germans substituted almost inedible turnips; the "turnip winter" of 1916–17 was remembered with bitter distaste for generations.[35] Early in the war bread rationing was introduced, and the system worked fairly well, albeit with shortfalls during the Turnip Winter and summer of 1918. White bread used imported flour and became unavailable, but there was enough rye or rye-potato flour to provide a minimal diet for all civilians.[36]

German women were not employed in the Army, but large numbers took paid employment in industry and factories, and even larger numbers engaged in volunteer services. Housewives were taught how to cook without milk, eggs or fat; agencies helped widows find work. Banks, insurance companies and government offices for the first time hired women for clerical positions. Factories hired them for unskilled labor – by December 1917, half the workers in chemicals, metals, and machine tools were women. Laws protecting women in the workplace were relaxed, and factories set up canteens to provide food for their workers, lest their productivity fall off. The food situation in 1918 was better, because the harvest was better, but serious shortages continued, with high prices, and a complete lack of condiments and fresh fruit. Many migrants had flocked into cities to work in industry, which made for overcrowded housing. Reduced coal supplies left everyone in the cold. Daily life involved long working hours, poor health, and little or no recreation, and increasing fears for the safety of loved ones in the Army and in prisoner of war camps. The men who returned from the front were those who had been permanently crippled; wounded soldiers who had recovered were sent back to the trenches.[37]

Defeat and revolt

See also: Aftermath of World War I
 
Demobilization after World War I

Many Germans wanted an end to the war and increasing numbers of Germans began to associate with the political left, such as the Social Democratic Party and the more radical Independent Social Democratic Party which demanded an end to the war. The third reason was the entry of the United States into the war in April 1917, which tipped the long-run balance of power even more to the Allies. The end of October 1918, in Kiel, in northern Germany, saw the beginning of the German Revolution of 1918–19. Civilian dock workers led a revolt and convinced many sailors to join them; the revolt quickly spread to other cities. Meanwhile, Hindenburg and the senior generals lost confidence in the Kaiser and his government.

In November 1918, with internal revolution, a stalemated war, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire suing for peace, Austria-Hungary falling apart from multiple ethnic tensions, and pressure from the German high command, the Kaiser and all German ruling princes abdicated. On 9 November 1918, the Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed a Republic. The new government led by the German Social Democrats called for and received an armistice on 11 November 1918; in practice it was a surrender, and the Allies kept up the food blockade to guarantee an upper hand in negotiations. The now defunct German Empire was succeeded by the Weimar Republic.[38][page needed]

Seven million soldiers and sailors were quickly demobilized, and they became a conservative voice that drowned out the radical left in cities such as Kiel and Berlin. The radicals formed the Spartakusbund and later the Communist Party of Germany.

Due to German military forces still occupying portions of France on the day of the armistice, various nationalist groups and those angered by the defeat in the war shifted blame to civilians; accusing them of betraying the army and surrendering. This contributed to the "Stab-in-the-back myth" that dominated German politics in the 1920s and created a distrust of democracy and the Weimar government.[39]

War deaths

Main article: World War I casualties

Out of a population of 65 million, Germany suffered 1.7 million military deaths and 430,000 civilian deaths due to wartime causes (especially the food blockade), plus about 17,000 killed in Africa and the other overseas colonies.[40]

The Allied blockade continued until July 1919, causing severe additional hardships.[41]

Soldiers' experiences

Despite the often ruthless conduct of the German military machine, in the air and at sea as well as on land, individual German and soldiers could view the enemy with respect and empathy and the war with contempt.[42] Some examples from letters homework :

"A terrible picture presented itself to me. A French and a General soldier on their knees were leaning against each other. They had pierced each other with the bayonet and had dropped like this to the ground...Courage, heroism, does it really exist? I am about to doubt it, since I haven't seen anything else than fear, anxiety , and despair in every face during the battle. There was nothing at all like courage, bravery, or the like. In reality, there is nothing else than texting discipline and coercion propelling the soldiers forward" Dominik Richert, 1914.[43]

"Our men have reached an agreement with the French to cease fire. They bring us bread, wine, sardines etc., we bring them schnapps. The masters make war, they have a quarrel, and the workers, the little men...have to stand there fighting against each other. Is that not a great stupidity?...If this were to be decided according to the number of votes, we would have been long home by now" Hermann Baur, 1915.[44]

"I have no idea what we are still fighting for anyway, maybe because the newspapers portray everything about the war in a false light which has nothing to do with the reality.....There could be no greater misery in the enemy country and at home. The people who still support the war haven't got a clue about anything...If I stay alive, I will make these things public...We all want peace...What is the point of conquering half of the world, when we have to sacrifice all our strength?..You out there, just champion peace! … We give away all our worldly possessions and even our freedom. Our only goal is to be with our wife and children again," Anonymous Bavarian soldier, 17 October 1914.[45]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth and Mobilization in Germany (Cambridge U.P., 2000).
  2. ^ N.P. Howard, "The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany, 1918-19," German History (1993), 11#2, pp. 161-88 online p. 166, with 271,000 excess deaths in 1918 and 71,000 in 1919.
  3. ^ Strachan, Hew (1998). World War 1. Oxford University Press. p. 125. ISBN 9780198206149.
  4. ^ This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Rines, George Edwin, ed. (1920). "Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald Theodore Friedrich Alfred von" . Encyclopedia Americana.
  5. ^ Konrad H. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914." Central European History 2.1 (1969): 48-76.
  6. ^ Trachtenberg, Marc. "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914." International Security 15#3 (1990), pp. 120–50, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538909.
  7. ^ Fritz Fischer, "1914: Germany Opts for War, 'Now or Never'", in Holger H. Herwig, ed., The Outbreak of World War I (1997), pp. 70-89 at p. 71.online
  8. ^ Butler, David Allen (2010). The Burden of Guilt: How Germany Shattered the Last Days of Peace, Summer 1914. Casemate Publishers. p. 103. ISBN 9781935149576. Retrieved 30 July 2012.
  9. ^ Barbara Tuchman, The guns of August (1970) p. 84
  10. ^ Hull, Isabel V. (2005). Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany. Cornell University Press. p. 233. ISBN 0801442583. Retrieved 7 July 2009.
  11. ^ Wolfgang J. Mommsen,"Public opinion and foreign policy in Wilhelmian Germany, 1897–1914." Central European History 24.4 (1991): 381-401.
  12. ^ Frauendienst, Werner (1985). "Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald Theodor Friedrich Alfred von". Neue Deutsche Biographie 2 (in German). pp. 188–193 [Online-Version].
  13. ^ Robert F. Hopwood, "Czernin and the Fall of Bethmann–Hollweg." Canadian Journal of History 2.2 (1967): 49-61.
  14. ^ Jeff Lipkes, Rehearsals: The German Army in Belgium, August 1914 (2007)
  15. ^ Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (1962)
  16. ^ Fred R. Van Hartesveldt, The Battles of the Somme, 1916: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography (1996), pp. 26-27.
  17. ^ C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War: 1914-1918 (1935) ch 15-29
  18. ^ Holger H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (1997) ch. 4-6.
  19. ^ Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtrooper Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 (1989), pp. 155-70.
  20. ^ David Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 (2011), pp. 30-111.
  21. ^ C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War: 1914-1918 (1935), pp. 505-35r.
  22. ^ Millett, Allan (1991). Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps. Simon and Schuster. p. 304. ISBN 9780029215968.
  23. ^ Tucker, Spencer C. (2005). World War I: A - D. ABC-CLIO. p. 1256. ISBN 9781851094202.
  24. ^ Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 (1998) p. 14
  25. ^ Richie, Faust's Metropolis, pp. 272-75.
  26. ^ William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West (1991 edition) p. 742.
  27. ^ D. G. Williamson, "Walther Rathenau and the K.R.A. August 1914-March 1915," Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte (1978), Issue 11, pp. 118-136.
  28. ^ Hew Strachan, The First World War: Volume I: To Arms (2001), pp. 1014-49 on Rathenau and KRA.
  29. ^ Feldman, Gerald D. "The Political and Social Foundations of Germany's Economic Mobilization, 1914-1916," Armed Forces & Society (1976), 3#1, pp. 121-145. online
  30. ^ Keith Allen, "Sharing scarcity: Bread rationing and the First World War in Berlin, 1914-1923," Journal of Social History, (1998), 32#2, pp. 371-93, quote p. 380.
  31. ^ N. P. Howard, "The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany, 1918-19," German History, April 1993, Vol. 11, Issue 2, pp. 161-188.
  32. ^ a b Cox, Mary Elisabeth (2015-05-01). "Hunger games: or how the Allied blockade in the First World War deprived German children of nutrition, and Allied food aid subsequently saved them". The Economic History Review. 68 (2): 600–631. doi:10.1111/ehr.12070. ISSN 1468-0289. S2CID 142354720.
  33. ^ Roger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 (2004) p. 141-42
  34. ^ David Welch, Germany, Propaganda and Total War, 1914-1918 (2000) p.122
  35. ^ Chickering, Imperial Germany, pp. 140-145.
  36. ^ Keith Allen, "Sharing scarcity: Bread rationing and the First World War in Berlin, 1914-1923," Journal of Social History (1998) 32#2, 00224529, Winter98, Vol. 32, Issue 2
  37. ^ Alexandra Richie, Faust's Metropolis (1998), pp. 277-80.
  38. ^ A. J. Ryder, The German Revolution of 1918: A Study of German Socialism in War and Revolt (2008)
  39. ^ Wilhelm Diest and E. J. Feuchtwanger, "The Military Collapse of the German Empire: the Reality Behind the Stab-in-the-Back Myth," War in History, April 1996, Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp. 186-207.
  40. ^ Leo Grebler and Wilhelm Winkler, The Cost of the World War to Germany and Austria-Hungary (Yale University Press, 1940)
  41. ^ N.P. Howard, N.P. "The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany, 1918-19," German History (1993) p 162
  42. ^ Bernd Ulrich said and Benjamin, ed., Ziemann, German Soldiers in the Great War: and Savey Letters and Eyewitness Accounts (Pen and Sword Military, 2010). This book is a compilation of German soldiers' letters and memoirs. All the references come from this book.
  43. ^ German Soldiers in the Great War, 77.
  44. ^ German Soldiers in the Great War, 64.
  45. ^ German Soldiers in the Great War, 51.

Further reading

  • Watson, Alexander. Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I (2014), excerpt

Military

  • Cecil, Lamar (1996), Wilhelm II: Emperor and Exile, 1900-1941, vol. II, Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, p. 176, ISBN 978-0-8078-2283-8, OCLC 186744003
  • Chickering, Roger, et al. eds. Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918 (Publications of the German Historical Institute) (2000). ISBN 0-521-77352-0. 584 pgs.
  • Cowin, Hugh W. German and Austrian Aviation of World War I: A Pictorial Chronicle of the Airmen and Aircraft That Forged German Airpower (2000). Osprey Pub Co. ISBN 1-84176-069-2. 96 pgs.
  • Cruttwell, C.R.M.F. A History of the Great War: 1914-1918 (1935) ch 15-29 online free
  • Cross, Wilbur (1991), Zeppelins of World War I, ISBN 978-1-55778-382-0
  • Herwig, Holger H. The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (1996), mostly military
  • Horne, John, ed. A Companion to World War I (2012)
  • Hubatsch, Walther; Backus, Oswald P (1963), Germany and the Central Powers in the World War, 1914–1918, Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, OCLC 250441891
  • Karau, Mark D. Germany's Defeat in the First World War: The Lost Battles and Reckless Gambles That Brought Down the Second Reich (ABC-CLIO, 2015) scholarly analysis. excerpt
  • Kitchen, Martin. The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916–1918 (London: Croom Helm, 1976)
  • Morrow, John. German Air Power in World War I (U. of Nebraska Press, 1982); Contains design and production figures, as well as economic influences.
  • Sheldon, Jack (2005). The German Army on the Somme: 1914 - 1916. Barnsley: Pen and Sword Books Ltd. ISBN 978-1-84415-269-8.

Home front

  • Allen, Keith. "Sharing Scarcity: Bread Rationing and the First World War in Berlin, 1914– 1923," Journal of Social History (1998), 32#2, pp. 371–96.
  • Armeson, Robert. Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor: A Study of the Military-Industrial Complex in Germany during World War I (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1964)
  • Bailey, S. "The Berlin Strike of 1918," Central European History (1980), 13#2, pp. 158–74.
  • Bell, Archibald. A History of the Blockade of Germany and the Countries Associated with Her in the Great War, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, 1914–1918 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1937)
  • Broadberry, Stephen and Mark Harrison, eds. The Economics of World War I (2005) ISBN 0-521-85212-9. Covers France, UK, USA, Russia, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and the Netherlands
  • Burchardt, Lothar. "The Impact of the War Economy on the Civilian Population of Germany during the First and the Second World Wars," in The German Military in the Age of Total War, edited by Wilhelm Deist, 40–70. Leamington Spa: Berg, 1985.
  • Chickering, Roger. Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914–1918 (1998), wide-ranging survey
  • Daniel, Ute. The War from Within: German Working-Class Women in the First World War (1997)
  • Dasey, Robyn. "Women's Work and the Family: Women Garment Workers in Berlin and Hamburg before the First World War," in The German Family: Essays on the Social History of the Family in Nineteenth-and Twentieth-Century Germany, edited by Richard J. Evans and W. R. Lee, (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 221–53.
  • Davis, Belinda J. Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin (2000) online edition
  • Dobson, Sean. Authority and Upheaval in Leipzig, 1910–1920 (2000).
  • Domansky, Elisabeth. "Militarization and Reproduction in World War I Germany," in Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870–1930, edited by Geoff Eley, (University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 427–64.
  • Donson, Andrew. "Why did German youth become fascists? Nationalist males born 1900 to 1908 in war and revolution," Social History, Aug2006, Vol. 31, Issue 3, pp. 337–358
  • Feldman, Gerald D. "The Political and Social Foundations of Germany's Economic Mobilization, 1914-1916," Armed Forces & Society (1976), 3#1, pp. 121–145. online
  • Feldman, Gerald. Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918 (1966)
  • Ferguson, Niall The Pity of War (1999), cultural and economic themes, worldwide
  • Hardach, Gerd. The First World War 1914-1918 (1977), economics
  • Herwig, Holger H. The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (1996), one third on the homefront
  • Howard, N.P. "The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany, 1918-19," German History (1993), 11#2, pp. 161–88 online
  • Kocka, Jürgen. Facing total war: German society, 1914-1918 (1984). online at ACLS e-books
  • Lee, Joe. "German Administrators and Agriculture during the First World War," in War and Economic Development, edited by Jay M. Winter. (Cambridge UP, 1922).
  • Lutz, Ralph Haswell. The German revolution, 1918-1919 (1938) a brief survey online free
  • Marquis, H. G. "Words as Weapons: Propaganda in Britain and Germany during the First World War." Journal of Contemporary History (1978) 12: 467–98.
  • McKibbin, David. War and Revolution in Leipzig, 1914–1918: Socialist Politics and Urban Evolution in a German City (University Press of America, 1998).
  • Moeller, Robert G. "Dimensions of Social Conflict in the Great War: A View from the Countryside," Central European History (1981), 14#2, pp. 142–68.
  • Moeller, Robert G. German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, 1914–1924: The Rhineland and Westphalia (1986). online edition
  • Offer, Avner. The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (1991), on food supply of Britain and Germany
  • Osborne, Eric. Britain's Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914-1919 (2004)
  • Richie, Alexandra. Faust's Metropolis: a History of Berlin (1998), pp. 234–83.
  • Ryder, A. J. The German Revolution of 1918 (Cambridge University Press, 1967)
  • Siney, Marion. The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1914–1916 (1957)
  • Steege, Paul. Black Market, Cold War: Everyday Life in Berlin, 1946-1949 (2008) excerpt and text search
  • Terraine, John. "'An Actual Revolutionary Situation': In 1917 there was little to sustain German morale at home," History Today (1978), 28#1, pp. 14–22, online
  • Tobin, Elizabeth. "War and the Working Class: The Case of Düsseldorf, 1914–1918," Central European History (1985), 13#3, pp. 257–98
  • Triebel, Armin. "Consumption in Wartime Germany," in The Upheaval of War: Family, Work, and Welfare in Europe, 1914–1918 edited by Richard Wall and Jay M. Winter, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 159–96.
  • Usborne, Cornelie. "Pregnancy Is a Woman's Active Service," in The Upheaval of War: Family, Work, and Welfare in Europe, 1914–1918 edited by Richard Wall and Jay M. Winter, (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 289–416.
  • Verhey, Jeffrey. The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany (2006) excerpt
  • Welch, David. Germany and Propaganda in World War I: Pacifism, Mobilization and Total War (IB Tauris, 2014)
  • Winter, Jay, and Jean-Louis Robert, eds. Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin 1914-1919 (2 vol. 1999, 2007), 30 chapters 1200pp; comprehensive coverage by scholars vol 1 excerpt; vol 2 excerpt and text search
  • Winter, Jay. Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (1995)
  • Ziemann, Benjamin. War Experiences in Rural Germany, 1914-1923 (Berg, 2007) online edition

Primary sources

  • Gooch, P. G. Recent Revelations Of European Diplomacy (1940). pp3–100
  • Lutz, Ralph Haswell, ed. Fall of the German Empire, 1914–1918 (2 vol 1932). 868pp online review, primary sources

External links

  • (in German) "Der Erste Weltkrieg" (in English) "The First World War" at Living Museum Online (LeMO)
  • Articles relating to Germany at 1914-1918 Online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War
    • Hirschfeld, Gerhard: Germany
    • Fehlemann, Silke: Bereavement and Mourning (Germany)
    • Bruendel, Steffen: Between Acceptance and Refusal - Soldiers' Attitudes Towards War (Germany)
    • Davis, Belinda: Food and Nutrition (Germany)
    • Oppelland, Torsten: Governments, Parliaments and Parties (Germany)
    • Stibbe, Matthew: Women's Mobilisation for War (Germany)
    • Ungern-Sternberg, Jürgen von: Making Sense of the War (Germany)
    • Ullmann, Hans-Peter: Organization of War Economies (Germany)
    • Gross, Stephen: War Finance (Germany)
    • Altenhöner, Florian: Press/Journalism (Germany)
    • Ther, Vanessa: Propaganda at Home (Germany)
    • Pöhlmann, Markus: Warfare 1914-1918 (Germany)
    • Löffelbein, Nils: War Aims and War Aims Discussions (Germany)
    • Whalen, Robert Weldon: War Losses (Germany)
  • Germany and the First World War article index at Spartacus Educational
  • Posters of the German Military Government in the Generalgouvernement Warshau (German occupied Poland) from World War I, 1915-1916 From the Collections at the Library of Congress

March 03, 2023
history, germany, during, world, during, world, german, empire, central, powers, began, participation, conflict, after, declaration, against, serbia, ally, austria, hungary, german, forces, fought, allies, both, eastern, western, fronts, although, german, terr. During World War I the German Empire was one of the Central Powers It began participation in the conflict after the declaration of war against Serbia by its ally Austria Hungary German forces fought the Allies on both the eastern and western fronts although German territory itself remained relatively safe from widespread invasion for most of the war except for a brief period in 1914 when East Prussia was invaded A tight blockade imposed by the Royal Navy caused severe food shortages in the cities especially in the winter of 1916 17 known as the Turnip Winter At the end of the war Germany s defeat and widespread popular discontent triggered the German Revolution of 1918 1919 which overthrew the monarchy and established the Weimar Republic Contents 1 Overview 1 1 Government 2 1914 15 3 1916 4 1917 5 1918 6 Home front 6 1 War fever 6 2 Economy 7 Defeat and revolt 8 War deaths 9 Soldiers experiences 10 See also 11 Notes 12 Further reading 12 1 Military 12 2 Home front 12 3 Primary sources 13 External linksOverview EditMain articles German entry into World War I and German Empire World War I World War I mobilization 1 August 1914 The German population responded to the outbreak of war in 1914 with a complex mix of emotions in a similar way to the populations in other countries of Europe notions of overt enthusiasm known as the Spirit of 1914 have been challenged by more recent scholarship 1 The German government dominated by the Junkers saw the war as a way to end being surrounded by hostile powers France Russia and Britain The war was presented inside Germany as the chance for the nation to secure our place under the sun as the Foreign Minister Bernhard von Bulow had put it which was readily supported by prevalent nationalism among the public The German establishment hoped the war would unite the public behind the monarchy and lessen the threat posed by the dramatic growth of the Social Democratic Party of Germany which had been the most vocal critic of the Kaiser in the Reichstag before the war Despite its membership in the Second International the Social Democratic Party of Germany ended its differences with the Imperial government and abandoned its principles of internationalism to support the war effort The German state spent 170 billion Marks during the war The money was raised by borrowing from banks and from public bond drives Symbolic purchasing of nails which were driving into public wooden crosses spurred the aristocracy and middle class to buy bonds These bonds became worthless with the 1923 hyperinflation It soon became apparent that Germany was not prepared for a war lasting more than a few months At first little was done to regulate the economy for a wartime footing and the German war economy would remain badly organized throughout the war Germany depended on imports of food and raw materials which were stopped by the British blockade of Germany First food prices were limited then rationing was introduced In 1915 five million pigs were massacred in the so called Schweinemord both to produce food and to preserve grain The winter of 1916 17 was called the turnip winter because the potato harvest was poor and people ate animal food including vile tasting turnips From August 1914 to mid 1919 the excess deaths compared to peacetime caused by malnutrition and high rates of exhaustion and disease and despair came to about 474 000 civilians 2 3 Bethmann Hollweg in uniform He never served in the army but after the war started he was appointed to an honorary rank with a general s uniform 4 Government Edit Main articles German entry into World War I and Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg According to biographer Konrad H Jarausch a primary concern for Bethmann Hollweg in July 1914 was the steady growth of Russian power and the growing closeness of the British and French military collaboration Under these circumstances he decided to run what he considered a calculated risk to back Vienna in a local small scale war against Serbia while risking a major war with Russia He calculated that France would not support Russia It failed when Russia decided on general mobilization and his own Army demanded the opportunity to use the Schlieffen Plan for quick victory against a poorly prepared France By rushing through Belgium Germany expanded the war to include England Bethmann thus failed to keep France and Britain out of the conflict 5 The crisis came to a head on 5 July 1914 when the Count Hoyos Mission arrived in Berlin in response to Austro Hungarian Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold s plea for friendship Bethmann Hollweg was assured that Britain would not intervene in the frantic diplomatic rounds across the European powers However reliance on that assumption encouraged Austria to demand Serbian concessions His main concern was Russian border manoeuvres conveyed by his ambassadors at a time when Raymond Poincare himself was preparing a secret mission to St Petersburg He wrote to Count Sergey Sazonov Russian mobilisation measures would compel us to mobilise and that then European war could scarcely be prevented 6 Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 Bethmann Hollweg and his foreign minister Gottlieb von Jagow were instrumental in assuring Austria Hungary of Germany s unconditional support regardless of Austria s actions against Serbia While Grey was suggesting a mediation between Austria Hungary and Serbia Bethmann Hollweg wanted Austria Hungary to attack Serbia and so he tampered with the British message and deleted the last line of the letter Also the whole world here is convinced and I hear from my colleagues that the key to the situation lies in Berlin and that if Berlin seriously wants peace it will prevent Vienna from following a foolhardy policy 7 When the Austro Hungarian ultimatum was presented to Serbia Kaiser Wilhelm II ended his vacation and hurried back to Berlin When Wilhelm arrived at the Potsdam station late in the evening of July 26 he was met by a pale agitated and somewhat fearful Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg s apprehension stemmed not from the dangers of the looming war but rather from his fear of the Kaiser s wrath when the extent of his deceptions were revealed The Kaiser s first words to him were suitably brusque How did it all happen Rather than attempt to explain the Chancellor offered his resignation by way of apology Wilhelm refused to accept it muttering furiously You ve made this stew now you re going to eat it 8 Bethmann Hollweg much of whose foreign policy before the war had been guided by his desire to establish good relations with Britain was particularly upset by Britain s declaration of war following the German violation of Belgium s neutrality during its invasion of France He reportedly asked the departing British Ambassador Edward Goschen how Britain could go to war over a scrap of paper ein Fetzen Papier which was the 1839 Treaty of London guaranteeing Belgium s neutrality Bethmann Hollweg sought public approval from a declaration of war His civilian colleagues pleaded for him to register some febrile protest but he was frequently outflanked by the military leaders who played an increasingly important role in the direction of all German policy 9 However according to historian Fritz Fischer writing in the 1960s Bethmann Hollweg made more concessions to the nationalist right than had previously been thought He supported the ethnic cleansing of Poles from the Polish Border Strip as well as Germanisation of Polish territories by settlement of German colonists 10 A few weeks after the war began Bethmann presented the Septemberprogramm which was a survey of ideas from the elite should Germany win the war Bethmann Hollweg with all credibility and power now lost conspired over Falkenhayn s head with Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff respectively commander in chief and chief of staff for the Eastern Front for an Eastern Offensive They then succeeded in August 1916 in securing Falkenhayn s replacement by Hindenburg as Chief of the General Staff with Ludendorff as First Quartermaster General Hindenburg s deputy Thereafter Bethmann Hollweg s hopes for US President Woodrow Wilson s mediation at the end of 1916 came to nothing Over Bethmann Hollweg s objections Hindenburg and Ludendorff forced the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare in March 1917 adopted as a result of Henning von Holtzendorff s memorandum Bethmann Hollweg had been a reluctant participant and opposed it in cabinet The US entered the war in April 1917 According to Wolfgang J Mommsen Bethmann Hollweg weakened his own position by failing to establish good control over public relations To avoid highly intensive negative publicity he conducted much of his diplomacy and secret thereby failed to build strong support for it In 1914 he was willing to risk a world war to win public support 11 Bethmann Hollweg remained in office until July 1917 when a Reichstag revolt resulted in the passage of Matthias Erzberger s Peace Resolution by an alliance of the Social Democratic Progressive and Centre parties That same July the strong opposition to him from high level military leaders including Hindenburg and Ludendorff who both threatened to resign was exacerbated when Bethmann Hollweg convinced the Emperor to agree publicly to the introduction of equal manhood suffrage in Prussian state elections 12 The combination of political and military opposition forced Bethmann Hollweg s resignation and replacement by a relatively unknown figure Georg Michaelis 13 1914 15 Edit German soldiers on the way to the front in 1914 A message on the freight car spells out Trip to Paris early in the war all sides expected the conflict to be a short one In this contemporary drawing by Heinrich Zille the German soldiers bound westwards to France and those bound eastwards to Russia smilingly salute each other Main article Western Front World War I The German army opened the war on the Western Front with a modified version of the Schlieffen Plan designed to quickly attack France through neutral Belgium before turning southwards to encircle the French army on the German border The Belgians fought back and sabotaged their rail system to delay the Germans The Germans did not expect this and were delayed and responded with systematic reprisals on civilians killing nearly 6 000 Belgian noncombatants including women and children and burning 25 000 houses and buildings 14 The plan called for the right flank of the German advance to converge on Paris and initially the Germans were very successful particularly in the Battle of the Frontiers 14 24 August By 12 September the French with assistance from the British forces halted the German advance east of Paris at the First Battle of the Marne 5 12 September The last days of this battle signified the end of mobile warfare in the west The French offensive into Germany launched on 7 August with the Battle of Mulhouse had limited success 15 In the east only one Field Army defended East Prussia and when Russia attacked in this region it diverted German forces intended for the Western Front Germany defeated Russia in a series of battles collectively known as the First Battle of Tannenberg 17 August 2 September but this diversion exacerbated problems of insufficient speed of advance from rail heads not foreseen by the German General Staff The Central Powers were thereby denied a quick victory and forced to fight a war on two fronts The German army had fought its way into a good defensive position inside France and had permanently incapacitated 230 000 more French and British troops than it had lost itself Despite this communications problems and questionable command decisions cost Germany the chance of obtaining an early victory 1916 Edit German soldiers digging trenches 1916 was characterized by two great battles on the Western front at Verdun and the Somme They each lasted most of the year achieved minimal gains and drained away the best soldiers of both sides Verdun became the iconic symbol of the murderous power of modern defensive weapons with 280 000 German casualties and 315 000 French At the Somme there were over 400 000 German casualties against over 600 000 Allied casualties At Verdun the Germans attacked what they considered to be a weak French salient which nevertheless the French would defend for reasons of national pride The Somme was part of a multinational plan of the Allies to attack on different fronts simultaneously German woes were also compounded by Russia s grand Brusilov offensive which diverted more soldiers and resources Although the Eastern front was held to a standoff and Germany suffered fewer casualties than their allies with 150 000 of the 770 000 Central powers casualties the simultaneous Verdun offensive stretched the German forces committed to the Somme offensive German experts are divided in their interpretation of the Somme Some say it was a standoff but most see it as a British victory and argue it marked the point at which German morale began a permanent decline and the strategic initiative was lost along with irreplaceable veterans and confidence 16 1917 Edit German soldiers operating a flamethrower in 1917 In early 1917 the SPD leadership became concerned about the activity of its anti war left wing which had been organising as the Sozialdemokratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft SAG Social Democratic Working Group On 17 January they expelled them and in April 1917 the left wing went on to form the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany German Unabhangige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands The remaining faction was then known as the Majority Social Democratic Party of Germany This happened as the enthusiasm for war faded with the enormous numbers of casualties the dwindling supply of manpower the mounting difficulties on the homefront and the never ending flow of casualty reports A grimmer and grimmer attitude began to prevail amongst the general population The only highlight was the first use of mustard gas in warfare in the Battle of Ypres After morale was helped by victories against Serbia Greece Italy and Russia which made great gains for the Central Powers Morale was at its greatest since 1914 at the end of 1917 and beginning of 1918 with the defeat of Russia following her rise into revolution and the German people braced for what General Erich Ludendorff said would be the Peace Offensive in the west 17 18 1918 EditFurther information German spring offensive In spring 1918 Germany realized that time was running out It prepared for the decisive strike with new armies and new tactics hoping to win the war on the Western front before millions of American soldiers appeared in battle General Erich Ludendorff and Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg had full control of the army they had a large supply of reinforcements moved from the Eastern front and they trained storm troopers with new tactics to race through the trenches and attack the enemy s command and communications centers The new tactics would indeed restore mobility to the Western front but the German army was too optimistic During the winter of 1917 18 it was quiet on the Western Front British casualties averaged only 3 000 a week Serious attacks were impossible in the winter because of the deep caramel thick mud Quietly the Germans brought in their best soldiers from the eastern front selected elite storm troops and trained them all winter in the new tactics With stopwatch timing the German artillery would lay down a sudden fearsome barrage just ahead of its advancing infantry Moving in small units firing light machine guns the stormtroopers would bypass enemy strongpoints and head directly for critical bridges command posts supply dumps and above all artillery batteries By cutting enemy communications they would paralyze response in the critical first half hour By silencing the artillery they would break the enemy s firepower Rigid schedules sent in two more waves of infantry to mop up the strong points that had been bypassed The shock troops frightened and disoriented the first line of defenders who would flee in panic In one instance an easy going Allied regiment broke and fled reinforcements rushed in on bicycles The panicky men seized the bikes and beat an even faster retreat The stormtrooper tactics provided mobility but not increased firepower Eventually in 1939 and 1940 the formula would be perfected with the aid of dive bombers and tanks but in 1918 the Germans lacked both 19 Ludendorff erred by attacking the British first in 1918 instead of the French He mistakenly thought the British to be too uninspired to respond rapidly to the new tactics The exhausted dispirited French perhaps might have folded The German assaults on the British were ferocious the largest of the entire war At the Somme River in March 63 divisions attacked in a blinding fog No matter the German lieutenants had memorized their maps and their orders The British lost 270 000 men fell back 40 miles and then held They quickly learned how to handle the new German tactics fall back abandon the trenches let the attackers overextend themselves and then counterattack They gained an advantage in firepower from their artillery and from tanks used as mobile pillboxes that could retreat and counterattack at will In April Ludendorff hit the British again inflicting 305 000 casualties but he lacked the reserves to follow up Ludendorff launched five great attacks between March and July inflicting a million British and French casualties The Western Front now had opened up the trenches were still there but the importance of mobility now reasserted itself The Allies held The Germans suffered twice as many casualties as they inflicted including most of their precious stormtroopers The new German replacements were under aged youth or embittered middle aged family men in poor condition They were not inspired by the elan of 1914 nor thrilled with battle they hated it and some began talking of revolution Ludendorff could not replace his losses nor could he devise a new brainstorm that might somehow snatch victory from the jaws of defeat The British likewise were bringing in reinforcements from the whole Empire but since their home front was in good condition and since they could see inevitable victory their morale was higher The great German spring offensive was a race against time for everyone could see the Americans were training millions of fresh young men who would eventually arrive on the Western Front 20 21 German troops in Kiev March 1918 The attrition warfare now caught up to both sides Germany had used up all the best soldiers they had and still had not conquered much territory The British likewise were bringing in youths of 18 and unfit and middle aged men but they could see the Americans arriving steadily The French had also nearly exhausted their manpower Berlin had calculated it would take months for the Americans to ship all their men and equipment but the U S troops arrived much sooner as they left their heavy equipment behind and relied on British and French artillery tanks airplanes trucks and equipment Berlin also assumed that Americans were fat undisciplined and unaccustomed to hardship and severe fighting They soon realized their mistake The Germans reported that The qualities of the Americans individually may be described as remarkable They are physically well set up their attitude is good They lack at present only training and experience to make formidable adversaries The men are in fine spirits and are filled with naive assurance 22 By September 1918 the Central Powers were exhausted from fighting the American forces were pouring into France at a rate of 10 000 a day the British Empire was mobilised for war peaking at 4 5 million men and 4 000 tanks on the Western Front The decisive Allied counteroffensive known as the Hundred Days Offensive began on 8 August 1918 what Ludendorff called the Black Day of the German army The Allied armies advanced steadily as German defenses faltered 23 Although German armies were still on enemy soil as the war ended the generals the civilian leadership and indeed the soldiers and the people knew all was hopeless They started looking for scapegoats The hunger and popular dissatisfaction with the war precipitated revolution throughout Germany By 11 November Germany had virtually surrendered the Kaiser and all the royal families had abdicated and the German Empire had been replaced by the Weimar Republic Home front EditWar fever Edit Military propaganda postcard Wounded soldiers cheer to the German Emperor Wilhelm II who is in a car The spirit of 1914 was the overwhelming enthusiastic support of all elements of the population for war in 1914 In the Reichstag the vote for credits was unanimous with all the Socialists but one Karl Liebknecht joining in One professor testified to a great single feeling of moral elevation of soaring of religious sentiment in short the ascent of a whole people to the heights 24 At the same time there was a level of anxiety most commentators predicted the short victorious war but that hope was dashed in a matter of weeks as the invasion of Belgium bogged down and the French Army held in front of Paris The Western Front became a killing machine as neither army moved more than a few hundred yards at a time Industry in late 1914 was in chaos unemployment soared while it took months to reconvert to munitions productions In 1916 the Hindenburg Program called for the mobilization of all economic resources to produce artillery shells and machine guns Church bells and copper roofs were ripped out and melted down 25 According to historian William H MacNeil By 1917 after three years of war the various groups and bureaucratic hierarchies which had been operating more or less independently of one another in peacetime and not infrequently had worked at cross purposes were subordinated to one and perhaps the most effective of their number the General Staff Military officers controlled civilian government officials the staffs of banks cartels firms and factories engineers and scientists workingmen farmers indeed almost every element in German society and all efforts were directed in theory and in large degree also in practice to forwarding the war effort 26 Economy Edit Germany had no plans for mobilizing its civilian economy for the war effort and no stockpiles of food or critical supplies had been made Germany had to improvise rapidly All major political sectors initially supported the war including the Socialists Early in the war industrialist Walter Rathenau held senior posts in the Raw Materials Department of the War Ministry while becoming chairman of AEG upon his father s death in 1915 Rathenau played the key role in convincing the War Ministry to set up the War Raw Materials Department Kriegsrohstoffabteilung KRA he was in charge of it from August 1914 to March 1915 and established the basic policies and procedures His senior staff were on loan from industry KRA focused on raw materials threatened by the British blockade as well as supplies from occupied Belgium and France It set prices and regulated the distribution to vital war industries It began the development of ersatz raw materials KRA suffered many inefficiencies caused by the complexity and selfishness KRA encountered from commerce industry and the government 27 28 Collecting scrap metal for the war effort 1916 While the KRA handled critical raw materials the crisis over food supplies grew worse The mobilization of so many farmers and horses and the shortages of fertilizer steadily reduced the food supply Prisoners of war were sent to work on farms and many women and elderly men took on work roles Supplies that had once come in from Russia and Austria were cut off 29 The concept of total war in World War I meant that food supplies had to be redirected towards the armed forces and with German commerce being stopped by the British blockade German civilians were forced to live in increasingly meager conditions Food prices were first controlled Bread rationing was introduced in 1915 and worked well the cost of bread fell Allen says there were no signs of starvation and states the sense of domestic catastrophe one gains from most accounts of food rationing in Germany is exaggerated 30 However Howard argues that hundreds of thousands of civilians died from malnutrition usually from a typhus or a disease their weakened body could not resist Starvation itself rarely caused death 31 A 2014 study derived from a recently discovered dataset on the heights and weights of German children between 1914 and 1924 found evidence that German children suffered from severe malnutrition during the blockade with working class children suffering the most 32 The study furthermore found that German children quickly recovered after the war due to a massive international food aid program 32 Conditions deteriorated rapidly on the home front with severe food shortages reported in all urban areas The causes involved the transfer of so many farmers and food workers into the military combined with the overburdened railroad system shortages of coal and the British blockade that cut off imports from abroad The winter of 1916 1917 was known as the turnip winter because that hardly edible vegetable usually fed to livestock was used by people as a substitute for potatoes and meat which were increasingly scarce Thousands of soup kitchens were opened to feed the hungry people who grumbled that the farmers were keeping the food for themselves Even the army had to cut the rations for soldiers 33 Morale of both civilians and soldiers continued to sink Wartime ration stamps in Bavaria The drafting of miners reduced the main energy source coal The textile factories produced Army uniforms and warm clothing for civilians ran short The device of using ersatz materials such as paper and cardboard for cloth and leather proved unsatisfactory Soap was in short supply as was hot water All the cities reduced tram services cut back on street lighting and closed down theaters and cabarets The food supply increasingly focused on potatoes and bread it was harder and harder to buy meat The meat ration in late 1916 was only 31 of peacetime and it fell to 12 in late 1918 The fish ration was 51 in 1916 and none at all by late 1917 The rations for cheese butter rice cereals eggs and lard were less than 20 of peacetime levels 34 In 1917 the harvest was poor all across Europe and the potato supply ran short and Germans substituted almost inedible turnips the turnip winter of 1916 17 was remembered with bitter distaste for generations 35 Early in the war bread rationing was introduced and the system worked fairly well albeit with shortfalls during the Turnip Winter and summer of 1918 White bread used imported flour and became unavailable but there was enough rye or rye potato flour to provide a minimal diet for all civilians 36 German women were not employed in the Army but large numbers took paid employment in industry and factories and even larger numbers engaged in volunteer services Housewives were taught how to cook without milk eggs or fat agencies helped widows find work Banks insurance companies and government offices for the first time hired women for clerical positions Factories hired them for unskilled labor by December 1917 half the workers in chemicals metals and machine tools were women Laws protecting women in the workplace were relaxed and factories set up canteens to provide food for their workers lest their productivity fall off The food situation in 1918 was better because the harvest was better but serious shortages continued with high prices and a complete lack of condiments and fresh fruit Many migrants had flocked into cities to work in industry which made for overcrowded housing Reduced coal supplies left everyone in the cold Daily life involved long working hours poor health and little or no recreation and increasing fears for the safety of loved ones in the Army and in prisoner of war camps The men who returned from the front were those who had been permanently crippled wounded soldiers who had recovered were sent back to the trenches 37 Defeat and revolt EditSee also Aftermath of World War I Demobilization after World War I Many Germans wanted an end to the war and increasing numbers of Germans began to associate with the political left such as the Social Democratic Party and the more radical Independent Social Democratic Party which demanded an end to the war The third reason was the entry of the United States into the war in April 1917 which tipped the long run balance of power even more to the Allies The end of October 1918 in Kiel in northern Germany saw the beginning of the German Revolution of 1918 19 Civilian dock workers led a revolt and convinced many sailors to join them the revolt quickly spread to other cities Meanwhile Hindenburg and the senior generals lost confidence in the Kaiser and his government In November 1918 with internal revolution a stalemated war Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire suing for peace Austria Hungary falling apart from multiple ethnic tensions and pressure from the German high command the Kaiser and all German ruling princes abdicated On 9 November 1918 the Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann proclaimed a Republic The new government led by the German Social Democrats called for and received an armistice on 11 November 1918 in practice it was a surrender and the Allies kept up the food blockade to guarantee an upper hand in negotiations The now defunct German Empire was succeeded by the Weimar Republic 38 page needed Seven million soldiers and sailors were quickly demobilized and they became a conservative voice that drowned out the radical left in cities such as Kiel and Berlin The radicals formed the Spartakusbund and later the Communist Party of Germany Due to German military forces still occupying portions of France on the day of the armistice various nationalist groups and those angered by the defeat in the war shifted blame to civilians accusing them of betraying the army and surrendering This contributed to the Stab in the back myth that dominated German politics in the 1920s and created a distrust of democracy and the Weimar government 39 War deaths EditMain article World War I casualties Out of a population of 65 million Germany suffered 1 7 million military deaths and 430 000 civilian deaths due to wartime causes especially the food blockade plus about 17 000 killed in Africa and the other overseas colonies 40 The Allied blockade continued until July 1919 causing severe additional hardships 41 Soldiers experiences EditDespite the often ruthless conduct of the German military machine in the air and at sea as well as on land individual German and soldiers could view the enemy with respect and empathy and the war with contempt 42 Some examples from letters homework A terrible picture presented itself to me A French and a General soldier on their knees were leaning against each other They had pierced each other with the bayonet and had dropped like this to the ground Courage heroism does it really exist I am about to doubt it since I haven t seen anything else than fear anxiety and despair in every face during the battle There was nothing at all like courage bravery or the like In reality there is nothing else than texting discipline and coercion propelling the soldiers forward Dominik Richert 1914 43 Our men have reached an agreement with the French to cease fire They bring us bread wine sardines etc we bring them schnapps The masters make war they have a quarrel and the workers the little men have to stand there fighting against each other Is that not a great stupidity If this were to be decided according to the number of votes we would have been long home by now Hermann Baur 1915 44 I have no idea what we are still fighting for anyway maybe because the newspapers portray everything about the war in a false light which has nothing to do with the reality There could be no greater misery in the enemy country and at home The people who still support the war haven t got a clue about anything If I stay alive I will make these things public We all want peace What is the point of conquering half of the world when we have to sacrifice all our strength You out there just champion peace We give away all our worldly possessions and even our freedom Our only goal is to be with our wife and children again Anonymous Bavarian soldier 17 October 1914 45 See also EditGerman entry into World War I History of Germany History of German foreign policy Home front during World War I International relations of the Great Powers 1814 1919 Central PowersNotes Edit Jeffrey Verhey The Spirit of 1914 Militarism Myth and Mobilization in Germany Cambridge U P 2000 N P Howard The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany 1918 19 German History 1993 11 2 pp 161 88 online p 166 with 271 000 excess deaths in 1918 and 71 000 in 1919 Strachan Hew 1998 World War 1 Oxford University Press p 125 ISBN 9780198206149 This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain Rines George Edwin ed 1920 Bethmann Hollweg Theobald Theodore Friedrich Alfred von Encyclopedia Americana Konrad H Jarausch The Illusion of Limited War Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg s Calculated Risk July 1914 Central European History 2 1 1969 48 76 Trachtenberg Marc The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914 International Security 15 3 1990 pp 120 50 https doi org 10 2307 2538909 Fritz Fischer 1914 Germany Opts for War Now or Never in Holger H Herwig ed The Outbreak of World War I 1997 pp 70 89 at p 71 online Butler David Allen 2010 The Burden of Guilt How Germany Shattered the Last Days of Peace Summer 1914 Casemate Publishers p 103 ISBN 9781935149576 Retrieved 30 July 2012 Barbara Tuchman The guns of August 1970 p 84 Hull Isabel V 2005 Absolute Destruction Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany Cornell University Press p 233 ISBN 0801442583 Retrieved 7 July 2009 Wolfgang J Mommsen Public opinion and foreign policy in Wilhelmian Germany 1897 1914 Central European History 24 4 1991 381 401 Frauendienst Werner 1985 Bethmann Hollweg Theobald Theodor Friedrich Alfred von Neue Deutsche Biographie 2 in German pp 188 193 Online Version Robert F Hopwood Czernin and the Fall of Bethmann Hollweg Canadian Journal of History 2 2 1967 49 61 Jeff Lipkes Rehearsals The German Army in Belgium August 1914 2007 Barbara Tuchman The Guns of August 1962 Fred R Van Hartesveldt The Battles of the Somme 1916 Historiography and Annotated Bibliography 1996 pp 26 27 C R M F Cruttwell A History of the Great War 1914 1918 1935 ch 15 29 Holger H Herwig The First World War Germany and Austria Hungary 1914 1918 1997 ch 4 6 Bruce I Gudmundsson Stormtrooper Tactics Innovation in the German Army 1914 1918 1989 pp 155 70 David Stevenson With Our Backs to the Wall Victory and Defeat in 1918 2011 pp 30 111 C R M F Cruttwell A History of the Great War 1914 1918 1935 pp 505 35r Millett Allan 1991 Semper Fidelis The History of the United States Marine Corps Simon and Schuster p 304 ISBN 9780029215968 Tucker Spencer C 2005 World War I A D ABC CLIO p 1256 ISBN 9781851094202 Roger Chickering Imperial Germany and the Great War 1914 1918 1998 p 14 Richie Faust s Metropolis pp 272 75 William H McNeill The Rise of the West 1991 edition p 742 D G Williamson Walther Rathenau and the K R A August 1914 March 1915 Zeitschrift fur Unternehmensgeschichte 1978 Issue 11 pp 118 136 Hew Strachan The First World War Volume I To Arms 2001 pp 1014 49 on Rathenau and KRA Feldman Gerald D The Political and Social Foundations of Germany s Economic Mobilization 1914 1916 Armed Forces amp Society 1976 3 1 pp 121 145 online Keith Allen Sharing scarcity Bread rationing and the First World War in Berlin 1914 1923 Journal of Social History 1998 32 2 pp 371 93 quote p 380 N P Howard The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany 1918 19 German History April 1993 Vol 11 Issue 2 pp 161 188 a b Cox Mary Elisabeth 2015 05 01 Hunger games or how the Allied blockade in the First World War deprived German children of nutrition and Allied food aid subsequently saved them The Economic History Review 68 2 600 631 doi 10 1111 ehr 12070 ISSN 1468 0289 S2CID 142354720 Roger Chickering Imperial Germany and the Great War 1914 1918 2004 p 141 42 David Welch Germany Propaganda and Total War 1914 1918 2000 p 122 Chickering Imperial Germany pp 140 145 Keith Allen Sharing scarcity Bread rationing and the First World War in Berlin 1914 1923 Journal of Social History 1998 32 2 00224529 Winter98 Vol 32 Issue 2 Alexandra Richie Faust s Metropolis 1998 pp 277 80 A J Ryder The German Revolution of 1918 A Study of German Socialism in War and Revolt 2008 Wilhelm Diest and E J Feuchtwanger The Military Collapse of the German Empire the Reality Behind the Stab in the Back Myth War in History April 1996 Vol 3 Issue 2 pp 186 207 Leo Grebler and Wilhelm Winkler The Cost of the World War to Germany and Austria Hungary Yale University Press 1940 N P Howard N P The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany 1918 19 German History 1993 p 162 Bernd Ulrich said and Benjamin ed Ziemann German Soldiers in the Great War and Savey Letters and Eyewitness Accounts Pen and Sword Military 2010 This book is a compilation of German soldiers letters and memoirs All the references come from this book German Soldiers in the Great War 77 German Soldiers in the Great War 64 German Soldiers in the Great War 51 Further reading EditWatson Alexander Ring of Steel Germany and Austria Hungary in World War I 2014 excerptMilitary Edit Cecil Lamar 1996 Wilhelm II Emperor and Exile 1900 1941 vol II Chapel Hill North Carolina University of North Carolina Press p 176 ISBN 978 0 8078 2283 8 OCLC 186744003 Chickering Roger et al eds Great War Total War Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front 1914 1918 Publications of the German Historical Institute 2000 ISBN 0 521 77352 0 584 pgs Cowin Hugh W German and Austrian Aviation of World War I A Pictorial Chronicle of the Airmen and Aircraft That Forged German Airpower 2000 Osprey Pub Co ISBN 1 84176 069 2 96 pgs Cruttwell C R M F A History of the Great War 1914 1918 1935 ch 15 29 online free Cross Wilbur 1991 Zeppelins of World War I ISBN 978 1 55778 382 0 Herwig Holger H The First World War Germany and Austria Hungary 1914 1918 1996 mostly military Horne John ed A Companion to World War I 2012 Hubatsch Walther Backus Oswald P 1963 Germany and the Central Powers in the World War 1914 1918 Lawrence Kansas University of Kansas OCLC 250441891 Karau Mark D Germany s Defeat in the First World War The Lost Battles and Reckless Gambles That Brought Down the Second Reich ABC CLIO 2015 scholarly analysis excerpt Kitchen Martin The Silent Dictatorship The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff 1916 1918 London Croom Helm 1976 Morrow John German Air Power in World War I U of Nebraska Press 1982 Contains design and production figures as well as economic influences Sheldon Jack 2005 The German Army on the Somme 1914 1916 Barnsley Pen and Sword Books Ltd ISBN 978 1 84415 269 8 Home front Edit Allen Keith Sharing Scarcity Bread Rationing and the First World War in Berlin 1914 1923 Journal of Social History 1998 32 2 pp 371 96 Armeson Robert Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor A Study of the Military Industrial Complex in Germany during World War I The Hague M Nijhoff 1964 Bailey S The Berlin Strike of 1918 Central European History 1980 13 2 pp 158 74 Bell Archibald A History of the Blockade of Germany and the Countries Associated with Her in the Great War Austria Hungary Bulgaria and Turkey 1914 1918 London H M Stationery Office 1937 Broadberry Stephen and Mark Harrison eds The Economics of World War I 2005 ISBN 0 521 85212 9 Covers France UK USA Russia Italy Germany Austria Hungary the Ottoman Empire and the Netherlands Burchardt Lothar The Impact of the War Economy on the Civilian Population of Germany during the First and the Second World Wars in The German Military in the Age of Total War edited by Wilhelm Deist 40 70 Leamington Spa Berg 1985 Chickering Roger Imperial Germany and the Great War 1914 1918 1998 wide ranging survey Daniel Ute The War from Within German Working Class Women in the First World War 1997 Dasey Robyn Women s Work and the Family Women Garment Workers in Berlin and Hamburg before the First World War in The German Family Essays on the Social History of the Family in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Germany edited by Richard J Evans and W R Lee London Croom Helm 1981 pp 221 53 Davis Belinda J Home Fires Burning Food Politics and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin 2000 online edition Dobson Sean Authority and Upheaval in Leipzig 1910 1920 2000 Domansky Elisabeth Militarization and Reproduction in World War I Germany in Society Culture and the State in Germany 1870 1930 edited by Geoff Eley University of Michigan Press 1996 pp 427 64 Donson Andrew Why did German youth become fascists Nationalist males born 1900 to 1908 in war and revolution Social History Aug2006 Vol 31 Issue 3 pp 337 358 Feldman Gerald D The Political and Social Foundations of Germany s Economic Mobilization 1914 1916 Armed Forces amp Society 1976 3 1 pp 121 145 online Feldman Gerald Army Industry and Labor in Germany 1914 1918 1966 Ferguson Niall The Pity of War 1999 cultural and economic themes worldwide Hardach Gerd The First World War 1914 1918 1977 economics Herwig Holger H The First World War Germany and Austria Hungary 1914 1918 1996 one third on the homefront Howard N P The Social and Political Consequences of the Allied Food Blockade of Germany 1918 19 German History 1993 11 2 pp 161 88 online Kocka Jurgen Facing total war German society 1914 1918 1984 online at ACLS e books Lee Joe German Administrators and Agriculture during the First World War in War and Economic Development edited by Jay M Winter Cambridge UP 1922 Lutz Ralph Haswell The German revolution 1918 1919 1938 a brief survey online free Marquis H G Words as Weapons Propaganda in Britain and Germany during the First World War Journal of Contemporary History 1978 12 467 98 McKibbin David War and Revolution in Leipzig 1914 1918 Socialist Politics and Urban Evolution in a German City University Press of America 1998 Moeller Robert G Dimensions of Social Conflict in the Great War A View from the Countryside Central European History 1981 14 2 pp 142 68 Moeller Robert G German Peasants and Agrarian Politics 1914 1924 The Rhineland and Westphalia 1986 online edition Offer Avner The First World War An Agrarian Interpretation 1991 on food supply of Britain and Germany Osborne Eric Britain s Economic Blockade of Germany 1914 1919 2004 Richie Alexandra Faust s Metropolis a History of Berlin 1998 pp 234 83 Ryder A J The German Revolution of 1918 Cambridge University Press 1967 Siney Marion The Allied Blockade of Germany 1914 1916 1957 Steege Paul Black Market Cold War Everyday Life in Berlin 1946 1949 2008 excerpt and text search Terraine John An Actual Revolutionary Situation In 1917 there was little to sustain German morale at home History Today 1978 28 1 pp 14 22 online Tobin Elizabeth War and the Working Class The Case of Dusseldorf 1914 1918 Central European History 1985 13 3 pp 257 98 Triebel Armin Consumption in Wartime Germany in The Upheaval of War Family Work and Welfare in Europe 1914 1918 edited by Richard Wall and Jay M Winter Cambridge University Press 1988 pp 159 96 Usborne Cornelie Pregnancy Is a Woman s Active Service in The Upheaval of War Family Work and Welfare in Europe 1914 1918 edited by Richard Wall and Jay M Winter Cambridge University Press 1988 pp 289 416 Verhey Jeffrey The Spirit of 1914 Militarism Myth and Mobilization in Germany 2006 excerpt Welch David Germany and Propaganda in World War I Pacifism Mobilization and Total War IB Tauris 2014 Winter Jay and Jean Louis Robert eds Capital Cities at War Paris London Berlin 1914 1919 2 vol 1999 2007 30 chapters 1200pp comprehensive coverage by scholars vol 1 excerpt vol 2 excerpt and text search Winter Jay Sites of Memory Sites of Mourning The Great War in European Cultural History 1995 Ziemann Benjamin War Experiences in Rural Germany 1914 1923 Berg 2007 online editionPrimary sources Edit Gooch P G Recent Revelations Of European Diplomacy 1940 pp3 100 Lutz Ralph Haswell ed Fall of the German Empire 1914 1918 2 vol 1932 868pp online review primary sourcesExternal links Edit in German Der Erste Weltkrieg in English The First World War at Living Museum Online LeMO Articles relating to Germany at 1914 1918 Online International Encyclopedia of the First World War Hirschfeld Gerhard Germany Fehlemann Silke Bereavement and Mourning Germany Bruendel Steffen Between Acceptance and Refusal Soldiers Attitudes Towards War Germany Davis Belinda Food and Nutrition Germany Oppelland Torsten Governments Parliaments and Parties Germany Stibbe Matthew Women s Mobilisation for War Germany Ungern Sternberg Jurgen von Making Sense of the War Germany Ullmann Hans Peter Organization of War Economies Germany Gross Stephen War Finance Germany Altenhoner Florian Press Journalism Germany Ther Vanessa Propaganda at Home Germany Pohlmann Markus Warfare 1914 1918 Germany Loffelbein Nils War Aims and War Aims Discussions Germany Whalen Robert Weldon War Losses Germany Germany and the First World War article index at Spartacus Educational Posters of the German Military Government in the Generalgouvernement Warshau German occupied Poland from World War I 1915 1916 From the Collections at the Library of Congress Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title History of Germany during World War I amp oldid 1141441049, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, 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