The Geneva Naval Conference was a conference held to discuss naval arms limitation, held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1927. The aim of the conference was to extend the existing limits on naval construction which had been agreed in the Washington Naval Treaty. The Washington Treaty had limited the construction of battleships and aircraft carriers, but had not limited the construction of cruisers, destroyers or submarines.
In February 1927, President Calvin Coolidge issued a call to the Big Five Powers to meet in Geneva to confront the issue of naval rivalries, as a result of discussions about naval arms limitations at League of Nations disarmament meetings.[1] Britain and Japan accepted the invitation, but France and Italy (the other nations which had signed the Washington Treaty) declined.[2]
The Washington Treaty had defined a ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 in the strength of capital ships (battleships and battlecruisers) between Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy respectively. The USA sought to use the Geneva conference to extend this ratio to smaller craft, allowing both Britain and themselves cruisers with a total displacement of 300,000 tons, with the Japanese allowed 180,000 tons. At the same time, the USA wanted to avoid further restrictions on the sizes of individual ships.[3]
NegotiationsEdit
Under the Washington Treaty, each nation was allowed to build cruisers of up to 10,000 tons displacement carrying 8-inch guns. In practice this had also become a minimum figure, with navies competing to design cruisers of exactly 10,000 tons displacement. The US's negotiating position, on which it was unwilling to compromise, was a plan to build 25 heavy cruisers of 10,000 tons displacement (250,000 tons total).[4]
Britain, by contrast, was prepared to accept parity with the US in its cruiser fleet, so long as the Royal Navy was able to maintain the very large cruiser force, if necessary of smaller and cheaper ships, which it felt was necessary to protect the long trade routes and imperial commitments of the British Empire. Britain proposed the reduction of the 10,000-ton and 8-inch limit for newly constructed cruisers. The British estimated they needed 70 cruisers totalling 560,000 tons displacement (i.e. averaging 8,000 tons each), almost twice the total tonnage of the American proposal.[5]
The principal Japanese concern was to avoid a repetition of the 5:5:3 ratio. The Japanese naval staff felt that a fleet 70% the size of that of the US was the minimum required to win a war against the US. Since the 70% ratio had not been achieved with battleships, it was particularly important to retain it for cruisers.[6] However, since the British and American delegations were unable to reach agreement, Japanese objections were not crucial to the failure of the summit.
In the end, the participants at the conference failed to reach a binding agreement regarding the distribution of naval tonnage.
ImpactEdit
The question of limitations on cruiser tonnage was raised again at the London Naval Conference of 1930, resulting in the London Naval Treaty. The London Conference succeeded where Geneva failed, with the US being permitted a larger number of heavy cruisers than Britain, but Britain being permitted a larger number of light cruisers. Agreement was reached in part because the British and US delegations recognized a greater shared interest[7] and the need to cut government expenditure as a result of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. These events focused minds on the need to reach an agreement.[8]
Baker, A. D., III (1989). "Battlefleets and Diplomacy: Naval Disarmament Between the Two World Wars". Warship International. XXVI (3): 217–255. ISSN 0043-0374.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
Evans, David & Peattie, Mark. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997. ISBN0-87021-192-7
Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. Macmillan, London, 1983. ISBN0-333-35094-4
Marriott, Leo. Treaty Cruisers: The First International Warship Building Competition. Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2005. ISBN1-84415-188-3
Potter, E (Editor). Sea Power: A Naval History, 2nd Ed. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1981. ISBN0-87021-607-4
Szudarek, Krystian Maciej. "The British government and the naval disarmament conference in Geneva (1927)." Studia Maritima 27.1 (2014): 87–151.
August 28, 2023
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For other conferences in Geneva see Geneva Conference The Geneva Naval Conference was a conference held to discuss naval arms limitation held in Geneva Switzerland in 1927 The aim of the conference was to extend the existing limits on naval construction which had been agreed in the Washington Naval Treaty The Washington Treaty had limited the construction of battleships and aircraft carriers but had not limited the construction of cruisers destroyers or submarines U S Navy officers at the conference from left to right Arthur J Hepburn Laurence H Frost Adolphus Andrews Hilary P Jones Harold C Train Frank H Schofield William W Smith and Joseph M Reeves Contents 1 Background 2 Negotiations 3 Impact 4 Notes 5 ReferencesBackground EditIn February 1927 President Calvin Coolidge issued a call to the Big Five Powers to meet in Geneva to confront the issue of naval rivalries as a result of discussions about naval arms limitations at League of Nations disarmament meetings 1 Britain and Japan accepted the invitation but France and Italy the other nations which had signed the Washington Treaty declined 2 The Washington Treaty had defined a ratio of 5 5 3 1 75 1 75 in the strength of capital ships battleships and battlecruisers between Britain the United States Japan France and Italy respectively The USA sought to use the Geneva conference to extend this ratio to smaller craft allowing both Britain and themselves cruisers with a total displacement of 300 000 tons with the Japanese allowed 180 000 tons At the same time the USA wanted to avoid further restrictions on the sizes of individual ships 3 Negotiations EditUnder the Washington Treaty each nation was allowed to build cruisers of up to 10 000 tons displacement carrying 8 inch guns In practice this had also become a minimum figure with navies competing to design cruisers of exactly 10 000 tons displacement The US s negotiating position on which it was unwilling to compromise was a plan to build 25 heavy cruisers of 10 000 tons displacement 250 000 tons total 4 Britain by contrast was prepared to accept parity with the US in its cruiser fleet so long as the Royal Navy was able to maintain the very large cruiser force if necessary of smaller and cheaper ships which it felt was necessary to protect the long trade routes and imperial commitments of the British Empire Britain proposed the reduction of the 10 000 ton and 8 inch limit for newly constructed cruisers The British estimated they needed 70 cruisers totalling 560 000 tons displacement i e averaging 8 000 tons each almost twice the total tonnage of the American proposal 5 The principal Japanese concern was to avoid a repetition of the 5 5 3 ratio The Japanese naval staff felt that a fleet 70 the size of that of the US was the minimum required to win a war against the US Since the 70 ratio had not been achieved with battleships it was particularly important to retain it for cruisers 6 However since the British and American delegations were unable to reach agreement Japanese objections were not crucial to the failure of the summit In the end the participants at the conference failed to reach a binding agreement regarding the distribution of naval tonnage Impact EditThe question of limitations on cruiser tonnage was raised again at the London Naval Conference of 1930 resulting in the London Naval Treaty The London Conference succeeded where Geneva failed with the US being permitted a larger number of heavy cruisers than Britain but Britain being permitted a larger number of light cruisers Agreement was reached in part because the British and US delegations recognized a greater shared interest 7 and the need to cut government expenditure as a result of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 These events focused minds on the need to reach an agreement 8 Notes Edit Marriott p 12 Potter p 234 Marriott p 12 Marriott p 12 3 Marriott p 12 3 Evans and Peattie p 234 Potter p 234 5 Marriott p 13References EditBaker A D III 1989 Battlefleets and Diplomacy Naval Disarmament Between the Two World Wars Warship International XXVI 3 217 255 ISSN 0043 0374 a href Template Cite journal html title Template Cite journal cite journal a CS1 maint multiple names authors list link Evans David amp Peattie Mark Kaigun Strategy Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887 1941 Naval Institute Press Annapolis 1997 ISBN 0 87021 192 7 Kennedy Paul The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery Macmillan London 1983 ISBN 0 333 35094 4 Marriott Leo Treaty Cruisers The First International Warship Building Competition Pen amp Sword Barnsley 2005 ISBN 1 84415 188 3 Potter E Editor Sea Power A Naval History 2nd Ed Naval Institute Press Annapolis 1981 ISBN 0 87021 607 4 Szudarek Krystian Maciej The British government and the naval disarmament conference in Geneva 1927 Studia Maritima 27 1 2014 87 151 Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Geneva Naval Conference amp oldid 1165586417, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,
