The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was an internal commission convened by NASA to investigate the destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia during STS-107 upon atmospheric re-entry on February 1, 2003.[1][2] The panel determined that the accident was caused by foam insulation breaking off from the external fuel tank, forming debris which damaged the orbiter's wing, and that the problem of "debris shedding" was well known but considered "acceptable" by management.[3] The panel also recommended changes that should be made to increase the safety of future shuttle flights. The CAIB released its final report on August 26, 2003.[4][5][6]
The board found both the immediate physical cause of the accident and also what it called organizational causes.
Immediate cause of the accidentedit
Close-up photo of left Bipod Foam Ramp
82 seconds after launch a large piece of foam insulating material, the "left bipod foam ramp", broke free from the external tank and struck the leading edge of the shuttle's left wing, damaging the protective carbon heat shielding panels.
During re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere, this damage allowed super-heated gases to enter and erode the inner wing structure which led to the destruction of Columbia. It was the seventh instance of a piece of foam, from this particular area of the external tank, breaking free during launch, and the only instance of structural damage as a result of the breakage.[7]
Organizational cause of the accidentedit
The problem of debris shedding from the external tank was well known and had caused shuttle damage on every prior shuttle flight. The damage was usually, but not always, minor. Over time, management gained confidence that it was an acceptable risk. NASA decided that it did not warrant an extra EVA for visual inspection, feeling that it would be like a car going down a highway and hitting a Styrofoam cooler.[citation needed]
Board recommendationsedit
The board made 29 specific recommendations to NASA to improve the safety of future shuttle flights. These recommendations include:
Increase quality of images available of shuttle during ascent and on-flight
Recertify all shuttle components by the year 2010
Establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements and all waivers to them, and will build a disciplined, systematic approach to identifying, analyzing, and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of the Shuttle System.
Only two further Space Shuttle missions were allowed to be flown before the implementation of these recommendations.
Shuttle program after the CAIB reportedit
After the CAIB report came out, NASA implemented all recommended changes and flew its first post-Columbia mission in 2005. As part of the CAIB recommendations, the Shuttle carried a 50-foot inspection boom attached to the robot arm, which was used within 24 hours of launch to check the orbiter for damage. As all but one of the post-Columbia missions were concentrated on the International Space Station, primarily to provide a "safe haven" in the event an orbiter was damaged beyond the normal repair methods, NASA implemented a STS-3xx contingency mission program that could launch a rescue orbiter on short notice, similar to the Skylab Rescue that was planned during the Skylab program.
NASA retired the Space Shuttle fleet on July 21, 2011 after completing the ISS and the final flight and subsequent landing of Atlantis. The Shuttle's replacement, Orion, was to have consisted of an Apollo-derived spacecraft launched on the Ares I rocket, which would use a Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster as its first stage. Orion would not face the dangers of either an O-ring failure (due to the presence of a launch escape system[8]) or shedding foam (as the spacecraft would be launched in a stack configuration). In addition to ferrying crews to the ISS, the Orion spacecraft was (as part of Project Constellation) to allow NASA to return to the Moon.[9] President Obama signed the NASA Authorization Act 2010 on October 11 which officially brought the Constellation program to an end, replacing it with the Space Launch System (SLS) and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) programs to develop the launch vehicle and spacecraft to enable human exploration missions beyond low-Earth orbit.[10]
^"NASA Columbia disaster: The investigation into one of history's worst space tragedies - and its lasting legacy". Sky News. Retrieved 2023-02-01.
^Elizabeth Howell (2023-02-01). "20 years after Columbia shuttle tragedy, NASA pledges 'acute awareness' of astronaut safety". Space.com. Retrieved 2023-02-01.
^Deignan, Owen (2022-11-13). "What caused the space shuttle Columbia explosion?". Rebellion Research. Retrieved 2023-02-01.
^"The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)". NASA. 2003-08-24. Retrieved 2023-04-05.
^"Space Shuttle Columbia Fast Facts". CNN. 2013-09-30. Retrieved 2023-02-01.
^Langewiesche, William (2003-11-01). "Columbia's Last Flight". The Atlantic. Retrieved 2023-02-01.
^. Archived from the original on 2012-05-22. Retrieved 2012-05-28.
Sourcesedit
Retrieved February 15, 2004
NASA SLS MPCV 2011-04-27 at the Wayback Machine Retrieved April 30, 2011
External linksedit
NASA homepage
Works by Columbia Accident Investigation Board at LibriVox (public domain audiobooks)
Columbia Accident Investigation Board on C-SPAN
April 15, 2024
columbia, accident, investigation, board, main, article, space, shuttle, columbia, disaster, this, article, includes, list, general, references, lacks, sufficient, corresponding, inline, citations, please, help, improve, this, article, introducing, more, preci. Main article Space Shuttle Columbia disaster This article includes a list of general references but it lacks sufficient corresponding inline citations Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations September 2009 Learn how and when to remove this template message The Columbia Accident Investigation Board CAIB was an internal commission convened by NASA to investigate the destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia during STS 107 upon atmospheric re entry on February 1 2003 1 2 The panel determined that the accident was caused by foam insulation breaking off from the external fuel tank forming debris which damaged the orbiter s wing and that the problem of debris shedding was well known but considered acceptable by management 3 The panel also recommended changes that should be made to increase the safety of future shuttle flights The CAIB released its final report on August 26 2003 4 5 6 Columbia memorial in Arlington National Cemetery Contents 1 Major findings 1 1 Immediate cause of the accident 1 2 Organizational cause of the accident 2 Board recommendations 3 Shuttle program after the CAIB report 4 Board members 4 1 Board support 4 2 Partial list of additional investigators and CAIB support staff 5 See also 6 References 7 Sources 8 External linksMajor findings editThe board found both the immediate physical cause of the accident and also what it called organizational causes Immediate cause of the accident edit nbsp Close up photo of left Bipod Foam Ramp82 seconds after launch a large piece of foam insulating material the left bipod foam ramp broke free from the external tank and struck the leading edge of the shuttle s left wing damaging the protective carbon heat shielding panels During re entry into the Earth s atmosphere this damage allowed super heated gases to enter and erode the inner wing structure which led to the destruction of Columbia It was the seventh instance of a piece of foam from this particular area of the external tank breaking free during launch and the only instance of structural damage as a result of the breakage 7 Organizational cause of the accident edit The problem of debris shedding from the external tank was well known and had caused shuttle damage on every prior shuttle flight The damage was usually but not always minor Over time management gained confidence that it was an acceptable risk NASA decided that it did not warrant an extra EVA for visual inspection feeling that it would be like a car going down a highway and hitting a Styrofoam cooler citation needed Board recommendations editThe board made 29 specific recommendations to NASA to improve the safety of future shuttle flights These recommendations include Foam from external tank should not break free Better pre flight inspection routines Increase quality of images available of shuttle during ascent and on flight Recertify all shuttle components by the year 2010 Establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements and all waivers to them and will build a disciplined systematic approach to identifying analyzing and controlling hazards throughout the life cycle of the Shuttle System Only two further Space Shuttle missions were allowed to be flown before the implementation of these recommendations Shuttle program after the CAIB report editAfter the CAIB report came out NASA implemented all recommended changes and flew its first post Columbia mission in 2005 As part of the CAIB recommendations the Shuttle carried a 50 foot inspection boom attached to the robot arm which was used within 24 hours of launch to check the orbiter for damage As all but one of the post Columbia missions were concentrated on the International Space Station primarily to provide a safe haven in the event an orbiter was damaged beyond the normal repair methods NASA implemented a STS 3xx contingency mission program that could launch a rescue orbiter on short notice similar to the Skylab Rescue that was planned during the Skylab program NASA retired the Space Shuttle fleet on July 21 2011 after completing the ISS and the final flight and subsequent landing of Atlantis The Shuttle s replacement Orion was to have consisted of an Apollo derived spacecraft launched on the Ares I rocket which would use a Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster as its first stage Orion would not face the dangers of either an O ring failure due to the presence of a launch escape system 8 or shedding foam as the spacecraft would be launched in a stack configuration In addition to ferrying crews to the ISS the Orion spacecraft was as part of Project Constellation to allow NASA to return to the Moon 9 President Obama signed the NASA Authorization Act 2010 on October 11 which officially brought the Constellation program to an end replacing it with the Space Launch System SLS and Multi Purpose Crew Vehicle MPCV programs to develop the launch vehicle and spacecraft to enable human exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit 10 Board members editChairman of the board Admiral Hal Gehman USNBoard members Rear Admiral Stephen Turcotte Commander Naval Safety Center Maj General John Barry Director Plans and Programs Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command Maj General Kenneth W Hess Commander Air Force Safety Center Dr James N Hallock Chief Aviation Safety Division U S Department of Transportation Volpe Center Mr Steven B Wallace Director of Accident Investigation Federal Aviation Administration Brig General Duane Deal Commander 21st Space Wing United States Air Force Mr Scott Hubbard Director NASA Ames Research Center Mr Roger E Tetrault Retired Chairman McDermott International Dr Sheila E Widnall Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems MIT Dr Douglas D Osheroff Professor of Physics and Applied Physics Stanford University Dr Sally Ride Former astronaut and professor of Space Science University of California San Diego Only board member to serve on both the Challenger and Columbia accident boards Dr John Logsdon Director of the Space Policy Institute George Washington UniversityBoard support edit Ex Officio Member Lt Col Michael J Bloomfield NASA Astronaut Executive Secretary Mr Theron M Bradley Jr NASA Chief EngineerPartial list of additional investigators and CAIB support staff edit Col Timothy Bair Col Jack Anthony Dr James P Bagian Lt Col Richard J Burgess Thomas L Carter Dr Dwayne A Day Major Tracy Dillinger Thomas L Foster CDR Mike Francis Howard E Goldstein Lt Col Patrick A Goodman Lt Matthew E Granger Ronald K Gress Thomas Haueter Dr Daniel Heimerdinger Dennis R Jenkins Dr Christopher Kirchhoff Dr Gregory T A Kovacs John F Lehman Jim Mosquera Gary Olson Gregory Phillips David B Pye Lester A Reingold Donald J Rigali Dr James W Smiley G Mark Tanner Lt Col Wade J Thompson Dr Edward Tufte 11 Bob Vallaster Dr Diane Vaughan sociologist Lt Col Donald J White Dr Paul D Wilde LCDR Johnny R Wolfe Jr Richard W Russell Mr Daniel W Haros Dr Robert E Green Jr Dr Stuart E Rogers Dr Reynaldo J Gomez Michael J Aftosmis Source 12 See also editApollo 204 Review Board Apollo 1 fire Rogers CommissionReferences edit NASA Columbia disaster The investigation into one of history s worst space tragedies and its lasting legacy Sky News Retrieved 2023 02 01 Elizabeth Howell 2023 02 01 20 years after Columbia shuttle tragedy NASA pledges acute awareness of astronaut safety Space com Retrieved 2023 02 01 Deignan Owen 2022 11 13 What caused the space shuttle Columbia explosion Rebellion Research Retrieved 2023 02 01 The Columbia Accident Investigation Board CAIB NASA 2003 08 24 Retrieved 2023 04 05 Space Shuttle Columbia Fast Facts CNN 2013 09 30 Retrieved 2023 02 01 Langewiesche William 2003 11 01 Columbia s Last Flight The Atlantic Retrieved 2023 02 01 Gehman Harold Barry John Deal Duane Hallock James Hess Kenneth Hubbard G Scott Logsdon John Logsdon John Ride Sally Tetrault Roger Turcotte Stephen Wallace Steven Widnall Sheila August 26 2003 Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board PDF NASA Retrieved July 19 2021 Orion Lockheed Martin Archived from the original on 2011 05 05 Retrieved 2011 05 01 Orion Lockheed Martin Archived from the original on 2011 05 05 Retrieved 2011 05 01 NASA gov Archived from the original on 2011 04 27 Retrieved 2011 05 01 NASA gov CAIB Archived from the original on 2012 05 22 Retrieved 2012 05 28 Sources editCAIB panel and staff information Retrieved February 15 2004 CAIB Final Report Volume 1 August 26 2003 STS 107 Investigation Reference Page NASA SLS MPCV Archived 2011 04 27 at the Wayback Machine Retrieved April 30 2011External links editColumbia Accident Investigation Board homepage CAIB hearing transcripts NASA homepage Works by Columbia Accident Investigation Board at LibriVox public domain audiobooks nbsp Columbia Accident Investigation Board on C SPAN Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Columbia Accident Investigation Board amp oldid 1190406843, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,
