Three warfares

"Three warfares" (Chinese: 三战^[1] or 三种战法, pinyin: Sān zhǒng zhàn fǎ;^[2] also translated as 'three tactics') is an official political and information non-kinetic warfare strategy of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) employing media or public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. Promulgated as work regulations, the "three warfares" was set forth in the amended Political Work Regulations of the PLA in 2003.

History

Political warfare

Further information: Political warfare § China

Political warfare, during the formative years of China, was as much concerned with creating national identity and defeating domestic adversaries as it was with China's ability to compete in the world.^[3]

Establishing legal justifications prior to military conflict is not new. Since the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), casus belli have always been established before military action is taken as was seen in the case of the Korean War, the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict, and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Military action backed by domestic law strengthens PRC's position as is in the case of the usage of the 1992 Territorial Sea Laws in the South China Sea and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law in relation to Taiwan. This diplomatic tradition has now been combined with modern warfare. Psychological warfare has been one of the main responsibilities of the Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission (formerly the PLA's General Political Department or GPD) since the day it was established. Media or public opinion warfare combines traditional propaganda techniques with deception and perception management.^[4]

Information warfare

Main article: Chinese information operations and information warfare

In the PLA's Science of Military Strategy, it was noted that information systems played a big part in the Gulf War: "Precision-guided weapons made up only 7 percent of all weapons used by U.S. military, but they destroyed 80 percent of important targets".^[4] A 2007 book, Information Warfare Theory, written by the president of the PLA Information Engineering University, states that information warfare is at the center of China's military reforms.^[5]

Three warfares

Three warfares is believed to be inspired from the Zhou dynasty strategist Sun Tzu's book The Art of War, particularly his notion of winning without fighting.^[6] Laura Jackson, an American China expert, said that three warfares aims at "undermining international institutions, changing borders, and subverting global media, all without firing a shot".^[7]

The doctrine was approved by the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee (CCP) and the Central Military Commission in December 2003 to guide PLA political and information operations.^[8][9][10] Chapter 2, Section 18 of the "Chinese People’s Liberation Army Political Work Regulations" sets forth the three warfares, among other political tasks.^[11][12] The three warfares under "wartime political work" are public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare.^[13][14][1] Three warfares was integrated into PLA teaching programs.^[15] Operationally, PLA's General Political Department's Liaison Department (GPD/LD), China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and United Front Work Department are organizations responsible for three warfares.^[16][17] China has incorporated three warfares into local governments and institutions.^[18]

These work regulations have been revised over time.^[19][13][15] Recent output from the PLA Academy of Military Science and the PLA National Defence University (NDU) builds on three warfares doctrine and expands its roles and methods; this includes texts such as the PLA Academy of Military Science's The Science of Military Strategy (2013), the NDU's "Introduction to Public Opinion Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Legal Warfare" (2014), and NDU's "Science of Military Strategy" (2015).^[1][15]

About

For the PLA, legal warfare in the modern international context is a way to "expose the enemy", "publicize one's own humanitarianism ... win over the universal sympathy and support from the international community ... to compel [the] opponent to bog down in isolation and passivity" among other things. Psychological warfare, quoting PLA strategist Yu Guohua, "should sap the enemy’s morale, disintegrate their will to fight, ignite the anti-war sentiment among citizens at home, heighten international and domestic conflict, weaken and sway the will to fight among its high level decision makers, and in turn lessen their superiority in military strength". One tactic of media warfare may be "to open for selective study the parts of the PLA that help deliver the message that the GPD and the Propaganda Department want delivered to foreign audiences while concealing other areas of PLA activity".^[4]

Foreign definitions

According to Abhijit Singh, a research fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), an Indian think tank, three warfares involves using public opinion (or media warfare) warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare (lawfare) to "weaken its adversaries in regions constituting what it perceives to be its core interests" aimed at "creating conditions suitable for a resolution of the conflict on favourable terms to China without resorting to physical war" or conversely "to create the climate and context for the use of force".^[13][6] Public opinion or media warfare can include overt and covert media manipulation, while legal warfare or lawfare includes exploitation of national and international legal systems.^[6]

In 2011, the United States Department of Defense defined three warfares as the following:^[20][21]

1) Psychological Warfare – seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralising enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations.

2) Media Warfare – is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build support for China's military actions and dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China's interests.

3) Legal Warfare – uses international and domestic law to claim the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests. It can be used to thwart an opponent's operational freedom and shape the operational space. It is also used to build international support and manage possible political repercussions of China's military

Three Warfares provides a useful schema for unpacking Beijing's approach [...] the constant discussion of China's [...] capabilities by its adversaries, which invariably surrounds any agreements, serves as psychological warfare by reinforcing perceptions of China's strength, without the need for sabre-rattling or messaging directly from Beijing that might conflict with rhetoric of a peaceful rise.

Matt Sawers, AIIA^[15]

Anne-Marie Brady, a politics professor at the University of Canterbury, in her book Making the Foreign Serve China has described the tactics used including,^[22]

...appointing foreigners with access to political power to high profile roles in Chinese companies or Chinese-funded entities in the host country. [...] Co-opting foreign academics, entrepreneurs, and politicians to promote China’s perspective in the media and academia. Build up positive relations with susceptible individuals via shows of generous political hospitality in China.

Distraction

Three warfares has been labelled a tool for distraction by Western analysts, with the aim of distracting from the "much larger organizational and operational infrastructure that exists under the CCP".^[16]

Usage

China's deployment of the "three warfares" strategy has been recognized by several strategists, including Professor Kerry Gershaneck of MCU, Seth G. Jones of CSIS, Associate Professor Michael Clarke of ANU and the former CIA analyst Peter Mattis.^{[23][24][25][26]} The French Ministry of Defence considers the strategy to be the core of China's political warfare.^[27] The strategy has been seen as part of Beijing's ability to link all elements of national power for strategic ends.^[28] It may include the building of military bases in contested areas, done, not for kinetic purposes, but for psychological effect.^[29]

Australia and New Zealand

See also: Foreign espionage in New Zealand and 2019 Australian Parliament infiltration plot

According to Sascha Dov Bachmann, Professor in Law at the University of Canberra, China has since 2000, employed influence operations that have eroded the sovereignty of both Australia and New Zealand. It aims to undermine the integrity of the organic political processes in both countries to manufacture a friendly political environment for Beijing through the use of influence and disinformation campaigns.^[30] According to Anne-Marie Brady, the Chinese Communist Party works with the Chinese diaspora as part of a united front strategy to advance Chinese political and economic interests in New Zealand, with goals including cultivating local political leaders in the country.^[31][32][33]

Canada

Main article: Chinese government interference in Canada

  Additional information needed

Belt and Road Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project is seen as a key element of the three warfares doctrine, seeking to create a debt-trap for unsuspecting nations and compromise the economic and political sovereignty of these nations. Through bribery and coercion, China has acquired allies and clients within the economic and political elites of these nations, and gets them to promote the acceptance of the BRI project in their respective nations.^[34]

COVID-19 pandemic

Further information: COVID-19 misinformation by China

During the COVID-19 pandemic, China used a vast disinformation campaign that COVID-19 originated outside of China. It used proxy accounts, bots and even Chinese government officials and diplomats to disseminate false stories on social media. For example, Chinese state-run media falsely claimed that COVID-19 had originated in South Korea and Italy. A Chinese diplomat Zhao Lijian shared a theory that a US Army service member had brought the virus to China. The German Interior Ministry also revealed that Chinese diplomats had urged Germany to report favorably on China's COVID-19 response efforts. China has also influenced the World Health Organization to shape and steer its messaging in favour of China. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the WHO Director General, consistently praised China's "effective" response but never criticized China for suppressing whistleblowers and ignoring WHO's recommendations on how to stop the spread of COVID-19.^[35]

Czech Republic

According to a Czech Republic's counter-intelligence agency Security Information Service (BIS) 2014 report, "China’s administration and its intelligence services have put an emphasis on gaining influence over Czech political and state structures and on gathering political intelligence, with active participation by select Czech elites, including politicians and state officials."^[8]

India

Further information: Sino-Indian border dispute

According to Abhijit Singh, a research fellow at MP-IDSA, a news item dated 29 January 2013 and carried by China's state-owned Xinhua News Agency on the self-immolations by Tibetans, is an example of media warfare. The news story was related to trying to find a judicial "Indian connection" to the immolations, however the court which was overseeing the case did not give a verdict.^[13]

The Times of India reported that during the 2017 Doklam standoff China used the three warfares against India.^[36] Media warfare was waged with the aim of stopping India from proceeding with its action in Bhutan and belittling Bhutan's claims. China's media and multiple ministries made statements at numerous public forums with the same goal. Psychological warfare included calling India's foreign minister a liar and asserting that China would change it stance related to the Indian state of Sikkim, and in turn "free" Sikkim from Indian control. Legal warfare included Chinese statements saying that Bhutan had accepted Chinese claims on Doklam and that the 1890 convention is to be followed while ignoring the 1914 convention.^[36][37]

South China Sea

See also: Territorial disputes in the South China Sea

Since 2013, China has reclaimed land and fortified a number of islands in the South China Sea. The reclamation projects and deployment of military assets in the islands shows China's efforts to "undermine the psychological ability of the other claimants (Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia) to oppose its own". It has also deployed maritime militia in the region to create confusion among the navies of these nations. It has followed an aggressive messaging initiative using diplomatic pressure, news media and other media "to promote narratives reinforcing the historicity of its claim and warning others to refrain from antagonism".^[6] China has also consistently attempted to push narratives that show itself as the upholder of international law in the South China Sea region as well as its own interpretations of international law to oppose the other nations' positions and to delegitimize the arbitration process.^[1]

Taiwan

See also: United front in Taiwan

China has used three warfares against Taiwan through the efforts of the PLA's former General Political Department's Base 311 which oversaw at least six regiments. In peacetime, Base 311's employment includes a commercial front, the China Huayi Broadcasting Corporation.^[38][39]

United States

See also: Chinese espionage in the United States

In April 2014, The Pentagon released a report it which it claimed the PLA was using its three warfares strategy and warned of China's use of coercive economic inducements and other non-traditional methods to weaken the resolve of the US and its regional partners to defend the islands and oceans of the South and East China seas.^[40] In 2016, the Journal of Strategic Security reported that China uses the three warfares strategy to influence the international community, and the United States in particular, to forestall the development and implementation of any counter strategy to its cyber-espionage campaign which has resulted in losses of $338 billion to the United States.^[41] In 2020, Chinese lawyers sued the United States for covering up COVID-19, an example of three warfares being conducted as if it were a military operation.^[42][43]

Xinjiang

Further information: Persecution of Uyghurs in China

The three warfares doctrine has been seen to have been used in Xinjiang even though it is an internal province of China. The use of three warfares and the concept of "social management" is a means of preserving its hold on power. China implemented a Social Credit System through which it collects and analyses metadata to shape and "score" the economic and social behavior of citizens. This scoring system allows for "predictive policing", enabling the state to make predictive assessments of perceived threats to its authority.^[44]

Countermeasures

A strategy to combat three warfares, as suggested by Abhijit Singh, could focus on "creating awareness" about three warfares: establishing SOPs for "impact mitigation", staying "flexible" in response, and "pre-empting attacks".^[13] Countermeasures suggested have included documenting, exposing, publicizing and amplifying Chinese operations and activities using three warfares techniques.^[45]

Commentary

Dean Cheng of The Heritage Foundation's Asian Study Center, an American think tank, warns that the phrase is a misnomer, that many do not take political warfare (media, psychological or law warfare) as real "warfare". He says that for the Chinese, "political warfare [...] is a strategic option that is underway all the time".^[43]

References

1. Kania, Elsa (22 August 2016). "The PLA's Latest Strategic Thinking on the Three Warfares". Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved 18 September 2020.
2. "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011. A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000" (PDF). US Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
3. Heinlein, Joseph J., Jr. Political Warfare: The Chinese Nationalist Model. (PHD Thesis, The American University 1974), p. 3
4. Wortzel, L. (2014). The Chinese People's Liberation Army And Information Warfare. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. Retrieved 16 October 2020, from — JSTOR
5. Gertz, Bill (2 June 2010). "Inside the Ring". The Washington Times. Retrieved 2020-10-17.
6. Livermore, Doug (25 March 2018). "China's "Three Warfares" In Theory and Practice in the South China Sea". Georgetown Security Studies Review: A Publication of the Georgetown University Center for Security Studies. Retrieved 21 September 2020.
7. "Information at War: From China's Three Warfares to NATO's Narratives". Legatum Institute. 25 September 2015. Retrieved 2020-10-16.
8. Raska, Michael (18 December 2015). "China and the 'Three Warfares'". The Diplomat. Retrieved 21 September 2020.
9. Clarke, Michael (January 2019). "China's Application of the 'Three Warfares' in the South China Sea and Xinjiang" (PDF). nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au. National Security College, Australian National University (ANU) Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd. Retrieved 21 September 2020.
10. Fritz, Jason R. (2017-03-21). China's Cyber Warfare: The Evolution of Strategic Doctrine. Lexington Books. p. 70. ISBN 978-1-4985-3708-7.
11. Dean Cheng (27 January 2011). "Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission: China’s Active Defense Strategy and its Regional Impact". The Heritage Foundation.
12. Issues & Studies Volume 43, Issues 1-4. Institute of International Relations, Republic of China. 2007. p. 171.
13. Singh, Abhijit (December 2013). "China's 'Three Warfares' and India" (PDF). Journal of Defence Studies. 7 (4, October–December 2013): 27–46.
14. Fravel, M. Taylor (2020-11-10). Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949. Princeton University Press. p. 221. ISBN 978-0-691-21033-9.
15. Sawers, Matt (21 February 2020). "How Beijing's Cyber Security Engagement Incorporates The Three Warfares - AIIA". Australian Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved 2020-09-25.
16. "Taiwan and the CCP's "Public Opinion Warfare". pp 41–42. Li-wen Tung. Taiwan Strategists No. 2. Retrieved on 16 October 2020.
17. Ramanujam, Kanchana (3 July 2019). "From Human Wave to Info Wave: China's Propaganda Warfare". CLAWS. Retrieved 16 October 2020.
18. Cordesman, Anthony H.; Hess, Ashley; Yarosh, Nicholas S. (2013-10-22). Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: A Western Perspective. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-1-4422-2776-7.
19. "PLA implements new political work regulation". People's Daily. Xinhua. 13 September 2010. Retrieved 2020-09-23.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: others (link)
20. Halper, Stefan. "China: The Three Warfares (May 2013)" (PDF). Retrieved 15 September 2020.
21. "Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011. A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000" (PDF). US Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
22. Lulu, Jichang (22 March 2019). "Make the foreign serve Huawei: An invitation-only presentation to demonstrate the company's openness". Sinopsis. Retrieved 18 September 2020.
23. Gershaneck, Kerry. "To Win without Fighting: Defining China's Political Warfare" (PDF). Expeditions with MCUP.
24. "2022 National Defense Strategy: Implications for China and the Indo-Pacific". www.csis.org. 28 October 2022. Retrieved 2022-12-21.
25. Clarke, Michael (January 2019). "China's Application of the 'Three Warfares' in the South China Sea and Xinjiang" (PDF). Foreign Policy Research Institute.
26. "Chinese national security and the 'three warfares': How Beijing decides who or what to target". ABC News. 2019-02-25. Retrieved 2022-12-21.
27. "CHINESE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS". www.irsem.fr. Retrieved 2022-12-21.
28. Denmark, Abraham; Patel, Nirav, eds. (September 2009). "China's Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship" (PDF). Center for a New American Security.
29. Seebeck, Lesley; Williams, Emily; Wallis, Jacob (7 June 2022). "Countering the Hydra: A proposal for an Indo-Pacific hybrid threat centre". Australian Strategic Policy Institute Policy Brief (Report No. 60/2022).
30. Bachmann, Sascha Dov (2020). "The Silent Erosion of Sovereignty: A Sino–Australian Example". Wild Blue Yonder / Maxwell Afb, al. academia.edu. Retrieved 20 September 2020.
31. Brady, Anne-Marie (2017-09-22). "Magic weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping". apo.org.au. from the original on 24 January 2019. Retrieved 24 January 2019.
32. Brady, Anne-Marie (16–17 September 2017). (PDF). The corrosion of democracy under China's global influence. Arlington County, Virginia: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. pp. 1–57. Archived from the original (PDF) on 12 January 2020. Retrieved 22 February 2019.
33. Edwards, Bryce (12 December 2017). "Political Roundup: China's 'magic weapons' in NZ". New Zealand Herald. from the original on 22 February 2019. Retrieved 22 February 2019.
34. Gershaneck, Professor Kerry. "To Win without Fighting Defining China's Political Warfare". US Marine Corps University. Retrieved 19 September 2020.
35. Ha, Mathew (30 April 2020). "China's Coronavirus Disinformation Campaigns Are Integral to Its Global Information Warfare Strategy". Foundation for Defence of Democracies. Retrieved 20 September 2020.
36. Bagchi, Indrani (13 August 2017). "Doklam standoff: China playing out its 'Three Warfares' strategy against India". The Times of India. Retrieved 2020-09-15.
37. Bisht, Nagender S. P.; Jain, Rajeev; Gambhir, Victor (2019-11-01). "Doklam Plateau and Three Warfares Strategy". China Report. 55 (4): 293–309. doi:10.1177/0009445519875234. ISSN 0009-4455. S2CID 214278483.
38. Whyte, Christopher; Thrall, A. Trevor; Mazanec, Brian M. (2020-07-28). Information Warfare in the Age of Cyber Conflict. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-429-89392-6.
39. Kania, Elsa (2017-02-15). "The Role of PLA Base 311 in Political Warfare against Taiwan (Part 3)". Global Taiwan Institute. Retrieved 2023-12-09.
40. Garnaut, John (11 April 2014). "US unsettled by China's 'three warfares' strategy: Pentagon report". Sunday Morning Herald. Retrieved 21 September 2020.
41. Iasiello, Emilio (2016). "China's Three Warfares Strategy Mitigates Fallout From Cyber Espionage Activities". JSS, University of South Florida. Retrieved 20 September 2020.
42. "Chinese Lawyers Sue U.S. Over 'Coronavirus Cover-up'". Radio Free Asia. 26 March 2020. Retrieved 2020-09-23.
43. Cheng, Dean (2 April 2020). "For the Chinese, Political Warfare Is War by Other Means". The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved 2020-09-23.
44. Clarke, Michael (January 2019). "China's Application of the 'Three Warfares' in the South China Sea and Xinjiang". The Diplomat. Retrieved 18 September 2020.
45. Wieck, Brian D. (11 May 2017). "Information Operations Countermeasures to Anti-Access/Area Denial". The Strategy Bridge. Retrieved 2020-10-01.

Further reading

• Hadrien T. Saperstein (12 October 2020). The Royal Thai Navy’s Theoretical Application of the Maritime Hybrid Warfare Concept. Asia Centre.
• Thomas, Timothy L. (2010). Google Confronts China's 'Three Warfares'. United States Army War College Quarterly (Summer 2010), v.39 no.3, p. 101-113