fbpx
Wikipedia

Social utility efficiency

Social utility efficiency (SUE) is a measurement of the utilitarian performance of voting methods—how likely they are to elect the candidate who best represents the voters' preferences.[2]

Efficiency of several voting systems with an impartial culture model and 25 voters[1]

It is also known as utilitarian efficiency,[3][4] voter satisfaction index (VSI)[5][6] or voter satisfaction efficiency (VSE).[7][8]

Definition edit

Social utility efficiency is defined as the ratio between the social utility of the candidate who is actually elected by a given voting method and that of the candidate who would maximize social utility, where  is the expected value over many iterations of the sum of all voter utilities for a given candidate:[9]

 

A voting method with 100% efficiency would always pick the candidate that maximizes voter utility. A method that chooses a winner randomly would have efficiency of 0%, and a (pathological) method that did worse than a random pick would have less than 0% efficiency.

SUE is not only affected by the voting method, but is a function of the number of voters, number of candidates, and of any strategies used by the voters.[1]

History edit

The concept was originally introduced as a system's "effectiveness" by Robert J. Weber in 1977, defined as:[2]

 

Where   is the expected social utility of the given candidate,   is the number of voters, and   is the number of candidates. He used a random society (impartial culture) model to analytically calculate the effectiveness of FPTP, two Approval variants, and Borda, as the number of voters approaches infinity.

It was given the name "social utility efficiency" and extended to the more realistic spatial model of voting by Samuel Merrill III[1] in the 1980s, calculated statistically from random samples, with 25–201 voters and 2–10 candidates.[10] This analysis included FPTP, Runoff, IRV, Coombs, Approval, Black, and Borda (in increasing order of efficiency). (Merrill's model normalizes individual voter utility before finding the utility winner, while Weber's does not, so that Merrill considers all 2-candidate voting systems to have an SUE of 100%, decreasing with more candidates, while Weber considers them to have an effectiveness of   = 81.6%, with some systems increasing with more candidates.)

See also edit

References edit

  1. ^ a b c Merrill, Samuel (1984). "A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems". American Journal of Political Science. 28 (1): 23–48. doi:10.2307/2110786. ISSN 0092-5853. JSTOR 2110786.
  2. ^ a b Weber, Robert J. (September 1978). "Comparison of Public Choice Systems". Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics: 16, 38, 62. No. 498.
  3. ^ Mueller, Dennis C. (2003). Public choice III. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-511-06504-3. OCLC 191952945.
  4. ^ Duddy, Conal (2017). "Geometry of run-off elections". Public Choice. 173 (3–4): 267–288. doi:10.1007/s11127-017-0476-2. ISSN 0048-5829. S2CID 254935333.
  5. ^ Shentrup, Clay (2007-07-07). "Voter Satisfaction Index". Center for Range Voting. Retrieved 2019-07-24. Voter satisfaction index, or "VSI" for short (also called "social utility efficiency" ... a lower number is actually better, and this can confuse people who are new to the concept. ... the utility units have an arbitrary magnitude, making it difficult to compare Bayesian regret figures
  6. ^ Huang, John (January 11, 2020). "Alternative Voting Methods — How well do they perform in the best case?". Americans for Representation. Retrieved 2021-01-31. For this blog post, I'm going to stick with something called "Voter Satisfaction Index".
  7. ^ Quinn, Jameson (2017-02-10). "Voter Satisfaction Efficiency FAQ". GitHub Pages. Retrieved 2019-07-24.
  8. ^ Wolk, Sara; Quinn, Jameson; Ogren, Marcus (2023-03-20). "STAR Voting, equality of voice, and voter satisfaction: considerations for voting method reform". Constitutional Political Economy. 34 (3): 310–334. doi:10.1007/s10602-022-09389-3. ISSN 1043-4062. S2CID 257653868.
  9. ^ Merrill, Samuel (2014-07-14). Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic. Princeton University Press. ISBN 9781400859504. If the ratings are interpreted as Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities … I define the social utility of a candidate as the sum of all voter utilities for that candidate.
  10. ^ Merrill, Samuel (1984). "A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems". American Journal of Political Science. 28 (1): 23–48. doi:10.2307/2110786. ISSN 0092-5853. JSTOR 2110786.

social, utility, efficiency, measurement, utilitarian, performance, voting, methods, likely, they, elect, candidate, best, represents, voters, preferences, efficiency, several, voting, systems, with, impartial, culture, model, voters, also, known, utilitarian,. Social utility efficiency SUE is a measurement of the utilitarian performance of voting methods how likely they are to elect the candidate who best represents the voters preferences 2 Efficiency of several voting systems with an impartial culture model and 25 voters 1 It is also known as utilitarian efficiency 3 4 voter satisfaction index VSI 5 6 or voter satisfaction efficiency VSE 7 8 Contents 1 Definition 2 History 3 See also 4 ReferencesDefinition editSocial utility efficiency is defined as the ratio between the social utility of the candidate who is actually elected by a given voting method and that of the candidate who would maximize social utility where E displaystyle E nbsp is the expected value over many iterations of the sum of all voter utilities for a given candidate 9 SUE E selected candidate E random candidate E maximizing candidate E random candidate displaystyle operatorname SUE frac E text selected candidate E text random candidate E text maximizing candidate E text random candidate nbsp A voting method with 100 efficiency would always pick the candidate that maximizes voter utility A method that chooses a winner randomly would have efficiency of 0 and a pathological method that did worse than a random pick would have less than 0 efficiency SUE is not only affected by the voting method but is a function of the number of voters number of candidates and of any strategies used by the voters 1 History editThe concept was originally introduced as a system s effectiveness by Robert J Weber in 1977 defined as 2 Effectiveness lim n E elected m n E random m E maximal m n E random m displaystyle operatorname Effectiveness lim n to infty frac E text elected m n E text random m E text maximal m n E text random m nbsp Where E displaystyle E nbsp is the expected social utility of the given candidate n displaystyle n nbsp is the number of voters and m displaystyle m nbsp is the number of candidates He used a random society impartial culture model to analytically calculate the effectiveness of FPTP two Approval variants and Borda as the number of voters approaches infinity It was given the name social utility efficiency and extended to the more realistic spatial model of voting by Samuel Merrill III 1 in the 1980s calculated statistically from random samples with 25 201 voters and 2 10 candidates 10 This analysis included FPTP Runoff IRV Coombs Approval Black and Borda in increasing order of efficiency Merrill s model normalizes individual voter utility before finding the utility winner while Weber s does not so that Merrill considers all 2 candidate voting systems to have an SUE of 100 decreasing with more candidates while Weber considers them to have an effectiveness of 2 3 displaystyle sqrt 2 3 nbsp 81 6 with some systems increasing with more candidates See also editCondorcet efficiency Comparison of electoral systemsReferences edit a b c Merrill Samuel 1984 A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems American Journal of Political Science 28 1 23 48 doi 10 2307 2110786 ISSN 0092 5853 JSTOR 2110786 a b Weber Robert J September 1978 Comparison of Public Choice Systems Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics 16 38 62 No 498 Mueller Dennis C 2003 Public choice III Cambridge Cambridge University Press ISBN 0 511 06504 3 OCLC 191952945 Duddy Conal 2017 Geometry of run off elections Public Choice 173 3 4 267 288 doi 10 1007 s11127 017 0476 2 ISSN 0048 5829 S2CID 254935333 Shentrup Clay 2007 07 07 Voter Satisfaction Index Center for Range Voting Retrieved 2019 07 24 Voter satisfaction index or VSI for short also called social utility efficiency a lower number is actually better and this can confuse people who are new to the concept the utility units have an arbitrary magnitude making it difficult to compare Bayesian regret figures Huang John January 11 2020 Alternative Voting Methods How well do they perform in the best case Americans for Representation Retrieved 2021 01 31 For this blog post I m going to stick with something called Voter Satisfaction Index Quinn Jameson 2017 02 10 Voter Satisfaction Efficiency FAQ GitHub Pages Retrieved 2019 07 24 Wolk Sara Quinn Jameson Ogren Marcus 2023 03 20 STAR Voting equality of voice and voter satisfaction considerations for voting method reform Constitutional Political Economy 34 3 310 334 doi 10 1007 s10602 022 09389 3 ISSN 1043 4062 S2CID 257653868 Merrill Samuel 2014 07 14 Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic Princeton University Press ISBN 9781400859504 If the ratings are interpreted as Von Neumann Morgenstern utilities I define the social utility of a candidate as the sum of all voter utilities for that candidate Merrill Samuel 1984 A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems American Journal of Political Science 28 1 23 48 doi 10 2307 2110786 ISSN 0092 5853 JSTOR 2110786 nbsp This election related article is a stub You can help Wikipedia by expanding it vte Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Social utility efficiency amp oldid 1222909293, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

article

, read, download, free, free download, mp3, video, mp4, 3gp, jpg, jpeg, gif, png, picture, music, song, movie, book, game, games.