Franco-Spanish War (1635–1659)

For other uses, see Franco-Spanish War (disambiguation).

The Franco-Spanish War (1635–1659) was fought between France and Spain with the participation of a changing list of allies throughout the war. The first phase, beginning in May 1635 and ending with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, is considered a related conflict of the Thirty Years' War. The second phase continued until 1659, when France and Spain agreed to peace terms in the Treaty of the Pyrenees.

Franco–Spanish War
Part of the Thirty Years' War
The war was driven by long standing French attempts to strengthen their borders with Habsburg Spain (red) and Habsburg Austria (yellow)
Date 19 May 1635 – 7 November 1659 (24 years, 5 months, 2 weeks and 5 days) Location Northern France, Catalonia, Spanish Netherlands, Northern Italy, the Rhineland, Mediterranean Sea, Atlantic Ocean Result Treaty of the Pyrenees Territorial changes Artois and Roussillon annexed by France
Belligerents
Phase I: 1635–1648  Kingdom of France  Dutch Republic Savoy  Duchy of Modena and Reggio (1647–1649)  Duchy of Parma (1635–1637) Phase II: 1648–1659  Kingdom of France Savoy  Duchy of Modena and Reggio (1655–1659)  Commonwealth (1657–1659) Co-belligerent: Kingdom of Portugal (1640–1659)^[a]	Phase I: 1635–1648 Spanish Empire  Holy Roman Empire  Duchy of Modena and Reggio (1636–1646) Phase II: 1648–1659 Spanish Empire
Commanders and leaders
Turenne Condé (until 1652) Gassion Choiseul La Meilleraye La Ferté Prince of Orange Bernard of Saxe-Weimar	Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand Francisco de Melo Leopold Wilhelm John of Austria Caracena Vélez Condé (from 1652)
Strength
c. 100,000 (1640s)^[b] c. 120,000 (1653)^[1] c. 110,000–125,000 (1653–1659)^[3]	c. 110,000 (1640)^[c]
Casualties and losses
200,000–300,000 killed or wounded^[5]^[d] 42 generals killed	288,000+ dead or missing (Castile and Aragon only)^[6]^[e]^[need quotation to verify]

Major areas of conflict included northern Italy, the Spanish Netherlands and the German Rhineland. In addition, France supported revolts against Spanish rule in Portugal (1640–1668), Catalonia (1640–1653) and Naples (1647), and from 1647 to 1653, Spain backed French rebels in the civil war known as the Fronde. Both also backed opposing sides in the 1639 to 1642 Piedmontese Civil War.

France avoided direct participation in the Thirty Years' War until May 1635, when it declared war on Spain and the Holy Roman Empire and entered the conflict as an ally of the Dutch Republic and of Sweden. After Westphalia in 1648, the war continued between Spain and France, with neither side able to achieve decisive victory. France made some gains in Flanders and along the north-eastern end of the Pyrenees, but by 1658 both sides were financially exhausted, which led them to make peace in November 1659.

French territorial gains were minor but strengthened the kingdom's borders; additionally, Louis XIV married Maria Theresa of Spain, the eldest daughter of Philip IV. Spain retained a vast global empire and remained a leading power in Europe, but the treaty marked the beginning of a rapid loss of its European predominance in favour of a rising France under Louis XIV.^[7][8][9]

Strategic overview

 

The Spanish Road; Purple: Spanish dependencies; Green: Ruled by Austria; Orange: Ruled by Spain

Europe in the 17th century was dominated by the struggle between the Bourbon kings of France, and their Habsburg rivals in Spain and the-Holy Roman Empire. Until the mid 20th century, the Thirty Years' War was primarily seen as a German religious conflict. In 1938, the British historian Veronica Wedgwood argued that it formed part of a wider ongoing European struggle, with the Habsburg-Bourbon conflict at its centre. Modern historians sometimes refer to the Franco-Spanish War as a "declared war" and the formal part of a much wider contest with many different locations and participants.^[10]

During the 1620s, France was threatened internally by a series of Huguenot rebellions and externally by Habsburg possessions on its borders in the Spanish Netherlands, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté and Roussillon. Prior to 1635, France sought to weaken both branches of the Habsburgs by financing their opponents, including the Dutch, clients in Northern Italy and the Grisons, the Ottomans, the Venetian Republic, Transylvania and Sweden. After 1635, France intervened directly through anti-Habsburg alliances with the Dutch and the Swedish and supported insurgents in Portugal, Catalonia and Naples^[11]

For their part, the Habsburgs backed the Huguenots and numerous conspiracies led by the feudal lords who resented their loss of power under Cardinal Richelieu and his successor, Cardinal Mazarin. The most significant ones were the 1632 Montmorency plot, the 1641 Princes des Paix rising, and Cinq-Mars in 1642. Spain also financed the 1648–1653 civil war in France that is known as the Fronde.^[12]

Wider co-operation between the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs was limited since their objectives did not always align. Spain was a global maritime power, and Austria was primarily a European land power and focused on the Holy Roman Empire, which contained over 1,800 members, most of them extremely small. Although the Habsburgs had been Holy Roman Emperors since 1440, their control over the empire was weakened by the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, which continued in the period leading up to 1620. Reversing the trend was a major Habsburg objective during the Thirty Years' War, but failure was acknowledged by the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.^[13]

France faced the same issue of diverging objectives with its allies. The war coincided with the period of economic supremacy known as the Dutch Golden Age, and by 1640, many Dutch statesmen viewed French ambitions in the Spanish Netherlands as a threat.^[14] Unlike France, Swedish war aims were restricted to Germany, and in 1641, the Swedes considered a separate peace with Emperor Ferdinand III.^[15]

From the late 16th century, Italy, especially the Kingdom of Naples, was the primary source of soldiers and money for the Spanish Army of Flanders.^[16] As a result, much of the fighting focused on the Spanish Road, a land supply route connecting Spanish possessions in Italy with Flanders but also passing through areas considered vital to French security, like Alsace. The independent Duchy of Savoy and Spanish-held Duchy of Milan were strategically important to the Road but also provided access to the vulnerable southern borders of France and Habsburg territories in Austria. Richelieu aimed to end Spanish dominance in those areas, an objective that had been largely achieved at his death in 1642.^[13]

Until the advent of railways in the 19th century, water was the primary means of bulk transportation, and campaigns focused on control of rivers and ports. Armies relied on foraging, while the feeding of the draught animals essential for transport and cavalry restricted campaigning in the winter. By the 1630s, the countryside had been devastated by years of constant warfare, which limited the size of the armies and their ability to conduct operations. Sickness killed far more soldiers than combat. The French army that invaded Flanders in May 1635 had been reduced by desertion and disease from 27,000 to under 17,000 by early July.^[17]

Background

 

Louis XIII, French ruler from 1610 to 1643

The Thirty Years' War began in 1618 when the Protestant-dominated Bohemian Estates offered the Crown of Bohemia to Frederick of the Palatinate, rather than the conservative Catholic Emperor Ferdinand II. Most of the Holy Roman Empire remained neutral and viewed it as an inheritance dispute, and the revolt was quickly suppressed. However, when Frederick refused to admit defeat, Imperial forces invaded the Palatinate and forced him into exile. The removal of a hereditary prince changed the nature and extent of the war.^[18] Combined with a renewed Counter-Reformation, it presented a direct threat both to Imperial Protestant states and external powers that held Imperial territories. They included the Dutch Prince of Orange, hereditary ruler of Nassau-Dillenburg, and Christian IV of Denmark, who was also Duke of Holstein-Gottorp. That presented Richelieu with additional opportunities to weaken his Habsburg opponents in Spain and the Empire but avoid direct conflict.^[19]

As a result, Catholic France supported the Protestant Dutch Republic in its war against Spain and funded first Danish and then Swedish intervention in the Empire. In 1630, Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden invaded Pomerania partly to support his Protestant coreligionists, but he also sought control of the Baltic trade, which provided much of Sweden's income.^[20] The Swedish intervention continued after his death at Lützen in 1632 but caused tensions with Saxony and Brandenburg-Prussia, whose lands were devastated by the plague and famine that accompanied the war.^[21] A significant Imperial-Spanish victory at Nördlingen in September 1634 forced the Swedes to abandon southern Germany, and most of their German allies used the opportunity to make peace with Ferdinand II at Prague in April 1635.^[22]

The other major European conflict of the period was the Eighty Years' War (1568-1648) between Spain and the Dutch Republic, suspended in 1609 by the Twelve Years' Truce.^[23] The Spanish strongly objected to its commercial provisions, and when Philip IV became king in 1621, he resumed the war. The cost proved extremely high and increased after 1628 by a proxy war with France over the Mantuan succession. The Spanish Empire reached its maximum nominal extent under Philip's rule, but its size and complexity made it increasingly difficult to govern, or enact essential reforms.^[24] However, its depth of resources consistently allowed it to recover from defeats that would have shattered other powers, and new regulations passed in 1631 and 1632 were key to the improved Spanish military performance in the first part of the war.^[25]

In 1628, the Dutch captured the Spanish treasure fleet, which they used to finance the capture of 's-Hertogenbosch the following year. The powerful Amsterdam mercantile lobby saw that as an opportunity to end the war. Negotiations ended without result in 1633 but strengthened the peace party.^[26] The Peace of Prague led to rumours of a proposed Austro-Spanish offensive in the Netherlands and led Louis XIII of France and Richelieu to decide on direct intervention. In early 1635, they signed an agreement with Bernard of Saxe-Weimar to provide 16,000 troops for a campaign in Alsace and the Rhineland, formed an anti-Spanish alliance with the Dutch and signed the Treaty of Compiègne with Sweden.^[27]

Phase I: 1635 to 1648 Treaty of Westphalia

 

 

Les Avins

 

Dunkirk

 

Brussels

 

Leuven

 

Valenciennes

 

Maastricht

 

Corbie

 

Lens

 

Arras

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1635–1659; key locations in northern France and the Spanish Netherlands (current Belgium borders shown; Arras, Valenciennes and Dunkirk were part of the Spanish Netherlands)

In May, a French army of 27,000 invaded the Spanish Netherlands and defeated a smaller Spanish force at Les Avins and besieged Leuven on 24 June, where they were joined by Dutch reinforcements. Disease and lack of supplies quickly reduced the besieging army, which withdrew in the face of a relief force under Ottavio Piccolomini on 4 July.^[28] Led by Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand of Austria, the Spanish took the initiative and captured Limbourg, Gennep, Diest and Goch and besieged Dutch garrisons in the Duchy of Cleves. The French retreated across the border, and the Dutch, under Frederick Henry, marched urgently on the strategic position of Schenkenschans. Captured by the Spanish on 28 July, it was recovered only after a long and costly siege.^[17]

After that failure, the States General of the Netherlands opposed further large-scale land operations in favour of attacks on Spanish trade.^[29] In the campaign of 1636, Philip switched his focus to recovering territories in the Low Countries, while a Franco-Savoyard offensive in Lombardy was defeated at Tornavento in June. A Spanish incursion into northern France captured the key fortified town of Corbie in August, but despite causing panic in Paris, lack of supplies forced the Spanish to retreat in September, and the attack was not repeated.^[30]

As agreed at Compiègne in 1635, the French replaced Swedish garrisons in Alsace. Prior to his death in 1639, Bernard of Saxe-Weimar won a series of victories over the Imperials in the Rhineland, notably the capture of Breisach in December 1638.^[31] Severing the Spanish Road meant the Spanish armies in Flanders had to be resupplied by sea, which made them vulnerable to attack by the Dutch navy, which destroyed a large Spanish fleet at the Battle of the Downs in 1639. Although most convoys managed to get through, that illustrated the difficulties Spain faced in sustaining its war effort in the Low Countries.^[32]

With Spanish resources stretched to the limit in Europe, the Dutch used the opportunity to attack their possessions in the Americas, Africa and Asia, especially those belonging to the Portuguese Empire, which was also ruled by Philip IV. Spanish inability to protect those interests caused increasing unrest in Portugal.^[33] Damage to the economy and tax increases imposed to pay for the war led to protests throughout Spanish territories, which in 1640 erupted into open revolts in Portugal and Catalonia.^[34] In 1641, the Catalan Courts recognised Louis XIII of France as Count of Barcelona and the ruler of the Principality of Catalonia.^[35] However, they soon found the new administration differed little from the old, which turned the war into a three sided contest between the Franco-Catalan elite, the rural peasantry and the Spanish.^[36]

 

 

Breisach

 

Rheinfelden

 

Mergentheim

 

Mannheim

 

Tuttlingen

 

Zusmarshausen

 

Nördlingen

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1635–1648; key locations Rhineland campaign

Louis XIII died on 14 May 1643, and was succeeded by his five-year-old son, Louis XIV, whose mother, Anne of Austria, took control of the Regency Council that ruled in his name. Five days later, Louis II de Bourbon, Prince of Condé, then known as the duc d'Enghien, defeated the Spanish Army of Flanders at Rocroi. Less decisive than often thought, the battle led to the loss of the veteran army and ended Spanish dominance of the European battlefield.^[37] It also gave Condé, a member of the royal family and the effective ruler of large parts of eastern France, leverage in his struggle with Anne and Cardinal Mazarin.^[38]

Despite some successes in northern France and the Spanish Netherlands, including victory at Lens in August 1648, France was unable to knock Spain out of the war. In the Holy Roman Empire, Imperial victories at Tuttlingen and Mergentheim were offset by French success at Nördlingen and Zusmarshausen. In Italy, French-backed Savoyard offensives against the Spanish-ruled Duchy of Milan achieved little because of lack of resources and the disruption caused by the 1639 to 1642 Piedmontese Civil War. Victory at Orbetello in June 1646, and the recapture of Naples in 1647 left Spain firmly in control of the region.^[39]

The 1648 Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War, recognised Dutch independence and ended the drain on Spanish resources. Under the October 1648 Treaty of Münster, France gained strategic locations in Alsace and Lorraine, as well as Pinerolo, which controlled access to Alpine passes in Northern Italy.^[39] However, the peace excluded Italy, Imperial territories in the Low Countries and French-occupied Lorraine. Although Emperor Ferdinand was now at peace with France, the fighting between France and Spain continued.^[40]

Phase II: 1648 to 1659

 

 

Tornavento

 

Turin

 

Mantua

 

Casale

 

Milan

 

Cremona

 

Pinerolo

 

Genoa

 

Modena

 

Pavia

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Northern Italy; key locations 1635–1659 (note Pinerolo, ceded to France in 1648)

After Philip IV of Spain had declared bankruptcy in 1647, he reduced expenditure by prioritising the retaking of Catalonia and remaining on the defensive elsewhere. In addition, many of his best troops had been lost at Rocroi and parts of Flanders overrun, including the key port of Dunkirk, a centre for Spanish privateer attacks on Dutch and French shipping.^[f] However, his position improved after the Peace of Westphalia ended the Dutch war, and political and economic turmoil in France led to a civil war, the Fronde.^[42]

Philip initially hoped simply to improve the terms on offer from France, but the Fronde allowed him to make substantial gains in the Netherlands, including retaking Ypres. Elsewhere, neither side was able to win a significant advantage. In 1650, Spanish success in crushing the Neapolitan Revolt was offset by the loss of Barcelona to French-backed Catalan rebels. Mazarin forced Condé into exile in the Spanish Netherlands in 1651, where his immense prestige in territories adjacent to the Spanish possession of Franche-Comté made him a valuable ally for Philip.^[43]

Over the course of 1652, Spain recaptured both Dunkirk and Barcelona, and although limited combat continued in Roussillon, the front by 1653 had stabilised along the modern Pyrenees border.^[44] However, doing so forced Philip into bankruptcy again, while the end of the Fronde allowed Mazarin to resume attacks on Milan, possession of which would allow France to threaten Habsburg Austria. The attempt failed despite support from Savoy, Modena and Portugal.^[45] By now, the two antagonists were exhausted, with neither able to establish dominance. From 1654 to 1656, major French victories at Arras, Landrecies and Saint-Ghislain were offset by Spanish victories at Pavia and Valenciennes. Under pressure from Pope Alexander VII, Mazarin offered peace terms but refused to accept Philip's insistence for Condé to be restored to his French titles and lands.^[46] Since the Spanish king viewed this as a personal obligation to Condé, the war continued.^[47]

France had previously relied on the Dutch to provide naval support against Spain, which ended after Westphalia. In 1657, Mazarin replaced the loss by negotiating an anti-Spanish alliance with the Commonwealth of England. That expanded the scope of the Anglo-Spanish War (1654–1660), and France withdrew support for the exiled Charles II of England, whose supporters joined the Spanish as a result.^[48] After the Anglo-French capture of Dunkirk in June 1658, Philip requested a truce, which Mazarin refused, but once again, success proved illusory. On 15 August, Spain won an important victory at Camprodon in Catalonia, Oliver Cromwell's death in September led to political chaos in England, and fighting in northern Italy ended when French allies Savoy and Modena agreed to a truce with the Spanish commander, Caracena.^[49]

Treaty of the Pyrenees and marriage contract

 

Philip IV of Spain, ruler from 1621 to 1665

On 8 May 1659, France and Spain began negotiating terms; the death of Oliver Cromwell in September 1658 weakened England, which was allowed to observe but excluded from the talks. Although the Anglo-Spanish War was suspended after the 1660 restoration of Charles II, it did not formally end until the Treaty of Madrid (1667).^[50]

Under the Treaty of the Pyrenees, signed on 5 November 1659, France gained Artois and Hainaut along its border with the Spanish Netherlands, as well as Roussillon. These were more significant than often assumed; in combination with the 1648 Treaty of Münster, France strengthened its borders in the east and south-west, while in 1662, Charles II sold Dunkirk to France. Acquisition of Roussillon established the Franco-Spanish border along the Pyrenees, but divided the historic Principality of Catalonia, an event still commemorated each year by French Catalan-speakers in Perpignan.^[51] In addition to these territorial loses, Spain was forced to recognize and confirm all of the French territorial gains at the Peace of Westphalia.^[52]

France withdrew support from Afonso VI of Portugal, while Louis XIV renounced his claim to be Count of Barcelona, and king of Catalonia. Condé regained his possessions and titles, as did many of his followers, such as the Comte de Montal, but his political power was broken, and he did not hold military command again until 1667.^[53]

An integral part of the peace negotiations was the marriage contract between Louis and Maria Theresa, which he used to justify the 1666 to 1667 War of Devolution, and formed the basis of French claims over the next 50 years. The marriage was more significant than intended, since it was agreed shortly after Philip's second wife, Mariana of Austria, gave birth to a second son, both of whom died young.^[54] Philip died in 1665, leaving his four-year-old son Charles as king, once described as "always on the verge of death, but repeatedly baffling Christendom by continuing to live."^[55]

Aftermath and historical assessment

 

Maria Theresa of Spain, whose marriage to Louis XIV was part of the peace negotiations

Traditional scholarship viewed the war as a French victory that marked the start of France's rise, replacing Spain as the predominant European power.^[8] More recent assessments argue this relies on hindsight, and that while France made crucial strategic gains around its borders, the outcome was far more balanced. One view is that the two parties effectively settled for a draw,^[56] and that had France not moderated its demands in 1659, Spain would have continued fighting.^[57]

"The (1659 treaty) was a peace of equals. Spanish losses were not great, and France returned some territory and strongholds. With hindsight, historians have regarded the treaty as a symbol of the 'decline of Spain' and the 'ascendancy of France'; at that time, however, (it) appeared a far from decisive verdict on the international hierarchy".^[8]

"Spain maintained her supremacy in Europe until 1659, and was the greatest imperial power for years after that. Although (its) economic and military power suffered an abrupt decline in the half century after (1659), (it) was a major participant in the European coalitions against Louis XIV, and the peace congresses at Nijmegen in 1678, and Ryswick in 1697".^[7]

David Parrott, Professor of Early Modern History at New College, Oxford claims the Peaces of Westphalia and the Pyrenees both reflected mutual exhaustion and stalemate, not a "military diktat imposed by victorious powers".^[9] Elsewhere, he labels the Franco-Spanish War as "25 years of indecisive, over-ambitious and, on occasions, truly disastrous conflict".^[58]

Financial and military impact

Taking on the Spanish Empire, then the strongest military power in Europe, required French forces of unprecedented size and an associated expansion of the taxation and supply base needed to support them. To meet these needs, official estimates for the army expanded from 39,000 in 1630 to around 150,000 shortly before the declaration of war in May 1635.^[59] However, at this stage the French state was unable to support such large numbers; of the 27,000 men who took part in the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands in May of the same year, fewer than 15,000 remained a month later. Throughout the war, both sides struggled to support offensives outside their own boundaries; the Spanish invasion of northern France in 1636 collapsed due to lack of supplies and was not repeated.^[17]

 

The Battle of Rocroi (1643) is often seen as the end of the battlefield supremacy of the tercios.

Including those supplied by Bernard of Saxe-Weimar and paid by France, between 1635 and 1642 official troop levels averaged 150,000 to 160,000, with a peak of 211,000 in 1639.^[60] These are based on official muster rolls and should be treated with caution, since officers were paid for numbers reported, rather than those actually present; in addition, during this period on average another 10% was absent due to sickness, although most generally recovered.^[61] Parrott estimates variances between "Reported" and "Actual" averaged up to 35% for the French and 50% for the Spanish.^[62] Historian John A. Lynn suggests an average of 60% "Reported" versus "Actual" "provides the most reasonable guide", a figure based on André Corvisier's 1964 work L'armée française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul.^[63]

Throughout the war, logistics remained the major constraint on the number of troops, while strategy was often subordinated to the need to find adequate provisions, especially given the primitive infrastructure then available. It was not until the 1660s that Louvois created the support systems that allowed France to sustain an army of nearly 200,000 men for extended periods, and crucially ensure co-ordinated strategy between different fronts.^[64] The more experienced Spanish were better equipped in this respect while their resources made it easier to replace losses of men and material. These advantages could be offset by engaging them on multiple fronts while attacking their lines of communication, a tactic the French used throughout the war by supporting the Catalan, Neapolitan and Portuguese rebels along with allies in Northern Italy and the Rhineland.^[65] Loss of Dutch naval support after 1648 severely impacted their ability to challenge the Spanish at sea, until replaced with the English alliance in 1657.^[66]

At its peak in 1632, the Spanish army contained around 300,000 regulars, exclusive of local militia and the empire increasingly relied on its Italian territories for recruits and money. Historian Davide Maffi calculates the Duchy of Milan provided an annual 6 million scudi for the war, as well as an average of 4,000 recruits per year. The Grand Duchy of Tuscany, a de facto Spanish protectorate was required to supply 17,000 scudi a month, as well as provide ships for the fleet and soldiers for the Army of Flanders. In 1631 to 1636 alone, Naples provided 3.5 million scudi, significant naval resources and 53,500 recruits for the Spanish army, more than Castile from a population half the size.^[67]

 

The Spanish retake Naples, April 1648; high taxes imposed to pay for the war led to revolt in October 1647

In addition to supporting its own army and navy, from 1630 to 1643 Naples supplied an average of 10,000 soldiers a year to the Spanish army, provided an annual subsidy of one million ducats to support other areas of the Spanish Empire, and paid a third of Milan's government expenditures. As a result, its public debt quintupled and by 1648 interest payments constituted 57% of the kingdom's revenue. In both Naples and Sicily, taxes tripled between 1618 and 1688; Philip sought to mitigate the impact by providing tax exemption for the elderly and poor and increasing consumption taxes on the wealthy, but this and other measures had the indirect effect of crushing the southern Italian economy.^[68]

Despite its power, the Spanish army was subject to constant supply shortages throughout the twenty five year conflict. By the end of it, both states were exhausted. When the commander of the Army of Extremadura requested 3,000 quintales (138 tons) of gunpowder for the 1659 campaign in Portugal, the central Junta of War for Spain revealed that total supplies for defense in the peninsula (including the navy, coastal garrisons, and militia in addition to the three major war fronts in Catalonia, Extremadura and Galicia) were only 1427 quintales (66 tons) due to so much powder having been spent in the fight against France. Shortages were particularly prominent among the militia and reserve forces. In 1632, 70% of the 44,000 men in Castile's militias were "unarmed" (as in, armed only with swords or similar weapons rather than firearms or pikes) due to a shortage of arquebuses. With the outbreak of war, this situation quickly improved so that by 1636 only 25% of militiamen in Castile were armed with hand weapons alone, with 25% carrying pikes and the remaining 50% arquebuses and muskets. By the end of the conflict, however, the situation had deteriorated once again, with more than 87 percent of the 465,000 militiamen listed in Castilian registers classed as "unarmed".^[69]

In October 1647, discontent led to revolts in both Sicily and Naples; although quickly suppressed, it exposed the weakness of Spanish rule in Italy and the alienation of the local elites from Madrid.^[70] In 1650, the governor of Milan wrote that as well as widespread dissatisfaction in the south, the only one of the Italian states that could be relied on was the Duchy of Parma.^[71]

Notes

1. Portugal declared its independence from Spain in 1640, triggering the Portuguese Restoration War. Although the Portuguese were already engaged in the Dutch–Portuguese War since 1602, they agreed to a 10-year truce with the Dutch Republic in Europe (1640–1650) while both were fighting for independence from Spain; nevertheless, the colonial war between the Portuguese and the Dutch West India Company (WIC) in the Americas (especially Dutch Brazil) continued.
2. The strength of the French Army fluctuated greatly in the 1640s, and estimates by historians vary accordingly, ranging from 218,000 to just 40,000 around 1645–1648.^[1] On average, it is likely that about 100,000 soldiers were usually in the field at any given time.^[2]
3. Total available in Italy, Portugal, Catalonia; excludes another 90,000 facing the Dutch in the Army of Flanders.^[4]
4. Wilson estimates three men died from disease for every one killed in action.^[5]
5. The figure of 288,000 dead and missing, allegedly 25% to 30% of all Spanish troops enlisted (not including troops from Italy, the Spanish Netherlands, Portugal, or other territories), may be an underestimate, as some municipalities did not have figures available.^[6]
6. Ships based in Dunkirk could enter the North Sea on a single flood tide, which allowed them to raid as far north as the Orkney Islands, and so its closure was an English objective for centuries.^[41]

References

1. Chartrand 2019, p. 33.
2. Chartrand 2019, p. 24.
3. Chartrand 2019, p. 34.
4. Clodfelter 2008, p. 39.
5. Wilson 2009, p. 791.
6. Ortiz 1970, p. 95.
7. Levy 1983, p. 34.
8. Darby 2015, p. 66.
9. Parrott 2001, pp. 77–78.
10. Sutherland 1992, pp. 588–590.
11. Jensen 1985, pp. 451–470.
12. Wilson 2009, pp. 663–664.
13. Wilson 1976, p. 259.
14. Wilson 2009, p. 669.
15. Wilson 2009, p. 627.
16. Kamen 2002, p. 403.
17. Van Nimwegen 2014, pp. 169–170.
18. Wilson 2009, pp. 314–316.
19. Hayden 1973, pp. 1–23.
20. Wedgwood 1938, pp. 385–386.
21. Riches 2012, pp. 125–126.
22. Knox 2017, pp. 182–183.
23. Lynch 1969, p. 42.
24. Mackay 1999, pp. 4–5.
25. Stradling 1979, p. 212.
26. Israel 1995, pp. 521–523.
27. Poot 2013, pp. 120–122.
28. Israel 1995, p. 70.
29. Israel 1995, p. 934.
30. Israel 1995, pp. 272–273.
31. Bely 2014, pp. 94–95.
32. Wilson 2009, p. 661.
33. Costa 2005, p. 4.
34. Kamen 2002, p. 402.
35. Van Gelderen 2002, p. 284.
36. Mitchell 2005, pp. 431–448.
37. Black 2002, p. 147.
38. Wilson 2009, pp. 666–668.
39. Paoletti 2007, pp. 27–28.
40. Wilson 2009, p. 747.
41. Bromley 1987, p. 233.
42. Inglis Jones 1994, pp. 59–64.
43. Inglis Jones 1994, pp. 9–12.
44. Parker 1972, pp. 221–224.
45. Schneid 2012, p. 69.
46. Inglis Jones 1994, pp. 296–300.
47. Black 1991, p. 16.
48. Quainton 1935, p. 268.
49. Hanlon 2016, p. 134.
50. Davenport & Paullin 1917, p. 50.
51. Serra 2008, pp. 82–84.
52. Maland 1966, p. 227.
53. Tucker 2011, p. 838.
54. Inglis Jones 1994, p. 307.
55. Durant & Durant 1963, p. 25.
56. Luard 1986, p. 50.
57. Stradling 1994, p. 27.
58. Parrott 2006, pp. 31–49.
59. Lynn 1994, p. 890.
60. Lynn 1994, p. 891.
61. Wilson 2009, p. 790.
62. Parrott 2001, p. 8.
63. Lynn 1994, p. 896–897.
64. Parrott 2001, pp. 548–551.
65. Stradling 1979, pp. 206–207.
66. Ekberg 1981, pp. 324–325.
67. Hanlon 2014, p. 116.
68. Hanlon 2016, pp. 119–120.
69. Lorraine White. "The Experience of Spain's Early Modern Soldiers: Combat, Welfare and Violence." War in History, January 2002, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1–38 [11–13].
70. Kamen 2002, p. 406.
71. Kamen 2002, p. 407.

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