Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962),[1] was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)[2] to require that federal courts grant a party leave to amend a pleading absent special circumstances such as bad faith or prejudice to the opposing party. It has been recognized by both other courts[3] and secondary sources[4] as a leading decision on the interpretation of Rule 15(a).
Judgment affirmed and motions to vacate the judgment and amend the complaint denied by the First Circuit, 292 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1961); cert. granted, 368 U.S. 951 (1962)
Subsequent
Judgment reversed by the First Circuit, 316 F.2d 254 (1963)
Holding
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires courts to grant a party leave to amend a pleading except in limited circumstances.
Foman's father allegedly promised her he would not execute a will in exchange for Foman caring for her mother until her mother's death. After her mother died, Foman's father married Davis, and, contrary to the alleged promise, executed a will leaving his entire estate to Davis. Following her father's death, Foman filed suit against Davis in the District of Massachusetts to recover what would have been her intestate share of her father's estate, that is, the amount she would have gotten had he not executed a will, as he allegedly promised.
Davis moved to dismiss the case, arguing that, under Massachusetts law, an oral promise not to execute a will was within the statute of frauds and thus unenforceable. The district court agreed and dismissed the case. Foman appealed the judgment to the First Circuit. Soon after appealing, though, Foman moved the district court for an order vacating the judgment and granting her leave to amend her complaint to assert a new cause of action for quantum meruit. The district court denied these motions, and Foman appealed this denial to the First Circuit. On appeal, the First Circuit held that it was unable to consider the merits of the case because Foman moved to vacate the judgment subsequent to her first appeal, meaning the judgment was not "final." The First Circuit then upheld the district court's denial of Foman's motions to vacate the judgment and amend her complaint.[5] The Supreme Court agreed to review the case.
Opinion of the CourtEdit
Justice Goldberg, writing for the Court, began by holding that the First Circuit was wrong to find that it could not consider the merits of the case because Foman moved to vacate the judgment after filing her initial appeal. Instead, the First Circuit should have considered the merits at the same time as the motions to vacate and amend.
The Court then turned to the First Circuit's denial of Foman's motion to amend her complaint. Under Rule 15(a), federal courts "should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires."[2] In the Court's view, this meant that the standard for granting leave to amend was quite liberal: only in very limited circumstances would a denial of leave to amend be justified. Specifically, the Court found that undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendment, prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment would support a denial. Absent such special circumstances, it would be an abuse of discretion for a court to deny leave to amend. The Court granted Foman's motion to amend her complaint and remanded the case to the First Circuit for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Concurrence/DissentEdit
The second Justice Harlan, writing for himself and Justice White, issued a two-sentence opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Harlan agreed that the First Circuit should have considered the merits of Foman's case, but he believed the question of whether Foman should have been allowed to amend her complaint was best left to the lower courts.
Subsequent DevelopmentsEdit
On remand, the First Circuit considered the merits of Foman's case, as the Supreme Court had directed.[6] It overturned the district court, ruling that under Massachusetts law, an oral promise not to execute a will was not rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds.[6] Accordingly, the First Circuit had no need to consider Foman's quantum meruit argument.
Text of Foman v. Davis, 371U.S. 178 (1962) is available from:CourtListenerFindlawGoogle ScholarJustiaLibrary of CongressOyez (oral argument audio)
August 25, 2023
foman, davis, 1962, case, which, supreme, court, united, states, interpreted, require, that, federal, courts, grant, party, leave, amend, pleading, absent, special, circumstances, such, faith, prejudice, opposing, party, been, recognized, both, other, courts, . Foman v Davis 371 U S 178 1962 1 was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States interpreted Fed R Civ P 15 a 2 to require that federal courts grant a party leave to amend a pleading absent special circumstances such as bad faith or prejudice to the opposing party It has been recognized by both other courts 3 and secondary sources 4 as a leading decision on the interpretation of Rule 15 a Foman v DavisSupreme Court of the United StatesArgued November 14 1962Decided December 3 1962Full case nameLenore Foman v Elvira A DavisCitations371 U S 178 more 83 S Ct 227 9 L Ed 2d 222 1962 U S LEXIS 65Case historyPriorJudgment affirmed and motions to vacate the judgment and amend the complaint denied by the First Circuit 292 F 2d 85 1st Cir 1961 cert granted 368 U S 951 1962 SubsequentJudgment reversed by the First Circuit 316 F 2d 254 1963 HoldingRule 15 a of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires courts to grant a party leave to amend a pleading except in limited circumstances Court membershipChief Justice Earl Warren Associate Justices Hugo Black William O DouglasTom C Clark John M Harlan IIWilliam J Brennan Jr Potter StewartByron White Arthur GoldbergCase opinionsMajorityGoldberg joined by Warren Black Douglas Clark Brennan StewartConcur dissentHarlan joined by WhiteLaws appliedFed R Civ P 15 a Contents 1 Background 2 Opinion of the Court 2 1 Concurrence Dissent 3 Subsequent Developments 4 References 5 External linksBackground EditFoman s father allegedly promised her he would not execute a will in exchange for Foman caring for her mother until her mother s death After her mother died Foman s father married Davis and contrary to the alleged promise executed a will leaving his entire estate to Davis Following her father s death Foman filed suit against Davis in the District of Massachusetts to recover what would have been her intestate share of her father s estate that is the amount she would have gotten had he not executed a will as he allegedly promised Davis moved to dismiss the case arguing that under Massachusetts law an oral promise not to execute a will was within the statute of frauds and thus unenforceable The district court agreed and dismissed the case Foman appealed the judgment to the First Circuit Soon after appealing though Foman moved the district court for an order vacating the judgment and granting her leave to amend her complaint to assert a new cause of action for quantum meruit The district court denied these motions and Foman appealed this denial to the First Circuit On appeal the First Circuit held that it was unable to consider the merits of the case because Foman moved to vacate the judgment subsequent to her first appeal meaning the judgment was not final The First Circuit then upheld the district court s denial of Foman s motions to vacate the judgment and amend her complaint 5 The Supreme Court agreed to review the case Opinion of the Court EditJustice Goldberg writing for the Court began by holding that the First Circuit was wrong to find that it could not consider the merits of the case because Foman moved to vacate the judgment after filing her initial appeal Instead the First Circuit should have considered the merits at the same time as the motions to vacate and amend The Court then turned to the First Circuit s denial of Foman s motion to amend her complaint Under Rule 15 a federal courts should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires 2 In the Court s view this meant that the standard for granting leave to amend was quite liberal only in very limited circumstances would a denial of leave to amend be justified Specifically the Court found that undue delay bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendment prejudice to the opposing party and futility of amendment would support a denial Absent such special circumstances it would be an abuse of discretion for a court to deny leave to amend The Court granted Foman s motion to amend her complaint and remanded the case to the First Circuit for proceedings consistent with its opinion Concurrence Dissent Edit The second Justice Harlan writing for himself and Justice White issued a two sentence opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part Harlan agreed that the First Circuit should have considered the merits of Foman s case but he believed the question of whether Foman should have been allowed to amend her complaint was best left to the lower courts Subsequent Developments EditOn remand the First Circuit considered the merits of Foman s case as the Supreme Court had directed 6 It overturned the district court ruling that under Massachusetts law an oral promise not to execute a will was not rendered unenforceable by the statute of frauds 6 Accordingly the First Circuit had no need to consider Foman s quantum meruit argument References Edit Foman v Davis 371 U S 178 1962 a b Fed R Civ P 15 See e g Gardner v So Ry Sys Archived 2010 05 15 at the Wayback Machine 675 F 2d 949 7th Cir 1982 6 Wright Miller amp Kane Federal Practice amp Procedure 1487 2d ed 1990 Foman v Davis 292 F 2d 85 1st Cir 1961 a b Foman v Davis 316 F 2d 254 1st Cir 1963 External links EditText of Foman v Davis 371 U S 178 1962 is available from CourtListener Findlaw Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress Oyez oral argument audio Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Foman v Davis amp oldid 931316875, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,
