fbpx
Wikipedia

Varig Flight 254

Varig Flight 254 was a Boeing 737-241, c/n 21006/398,[2] registration PP-VMK,[3] on a scheduled passenger flight from São Paulo, Brazil, to Belém, capital city of the state of Pará in the country's North Region, on 3 September 1989. The flight had several intermediate stopovers, the last being in Marabá, Pará. Prior to takeoff from Marabá, the crew entered an incorrect heading into the flight computer, flying deep into a remote area of the Amazon jungle.[4][5] Attempts to reach an alternative airport were unsuccessful, and the plane eventually ran out of fuel,[6] making a belly landing in the jungle[7] 1,700 kilometres (920 nautical miles) northwest of Rio de Janeiro.[6] Of the 54 passengers and crew, 12 passengers died and many more sustained serious injuries.[2][8][9] The survivors were rescued two days later.[7]

Varig Flight 254
PP-VMK, the aircraft involved in the accident
Accident
Date3 September 1989
SummaryMajor navigational error resulting in fuel exhaustion
Sitenear São José do Xingu, Brazil
10°26′40.55″S 52°39′26.90″W / 10.4445972°S 52.6574722°W / -10.4445972; -52.6574722Coordinates: 10°26′40.55″S 52°39′26.90″W / 10.4445972°S 52.6574722°W / -10.4445972; -52.6574722
Aircraft
Aircraft typeBoeing 737-241
OperatorVarig
RegistrationPP-VMK
Flight originSão Paulo–Guarulhos Int'l Airport
1st stopoverUberaba Airport
2nd stopoverUberlândia Airport
3rd stopoverGoiânia–Santa Genoveva Airport
4th stopoverBrasília International Airport
5th stopoverImperatriz Airport
6th stopoverMarabá Airport
DestinationBelém–Val de Cans Int'l Airport
Passengers48
Crew6
Fatalities12
Injuries34[1]
Survivors42

Background

The flight was a scheduled service from São Paulo to Belém with stopovers in Uberaba, Uberlândia, Goiânia, Brasília, Imperatriz, Marabá, and finally Belém.[10] The São Paulo–Belém route had an approximate duration of eight hours and 20 minutes.[11] At 9:43, flight 254 left Guarulhos International Airport, São Paulo, heading towards Belém. The flight crew consisted of 32-year-old Captain Cézar Augusto Padula Garcez,[11] First Officer Nilson de Souza Zille, 29, and four flight attendants. The flight went smoothly through all the stops, and at 17:20, the crew was arranging the final preparations at Marabá Airport while the passengers were boarding.

Incident

 
 
Maraba Airport
 
Belem Airport
 
 
São Paulo-Guarulhos
 
Uberaba Airport
 
Uberlândia Airport
 
Goiânia Airport
 
Brasília Airport
 
Imperatriz Airport
 
Santarém Airport
 
Santarém Airport
 
Cachimbo Airport
 
Barra do Garças Airport
class=notpageimage|
Location of the accident and departure/destination airports. Airports relevant to the incident are marked in red.

While First Officer Zille was making an external inspection of the aircraft, Captain Garcez consulted the flight plan for the magnetic heading to Belém; the flight plan read 0270. Garcez interpreted this as 270°, but it intended to mean 027.0°. Varig's heading notation for the flight plan was changed to four digits from three while Garcez was on vacation,[12] and it did not explicitly specify the position for the decimal point, which was implicitly located to the left of the rightmost digit. That confusion was the primary cause for the disaster, along with other minor errors. The captain, therefore, set the left-side horizontal situation indicator (HSI) to 270°, i.e. a due-west course. This heading is clearly inconsistent with a route from Marabá to Belém.

After setting the HSI, Garcez programmed the aircraft performance management system (PMS)[13][14] to the distance to Belém (346 kilometres or 187 nautical miles). The flight plan indicated an altitude of 29,000 ft (8,800 m) (FL290), and a leg duration of 48 minutes. When co-captain Zille got to his seat, instead of checking his own flight plan to adjust his HSI – as he was required to do – he only referenced the captain's indicator and set his to match it. At 17:45, flight 254 took off from Marabá, and the autopilot steered the aircraft to a heading of 270° away. When Garcez believed the aircraft to be close to the destination, he attempted to use his VHF radio to communicate with the Belém tower. Failing to do so directly, he used another Varig airliner operating flight RG266, as a radio relay to talk to Belém Airport. When Garcez managed to establish communications with Belém, he requested descent clearance, and received it. Upon performing his descent, the captain found it very odd that he could not recognize any of the characteristic geographical features of the Belém area (such as the Marajó Island and the Amazon River estuary), and even asked the tower controller if the city was without electricity. In 1989, Belém airport still had no radar, so the Controller informed Flight 254 that it was the only one in its airspace, and gave it landing clearance.

After the PMS started indicating negative distance to its destination, Captain Garcez decided to execute a 180° turn and locate Belém visually. He also descended the aircraft to 4,000 ft (1,200 m) and reduced its speed to 200 knots (370 km/h). Reluctant to use the HF radio to request help, the captain decided to take visual reference from a river he located below the plane, believing it to be the Amazon. The river was actually the Xingu, which runs chiefly south-north, while the Amazon runs west-east.

At that time, the flight had already taken 30 minutes longer than scheduled, and the passengers were getting anxious. When First Officer Zille finally noticed their initial mistake, the captain and he decided, after checking their navigation charts, to make contact with Santarém airport, believing it to be the closest airport, and made an almost 180° turn, now establishing a 350° magnetic course. After some calculations, Garcez realized that the aircraft did not have the necessary fuel to reach Santarém, and he started heading south again (along the now properly identified Xingu River). Finally, he decided to contact Marabá airport again, to find his location. The radio frequency of Goiânia's locator was the same as Marabá's, and Garcez mistakenly tuned to Goiânia, located about 1,250 km (675 nmi) south of Marabá. The captain was already nervous, and he failed to notice that the tuned locator's Morse code identifier was not consistent with Marabá's beacon.

At 20:05, Belém Center called Flight 254 again, demanding a report. The captain stated that he had a 170° magnetic heading to Marabá (in reality it was Goiânia), and that he was receiving a bearing from the Carajás beacon (which actually was the Barra do Garças beacon). Garcez was perplexed when Belém informed him that the Carajás beacon had been shut down since 19:30, and the center decided to illuminate the Carajás runway in an attempt to facilitate Flight 254's orientation. Realizing that he would not have enough fuel to reach Belém, the captain decided to head for Carajás Airport, which would have been the correct decision if he had not mistaken Goiânia for Marabá. Another opportunity to solve the situation was missed around 20:30, when the flight passed within 190 km (100 nmi) of the Serra do Cachimbo Air Force Base, a very large airfield, which the 737 could have successfully reached.

After that, the forced landing of the aircraft into the rainforest in the north of Mato Grosso became inevitable. At the time, no written procedures were available for such an emergency situation. Garcez and Zille decided to fly at 8,000 ft (2,400 m) until they ran out of fuel, thus avoiding a possible explosion upon landing, and with the engines on, they would still have hydraulic power to command the aircraft's ailerons and flaps. They also decided to keep the plane flying slightly above stall speed, which in this case was around 150 kn (280 km/h). During their descent, they spotted very few lights through the jungle, coming from the houses of farms that had electrical generators. At 20:40, Garcez informed the Belém center that he would be making a forced landing over the jungle. A few minutes later, when he had 15 minutes left of fuel, Garcez informed his passengers of the situation. When around 100 kg (220 lb) of fuel were remaining, the left engine stopped. The right engine ran for a further two minutes, and then stopped, as well.

Even after shutdown, the engines were still windmilling due to the passage of the air through them. This gave the airplane some rudimentary and unreliable hydraulic control. Garcez commanded the lowering of the flaps, which only moved to position two, (around 10°) due to the failing hydraulic system. With the batteries discharged, the plane had no electrical power and the only four instruments working in the cockpit were the artificial horizon, altimeter, airspeed indicator, and vertical speed indicator. The only things the crew could see on the horizon were faint light spots due to distant forest burnings, and at 21:06, local time, the plane crash-landed over treetops that extended over 50 m (160 ft) above ground.

The deceleration due to the crash was such that passengers without fastened seatbelts were flung to the front of the airplane, and some seats detached from the floor, also racing forward. When the aircraft fell through the foliage, two thick trees tore away both wings, and caused a severe torsion of the fuselage, which contributed to more seats detaching, and to the collapsing of the false roof over the passengers' heads. After its speed slowed to about 35 kn (65 km/h), the aircraft ran for little more than 30 m (100 ft) and stopped, lying on its right side.

Search and rescue

On 5 September, two days after the crash, Alfonso Saraiva and three other survivors started walking to look for help.[11] After about two[5] or three hours of walking in the jungle,[11] the group found the house of the Curunaré farm,[11] in São José do Xingu.[15] That farm had no radio, so they were taken by car to another farm, Serrão da Prata, reaching it around 12:30. With the help of radio operator João Capanema Jr., they were able to contact Franca Airport, 400 km (220 nmi) north of São Paulo, and at 16:27, an Embraer EMB-110 Bandeirante airplane from the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) dropped food packages over the wreckage. By noon the next day, on their fourth day in the jungle, all survivors had been rescued by the FAB.

Forty-one survivors were rescued from the crash site by helicopter, which flew them 50 km (25 nmi) to São José do Xingu, and from there they were flown by plane to Cachimbo Airport, 300 km (160 nmi) to the northwest.[16] They were then flown to Brasilia Base Hospital near Brasilia.

Causes

Upon investigation, the crash was found to have been caused primarily by negligence on the part of the flight crew. Customary investigations showed that the aircraft was in perfect condition for the flight, and that its mandatory periodic inspections had been properly conducted. The main factor for the accident was concluded to be an error in reading the correct heading from the flight plan by the commander, compounded by the co-pilot copying the setting from the commander's panel instead of checking the flight plan.[2] The fact that plan course 0270 actually asked for 027.0 degrees was due to the Varig standardization of flight planning for all its fleet, but only aircraft equipped with an inertial navigation system (INS) actually used headings with decimals. Despite the pilots having been told about this peculiarity in the airline's training program, the value expressed in the flight plan 0270 was interpreted by the commander as 270° (he was on vacation during the change of standard). This misinterpretation changed the general direction from north-northeast (27.0°) to west (270°). The Boeing 737 was not equipped with INS, using only automatic direction finders and VHF omnidirectional range.[14]

Months after the accident, the flight plan Varig 254 used was shown to 21 pilots of major airlines in the world during a test conducted by the International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations. No fewer than 15 pilots committed the same mistake that the Varig flight 254 crew had made. After the flight 254 accident, Varig installed Omega navigation systems in their aircraft.[17]

Also, several other factors contributed to the accident; the pilot did not realise he should be receiving a stronger VHF signal from Belém if he were nearing that airport, he should be receiving the local radio stations from Belém instead of other distant stations at the same frequencies, he should have checked his position and heading against the sun and geographic landmarks, and the airline's support team in Belém did not take action upon realizing the aircraft arrival was delayed.[2]

Captain Garcez and First Officer Zille were both sentenced to four years in prison for their roles in the accident, but this was later changed to community service.[18][19]

Dramatization

The events of Flight 254 were featured in season 14 of the TV series Mayday, in an episode named "Vanishing Act".[20]

See also

References

  1. ^ Gregg Newton (7 September 1989). "Varig Airlines Crash". Corbis. Retrieved 27 February 2011.
  2. ^ a b c d Accident description at the Aviation Safety Network. Some English text, mostly Portuguese.
  3. ^ "Registro Aeronáutico Brasileiro (PP-VMK)". Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil.
  4. ^ [Brazilian plane disappears over the Amazon]. Le Monde (in French). Agence France-Presse. 5 September 1989. Archived from the original on 29 June 2011. Retrieved 17 July 2017.
  5. ^ a b [Brazil: A Varig Boeing's accident leaves survivors in the Amazon]. Le Monde (in French). Agence France-Presse. 7 September 1989. Archived from the original on 29 June 2011. Retrieved 17 July 2017.
  6. ^ a b "Amazon crash survivors owe their lives to unemployed teen". Houston Chronicle. 7 September 1989. p. 16. Archived from the original on 23 July 2012.
  7. ^ a b Brooke, James (6 September 1989). . The New York Times. Archived from the original on 28 July 2014. 
  8. ^ (in Portuguese). Archived from the original on 3 September 2014.
  9. ^ Germano da Silva (2008), p. 352–360.
  10. ^ . Los Angeles Times. Associated Press. 5 September 1989. Archived from the original on 22 March 2015. 
  11. ^ a b c d e [46 live and only eight dead in a Boeing found in the forest]. Folha de S. Paulo (in Portuguese). 6 September 1989. Archived from the original on 31 March 2012. Retrieved 4 July 2012.
  12. ^ "Vanishing Act". Mayday. Season 14. Episode 3. 10 February 2015. National Geographic Channel.
  13. ^ Lowell, Norm (12 October 1988). Pilot's Handbook Performance Management System for 737-200 Aircraft (02 ed.). Phoenix, AZ: Honeywell. p. 2.A-2.
  14. ^ a b PERALTA, PAULO FERNANDO. "Relatório Final". Cefetes. CENIPA.[permanent dead link]
  15. ^ "Accident information : Boeing 737 Varig PP-VMK". Airfleets.net. Retrieved 27 February 2011.
  16. ^ "Lucky just to be alive", Jorge Mederos, Associated Press, published in The Free Lance Star, 7 September 1989, Page 17.
  17. ^ Silva, Carlos Ari Cesar Germano da (2008). O rastro da bruxa: história da aviação comercial brasileira no século XX através de seus acidentes — 1928–1996 (The Witch trail: history of Brazilian commercial aviation in the twentieth century through its accidents - 1928-1996) (2nd ed.). Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS. pp. 352–360. ISBN 978-85-7430-760-2.
  18. ^ "Folha de S.Paulo - Piloto de avião que caiu em 89 é condenado - 13/09/97" [Folha de S.Paulo - Airplane pilot who fell in 89 is condemned - 09/13/97]. www1.folha.uol.com.br (in Portuguese). Retrieved 2 June 2019.
  19. ^ "Queda de avião da Varig na selva em 1989 'só ocorreu por prepotência', diz copiloto" [Varig plane crash in the jungle in 1989 'only occurred due to arrogance', says co-pilot]. G1 (in Brazilian Portuguese). Retrieved 2 June 2019.
  20. ^ "Air Crash Investigation" Vanishing Act (TV Episode 2015) - IMDb, retrieved 9 August 2022

Bibliography

  • Germano da Silva, Carlos Ari César (2008). "Rumo errado". O rastro da bruxa: história da aviação comercial brasileira no século XX através dos seus acidentes 1928–1996 (in Portuguese) (2 ed.). Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS. ISBN 978-85-7430-760-2.

External links

  • "Final Report" (PDF) (in Portuguese). 23 April 1991. (PDF) from the original on 29 April 2020.
  • [Deep into the forest] (in Portuguese). veja.com. 13 September 1989. Archived from the original on 12 October 2012.
  • Marco Aurélio Roncato de Moura's accident description 20 April 2008 at the Wayback Machine in Portuguese.
  • [Usurped!]
  • Blackbox recording of Captain's last announcement and radio traffic in Portuguese

varig, flight, this, article, needs, additional, citations, verification, please, help, improve, this, article, adding, citations, reliable, sources, unsourced, material, challenged, removed, find, sources, news, newspapers, books, scholar, jstor, june, 2009, . This article needs additional citations for verification Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources Unsourced material may be challenged and removed Find sources Varig Flight 254 news newspapers books scholar JSTOR June 2009 Learn how and when to remove this template message Varig Flight 254 was a Boeing 737 241 c n 21006 398 2 registration PP VMK 3 on a scheduled passenger flight from Sao Paulo Brazil to Belem capital city of the state of Para in the country s North Region on 3 September 1989 The flight had several intermediate stopovers the last being in Maraba Para Prior to takeoff from Maraba the crew entered an incorrect heading into the flight computer flying deep into a remote area of the Amazon jungle 4 5 Attempts to reach an alternative airport were unsuccessful and the plane eventually ran out of fuel 6 making a belly landing in the jungle 7 1 700 kilometres 920 nautical miles northwest of Rio de Janeiro 6 Of the 54 passengers and crew 12 passengers died and many more sustained serious injuries 2 8 9 The survivors were rescued two days later 7 Varig Flight 254PP VMK the aircraft involved in the accidentAccidentDate3 September 1989SummaryMajor navigational error resulting in fuel exhaustionSitenear Sao Jose do Xingu Brazil 10 26 40 55 S 52 39 26 90 W 10 4445972 S 52 6574722 W 10 4445972 52 6574722 Coordinates 10 26 40 55 S 52 39 26 90 W 10 4445972 S 52 6574722 W 10 4445972 52 6574722AircraftAircraft typeBoeing 737 241OperatorVarigRegistrationPP VMKFlight originSao Paulo Guarulhos Int l Airport1st stopoverUberaba Airport2nd stopoverUberlandia Airport3rd stopoverGoiania Santa Genoveva Airport4th stopoverBrasilia International Airport5th stopoverImperatriz Airport6th stopoverMaraba AirportDestinationBelem Val de Cans Int l AirportPassengers48Crew6Fatalities12Injuries34 1 Survivors42 Contents 1 Background 2 Incident 3 Search and rescue 4 Causes 5 Dramatization 6 See also 7 References 8 Bibliography 9 External linksBackground EditThe flight was a scheduled service from Sao Paulo to Belem with stopovers in Uberaba Uberlandia Goiania Brasilia Imperatriz Maraba and finally Belem 10 The Sao Paulo Belem route had an approximate duration of eight hours and 20 minutes 11 At 9 43 flight 254 left Guarulhos International Airport Sao Paulo heading towards Belem The flight crew consisted of 32 year old Captain Cezar Augusto Padula Garcez 11 First Officer Nilson de Souza Zille 29 and four flight attendants The flight went smoothly through all the stops and at 17 20 the crew was arranging the final preparations at Maraba Airport while the passengers were boarding Incident Edit Maraba Airport Belem Airport Sao Paulo Guarulhos Uberaba Airport Uberlandia Airport Goiania Airport Brasilia Airport Imperatriz Airport Santarem Airport Santarem Airport Cachimbo Airport Barra do Garcas Airportclass notpageimage Location of the accident and departure destination airports Airports relevant to the incident are marked in red While First Officer Zille was making an external inspection of the aircraft Captain Garcez consulted the flight plan for the magnetic heading to Belem the flight plan read 0270 Garcez interpreted this as 270 but it intended to mean 027 0 Varig s heading notation for the flight plan was changed to four digits from three while Garcez was on vacation 12 and it did not explicitly specify the position for the decimal point which was implicitly located to the left of the rightmost digit That confusion was the primary cause for the disaster along with other minor errors The captain therefore set the left side horizontal situation indicator HSI to 270 i e a due west course This heading is clearly inconsistent with a route from Maraba to Belem After setting the HSI Garcez programmed the aircraft performance management system PMS 13 14 to the distance to Belem 346 kilometres or 187 nautical miles The flight plan indicated an altitude of 29 000 ft 8 800 m FL290 and a leg duration of 48 minutes When co captain Zille got to his seat instead of checking his own flight plan to adjust his HSI as he was required to do he only referenced the captain s indicator and set his to match it At 17 45 flight 254 took off from Maraba and the autopilot steered the aircraft to a heading of 270 away When Garcez believed the aircraft to be close to the destination he attempted to use his VHF radio to communicate with the Belem tower Failing to do so directly he used another Varig airliner operating flight RG266 as a radio relay to talk to Belem Airport When Garcez managed to establish communications with Belem he requested descent clearance and received it Upon performing his descent the captain found it very odd that he could not recognize any of the characteristic geographical features of the Belem area such as the Marajo Island and the Amazon River estuary and even asked the tower controller if the city was without electricity In 1989 Belem airport still had no radar so the Controller informed Flight 254 that it was the only one in its airspace and gave it landing clearance After the PMS started indicating negative distance to its destination Captain Garcez decided to execute a 180 turn and locate Belem visually He also descended the aircraft to 4 000 ft 1 200 m and reduced its speed to 200 knots 370 km h Reluctant to use the HF radio to request help the captain decided to take visual reference from a river he located below the plane believing it to be the Amazon The river was actually the Xingu which runs chiefly south north while the Amazon runs west east At that time the flight had already taken 30 minutes longer than scheduled and the passengers were getting anxious When First Officer Zille finally noticed their initial mistake the captain and he decided after checking their navigation charts to make contact with Santarem airport believing it to be the closest airport and made an almost 180 turn now establishing a 350 magnetic course After some calculations Garcez realized that the aircraft did not have the necessary fuel to reach Santarem and he started heading south again along the now properly identified Xingu River Finally he decided to contact Maraba airport again to find his location The radio frequency of Goiania s locator was the same as Maraba s and Garcez mistakenly tuned to Goiania located about 1 250 km 675 nmi south of Maraba The captain was already nervous and he failed to notice that the tuned locator s Morse code identifier was not consistent with Maraba s beacon At 20 05 Belem Center called Flight 254 again demanding a report The captain stated that he had a 170 magnetic heading to Maraba in reality it was Goiania and that he was receiving a bearing from the Carajas beacon which actually was the Barra do Garcas beacon Garcez was perplexed when Belem informed him that the Carajas beacon had been shut down since 19 30 and the center decided to illuminate the Carajas runway in an attempt to facilitate Flight 254 s orientation Realizing that he would not have enough fuel to reach Belem the captain decided to head for Carajas Airport which would have been the correct decision if he had not mistaken Goiania for Maraba Another opportunity to solve the situation was missed around 20 30 when the flight passed within 190 km 100 nmi of the Serra do Cachimbo Air Force Base a very large airfield which the 737 could have successfully reached After that the forced landing of the aircraft into the rainforest in the north of Mato Grosso became inevitable At the time no written procedures were available for such an emergency situation Garcez and Zille decided to fly at 8 000 ft 2 400 m until they ran out of fuel thus avoiding a possible explosion upon landing and with the engines on they would still have hydraulic power to command the aircraft s ailerons and flaps They also decided to keep the plane flying slightly above stall speed which in this case was around 150 kn 280 km h During their descent they spotted very few lights through the jungle coming from the houses of farms that had electrical generators At 20 40 Garcez informed the Belem center that he would be making a forced landing over the jungle A few minutes later when he had 15 minutes left of fuel Garcez informed his passengers of the situation When around 100 kg 220 lb of fuel were remaining the left engine stopped The right engine ran for a further two minutes and then stopped as well Even after shutdown the engines were still windmilling due to the passage of the air through them This gave the airplane some rudimentary and unreliable hydraulic control Garcez commanded the lowering of the flaps which only moved to position two around 10 due to the failing hydraulic system With the batteries discharged the plane had no electrical power and the only four instruments working in the cockpit were the artificial horizon altimeter airspeed indicator and vertical speed indicator The only things the crew could see on the horizon were faint light spots due to distant forest burnings and at 21 06 local time the plane crash landed over treetops that extended over 50 m 160 ft above ground The deceleration due to the crash was such that passengers without fastened seatbelts were flung to the front of the airplane and some seats detached from the floor also racing forward When the aircraft fell through the foliage two thick trees tore away both wings and caused a severe torsion of the fuselage which contributed to more seats detaching and to the collapsing of the false roof over the passengers heads After its speed slowed to about 35 kn 65 km h the aircraft ran for little more than 30 m 100 ft and stopped lying on its right side Search and rescue EditOn 5 September two days after the crash Alfonso Saraiva and three other survivors started walking to look for help 11 After about two 5 or three hours of walking in the jungle 11 the group found the house of the Curunare farm 11 in Sao Jose do Xingu 15 That farm had no radio so they were taken by car to another farm Serrao da Prata reaching it around 12 30 With the help of radio operator Joao Capanema Jr they were able to contact Franca Airport 400 km 220 nmi north of Sao Paulo and at 16 27 an Embraer EMB 110 Bandeirante airplane from the Brazilian Air Force FAB dropped food packages over the wreckage By noon the next day on their fourth day in the jungle all survivors had been rescued by the FAB Forty one survivors were rescued from the crash site by helicopter which flew them 50 km 25 nmi to Sao Jose do Xingu and from there they were flown by plane to Cachimbo Airport 300 km 160 nmi to the northwest 16 They were then flown to Brasilia Base Hospital near Brasilia Causes EditUpon investigation the crash was found to have been caused primarily by negligence on the part of the flight crew Customary investigations showed that the aircraft was in perfect condition for the flight and that its mandatory periodic inspections had been properly conducted The main factor for the accident was concluded to be an error in reading the correct heading from the flight plan by the commander compounded by the co pilot copying the setting from the commander s panel instead of checking the flight plan 2 The fact that plan course 0270 actually asked for 027 0 degrees was due to the Varig standardization of flight planning for all its fleet but only aircraft equipped with an inertial navigation system INS actually used headings with decimals Despite the pilots having been told about this peculiarity in the airline s training program the value expressed in the flight plan 0270 was interpreted by the commander as 270 he was on vacation during the change of standard This misinterpretation changed the general direction from north northeast 27 0 to west 270 The Boeing 737 was not equipped with INS using only automatic direction finders and VHF omnidirectional range 14 Months after the accident the flight plan Varig 254 used was shown to 21 pilots of major airlines in the world during a test conducted by the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations No fewer than 15 pilots committed the same mistake that the Varig flight 254 crew had made After the flight 254 accident Varig installed Omega navigation systems in their aircraft 17 Also several other factors contributed to the accident the pilot did not realise he should be receiving a stronger VHF signal from Belem if he were nearing that airport he should be receiving the local radio stations from Belem instead of other distant stations at the same frequencies he should have checked his position and heading against the sun and geographic landmarks and the airline s support team in Belem did not take action upon realizing the aircraft arrival was delayed 2 Captain Garcez and First Officer Zille were both sentenced to four years in prison for their roles in the accident but this was later changed to community service 18 19 Dramatization EditThe events of Flight 254 were featured in season 14 of the TV series Mayday in an episode named Vanishing Act 20 See also Edit Brazil portal Aviation portal 1980s portalAir navigation Air traffic control Dead reckoning Emergency position indicating radiobeacon station Flight plan Flight planning Gol Transportes Aereos Flight 1907 another 737 which crashed 65 km 40 mi away from Varig Flight 254 s crash site List of airline flights that required gliding Navigation Pilot error Piloting navigation Situation awarenessReferences Edit Gregg Newton 7 September 1989 Varig Airlines Crash Corbis Retrieved 27 February 2011 a b c d Accident description at the Aviation Safety Network Some English text mostly Portuguese Registro Aeronautico Brasileiro PP VMK Agencia Nacional de Aviacao Civil Disparition d un Boeing bresilien en Amazonie Brazilian plane disappears over the Amazon Le Monde in French Agence France Presse 5 September 1989 Archived from the original on 29 June 2011 Retrieved 17 July 2017 a b Bresil L accident d un Boeing de la Varig Les rescapes de l Amazonie Brazil A Varig Boeing s accident leaves survivors in the Amazon Le Monde in French Agence France Presse 7 September 1989 Archived from the original on 29 June 2011 Retrieved 17 July 2017 a b Amazon crash survivors owe their lives to unemployed teen Houston Chronicle 7 September 1989 p 16 Archived from the original on 23 July 2012 a b Brooke James 6 September 1989 After Trek From Brazil Crash Survivor Says 46 of 54 Live The New York Times Archived from the original on 28 July 2014 Final accident report in Portuguese Archived from the original on 3 September 2014 Germano da Silva 2008 p 352 360 Jet With 54 on Board Missing in Brazil Disappears Over Amazon Toll in Cuban Crash May Reach 150 Los Angeles Times Associated Press 5 September 1989 Archived from the original on 22 March 2015 a b c d e 46 vivem e so oito morrem no Boeing achado na mata 46 live and only eight dead in a Boeing found in the forest Folha de S Paulo in Portuguese 6 September 1989 Archived from the original on 31 March 2012 Retrieved 4 July 2012 Vanishing Act Mayday Season 14 Episode 3 10 February 2015 National Geographic Channel Lowell Norm 12 October 1988 Pilot s Handbook Performance Management System for 737 200 Aircraft 02 ed Phoenix AZ Honeywell p 2 A 2 a b PERALTA PAULO FERNANDO Relatorio Final Cefetes CENIPA permanent dead link Accident information Boeing 737 Varig PP VMK Airfleets net Retrieved 27 February 2011 Lucky just to be alive Jorge Mederos Associated Press published in The Free Lance Star 7 September 1989 Page 17 Silva Carlos Ari Cesar Germano da 2008 O rastro da bruxa historia da aviacao comercial brasileira no seculo XX atraves de seus acidentes 1928 1996 The Witch trail history of Brazilian commercial aviation in the twentieth century through its accidents 1928 1996 2nd ed Porto Alegre EDIPUCRS pp 352 360 ISBN 978 85 7430 760 2 Folha de S Paulo Piloto de aviao que caiu em 89 e condenado 13 09 97 Folha de S Paulo Airplane pilot who fell in 89 is condemned 09 13 97 www1 folha uol com br in Portuguese Retrieved 2 June 2019 Queda de aviao da Varig na selva em 1989 so ocorreu por prepotencia diz copiloto Varig plane crash in the jungle in 1989 only occurred due to arrogance says co pilot G1 in Brazilian Portuguese Retrieved 2 June 2019 Air Crash Investigation Vanishing Act TV Episode 2015 IMDb retrieved 9 August 2022Bibliography EditGermano da Silva Carlos Ari Cesar 2008 Rumo errado O rastro da bruxa historia da aviacao comercial brasileira no seculo XX atraves dos seus acidentes 1928 1996 in Portuguese 2 ed Porto Alegre EDIPUCRS ISBN 978 85 7430 760 2 External links Edit Final Report PDF in Portuguese 23 April 1991 Archived PDF from the original on 29 April 2020 O mergulho na selva Deep into the forest in Portuguese veja com 13 September 1989 Archived from the original on 12 October 2012 Marco Aurelio Roncato de Moura s accident description Archived 20 April 2008 at the Wayback Machine in Portuguese Varig Flight 254 crash site photograph Usurped Blackbox recording of Captain s last announcement and radio traffic in Portuguese Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Varig Flight 254 amp oldid 1130401139, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

article

, read, download, free, free download, mp3, video, mp4, 3gp, jpg, jpeg, gif, png, picture, music, song, movie, book, game, games.