William Bailey (British Army officer)

Stanley William Bailey OBE was a British Army officer in World War II, who reached the rank of colonel and was most notable for being the head and then political advisor of the British Special Operations Executive Liaison Mission to the Chetnik Forces of Draža Mihailović from December 25, 1942—January 29, 1944. British policy toward Mihailović was shaped by the regular reports from Bailey. Bailey's position on General Mihailović was influential in undermining the relationship between Mihailović and the Chetniks with Churchill and the British Foreign Office, and consequently with the other Allied nations.

Stanley William Bailey
Nickname(s)	Bill, Miloš
Allegiance	United Kingdom
Service/branch	British Army
Rank	Colonel
Service number	133406
Battles/wars	World War I World War II

Early life

Bailey attended Emanuel School in Wandsworth, in London, England. Before the Second World War, Bailey lived in Kingdom of Yugoslavia for some time when he was an engineer in the Trepča Mines. He learned to speak the Serbian language fluently.^[1] During the First World War Bailey was a member of the British SOE team in Athens, Greece when the king of Greece was removed and pro-Allied Venizelist government installed.^[2]

World War II

Upon returning from a mission in Canada, Bailey was parachuted into Mihailović's headquarters on December 25, 1942, as a British Liaison Officer (BLO) for the British SOE mission to Mihailović.^[3] The chief of Bailey's staff in the Chetnik headquarters was Major Kenneth Greenlees.^[4]

Head of Allied Mission at Chetnik HQ

Apart from this mission headed by Bailey, there were nine other British missions to Chetnik commanders beginning in April 1943.^[5][6] Bailey reported to his superiors that Mihailović had the overwhelming support of the people in Serbia while the strength of Communists there was negligible.^[7] Mihailović gave the code name "Miloš" to Bailey, either with reference to Kosovo, where Bailey lived previous to his military service, or in reference to the Serbian hero of the Battle of Kosovo, Miloš Obilić.^[8]

Crisis in Africa

The British General Harold Alexander sent a personal telegram to Draža Mihailović before the Allied offensive against Rommel in Africa, requesting him to organize a large-scale campaign against Axis lines of communication in order to obstruct transport of German war materièl through Serbia to Thessaloniki and from there to Libya.^[9] After his arrival at Chetnik headquarters, Bailey decided to reinforce the British mission to the Chetniks with well-trained British military sappers who could help the Chetniks to be more effective in sabotaging German lines of communication.^[10] In May 1942 Mihailović demanded heavy explosives from the British command that would be used to cut the German supply line running through Serbia and the Aegean to German forces in North Africa.^[11] The successful accomplishment of this sabotage campaign was witnessed by fellow SOE liaison officer, Colonel "Bill" Hudson.^[12] On December 1, 1942, Mihailović received a greeting from the Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, Alan Brooke^[13] who expressed his felicitations for this wonderful achievement of the Yugoslav Army.^[14] Mihailović's disruption of Axis communications was probably instrumental in victory of Allies against Rommel in Africa, so the British Near East Command jointly sent a telegram to Mihailovic on August 16, 1943, stating: "With admiration we are following your directed operations which are of inestimable value to our allied cause."^[15] Hitler blamed the Chetniks in Serbia for his defeat in Africa and issued an order for the complete annihilation of all Chetnik forces. Evidence for this exists in a letter sent to Mussolini in a letter on February 16, 1943:^[16]

We have no other choice, but to annihilate all Chetniks and use the most brutal means against the bandits.

— Adolf Hitler^[17][18]

By 1942, Yugoslav Partisans had begun to allege that Mihailović's Chetniks were collaborating with German forces. Bailey, though confirming Colonel Hudson's earlier reports about agreements between some Montenegrin Chetniks and the Italians, emphasized that he found "no evidence of direct collaboration between Mihailović himself and the Germans and Italians."^[19]

While he was in Lipovo, Bailey went to Kolašin three times, one of these times in February when he visited Pavle Đurišić and inspected Chetnik units before their departure to Neretva.^[20] On this occasion Bailey offered to Đurišić British support to replace Mihailović as Chetnik leader, but Đurišić refused and personally informed Mihailović about this offer.^[21]

British Convince Mihailović they Could "Make Him or Break Him"

When the crisis of Allies in Africa had passed, the Chetniks reverted to a policy of tactical inactivity toward the Axis forces, which was criticized by the British.^[22] In his report sent to SOE headquarters in Cairo, Bailey emphasized: "...the time has come to treat Mihailović firmly. He must be made to realize that we could make him or break him."^[23]

Starting in December 1943, the United Kingdom withdrew all support from Mihailović and his Yugoslav Army of the Homeland (Chetniks), and began exclusively to support and heavily supply the Partisan Communist forces in Yugoslavia. Prior to this, beginning in 1942, the BBC repeatedly gave credit to communists for anti-Axis action performed, in reality, by Mihailović's Chetniks, this was especially true during September and October 1943, which contributed to an official policy increasingly set against Mihailović.^[24] Nevertheless, Mihailović launched a campaign against Axis positions in Eastern Bosnia in October 1943, inflicting hundreds of casualties on Axis forces and liberating Višegrad, Rogatica and many other places. Still the British media, following the BBC, attributed each Chetnik victory to rival Communist forces. This enraged the Chetniks to the extent that, before Brigadier Charles Armstrong was dispatched to Chetnik headquarters in July 1943, Colonel Bailey advised him that Chetniks were angry and that, "Mihailović "won't hear of the British anymore".^[25] When Armstrong arrived at Mihailović's Chetnik headquarters at the end of September 1943, he became the head of British mission and Bailey assumed position of his political advisor.^[26] Bailey organized the handing over arms of the Italian Venezia division of 8,000 Italian soldiers to the Communists instead of to the Chetniks.^[27] The final consequence of this was that Chetniks were forced to leave the valley of the river Lim.^[28]

The head of the American Mission to General Mihailović, Capt. Walter R. Mansfield, proposed to retain one member of the British and American army with Mihailović after Armstrong and Mansfield left it, but Bailey refused this proposal.^[29] Bailey left Yugoslavia for Bari on 29 January 1944.^[30]

Historian Mark Wheeler emphasizes that Colonel Bailey did not have the qualifications—neither the education nor the political background—to do full justice as a liaison officer between the SOE and General Mihailović. Bailey's influence was instrumental in counterproductively destroying Mihailović's credibility with Churchill and the British Foreign Office, thus cementing Allied support for Tito and his Partisans, and laying the path for an unhindered Communist dictatorship immediately following the War.

See also

• Western betrayal

References

1. (Latas 1979, p. 367)
2. (Barker 1976, p. 97)
3. (MacLaren 2011, p. 137): "Meanwhile Bailey, having returned from his recruiting mission to Canada, had been parachuted to Mihailović's headquarters on Christmas Eve 1942"
4. (Ford 1992, p. 4):"Col. William Bailey, head of the British mission to Mihailovich's headquarters, and Maj. Kenneth Greenlees, Bailey's chief of staff. "
5. (MacLaren 2011, p. 137)
6. Macedonian Review. Kulturen Zhivot. 1981. p. 200. In addition, they sent, in the course of 1943, a number of military missions to various Chetnik corps in Serbia.
7. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ... Congress. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1980. p. 4678. Colonel Bailey, who was in charge of the British mission through most of 1943, repeatedly made the point that ... army—they added that they fought against the Germans only in self defense— but wished solely to fight the Chetniks
8. (Latas 1979, p. 367):"Дража му је дао симболично име Милош, што је требало да асоцира на Косово, где је Бејли провео дуже времена за време своје службе у Југославији, односно на косовског јунака Милоша Обилића. "
9. (Jukić 1974, p. 136)
10. (Ogden 2010, p. 69):"Following Colonel Bailey's decision to reinforce the chetnik Missions with trained military engineers, so that they could more effectively sabotage German lines of communication and...."
11. (Milazzo 1975, p. 103):"Mihailović ... requested from the British Middle East command heavy explosives for the purpose of destroying the German supply lines running south to the Aegean for Rommel's troops in North Africa."
12. (Repac 1957, p. 70):"The campaign against Axis communications had been witnessed by Colonel William Hudson, who at that time was the sole British officer attached to Mihailovich."
13. General Mihailovich: The World's Verdict : a Selection of Articles on the First Resistance Leader in Europe Published in the World Press. John Bellows. 1947. p. 131. ... joined the ranks of our Army in the Near East in the triumphant hour, but also of your undefeatable Chetniks under your command, who are fighting night and day under the most difficult conditions. December 1st, 1942. General Alan Brooke.
14. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ... Congress. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1956. p. 4989. The Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, pursuant to Yugoslavia's unity Day, December 1, 1942, sent the following greeting to the War Minister and the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of King Peter II to Army Gen Dragoljub M Mihailovich: In the name of the British Imperial General Staff I cannot let the twenty-fourth anniversary of the unification of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into one Kingdom pass without expressing my felicitations for the wonderful undertaking of the Yugoslav Army. I am not thinking only of the forces which have joined the ranks of our army in the Near East in the triumphant hour but also of your undefeatable Chetniks under your command who are fighting night and day under the most difficult war conditions.
15. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ... Congress. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1956. p. 12782. During 1942 Africa crisis, Mihailovic's all-out campaign against Axis communications, especially vital to Belgrade-Nis-Salonika line, was probably instrumental for saving Africa from Rommel. British Near East Command jointly wired Mihailovic August 16, 1943: 'With admiration we are following your directed operations which are of inestimable value to our allied cause."
16. (Minich 1975, p. 6):"As for his defeat in Africa, Hitler put the blame on Serbian insurgents. Hitler's order for complete annihilation of all the chetnik forces was sent to Mussolini in a letter dated February 16, 1943,...
17. The South Slav Journal. Dositey Obradovich Circle. 2003. p. 121. Hitler had said frankly: „We have no other choice, but to annihilate all Chetniks and against the bandits use the most brutal means."
18. (Piekałkiewicz 1984, p. 185):"Hitler zu Graf Ciano: »Es bleibe ... nichts übrig, als alle Tschetniks restlos auszurotten und gegen die Banden mit brutaltsten Mitteln vorzugehen."
19. (Ford 1992, p. 9):""no evidence of direct collaboration between Mihailovic himself and the Germans and Italians.""
20. (Latas 1979, p. 372):"За време свог боравка у Липову пуковник Бејли је трипут одлазио у Колашин. Једном је (у фебруа- ру) посетио Павла Буришића и нзвршио смотру четника пред њихов одлазак на Неретву, други пут у марту и трећи пут у првој ..."
21. (Redžić 2002, p. 566):"Кнежевић је на то одговорио "да је мајор Ђуришић до јуче био капетан, да је велики јунак, да је одликован Карађорђевом Звездом, али да није дорастао да буде вођа једног целог народа". И пуковник Бејли је тих дана питао Ђуришића за пристанак да замени Ђенерала Михаиловића. "Као верни официр свом врховном команданту, Павле је одбио предлог у корист ђенерала Михаиловића и лично (га) обавестио ...." о њему"
22. (Repac 1957, p. 70):"After the crisis in Africa had passed, the Chetniks reverted to policy of tactical inactivity. For this they were subsequently criticized by the British"
23. (Ford 1992, p. 9):" Bailey informed Cairo that "the time has come to treat Mihailovic firmly. He must be made to realise that we can make him or break him...." Just how the British were to convince Mihailovich that they could "make him or break him".
24. (Charters & Tugwell 1990, p. 73)
25. (Pešić 2002, p. 78)
26. Odense University Studies in History and Social Sciences. Odense University Press. 1978. p. 535. ISBN 9788774922377. The mission was headed by Brigadier C. D. Armstrong with S. W. Bailey as political adviser...
27. (Charters & Tugwell 1990, p. 73):"Bailey brought the Venezia division under Allied command, thus depriving the Chetniks of the possibility of disarming it"
28. (Николић 2009, p. 440):"Да је пуковник Бејли спречавао четнике да разоружавају Италијане, потврдио је и Бригадир Чарлс Армстронг: ,,Морам изјавити да је ..."
29. Časopis za suvremenu povijest. 1990. p. 36.
30. Serbian Democratic Forum. Serbian National Committee. 1975. p. 54. It is to be noted that Colonel Bailey, chief of the first British Mission to Mihailovich, left Yugoslavia for Bari on January 29, 1944.

Sources

• Barker, Elisabeth (1976). British policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War. Barnes & Noble Books. ISBN 978-0-06-490301-1.
• Charters, David; Tugwell, Maurice (1990). Deception Operations: Studies in the East-West Context. Brassey's. ISBN 978-0-08-036706-4.
• Ford, Kirk (1992). OSS and the Yugoslav resistance, 1943-1945. Texas A&M University Press. ISBN 978-0-89096-517-7.
• Николић, Коста (2009). Италијанска војска и четници у другом светском рату у Југославији, 1941-1943. Институт за савремену историjу. ISBN 978-86-7403-130-8.
• Jukić, Ilija (1974). The fall of Yugoslavia. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. ISBN 9780151301003.
• Latas, Branko (1979). Četnički pokret Draže Mihailovića: 1941-1945. Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod.
• MacLaren, Roy (1 November 2011). Canadians Behind Enemy Lines, 1939-1945. UBC Press. ISBN 978-0-7748-4241-9.
• Milazzo, Matteo J. (1 March 1975). The Chetnik movement & the Yugoslav resistance. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 9780801815898.
• Minich, Mihailo (1975). Excerpts from the Book "The Scattered Bones". Minich.
• Ogden, Alan (2010). Through Hitler's Back Door: SOE Operations in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 1939-1945. Pen & Sword Military. ISBN 978-1-84884-248-9.
• Pešić, Miodrag D. (2002). Operation Air Bridge: Serbian Chetniks and the Rescued American Airmen in World War II. Serbian Master's Society. ISBN 978-86-82235-12-5.
• Piekałkiewicz, Janusz (January 1984). Krieg auf dem Balkan, 1940-1945. Südwest. ISBN 978-3-517-00790-8.
• Redžić, Vučeta (2002). Građanski rat u Crnoj Gori: Dešavanja od sredine 1942. godine do sredine 1945. godine. Stupovi.
• Repac, Stanley (1957). Draza Mihailovich. University of Wisconsin--Madison.
• West, Richard (15 November 2012). Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia. Faber & Faber. ISBN 978-0-571-28110-7.