Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant
The Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant, or THORP, is a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at Sellafield in Cumbria, England. THORP is owned by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority and operated by Sellafield Ltd (which is the site licensee company).
| Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant | |
|---|---|
The THORP building viewed from the south behind an internal rail line | |
| Country | England, United Kingdom |
| Location | Cumbria, North West England |
| Coordinates | 54°24′56″N 3°30′06″W / 54.4155°N 3.5017°W |
| Status | Operational |
| Construction began | 1974 |
| Commission date | 1994 |
| Decommission date | 2018 (ceased reprocessing, fuel storage continuing) |
| Construction cost | £1.8–billion |
| Owner(s) | Nuclear Decommissioning Authority |
| Operator(s) | Sellafield Ltd |
| Cooling source | Forced draft cooling towers |
Spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors was reprocessed to separate the 96% uranium and the 1% plutonium from the 3% radioactive wastes, which are treated and stored at the plant. The uranium is then made available for customers to be manufactured into new fuel, and the plutonium incorporated into mixed oxide fuel.
On 14 November 2018 it was announced that reprocessing operations had ended at THORP after earning £9bn in revenue. The receipt and storage facility (which makes up nearly half of THORP's physical footprint), will operate through to the 2070s to receive and store spent nuclear fuel from the UK's PWR and AGR fleet.[1] The decommissioning is expected to start around 2075.[2]
History edit
Between 1977 and 1978 an inquiry was held into an application by British Nuclear Fuels plc for outline planning permission to build a new plant to reprocess irradiated oxide nuclear fuel from both UK and foreign reactors. The inquiry was to answer three questions:
- Should oxide fuel from United Kingdom reactors be reprocessed in this country at all; whether at Windscale or elsewhere?
- If yes, should such reprocessing be carried on at Windscale?
- If yes, should the reprocessing plant be about double the estimated site required to handle United Kingdom oxide fuels and be used as to the spare capacity, for reprocessing foreign fuels?
The result of the inquiry was that the new plant, the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant, was given the go-ahead in 1978.[3]
Construction of THORP started in 1979, and was completed in 1994. The plant went into operation in August 1997. Build cost was £1.8 billion.[4]
THORP's first irradiated fuel rod was sheared in March 1994, which was followed in January of 1995 by the chemical separation plant processing the irradiated fuel feed solution that had been produced in the previous year by the Head End plant. By the Spring of 1998 over 1400 t of irradiated fuel has been reprocessed in THORP, and the plant was steadily and successfully ramped up to its normal operating throughput throughout this time. At this time, the performance of the THORP Chemical Separation Plant had been excellent, above all, the uranium-plutonium separation stage, which received extensive development to deal with the effects of the fission product technetium, has given an overall separation performance well in excess of the minimum flowsheet requirement. THORP's discharges represented a small fraction of overall discharges from the wider Sellafield site.[5][6]
On 14 November 2018 it was announced that reprocessing operations had ended at THORP after all existing reprocessing contracts had been fulfilled. It had reprocessed 9,331 tonnes of used nuclear fuel from 30 customers in nine countries, earning £9bn in revenue. The receipt and storage facility within THORP continues to operate.[1][7]
Decommissioning will take place after several decades to allow radiation levels to decline, and is expected to occur between 2075 and 2095. The estimated cost of decommissioning is forecast as £4 billion at 2018 prices.[4]
Design edit
The chemical flowsheet for THORP is designed to add less non-volatile matter to the first cycle PUREX raffinate. One way in which this is done is by avoiding the use of ferrous compounds as plutonium reducing agents. In this plant the reduction is done using either hydrazine or HAN (hydroxylamine nitrate). The plant releases gaseous emissions of krypton-85, a radioactive beta-emitter with a half-life of 10.7 years. The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland (RPII) commenced 24-hour atmospheric monitoring for krypton-85 in 1993, prior to the plant's commissioning.[8][9]
The cooled oxide fuel is chopped up in the Shear Cell and the fuel dissolved in nitric acid. It is chemically conditioned before passing to the chemical separation plant. Pulsed columns (designated HA/HS) are used to initially separate the majority of the uranium and plutonium from the fission products by transferring them into the solvent phase, which comprises tri-butyl phosphate in odourless kerosene (TBP/OK). The transfer is done in the HA column with the HS column providing further removal of fission products. 2 further pulsed columns (designated BS/BX) and a mixer/settler assembly (1BXX) then separate the uranium and plutonium into separate streams. Plutonium is reduced to the +3 oxidation state, which is insoluble in the solvent phase so ends up in the aqueous phase exiting the 1BX column.
The 1BXX mixer/settler completes the removal of Pu from the solvent phase. The 1BS column removes any remaining Uranium from the aqueous phase by the use of fresh solvent.
Pulsed columns then purify the plutonium, removing the troublesome fission products that remain. A mixer/settlet (1C) is used to transfer (washes) the uranium across to the aqueous phase ready for the next stage. Uranium purification is achieved using three mixer settlers (UP1 - UP3) similar to those in use on the existing Magnox reprocessing plant. Evaporation of the two product streams then occurs before further processing is undertaken. Uranium is converted to UO3 powder while the plutonium is converted to PuO2 powder and sent to storage.
Pulsed columns were chosen to avoid the risk of a criticality incident occurring within the plant. This can happen if sufficient fissile material comes together to start an uncontrolled chain reaction, producing a large release of neutrons. The risks and mechanisms are well understood and the plant design is arranged to prevent its occurrence, i.e.: intrinsically safe.
2005 internal leak edit
On 9 May 2005 it was announced that THORP suffered a large leak of a highly radioactive solution, which had first started in July 2004. British Nuclear Group's board of inquiry determined that a design error led to the leak, while a complacent culture at the plant delayed detection for nine months. Operations staff did not discover the leak until safeguards staff reported major fluid accountancy discrepancies.
Altogether 83 cubic metres (82,966 litres) of hot nitric acid solution leaked from a small fractured feedpipe, which was discovered when a remote camera was sent in to examine THORP's Feed Clarification Cell on 19 April 2005. All the fluids collected under gravity into the secondary containment, which is a stainless steel tub embedded in 2-metre thick reinforced concrete, capable of holding 250 cubic metres of fluids.
The solution from the spill was estimated to contain 20 metric tons of uranium and 160 kilograms of plutonium. The leaked solution was safely recovered into primary containment using originally installed steam ejectors. Radiation levels in the cell precluded entry of humans.
The pipe fractured due to lateral motion of an accountancy tank, which measures volume by weight and moves horizontally and vertically in the process. The tank's original design had restraint blocks to prevent lateral motion, but these were later removed from the design for seismic uncoupling.
The incident was classified as Level 3 out of 7 on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), a "serious incident", due to the amount of radioactive inventory that leaked from primary to secondary containment without discovery over a number of months.[10] This was initially considered by BNFL to be surprisingly high, but the specifications of the scale required it.
The British Nuclear Group was convicted for breaches of health and safety regulations following the accident, and fined £500,000.[11]
Production at the plant restarted in late 2007, but in early 2008 stopped again for the repair of an underwater lift that moved fuel for reprocessing.[12]
See also edit
- Other reprocessing sites
References edit
- ^ a b "Reprocessing ceases at UK's Thorp plant". World Nuclear News. 14 November 2018. Retrieved 15 November 2018.
- ^ NDA Annual Report and Accounts 2018 to 2019. NDA, 4 July 2019
- ^ Brown, Paul (1 April 1999), "Sellafield says don't blame Thorp for cuts", The Guardian, UK, p. 27
- ^ a b Leggett, Theo (27 November 2018). "Inside Sellafield's death zone with the nuclear clean-up robots". BBC News. Retrieved 29 November 2018.
- ^ Philips, C. (July 1998). "The thermal oxide reprocessing plant at Sellafield: Three years of active operation in the chemical separation plant".
- ^ C., Phillips (16 February 1993). "Development and design of the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant at Sellafield". Chemical Engineering Research and Design. 71 (A2).
- ^ "Sellafield Thorp site to close in 2018". BBC News Cumbria. BBC. 7 June 2012. Retrieved 22 August 2012.
- ^ . The Irish News. 16 January 1995. Archived from the original on 11 January 2016. Retrieved 1 May 2015.
- ^ McDonald, Frank (7 January 1995). . The Irish Times. Archived from the original on 11 January 2016. Retrieved 2 May 2015.
- ^ [1] 28 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ Wilson, James (17 October 2006). "Sellafield criticised on safety as BNG fined". FT.com. Archived from the original on 11 December 2022. Retrieved 4 February 2013.
- ^ Geoffrey Lean, 'Shambolic' Sellafield in crisis again after damning safety report, The Independent, 3 February 2008.
External links edit
- Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
- Sellafield Limited
- Nuclear unit closed after checks - BBC, 23 April 2005
- Huge radioactive leak closes Thorp nuclear plant - The Guardian, 9 May 2005
- , BNFL, 26 May 2005
- - Bellona Foundation, 7 July 2005
- - Nuclear Engineering International, 27 July 2005
- Nuclear staff suspended over leak - BBC, 4 August 2005
- - News & Star, 11 November 2005
- , John Large, 13 April 2006 - includes diagrams
- - Nuclear Engineering International, 17 January 2007
- - Nuclear Engineering International, 25 April 2007
- , Mr Justice Openshaw, 16 October 2006