In United States tax law history, the Tariff of 1883 (signed into law on March 3, 1883[1]), also known as the Mongrel Tariff Act by its critics, reduced high tariff rates only marginally, and left in place fairly strong protectionist barriers.
President Chester A. Arthur appointed a commission in May 1882 to recommend how much tariff rates should be reduced. The issue was controversial during the last three decades of the nineteenth century, making tariff revision a daunting task. Different constituents argued for opposite measures, often wanting to maintain tariffs on some items while reducing them on others. Support or opposition to tariffs often broke down along regional lines.
In December 1882, the commission argued for substantial reductions. Protectionists in Congress by this time recognized that some type of reduction would be politically popular, but wanted to avoid a drastic cut. Lame-duck Republicans wanted to ensure that a tariff reduction passed before incumbent Democrats assumed control of Congress in the next session and lowered rates by a greater margin.
The result was an enormously complicated and unpopular piece of legislation with no clear vision. Tariffs on some items were lowered. Others were inexplicably raised. Some goods had multiple tariffs rates placed on them to be applied in different locations with no clear reasoning. Tariff rates were reduced an average 1.47 percent, with most rates remaining around 35–40 percent.
President Arthur was not the most enthusiastic supporter of tariff reduction, but he did feel that some meaningful reduction was needed and he recognized that the changes made by the "Mongrel Tariff" were insufficient. Thus, he directed U.S. Secretary of StateFrederick Theodore Frelinghuysen to establish reciprocal trade agreements with other nations, especially those with raw material the U.S. needed. The reciprocal trade agreements allowed Arthur to amend the tariff without having to involve himself in a congressional battle over the issue.
Nix v. Heddenedit
The law exempts fruit but not vegetables, causing tomato importers to file sue claiming that tomatoes are a fruit, resulting in the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision in Nix v. Hedden (May 10, 1893) that tomatoes are to be considered a vegetable for purposes of this tariff.
Referencesedit
^. Archived from the original on February 20, 2009. Retrieved March 7, 2009. Access date: 03/06/09
Further readingedit
Hendrickson, Scott A.; Robert, Jason M. (2016). "Short-Term Goals and Long-Term Effects: The Mongrel Tariff and the Creation of the Special Rule in the U.S. House". Journal of Policy History. 28 (2): 318–341. doi:10.1017/S0898030616000087. S2CID 155274712.
Taussig, F. W. (1912). Tariff History of the United States(PDF).
April 11, 2024
tariff, 1883, united, states, history, signed, into, march, 1883, also, known, mongrel, tariff, critics, reduced, high, tariff, rates, only, marginally, left, place, fairly, strong, protectionist, barriers, president, chester, arthur, appointed, commission, 18. In United States tax law history the Tariff of 1883 signed into law on March 3 1883 1 also known as the Mongrel Tariff Act by its critics reduced high tariff rates only marginally and left in place fairly strong protectionist barriers President Chester A Arthur appointed a commission in May 1882 to recommend how much tariff rates should be reduced The issue was controversial during the last three decades of the nineteenth century making tariff revision a daunting task Different constituents argued for opposite measures often wanting to maintain tariffs on some items while reducing them on others Support or opposition to tariffs often broke down along regional lines In December 1882 the commission argued for substantial reductions Protectionists in Congress by this time recognized that some type of reduction would be politically popular but wanted to avoid a drastic cut Lame duck Republicans wanted to ensure that a tariff reduction passed before incumbent Democrats assumed control of Congress in the next session and lowered rates by a greater margin The result was an enormously complicated and unpopular piece of legislation with no clear vision Tariffs on some items were lowered Others were inexplicably raised Some goods had multiple tariffs rates placed on them to be applied in different locations with no clear reasoning Tariff rates were reduced an average 1 47 percent with most rates remaining around 35 40 percent President Arthur was not the most enthusiastic supporter of tariff reduction but he did feel that some meaningful reduction was needed and he recognized that the changes made by the Mongrel Tariff were insufficient Thus he directed U S Secretary of State Frederick Theodore Frelinghuysen to establish reciprocal trade agreements with other nations especially those with raw material the U S needed The reciprocal trade agreements allowed Arthur to amend the tariff without having to involve himself in a congressional battle over the issue Nix v Hedden editThe law exempts fruit but not vegetables causing tomato importers to file sue claiming that tomatoes are a fruit resulting in the unanimous U S Supreme Court decision in Nix v Hedden May 10 1893 that tomatoes are to be considered a vegetable for purposes of this tariff References edit American President Key Events in the Presidency of Chester A Arthur Archived from the original on February 20 2009 Retrieved March 7 2009 Access date 03 06 09Further reading editHendrickson Scott A Robert Jason M 2016 Short Term Goals and Long Term Effects The Mongrel Tariff and the Creation of the Special Rule in the U S House Journal of Policy History 28 2 318 341 doi 10 1017 S0898030616000087 S2CID 155274712 Taussig F W 1912 Tariff History of the United States PDF Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Tariff of 1883 amp oldid 1205555286, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,
