Scientific essentialism, a view espoused by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam,[1] maintains that there exist essential properties that objects possess (or instantiate) necessarily. In other words, having such and such essential properties is a necessary condition for membership in a given natural kind. For example, tigers are tigers in virtue of possessing a particular set of genetic properties, but identifying (or appearance-based) properties are nonessential properties. If a tiger lost a leg, or didn't possess stripes, we would still call it a tiger. They are not necessary for being a member of the class of tigers.
It is important, however, that the set of essential properties of an object not be used to identify or be identified with that object because they are not necessary and sufficient, but only necessary. Having such and such a genetic code does not suffice for being a tiger. We wouldn't call a piece of tiger tail a tiger, even though a piece of tiger tail contains the genetic information essential to being a tiger.
^Hanna, R. (1998). "A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 58 (3): 497–528. doi:10.2307/2653754. JSTOR 2653754.
^ abBigelow, J.; Ellis, B.; Lierse, C. (1992). "The World as One of a Kind: Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 43 (3): 371–388. doi:10.1093/bjps/43.3.371.
scientific, essentialism, this, article, needs, additional, citations, verification, please, help, improve, this, article, adding, citations, reliable, sources, unsourced, material, challenged, removed, find, sources, news, newspapers, books, scholar, jstor, j. This article needs additional citations for verification Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources Unsourced material may be challenged and removed Find sources Scientific essentialism news newspapers books scholar JSTOR January 2012 Learn how and when to remove this template message Scientific essentialism a view espoused by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam 1 maintains that there exist essential properties that objects possess or instantiate necessarily In other words having such and such essential properties is a necessary condition for membership in a given natural kind For example tigers are tigers in virtue of possessing a particular set of genetic properties but identifying or appearance based properties are nonessential properties If a tiger lost a leg or didn t possess stripes we would still call it a tiger They are not necessary for being a member of the class of tigers It is important however that the set of essential properties of an object not be used to identify or be identified with that object because they are not necessary and sufficient but only necessary Having such and such a genetic code does not suffice for being a tiger We wouldn t call a piece of tiger tail a tiger even though a piece of tiger tail contains the genetic information essential to being a tiger Other advocates of scientific essentialism include Brian Ellis 2 Caroline Lierse 3 John Bigelow 3 and Alexander Bird 4 References edit Hanna R 1998 A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 3 497 528 doi 10 2307 2653754 JSTOR 2653754 Brian Ellis July 23 2007 Scientific Essentialism Cambridge Studies in Philosophy Cambridge University Press ISBN 978 0 521 03774 7 OCLC 124025546 OL 7715358M 0521037743 a b Bigelow J Ellis B Lierse C 1992 The World as One of a Kind Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 3 371 388 doi 10 1093 bjps 43 3 371 Alexander Bird August 31 2007 Nature s Metaphysics Oxford University Press USA ISBN 978 0 19 922701 3 OL 10145956M 0199227012External links editScientific essentialism at PhilPapers Essentialism at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Scientific essentialism amp oldid 1154077559, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,
