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Military of the Qing dynasty

December 15, 2023

The Qing dynasty (1636–1912) was established by conquest and maintained by armed force. The founding emperors personally organized and led the armies, and the continued cultural and political legitimacy of the dynasty depended on their ability to defend the country from invasion and expand its territory. Therefore, military institutions, leadership, and finance were fundamental to the dynasty's initial success and ultimate decay. The early military system centered on the Eight Banners, a hybrid institution that also played social, economic, and political roles.[1] The Banner system was developed on an informal basis as early as 1601, and formally established in 1615 by Jurchen leader Nurhaci (1559–1626), the retrospectively recognized founder of the Qing. His son Hong Taiji (1592–1643), who renamed the Jurchens "Manchus", created eight Mongol banners to mirror the Manchu ones and eight "Han-martial" (漢軍; Hànjūn) banners manned by Han troops who surrendered to the Qing before the full-fledged conquest of China proper began in 1644. After 1644, the Ming troops that surrendered to the Qing were integrated into the Green Standard Army, a corps that eventually outnumbered the Banners by three to one. By the middle of the 18th century, the military of the Qing dynasty numbered over 800,000 (200,000 bannermen and 600,000 Green Standard troops).[2]

The Qianlong Emperor in ceremonial armour on horseback, by Giuseppe Castiglione.

The use of gunpowder during the High Qing can compete with the three gunpowder empires in western Asia.[3] Manchu imperial princes led the Banners in defeating the Ming armies, but after lasting peace was established starting in 1683, both the Banners and the Green Standard Armies started to lose their efficiency. Garrisoned in cities, soldiers had few occasions to drill. The Qing nonetheless used superior armament and logistics to expand deeply into Inner Asia, defeat the Dzungar Mongols in 1759, and complete their conquest of Xinjiang. Despite the dynasty's pride in the Ten Great Campaigns of the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1735–1796), the Qing armies became largely ineffective by the end of the 18th century. It took almost ten years and huge financial waste to defeat the badly equipped White Lotus Rebellion (1795–1804), partly by legitimizing militias led by local Han elites. The Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), a large-scale uprising that started in southern China, marched to within miles of Beijing in 1853. The Qing court was forced to let its Han governors-general, first led by Zeng Guofan, raise regional armies. This new type of army and leadership defeated the rebels but signaled the end of Manchu dominance of the military establishment.

The military technology of the European Industrial Revolution made China's armament and military rapidly obsolete. In 1860 British and French forces in the Second Opium War captured Beijing and sacked the Summer Palace. The shaken court attempted to modernize its military and industrial institutions by buying European technology. This Self-Strengthening Movement established shipyards (notably the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Foochow Arsenal) and bought modern guns and battleships in Europe. The Qing navy became the largest in East Asia, but its organization and logistics were inadequate, officer training was deficient, and corruption widespread. The Beiyang Fleet was virtually destroyed and the modernized ground forces defeated in the 1895 First Sino-Japanese War. The Qing created a New Army, but could not prevent the Eight Nation Alliance from invading China to put down the Boxer Uprising in 1900. The revolt of a New Army corps in 1911 led to the fall of the dynasty.

Organization edit

Main article: Eight Banners
 
Early Qing dynasty helmet, mid to late 17th c.
 
Qing helmet, 17th-18th c.
 
The Qianlong Emperor's Southern Inspection Tour, Scroll Twelve: Return to the Palace (detail), 1764–1770, by Xu Yang.

One of the keys to Nurhaci's successful unification of Jurchen tribes and his challenge to the Ming dynasty in the early seventeenth century was the formation of the Eight Banners, a uniquely Manchu institution that was militarily efficient, but also played economic, social, and political roles.[4] As early as 1601 and possibly a few years earlier, Nurhaci made his soldiers and their families register into permanent companies known as niru, the same name as the smaller hunting parties in which Jurchen men traditionally joined to practice military operations and wage war.[5] Sometime before 1607, these companies were themselves grouped into larger units called gūsa, or "banners", differentiated by colors: yellow, white, red, and blue.[6] In 1615 a red border was added to each flag (except for the red banner, to which a white border was added) to form a total of eight banners that Jurchen troops carried into battles.[6] The banner system allowed Nurhaci's new state to absorb defeated Jurchen tribes simply by adding companies; this integration in turn helped to reorganize Jurchen society beyond petty clan affiliations.[7]

As Qing power expanded north of the Great Wall, the Banner system kept expanding too. Soon after defeating the Chahar Mongols with the help of other Mongol tribes in 1635, Nurhaci's son and successor Hong Taiji incorporated his new Mongol subjects and allies into the Mongol Eight Banners, which ran parallel to the original Manchu banners.[8] Hong Taiji was more prudent in integrating Chinese troops.[9] In 1629, he first created a "Chinese army" (Manchu: ᠨᡳᡴᠠᠨ
ᠴᠣᠣᡥᠠ nikan cooha; Chinese: 漢軍; pinyin: Hànjūn) of about 3000 men.[10] In 1631 these Chinese units absorbed men that could build and operate European-style cannon, and were therefore renamed "Heavy Troops" (M.: ujen cooha; Chinese: 重軍; pinyin: Zhòngjūn).[11] By 1633 they counted about 20 companies and 4,500 men fighting under black standards.[11] These Chinese companies were grouped into two banners in 1637, four in 1639, and finally eight banners in 1642.[8] These "Hanjun" banners are known as the "Chinese" or "Chinese-martial" banners.[12]

Select groups of Han Chinese bannermen were mass-transferred into Manchu Banners by the Qing, changing their ethnicity from Han Chinese to Manchu. Han Chinese bannermen of Tai Nikan 台尼堪 (watchpost Chinese) and Fusi Nikan 抚顺尼堪 (Fushun Chinese)[13] backgrounds merged into the Manchu banners in 1740 by order of the Qing Qianlong emperor.[14] It was between 1618 and 1629 when the Han Chinese from Liaodong who later became the Fushun Nikan and Tai Nikan defected to the Jurchen (Manchus).[15] Manchu clans of Han Chinese origin continued to use their Han surnames and were marked as of Han origin on Qing lists of Manchu clans. Manchu families adopted Han Chinese sons from families of bondservant Booi Aha (baoyi) origin and they served in Manchu company registers as detached household Manchus and the Qing imperial court found this out in 1729. Manchu bannermen who needed money helped falsify registration for Han Chinese servants being adopted into the Manchu banners and Manchu families who lacked sons were allowed to adopt their servants' sons, or the servants themselves.[16] The Manchu families were paid to adopt Han Chinese sons from bondservant families by those families. The Qing Imperial Guard captain Batu was furious at Manchus who adopted Han Chinese from slave and bondservant families in exchange for money, and expressed his displeasure at them adopting Han Chinese instead of other Manchus.[17] These Han Chinese who infiltrated the Manchu Banners by adoption were known as "secondary-status bannermen" and "false Manchus" or "separate-register Manchus", and there were eventually so many of them that they took over military positions in the Banners that would have been reserved for Manchus. Han Chinese foster-son and separate-register bannermen made up 800 of 1,600 soldiers in the Mongol Banners and Manchu Banners of Hangzhou in 1740, which was nearly 50%. Han Chinese foster-sons made up 220 out of 1,600 unsalaried troops at Jingzhou in 1747 and an assortment of Han Chinese separate-register, Mongol, and Manchu bannermen made up the remainder. Han Chinese secondary status bannermen made up 180 of 3,600 troop households in Ningxia, while Han Chinese separate-registers made up 380 of 2,700 Manchu soldiers in Liangzhou. Because Han Chinese Manchus filled up military positions, few Manchus gained positions as soldiers in the Banner armies. The Han Chinese were said to be good military troops and their marching and archery skills were up to par; the Zhapu lieutenant general couldn't differentiate them from true Manchus in terms of military skills.[18] Manchu Banners contained a lot of "false Manchus" who were from Han Chinese civilian families but were adopted by Manchu bannermen after the Yongzheng reign. The Jingkou and Jiangning Mongol banners and Manchu Banners had 1,795 adopted Han Chinese and the Beijing Mongol Banners and Manchu Banners had 2,400 adopted Han Chinese in statistics taken from the 1821 census. Despite Qing attempts to differentiate adopted Han Chinese from normal Manchu bannermen the differences between them became hazy.[19] These adopted Han Chinese bondservants who managed to get themselves into Manchu banner roles were called kaihu ren (開戶人) in Chinese and dangse faksalaha urse in Manchu. Other Manchus were called jingkini Manjusa.

The Manchus sent Han bannermen to fight against Koxinga's Ming loyalists in Fujian.[20] The Qing carried out a seaban, forcing people to evacuate the coast, in order to deprive Koxinga's Ming loyalists of resources. This led to a myth that it was because Manchus were "afraid of water". In Fujian, Han Chinese bannermen were fighting on behalf of the Qing, which disproves the claim that Manchus feared the water.[21] A poem shows northern Han bannermen referring to the Tanka boat people living on the coast and rivers of Southern Fujian as "barbarians".[22]

The banners in their order of precedence were as follows: yellow, bordered yellow, white, red, bordered white, bordered red, blue, and bordered blue. The yellow, bordered yellow, and white banners were collectively known as the "Upper Three Banners" (Chinese: 上三旗; pinyin: shàng sān qí) and were under the direct command of the emperor. Only Manchus belonging to the Upper Three Banners, and selected Han Chinese who had passed the highest level of martial exams, were qualified to serve as the emperor's personal bodyguards. The remaining Banners were known as the "Lower Five Banners" (Chinese: 下五旗; pinyin: xià wǔ qí) and were commanded by hereditary Manchu princes descended from Nurhachi's immediate family, known informally as the "Iron Cap Princes". In Nurhaci's era and the early Hong Taiij era, these princes formed the Deliberative Council of Princes and Ministers as well as high command of the army.[citation needed]

Upper Three Banners
Lower Five Banners

Green Standard Army edit

Main article: Green Standard Army
 
A Chinese Green Standard Army soldier
 
Scale armour with lionhead shoulder guards, Qing dynasty

After the Qing captured Beijing in 1644 and rapidly gained control of large tracts of former Ming territory, the relatively small Banner armies were further augmented by remnants of Ming forces that surrendered to the Qing. Some of these troops were first accepted into the Chinese-martial banners, but after 1645 they were integrated a new military unit called the Green Standard Army, named after the color of their battle pennants.[23] The Qing created Chinese armies in the regions it conquered. Green Standard armies were created in Shanxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, and Jiangnan in 1645, in Fujian in 1650, in Lianguang (Guangdong and Guangxi) in 1651, in Guizhou in 1658, and in Yunnan in 1659.[24] They maintained their Ming-era ranks and were led by a mix of Banner and Green Standard officers.[25] These Chinese troops eventually outnumbered Banner troops three to one (about 600,000 Green Standard troops to 200,000 bannermen).[citation needed]

Even though the Manchu banners were the most effective fighting force during the Qing conquest of the Ming, most of the fighting was done by Chinese banners and Green Standard troops, especially in southern China where Manchu cavalry could play less of a role.[26] The banners also performed badly during the revolt of the Three Feudatories that erupted in southern China in 1673.[27] It was regular Chinese troops, albeit led by Manchu and Chinese officers, who helped the Qing to defeat their enemies in 1681 and thus consolidate their control over all of China.[27] Green Standard troops also formed the main personnel of the naval forces that defeated the Southern Ming dynasty resistance in Taiwan.[28]

The Banners and Green Standard troops were standing armies, paid for by the central government. In addition, regional governors from provincial down to village level maintained their own irregular local militias for police duties and disaster relief. These militias were usually granted small annual stipends from regional coffers for part-time service obligations.

The Qing divided the command structure of the Green Standard Army in the provinces between the high-ranking officers and low ranking officers, the best and strongest unit was under the control of the highest-ranking officers but at the same time, these units were outnumbered by other units divided between individual lower ranking officers so none of them could revolt on their own against the Qing because they did not control the entire armies.[29]

Manchu generals and bannermen were initially put to shame by the better performance of the Han Chinese Green Standard Army, who fought better than them against the rebels, and this was noted by the Kangxi Emperor, leading him to task Generals Sun Sike, Wang Jinbao, and Zhao Liangdong to lead Green Standard soldiers to crush the rebels.[30] The Qing thought that Han Chinese were superior at battling other Han people and so used the Green Standard Army as the dominant and majority army for crushing the rebels, instead of bannermen.[31] In northwestern China against Wang Fuchen, the Qing put bannermen in the rear as reserves while they used Han Chinese Green Standard Army soldiers and Han Chinese generals like Zhang Liangdong, Wang Jinbao, and Zhang Yong as the primary military forces, considering Han troops as better at fighting other Han people, and these Han generals achieved victory over the rebels.[32] Sichuan and southern Shaanxi were retaken by the Han Chinese Green Standard Army under Wang Jinbao and Zhao Liangdong in 1680, with Manchus only participating in dealing with logistics and provisions.[33] 400,000 Green Standard Army soldiers and 150,000 Bannermen served on the Qing side during the war.[33] 213 Han Chinese Banner companies, and 527 companies of Mongol and Manchu Banners were mobilized by the Qing during the revolt.[34] The Qing had the support of the majority of Han Chinese soldiers and Han elite against the Three Feudatories, since they refused to join Wu Sangui in the revolt, while the Eight Banners and Manchu officers fared poorly against Wu Sangui, so the Qing responded with using a massive army of more than 900,000 Han Chinese (non-Banner) instead of the Eight Banners, to fight and crush the Three Feudatories.[35] Wu Sangui's forces were crushed by the Green Standard Army, made out of defected Ming soldiers.[36]

The frontier in the south-west was extended slowly. In 1701 the Qing defeated Tibetans at the Battle of Dartsedo. The Dzungar Khanate conquered the Uyghurs in the Dzungar conquest of Altishahr and seized control of Tibet. Han Chinese Green Standard Army soldiers and Manchu bannermen were commanded by the Han Chinese General Yue Zhongqi in the Chinese expedition to Tibet (1720) which expelled the Dzungars from Tibet and placed it under Qing rule. At multiple places such as Lhasa, Batang, Dartsendo, Lhari, Chamdo, and Litang, Green Standard troops were garrisoned throughout the Dzungar war.[37] Green Standard Army troops and Manchu bannermen were both part of the Qing force who fought in Tibet in the war against the Dzungars.[38] It was said that the Sichuan commander Yue Zhongqi (a descendant of Yue Fei) entered Lhasa first when the 2,000 Green Standard soldiers and 1,000 Manchu soldiers of the "Sichuan route" seized Lhasa.[39] According to Mark C. Elliott, after 1728 the Qing used Green Standard Army troops to man the garrison in Lhasa rather than bannermen.[40] According to Evelyn S. Rawski both Green Standard Army and bannermen made up the Qing garrison in Tibet.[41] According to Sabine Dabringhaus, Green Standard Chinese soldiers numbering more than 1,300 were stationed by the Qing in Tibet to support the 3,000 strong Tibetan army.[42]

Garrisons in peacetime edit

 
A late-Qing woodblock print representing the "Yangzhou massacre" of May 1645. By the late 19th century, the massacre was used by anti-Qing revolutionaries to arouse anti-Manchu sentiment among the population.

Banner armies were broadly divided along ethnic lines, namely Manchu and Mongol, although the ethnic composition of Manchu banners was far from homogeneous, as they included non-Manchu bondservants registered under the household of their Manchu masters. As the war with the Ming dynasty progressed and the Han Chinese population under Manchu rule increased, Hong Taiji created a separate branch of Han Banners to draw on this new source of manpower. The Six Ministries and other major positions were filled with Han Bannermen chosen by the Qing.[43] It was Han Chinese bannermen who were responsible for the successful Qing takeover of China. They made up the majority of governors in the early Qing and were the ones who governed and administered China after the conquest, stabilizing Qing rule.[44] Han bannermen dominated governor-general posts in the time of the Shunzhi and Kangxi Emperors, as well as governor posts, largely excluding ordinary Han civilians.[45] The political barrier was between non-bannermen and the "conquest elite" of bannermen whether Han Chinese, Mongols or Manchu. It was not ethnicity which was the factor.[46]

The social origins of the Banner system meant that the population of each branch and their sub-divisions was hereditary and rigid. Only under special circumstances sanctioned by imperial edict was miscegenation between banners permitted. In contrast, the Green Standard Army was originally intended to be a professional force.

After defeating the remnants of the Ming forces, the Manchu Banner Army, approximately 200,000 strong at the time, was evenly divided; half was designated the Forbidden Eight Banner Army (Chinese: 禁旅八旗; pinyin: jìnlǚ bāqí) and was stationed in Beijing. It served both as the capital's garrison and the Qing government's main strike force. The remainder of the Banner troops were distributed to guard key cities in China. These were known as the Territorial Eight Banner Army (simplified Chinese: 驻防八旗; traditional Chinese: 駐防八旗; pinyin: zhùfáng bāqí). The Manchu court, keenly aware its own minority status, reinforced a strict policy of racial segregation between the Manchus and Mongols from Han Chinese for fear of being sinicized by the latter. This policy applied directly to the banner garrisons, most of which occupied a separate walled zone within the cities where they were stationed. In cities where there were limitations of space such as in Qingzhou, a new fortified town was purposely erected to house the banner garrison and their families. Beijing being the imperial seat, the regent Dorgon had the entire Chinese population forcibly relocated to the southern suburbs which became known as the "Outer Citadel" (Chinese: 外城; pinyin: wàichéng). The northern walled city, called "Inner Citadel" (Chinese: 內城; pinyin: nèichéng), was portioned out to the remaining Manchu Eight Banners, each responsible for guarding a section of the Inner Citadel surrounding the Forbidden City palace complex.[a][citation needed]

Military training was undertaken by martial artists in the Qing armed forces.[47]

Associations for martial arts were joined by Manchu bannermen in Beijing.[48]

A hall for martial arts was where the military careers of Muslim generals Ma Fulu and Ma Fuxiang started in Hezhou.[49]

Soldiers and officers in the Qing army were taught by the Muslim martial arts instructor Wang Zi-Ping before he fought in the Boxer rebellion. Another teacher of martial arts of the military in Beijing was Wang Xiang Zhai.[50] The army martial arts trainers imhad to deal with a massive assortment of different armaments such as spears and swords.[51] Gunpowder weaponry had been long used by China so the idea that melee combat in China was replaced out of thin air by western guns is a myth.[52] Cavalry were also taught martial arts. Martial arts were part of the exams for military officers.[53] Martial artists were among those who migrated into cities from the countryside.[54] The Qing and Ming military drew on the Shaolin tradition.[55] Techniques and armaments cross fertilized across the army and civilian realms.[56] The army included trainers in martial arts from the Taoists.[57] The Taiping military had martial artists.[58]

Navy edit

See also: Imperial Chinese Navy
 
Fujian fleet in the Taiwan Strait

The "sea ban" policy during the early Qing dynasty meant that the development of naval power stagnated. River and coastal naval defence was the responsibility of the waterborne units of the Green Standard Army, which were based at Jingkou (now Zhenjiang) and Hangzhou.

In 1661, a naval unit was established at Jilin to defend against Russian incursions into Manchuria. Naval units were also added to various banner garrisons subsequently, referred to collectively as the "Eight Banners Navy". In 1677, the Qing court re-established the Fujian Fleet in order to combat the Ming-loyalist Kingdom of Tungning based on Taiwan. This conflict culminated in the Qing victory at the Battle of Penghu in 1683 and the surrender of the Tungning shortly after the battle.

The Qing, like the Ming, placed considerable importance on the building of a strong navy. However unlike the Europeans, they did not perceive the need to dominate the open ocean and hence monopolise trade, and instead focused on defending, by means of patrols, their inner sea space. The Qing demarcated and controlled their inner seas in the same manner as land territory.[59]

The Kangxi Emperor and his successors established a four-zone sea defence system consisting of the Bohai Gulf (Dengzhou fleet, Jiaozhou fleet, Lüshun fleet and Tianjin/Daigu fleet), Jiangsu-Zhejiang coast (Jiangnan fleet and Zhejiang fleet), Taiwan Strait (Fujian fleet) and the Guangdong coast (Guangdong Governor's fleet and Guangdong regular fleet). The fleets were supported by a chain of coastal artillery batteries along the coast and "water castles" or naval bases. Qing warships of the Kangxi era had a crew of 40 seamen and were armed with cannons and wall guns of Dutch design.[60]

Although the Qing had invested in naval defences for their adjacent seas in earlier periods, after the death of the Qianlong Emperor in 1799, the navy decayed as more attention was directed to suppressing the Miao Rebellion and White Lotus Rebellion, which left the Qing treasury bankrupt. The remaining naval forces were badly overstretched, undermanned, underfunded and uncoordinated.[61]

Eighteenth century edit

 
Mail armour, Qing dynasty
See also: Ten Great Campaigns

The policy of posting banner troops as territorial garrison was not to protect but to inspire awe in the subjugated populace at their expertise as cavalry. As a result, after a century of peace and lack of field training the Manchu Banner troops had deteriorated greatly in their combat worthiness. Secondly, before the conquest, the Manchu banner was a "citizen" army, and its members were Manchu farmers and herders obligated to provide military service to the state in times of war. The Qing government's decision to turn the banner troops into a professional force whose every welfare and need was met by state coffers brought wealth, and with it corruption, to the rank and file of the Manchu banners and hastened its decline as a fighting force. Bannermen frequently went into debt as a result of drinking, gambling, and spending time at theaters and brothels, leading to a general ban on theater-going within the Eight Banners.[62]

 
A battle between Qing troops and Uyghur Khojas near Lake Eshilkul in 1759.

At the same time, a similar decline was occurring in the Green Standard Army. In peacetime, soldiering became merely a source of supplementary income. Soldiers and commanders alike neglected training in pursuit of their own economic gains. Corruption was rampant as regional unit commanders submitted pay and supply requisitions based on exaggerated head counts to the quartermaster department and pocketed the difference. When Green Standard troops proved unable to fire their guns accurately while suppressing a rebellion of White Lotus followers under Wang Lun in 1774, the governor-general blamed the failure on enemy magic, prompting a furious reply from the Qianlong Emperor in which he described incompetence with firearms as a "common and pervasive disease" of the Green Standard Army, whose gunners were full of excuses.[63]

Qing emperors attempted to reverse the decline of the military through a variety of means. Although it was under the Qianlong Emperor that the empire expanded to its greatest extent, the emperor and his officers frequently made note of the decline of martial discipline among the troops.[64][65] Qianlong reinstituted the annual hunt at Mulan as a form of military training. Thousands of troops participated in these massive exercises, selected from among Eight Banners troops of both the capital and the garrisons.[66] Qianlong also promoted military culture, directing his court painters to produce a large number of works on military themes, including victories in battle, the grand inspections of the army, and the imperial hunt at Mulan.[67]

Technology edit

 
Mounted soldier with musket

Qing armies in the eighteenth century may not have been as well-armed as their European counterparts, but under pressure from the imperial throne they proved capable of innovation and efficiency, sometimes in difficult circumstances. The Qing were consistently very keen on adopting Western military technology. In the Second Jinchuan War, for instance, the Qianlong emperor despatched the Jesuit Felix da Rocha, the director of the Bureau of Astronomy, to the front to cast heavy field cannon that could not be transported to the deep mountains in which the Jinchuan tribes lived.[68] The Qing army produced new cannons based on the designs supplied by the Jesuit Missionaries Ferdinand Verbiest in the 1670s and Felix da Rocha in the 1770s. These cannon designs continued to be reproduced in China until the First Opium War.[69]

Shi Lang's fleet to crush the Ming resistance in Taiwan incorporated Dutch naval technology.[70]

The Qing dynasty established the Firearm Battalion or Huoqiying as one of the elite military divisions stationed around the capital Beijing. It was a special force that incorporated all the musket and cannon specialists previously subordinated to the Eight Banners.[71] Its role was similar to the Shenjiying of the Ming dynasty. The entire Firearm Battalion practiced firearms training, and the firearms they practiced include shotguns and large cannons. Composed of Eight Banners soldiers, it was responsible for guarding the imperial city of Beijing.

The Qing court restricted the usage of firearms at times. Fishing boats and coastal vessels were forbidden from using them and firearms were reserved for hunting only. Manchu leaders tried to prevent Han Chinese military divisions from using the most powerful handguns while reserving them for Manchu units. In 1778, the Qianlong Emperor criticized the governor of Shandong Province for training militia in the use of firearms. The Manchus themselves appeared to have spent more time practicing with the bow than with firearms. It is suggested that this was due to the traditional role of archery in Manchu culture. [72]

 
The Eight Banners army armed with bow and arrow going to into battle against Dzungar forces armed with firearms

It is estimated that 30 to 40% of Chinese soldiers at the time of the First Opium War were equipped with firearms, typically matchlock muskets.[73]

 
General Zeng Guofan

Early during the Taiping Rebellion, Qing forces suffered a series of disastrous defeats culminating in the loss of the regional capital city of Nanjing in 1853. The rebels massacred the entire Manchu garrison and their families in the city and made it their capital.[74] Shortly thereafter, a Taiping expeditionary force penetrated as far north as the suburbs of Tianjin in what was considered the imperial heartlands. In desperation the Qing court ordered a Chinese mandarin, Zeng Guofan, to organize regional (simplified Chinese: 团勇; traditional Chinese: 團勇; pinyin: tuányǒng) and village (simplified Chinese: 乡勇; traditional Chinese: 鄉勇; pinyin: xiāngyǒng) militias into a standing army called tuanlian to contain the rebellion. Zeng Guofan's strategy was to rely on local gentries to raise a new type of military organization from those provinces that the Taiping rebels directly threatened. This new force became known as the Xiang Army, named after the Hunan region where it was raised. The Xiang Army was a hybrid of local militia and a standing army. It was given professional training, but was paid for out of regional coffers and funds its commanders — mostly members of the Chinese gentry — could muster. The Xiang Army and its successor, the Huai Army, created by Zeng Guofan's colleague and student Li Hongzhang, were collectively called the "Yong Ying" (Brave Camp).[75]

Before forming and commanding the Xiang Army, Zeng Guofan had no military experience. Being a classically educated Mandarin, his blueprint for the Xiang Army was taken from a historical source — the Ming general Qi Jiguang, who, because of the weakness of regular Ming troops, had decided to form his own "private" army to repel raiding Japanese pirates in the mid-16th century. Qi Jiguang's doctrine was based on Neo-Confucian ideas of binding troops' loyalty to their immediate superiors and also to the regions in which they were raised. This initially gave the troops an excellent esprit de corps. Qi Jiguang's army was an ad hoc solution to the specific problem of combating pirates, as was Zeng Guofan's original intention for the Xiang Army, which was raise to eradicate the Taiping rebels. However, circumstances led to the Yongying system becoming a permanent institution within the Qing military, which in the long run created problems of its own for the beleaguered central government.

 
In 1894–1895, fighting over influence in Korea, Japanese troops defeated Qing forces.

First, the Yongying system signaled the end of Manchu dominance in Qing military establishment. Although the Banners and Green Standard armies lingered on as parasites depleting resources, henceforth the Yongying corps became the Qing government's de facto first-line troops. Secondly the Yongying corps were financed through provincial coffers and were led by regional commanders. This devolution of power weakened the central government's grip on the whole country, a weakness further aggravated by foreign powers vying to carve up autonomous colonial territories in different parts of the Qing Empire in the later half of the 19th century. Despite these serious negative effects, the measure was deemed necessary as tax revenue from provinces occupied and threatened by rebels had ceased to reach the cash-strapped central government. Finally, the nature of Yongying command structure fostered nepotism and cronyism amongst its commanders, whom, as they ascended the bureaucratic ranks laid the seeds to Qing's eventual demise and the outbreak of regional warlordism in China during the first half of the 20th century.[75]

By the late 19th century, China was fast descending into a semi-colonial state. Even the most conservative elements within the Qing court could no longer ignore China's military weakness in contrast to the foreign "barbarians" literally beating down its gates. In 1860, during the Second Opium War, the capital Beijing was captured and the Summer Palace sacked by a relatively small Anglo-French coalition force numbering 25,000.

Taiping Rebellion edit

8 Banners edit

The 8 banners were officially organised into 24 kusai with each banner containing 1 Kusai each of Mongol, Manchu and Han though the Manchus cosisted of 75% of the personnel, by the time of the rebellion due to stagnant pay and provisions many did not even possess a mount when allowance was supposed to be sufficient for 3-6 horses. The reality was that this elite army was mostly part-time soldiers who did civilian work to survive and occasionally assembled for a lacklustre series of drills when called upon before being told to fight more akin to a militia army than the elite reserve it was supposed to be.[76]

Each Kusai had 5 battalions (2 for the Mongols) of 1,500 men and subdivided into 5 Niru of 300 though by 1851 most Niru did not number more than 150 or even more than 50 men. Despite this formal organisation reality was often much different with the Bannermen dispersed in various garrisons in various sizes with a force over 3,000 men being commanded by a Tartar-General who was the highest military ranked official in the Viceroyalty where he was stationed, garrisons between 1,000 and 3,000 were commanded by a Deputy-General and those smaller by a Commandant.[76]

Organisation of the Eight Banners 1851[76]
Subdivision name Number Ethnic composition Brief description
6 Capital divisions
Imperial Bodyguard 3,000 Manchu Ceremonial cavalry
Vanguard 1,500-2,000 Manchu and Mongol infantry
Flank division 15,000-16,000 Manchu and Mongol infantry and cavalry
Light division 3,000-4,000 Mongol and Chinese Chinese infantry

Mongolian cavalry

Firearms division 8,000 Manchu and Mongol organised into inner and outer units

inner for Beijing outer for field service

Paid force 66,000 8,250 Mongols

28,875 Manchus 28,875 Chinese

The only combat ready formation of the 6 divisions

predominantly cavalry with 7,000 matchlock men 100 sword and bucklermen and 100 artillerymen

Total 96,500-99,000
Foot force 23,200 15,000 Manchus

4,500 Mongols 3,700 Chinese

Beijing police force mostly infantry with a small

mounted matchlock security force

Imperial Mausolea force 1,250 Garrisoning the Imperial Maosoleum
Metropolitan Garrison 40,000 Garrisoning the 25 cities around Beijing
Yuanmingyuan force 5,800 Garrisoning the Old Summer Palace (also possessed

550 artillery pieces)

Provincial garrisons 80,750-83,250 25 garrisons in the provinces of varying sizes
Grand Total* 250,000

*In 1862 the Peking field force was founded consisting of 3,000 men

Army of the Green Standard edit

The army of the Green Standard was entirely non-manchu and despite its name functioned more akin to 18 provincial armies rather than a singular unified army. At the onset of the war the army was inefficient and militarily incapable due to various issues including a lack of training (a ying in Zhoushan having not trained in 8 years), opium usage, corruption and inadequate pay. Despite many concurrent rebellions in the 1850s many Green Standard formations remained chronically understrength many at only one-third strength, by the 1860s the situation improved and most units were at half-strength though it was common practice to hire vagabonds and peasants and enroll them when needed therefore the quality of the army did not increase.[76]

The Army of the Green Standard was divided into 3 types the garrison infantry, the infantry and the cavalry. In 1851 it was estimated that there were 321,900 garrison infantry, 194,800 infantry and 87,100 cavalry and 7,400 officers. In coastal provinces up to a third of the cavalry were actually shuiying or marines and not actual cavalry. The army was organised into Ying nominally of 500 but in reality varying from 50 to 1,000 men in size with a ying subdivided into 2 Shao (patrols) which were further subdivided into between 2 and 4 Si each with each Si containing a varied amount of Peng (squads). However, only 10% of the green standard army was active thus, of a total of over 600,000 only 60,000 or so were actively with the colours at any given point of time.[76]

Tuanlian edit

These were village militias primarily armed with spears, swords bows and eventually sporadically matchlocks as the rebellion progressed. These self-defense militias were primarily used for protecting the immediate territories their men were drawn from and would fight Qing or Taiping forces if needed. Each of the tuanlian possessed between 200 and 500 men in companies of 100 though it was not uncommon for several communities to combine their tuanlian to form a force of several thousand men. Urban regions had their own counterpart the Thou-ping.[76]

Self-Strengthening: military modernization edit

Main article: Self-Strengthening Movement
 
Several notable figures such as Zaitao, Zaixun, Xu Shichang, Sheng Xuanhuai, Zaizhen, and Yinchang

Although the Chinese invented gunpowder, and firearms had been in continual use in Chinese warfare since as far back as the Song dynasty, the advent of modern weaponry resulting from the European Industrial Revolution had rendered China's traditionally trained and equipped army and navy obsolete.

After the humiliating capture of Beijing and the sack of the Summer Palace in 1860, officials like Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and the Manchu Wenxiang made efforts to acquire advanced western weapons and copy western military organization.[77] Special brigades of Chinese soldiers equipped with modern rifles and commanded by foreign officers (one example is the Ever Victorious Army commanded by Frederick Townsend Ward and later Charles George Gordon) helped Zeng and Li to defeat the Taiping rebels.[77] Li Hongzhang's Huai Army also acquired western rifles and incorporated some western drills.[77] Meanwhile, in Beijing, Prince Gong and Wenxiang created an elite army, the "Peking Field Force", which was armed with Russian rifles and French cannon and drilled by British officers.[78] When this force of 2,500 bannermen defeated a bandit army more than ten times more numerous, they seemed to prove Wenxiang's point that a small but well-trained and well-equipped banner army would be sufficient to defend the capital in the future.[79]

One major emphasis of the reforms was to improve the weaponry of Chinese armies. In order to produce modern rifles, artillery, and ammunition, Zeng Guofan created an arsenal in Suzhou, which was moved to Shanghai and expanded into the Jiangnan Arsenal.[80] In 1866 the sophisticated Fuzhou Shipyard was created under the leadership of Zuo Zongtang, its focus being the building of modern warships for coastal defense.[80] From 1867 to 1874 it built fifteen new ships.[81] Other arsenals were created in Nanjing, Tianjin (it served as a major source of ammunition for northern Chinese armies in the 1870s and 1880s), Lanzhou (to support Zuo Zongtang's quelling of a large Muslim uprising in the northwest), Sichuan, and Shandong.[80] Prosper Giquel, a French naval officer who served as adviser at the Fuzhou Shipyard, wrote in 1872 that China was quickly becoming a formidable rival to western powers.[82]

Thanks to these reforms and improvements, the Qing government gained a major advantage over domestic rebels.[83] After vanquishing the Taiping in 1864, the newly equipped armies defeated the Nian Rebellion in 1868, the Guizhou Miao in 1873, the Panthay Rebellion in Yunnan in 1873, and in 1877 the massive Muslim uprising that had engulfed Xinjiang since 1862.[83] In addition to quelling domestic revolts, the Qing also fought foreign powers with relative success. Qing armies managed to solve the 1874 crisis with Japan over Taiwan diplomatically, forced the Russians out of the Ili River valley in 1881, and fought the French to a standstill in the Sino-French War of 1884–1885 despite many failures in naval warfare.[84]

 
Chinese infantry

Foreign observers reported that, when their training was complete, the troops stationed in the Wuchang garrison were the equal of contemporary European forces.[85] Mass media in the west during this era portrayed China as a rising military power due to its modernization programs and as a major threat to the western world, invoking fears that China would successfully conquer western colonies like Australia. Chinese armies were praised by John Russell Young, US envoy, who commented that "nothing seemed more perfect" in military capabilities, predicting a future confrontation between America and China."[86] The Russian military observer D. V. Putiatia visited China in 1888 and found that in Northeastern China (Manchuria) along the Chinese-Russian border, the Chinese soldiers were potentially able to become adept at "European tactics" under certain circumstances, and the Chinese soldiers were armed with modern weapons like Krupp artillery, Winchester carbines, and Mauser rifles.[87] On the eve of the First Sino-Japanese War, the German General Staff predicted a Japanese defeat and William Lang, who was a British advisor to the Chinese military, praised Chinese training, ships, guns, and fortifications, stating that "in the end, there is no doubt that Japan must be utterly crushed".[88]

The military improvements that resulted from modernizing reforms were substantial, but they still proved insufficient, as the Qing was soundly defeated by Meiji Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.[89] Even China's best troops the Huai Army and the Beiyang Fleet, both commanded by Li Hongzhang were no match for Japan's better-trained, better led, and faster army and navy.[90]

When it was first developed by Empress Dowager Cixi, the Beiyang Fleet was said to be the strongest navy in East Asia. Before her adopted son, Emperor Guangxu, took over the throne in 1889, Cixi wrote out explicit orders that the navy should continue to develop and expand gradually.[91] However, after Cixi went into retirement, all naval and military development came to a drastic halt. Japan's victories over China has often been falsely rumored to be the fault of Cixi.[92] Many believed that Cixi was the cause of the navy's defeat by embezzling funds from the navy in order to build the Summer Palace in Beijing. However, extensive research by Chinese historians revealed that Cixi was not the cause of the Chinese navy's decline. In actuality, China's defeat was caused by Emperor Guangxu's lack of interest in developing and maintaining the military.[91] His close adviser, Grand Tutor Weng Tonghe, advised Guangxu to cut all funding to the navy and army, because he did not see Japan as a true threat, and there were several natural disasters during the early 1890s which the emperor thought to be more pressing to expend funds on.[91]

The military defeats suffered by China has been attributed to the factionalism of regional military governors. For instance, the Beiyang Fleet refused to participate in the Sino-French War in 1884,[93] the Nanyang Fleet retaliating by refusing to deploy during the Sino-Japanese War of 1895.[94] Li Hongzhang wanted to personally maintain control of this fleet, many top vessels among its number, by keeping it in northern China and not let it slip into the control of southern factions.[95] China did not have a single admiralty in charge of all the Chinese navies before 1885;[96] the northern and southern Chinese navies did not cooperate, therefore enemy navies needed only to fight a segment of China's navy.[97]

In the mid-1880s the Green Standard was said to be some 447,876 men strong grouped into formations of varying sizes. Six units were below 1,000 men, 29 units between 2,000 and 3,000, 25 between 2,000 and 3,000, 20 between 3,000 and 4,000, 6 between 4,000 and 6,000, 4 units between 6,000 and 7,000, 1 unit between 8,000 and 9,000, 4 units between 9,000 and 10,000 and 1 unit over 10,000. With a further 31 units of an unspecified amount for a total of 127 units with an average of slightly above 3,500 per unit.[99]

First Sino-Japanese war edit

The below table has been later evaluated as having likely over estimated the Green Standard Army and underestimating the size of the trained army. However, it is impossible to obtain a complete and accurate record of the forces of the Qing dynasty on the eve on the conflict.[100]

According to Boulay the Chinese forces on the eve of the war counted just under 1,100,000 men strong but he notes that this is likely an overstatement and the force is likely smaller in practice.The Chinese trained forces in the war region totalled 92,390 infantry, 23,410 cavalry 7,010 artillerymen both field and garrison 1,090 mine troops (naval) and 1,130 boatmen for the various canals and rivers. The Artillery men were armed with 70mm and 80mm Krupp guns but their training was lacking especially in gunnery.[101]

*approximately 100,000 men of the trained army were simultaneously enrolled in the green standard[102]

An alternative figure is given Volpicelli:

 
Li Hongzhang commander of the Huai Army and Beiyang fleet the forces responsible for the majority of the fighting of the First Sino-Japanese war.

*There also existed a 170,000 strong Manchurian Army of which there were 12,000 trained infantry 1,500 trained cavalry and 60 guns. Divided equally between the 3 provinces giving each province 4,000 infantry 500 cavalry and 20 guns. This force being organised by Wu Dacheng in the late 1880s but no further training of the remaining 156,500 soldiers was conducted prior to the outbreak of war.[101][104]

The entire Qing army on the eve of the war therefore consisted of 974,641 soldiers (not including the Manchurian army or those on Taiwan). Jowett states that of the nearly 600,000 Green Standard soldiers only 50,000 had received modern training and firearms.[105] The table above does not include the garrison for Taiwan Esposito gives the garrison of Taiwan at 20 Brave battalions or 10,000 men on paper with an additional 14,000 green standard soldiers again on paper. Though during the war reinforcements from mainland China and native levies led to the growth of the strength of the forces on Taiwan to 50,000.[106] Zenone's account states that anywhere between 20,000 and 30,000 of the Metropolitan banners were actual soldiers with the ability to fight. Esposito states that 60% of the Banner army was cavalry.[107][108]

The Metropolitan Manchu Banner armies were also further subdivided but there are 2 differing accounts of the size and nature of the subdivision[106][103]

*In Esposito's account there was also 4,000 men of the Imperial Hunting establishment organised in a Tiger-Hunting battalion and operated as a shock force throughout the 19th century.

** In Esposito's account the Peking Field force was a unit where Bannermen were rotated through in order to receive modern training this being in addition to the core force of 7,250 the guns mentioned are also smoothbore guns.

 
Qing troops facing defeat during the Battle of Yingkou 1895.

During the period between the end of the Taiping Rebellion and the Beginning of the war the Qing government began a process of reform of the Green standard army. The Green Standard army was weak and scattered unable to mobilise men effectively as the payroll was inflated with non-existent soldiers and its soldiers were addicted to opium and gambling. The Qing government sought to recreate the Green Standard Army in a modern fashion with the creation of the 'Disciplined Forces' or Lien-chun. The Lien-Chun drew their men from the Green Standard but operated more like the Braves of the Hunan and Anhui armies. From 1885 onwards frequent Imperial Edicts recommended the reform of the entire Green Standard Army into Lien-Chun however little progress was made. In 1894 the Imperial government dictated that the Green Standard was for policing duties and counter-bandit operations whilst the Braves were for fighting rebellions.[109] The Qing government began a program of re-armament importing weaponry and producing its own weaponry in local arsenals in 1880 alone the Qing government imported 149 heavy and 275 field artillery pieces it also decided to import 26,000 Mauser 1871 rifles and standardise on this rifle in 1882 however this was never achieved. The Chinese government also purchased 151 Maxim guns between 1892 and 1895 and in 1890 the Tianjin arsenal was already producing maxim guns joined in 1892 by the Nanjing arsenal.[110][111] The estimates of the Board of Revenue and Board of War states that the effective strength of the Chinese army was 360,000 including the provincial militia, the defense army (the braves), the Lien-Chun and new style troops. The army during the war was slow to mobilise and move towards the fighting the lack of railways a key factor in this. Therefore, the fighting of the war fell almost entirely upon the forces already present in Manchuria Zhili and Shandong. The armies themselves were predominantly infantry and cavalry with artillery attached to the infantry with support services such as logistics, medical, engineer and signal not existing, hired labour conducted transportation of goods and basic engineering with some civilian workers who acred as quartermasters with some doctors at the rear. The supply of troops was generally left to the provinces in which they fought. This created a chaotic situation with some units being well-supplied with others being hardly supplied with ammunition being poorly distributed and this issue was only exacerbated by the lack of standardisation of weaponry amongst the soldiers. The government arsenals proved insufficient to support the entire Qing military and the government was forced to purchase equipment from abroad.[112] The key issues of the Chinese military was the decentralised command, the lack of specialised formations, the lack of modern training and the shortage of modern weaponry. However, the worst weakness was the severe incompetence at a senior level with basic strategy and tactics completely lacking, the Chinese high command repeatedly used the same basic tactic of a passive defense fortifying a position only for the Japanese to flank the position and rout them[109]

Late Qing armies edit

Main article: New Army
 
The Beiyang Army in conducting military exercises, 1910
 
The Qing New Army in 1905

Losing the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 was a watershed for the Qing government. Japan, a country long regarded by the Chinese as little more than an upstart nation of pirates, had convincingly beaten its larger neighbour and in the process annihilated the Qing government's pride and joy — its modernized Beiyang Fleet, then deemed to be the strongest naval force in Asia. In doing so, Japan became the first Asian country to join the previously exclusively western ranks of colonial powers. The defeat was a rude awakening to the Qing court especially when set in the context that it occurred a mere three decades after the Meiji Restoration set a feudal Japan on course to emulate the Western nations in their economic and technological achievements. Finally, in December 1894, the Qing government took concrete steps to reform military institutions and to re-train selected units in westernized drills, tactics and weaponry. These units were collectively called the New Army. The most successful of these was the Beiyang Army under the overall supervision and control of a former Huai Army commander, General Yuan Shikai, who used his position to eventually become President of the Republic of China and finally emperor of China.[113]

 
After the end of empire, Sichuan New Army leaving Lhasa in 1912.
 
The Qing New Army in 1911

During the Boxer Rebellion, Imperial Chinese forces deployed a weapon called "electric mines" on June 15, at the river Hai River before the Battle of Dagu Forts (1900), to prevent the western Eight-Nation Alliance from sending ships to attack. This was reported by American military intelligence in the United States. War Dept. by the United States. Adjutant-General's Office. Military Information Division.[114][115] Different Chinese armies were modernized to different degrees by the Qing dynasty. For example, during the Boxer Rebellion, in contrast to the Manchu and other Chinese soldiers who used arrows and bows, the Muslim Kansu Braves cavalry had the newest carbine rifles.[116] The Muslim Kansu Braves used the weaponry to inflict numerous defeats upon western armies in the Boxer Rebellion, in the Battle of Langfang, and, numerous other engagements around Tianjin.[117][118] The Times noted that "10,000 European troops were held in check by 15,000 Chinese braves". Chinese artillery fire caused a steady stream of casualties upon the western soldiers. During one engagement, heavy casualties were inflicted on the French and Japanese, and the British and Russians lost some men.[119] Chinese artillerymen during the battle also learned how to use their German bought Krupp artillery accurately, outperforming European gunners. The Chinese artillery shells slammed right on target into the western armies military areas.[120]

The military leaders and the armies formed in the late 19th century continued to dominate politics well into the 20th century. During what was called the Warlord Era (1916–1928) the late-Qing armies became rivals and fought among themselves and with new militarists.[121]

The Qing dynasty in their last series of reforms formed the New army divided into the Lujun (regular army) and the Xunfangdui (reserve/provincial troops). The Lujun was divided into 3 formations the Changbei jun which consisted of 36 divisions with 12,512 men in peacetime and over 21,000 in wartime with a service term of 3 years. The Xubei jun or first reserve with 36 divisions of 9,840 men with a service term of 4 years. The Houbei jun 36 divisions each of 4,960 men with a service term of 4 years.[122]

This gave a total army in wartime of 934,560 with 756,000 in 36 divisions of 21,512 (excluding camp followers) and 178,560 in 36 independent brigades.

 
Green Standard troops in the 1900s.

The Xunfangdui were organised per province with each province allowed to maintain 5 units either of 3,010 infantry or 1,890 cavalry or a mix of the as long as there are no more than a combined total of 5 infantry and cavalry units. Therefore, the 22 provinces could field a potential maximum of 331,100 (if they fielded all infantry) or a minimum of 207,900. The Xunfangdui would act as a gendarmerie in peacetime and auxiliary units to field units in wartime.[123]

The Green standard was divided into 75 groups each commanded by a Brigade-general with an additional 16 marine brigade-generals. Each brigade contained an unspecified number of regiments and each of these contained an unspecified amount of Ying (battalions) which each contained 500 infantry and 250 cavalry. If the Green standard conformed to the organisation of the Lujun each brigade contained 2 regiments which contained 3 battalions thus a brigade contained 6 battalions or 3,000 cavalry and 1,500 cavalry a total of 4,500, this would give a national total of 337,500 land troops and 72,000 marine troops (though marine troops were not marines in the traditional sense but also contained coastal defense troops and its cavalry was not mounted). This would give a total 273,000 infantry and 112,500 mounted cavalry and 24,000 unmounted cavalry.[124]

See also edit

Notes edit

  1. ^ Chinese: 紫禁城; pinyin: zǐjìnchéng; Ma:   Dabkūri dorgi hoton

References edit

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  92. ^ Chang, Jung (2013). The Concubine Who Launched Modern China: Empress Dowager Cixi. New York: Anchor Books. pp. 160–61. ISBN 978-0307456700.
  93. ^ Loir, M., L'escadre de l'amiral Courbet (Paris, 1886), 26–29, 37–65.
  94. ^ Lung Chang [龍章], Yueh-nan yu Chung-fa chan-cheng [越南與中法戰爭, Vietnam and the Sino-French War] (Taipei, 1993), 327–28.
  95. ^ Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795–1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 87. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. Not surprisingly, considering Li Hongzhang's political power, many of the best and most modern ships found their way into Li's northern fleet, which never saw any action in the Sino-French conflict. In fact, fear that he might lose control over his fleet led Li to refuse to even consider sending his ships southward to aid the Fuzhou fleet against the French. Although Li later claimed that moving his fleet southward would have left northern China undefended, his decision has been criticized as a sign of China's factionalized government as well as its provincial north-south mindset.
  96. ^ 姜文奎 (1987). 《中國歷代政制考》. 臺北市: 國立編譯館. pp. 839、840.
  97. ^ Bruce A. Elleman (2001). Modern Chinese warfare, 1795–1989 (illustrated ed.). Psychology Press. p. 87. ISBN 0-415-21474-2. Retrieved 2012-01-18. there was little, if any, coordination between the fleets in north and south China. The lack of a centralized admiralty commanding the entire navy meant that at any one time France opposed only a fraction of China's total fleet. This virtually assured French naval dominance in the upcoming conflict.
  98. ^ Hsieh, Pao Chao (2018). The Government of China, 1644-1911. London. pp. 213–214. ISBN 978-0-429-45550-6. OCLC 1050360672.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  99. ^ Hsieh, Pao Chao (2018). The Government of China, 1644-1911. London. p. 298. ISBN 978-0-429-45550-6. OCLC 1050360672.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  100. ^ Powell, Ralph L. (2016). Rise of the Chinese Military Power. Princeton, NJ. p. 46. ISBN 978-1-4008-7884-0. OCLC 1013941977.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  101. ^ a b c Du Boulay, N.W.H. (1896). An Epitome of the Chino-Japanese War, 1894-95. H.M. Stationery Office. pp. 10–11.
  102. ^ Olender, Piotr (2014). Sino-Japanese naval war : 1894-1895. Hampshire, England. p. 43. ISBN 978-83-63678-51-7. OCLC 889306207.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  103. ^ a b c Volpicelli, Zenone (1896). The China-Japan War: Compiled from Japanese, Chinese and Foreign Sources. UK: Charles Scribner's Sons. pp. 72–76.
  104. ^ Volcipelli, Zenone (1896). The China-Japan war; compiled from Japanese, Chinese and foreign sources (1st ed.). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. pp. 74–76. ISBN 978-9353955595.
  105. ^ Jowett, Philip S. (2016). Imperial Chinese armies 1840-1911. G. A. Embleton. Oxford. p. 11. ISBN 978-1-4728-1427-2. OCLC 948794129.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  106. ^ a b c Esposito, Gabriele (2022). Armies of the first Sino-Japanese War 1894-95. Giuseppe Rava. Oxford. p. 76. ISBN 978-1-4728-5130-7. OCLC 1350351894.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  107. ^ Volpicelli, Zenone (1896). The China-Japan war compiled from Japanese, Chinese and foreign sources (1st ed.). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. p. 71. ISBN 978-1163248065.
  108. ^ Esposito, Gabriele (2022). Armies of the first Sino-Japanese War 1894-95. Giuseppe Rava. Oxford. pp. 57–59. ISBN 978-1-4728-5133-8. OCLC 1346320458.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  109. ^ a b Powell, Ralph (1955). The rise of Chinese military power, 1895-1912. Princeton University press. pp. 40–47.
  110. ^ Esposito, Gabriele (2022). Armies of the First Sino-Japanese War 1894-95. Giuseppe Rava. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. pp. 65–66. ISBN 978-1-4728-5130-7. OCLC 1333082856.
  111. ^ Jowett, Philip S. (2016). Imperial Chinese armies 1840-1911. G. A. Embleton. Oxford. p. 21. ISBN 978-1-4728-1427-2. OCLC 948794129.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  112. ^ Powell, Ralph (1955). The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895-1912. Princeton University Press. pp. 36–40. ISBN 9780608308432.
  113. ^ Liu & Smith 1980, pp. 251–273.
  114. ^ Monro MacCloskey (1969). Reilly's Battery: a story of the Boxer Rebellion. R. Rosen Press. p. 95. ISBN 9780823901456. Retrieved February 19, 2011.
  115. ^ Stephan L'H. Slocum, Carl Reichmann, Adna Romanza Chaffee, United States. Adjutant-General's Office. Military Information Division (1901). Reports on military operations in South Africa and China. G.P.O. p. 533. Retrieved February 19, 2011. June 15, it was learned that the mouth of the river was protected by electric mines, that the forts at Taku were.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  116. ^ Diana Preston (2000). The boxer rebellion: the dramatic story of China's war on foreigners that shook the world in the summer of 1900. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. p. 145. ISBN 0-8027-1361-0. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
  117. ^ Elliott, Jane E. (2002), Some Did it for Civilisation, Some Did it for Their Country: A Revised View of the Boxer War, Chinese University Press, p. 204, ISBN 9789629960667.
  118. ^ Wood, Frances. . The British Library. Archived from the original on 2011-10-29. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
  119. ^ Arthur Henderson Smith (1901). China in convulsion, Volume 2. F. H. Revell Co. p. 448. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
  120. ^ Arthur Henderson Smith (1901). China in convulsion, Volume 2. F. H. Revell Co. p. 446. Retrieved 2010-06-28.
  121. ^ For an overview, see Edward L. Dreyer. China at War, 1901–1949. (London; New York: Longman, Modern Wars in Perspective, 1995). ISBN 0582051258.
  122. ^ Brunnert, H. S.; Hagelstrom, V. V. (2007). Present day political organization of China. London: Routledge. pp. 285–288. ISBN 978-0-7007-1018-8.
  123. ^ Brunnert, H. S.; Hagelstrom, V. V. (2007). Present day political organization of China. London: Routledge. pp. 308–309. ISBN 978-0-7007-1018-8.
  124. ^ Brunnert, H. S.; Hagelstrom, V. V. (2007). Present day political organization of China. London: Routledge. pp. 337–340. ISBN 978-0-7007-1018-8.

Works cited edit

  • Crossley, Pamela Kyle (1990), Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ISBN 0691055831.
  • —— (1997), The Manchus, Oxford: Blackwell, ISBN 1557865604 (hardback), ISBN 0631235914 (paperback).
  • —— (1999), A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, ISBN 0520215664.
  • Dreyer, Edward L. (2002), "Continuity and Change", in David A. Graff; Robin Higham (eds.), A Military History of China, Boulder, Colorado, and Oxford, England: Westview Press, pp. 19–38, ISBN 0813337364 (hardcover), ISBN 0813339901 (paperback).
  • Elliott, Mark C. (2001), The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, ISBN 978-1-134-36222-6.
  • Elman, Benjamin A. (2005), On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550–1900, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ISBN 0674016858.
  • Horowitz, Richard S. (2002), "Beyond the Marble Boat: The Transformation of the Chinese Military, 1850–1911", in David A. Graff; Robin Higham (eds.), A Military History of China, Boulder, Colorado, and Oxford, England: Westview Press, pp. 153–74, ISBN 0813337364 (hardcover), ISBN 0813339901 (paperback).
  • Liu, Kwang-ching; Smith, Richard J. (1980). "The Military Challenge: The North-west and the Coast". In Fairbank, John K.; Liu, Kwang-Ching (eds.). The Cambridge History of China, Volume 11: Late Ch'ing 1800–1911, Part 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-22029-3..
  • Lococo, Paul Jr. (2002), "The Qing Empire", in David A. Graff; Robin Higham (eds.), A Military History of China, Boulder, Colorado, and Oxford, England: Westview Press, pp. 115–33, ISBN 0813337364 (hardcover), ISBN 0813339901 (paperback).
  • Roth Li, Gertraude (2002). "State Building Before 1644". In Peterson, Willard J. (ed.). The Cambridge History of China, Volume 9: The Ch'ing Empire to 1800, Part One. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 9–72. ISBN 978-0-521-24334-6..
  • Wakeman, Frederic (1985), The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China, Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, ISBN 0520048040. In two volumes.
  • Waley-Cohen, Joanna (2006), The Culture of War in China: Empire and the Military under the Qing Dynasty, London: I.B. Tauris, International Library of War Studies, ISBN 1845111591.
  • Wright, Mary C. (1957), The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862–1874, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Further reading edit

  • Elleman, Bruce A. (2001), Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989, London and New York: Routledge, Warfare and History, ISBN 0415214734.
  • Graff, David A. and Robin D. S. Higham. A Military History of China. (Boulder, Colo. Oxford: Westview, 2002). ISBN 0813339901.
  • Hayford, Charles W. (2018). "New Chinese Military History, 1839–1951: What's the Story?". Frontiers of History in China. 13 (1): 90–126. doi:10.3868/s020-007-018-0006-0.
  • Li, Xiaobing, ed. (2012), China at War: An Encyclopedia, Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, ISBN 978-1-59884-415-3
  • Meyer-Fong, Tobie S (2013), What Remains: Coming to Terms with Civil War in 19th Century China, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, ISBN 9780804754255.
  • Perdue, Peter C. (2005), China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, ISBN 067401684X.
  • Platt, Stephen R. (2012), Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, the West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War, New York: Knopf, ISBN 9780307271730.
  • Setzekorn, Eric (2015). "Chinese Imperialism, Ethnic Cleansing, and Military History, 1850-1877". Journal of Chinese Military History. 4 (1): 80–100. doi:10.1163/22127453-12341278.
  • Yu, Maochun (2002), "The Taiping Rebellion: A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution", in David A. Graff; Robin Higham (eds.), A Military History of China, Boulder, Colorado, and Oxford, England: Westview Press, pp. 135–52, ISBN 0813337364 (hardcover), ISBN 0813339901 (paperback).

December 15, 2023
military, qing, dynasty, qing, dynasty, 1636, 1912, established, conquest, maintained, armed, force, founding, emperors, personally, organized, armies, continued, cultural, political, legitimacy, dynasty, depended, their, ability, defend, country, from, invasi. The Qing dynasty 1636 1912 was established by conquest and maintained by armed force The founding emperors personally organized and led the armies and the continued cultural and political legitimacy of the dynasty depended on their ability to defend the country from invasion and expand its territory Therefore military institutions leadership and finance were fundamental to the dynasty s initial success and ultimate decay The early military system centered on the Eight Banners a hybrid institution that also played social economic and political roles 1 The Banner system was developed on an informal basis as early as 1601 and formally established in 1615 by Jurchen leader Nurhaci 1559 1626 the retrospectively recognized founder of the Qing His son Hong Taiji 1592 1643 who renamed the Jurchens Manchus created eight Mongol banners to mirror the Manchu ones and eight Han martial 漢軍 Hanjun banners manned by Han troops who surrendered to the Qing before the full fledged conquest of China proper began in 1644 After 1644 the Ming troops that surrendered to the Qing were integrated into the Green Standard Army a corps that eventually outnumbered the Banners by three to one By the middle of the 18th century the military of the Qing dynasty numbered over 800 000 200 000 bannermen and 600 000 Green Standard troops 2 The Qianlong Emperor in ceremonial armour on horseback by Giuseppe Castiglione The use of gunpowder during the High Qing can compete with the three gunpowder empires in western Asia 3 Manchu imperial princes led the Banners in defeating the Ming armies but after lasting peace was established starting in 1683 both the Banners and the Green Standard Armies started to lose their efficiency Garrisoned in cities soldiers had few occasions to drill The Qing nonetheless used superior armament and logistics to expand deeply into Inner Asia defeat the Dzungar Mongols in 1759 and complete their conquest of Xinjiang Despite the dynasty s pride in the Ten Great Campaigns of the Qianlong Emperor r 1735 1796 the Qing armies became largely ineffective by the end of the 18th century It took almost ten years and huge financial waste to defeat the badly equipped White Lotus Rebellion 1795 1804 partly by legitimizing militias led by local Han elites The Taiping Rebellion 1850 1864 a large scale uprising that started in southern China marched to within miles of Beijing in 1853 The Qing court was forced to let its Han governors general first led by Zeng Guofan raise regional armies This new type of army and leadership defeated the rebels but signaled the end of Manchu dominance of the military establishment The military technology of the European Industrial Revolution made China s armament and military rapidly obsolete In 1860 British and French forces in the Second Opium War captured Beijing and sacked the Summer Palace The shaken court attempted to modernize its military and industrial institutions by buying European technology This Self Strengthening Movement established shipyards notably the Jiangnan Arsenal and the Foochow Arsenal and bought modern guns and battleships in Europe The Qing navy became the largest in East Asia but its organization and logistics were inadequate officer training was deficient and corruption widespread The Beiyang Fleet was virtually destroyed and the modernized ground forces defeated in the 1895 First Sino Japanese War The Qing created a New Army but could not prevent the Eight Nation Alliance from invading China to put down the Boxer Uprising in 1900 The revolt of a New Army corps in 1911 led to the fall of the dynasty Contents 1 Organization 1 1 Green Standard Army 1 2 Garrisons in peacetime 1 3 Navy 2 Eighteenth century 2 1 Technology 2 2 Taiping Rebellion 2 2 1 8 Banners 2 2 2 Army of the Green Standard 2 2 3 Tuanlian 3 Self Strengthening military modernization 4 First Sino Japanese war 5 Late Qing armies 6 See also 7 Notes 8 References 9 Works cited 10 Further readingOrganization editMain article Eight Banners nbsp Early Qing dynasty helmet mid to late 17th c nbsp Qing helmet 17th 18th c nbsp The Qianlong Emperor s Southern Inspection Tour Scroll Twelve Return to the Palace detail 1764 1770 by Xu Yang One of the keys to Nurhaci s successful unification of Jurchen tribes and his challenge to the Ming dynasty in the early seventeenth century was the formation of the Eight Banners a uniquely Manchu institution that was militarily efficient but also played economic social and political roles 4 As early as 1601 and possibly a few years earlier Nurhaci made his soldiers and their families register into permanent companies known as niru the same name as the smaller hunting parties in which Jurchen men traditionally joined to practice military operations and wage war 5 Sometime before 1607 these companies were themselves grouped into larger units called gusa or banners differentiated by colors yellow white red and blue 6 In 1615 a red border was added to each flag except for the red banner to which a white border was added to form a total of eight banners that Jurchen troops carried into battles 6 The banner system allowed Nurhaci s new state to absorb defeated Jurchen tribes simply by adding companies this integration in turn helped to reorganize Jurchen society beyond petty clan affiliations 7 As Qing power expanded north of the Great Wall the Banner system kept expanding too Soon after defeating the Chahar Mongols with the help of other Mongol tribes in 1635 Nurhaci s son and successor Hong Taiji incorporated his new Mongol subjects and allies into the Mongol Eight Banners which ran parallel to the original Manchu banners 8 Hong Taiji was more prudent in integrating Chinese troops 9 In 1629 he first created a Chinese army Manchu ᠨᡳᡴᠠᠨᠴᠣᠣᡥᠠ nikan cooha Chinese 漢軍 pinyin Hanjun of about 3000 men 10 In 1631 these Chinese units absorbed men that could build and operate European style cannon and were therefore renamed Heavy Troops M ujen cooha Chinese 重軍 pinyin Zhongjun 11 By 1633 they counted about 20 companies and 4 500 men fighting under black standards 11 These Chinese companies were grouped into two banners in 1637 four in 1639 and finally eight banners in 1642 8 These Hanjun banners are known as the Chinese or Chinese martial banners 12 Select groups of Han Chinese bannermen were mass transferred into Manchu Banners by the Qing changing their ethnicity from Han Chinese to Manchu Han Chinese bannermen of Tai Nikan 台尼堪 watchpost Chinese and Fusi Nikan 抚顺尼堪 Fushun Chinese 13 backgrounds merged into the Manchu banners in 1740 by order of the Qing Qianlong emperor 14 It was between 1618 and 1629 when the Han Chinese from Liaodong who later became the Fushun Nikan and Tai Nikan defected to the Jurchen Manchus 15 Manchu clans of Han Chinese origin continued to use their Han surnames and were marked as of Han origin on Qing lists of Manchu clans Manchu families adopted Han Chinese sons from families of bondservant Booi Aha baoyi origin and they served in Manchu company registers as detached household Manchus and the Qing imperial court found this out in 1729 Manchu bannermen who needed money helped falsify registration for Han Chinese servants being adopted into the Manchu banners and Manchu families who lacked sons were allowed to adopt their servants sons or the servants themselves 16 The Manchu families were paid to adopt Han Chinese sons from bondservant families by those families The Qing Imperial Guard captain Batu was furious at Manchus who adopted Han Chinese from slave and bondservant families in exchange for money and expressed his displeasure at them adopting Han Chinese instead of other Manchus 17 These Han Chinese who infiltrated the Manchu Banners by adoption were known as secondary status bannermen and false Manchus or separate register Manchus and there were eventually so many of them that they took over military positions in the Banners that would have been reserved for Manchus Han Chinese foster son and separate register bannermen made up 800 of 1 600 soldiers in the Mongol Banners and Manchu Banners of Hangzhou in 1740 which was nearly 50 Han Chinese foster sons made up 220 out of 1 600 unsalaried troops at Jingzhou in 1747 and an assortment of Han Chinese separate register Mongol and Manchu bannermen made up the remainder Han Chinese secondary status bannermen made up 180 of 3 600 troop households in Ningxia while Han Chinese separate registers made up 380 of 2 700 Manchu soldiers in Liangzhou Because Han Chinese Manchus filled up military positions few Manchus gained positions as soldiers in the Banner armies The Han Chinese were said to be good military troops and their marching and archery skills were up to par the Zhapu lieutenant general couldn t differentiate them from true Manchus in terms of military skills 18 Manchu Banners contained a lot of false Manchus who were from Han Chinese civilian families but were adopted by Manchu bannermen after the Yongzheng reign The Jingkou and Jiangning Mongol banners and Manchu Banners had 1 795 adopted Han Chinese and the Beijing Mongol Banners and Manchu Banners had 2 400 adopted Han Chinese in statistics taken from the 1821 census Despite Qing attempts to differentiate adopted Han Chinese from normal Manchu bannermen the differences between them became hazy 19 These adopted Han Chinese bondservants who managed to get themselves into Manchu banner roles were called kaihu ren 開戶人 in Chinese and dangse faksalaha urse in Manchu Other Manchus were called jingkini Manjusa The Manchus sent Han bannermen to fight against Koxinga s Ming loyalists in Fujian 20 The Qing carried out a seaban forcing people to evacuate the coast in order to deprive Koxinga s Ming loyalists of resources This led to a myth that it was because Manchus were afraid of water In Fujian Han Chinese bannermen were fighting on behalf of the Qing which disproves the claim that Manchus feared the water 21 A poem shows northern Han bannermen referring to the Tanka boat people living on the coast and rivers of Southern Fujian as barbarians 22 The banners in their order of precedence were as follows yellow bordered yellow white red bordered white bordered red blue and bordered blue The yellow bordered yellow and white banners were collectively known as the Upper Three Banners Chinese 上三旗 pinyin shang san qi and were under the direct command of the emperor Only Manchus belonging to the Upper Three Banners and selected Han Chinese who had passed the highest level of martial exams were qualified to serve as the emperor s personal bodyguards The remaining Banners were known as the Lower Five Banners Chinese 下五旗 pinyin xia wǔ qi and were commanded by hereditary Manchu princes descended from Nurhachi s immediate family known informally as the Iron Cap Princes In Nurhaci s era and the early Hong Taiij era these princes formed the Deliberative Council of Princes and Ministers as well as high command of the army citation needed Upper Three Banners nbsp Plain Yellow Banner nbsp Bordered Yellow Banner nbsp Plain White Banner Lower Five Banners nbsp Plain Red Banner nbsp Bordered White Banner nbsp Bordered Red Banner nbsp Plain Blue Banner nbsp Bordered Blue Banner Green Standard Army edit Main article Green Standard Army nbsp A Chinese Green Standard Army soldier nbsp Scale armour with lionhead shoulder guards Qing dynastyAfter the Qing captured Beijing in 1644 and rapidly gained control of large tracts of former Ming territory the relatively small Banner armies were further augmented by remnants of Ming forces that surrendered to the Qing Some of these troops were first accepted into the Chinese martial banners but after 1645 they were integrated a new military unit called the Green Standard Army named after the color of their battle pennants 23 The Qing created Chinese armies in the regions it conquered Green Standard armies were created in Shanxi Shaanxi Gansu and Jiangnan in 1645 in Fujian in 1650 in Lianguang Guangdong and Guangxi in 1651 in Guizhou in 1658 and in Yunnan in 1659 24 They maintained their Ming era ranks and were led by a mix of Banner and Green Standard officers 25 These Chinese troops eventually outnumbered Banner troops three to one about 600 000 Green Standard troops to 200 000 bannermen citation needed Even though the Manchu banners were the most effective fighting force during the Qing conquest of the Ming most of the fighting was done by Chinese banners and Green Standard troops especially in southern China where Manchu cavalry could play less of a role 26 The banners also performed badly during the revolt of the Three Feudatories that erupted in southern China in 1673 27 It was regular Chinese troops albeit led by Manchu and Chinese officers who helped the Qing to defeat their enemies in 1681 and thus consolidate their control over all of China 27 Green Standard troops also formed the main personnel of the naval forces that defeated the Southern Ming dynasty resistance in Taiwan 28 The Banners and Green Standard troops were standing armies paid for by the central government In addition regional governors from provincial down to village level maintained their own irregular local militias for police duties and disaster relief These militias were usually granted small annual stipends from regional coffers for part time service obligations The Qing divided the command structure of the Green Standard Army in the provinces between the high ranking officers and low ranking officers the best and strongest unit was under the control of the highest ranking officers but at the same time these units were outnumbered by other units divided between individual lower ranking officers so none of them could revolt on their own against the Qing because they did not control the entire armies 29 Manchu generals and bannermen were initially put to shame by the better performance of the Han Chinese Green Standard Army who fought better than them against the rebels and this was noted by the Kangxi Emperor leading him to task Generals Sun Sike Wang Jinbao and Zhao Liangdong to lead Green Standard soldiers to crush the rebels 30 The Qing thought that Han Chinese were superior at battling other Han people and so used the Green Standard Army as the dominant and majority army for crushing the rebels instead of bannermen 31 In northwestern China against Wang Fuchen the Qing put bannermen in the rear as reserves while they used Han Chinese Green Standard Army soldiers and Han Chinese generals like Zhang Liangdong Wang Jinbao and Zhang Yong as the primary military forces considering Han troops as better at fighting other Han people and these Han generals achieved victory over the rebels 32 Sichuan and southern Shaanxi were retaken by the Han Chinese Green Standard Army under Wang Jinbao and Zhao Liangdong in 1680 with Manchus only participating in dealing with logistics and provisions 33 400 000 Green Standard Army soldiers and 150 000 Bannermen served on the Qing side during the war 33 213 Han Chinese Banner companies and 527 companies of Mongol and Manchu Banners were mobilized by the Qing during the revolt 34 The Qing had the support of the majority of Han Chinese soldiers and Han elite against the Three Feudatories since they refused to join Wu Sangui in the revolt while the Eight Banners and Manchu officers fared poorly against Wu Sangui so the Qing responded with using a massive army of more than 900 000 Han Chinese non Banner instead of the Eight Banners to fight and crush the Three Feudatories 35 Wu Sangui s forces were crushed by the Green Standard Army made out of defected Ming soldiers 36 The frontier in the south west was extended slowly In 1701 the Qing defeated Tibetans at the Battle of Dartsedo The Dzungar Khanate conquered the Uyghurs in the Dzungar conquest of Altishahr and seized control of Tibet Han Chinese Green Standard Army soldiers and Manchu bannermen were commanded by the Han Chinese General Yue Zhongqi in the Chinese expedition to Tibet 1720 which expelled the Dzungars from Tibet and placed it under Qing rule At multiple places such as Lhasa Batang Dartsendo Lhari Chamdo and Litang Green Standard troops were garrisoned throughout the Dzungar war 37 Green Standard Army troops and Manchu bannermen were both part of the Qing force who fought in Tibet in the war against the Dzungars 38 It was said that the Sichuan commander Yue Zhongqi a descendant of Yue Fei entered Lhasa first when the 2 000 Green Standard soldiers and 1 000 Manchu soldiers of the Sichuan route seized Lhasa 39 According to Mark C Elliott after 1728 the Qing used Green Standard Army troops to man the garrison in Lhasa rather than bannermen 40 According to Evelyn S Rawski both Green Standard Army and bannermen made up the Qing garrison in Tibet 41 According to Sabine Dabringhaus Green Standard Chinese soldiers numbering more than 1 300 were stationed by the Qing in Tibet to support the 3 000 strong Tibetan army 42 Garrisons in peacetime edit nbsp A late Qing woodblock print representing the Yangzhou massacre of May 1645 By the late 19th century the massacre was used by anti Qing revolutionaries to arouse anti Manchu sentiment among the population Banner armies were broadly divided along ethnic lines namely Manchu and Mongol although the ethnic composition of Manchu banners was far from homogeneous as they included non Manchu bondservants registered under the household of their Manchu masters As the war with the Ming dynasty progressed and the Han Chinese population under Manchu rule increased Hong Taiji created a separate branch of Han Banners to draw on this new source of manpower The Six Ministries and other major positions were filled with Han Bannermen chosen by the Qing 43 It was Han Chinese bannermen who were responsible for the successful Qing takeover of China They made up the majority of governors in the early Qing and were the ones who governed and administered China after the conquest stabilizing Qing rule 44 Han bannermen dominated governor general posts in the time of the Shunzhi and Kangxi Emperors as well as governor posts largely excluding ordinary Han civilians 45 The political barrier was between non bannermen and the conquest elite of bannermen whether Han Chinese Mongols or Manchu It was not ethnicity which was the factor 46 The social origins of the Banner system meant that the population of each branch and their sub divisions was hereditary and rigid Only under special circumstances sanctioned by imperial edict was miscegenation between banners permitted In contrast the Green Standard Army was originally intended to be a professional force After defeating the remnants of the Ming forces the Manchu Banner Army approximately 200 000 strong at the time was evenly divided half was designated the Forbidden Eight Banner Army Chinese 禁旅八旗 pinyin jinlǚ baqi and was stationed in Beijing It served both as the capital s garrison and the Qing government s main strike force The remainder of the Banner troops were distributed to guard key cities in China These were known as the Territorial Eight Banner Army simplified Chinese 驻防八旗 traditional Chinese 駐防八旗 pinyin zhufang baqi The Manchu court keenly aware its own minority status reinforced a strict policy of racial segregation between the Manchus and Mongols from Han Chinese for fear of being sinicized by the latter This policy applied directly to the banner garrisons most of which occupied a separate walled zone within the cities where they were stationed In cities where there were limitations of space such as in Qingzhou a new fortified town was purposely erected to house the banner garrison and their families Beijing being the imperial seat the regent Dorgon had the entire Chinese population forcibly relocated to the southern suburbs which became known as the Outer Citadel Chinese 外城 pinyin waicheng The northern walled city called Inner Citadel Chinese 內城 pinyin neicheng was portioned out to the remaining Manchu Eight Banners each responsible for guarding a section of the Inner Citadel surrounding the Forbidden City palace complex a citation needed Military training was undertaken by martial artists in the Qing armed forces 47 Associations for martial arts were joined by Manchu bannermen in Beijing 48 A hall for martial arts was where the military careers of Muslim generals Ma Fulu and Ma Fuxiang started in Hezhou 49 Soldiers and officers in the Qing army were taught by the Muslim martial arts instructor Wang Zi Ping before he fought in the Boxer rebellion Another teacher of martial arts of the military in Beijing was Wang Xiang Zhai 50 The army martial arts trainers imhad to deal with a massive assortment of different armaments such as spears and swords 51 Gunpowder weaponry had been long used by China so the idea that melee combat in China was replaced out of thin air by western guns is a myth 52 Cavalry were also taught martial arts Martial arts were part of the exams for military officers 53 Martial artists were among those who migrated into cities from the countryside 54 The Qing and Ming military drew on the Shaolin tradition 55 Techniques and armaments cross fertilized across the army and civilian realms 56 The army included trainers in martial arts from the Taoists 57 The Taiping military had martial artists 58 Navy edit See also Imperial Chinese Navy nbsp Fujian fleet in the Taiwan StraitThe sea ban policy during the early Qing dynasty meant that the development of naval power stagnated River and coastal naval defence was the responsibility of the waterborne units of the Green Standard Army which were based at Jingkou now Zhenjiang and Hangzhou In 1661 a naval unit was established at Jilin to defend against Russian incursions into Manchuria Naval units were also added to various banner garrisons subsequently referred to collectively as the Eight Banners Navy In 1677 the Qing court re established the Fujian Fleet in order to combat the Ming loyalist Kingdom of Tungning based on Taiwan This conflict culminated in the Qing victory at the Battle of Penghu in 1683 and the surrender of the Tungning shortly after the battle The Qing like the Ming placed considerable importance on the building of a strong navy However unlike the Europeans they did not perceive the need to dominate the open ocean and hence monopolise trade and instead focused on defending by means of patrols their inner sea space The Qing demarcated and controlled their inner seas in the same manner as land territory 59 The Kangxi Emperor and his successors established a four zone sea defence system consisting of the Bohai Gulf Dengzhou fleet Jiaozhou fleet Lushun fleet and Tianjin Daigu fleet Jiangsu Zhejiang coast Jiangnan fleet and Zhejiang fleet Taiwan Strait Fujian fleet and the Guangdong coast Guangdong Governor s fleet and Guangdong regular fleet The fleets were supported by a chain of coastal artillery batteries along the coast and water castles or naval bases Qing warships of the Kangxi era had a crew of 40 seamen and were armed with cannons and wall guns of Dutch design 60 Although the Qing had invested in naval defences for their adjacent seas in earlier periods after the death of the Qianlong Emperor in 1799 the navy decayed as more attention was directed to suppressing the Miao Rebellion and White Lotus Rebellion which left the Qing treasury bankrupt The remaining naval forces were badly overstretched undermanned underfunded and uncoordinated 61 Eighteenth century edit nbsp Mail armour Qing dynastySee also Ten Great Campaigns The policy of posting banner troops as territorial garrison was not to protect but to inspire awe in the subjugated populace at their expertise as cavalry As a result after a century of peace and lack of field training the Manchu Banner troops had deteriorated greatly in their combat worthiness Secondly before the conquest the Manchu banner was a citizen army and its members were Manchu farmers and herders obligated to provide military service to the state in times of war The Qing government s decision to turn the banner troops into a professional force whose every welfare and need was met by state coffers brought wealth and with it corruption to the rank and file of the Manchu banners and hastened its decline as a fighting force Bannermen frequently went into debt as a result of drinking gambling and spending time at theaters and brothels leading to a general ban on theater going within the Eight Banners 62 nbsp A battle between Qing troops and Uyghur Khojas near Lake Eshilkul in 1759 At the same time a similar decline was occurring in the Green Standard Army In peacetime soldiering became merely a source of supplementary income Soldiers and commanders alike neglected training in pursuit of their own economic gains Corruption was rampant as regional unit commanders submitted pay and supply requisitions based on exaggerated head counts to the quartermaster department and pocketed the difference When Green Standard troops proved unable to fire their guns accurately while suppressing a rebellion of White Lotus followers under Wang Lun in 1774 the governor general blamed the failure on enemy magic prompting a furious reply from the Qianlong Emperor in which he described incompetence with firearms as a common and pervasive disease of the Green Standard Army whose gunners were full of excuses 63 Qing emperors attempted to reverse the decline of the military through a variety of means Although it was under the Qianlong Emperor that the empire expanded to its greatest extent the emperor and his officers frequently made note of the decline of martial discipline among the troops 64 65 Qianlong reinstituted the annual hunt at Mulan as a form of military training Thousands of troops participated in these massive exercises selected from among Eight Banners troops of both the capital and the garrisons 66 Qianlong also promoted military culture directing his court painters to produce a large number of works on military themes including victories in battle the grand inspections of the army and the imperial hunt at Mulan 67 Technology edit nbsp Mounted soldier with musketQing armies in the eighteenth century may not have been as well armed as their European counterparts but under pressure from the imperial throne they proved capable of innovation and efficiency sometimes in difficult circumstances The Qing were consistently very keen on adopting Western military technology In the Second Jinchuan War for instance the Qianlong emperor despatched the Jesuit Felix da Rocha the director of the Bureau of Astronomy to the front to cast heavy field cannon that could not be transported to the deep mountains in which the Jinchuan tribes lived 68 The Qing army produced new cannons based on the designs supplied by the Jesuit Missionaries Ferdinand Verbiest in the 1670s and Felix da Rocha in the 1770s These cannon designs continued to be reproduced in China until the First Opium War 69 Shi Lang s fleet to crush the Ming resistance in Taiwan incorporated Dutch naval technology 70 The Qing dynasty established the Firearm Battalion or Huoqiying as one of the elite military divisions stationed around the capital Beijing It was a special force that incorporated all the musket and cannon specialists previously subordinated to the Eight Banners 71 Its role was similar to the Shenjiying of the Ming dynasty The entire Firearm Battalion practiced firearms training and the firearms they practiced include shotguns and large cannons Composed of Eight Banners soldiers it was responsible for guarding the imperial city of Beijing The Qing court restricted the usage of firearms at times Fishing boats and coastal vessels were forbidden from using them and firearms were reserved for hunting only Manchu leaders tried to prevent Han Chinese military divisions from using the most powerful handguns while reserving them for Manchu units In 1778 the Qianlong Emperor criticized the governor of Shandong Province for training militia in the use of firearms The Manchus themselves appeared to have spent more time practicing with the bow than with firearms It is suggested that this was due to the traditional role of archery in Manchu culture 72 nbsp The Eight Banners army armed with bow and arrow going to into battle against Dzungar forces armed with firearmsIt is estimated that 30 to 40 of Chinese soldiers at the time of the First Opium War were equipped with firearms typically matchlock muskets 73 nbsp General Zeng GuofanEarly during the Taiping Rebellion Qing forces suffered a series of disastrous defeats culminating in the loss of the regional capital city of Nanjing in 1853 The rebels massacred the entire Manchu garrison and their families in the city and made it their capital 74 Shortly thereafter a Taiping expeditionary force penetrated as far north as the suburbs of Tianjin in what was considered the imperial heartlands In desperation the Qing court ordered a Chinese mandarin Zeng Guofan to organize regional simplified Chinese 团勇 traditional Chinese 團勇 pinyin tuanyǒng and village simplified Chinese 乡勇 traditional Chinese 鄉勇 pinyin xiangyǒng militias into a standing army called tuanlian to contain the rebellion Zeng Guofan s strategy was to rely on local gentries to raise a new type of military organization from those provinces that the Taiping rebels directly threatened This new force became known as the Xiang Army named after the Hunan region where it was raised The Xiang Army was a hybrid of local militia and a standing army It was given professional training but was paid for out of regional coffers and funds its commanders mostly members of the Chinese gentry could muster The Xiang Army and its successor the Huai Army created by Zeng Guofan s colleague and student Li Hongzhang were collectively called the Yong Ying Brave Camp 75 Before forming and commanding the Xiang Army Zeng Guofan had no military experience Being a classically educated Mandarin his blueprint for the Xiang Army was taken from a historical source the Ming general Qi Jiguang who because of the weakness of regular Ming troops had decided to form his own private army to repel raiding Japanese pirates in the mid 16th century Qi Jiguang s doctrine was based on Neo Confucian ideas of binding troops loyalty to their immediate superiors and also to the regions in which they were raised This initially gave the troops an excellent esprit de corps Qi Jiguang s army was an ad hoc solution to the specific problem of combating pirates as was Zeng Guofan s original intention for the Xiang Army which was raise to eradicate the Taiping rebels However circumstances led to the Yongying system becoming a permanent institution within the Qing military which in the long run created problems of its own for the beleaguered central government nbsp In 1894 1895 fighting over influence in Korea Japanese troops defeated Qing forces First the Yongying system signaled the end of Manchu dominance in Qing military establishment Although the Banners and Green Standard armies lingered on as parasites depleting resources henceforth the Yongying corps became the Qing government s de facto first line troops Secondly the Yongying corps were financed through provincial coffers and were led by regional commanders This devolution of power weakened the central government s grip on the whole country a weakness further aggravated by foreign powers vying to carve up autonomous colonial territories in different parts of the Qing Empire in the later half of the 19th century Despite these serious negative effects the measure was deemed necessary as tax revenue from provinces occupied and threatened by rebels had ceased to reach the cash strapped central government Finally the nature of Yongying command structure fostered nepotism and cronyism amongst its commanders whom as they ascended the bureaucratic ranks laid the seeds to Qing s eventual demise and the outbreak of regional warlordism in China during the first half of the 20th century 75 By the late 19th century China was fast descending into a semi colonial state Even the most conservative elements within the Qing court could no longer ignore China s military weakness in contrast to the foreign barbarians literally beating down its gates In 1860 during the Second Opium War the capital Beijing was captured and the Summer Palace sacked by a relatively small Anglo French coalition force numbering 25 000 Taiping Rebellion edit 8 Banners edit The 8 banners were officially organised into 24 kusai with each banner containing 1 Kusai each of Mongol Manchu and Han though the Manchus cosisted of 75 of the personnel by the time of the rebellion due to stagnant pay and provisions many did not even possess a mount when allowance was supposed to be sufficient for 3 6 horses The reality was that this elite army was mostly part time soldiers who did civilian work to survive and occasionally assembled for a lacklustre series of drills when called upon before being told to fight more akin to a militia army than the elite reserve it was supposed to be 76 Each Kusai had 5 battalions 2 for the Mongols of 1 500 men and subdivided into 5 Niru of 300 though by 1851 most Niru did not number more than 150 or even more than 50 men Despite this formal organisation reality was often much different with the Bannermen dispersed in various garrisons in various sizes with a force over 3 000 men being commanded by a Tartar General who was the highest military ranked official in the Viceroyalty where he was stationed garrisons between 1 000 and 3 000 were commanded by a Deputy General and those smaller by a Commandant 76 Organisation of the Eight Banners 1851 76 Subdivision name Number Ethnic composition Brief description6 Capital divisionsImperial Bodyguard 3 000 Manchu Ceremonial cavalryVanguard 1 500 2 000 Manchu and Mongol infantryFlank division 15 000 16 000 Manchu and Mongol infantry and cavalryLight division 3 000 4 000 Mongol and Chinese Chinese infantry Mongolian cavalryFirearms division 8 000 Manchu and Mongol organised into inner and outer units inner for Beijing outer for field servicePaid force 66 000 8 250 Mongols 28 875 Manchus 28 875 Chinese The only combat ready formation of the 6 divisions predominantly cavalry with 7 000 matchlock men 100 sword and bucklermen and 100 artillerymenTotal 96 500 99 000Foot force 23 200 15 000 Manchus 4 500 Mongols 3 700 Chinese Beijing police force mostly infantry with a small mounted matchlock security forceImperial Mausolea force 1 250 Garrisoning the Imperial MaosoleumMetropolitan Garrison 40 000 Garrisoning the 25 cities around BeijingYuanmingyuan force 5 800 Garrisoning the Old Summer Palace also possessed 550 artillery pieces Provincial garrisons 80 750 83 250 25 garrisons in the provinces of varying sizesGrand Total 250 000 In 1862 the Peking field force was founded consisting of 3 000 men Army of the Green Standard edit The army of the Green Standard was entirely non manchu and despite its name functioned more akin to 18 provincial armies rather than a singular unified army At the onset of the war the army was inefficient and militarily incapable due to various issues including a lack of training a ying in Zhoushan having not trained in 8 years opium usage corruption and inadequate pay Despite many concurrent rebellions in the 1850s many Green Standard formations remained chronically understrength many at only one third strength by the 1860s the situation improved and most units were at half strength though it was common practice to hire vagabonds and peasants and enroll them when needed therefore the quality of the army did not increase 76 The Army of the Green Standard was divided into 3 types the garrison infantry the infantry and the cavalry In 1851 it was estimated that there were 321 900 garrison infantry 194 800 infantry and 87 100 cavalry and 7 400 officers In coastal provinces up to a third of the cavalry were actually shuiying or marines and not actual cavalry The army was organised into Ying nominally of 500 but in reality varying from 50 to 1 000 men in size with a ying subdivided into 2 Shao patrols which were further subdivided into between 2 and 4 Si each with each Si containing a varied amount of Peng squads However only 10 of the green standard army was active thus of a total of over 600 000 only 60 000 or so were actively with the colours at any given point of time 76 Tuanlian edit These were village militias primarily armed with spears swords bows and eventually sporadically matchlocks as the rebellion progressed These self defense militias were primarily used for protecting the immediate territories their men were drawn from and would fight Qing or Taiping forces if needed Each of the tuanlian possessed between 200 and 500 men in companies of 100 though it was not uncommon for several communities to combine their tuanlian to form a force of several thousand men Urban regions had their own counterpart the Thou ping 76 Self Strengthening military modernization editMain article Self Strengthening Movement nbsp Several notable figures such as Zaitao Zaixun Xu Shichang Sheng Xuanhuai Zaizhen and YinchangAlthough the Chinese invented gunpowder and firearms had been in continual use in Chinese warfare since as far back as the Song dynasty the advent of modern weaponry resulting from the European Industrial Revolution had rendered China s traditionally trained and equipped army and navy obsolete After the humiliating capture of Beijing and the sack of the Summer Palace in 1860 officials like Zeng Guofan Li Hongzhang and the Manchu Wenxiang made efforts to acquire advanced western weapons and copy western military organization 77 Special brigades of Chinese soldiers equipped with modern rifles and commanded by foreign officers one example is the Ever Victorious Army commanded by Frederick Townsend Ward and later Charles George Gordon helped Zeng and Li to defeat the Taiping rebels 77 Li Hongzhang s Huai Army also acquired western rifles and incorporated some western drills 77 Meanwhile in Beijing Prince Gong and Wenxiang created an elite army the Peking Field Force which was armed with Russian rifles and French cannon and drilled by British officers 78 When this force of 2 500 bannermen defeated a bandit army more than ten times more numerous they seemed to prove Wenxiang s point that a small but well trained and well equipped banner army would be sufficient to defend the capital in the future 79 One major emphasis of the reforms was to improve the weaponry of Chinese armies In order to produce modern rifles artillery and ammunition Zeng Guofan created an arsenal in Suzhou which was moved to Shanghai and expanded into the Jiangnan Arsenal 80 In 1866 the sophisticated Fuzhou Shipyard was created under the leadership of Zuo Zongtang its focus being the building of modern warships for coastal defense 80 From 1867 to 1874 it built fifteen new ships 81 Other arsenals were created in Nanjing Tianjin it served as a major source of ammunition for northern Chinese armies in the 1870s and 1880s Lanzhou to support Zuo Zongtang s quelling of a large Muslim uprising in the northwest Sichuan and Shandong 80 Prosper Giquel a French naval officer who served as adviser at the Fuzhou Shipyard wrote in 1872 that China was quickly becoming a formidable rival to western powers 82 Thanks to these reforms and improvements the Qing government gained a major advantage over domestic rebels 83 After vanquishing the Taiping in 1864 the newly equipped armies defeated the Nian Rebellion in 1868 the Guizhou Miao in 1873 the Panthay Rebellion in Yunnan in 1873 and in 1877 the massive Muslim uprising that had engulfed Xinjiang since 1862 83 In addition to quelling domestic revolts the Qing also fought foreign powers with relative success Qing armies managed to solve the 1874 crisis with Japan over Taiwan diplomatically forced the Russians out of the Ili River valley in 1881 and fought the French to a standstill in the Sino French War of 1884 1885 despite many failures in naval warfare 84 nbsp Chinese infantryForeign observers reported that when their training was complete the troops stationed in the Wuchang garrison were the equal of contemporary European forces 85 Mass media in the west during this era portrayed China as a rising military power due to its modernization programs and as a major threat to the western world invoking fears that China would successfully conquer western colonies like Australia Chinese armies were praised by John Russell Young US envoy who commented that nothing seemed more perfect in military capabilities predicting a future confrontation between America and China 86 The Russian military observer D V Putiatia visited China in 1888 and found that in Northeastern China Manchuria along the Chinese Russian border the Chinese soldiers were potentially able to become adept at European tactics under certain circumstances and the Chinese soldiers were armed with modern weapons like Krupp artillery Winchester carbines and Mauser rifles 87 On the eve of the First Sino Japanese War the German General Staff predicted a Japanese defeat and William Lang who was a British advisor to the Chinese military praised Chinese training ships guns and fortifications stating that in the end there is no doubt that Japan must be utterly crushed 88 The military improvements that resulted from modernizing reforms were substantial but they still proved insufficient as the Qing was soundly defeated by Meiji Japan in the Sino Japanese War of 1894 1895 89 Even China s best troops the Huai Army and the Beiyang Fleet both commanded by Li Hongzhang were no match for Japan s better trained better led and faster army and navy 90 When it was first developed by Empress Dowager Cixi the Beiyang Fleet was said to be the strongest navy in East Asia Before her adopted son Emperor Guangxu took over the throne in 1889 Cixi wrote out explicit orders that the navy should continue to develop and expand gradually 91 However after Cixi went into retirement all naval and military development came to a drastic halt Japan s victories over China has often been falsely rumored to be the fault of Cixi 92 Many believed that Cixi was the cause of the navy s defeat by embezzling funds from the navy in order to build the Summer Palace in Beijing However extensive research by Chinese historians revealed that Cixi was not the cause of the Chinese navy s decline In actuality China s defeat was caused by Emperor Guangxu s lack of interest in developing and maintaining the military 91 His close adviser Grand Tutor Weng Tonghe advised Guangxu to cut all funding to the navy and army because he did not see Japan as a true threat and there were several natural disasters during the early 1890s which the emperor thought to be more pressing to expend funds on 91 The military defeats suffered by China has been attributed to the factionalism of regional military governors For instance the Beiyang Fleet refused to participate in the Sino French War in 1884 93 the Nanyang Fleet retaliating by refusing to deploy during the Sino Japanese War of 1895 94 Li Hongzhang wanted to personally maintain control of this fleet many top vessels among its number by keeping it in northern China and not let it slip into the control of southern factions 95 China did not have a single admiralty in charge of all the Chinese navies before 1885 96 the northern and southern Chinese navies did not cooperate therefore enemy navies needed only to fight a segment of China s navy 97 Expenditure on military forces 1885 98 Location Bannermen Green Standard TotalZhili 1 321 953 1 321 953Liaoning given as Fengtian 641 991 641 991Jilin 432 173 432 173Heilongjiang 331 127 331 127Shandong 110 262 361 348 471 610Shanxi 273 484 389 740 663 224Henan 119 188 289 223 408 411Jiangsu 317 250 578 664 895 914Anhui 197 198 197 198Jiangxi 225 166 225 166Fujian 125 564 851 740 1 007 034Zhejiang 153 904 692 125 846 029Hubei 319 023 286 000 605 023Hunan 425 047 425 047Shaanxi 357 856 208 259 566 125Xinjiang 449 203 1 568 039 2 017 242Sichuan 952 329 952 239Guangdong 168 702 1 115 777 1 284 479Guangxi 205 768 205 768Yunnan 355 664 355 664Guizhou 491 537 491 537Total 4 006 411 10 886 904 14 913 215In the mid 1880s the Green Standard was said to be some 447 876 men strong grouped into formations of varying sizes Six units were below 1 000 men 29 units between 2 000 and 3 000 25 between 2 000 and 3 000 20 between 3 000 and 4 000 6 between 4 000 and 6 000 4 units between 6 000 and 7 000 1 unit between 8 000 and 9 000 4 units between 9 000 and 10 000 and 1 unit over 10 000 With a further 31 units of an unspecified amount for a total of 127 units with an average of slightly above 3 500 per unit 99 First Sino Japanese war editThis section may require copy editing January 2023 Learn how and when to remove this template message The below table has been later evaluated as having likely over estimated the Green Standard Army and underestimating the size of the trained army However it is impossible to obtain a complete and accurate record of the forces of the Qing dynasty on the eve on the conflict 100 According to Boulay the Chinese forces on the eve of the war counted just under 1 100 000 men strong but he notes that this is likely an overstatement and the force is likely smaller in practice The Chinese trained forces in the war region totalled 92 390 infantry 23 410 cavalry 7 010 artillerymen both field and garrison 1 090 mine troops naval and 1 130 boatmen for the various canals and rivers The Artillery men were armed with 70mm and 80mm Krupp guns but their training was lacking especially in gunnery 101 The Distribution and Strength of the army in the Zone of operations and elsewhere 101 Location Bannermen Green Standard Trained men braves and Green standard TotalBeijing 125 610 10 000 28 720 163 340Coastal Zhili 1 070 8 090 28 150 37 310Interior Zhili 17 040 16 280 10 560 43 880Zhili Total 143 270 34 370 66 980 244 260Coastal Shandong 0 3 620 9 130 12 750Interior Shandong 2 510 13 770 9 270 23 550Total Shandong 2 510 17 390 18 400 38 300Coastal Shengjing Liaoning 4 170 0 15 160 19 330Interior Shengjing Liaoning 11 880 0 7 150 19 030Total Shengjing Liaoning 16 050 0 22 310 38 360Total Heilongjiang 8 080 0 8 040 16 120Total Jilin 10 400 0 9 300 19 700Total Manchuria 34 530 0 39 470 74 180Total Zhili Shandong and Manchuria 180 310 51 760 125 030 357 100Total rest of China 145 290 305 390 283 800 734 480Total whole empire 325 600 357 150 408 830 1 091 580 approximately 100 000 men of the trained army were simultaneously enrolled in the green standard 102 An alternative figure is given Volpicelli The Distribution and Strength of Qing forces in 1894 103 Provinces Banner Army Green Standard Army Braves Trained ArmyZhili 162 646 47 138 22 700 4 000Shanxi 4 149 26 288 5 700Shandong 2 405 25 406 6 500Henan 1 011 8 943 4 500 5 000Jiangsu and Anhui 6 539 46 840 27 100Jiangxi 11 074Zhejiang 4 055 37 546 2 850Fujian 2 781 62 573 5 500Guangdong 5 356 69 015 3 000Guangxi 11 535 3 000Sichuan 2 065 34 790 12 900Hubei 5 842 22 603 6 000Hunan 26 470Shaanxi 6 719 43 261Gansu 5 791 43 519Yunnan 36 110Guizhou 30 613Shengjing 19 952Jilin 10 712Amur 11 661Xinjiang 15 548 15 295Total 266 872 599 019 96 750 12 000 nbsp Li Hongzhang commander of the Huai Army and Beiyang fleet the forces responsible for the majority of the fighting of the First Sino Japanese war There also existed a 170 000 strong Manchurian Army of which there were 12 000 trained infantry 1 500 trained cavalry and 60 guns Divided equally between the 3 provinces giving each province 4 000 infantry 500 cavalry and 20 guns This force being organised by Wu Dacheng in the late 1880s but no further training of the remaining 156 500 soldiers was conducted prior to the outbreak of war 101 104 The entire Qing army on the eve of the war therefore consisted of 974 641 soldiers not including the Manchurian army or those on Taiwan Jowett states that of the nearly 600 000 Green Standard soldiers only 50 000 had received modern training and firearms 105 The table above does not include the garrison for Taiwan Esposito gives the garrison of Taiwan at 20 Brave battalions or 10 000 men on paper with an additional 14 000 green standard soldiers again on paper Though during the war reinforcements from mainland China and native levies led to the growth of the strength of the forces on Taiwan to 50 000 106 Zenone s account states that anywhere between 20 000 and 30 000 of the Metropolitan banners were actual soldiers with the ability to fight Esposito states that 60 of the Banner army was cavalry 107 108 The Metropolitan Manchu Banner armies were also further subdivided but there are 2 differing accounts of the size and nature of the subdivision 106 103 Subdivisions of the Metropolitan Banners Subdivisions of Zenone Zenone s account 103 Esposito s account 106 Subdivisions of Esposito Paid division 28 800 67 000 60 000 infantry Paid DivisionGuards flank 15 000 4 000 FlankVanguard 1 700 2 000 VanguardLight 2 000Imperial Guard 1 700 3 000 Imperial GuardGendarmerie 21 000 20 000 Foot forceArtillery and Musketry 6 200Peking Field Force 20 000 7 250 32 guns Peking Field Force Total 96 400 103 250 In Esposito s account there was also 4 000 men of the Imperial Hunting establishment organised in a Tiger Hunting battalion and operated as a shock force throughout the 19th century In Esposito s account the Peking Field force was a unit where Bannermen were rotated through in order to receive modern training this being in addition to the core force of 7 250 the guns mentioned are also smoothbore guns nbsp Qing troops facing defeat during the Battle of Yingkou 1895 During the period between the end of the Taiping Rebellion and the Beginning of the war the Qing government began a process of reform of the Green standard army The Green Standard army was weak and scattered unable to mobilise men effectively as the payroll was inflated with non existent soldiers and its soldiers were addicted to opium and gambling The Qing government sought to recreate the Green Standard Army in a modern fashion with the creation of the Disciplined Forces or Lien chun The Lien Chun drew their men from the Green Standard but operated more like the Braves of the Hunan and Anhui armies From 1885 onwards frequent Imperial Edicts recommended the reform of the entire Green Standard Army into Lien Chun however little progress was made In 1894 the Imperial government dictated that the Green Standard was for policing duties and counter bandit operations whilst the Braves were for fighting rebellions 109 The Qing government began a program of re armament importing weaponry and producing its own weaponry in local arsenals in 1880 alone the Qing government imported 149 heavy and 275 field artillery pieces it also decided to import 26 000 Mauser 1871 rifles and standardise on this rifle in 1882 however this was never achieved The Chinese government also purchased 151 Maxim guns between 1892 and 1895 and in 1890 the Tianjin arsenal was already producing maxim guns joined in 1892 by the Nanjing arsenal 110 111 The estimates of the Board of Revenue and Board of War states that the effective strength of the Chinese army was 360 000 including the provincial militia the defense army the braves the Lien Chun and new style troops The army during the war was slow to mobilise and move towards the fighting the lack of railways a key factor in this Therefore the fighting of the war fell almost entirely upon the forces already present in Manchuria Zhili and Shandong The armies themselves were predominantly infantry and cavalry with artillery attached to the infantry with support services such as logistics medical engineer and signal not existing hired labour conducted transportation of goods and basic engineering with some civilian workers who acred as quartermasters with some doctors at the rear The supply of troops was generally left to the provinces in which they fought This created a chaotic situation with some units being well supplied with others being hardly supplied with ammunition being poorly distributed and this issue was only exacerbated by the lack of standardisation of weaponry amongst the soldiers The government arsenals proved insufficient to support the entire Qing military and the government was forced to purchase equipment from abroad 112 The key issues of the Chinese military was the decentralised command the lack of specialised formations the lack of modern training and the shortage of modern weaponry However the worst weakness was the severe incompetence at a senior level with basic strategy and tactics completely lacking the Chinese high command repeatedly used the same basic tactic of a passive defense fortifying a position only for the Japanese to flank the position and rout them 109 Late Qing armies editMain article New Army nbsp The Beiyang Army in conducting military exercises 1910 nbsp The Qing New Army in 1905Losing the First Sino Japanese War of 1894 1895 was a watershed for the Qing government Japan a country long regarded by the Chinese as little more than an upstart nation of pirates had convincingly beaten its larger neighbour and in the process annihilated the Qing government s pride and joy its modernized Beiyang Fleet then deemed to be the strongest naval force in Asia In doing so Japan became the first Asian country to join the previously exclusively western ranks of colonial powers The defeat was a rude awakening to the Qing court especially when set in the context that it occurred a mere three decades after the Meiji Restoration set a feudal Japan on course to emulate the Western nations in their economic and technological achievements Finally in December 1894 the Qing government took concrete steps to reform military institutions and to re train selected units in westernized drills tactics and weaponry These units were collectively called the New Army The most successful of these was the Beiyang Army under the overall supervision and control of a former Huai Army commander General Yuan Shikai who used his position to eventually become President of the Republic of China and finally emperor of China 113 nbsp After the end of empire Sichuan New Army leaving Lhasa in 1912 nbsp The Qing New Army in 1911During the Boxer Rebellion Imperial Chinese forces deployed a weapon called electric mines on June 15 at the river Hai River before the Battle of Dagu Forts 1900 to prevent the western Eight Nation Alliance from sending ships to attack This was reported by American military intelligence in the United States War Dept by the United States Adjutant General s Office Military Information Division 114 115 Different Chinese armies were modernized to different degrees by the Qing dynasty For example during the Boxer Rebellion in contrast to the Manchu and other Chinese soldiers who used arrows and bows the Muslim Kansu Braves cavalry had the newest carbine rifles 116 The Muslim Kansu Braves used the weaponry to inflict numerous defeats upon western armies in the Boxer Rebellion in the Battle of Langfang and numerous other engagements around Tianjin 117 118 The Times noted that 10 000 European troops were held in check by 15 000 Chinese braves Chinese artillery fire caused a steady stream of casualties upon the western soldiers During one engagement heavy casualties were inflicted on the French and Japanese and the British and Russians lost some men 119 Chinese artillerymen during the battle also learned how to use their German bought Krupp artillery accurately outperforming European gunners The Chinese artillery shells slammed right on target into the western armies military areas 120 The military leaders and the armies formed in the late 19th century continued to dominate politics well into the 20th century During what was called the Warlord Era 1916 1928 the late Qing armies became rivals and fought among themselves and with new militarists 121 The Qing dynasty in their last series of reforms formed the New army divided into the Lujun regular army and the Xunfangdui reserve provincial troops The Lujun was divided into 3 formations the Changbei jun which consisted of 36 divisions with 12 512 men in peacetime and over 21 000 in wartime with a service term of 3 years The Xubei jun or first reserve with 36 divisions of 9 840 men with a service term of 4 years The Houbei jun 36 divisions each of 4 960 men with a service term of 4 years 122 This gave a total army in wartime of 934 560 with 756 000 in 36 divisions of 21 512 excluding camp followers and 178 560 in 36 independent brigades nbsp Green Standard troops in the 1900s The Xunfangdui were organised per province with each province allowed to maintain 5 units either of 3 010 infantry or 1 890 cavalry or a mix of the as long as there are no more than a combined total of 5 infantry and cavalry units Therefore the 22 provinces could field a potential maximum of 331 100 if they fielded all infantry or a minimum of 207 900 The Xunfangdui would act as a gendarmerie in peacetime and auxiliary units to field units in wartime 123 The Green standard was divided into 75 groups each commanded by a Brigade general with an additional 16 marine brigade generals Each brigade contained an unspecified number of regiments and each of these contained an unspecified amount of Ying battalions which each contained 500 infantry and 250 cavalry If the Green standard conformed to the organisation of the Lujun each brigade contained 2 regiments which contained 3 battalions thus a brigade contained 6 battalions or 3 000 cavalry and 1 500 cavalry a total of 4 500 this would give a national total of 337 500 land troops and 72 000 marine troops though marine troops were not marines in the traditional sense but also contained coastal defense troops and its cavalry was not mounted This would give a total 273 000 infantry and 112 500 mounted cavalry and 24 000 unmounted cavalry 124 See also editBaturu Chu Army Fujian Fleet Gansu Braves Gapsin Coup Great Hsi Ku Arsenal Guangdong Fleet Hushenying Imo Incident Imperial Guards Brigade Jiangnan Daying Nanyang Fleet Nine Gates Infantry Commander Second rout of the Jiangnan Daying Shuishiying Wuwei CorpsNotes edit Chinese 紫禁城 pinyin zǐjincheng Ma nbsp Dabkuri dorgi hotonReferences edit Elliott 2001 p 40 Yingcong Dai 12 July 2017 QING MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON GOVERNMENT ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1640 1800 Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press Retrieved 3 December 2023 By the middle of the eighteenth century the total number of Qing military forces may have reached 800 000 200 000 bannermen and 600 000 Green Standard troops Ergang Luo 羅爾綱 Luying bingzhi 綠營兵制 Beijing Zhonghua shuju 1984 7 9 Google Scholar Millward 2007 p 95 Elliott 2001 pp 40 uniquely Manchu and 57 role on Nurhaci s success Elliott 2001 p 58 a b Elliott 2001 p 59 Roth Li 2002 p 34 a b Roth Li 2002 p 58 Elliott 2001 p 75 Roth Li 2002 p 57 a b Roth Li 2002 pp 57 58 Roth Li 2002 p 58 Han chun Hanjun banners Elliott 2001 p 74 Chinese Eight Banners Crossley 1997 p 204 Chinese martial banners Elliott 2001 p 84 Crossley Pamela Kyle 2000 A Translucent Mirror History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology University of California Press p 128 ISBN 0520928849 Crossley Pamela Kyle 2000 A Translucent Mirror History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology University of California Press pp 103 5 ISBN 0520928849 Elliott 2001 p 324 Elliott 2001 p 331 Elliott 2001 p 325 Walthall Anne ed 2008 Servants of the Dynasty Palace Women in World History illustrated ed University of California Press pp 144 145 ISBN 978 0520254442 Sealords live in vain Fujian and the making of a maritime frontier in seventeenth century China p 135 Sealords live in vain Fujian and the making of a maritime frontier in seventeenth century China p 198 Sealords live in vain Fujian and the making of a maritime frontier in seventeenth century China p 206 Elliott 2001 p 480 integration of surrendered Ming troops into Green Standards Crossley 1999 pp 118 19 Chinese troops integrated into the Chinese banners in 1644 access restricted starting in 1645 Wakeman 1985 p 480 note 165 Elliott 2001 p 128 Lococo 2002 p 118 a b Lococo 2002 p 120 Dreyer 2002 p 35 Chu Wen Djang 2011 The Moslem rebellion in northwest China 1862 1878 a study of government minority policy reprint ed Walter de Gruyter pp 12 13 ISBN 978 3111414508 Henry Luce Nicola Di Cosmo 24 January 2007 The Diary of a Manchu Soldier in Seventeenth Century China My Service in the Army by Dzengseo Routledge pp 24 ISBN 978 1 135 78955 8 Henry Luce Nicola Di Cosmo 24 January 2007 The Diary of a Manchu Soldier in Seventeenth Century China My Service in the Army by Dzengseo Routledge pp 24 25 ISBN 978 1 135 78955 8 Henry Luce Nicola Di Cosmo 24 January 2007 The Diary of a Manchu Soldier in Seventeenth Century China My Service in the Army by Dzengseo Routledge pp 15 ISBN 978 1 135 78955 8 a b Henry Luce Nicola Di Cosmo 24 January 2007 The Diary of a Manchu Soldier in Seventeenth Century China My Service in the Army by Dzengseo Routledge pp 17 ISBN 978 1 135 78955 8 Henry Luce Nicola Di Cosmo 24 January 2007 The Diary of a Manchu Soldier in Seventeenth Century China My Service in the Army by Dzengseo Routledge pp 23 ISBN 978 1 135 78955 8 David Andrew Graff Robin Higham 2012 A Military History of China University Press of Kentucky pp 120 ISBN 978 0 8131 3584 7 David Andrew Graff Robin Higham 2012 A Military History of China University Press of Kentucky pp 121 122 ISBN 978 0 8131 3584 7 Xiuyu Wang 28 November 2011 China s Last Imperial Frontier Late Qing Expansion in Sichuan s Tibetan Borderlands Lexington Books pp 30 ISBN 978 0 7391 6810 3 Yingcong Dai 2009 The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing University of Washington Press pp 81 ISBN 978 0 295 98952 5 Yingcong Dai 2009 The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing University of Washington Press pp 81 82 ISBN 978 0 295 98952 5 Elliott 2001 pp 412 Evelyn S Rawski 15 November 1998 The Last Emperors A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions University of California Press pp 251 ISBN 978 0 520 92679 0 green standard army lhasa The Dynastic Centre and the Provinces Agents and Interactions BRILL 17 April 2014 pp 123 ISBN 978 90 04 27209 5 Yoshiki Enatsu 2004 Banner Legacy The Rise of the Fengtian Local Elite at the End of the Qing Center for Chinese Studies The University of Michigan p 24 ISBN 978 0 89264 165 9 Spencer 1990 p 41 Spence 1988 pp 4 5 James A Millward Ruth W Dunnell Mark C Elliott Philippe Foret eds 31 July 2004 New Qing Imperial History The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde Routledge pp 16 ISBN 978 1 134 36222 6 Ba Gua Zhang An Historical Analysis Ben Hill Bey 2010 pp 128 ISBN 978 0 557 46679 5 Pamela Kyle Crossley 1990 Orphan Warriors Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World Princeton University Press pp 174 ISBN 0 691 00877 9 Jonathan Neaman Lipman 1 July 1998 Familiar strangers a history of Muslims in Northwest China University of Washington Press pp 168 ISBN 978 0 295 80055 4 C S Tang 21 March 2015 The Complete Book of Yiquan Jessica Kingsley Publishers pp 33 ISBN 978 0 85701 172 5 Thomas A Green Joseph R Svinth 2010 Martial Arts of the World An Encyclopedia of History and Innovation ABC CLIO pp 96 ISBN 978 1 59884 243 2 Peter Allan Lorge 2012 Chinese Martial Arts From Antiquity to the Twenty First Century Cambridge University Press pp 212 ISBN 978 0 521 87881 4 Brian Kennedy Elizabeth Guo 1 December 2007 Chinese Martial Arts Training Manuals A Historical Survey Blue Snake Books pp 88 ISBN 978 1 58394 194 2 Andrew D Morris 2004 Marrow of the Nation A History of Sport and Physical Culture in Republican China University of California Press pp 186 ISBN 978 0 520 24084 1 Meir Shahar 2008 The Shaolin Monastery History Religion and the Chinese Martial Arts University of Hawaii Press pp 4 ISBN 978 0 8248 3110 3 Xiaobing Li 2012 China at War An Encyclopedia ABC CLIO pp 270 ISBN 978 1 59884 415 3 Vincent Goossaert David A Palmer 15 March 2011 The Religious Question in Modern China University of Chicago Press pp 113 ISBN 978 0 226 30418 2 Lily Xiao Hong Lee Clara Lau A D Stefanowska 17 July 2015 Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women V 1 The Qing Period 1644 1911 Routledge pp 198 ISBN 978 1 317 47588 0 Po Chung yam 28 June 2013 Conceptualizing the Blue Frontier The Great Qing and the Maritime World in the Long Eighteenth Century PDF Thesis Ruprecht Karls Universitat Heidelberg pp 85 95 Po Chung yam 28 June 2013 Conceptualizing the Blue Frontier The Great Qing and the Maritime World in the Long Eighteenth Century PDF Thesis Ruprecht Karls Universitat Heidelberg pp 116 151 Ronald C Po 2018 The Blue Frontier Maritime Vision and Power in the Qing Empire Cambridge Oceanic Histories Cambridge University Press p 80 ISBN 978 1108424615 Elliott 2001 pp 284 290 Waley Cohen 2006 pp 63 65 Elliott 2001 pp 283 284 Elliott 2001 pp 299 300 Elliott 2001 pp 184 186 Waley Cohen 2006 pp 84 87 Waley Cohen 2006 p 58 Waley Cohen Joanna 2000 The Sextants of Beijing Global Currents in Chinese History New York London W W Norton and Company pp 118 121 ISBN 039324251X Po Chung yam 28 June 2013 Conceptualizing the Blue Frontier The Great Qing and the Maritime World in the Long Eighteenth Century PDF Thesis Ruprecht Karls Universitat Heidelberg p 113 European Technology and Manchu Power Reflections on the Military Revolution in Seventeenth Century China PDF Retrieved October 2 2023 Andrade 2017 p 242 243 Andrade Tonio 2017 The Gunpowder Age China Military Innovation and the Rise of the West in World History Princeton University Press p 242 ISBN 978 0691178141 Crossley 1990 pp 126 27 a b Liu amp Smith 1980 pp 202 10 a b c d e f Heath Ian 1994 The Taiping Rebellion 1851 1866 London Osprey pp 11 15 ISBN 1 85532 346 X OCLC 39872216 a b c Horowitz 2002 p 156 Horowitz 2002 pp 156 57 Crossley 1990 p 145 a b c Horowitz 2002 p 157 Wright 1957 p 212 Wright 1957 p 220 a b Horowitz 2002 p 158 Horowitz 2002 pp 158 59 Bonavia David 1995 China s Warlords New York Oxford University Press pp 31 33 ISBN 0 19 586179 5 David Scott 2008 China and the International System 1840 1949 Power Presence and Perceptions in a Century of Humiliation SUNY Press pp 111 12 ISBN 978 0 7914 7742 7 Alex Marshall 22 November 2006 The Russian General Staff and Asia 1860 1917 Routledge pp 80 ISBN 978 1 134 25379 1 Liu Kwang Ching 1978 John King Fairbank ed The Cambridge History of China Vol 11 Late Ch ing 1800 1911 Part 2 illustrated ed Cambridge University Press p 269 ISBN 0 521 22029 7 Horowitz 2002 p 159 Elman 2005 pp 379 83 a b c Chang Jung 2013 The Concubine Who Launched Modern China Empress Dowager Cixi New York Anchor Books pp 182 84 ISBN 978 0307456700 Chang Jung 2013 The Concubine Who Launched Modern China Empress Dowager Cixi New York Anchor Books pp 160 61 ISBN 978 0307456700 Loir M L escadre de l amiral Courbet Paris 1886 26 29 37 65 Lung Chang 龍章 Yueh nan yu Chung fa chan cheng 越南與中法戰爭 Vietnam and the Sino French War Taipei 1993 327 28 Bruce A Elleman 2001 Modern Chinese warfare 1795 1989 illustrated ed Psychology Press p 87 ISBN 0 415 21474 2 Retrieved 2012 01 18 Not surprisingly considering Li Hongzhang s political power many of the best and most modern ships found their way into Li s northern fleet which never saw any action in the Sino French conflict In fact fear that he might lose control over his fleet led Li to refuse to even consider sending his ships southward to aid the Fuzhou fleet against the French Although Li later claimed that moving his fleet southward would have left northern China undefended his decision has been criticized as a sign of China s factionalized government as well as its provincial north south mindset 姜文奎 1987 中國歷代政制考 臺北市 國立編譯館 pp 839 840 Bruce A Elleman 2001 Modern Chinese warfare 1795 1989 illustrated ed Psychology Press p 87 ISBN 0 415 21474 2 Retrieved 2012 01 18 there was little if any coordination between the fleets in north and south China The lack of a centralized admiralty commanding the entire navy meant that at any one time France opposed only a fraction of China s total fleet This virtually assured French naval dominance in the upcoming conflict Hsieh Pao Chao 2018 The Government of China 1644 1911 London pp 213 214 ISBN 978 0 429 45550 6 OCLC 1050360672 a href Template Cite book html title Template Cite book cite book a CS1 maint location missing publisher link Hsieh Pao Chao 2018 The Government of China 1644 1911 London p 298 ISBN 978 0 429 45550 6 OCLC 1050360672 a href Template Cite book html title Template Cite book cite book a CS1 maint location missing publisher link Powell Ralph L 2016 Rise of the Chinese Military Power Princeton NJ p 46 ISBN 978 1 4008 7884 0 OCLC 1013941977 a href Template Cite book html title Template Cite book cite book a CS1 maint location missing publisher link a b c Du Boulay N W H 1896 An Epitome of the Chino Japanese War 1894 95 H M Stationery Office pp 10 11 Olender Piotr 2014 Sino Japanese naval war 1894 1895 Hampshire England p 43 ISBN 978 83 63678 51 7 OCLC 889306207 a href Template Cite book html title Template Cite book cite book a CS1 maint location missing publisher link a b c Volpicelli Zenone 1896 The China Japan War Compiled from Japanese Chinese and Foreign Sources UK Charles Scribner s Sons pp 72 76 Volcipelli Zenone 1896 The China Japan war compiled from Japanese Chinese and foreign sources 1st ed New York Charles Scribner s Sons pp 74 76 ISBN 978 9353955595 Jowett Philip S 2016 Imperial Chinese armies 1840 1911 G A Embleton Oxford p 11 ISBN 978 1 4728 1427 2 OCLC 948794129 a href Template Cite book html title Template Cite book cite book a CS1 maint location missing publisher link a b c Esposito Gabriele 2022 Armies of the first Sino Japanese War 1894 95 Giuseppe Rava Oxford p 76 ISBN 978 1 4728 5130 7 OCLC 1350351894 a href Template Cite book html title Template Cite book cite book a CS1 maint location missing publisher link Volpicelli Zenone 1896 The China Japan war compiled from Japanese Chinese and foreign sources 1st ed New York Charles Scribner s Sons p 71 ISBN 978 1163248065 Esposito Gabriele 2022 Armies of the first Sino Japanese War 1894 95 Giuseppe Rava Oxford pp 57 59 ISBN 978 1 4728 5133 8 OCLC 1346320458 a href Template Cite book html title Template Cite book cite book a CS1 maint location missing publisher link a b Powell Ralph 1955 The rise of Chinese military power 1895 1912 Princeton University press pp 40 47 Esposito Gabriele 2022 Armies of the First Sino Japanese War 1894 95 Giuseppe Rava London Bloomsbury Publishing Plc pp 65 66 ISBN 978 1 4728 5130 7 OCLC 1333082856 Jowett Philip S 2016 Imperial Chinese armies 1840 1911 G A Embleton Oxford p 21 ISBN 978 1 4728 1427 2 OCLC 948794129 a href Template Cite book html title Template Cite book cite book a CS1 maint location missing publisher link Powell Ralph 1955 The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895 1912 Princeton University Press pp 36 40 ISBN 9780608308432 Liu amp Smith 1980 pp 251 273 Monro MacCloskey 1969 Reilly s Battery a story of the Boxer Rebellion R Rosen Press p 95 ISBN 9780823901456 Retrieved February 19 2011 Stephan L H Slocum Carl Reichmann Adna Romanza Chaffee United States Adjutant General s Office Military Information Division 1901 Reports on military operations in South Africa and China G P O p 533 Retrieved February 19 2011 June 15 it was learned that the mouth of the river was protected by electric mines that the forts at Taku were a href Template Cite book html title Template Cite book cite book a CS1 maint multiple names authors list link Diana Preston 2000 The boxer rebellion the dramatic story of China s war on foreigners that shook the world in the summer of 1900 Bloomsbury Publishing USA p 145 ISBN 0 8027 1361 0 Retrieved 2010 06 28 Elliott Jane E 2002 Some Did it for Civilisation Some Did it for Their Country A Revised View of the Boxer War Chinese University Press p 204 ISBN 9789629960667 Wood Frances The Boxer Rebellion 1900 A Selection of Books Prints and Photographs The British Library Archived from the original on 2011 10 29 Retrieved 2010 06 28 Arthur Henderson Smith 1901 China in convulsion Volume 2 F H Revell Co p 448 Retrieved 2010 06 28 Arthur Henderson Smith 1901 China in convulsion Volume 2 F H Revell Co p 446 Retrieved 2010 06 28 For an overview see Edward L Dreyer China at War 1901 1949 London New York Longman Modern Wars in Perspective 1995 ISBN 0582051258 Brunnert H S Hagelstrom V V 2007 Present day political organization of China London Routledge pp 285 288 ISBN 978 0 7007 1018 8 Brunnert H S Hagelstrom V V 2007 Present day political organization of China London Routledge pp 308 309 ISBN 978 0 7007 1018 8 Brunnert H S Hagelstrom V V 2007 Present day political organization of China London Routledge pp 337 340 ISBN 978 0 7007 1018 8 Works cited editCrossley Pamela Kyle 1990 Orphan Warriors Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World Princeton NJ Princeton University Press ISBN 0691055831 1997 The Manchus Oxford Blackwell ISBN 1557865604 hardback ISBN 0631235914 paperback 1999 A Translucent Mirror History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology Berkeley and Los Angeles University of California Press ISBN 0520215664 Dreyer Edward L 2002 Continuity and Change in David A Graff Robin Higham eds A Military History of China Boulder Colorado and Oxford England Westview Press pp 19 38 ISBN 0813337364 hardcover ISBN 0813339901 paperback Elliott Mark C 2001 The Manchu Way The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China Stanford Stanford University Press ISBN 978 1 134 36222 6 Elman Benjamin A 2005 On Their Own Terms Science in China 1550 1900 Cambridge MA Harvard University Press ISBN 0674016858 Horowitz Richard S 2002 Beyond the Marble Boat The Transformation of the Chinese Military 1850 1911 in David A Graff Robin Higham eds A Military History of China Boulder Colorado and Oxford England Westview Press pp 153 74 ISBN 0813337364 hardcover ISBN 0813339901 paperback Liu Kwang ching Smith Richard J 1980 The Military Challenge The North west and the Coast In Fairbank John K Liu Kwang Ching eds The Cambridge History of China Volume 11 Late Ch ing 1800 1911 Part 2 Cambridge Cambridge University Press ISBN 978 0 521 22029 3 Lococo Paul Jr 2002 The Qing Empire in David A Graff Robin Higham eds A Military History of China Boulder Colorado and Oxford England Westview Press pp 115 33 ISBN 0813337364 hardcover ISBN 0813339901 paperback Roth Li Gertraude 2002 State Building Before 1644 In Peterson Willard J ed The Cambridge History of China Volume 9 The Ch ing Empire to 1800 Part One Cambridge Cambridge University Press pp 9 72 ISBN 978 0 521 24334 6 Wakeman Frederic 1985 The Great Enterprise The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth Century China Berkeley Los Angeles and London University of California Press ISBN 0520048040 In two volumes Waley Cohen Joanna 2006 The Culture of War in China Empire and the Military under the Qing Dynasty London I B Tauris International Library of War Studies ISBN 1845111591 Wright Mary C 1957 The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism The T ung Chih Restoration 1862 1874 Stanford CA Stanford University Press Further reading editElleman Bruce A 2001 Modern Chinese Warfare 1795 1989 London and New York Routledge Warfare and History ISBN 0415214734 Graff David A and Robin D S Higham A Military History of China Boulder Colo Oxford Westview 2002 ISBN 0813339901 Hayford Charles W 2018 New Chinese Military History 1839 1951 What s the Story Frontiers of History in China 13 1 90 126 doi 10 3868 s020 007 018 0006 0 Li Xiaobing ed 2012 China at War An Encyclopedia Santa Barbara Calif ABC CLIO ISBN 978 1 59884 415 3 Meyer Fong Tobie S 2013 What Remains Coming to Terms with Civil War in 19th Century China Stanford CA Stanford University Press ISBN 9780804754255 Perdue Peter C 2005 China Marches West The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia Cambridge Mass Belknap Press of Harvard University Press ISBN 067401684X Platt Stephen R 2012 Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom China the West and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War New York Knopf ISBN 9780307271730 Setzekorn Eric 2015 Chinese Imperialism Ethnic Cleansing and Military History 1850 1877 Journal of Chinese Military History 4 1 80 100 doi 10 1163 22127453 12341278 Yu Maochun 2002 The Taiping Rebellion A Military Assessment of Revolution and Counterrevolution in David A Graff Robin Higham eds A Military History of China Boulder Colorado and Oxford England Westview Press pp 135 52 ISBN 0813337364 hardcover ISBN 0813339901 paperback Retrieved from https en wikipedia org w index php title Military of the Qing dynasty amp oldid 1188453602, wikipedia, wiki, book, books, library,

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